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INFOINFOINFOS E C U R I T Y P O L I C Y

s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i n f o r m a t i o n

The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association– forum for security policy

SUMMER

2012

Turkey – the Country in the Middle...

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Since it was established in 1950, the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association (DATA) has in-formed the Danish public about Denmark’s foreign, defence and security policies and NATO. DATA is a nationally-based and internationally-oriented NGO that functions as a link between politicians, researchers, students and the interested public as well as a fo-rum for debate on security issues. DATA is a member of of the internatinal Atlantic Treaty Association, ATA. For more information vistit www.atlant.dk and www.ata-sec.org Executive editor: Troels FrølingEditor: Søren Kyster HvelplundAuthor: Andreas Mølvig LarsenTranslation: Kristin DurantCover photo: G-20 Summit in Toronto, June 2010.Left to right, fi rst row: President Barack Obama, USA, King Abdulaziz Al Saud, Saudi Arabia, President Nicolas Sakozy, France. Second row: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi,Ethiopia Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey, Prime Minister Monmohan Singh, India. Thrid row: Finance Minister Mante-gar Brazil, President of the EU Commission, Manuel Barroso . Photo: © EU Graphic design/print: Kosmos Grafi sk ApS ·+45 66139075ISSN: 1903-6396 (Electronic version)

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The Turkish Model2012 will be an exciting year for several reasons. In 2011, the Arab Spring brought inspiration to the world. Among other things, the Occupy Wall Street move-ment openly found encouragement in the enormous assemblies of people that mobilized to protest throughout the Arab World. The recent elections in Russia have also shown popular expres-sion on an unprecedented scale against the Medvedev-Putin regime. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, we saw that the people had the power to topple regimes, as long as they stand together across religious, political Stood and social divides. Each of the three revolutions proceeded in their own way. In Libya’s case this was along-side international support. With the fall of the dictators, however, the revolution has only just begun.

In many Arab countries the forces and structures that keep the old systems in place, continue to dominate. The chal-lenge now is to translate the desire for participation and respect for certain fundamental rights, into working demo-cracies and healthy economies that will serve society and function for the good of the people, as opposed to just the elite. This challenge is at least as big as

the process of bringing dictators to their knees. Hope prevails, but opinions about the outcomes of these revolutions are divided. It is noteworthy that several of the new systems - temporary or elected - see a democracy inspired by the Turkish model as an option. For this reason, Tur-key’s relations with the three countries in 2012 will be decisive in determining the outcome of the Arab Spring. This percep-tion also persists in Europe, where the so-lution of the economic crisis is domina-ting the agenda. By comparison, Turkey has a healthy economy, and has knocked on the door of the EU - without being let in - longer than any other country. The EU-Turkey partnership has traditionally been characterized by good intentions. In terms of trade, cooperation is particu-larly well developed. What Denmark can achieve in respect to this issue, with its EU presidency in the fi rst half of 2012, will be particularly interesting to follow.NATO also sees turkey as an important ally. As a member of the alliance since 1952, Turkey has been a longstand-ing and staunch exponent of NATO. Because of its geographical position, neighbouring Iran and in relative proxi-mity to Russia, Turkey was strategically important to NATO throughout the Cold

War, and will remain so in the future.With this edition of Security Policy INFO, the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association would like to draw a picture of Turkey’s future opportunities and challenges in an international perspective - based on a current and historical review.

With its NATO membership, a close re-lationship to the EU, and last but not least, its good relationship with MENA countries, Turkey is a very important player. Andreas Mølvig Larsen, student of Islamic Studies and author of this study, presents you, in cooperation with the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association, the opportunity to familiarize yourself with the many factors that make Tur-key a country that will receive contin-ued attention over the coming years.

In the spirit of the motto - “know ledge promotes understanding” - we wish you a good read!

Troels Frøling Secretary-GeneralThe Danish Atlantic Treaty Association

The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association would like to thank the following for fi nacial support: NATO PDD and Europa Nævnet

De tre karakteristika

The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association– forum for security policy

The Danish Atlantic Treaty Association– forum for security policy

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Turkey – the country in the middle…Since the founding of Turkey in the years after WWI, the country has played an important part in the security poli-tics of the region and of the West.Turkey is one of the EU’s and NATO’s most important partners in the region. Bilateral relations with other countries in the Middle East as well as Turkey’s eco-nomic and political cooperation with Western actors, has created an extensive network for the country. Turkey’s geopo-litical situ ation makes it a key strategic player for the U.S. and NATO. Not only historically, but also in the present day, most recently with the installation of ra-dar facilities on Turkish soil as part of the NATO missile shield.

For the EU, Turkey is important for se-veral reasons. The advanced state of trade between the two, means that economic interests weigh heavily in the relationship. The political relationship is also of great interest with regard to future Turkish EU membership. Within the past decade, Turkey has announced and implemented reforms in line with EU guidelines. However, with regard to human rights, for example, there is still room for improvement. Religious expres-sion has also gained greater visibility in the public space, for which the govern-ment has received both criticism and praise internationally.

Turkey hold a role special to Denmark. As the guest worker concept became

popular during the 1960s, Denmark saw a signifi cant proportion of workers ar-rive from Turkey, establishing the coun-try’s role in recent Danish immigration history. Turkey may also prove to play a major part in connection with the Da nish EU Presidency in the fi rst half of 2012, when Denmark has the opportunity to strengthen EU relations with the country.Because of this, Turkey’s position and ac-tions aff ect the international community to an extent rarely seen.

The Arab Spring has shown that people, across national borders and religious be-liefs, want - and more importantly, dare - to fi ght for their rights, against a supe-rior force which in most respects, seems insurmountable. This has spread hope and inspiration to people all over the world, particularly in the region. How-ever, aside from the push-factors and events which acted as “the last straw”, what has motivated the revolutionary forces following the fall of the regime? In the example of Tunisia, which has been at the forefront of the “Spring” Countries, it has been no secret that the political system in Turkey has acted as an enormous inspiration.

All of these factors combined make for an exciting future for Turkey, and make it highly likely that that the country will be-come an even bigger player both in the region and on the international scene. Thus, there is a need for insight into the

Neighboring countries:Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria. Capital: Ankara Population: 73.728.988(estimated on the 31st of December 2010)

Facts about Turkey

factors and conditions that are defi ning its current situation as well as the future.

A Secular System in a Muslim NationWhen the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the inspiration mainly stemmed from the European nation states and secular principles. Particularly the French laïcité has formed the basis of Turkish secularism. This has largely resulted in the protection of the public sphere from religious dissemination and impact. Turkish secularism is not quite like the French version – it is, in fact, very much its own.

Secularism was not implemented over-night, but involved a long pro cess beginning with the abolition of the caliphate, an event which didn’t truly take place until 1924. This marked the end of the religiously-based institu-tion of the state. The watchword be-came loyalty to the nation as opposed to the loyalty and subservience to God.According to the constitution of 1924, however, Islam was the offi cial state re-ligion in Turkey. This was changed in two stages - in respectively. 1928 and 1937. Article 2 in the constitution went from highlighting Islam as a state religion to explicitly declaring Turkey as a secular state, which led to a whole new percep-tion of identity and belonging as a citi-zen.

Source: CIA.

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Military or PoliticalMajority?In 1946, Turkey held its fi rst real multi-party elections. Until then there had been only one recognized political party, namely Atatürk and his successor Inönü’s, “Republican People’s Party” (CHP). It was with the election in 1950, and the follow-ing change of government, that marked the actual introduction of parliamentary democracy to Turkey. The power shift did not bring with it a radical change in the political sphere, as several key mem-bers of the new governing party had a political background in the CHP. There were a few diff erences, however: With the change of government came a new type of politician in Ankara. People from rural and lower social classes made their mark, and politicians with more religious profi les won seats, resulting in a less ag-gressive tone towards Islam than before. There was no longer a prohibition of the call to prayer - Ezan - in Arabic, which had previously only been allowed in Turkish. On the whole, the change of govern-ment can be seen as a consequence of the increasing dissatisfaction with the Kema list centralization of power. The army also received a reduced role in both politics and society. Prime Minister Menderes was the fi rst in the history of the country to appoint a defence minis-ter that did not have a history in the mili-tary, and in contrast to both Atatürk and Inönü, Menderes was not a military man.

The military coup that took place in 1960 must be seen in light of the failure of Turkish economic policy through-out the 1950s combined with high infl ation, as well as the army’s and the opposition’s frustration at being pushed out onto the political side-lines.

The military was in power for 18 months until the formation of a new civilian po-litical government. In 1971 the elected government was again deposed by the military. This time it was Süleyman Demirel and his ruling Justice Party, which was forced to resign after coming into power in 1965. In the elections of 1965 the Justice Party’s man-tra was, “We are to the right of center and on the path of God.” Such ideas were used by the Kemalists in the Republican People’s Party against the new govern-ment. Also instrumental in renewed military intervention were the ongoing student demonstrations – inspired by events in Paris - which developed into riots that the government failed to con-trol, Political slogans with religious over-tones as well as riots, gave the military incentive to perform the coup; It cited

AKP: Political Islam is modernIn the late 1990s and particularly after the coup of ‘97, Turkish policy took a turn towards the EU. There was a growing scepticism among Kemalists about the EU, while among Islamist politicians a perception was spread, that the EU could be their ticket to survival in politics. The coup was criticized by the EU and seen as a step in the wrong direction in terms of democratization. The EU critique was also that the military ought to play a much smaller role in Turkish politics. The Islamists saw a potential for using the

threats to national security and the secu-lar republic. Demirel was not executed as happened with Menderes in 1961, but was later re-elected no less than 4 times.

The 1970s were marked by political un-rest. There was an election each year in this period and the government alter-nated between the Justice Party and the Republican People’s Party. By the end of the decade the political environment was completely polarized. The extreme right and the extreme left were in direct confl ict, and politically motivated killings were part of everyday life. In addition to the political unrest, Turkey continued to fi ght with severe economic problems. In 1980 the National Security Council - the military - banned all political parties and organizations. Strikes were made illegal and the Legislature was put out of power. Thus, yet another military coup had taken place, and once again Prime Minister Sü-leyman Demirel was deposed. Over the next three years the military remained in power and appointed ministers.

It is clear that the military plays a defi ning role in Turkish political history. However, it is important to nuance the perception that these coups were all in the name of secularism and counter-reactions to an Islamization of the state, performed by the incumbent governments. Although these were among the arguments in the fi rst two coups, and they were employed heavily, regardless of how much sub-stance they contained, the coup of 1980 was not conducted under the pretence of the defence of the secular republic. On the contrary, General Kenan Evren - who led the coup - sought a form of coope-ration with Islamic-oriented groups in a united front against the greatest threat of all: The Left. There was even talk of a “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” in which na-tionalism and Islam were not seen as incompatible, but with common goals and values. What is particularly interest-ing is that with the construction of the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” of the 1980s, the military perhaps even helped to pave the way for the later Islamization of Turk-ish society.

“Soft Coup” and Political Islam at the HelmTurkey’s most popular party has, in the past decade been Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (in English, The Justice and De-velopment Party or AKP). The AKP was founded in 2001 and has since the par-liamentary elections in 2002 held power. The AKP is a liberal conservative party but is also known by some as an Islamic party. Politically, it is in line with several parties which, since Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party in 1970, have

not renounced their Muslim identity and, consequently, had to see themselves de-nied power by their political opponents.

In the election in 1995, the Refah Party – or the Virtue Party - became the largest party. The year before, the party had also won strong support in local elections and had no less than 29 mayors, includ-ing both in Ankara and Istanbul. Refah was founded as the successor to the National Savior Party, who was in turn successor to the National Order Party. Both parties had been closed due to sup-posed violation of secularism-clauses. The leader, Necmettin Erbakan himself, was even imprisoned for a short period in the 1980s. Erbakan is regarded as the man who really managed to introduce political Islam in Turkey, in conjunction with a nationalist agenda, as indicated by the names of his two previous parties. In 1996, Erbakan became prime minister in a coalition government with the former - and fi rst female - prime minister Tansu Çiller.

During this period the Headscarf ban for publicly employed women was ab-o l is hed and working hours during Ra-madan were modifi ed to take religious duties into account. In addition, Erbakan invited senior representatives from the Sufi orders (tarikats) for dinner during Ramadan. On the 28th of February 1997, the military - backed by some opposition parties - headed a process that led to Erbakan and his government’s resigna-tion in June of the same year. In this way, seve ral of the laws implemented by the deposed government were rolled back. This “soft coup” or “postmodern coup” as it was also called, was, unlike the previ-ous coups, very much a question of pro-tecting the secular republic. On college campuses, it was forbidden to use any form of religious clothing such as a head scarf. In January 1998 the Refah Party was dissolved by law, but true to tradition, a new party (The Virtue Party) was formed on the remnants of the old, but without ever achieving the same success.

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take place by the promotion of economic and trade relations between the involved parties, while taking into account im-provements to the Turkish people’s living standards. The process was divided into 3 phases: an initiation phase, a transition period, and a fi nal phase.

In the initial stage, Turkey’s economy was to be strengthened so that it could fulfi l the obligations which later stages required.In 1970 an additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement was included, re-lating to the transition phase. The as-sessment was that the initial phase had progressed as hoped and that the condi-tions to proceed to the transition phase were present. However, due to political unrest in the 1970s as well as the Cyprus problem, this phase became lengthy. The political situation in Turkey had become somewhat calmer after the coup in 1980 and the economy had improved. A new customs union was established in 1995, which was followed by the prohibition of customs duties and quantitative restric-tions - a ban that would improve trading conditions for and with Turkey.

Just six months after Erbakan had to give up his position as prime minister due to the “soft coup” in 1997, Turkey was as-sessed as being suitable to become an EU member, but was not given status as a candidate country. Erbakan was a pronounced opponent of Turkish mem-bership. His position was that such a membership was a Kemalist attempt to Europeanize Turkey at the expense of political Islam. As mentioned, despite this, the attitude among the Islam-ists changed by the end of the decade.When Turkey was granted the status of candidate country in 1999, this was in the context of improved relations be-tween Greece and Turkey in light of a major earthquake which resulted in a sense of solidarity. With the status of can-didate country, the actual negotiation process can normally begin. However, it was decided that Turkey had to continue to meet the so-called Copenhagen crite-ria - the conditions for EU membership decided in Copenhagen in 1993 - before the offi cial negotiations could begin.

In December 2002, the European Council met in Copenhagen.

EU relationship to safeguard their own rights. Where the Virtue Party had failed to gather support to the same extent as Refah, AKP did not. Despite this the AKP’s founder, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was sen-tenced to prison in 1998 after having re-cited, during his tenure as mayor of Istan-bul, a poem which supposedly violated constitutional secularism as laid down in 1982. Because of this, Erdoğan could not become prime minister, as he was ex-cluded from being elected to parliament.Instead, the party’s second man, Abdul-lah Gul, was elected prime minister.

With strong turnout for the AKP (34.3% of votes) and a threshold set at 10%, the party got 363 of 550 (two thirds) of the seats in parliament. The two thirds major-ity was important for the new AKP, since this is required in order to implement a constitutional amendment. Due to the high threshold only one other party, CHP, managed to cross the threshold by 19%, leading to a one-party government for the fi rst time in years.

A single party government can act as a stabilizing factor, however, it was a problem for the party that its premier - Erdoğan - had to stand on side-lines. Natu rally the AKP was interested in Erdoğan becoming prime minister. In 2002 this led to a rewording of the 1982 law that he was accused of having bro-ken. Erdoğan was thereby, in the spring of 2003, able to take on the role of prime minister. EU membership was a declared objective of the AKP, and the promised reform policies were therefore too im-portant to the AKP’s credibility to remain mere discussions. Domestic and foreign policy - or at least EU policy - were largely two sides of the same coin. With the cru-cial two-thirds of the parliament back-ing him, Erdoğan and his government succeeded in implementing several re-forms. In 2007 the AKP government was re-elected and was the fi rst party in 50 years to do so, with an increase in sup-port. In 2008 the government lifted the headscarf ban on university campuses. The opposition appealed to the Consti-tutional Court which annulled the deci-sion. This mobilized the opposition to at-tempt to get the Constitutional Council to close down the AKP on the grounds that the party was detrimental to the secular republic, but this strategy failed.

Turkey and the EU– a SlowfoxThe Ankara Agreement, which was signed by the EU and Turkey in 1963, aimed to facilitate future accession ne-gotiations through the gradual estab-lishment of a customs union. This was to

1959: Turkey applies for associate membership of the EU.1963: The Association Agreement – The Ankara Agreement – is signed.1987: Turkey applies for EU member-ship – and is turned down.1995: The Customs Union is estab-lished.1997: The European Council declares Turkey suitable for membership of the EU.1999: Turkey is given the status of candidate country.2005: Turkey and the EU commence negotioations about EU membership and the expansion of the Customs Union.

It was decided that Turkey must wait to be reassessed in 2004 – the only can-didate to be singled out as such. The Council recognized the reforms that had already been introduced, as well as the Government’s continued eff orts. The po-litical criteria were referred to directly by the Council as needing further improve-ment - both in terms of legislation and implementation. If these criteria were deemed to be met in 2004, negotiations would start without delay.

The assessment in 2004 proved posi-tive and membership negotiations were set to begin in October 2005. The Com-mission’s report described the progress made in relation to the political crite-ria over previous decades, as sporadic. However, it did highlight the time after the Turkish elections in 2002 as a time where, on the legislative and at the insti-tutional level, progress had been made. This progress was leading to a Turkey that in these fi elds was now largely approaching European standards.In the period between 2002 and 2004, Turkey adopted eight legislative pack-ages that have received great recogni-tion by the Commission. These include progress in terms of legal certainty, the relationship between civil society and the military, and the recognition of inter-national law and European law. Overall, the Commission estimated in 2005 that Turkey fulfi lled the political criteria to an adequate degree and recommended that negotiations begin. The same year the customs union with Turkey was ex-tended to apply to the ten new EU mem-ber states - amongst whom was Cyprus, whose Greek-Cypriot government Tur-key does not recognize. Thus Cyprus is one of the biggest problems for Turkey’s EU membership, as Cyprus joined the Union in 2004.

A report from the European Commission in October 2009 found that Turkey, de-spite support for negotiations between the Greek and Turkish part of Cyprus un-der the UN, had made no progress on a bilateral level with Cyprus. In 2010, the European Commission also reported that Turkey had from October 2009 and one year on, committed crimes against the European Commission of Human Rights no less than 553 times. Most of the cases deal with issues of ownership or the right to a fair trial. Fifty-three Kurdish mayors, for example, are lacking a fair trial, with a lawsuit that continues to drag on. Eco-nomic cooperation goes smoothly, how-ever, and in November 2011 the EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht, said that trade between the two parties is more extensive than ever, and that Turkey is the EU’s 7th largest trading partner.

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Cyprus - Zorbaor Turkish Folk Dance?The Turkish-Greek relationship has borne the legacy of the Ottoman Empire’s con-trol of Greece until 1829 and the two countries have been in armed confl ict several times. In particular, there is one point where the two countries still fail to reach an agreement: Cyprus has been the major topic in both states’ foreign and security policy in the second half of the 20th century. In 1960, an agree-ment was made that granted Cyprus independence. However, in 1963 the UN was forced to intervene to put a damper on the highly escalated confl ict between the Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus. The year after, the U.S. tried to act as a broker, but failed to achieve a solution. In 1974, Greece found oil in Greek territorial waters. Turkey disagreed on the division of the sea, adding yet another item to the list of contentious issues. When the Cypriot National Guard - led by Greek offi cers and supported by Greece – led a coup in Cyprus, Turkey responded by taking absolute control of northern Cy-prus. In 1975, the area was proclaimed the Turkish Federal State of Northern Cyprus. The disagreement about Cyprus is consistently a problem for the parties

involved. After Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, Turkey is no longer solely in disa-greement with the EU in this case, but in confl ict. As an EU member, Cyprus has great infl uence on the decision making process within the EU regarding Turkey. This is a factor that has frequently been used against Turkish interests and direct-ly blocks parts of the negotiations.

The High Minority One of the biggest domestic policy chal-lenges in Turkey is the issue of the Kurds and the PKK. Led by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK – the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – began an armed struggle for an inde-pendent Kurdistan in 1984. Since then at least 30,000 people have died in the con-fl ict, of which the vast majority are Kurds. There is continuing uncertainty about the actual number of deaths, and this it-self is seen by the Kurds as a sign of lack of political commitment from the Turk-ish side. In 1999 Öcalan was captured and sentenced to death - a conviction that was changed to imprisonment. As a result of tensions the Kurds have been subject to restrictions and laws that have limited their opportunities in Turkey. De-spite improvements, the situation is still problematic, which was demonstrated with a fl are up of confl ict during the summer 2011. After the parliamentary elections, clashes resulted in more than 200 deaths, once again, mainly on the Kurdish side. More recently the PKK is now said to be willing to work for a fu-ture for the Kurds in Turkey, rather than secession. This may prove constructive for future cooperation, which still has a long way to go.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmus-sen met with Erdoğan in April 2011 in Ankara. The subject of the meeting was the NATO mili-tary base in Izmir, the location of which is on the Aegean Sea, and therefore was of great im-portance to the NATO mission in Libya. Photo © NATO.

An all-time NATO FavoriteSince Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the coun-try has been of great strategic importance to the organization. Turkey was crucial for the containment policy toward the Soviet Union. The U.S. had already in 1946, shortly after Churchill’s “Iron Curtain speech”, sent a warship to Istanbul, a move of great sym-bolic importance. Turkey fought on South Korea’s - and thereby the West’s - side dur-ing the Korean War, and was one of the countries that suff ered the most casualties in the struggle. As a result, not only its po-litical position, but also the country’s com-mitment became clear. One of the results of which was NATO membership in 1952.When Turkey applied for membership in 1950, it was with the argument that it would be impossible to ensure stability in the Mediterranean region without the in-clusion of both Turkey and Greece - Greece also became a member in 1952. In 1980 – the year after the Soviet invasion of Af-ghanistan – the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement that gave fi nancial support to Turkey’s military, and in turn the U.S. could use no less than 25 military installations in Turkey. Again in 1990 an agreement was made that involved Turkish logistical sup-port to U.S. troops in the impending Gulf War. In 1991 NATO was given permission to use Turkish bases in South-Eastern Tur-key to bomb targets in Northern Iraq. All of this paints a clear picture of Cooperation for Mutual benefi t between Turkey and the NATO Allies. With one of the largest military apparatuses in the world it is obviously advantageous for NATO to have Turkey at the table added to this is its crucial geo-graphical location. Turkey’s importance to the United States is also made clear by the fact that the U.S. played a defi ning role in proposing Turkey’s membership of NATO.For Turkey – as for most NATO countries - membership has contributed to security and stability. Moreover, the U.S. increased its economic and military aid to Turkey in ‘91 and ‘92, which should be seen as a continuation of the agreements relat-ing to the Gulf War. Additionally, NATO cooperation has contributed to Tur-key’s international goodwill and power.When the U.S. went to war in Iraq in 2003, U.S. aircraft were given permission to use Turkish airspace. However, the US coali-tion was denied the option to create a northern front in Iraq via Turkey. This re-fusal carried economic consequences, as Turkey was not given the preferential loans they would otherwise likely have received.Turkey’s critical importance to the U.S. and NATO has recently been confi rmed by the deployment of Radar facilities to Turkey, which form part of the NATO missile shield. The shield is envisaged as a defence against possible attacks from states such as Iran.

G20 summit in Cannes, November 2011. From left: Obama, Erdoğan and European Com-mission President Manuel Barroso. Behind Erdoğan, on the right side, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy.Photo © EU.)

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After giving the President of Israel a clear message, Erdoğan leaves the panel discussion in Davos. From left: Moderator David Ignatius, Erdoğan, Shimon Peres, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and furthest to the right General of the Arab League Amr Moussa. Moussa is in the process of stand-ing up to give Erdoğan a handshake on his way out. Photo © World Economic Forum.

Erdoğan has ridden a wave of populari-ty both nationally and internationally. In 2004 he was listed as one of the world’s 100 most infl uential people according to Time Magazine, highlighting his abili ty to build bridges. The same year, Euro-pean Voice named him European of the year! This was a result of his policy of reform in Turkey. There were, however, many who looked with great scepticism upon the Islamic profi le, and noticed that Erdoğan’s wife herself wears a head-scarf. Sceptics fear that the government has a hidden Islamist agenda and will re-verse the secularization process that has taken almost a century to build. While reforms have improved human rights,freedom of speech, and democratic principles, religious expression has also gained greater visibility, which para-doxically acts as a deterrent to parts of Europe. Erdoğan stated in 2008 that while Muslims in the U.S. and Europe could wear headscarves at universi-ties, it was a shame that Muslims in Tur-key could not – a country where Mus-lims constitute 99% of the population. Erdoğan has repeatedly attracted atten-tion in the international arena. In Ger-many - a country with one of the biggest Turkish minorities - Erdoğan made quite an impression earlier last year. During a speech addressed to Turks living in Ger-many, he said: “You are my fellow citizens, you are my people, you are my friends, you are my brothers and sisters,” and contin-ued: “You are part of Germany, but you are also part of great Turkey.”

U.S. Allies in InternalConfl ictIn 2009 Erdoğan participated in a panel discussion at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in an attempt to indirectly mitigate the relationship be-tween Turkey and Israel. It did not go as planned, as Erdoğan severely criticised Israeli President Shimon Peres stating: “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.” Before Erdoğan left the panel discussion, he assured everyone that he would never return. Turkey’s relations with Israel are no better today. After Is-raeli soldiers boarded a ship sailing un-der a Turkish fl ag and killed nine activists in 2010, relations between the two coun-tries have been cold. Israel has refused to apologize for the loss of lives, as the ship was on its way to break a blockade of Gaza. At the same time, Turkey does not recognize the division of the oceans south of Cyprus, where Israel and Cyprus are searching for oil reserves. This has led to Cold War-esque conditions between Turkey and Israel, and it is an issue that concerns Washington to a great extent, as these countries are America’s closest allies in the region.

The Region Looks Toward TurkeyAlthough Turkey has - as recently as this year - confi rmed its commitment to NATO and completed pro-EU re-forms throughout a number of recent years, relations with the Middle Eastern countries have not suff ered as a result. Iran and Turkey’s relationship is now tied toget her through comprehensive economic agreements. Iran makes up 3.6% of Turkey’s total trade - Turkey’s fi fth largest trading partner - where the whole of the EU is number one. Trade has been shown to bind countries to-gether very eff ectively. It may prove extremely convenient if Iran continues to increase its domination over Iraq and eventually become a major regional player. However, the relationship could, despite economic interests, turn out to be extremely fragile, particularly under the infl uence of developments bet ween Turkey and Israel – and, to a larger de-gree, the West and Iran. Moreover, Tur-key’s relations with Iran off er a political route into Assad and Syria. There was probably widespread hope that Turkey would be able to aff ect developments in Syria. Erdoğan and Assad had a close re-lationship before the Arab Spring, which may explain why Turkey stubbornly tried diplomacy longer than other countries. Erdoğan has since had to admit that he could not make a diff erence for the Syri-an people, and he has been one of the sharpest critics of his former friend. Tur-key has been a pioneer in terms of sanc-tions. Generally, Erdoğan and his govern-ment have been very active with regard to the Arab Spring. The Syrian National Council, which is the established op-position to the regime in Syria, is based in Istanbul, and Erdoğan was among

As part of Erdoğan’s visit to the Arab Spring countries in September 2011, giant post-ers were put up in Egypt with pictures of Erdoğan and Egyptian and Turkish fl ags side by side. The text reads: “Hand in hand with Recep Erdoğan Tayyiep for a common future.” Photo © Turkey Analyst.

The Major Power of the Region

the first to call on Mubarak to resign. The “zero problems” doctrine that previ-ously governed Turkish foreign policy has been replaced. Turkey has been more or less involved in all matters on the international agenda in the Middle East in the past year. The political orientation toward the region has been underway for some years, but for Turkey, the Arab Spring could hardly have come at a better time. Erdoğan has not been shy of chances to build his profile in the post-revolutionary states. Greatly applauded, he has travelled to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. He is the strong man who says no to Israel. He has spoken to the people about frater-nity and presented them with a system like that in Turkey, which does not turn its back on Islam, but combines it with “modernity”. The sensational prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas involved Erdoğan who - at the request of the Israeli soldier’s father - persuaded Hamas to accept the conditions. Turkey’s foreign policy line has led to talk of “neo-Ottoman” policy among commenta-tors.

Winds of Change?In 2005, polls showed that among EU mem-ber states 52% of EU citizens were against Turkey’s membership. This is remarkable when the Union the same year estimated that the country was ready to begin negotia-tions. This, of course, does not go unnoticed in Turkey where impatience with the EU has increased, and proposals from EU countries involving a privileged partnership instead of full membership, do not encourage Turk-ish politicians to continue on the EU track. In the summer of 2011, the AKP won elections for the third time. Some months before the election Turkey’s chief negotiator with the EU - Egemen Bağiş – said what observers and other official representatives of Turkey before him have said, but never so clearly: “Turkey’s Plan A in the EU process was full member-ship. We are presently implementing plan B.” It seems that Turkey is about to fill the vacu-um which has arisen in the Arab world in re-cent years, particularly after the Arab Spring. Although Turkey has experienced of forced resignation of political leadership due to pressure from the military, the military lead-ership were the ones to resign from office in the summer of 2011. This happened as a pro-test to an on-going lawsuit against more than 200 senior officers, including several gener-als. They are accused of plotting to overthrow the government in 2003, in several cases with insufficient evidence. After the commander of the Turkish armed forces and the three services - army, air force and navy - retired,

Erdoğan and the President of the National Transitional Council in Libya, Abdul Jaleel, greet people at Martyrs Square in Tripoli on the 16th of September 2011. Photo © Mohamed Madi.

The people stood ready to welcome Erdoğan in Tu-nis on the 14th of September 2011. Photo © Turkey Analyst.

they were quickly replaced by more pro-gov-ernment officers. Thus, the political leader-ship made a rare but important move in the power relationship with the military. A new military coup seems unlikely in Turkey today. In relationship to the U.S. and NATO, Turkey has been an extremely important player for more than a half century and there is noth-ing to suggest that Turkey will lose its posi-tion in the coming years. That the U.S. is not trying to “knock” Turkey into place in regard to the conflict with Israel, demonstrates awareness that the US lacks the ability to do this, but also signifies a double dependency that exists between Turkey and the United States. Turkey was important for NATO dur-ing the Cold War. Jupiter missiles - armed with nuclear warheads – were placed on Turkish soil in 1961. Fifty years later, Turkey is a crucial part of the NATO missile shield. In light of recent developments between several NATO countries and Iran, it could prove crucial to have Turkey as an ally. Turkey and the EU have a well-developed economic cooperation which will con-tinue to be of interest for both parties in the years to come. Turkish membership in the EU does not seem imminent, but the question arises: “to what extent is this still Turkey’s first priority?”. Turkey has a strong position in the region compared to the Arab countries, both in terms of econo-my and military, but most importantly, as the model of a system that combines Is-lam, democracy and a modern outlook. Thus, Turkey has gone from an interesting story as a new republic to the fascinating re-vival of political Islam first with Erbakan, and since then with the AKP. It has the potential to become a regional hegemon with a very wide scope

Turkey - the Country in the Middle...Author: Master Student. in Islamic StudiesAndreas Mølvig Larsen