Security in Canada’s North Looking Beyond Arctic Sovereignty

Report November 2010

Security in Canada’s NorthLooking Beyond

Arctic Sovereignty

NatioNal Security aNd Public Safety

Preface

This report examines three dimensions of security in the

North—Arctic security, Northern security, and commun-

ity security—in order to provide a more comprehensive

picture of the security challenges in Canada’s North. The

research found that, of these three, community security

is the most important for Northerners. The people of the

North see the community—rather than the individual,

the state, or the nation—as the primary referent object

of living a secure life.

Security in Canada’s Greater North cannot be

adequately understood through Southern conceptions

of security alone. This report develops the concept of

community security primarily based on interviews with

Northerners (public officials, private sector executives,

and researchers).

Security in Canada’s North: Looking Beyond Arctic Sovereignty

by Bjorn Rutten

About The Conference Board of CanadaWe are:

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Forecasts and research often involve numerous assumptions and data sources, and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. This information is not intended as specific investment, accounting, legal, or tax advice.

coNteNtS

executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

chapter 1—Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

chapter 2—Canada’s Security and the Arctic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Sovereignty-Related Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Arctic Geopolitics: Diplomacy and Military Might . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Arctic Governance and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

chapter 3—Northern Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Security Challenges in the Greater North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Climate Change and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Economic Development and Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Governance Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

chapter 4—Community Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Security From a Northerner’s Perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Placing Community Security in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Socio-Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Health. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Public Safety and Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Political Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

chapter 5—Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

appendix a—Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

The National Security and Public Safety staff would like to thank the investors and roundtable members of the

Centre for the North for their commitment, collaboration, and support. This research report would not have been

possible without their investment, and it benefited greatly from members’ comments on an early draft version.

Writing a report like this one is a collective effort. The author would like to thank Barbara van Haute, George

Kolisnek, and Ashley Sisco for their research contributions and insightful comments. Most importantly, the author

owes a debt of gratitude to the following interviewees, who provided invaluable insights into security issues in the

North and the perspectives of Northerners: Nick Arnatsiaq, Clive Archer, Chris Burn, Eric Bussey, Michael Byers,

Julia Christensen, Jennifer Dagg, Bruce Donaldson, Vince Hawkes, Gunhild Hoogensen, Robert Huebert, Tom

Kontra, George Lindsey, Don McRae, Steve McVarnock, Randy Ottenbreit, Donat Pharand, John Sutherland,

and Jo-Ann Toulouse.

In addition, the author would like to thank Derrick Hynes, John Neily, and Gilles Rhéaume for their experienced

guidance and comments along the way.

about the ceNtre for the NorthThe Centre for the North is a major, five-year research initiative of The Conference Board of Canada. The Centre brings together Aboriginal leaders and representatives of businesses, governments, and community organizations to change the conversation about Canada’s North—and ultimately, to provide insights into how sustainable prosperity can be achieved in the North.

The Centre for the North is guided by the following founding principles: � The Centre is “North-centric.” It examines all issues from a Northern perspective, seeks to maximize Northern

engagement, and prioritizes Northern interests. � The Centre takes a “holistic” and action-oriented approach. It explores the full range of Northern challenges

and opportunities, and offers strategies that will lead to action. � The Centre considers not just the territorial North, but also the Northern regions of the seven provinces with

boundaries that stretch into the North. � The Centre takes a short- to long-term perspective, identifying immediate and future issues and actions.

Acknowledgements

ceNtre for the North MeMberSThe Conference Board of Canada is grateful to the investors and roundtable members of the Centre for the North that, through their membership, support the Centre’s research program.

(Note: The findings and conclusions of this report are entirely those of The Conference Board of Canada, not of the Centre investors and roundtable members.)

Agnico-Eagle Mines LimitedArctic Co-operatives LimitedBell CanadaBHP Billiton Diamonds Inc.BMO Financial GroupCanada Border Services AgencyCanada Mortgage and Housing CorporationCanadian Institutes of Health ResearchCanadian Northern Economic Development AgencyDe Beers Canada Inc.Department of National DefenceEnbridge Inc.First AirG13 UniversitiesGalin FoundationGolder Associates Ltd.Government of the Northwest TerritoriesHealth CanadaHuman Resources and Skills Development CanadaHydro-QuébecIGLOOIndian and Northern Affairs CanadaMinistère des ressources naturelles et de la faune

du Québec

MTS Allstream Inc.Northwestel Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and HousingOntario Ministry of Northern Development, Mines

and ForestryPrivy Council OfficeProvince of ManitobaPublic Health Agency of CanadaRBCRTL Robinson Enterprises Ltd.Saskatchewan Ministry of First Nations and Métis RelationsSaskPowerSaskTelScotiabankScotia Capital Inc.SNC-Lavalin Inc.TD Bank Financial Group TD Securities Inc.TransCanada PipeLines LimitedTransport CanadaWalter & Duncan Gordon FoundationYukon Economic Development

Acknowledgements

Find this report and other Conference Board research at www .e-library .ca

The current discourse on security in Canada’s

North, though colourful, is incomplete. The

media contribute to this phenomenon by focus-

ing their attention largely on a limited number of issues,

such as Canadian Arctic sovereignty and militarization,1

Canada’s ability to monitor and control increased offshore

economic activity,2 and dramatic Arctic search-and-rescue

missions.3 Further, media reports tend to focus exclusively

on issues related to the Arctic region, thereby neglecting

1 Akin, “PM Renews ‘Use It or Lose It’ Vow.”

2 Boswell, “Environment, Sovereignty Focus of New Arctic Marine Rules.”

3 Canadian Press, “Teen Hunter Trapped Alone.”

important southern areas of the territories and the

northern regions of many provinces. This “Southern”

view of security needs to be refreshed. A richer public

conversation is required.

While the security issues noted above are important to

Northerners, they are typically less important than com-

munity-level concerns. Northerners tend to see the issue

of security through a different lens than Southerners. To

those living in the North, security concerns are likely to

focus on the capacity of communities to meet the basic

needs of their inhabitants and to become more resilient.

The introduction of the “community” dimension to this

important security discourse demonstrates the need for a

more comprehensive assessment of security in Canada’s

North. Such an assessment should—at the minimum—

include the following key elements:

� arctic Security—the legal and geostrategic challenges

that influence Canada’s security posture and policy

in the Arctic region and its ability to protect Arctic

territory, people, and environment from remote

threats and undesired influences;

� Northern Security—the resilience of people, infra-

structure, and the environment, and their protection

from the widest possible range of threats and hazards

across the Greater North; and

� community Security—the social, economic, political, and

physical capacity of a community to address threats to,

and fulfill opportunities for meeting, the basic needs of

its inhabitants and to become more resilient.

Security in Canada’s NorthLooking Beyond Arctic Sovereignty

executive SuMMary

at a Glance � To those living in the North, security concerns

tend to focus on the capacity of communities to meet the basic needs of their inhabitants and to become more resilient.

� Of the three principal concepts of security in Canada’s North, that of community security is the least well understood.

� This report offers the concept of community security as a catalyst for a broader and more North-centric conversation about security.

ii | Security in Canada’s North—November 2010


arctic Security

Arctic security is a thoroughly researched and generally

well-understood concept. The efforts by various militaries

to increase and demonstrate their Arctic operating capabil-

ities are predominantly viewed as a symptom of military

due diligence, and the likelihood of armed conflict over

Arctic interests is deemed to be low. There are, however,

some important challenges facing Canada, including

legal, economic, and geostrategic security concerns

and diplomatic challenges. Given the wide international

interest in the Arctic Ocean and the diversity of opinion

on Arctic sovereignty among major economic and military

powers, it is in Canada’s interest to:

� promote the United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the definitive

mechanism to resolve remaining boundary

disputes in the Arctic region;

� seek the support of international entities (such

as the Arctic Council) for its Arctic policies;

� pursue binding and coordinated Arctic shipping

regulations;

� cooperate with other Arctic countries to improve

enforcement of shipping and environmental

regulations; and

� fulfill the promise of greater cooperation made

to indigenous peoples across Canada’s North

and the wider Arctic region.

NortherN Security

Northern security is not as well understood. Specifically,

there is a lack of knowledge about the threats and

vulnerabilities within the various regions of the North,

particularly in light of the increase in economic activity.

We need to know more about the threats and vulnerabil-

ities associated with the medium- and long-term conse-

quences of climate change, industrial accidents and other

man-made disasters on land and at sea, organized crime,

terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, and natural dis-

asters. As a first step, Canada should:

� undertake dedicated and comprehensive threat

assessments in the various regions of the North;

� identify and analyze the specific threats faced by

Northerners, critical infrastructure in the North,

and the Northern environment; and

� determine the various regions’ ability to address

these threats.

More work is needed to deepen and broaden our understanding of the community dimension of security in canada’s North .

coMMuNity Security

Of the three principal concepts of security in Canada’s

North, that of community security is the least well

understood. It is, however, the most relevant for

Northerners, who see the community—rather than

the individual, state, or the nation—as the most vital

referent object of security. This report does not provide

a conclusive definition of the concept of community

security or an exhaustive list of its component parts.

Rather, it offers the concept of community security as a

catalyst for a broader and more North-centric conversa-

tion about security (and safety). This concept is based on

conversations and interviews with Northerners as part of

several research projects conducted by the Centre for the

North. “Community security” includes the capacity of a

community to recognize and address threats to, and to

fulfill opportunities for meeting, its inhabitants’ basic

needs and developing a basic level of resiliency. This

report gives only a rudimentary description of the con-

cept. More work is needed to deepen and broaden our

understanding of the community dimension of security

in Canada’s North. Specifically, the development of a

set of clear indicators that assess the security needs,

capacity, and resilience of a given community would

allow for better understanding of the concept. With

this understanding in place, decision-makers in the

North would be better equipped to address the threats

to their communities.


Many Canadians have only a limited under-

standing of the security issues facing

Canada’s North. And what understanding

they do have is formed primarily by media reports that

tend to focus on a limited number of issues (such as

potential military disputes over the Arctic and its

resources). The geographic scope of discussions on

the North also tends to be limited to the Arctic. Many

issues of significance to the three territories—Yukon, the

Northwest Territories, and Nunavut—and the Northern

regions of several provinces are excluded.

The members of The Conference Board of Canada’s

Centre for the North firmly believe that the debate

about security in the North cannot be complete without

adequate consideration of the distinct perspectives

of Northerners and the local context of their culture,

socio-economic development, and environment. As

a first step toward remedying this perceived gap, the

Centre members commissioned a foundational research

project designed to identify:

� the main elements of a more comprehensive picture

of security, as it relates to Canada’s North;

� gaps in our understanding of the issues; and

� opportunities for increasing our understanding as it

relates to each element.

The report is based on an extensive literature review;

interviews with key public officials, academics, and

numerous interviews with other public and private

sector executives, both within and outside the North;

and numerous interviews with public and private sector

individuals from communities across the Greater North.

The findings are compelling and provide ample cause

and motivation for further research by the Centre for

the North and others.

The three basic elements of security in Canada’s North,

as identified in this report, are Arctic security, Northern

security, and community security. On one side we have

the sovereignty-related challenges—Arctic security; on

the other, the widely held concerns among Northerners

about the sustainability and resiliency of communities—

community security. In between lies Northern security—

the need to improve the resilience of people and

protect them—as well as critical infrastructure and

the environment—from the widest possible range of

threats and hazards across the Greater North.

Introduction

chaPter 1

chapter Summary � The three basic elements of security in Canada’s

North are Arctic security, Northern security, and community security.

� The debate about security in the North cannot be complete without adequate consideration of the distinct perspectives of Northerners and the local context of their culture, socio-economic development, and environment.

� This report is based on numerous interviews with public and private sector individuals from communities across the Greater North.


The geostrategic importance of the Arctic has

increased in recent years as the region has

become more accessible and as vast natural

resources have been discovered beneath the Arctic

Ocean seabed. Geostrategic concerns now range from

climate change and energy security to environmental

protection and the potential of foreign militaries—or

even international terrorists and criminal groups—to

operate freely across the Arctic region.

The disagreements over the extent of sovereignty rights

in the Arctic are fuelled to a large degree by concerns

over economic security. Arctic and non-Arctic states are

asserting their interest in securing free access to northern

navigation routes that connect the Atlantic and Pacific

oceans and in claiming rights to the natural resources of

the Arctic Ocean.

the international governance structure for the arctic region is only in its infancy .

The legal mechanism established under the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea1 for claims relative

to the Arctic Ocean is expected to eventually resolve most

of the boundary issues that exist today.2 The results may

not, in all cases, come out in Canada’s favour.3

Furthermore, the international governance structure for

the Arctic region is only in its infancy. The existing

Arctic shipping guidelines of the International Maritime

Organization are non-binding, as are the statements of

1 United Nations “Convention on the Law of the Sea” [hereinafter UNCLOS].

2 For more information, see International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, “Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries.”

3 Kraska, “International Law and International Security in the Northwest Passage.”

Canada’s Security and the Arctic

chaPter 2

chapter Summary � The international governance structure for

the Arctic region is only in its infancy.

� The Northwest Passage could eventually provide a shorter route for international shipping than currently exists, but the risks and costs could outweigh the benefits over the foreseeable future.

� Canada’s economic security could be affected by the outcome of legal disputes concerning sovereign rights over natural resources above and below the seabed of the Arctic Ocean.

� Climate change is one of the most pervasive threats in the North—one that will stretch the capacity of individual organizations and jurisdictions to respond to the security and safety-related consequences.

The Conference Board of Canada | 3


the Arctic Council. The five nations that share the Arctic

shelf (Russia, Denmark, Norway, the United States, and

Canada) have shown little interest in broadening the

mandate of the Council to include military and security

matters, or to expand its membership; and they oppose

the creation of any alternative or additional multilateral

rule-making bodies.

It remains to be seen whether current approaches and

institutions can provide effective solutions to traditional,

economic, and environmental security challenges based on

a meaningful representation of legitimate interests of the

international community and Arctic indigenous peoples.

SovereiGNty-related coNSideratioNS

The Northwest Passage, a term used to describe a set of

navigation routes linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans

via the Canadian archipelago, could eventually shorten

the maritime routes between major commercial centres.

But the risks of navigating the Arctic seas and the high

cost of ice-capable ships could outweigh the benefits

over the foreseeable future.4 (See Exhibit 1.)

once established, state sovereignty comes with a duty to provide security for the people who occupy the land .

The Arctic Ocean and land mass represent a huge ter-

ritory with an abundance of coveted natural resources

(including oil, gas, metals, minerals, timber, and fish)

that are becoming increasingly accessible due to the

warming effects of climate change and advances

in exploration and exploitation technology. Rising

prices for metals, minerals, and hydrocarbons provide

an additional incentive for Arctic and non-Arctic states

to direct their attention to this region, and for Arctic

coastal states to determine, seek formal recognition

of, and assert their sovereign rights in the Arctic.

4 Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt.”

Sovereignty and its component parts (e.g., jurisdiction)

can be defined as the (legal) competence of states in

respect of a particular territory (i.e., land area, airspace,

and territorial sea).5 It is the prerequisite for the provision

of basic security, as it establishes the international recog-

nition of a state’s authority over a given territory and the

associated respect for its terrestrial borders and maritime

boundaries. Once established, state sovereignty comes

with a duty to provide security for the people who

occupy the land.6

SovereiGNty over arctic iSlaNdSCanada bases its sovereignty over its Arctic islands (the

Canadian Arctic archipelago) on arguments of historic

title and possession, including:

� the acquisition of “Rupert’s Land and the North

Western Territory” from the Hudson’s Bay Company

in 1870;

� the transfer of “all British possessions on the American

continent not hitherto annexed to any colony” by the

United Kingdom in 1880; and

� the “presence of Inuit and other indigenous peoples

since time immemorial” and their self-determined

will to be governed by Canada.7

5 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 107–08.

6 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, para. 2.15.

7 Côté and Dufresne, The Arctic: Canada’s Legal Claims; Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.

exhibit 1Northern Routes Shorten Shipping Distances

Source: Hugo Alenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal.

4 | Security in Canada’s North—November 2010


Currently, there are no direct threats to Canada’s sover-

eignty and jurisdiction related to the land areas of the

Canadian Arctic archipelago, with the exception of Hans

Island. Although this dispute with Denmark appears to be

headed toward a cooperative agreement,8 neither country

has so far abandoned its claim to the island.

SovereiGNty over arctic WaterSAn issue that requires closer examination is that of the

extent of Canada’s sovereign rights over marine territory—

above and below the seabed. “This includes the waters

off the Canadian Arctic coasts—especially the Northwest

Passage, a set of waterways through the Canadian Arctic

Archipelago—as well as the submerged parts that form

the continental shelf, and particularly the continental shelf

beyond 200 nautical miles,” says Kristin Bartenstein, a

professor of international law in the Faculty of Law at

the University of Laval.9

In particular, there are countries that take legal positions

that, if validated, would prevent Canada from:

� interdicting navigation by unwanted vessels through

its Arctic waters or the overflight of unwanted aircraft

through its Arctic airspace;

� freely enacting and enforcing laws that address

the risks of increased commercial and military

navigation and other activity in parts of the

Canadian Arctic Archipelago; and

� exploring and exploiting natural resources in a

promising section of the Beaufort Sea and on

the seabed of parts of the Lomonosov Ridge.

NorthWeSt PaSSaGeIn principle, Canada’s sovereignty over the waters that

make up the Northwest Passage in the Canadian Arctic

Archipelago is undisputed. What is under dispute,

however, is to what degree Canada’s sovereignty is

limited by international law and the rights of others.

Canada deems the waters between its Arctic islands to

be “internal waters,” based on a theoretical line drawn

around the outer limits of the Canadian archipelago.

8 Donat Pharand. In-person interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 12, 2010.

9 Bartenstein, “Use It or Lose It.”

The “straight baseline” method that determines the extent

of internal waters is defined in Article 7 of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

which also determines that states can exercise the same

sovereignty rights (i.e., unqualified sovereignty) over

their so defined internal waters as they exercise over

their land territory. This interpretation would allow

Canada to decide which vessels would be allowed to

navigate through the Passage (see Exhibit 2) and give

Canada the power to bar unwanted aircraft from entering

the airspace above the Passage. It would also give Canada

the sovereign right to adopt and enforce laws and regula-

tions as it deems appropriate, such as those enshrined in

the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and

the regulations that formally established the Northern

Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) Zone10

under the Canada Shipping Act. The latter requires all

foreign vessels that travel through the Passage and the

Canadian Arctic Archipelago to register with and provide

information to the Canadian Coast Guard.11

What is under dispute is to what degree canada’s sovereignty is limited by international law and the rights of others .

Some states, most notably those of the European

Union,12 hold the legal opinion that the “Northwest

Passage” through the Canadian archipelago is simply

part of Canada’s territorial sea and does not qualify as

internal waters. According to this interpretation, Canada

would have to respect the right of “innocent passage” of

foreign vessels and the extent of its authority to regulate

activity in this area would be prescribed by Article 21

(“Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to

innocent passage”) of UNCLOS.13

10 Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations.

11 Boswell, “Environment, Sovereignty Focus of New Arctic Marine Rules.”

12 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.

13 UNCLOS, part II, s. 3, “Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea.”



The United States, which has not yet ratified UNCLOS,

also contests the legality of the baselines drawn by

Canada, and it further claims that the territorial sea of the

Canadian archipelago includes an “international strait.”

UNCLOS defines an international strait as a connection

between two parts of the high seas (or exclusive economic

zones). Classifying the Northwest Passage as an inter-

national strait would give any country the right of transit

passage14—including free navigation and overflight

for their militaries—thereby constraining even further

Canada’s rights to regulate activity and increasing the

freedom of use for other countries. Canada would only

have the prescriptive jurisdiction defined in Article 42

14 UNCLOS, part III, s. 2, “Transit Passage.”

(“Laws and regulations of States bordering straits relating

to transit passage”) of UNCLOS. Most legal experts agree

that customary international law would require that the

Northwest Passage be used as an international shipping

route before it can be deemed an international strait. Very

few ships have made the transit, so that requirement has

probably not been fulfilled. However, the warming effects

of climate change may in time change that situation. In

any case, the U.S. disagrees with most experts on this

point and interprets customary law in such a way that

the Northwest Passage requires only the “potential” to

be used as an international shipping route in order to be

deemed an international strait.

exhibit 2Shipping Routes Through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago

Source: geology.com.

ARCTIC OCEAN

Beaufort Sea

Labrador Sea

Hudson Bay

Baffin Bay

Chukchi Sea

Bering Sea

Gulf ofAlaska

ICELANDGREENLAND

CANADA

ALASKA(USA)

RUSSIA

Arctic Circle

Legend

Shipping routes



Another difference among legal experts concerns the

Northwest Passage and the applicability and scope of

Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”) of the Law of the Sea

Convention. This provision was inspired by Canada’s

AWPPA15 and gives coastal states the right to:

. . . adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws

and regulations for the prevention, reduction, and

control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-

covered areas within the limits of the exclusive

economic zone, where particularly severe climatic

conditions and the presence of ice covering such

areas for most of the year create obstructions or

exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution

of the marine environment could cause major

harm to or irreversible disturbance of the eco-

logical balance.

The applicability of AWPPA in the Canadian archipelago

is therefore supported by Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”)

of UNCLOS, but the warming effects of climate change

may make the provision relatively unreliable in the future,

as it applies only to areas that are covered by ice “for

most of the year.” The United States argues that

Article 234 does not apply to international straits,

and it therefore asserts the right of unfettered transit

passage and rejects Canada’s right to enact regulations

under Article 234 for the set of waterways that make up

the Northwest Passage.16

the deliMitatioN of MaritiMe bouNdarieS

excluSive ecoNoMic ZoNeCanada’s sovereign rights to the natural resources of

the Arctic Ocean and its seabed derive mainly from the

recognition in UNCLOS of the right of coastal states to

enforce an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) based on their

continental shelf but which can extend no further than

200 nautical miles from a defined coastal baseline.17

15 European Commission—Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Legal Aspects of Arctic Shipping.

16 See earlier section, “Northwest Passage.”

17 UNCLOS, part V.

Canada’s claimed exclusive economic zone is stated in

section 13 of the country’s Oceans Act. The rights con-

ferred upon Canada in the EEZ, based on its continental

shelf, include:

. . . sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring

and exploiting, conserving and managing the nat-

ural resources, whether living or non-living, of the

waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed

and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities

for the economic exploitation and exploration of

the zone, such as the production of energy from

the water, currents, and winds.18

The economic impacts arising from such sovereign rights

over resources in the EEZ cannot be underestimated. One

has only to look at the petroleum development off the

coast of Newfoundland19 to appreciate the historical,

current, and potential future economic importance of

such rights.

both the u .S . and canada claim the same territory north of the alaska–yukon border as their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones .

There is an ongoing disagreement between Canada and

the U.S. over their common maritime boundary in the

Beaufort Sea. Canada argues that the boundary follows

the 141st meridian of longitude, which is an extension

of the Alaska–Yukon border. The U.S., however, says the

boundary is farther east along a line drawn equidistant

between two headlands jutting northward into the Beaufort

Sea. (See Exhibit 3.) Both countries claim the territory

between these two lines as part of their territorial seas and

exclusive economic zones—mainly because initial studies

suggest that the seabed in the disputed region is rich with

oil and gas reserves. Both sides have issued exploration

licences for the area.20

18 UNCLOS, part V, art. 66, para. 1.

19 Newfoundland and Labrador, Petroleum Development.

20 Boswell, “Canada Non-Committal Over U.S. Position.”



exteNded coNtiNeNtal ShelfArctic coastal states (Canada, United States, Russia,

Denmark, and Norway) are carrying out research to

determine if they can gain additional sovereign rights in

the Arctic Ocean beyond 200 nautical miles. Under the

UNCLOS legal regime, it is possible to claim such rights

based on extended continental shelves up to a maximum

range of 350 miles. Countries must submit evidence sup-

porting their claims to the dedicated Commission on the

Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).21 Their claims,

if validated, will allow them to explore and exploit the

resources of the seabed and subsoil of their extended

continental shelf but not, however, the marine life above

the seabed. Canada’s continental shelf (beyond the EEZ)

is estimated by Natural Resources Canada to represent

“an area of about 1.5 million square kilometres on the

Atlantic and Arctic coasts.”22

canada ratified uNcloS in 2003 and therefore has until 2013 to submit scientific, technical, and legal details substantiating claims to an extended continental shelf .

Russia, Denmark, and Canada all have a keen interest in

the Lomonosov Ridge which is an undersea mountain

chain stretching across the North Pole from Ellesmere

Island to central Siberia. This ridge is believed to contain

vast reserves of hydrocarbons that could be developed

in the future. All three countries have signed UNCLOS,

and now they have to stake claims to their portions of the

ridge based on their continental shelves. Countries have

10 years from the coming into force of UNCLOS to sub-

mit their claims. Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003 and

therefore has until 2013 to submit scientific, technical,

and legal details substantiating its claims. Denmark must

submit in 2014, while Russia has until 2011 to resubmit

its claims. Russia was quick to submit a claim in 2001, but

the CLCS was not satisfied with the scientific evidence

and asked Russia to resubmit. Since then, Russia has

21 UNCLOS, part VI, art. 76, para. 8. Submissions made so far can be accessed on the Commission’s website at www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.

22 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Canada’s Ocean Estate.”

been engaged in extensive geological research. Canada

and Denmark collaborated on their geological research

in 2007, and Canada and the United States did so in

2008 and 2009.23 Their claims, however, are likely to

conflict—with each other’s and with the Russian claim.

Geostrategic considerationsGeostrategic considerations play a key role in determining

Canada’s challenges with respect to security in the Arctic,

and they also help to explain some of the opposition to

Canada’s legal and policy positions. For example, foreign

submarines could travel freely and submerged through the

Northwest Passage if certain legal positions on Canada’s

sovereign rights in the Arctic Ocean are not validated and

enforcement capabilities are not put in place. While this

kind of unfettered foreign military access to the waters

of the Northwest Passage (and its airspace) may not have

23 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, “Canada’s Submission to the Commission.”

exhibit 3Disputed Waters in the Beaufort Sea

Source: Ottawa Citizen.

ARCTIC OCEAN

BeaufortSea

Chukchi Sea

Bering Sea

Gulf ofAlaska

CANADA

RUSSIA

ALASKA(USA)

YUKON

NORTHWESTTERRITORIES

NUNAVUT

Disputed waters

International boundaries

Legend

200-nautical mile limit (370 km)

http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm

http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm



a direct effect on the security of the Arctic population

in particular, it could affect the strategic position of

Canada’s military and its allies. In recognition of the

growing need for a military presence and effective

monitoring in the North, Norway has already moved

its military operations centre from a southern location

near Stavenger to Reitan in the north of the country.24

This confirms the region’s strategic importance not

only to Norway, but also to NATO.

Canada’s economic security is another factor in geo-

strategic considerations that could be affected by the

outcome of the legal disputes concerning sovereign rights

over natural resources above and below the seabed of the

Arctic Ocean. For the private sector, however, “the key

factors are costs of development and the price cycle of

oil and gas,” as most of the reserves lie in existing and

recognized exclusive economic zones.25 At this point,

the motivation in the oil and gas community to develop

known Arctic reserves (on land and at sea) is low given

the existence of more cost-effective alternatives, both in

North America and abroad. While licence applications

may be filed and certain exploration projects undertaken,

significant development activity does not seem to be on

the horizon just yet.

licence applications may be filed and certain exploration projects undertaken, but significant oil and gas development activity does not seem to be on the horizon just yet .

Canada also hopes to benefit from potential commercial

shipping in the area, but the size of the benefit will depend

on the extent of its sovereign rights over the territory and

the cost-risk-benefit assessment of shipping companies

that could lead to decisions against using the hazardous

and largely uncharted northern navigation routes.

24 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 121–22.

25 Yalowitz and others, The Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy Conference, 13; Potts and Schofield, “Current Legal Developments.” Quoted in Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” 1221.

In addition, Donat Pharand—Professor Emeritus of

International Law at the University of Ottawa and

a founding member of the Canadian Council on

International Law—emphasizes that “Canada’s exclusive

control of all the waters of its archipelago could constitute

an important contribution to the fight against international

terrorism.”26 He believes that “unrestricted freedom of

navigation [in the Northwest Passage] could well bring

dangerous visitors and catastrophic consequences . . . .”27

in 2008, a russian expedition team made headlines in canada and around the world by placing a russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole .

Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark (via

Greenland), and Norway (via the Spitsbergen, or

Svalbard, Archipelago) all have Arctic lands bordering

on the Arctic Ocean. These Arctic coastal states are often

referred to as the “Arctic Five.” (See Exhibit 4.) They

are the only countries that can lay claim to extended

continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean, and all are now

engaged in determining their rights and territorial bound-

aries in the Arctic Ocean. All five have developed dedi-

cated Arctic policies and have begun to strengthen their

military capabilities in the North to varying degrees.28

Russia has significant economic and national security

interests in the Arctic. In 2008, a Russian expedition

team made headlines in Canada and around the world

by placing a Russian flag on the seabed at the North

Pole; and Russia regularly conducts long-range bomber

exercises near Canadian airspace in the Arctic. Both

Russia and the United States occasionally move to

demonstrate their operational capabilities in the High

Arctic by conducting exercises involving planes, ships,

and submarines. The Arctic waters are important to

26 Pharand, “Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty,” 5.

27 Ibid.

28 For an assessment and overview of recent developments among the Arctic Five, see Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic. See also Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 122–24.



Russia’s nuclear deterrent, which relies heavily on its

nuclear submarines and has grown increasingly significant

as the country’s conventional capabilities have diminished.

Furthermore, Russia views the Arctic as its most important

strategic (economic) resource base29; it asserts exclusive

jurisdiction over the Northeast Passage, and it lays claim

to the entire Lomonosov Ridge.

freedom of navigation and overflight is the point on which the u .S . and canadian positions most significantly diverge .

Canada and the United States share a strategic interest

in the Arctic, which is illustrated by their successful and

recently broadened30 partnership in NORAD, the joint

North American Aerospace and Defence Command. The

United States recognizes the significance of the Arctic for

its energy security and the need for balancing its economic

and environmental interests.31 But it also has a number

of “hard” security interests in the Arctic, including

“missile defence and early warning, deployment of sea

and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence,

maritime presence, and maritime security operations;

and ensuring the freedom of navigation and oversight.”32

It is the last point—freedom of navigation and overflight—

on which the U.S. and Canadian positions most signifi-

cantly diverge, with Canada insisting that the waters

of the Northwest Passage are internal and subject to

Canadian sovereign control.

Cleo Paskal, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House

in London,33 and a recent Canadian Senate Committee

report34 both argue that the current U.S. position that

29 The “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Until 2020 (NSS)” was announced on May 13, 2009. It is cited in Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic.

30 In 2006, a maritime warning element was added to NORAD’s surveillance capability.

31 Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic.

32 The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Directive 25.

33 Paskal, Global Warring, 123.

34 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling Canada’s Arctic Waters.

the Northwest Passage is an international strait runs

counter to efforts to ensure the security of North America,

as it prevents the United States’ neighbour and trusted

ally, Canada, from effectively controlling access to the

North American continent. Paskal says the U.S. position

is based on commercial interests.35 Others argue that it is

mainly military interests that determine the United States’

position. They say Washington’s efforts to have the

Northwest Passage deemed an international strait

bolsters U.S. claims to the right to freely use straits

and channels around the world for navigation and

overflight by its military.36

Non-Arctic states have also intensified their efforts to

define their concerns and assert their interests in the

Arctic region, which range from climate change and

35 Paskal, Global Warring, 124.

36 Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, “The Question of Sovereignty.”

exhibit 4Five Countries Border Arctic Ocean

Source: Hugo Alenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal.



environmental pollution to international trade and security.

Most non-Arctic states share the position that no country

or group of countries (i.e., the Arctic Five) should have

sovereignty over the Arctic Ocean and that any newly

opened routes through the Arctic Ocean should be free

for all countries to use.37 One of the legal arguments

brought forward is that much of the seabed of the Arctic

Ocean should be considered international and designated

a “common heritage of mankind” under the Declaration of

Principles Governing the Seabed38 and UNCLOS.39 This

would mean that no state could exercise sovereignty over

this area and that any exploitation of resources would have

to be carried out “for the benefit of mankind as a whole.”40

one of the legal arguments is that much of the seabed of the arctic ocean should be considered international and designated a “common heritage of mankind .”

The European Union’s High Representative for

the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the

Commission have clearly stated the EU’s economic and

security interests in the Arctic: “There is an increasing

need to address the growing debate over territorial claims

and access to new trade routes by different countries [that]

challenge Europe’s ability to effectively secure its trade

and resource interests in the region and may put pressure

on its relations with key partners.”41 The Commission

concludes that, “On the whole, Arctic challenges and

opportunities will have significant repercussions on the

life of European citizens for generations to come.”42

37 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2; Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic.

38 United Nations General Assembly, 2749 (XXV).

39 UNCLOS, part XI, art. 136. (The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was opened for signing on December 10, 1982. UNCLOS would take effect when at least 60 countries had ratified the agreement. That occurred on November 16, 1994, when Guyana became the 60th state to sign on to UNCLOS.)

40 UNCLOS, part XI, art. 140.

41 European Council, “Climate Change and International Security.”

42 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2.

Linda Jakobson, an international expert on security in the

Asia-Pacific region, expects export-dependent China to

intensify its engagement in political discussions about the

Arctic and to assert its claims to the right of free passage

and resource extraction in the Arctic Ocean in the near

future.43 Other trading nations, such as Taiwan and

India, stand to benefit from Arctic shipping routes, as

does South Korea where many ice-capable vessels are

built.44 In addition to its interest in new trade routes,

Japan is looking to secure international fishing rights

for its fisheries’ industry, which depends to a significant

degree on fishing in waters far from home and therefore

the right of access to international waters.

arctic GeoPoliticS: diPloMacy aNd Military MiGht

Canada has made the enhancement of the strategic

and operational capabilities of its three militaries in the

Arctic a priority, as evidenced by a number of funding

announcements.45 In August 2010, Canada held a military

exercise—“Operation Nanook”—in the Arctic. According

to Defence Minister Peter MacKay, the main objective

was to assert Canada’s sovereignty in the North.46

Rob Huebert, an Associate Professor of Political Science

at the University of Calgary and Arctic security expert,

says he is concerned about the increasingly serious tone

heard from defence and foreign affairs organizations in

Arctic countries. He notes that these countries are con-

ducting more Arctic military exercises and enhancing

their Arctic military capabilities.47 Michael Byers, a

professor of law at the University of British Columbia,

interprets this military buildup as a response “to the

constabulary responsibilities that come with a newly

opened coastline” rather than “a military buildup that’s

43 Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic.


45 Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy—Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, 10; Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Announces Expansion.”

46 CBC News, “Operation Nanook Continues in Pond Inlet.”

47 Robert Huebert. In-person interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 8, 2010.



directed at state threats in the Arctic.” Nevertheless,

he cautions that if “. . . you talk about [the risk of] conflict,

it can become self-fulfilling.”48 On the other hand, Huebert

argues that “if you refuse to react to what your neighbours

are doing in terms of a buildup, you risk leaving yourself

vulnerable in future disagreements and conflicts.”49

Despite some occasional rhetoric suggesting otherwise,

Canada’s military is not particularly concerned about

Russia’s efforts to increase its Arctic military capacity.50

In general, the Russian efforts are viewed as part of mil-

itary due diligence among the Arctic Five to be prepared

to operate in the Arctic environment and to maintain a

balance of military power between East and West. In fact,

in August 2010, Canadian and U.S. Air Force personnel—

under NORAD—conducted their first-ever joint exercise

with the Russian Federation Air Force designed to deal

with international air-terrorism.

it is not the military attack that planners are most worried about but the loss of control over strategic navigation routes, infrastructures, and energy reserves .

The militaries of the Arctic Five continue to train with

the goal of improving their ability to respond to Arctic

security threats. But the scenarios chosen for these

training exercises tend not to be based on any military

confrontation; instead, they are based on the potential

need for armed forces to respond to terrorist attacks,

sabotage, disasters, or various types of non-military

sovereignty challenges.51 It is not the military attack

that planners are most worried about—it is the loss of

control over strategic navigation routes, infrastructure,

and energy reserves.52

Past state behaviour suggests that the likelihood of Arctic

coastal states resorting to armed confrontation over

boundary disputes in the Arctic region is low. In 2008,

48 Canadian Press, “Arctic Sees Military Buildup.”

49 Huebert, in-person interview.

50 Canadian Press, “Russia’s Arctic Policy No Cause for Alarm.”

51 Rice, “Four Selected Intrusion Scenarios,” 65–78.

52 Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic, 124.

the five Arctic coastal states issued the Ilulissat

Declaration. The document expressed their commitment

to the legal framework that governs the Arctic Ocean,

promised cooperation on Arctic issues with each other

and other states, and committed themselves to the “orderly

settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”53

Significant divergence of interests exists between arctic and non-arctic states .

In August 2010, Canada released a statement on Arctic

foreign policy in which it identified the engaging of

neighbours to seek to resolve boundary issues as a

focus area for its international efforts.54 The United

States government has expressed its commitment to

“strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight

Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark,

Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden)” and

“to continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic

issues.”55 In September 2010, Russia and Norway con-

cluded an agreement on the maritime boundary in the

Barents Sea, ending a dispute that had lasted 40 years.56

While the member states of the Arctic Council seem

to be moving toward greater cooperation, significant

divergence of interests exists between Arctic and non-

Arctic states over the accessibility of the Arctic Ocean

and its seabed, regulation of navigation and economic

activity, and the question of how the Arctic region

should be governed. Some observers predict that this

could lead to serious diplomatic confrontations once the

climatic, technological, economic, and legal conditions

are right for allowing countries to fully capitalize on the

opportunities in the Arctic.57

53 Arctic Ocean Conference, “The Ilulissat Declaration.”

54 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.

55 The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Directive 25.

56 Harding, “Russia and Norway Resolve Arctic Border Dispute.”




arctic GoverNaNce aNd cooPeratioN

Existing governance arrangements (such as those pro-

vided through the Arctic Council and the International

Maritime Organization) are deficient in that they lack the

capacity to produce binding rules that can be enforced.

The Arctic Council is the only intergovernmental forum

that brings together the eight “Arctic” member states

(Norway [Svalbard Islands/Spitsbergen], Denmark

[Greenland], Iceland, Sweden, Canada, Russia, the

United States, and Finland) specifically to examine and

discuss Arctic issues. The Council is also the only forum

where Arctic indigenous associations and representatives

can participate in such high-level discussions.

However, the ability of the Arctic Council to deal effect-

ively with current and future disputes in the region is

questionable—mainly because its consensus-based reso-

lutions are non-binding and the mandate of the Council

does not allow members to address security issues. The

Council has also been criticized for excluding “nations

with legitimate interests.”58 China recently asked to be

granted permanent observer status59 but was turned down

(as were the European Union, South Korea, and Italy).

The current permanent observers are France, Germany,

Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and

a number of international and non-governmental organiz-

ations. China, Italy, and South Korea continue to hold the

status of ad hoc observers and must ask for permission to

attend meetings that they are interested in.

the ability of the arctic council to deal effectively with current and future disputes in the region is questionable .

While the Arctic Council members realize that many of

the transnational issues in the Arctic require cooperation

with other Arctic and non-Arctic countries, most Council

58 Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the Arctic, 14.

59 Schiller, “China Warming Up to Be an Arctic Player.“

members have tended to oppose any changes to the

Council’s mandate,60 and they have been reluctant to

negotiate a dedicated international regime for the Arctic

as has been proposed by some non-Arctic countries.

The Ilulissat Declaration in particular underlines the

fact that the Arctic Five see no need for a new inter-

national regime.61

Most arctic council members have tended to oppose any changes to the council’s mandate .

The Arctic Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping

Assessment62 includes recommendations for harmon-

ized regulations and technology transfer between Arctic

states and across the Arctic region. However, in many

areas, binding agreements and resource commitments

are still missing. The guidelines for ships operating in

Arctic ice-covered waters, prepared by the International

Maritime Organization,63 are less stringent than the

rules that Canada envisages for the waterways of the

Northwest Passage, are recommendatory in nature, and

have been criticized for a number of shortcomings.64

Donald McRae, law professor at the University of Ottawa

and an expert on the Arctic, calls on Arctic nations to

agree on a consistent set of stringent and enforceable

rules and regulations to manage the security, public

safety, and environmental risks of economic activity—

such as shipping, fishing, and oil exploration—in the

Arctic Ocean.65 The lack of consistent environmental

60 For Canada’s position, see Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 23–25. For the U.S. position, see The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Directive 25.

61 Arctic Ocean Conference, “The Ilulissat Declaration.”

62 Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report.

63 International Maritime Organization, Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters.

64 VanderZwaag and others, Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping, 19.

65 Don McRae. In-person interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 14, 2010.



protection standards has already raised concerns about

the expected increase in offshore drilling and the potential

for oil spills to travel across international boundaries.66

Canada would benefit from taking a regional and

cooperative approach to providing safety and environ-

mental protection in the Arctic Ocean—common rules

would ensure a consistent level of protection across all

areas of the Arctic Ocean67 and enable the more effect-

ive and efficient use of expensive resources, such as

ice-breakers, surveillance aircraft, and satellite-based

observation systems. A promising step in this direction

has been the negotiations among Arctic Council member

states on a regional search-and-rescue agreement, which

Russia said it expected to be signed in the spring of

2011.68 Canadian Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson says,

“There are national interests to be protected, but many of

the challenges can only be fully addressed by all affected

parties working together to meet common goals, set com-

mon standards, and achieve a shared vision of security.”69

cooperation with indigenous peoples who have been living in the arctic for generations is becoming increasingly important .

In the context of wide international interest in the

Arctic Ocean and the diversity of opinion between

major economic and military powers around the world,

it is in Canada’s interest to promote the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the

definitive mechanism to resolve remaining boundary

disputes in the Arctic region; seek support for its

Arctic policies in international entities, such as the

Arctic Council; pursue binding and coordinated Arctic

shipping regulations; and cooperate with other Arctic

countries to improve enforcement of environmental

regulations. In August 2010, Canada released a carefully

66 CBC News, “Oil Spill Raises Arctic Offshore Drilling Concerns.”

67 Granatstein, “Does the Northwest Passage Still Matter?”

68 BarentsObserver.com, “Arctic Countries to Sign Joint Agreement.”

69 Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson. Phone interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 12, 2010.

worded Arctic foreign policy statement that favours

“agreements” and “coordination” among the Arctic

Five and relegates cooperation with other countries

and forums to the domain of non-committal “dialogue”

and “research.” The policy takes a three-pronged

approach to Arctic governance, which includes:

� bilateral negotiations (particularly with the

U.S.) on issues of common interest;

� agreement and policy coordination among the

Arctic Five; and

� policy dialogue, development of guidelines on

select topics, and research through the Arctic

Council and other multilateral institutions.70

Cooperation with indigenous peoples who have

been living in the Arctic for generations is becoming

increasingly important—both for governments and

private enterprises that intend to seek out economic

opportunities in the Arctic. Respect for their cultures,

recognition of their traditional ways of life (including

subsistence hunting), and respect for self-government

rights are required to operationalize public policies and

business strategies. Indeed, the right of indigenous peoples

to consultation on matters that can affect their culture and

traditional way of life is increasingly being recognized

by the courts. In the summer of 2010, for example, the

Nunavut Court of Justice granted an injunction against a

seismic testing project that could have affected the trad-

itional hunting grounds of five indigenous communities.

The court based its decision not only on the potential

loss of marine mammals as a traditional food source,

but also on the potential “loss of culture.”71 The Inuit

in Greenland, Northern Canada, Alaska, and Chukotka

(Russia)—through the Circumpolar Council—made a

declaration on Arctic sovereignty in April 2009 that

asserted their rights under the United Nations

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

(UNDRIP)72 to “freely determine [their] political

status, freely pursue [their] economic, social, cultural,

70 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy.

71 Qikiqtani Inuit Association v. Canada (Minister of Natural Resources).

72 United Nations, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”



and linguistic development, and freely dispose of [their]

natural wealth and resources.”73 The Circumpolar

Council represents all Inuit peoples across the Arctic at

the Arctic Council, where it holds the status of permanent

participant. The Declaration on the Establishment of the

Arctic Council (The Ottawa Declaration, 1997) provides

that “the category of Permanent Participation is created

to provide for active participation and full consultation

with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the

Arctic Council.”74 While the Circumpolar Council

acknowledges that it has “a direct and meaningful seat”

at discussion and negotiating tables of the Arctic Council,

it says problems remain, including the following:

� The rights of indigenous peoples receive insufficient

mention in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration made by

the five Arctic coastal states.

� The discussions of Arctic sovereignty at the Arctic

Council lack references “to existing international

instruments that promote and protect the rights of

indigenous peoples.”

� The Arctic Five have “neglected to include Inuit in

Arctic sovereignty discussions in a manner compar-

able to Arctic Council deliberations.”75

73 Inuit Circumpolar Council, A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic.

74 Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.”

75 Inuit Circumpolar Council, A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic.

In 2007, Russia and Norway signed the Treaty Between

the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation

Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation

in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.76 And in

September 2010, the foreign ministers of the two

nations outlined the lessons and experiences provided

by the treaty. In an opinion piece in a Canadian national

newspaper, they offered advice on how best to resolve

maritime disputes, and they called for increased cooper-

ation.77 The ministers highlighted the Arctic Council

as an arena “where eight Arctic states meet at the pol-

itical and expert levels”—but they did not mention the

indigenous peoples of the Arctic nor identify them as a

necessary party to include in the “creative discussions

that are required to reach solutions.” There is an oppor-

tunity for Canada to foster greater cooperation with

Arctic indigenous peoples and to open up the possibility

of using their unique traditional knowledge and expertise

to create and implement more effective international

norms and agreements.78

76 Government of Norway, Treaty Between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation.

77 Lavrov and Støre, “Canada, Take Note.”

78 In A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, the Inuit expressed their readiness to partner with Arctic states.


Security challeNGeS iN the Greater North

While the existing and potential future

challenges to Canada’s sovereignty in

the Arctic have received a fair amount

of attention and are relatively clear, other security

challenges in the Greater North are not as well defined

or understood. Canada would benefit greatly from a

comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment that

takes regional differences in the Greater North into

account, examines all hazards, and considers the

linkages between economic development and security.

Northern communities differ significantly in the maturity of their socio-economic development .

Northern security extends well beyond issues related to

Canada’s sovereignty. It includes the protection of people,

infrastructure, and the environment against all hazards

in Canada’s Greater North. It is also about mitigation,

emergency response, and recovery when major natural

or human-caused incidences occur. While there are

some threats—such as forest fires and floods—that are

well known, there are other threats—such as pandemics,

industrial accidents, organized crime, illegal trafficking in

drugs and people, and (eco-)terrorism—whose particular

significance and consequences in the North are less well

known. Furthermore, there is a lack of understanding of

the vulnerabilities associated with these threats to critical

infrastructure (particularly energy-related infrastructure),

Northern communities, and the environment.

threatS aNd vulNerabilitieSThe Greater North is highly diverse in terms of geography

and climate, and Northern communities differ significantly

in the maturity of their socio-economic development and,

therefore, the nature of the threats that they face. Cities

that have benefited from resource development, such

Northern Security

chaPter 3

chapter Summary � Northern security extends well beyond issues

related to Canada’s sovereignty. It includes the protection of people, infrastructure, and the environment against all hazards in Canada’s Greater North.

� Northerners are concerned that the security implications of the effects of climate change and the resulting broad range of economic development activity have not been assessed in a comprehensive way.

� Megaprojects and other types of economic development in the Greater North have brought valuable goods and money to the region—but have also resulted in a variety of illegal activities.



as Fort McMurray, face different security threats than

smaller and more isolated communities, such as those

that lie at the northern edge of the Canadian Arctic.

Interviews with some 30 subject-matter experts and

Northern leaders have shown that a comprehensive

assessment of the security risks that could affect the

people, critical infrastructure, and the environment of

the North continues to be lacking. This rings particularly

true with respect to the long-term consequences of climate

change and the potential effects of increasing economic

development activities on the security of Northerners

and their environment.

cliMate chaNGe aNd Security

Climate change has begun to reduce the environmental

impediments to operations in the North and sparked

private sector interest in exploring opportunities for

shipping, oil and gas, and mining. Northerners are

concerned that the security implications of the effects

of climate change and the resulting broad range of eco-

nomic development activity have not been assessed in a

comprehensive way. While the current (and some future

potential) effects are known and the implications relatively

clear, others are less certain.

Navigation in the arctic is particularly challenging—it is not very well mapped and conditions keep changing .

The warming effects of climate change on permafrost

soil have started to endanger the stability of pipelines

and other essential infrastructure, such as roads that

connect Northern communities to the outside world

or provide access to remote commercial facilities in

the Greater North.1

Increased shipping in and through the Arctic would

inevitably lead to a greater probability of accidents,

pollution, and negative effects on marine life in the

Arctic Ocean. On July 16, 2010, two ice-rated tankers

1 Alfred Wegener Institute, “Will the Permafrost Soils in Alaska and Siberia Thaw?”

registered to a Russian company collided while attempting

to navigate the Northeast passage between Murmansk and

Chukotka in Russia’s Far East. They were under escort of

two Russian nuclear powered ice-breakers. While it was

reported that there was no leakage of their loads of diesel

fuel, Russian officials conceded that the collision occurred

in difficult ice conditions exacerbated by poor visibility.2

Navigation in the Arctic is particularly challenging

because the region is not very well mapped and condi-

tions keep changing, partly due to the fluctuation of

extreme temperatures. Another example of the chal-

lenges of navigating Arctic waters came in August

2010 when a cruise ship ran aground after hitting an

unmapped rock approximately 55 nautical miles west

of Kugluktuk, Nunavut.3

the increase in transit traffic is hard to predict, but shipping companies that already supply Northern communities can be expected to pick up more business .

The opening of the Northwest Passage due to melting sea

ice has some observers speculating that it might eventu-

ally become a viable navigation route for commercial

shipping, mainly because it is significantly shorter than

currently used routes between major commercial centres.

However, a recent survey by Frédéric Lasserre of Laval

University suggests that international shipping companies

may not be as interested in using the Northwest Passage

as these observers believe.4 Others have raised similar

doubts.5 The concrete increase in transit traffic is hard

to predict, but shipping companies that already supply

Northern communities can be expected to pick up more

business as economic activity on land increases.

The number of military naval vessels traversing the Arctic

Ocean is believed to be on the rise, given the strategic

importance of the region. The number of scientific mis-

sions and expeditions into the Arctic Ocean has already

2 BarentsObserver.com, “Arctic Oil Tankers Collided.”

3 Canadian Press, “Cruise Ship Exploring Northwest Passage Runs Aground.”

4 Weber, “Cold Shoulder: Little Shipping Interest in Ice-Free Northwest Passage.”




started to increase. Cruise ships are increasingly sailing

to Arctic waters during summer months. Marine traffic

to an increasing number of offshore infrastructures used

for the exploration of oil and gas fields can be expected to

increase as well. Oil companies are considering invest-

ments in the exploration of the Arctic seabed and have

applied for drilling licences in the Beaufort Sea and the

eastern Arctic waterway of the Davis Strait. Extracting

oil and gas in the Arctic Ocean has particular challenges

that have raised concern about an elevated potential for

accidents and oil spills that could be difficult to respond

to and clean up.6

rarely is additional funding provided to address the increase in criminal activity that comes with new-found wealth .

One of the greatest challenges of dealing with the con-

sequences of climate change and the implications of

aggressive economic development in the North may prove

to be the already limited capability of local and federal

governments to respond to the threats they will increas-

ingly face, and a lack of resources to properly respond to

those threats. The expected increase in human activity in

the North, combined with the evolving effects of climate

change, will make the public safety and emergency man-

agement resource gap an increasingly pressing concern.7

ecoNoMic develoPMeNt aNd criMe

Across the Greater North, planned “megaprojects” and

other economic activities mean growth potential for the

participating companies and the promise of opportunity

for local communities. But these projects also increase

the likelihood of criminal activity when Northern

employees return home to their communities with sig-

nificant amounts of money in their pockets. While the

corporations that are developing the sites are expected

6 CBC News, “Oil Spill Raises Arctic Offshore Drilling Concerns.”

7 Regan Watts. In-person interview with The Conference Board of Canada. May 31, 2010.

to provide security for their facilities, there is rarely any

adjustment to the policing reference level for the com-

munities in the vicinity of those facilities—no additional

funding is provided to address the increase in criminal

activity that comes with the new-found wealth.8

Current and future economic development activities and

opportunities include natural resource extraction, con-

struction of various forms of infrastructure, and electricity

generation and transmission. Many of the projects that

are currently under way or planned can be characterized

as “megaprojects” due to their size, the effort required to

bring them to operation, and the prospective high rate of

return on investment.

the drug trade has become a significant problem in Northern communities .

Megaprojects and other types of economic development

in the Greater North have brought valuable goods and

cash to the region but have also resulted in a variety

of illegal activities. Organized crime has arrived in

Northern communities, mainly in the form of street or

youth gangs based on those in the South. This criminal

activity has gained from economic development, and

organized crime is focusing its recruitment efforts on the

local youth and on residents of correctional facilities who

eventually will return to Northern communities. The drug

trade (involving, for example, the use of small planes for

drop-in operations) has become a significant problem in

Northern communities.9

Smugglers and organized crime groups, such as human

traffickers and drug dealers, may increasingly see access

to North America through the North as a business

opportunity. The relative isolation of the many small

communities will be a deterrent in the near term, but as

time passes and increased numbers of people arrive in

8 Sgt. Steven McVarnock. Phone interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 26, 2010.

9 Vince Hawkes. Phone interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 23, 2010.



the Arctic as a result of economic growth and resource

exploitation, these types of activities are likely to

increase if no action is taken.10

Terrorist groups may also view the newly opened north-

ern access to North America as viable routes for moving

people and weapons, as the northern border will be harder

to control than borders further south. Meeting this chal-

lenge would require a high degree of cooperation and

trust among the five Arctic nations and other countries

dealing with the threat of terrorism.11

GoverNaNce challeNGeS

Canadian efforts to provide comprehensive security and

public safety in all regions of the Greater North have been

encumbered by a shortage of locally available resources

and shortcomings in governance.

Most regions in the Greater North do not have the resources needed to deal effectively with a range of current and future security challenges .

What has become evident is that most regions in the

Greater North do not have the resources needed to deal

effectively with a range of current and future security

challenges, including organized crime, drug abuse, and

street gangs controlled from the South.12 There are

insufficient police services to respond to emergencies,

and the ones that are in place have an overwhelming

workload.13 For example, in addition to their regular

duties in most communities policed by the RCMP in

Nunavut, Mounties frequently act as social services rep-

resentatives and parole officers. The Ontario Provincial

Police (OPP) is regularly called to assist First Nations

10 Michael Byers. In-person interview with The Conference Board of Canada. February 12, 2010; Robert Huebert. In-person interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 8, 2010.

11 Huebert, in-person interview.

12 Hawkes, phone interview.

13 McVarnock, phone interview.

police services on major crimes, and it does so without

the funding required to pay for the additional specialized

policing services that the OPP provides. Two interviewees

stated that some communities in Northern Ontario lack

the ability to maintain infrastructure and equipment

that were purchased through capital funding. The assets

deteriorate quickly due to the lack of operations and

maintenance funding.14

the canadian forces have an ever-increasing role in the partnerships required to provide security in the North .

Emergency management personnel tend to be based in

major cities in the South, and they must monitor security

risks and vulnerabilities not only in the North but in the

Southern regions of their overall jurisdictions as well.

Capacity to deal with security challenges in much of the

Greater North is limited, and public safety resources, such

as search and rescue equipment and personnel, are gen-

erally located far away.

The Canadian Forces have an ever-increasing role in

the partnerships required to provide security in the

North.15 Most federal agencies—with the exception

of the RCMP—lack a broad and distributed presence

in the Arctic and frequently depend on the Canadian

Forces for transportation to and from Arctic locations.

While this would change somewhat if the Canadian

government decided to equip other departments to be

able to operate more independently in the Arctic, the

armed forces will continue to play a central role. Other

countries already train their armed forces to respond

to particular security challenges that require military

skill sets and equipment. Energy security, for example,

has become a major concern for Arctic countries, as

disruptions to the continuous functioning of the related

infrastructures could have serious consequences for their

national economies. As a consequence, Norway has

14 Tom Kontra. Phone interview with The Conference Board of Canada. April 23, 2010; Hawkes, phone interview.

15 McVarnock, phone interview.



recently begun to train its Special Forces teams in the

skills and tactics required to recapture offshore oil-drilling

platforms should they be hijacked by eco-terrorists or

other criminal elements.

But while the Canadian Forces may for the moment be

the best equipped to operate in the Arctic, there are

several security and control tasks related to border

control, environment, search and rescue, and infrastruc-

ture that require the involvement of other responsible

government departments and agencies. The Standing

Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans recently

recommended that the Canadian Coast Guard be better

equipped to address Northern security challenges, and it

said that would involve the Coast Guard having a year-

round Northern operation that is actually administered in

the North. The committee also recognized the role of the

territorial governments and the federal departments of

Indian and Northern Affairs, Fisheries and Oceans,

Environment Canada, Natural Resources, Foreign

Affairs and International Trade, and Transport

Canada.16 (Public Safety Canada was curiously

missing from the list despite its broad responsibility

for the coordination of national security, emergency

management, intelligence, and corrections.)

16 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling Canada’s Arctic Waters.

Climate change is judged by many to be one of the most

pervasive threats—one that will stretch the capacity of

individual organizations and jurisdictions to respond to

the security and safety-related consequences. We know

that the warming effect of climate change is most pro-

nounced in the Arctic and that the consequences could

alter the entire region in a fundamental and unpreced-

ented way.17 In recent years, the interrelationships

between climate change and security have become the

theme of many discussions, publications, and confer-

ences in security circles18 that highlight the need for a

holistic policy response that integrates different levels of

government and divergent priorities between departments

and agencies.

In Canada, too, there is a strong need to improve policy

integration, cooperation, and information sharing among

the various territorial, provincial, federal, and local gov-

ernments, and to raise the degree of coordination among

different departments and agencies on Arctic policy.19

17 Lemmen and others, From Impact to Adaptation.

18 See Bjorn Rutten, The Threat of a Changing Climate; also Yalowitz and others, The Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy Conference, 13.

19 Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling Canada’s Arctic Waters, iii.


While most casual observers tend to associate

security in the North with Arctic geopol-

itics, defence, and economic development,

Northerners themselves have made clear that their con-

ception of security is quite different. Interviews with a

diverse group of Northerners show that their focus is on

the capacity of local communities to provide residents

with the basic necessities of life (e.g., water, food, shelter)

and to enable them to develop a basic level of resiliency—

regardless of whether the identified dangers to the com-

munity are external (security threats) or internal (safety

threats). The largely artificial distinction between public

safety and security has no practical value to them. Given

that capacity building in Northern communities is fre-

quently led, funded, and facilitated from the outside,

the threat of a lack of capacity can be considered by

Northerners to be external (and therefore largely out-

side of their control). It is not surprising that Northern

communities view this problem through a “community

security” lens.

Northerners’ focus is on the capacity of local communities to provide residents with the basic necessities of life and a basic level of resiliency .

Security froM a NortherNer’S PerSPective

In our interviews with researchers, Northern community

representatives, and corporate entities regarding their

interpretations of “security” in Canada’s North, it

became apparent that the traditional interpretations

of security promoted by academics and policy-makers

have little relevance to the experience of a Northerner.

Although each interviewee stressed different challenges

to, and opportunities for, security, each focused on com-

munity-specific threats and opportunities, rather than on

those that might be considered personal or national in

Community Security

chaPter 4

chapter Summary � Northerners are more concerned with the

direct, local, and immediate threats to their community’s sustainability and resiliency than they are with threats whose effects are primarily indirect, remote, and in the future.

� Communities will not be able to thrive unless a basic capacity to meet security needs and build resiliency is provided at the community level.

� Northerners are concerned about the growing potential for environmental accidents caused or aggravated by economic development activity and the inability to respond to such disasters in a timely fashion.



scope. Interviewees confirmed what researchers of the

International Polar Year GAPS (Gas, Arctic Peoples,

and Security) initiative1 and others have noted—namely

that Northerners (and Canada’s Northern indigenous

people in particular) see their “community,” rather than

the individual or the state, as being the primary referent

object of living a secure life.

This may be explained in part by the fact that, for gener-

ations, people in the North—particularly in the Canadian

Arctic and in other remote Northern regions—have had

to rely on their communities or bands for survival in a

hostile environment. Harsh climatic conditions and great

distances between areas of human activity have required

Northerners to focus on their immediate environment and

made questions of national scope less relevant. Today,

Northerners have greater access to goods and services

from the South, but many issues have not changed.

Northerners still face the challenges of low population

density, great distances between communities, and harsh

climatic conditions.

Northerners now have greater access to goods and services from the South, but many issues have not changed, such as great distances and harsh climatic conditions .

Northerners are more concerned with the direct, local,

and immediate threats to their community’s sustain-

ability and resiliency than they are with threats whose

effects are primarily indirect, remote, and in the future.

Northerners believe that their ability to prevent security

incidents from within (e.g., criminalization and radical-

ization of youths) and to recover from the potentially

1 “GAPS” (Gas, Arctic Peoples, and Security) is a fully endorsed International Polar Year (IPY) project and is funded through the Canadian and Norwegian IPY programs. GAPS is a multinational, multidisciplinary initiative that aims to examine the scope and range of human security in the Arctic. GAPS specifically focuses on the impacts of oil and gas activity on climate change and on Arctic peoples, in order to identify and document threats and coping strategies from multiple security perspectives (in Arctic communities and among Arctic researchers). GAPS aims to deliver this knowledge, in cooperation with Arctic communities, to other Arctic communities and to the human security policy and academic communities.

catastrophic consequences of security incidents depends

on the capacity of their communities to provide or attract

the infrastructure, expertise, and funding required for:

� delivering health, education, public safety, and

environmental protection services;

� promoting socio-economic development; and

� building effective community governance.

This report does not claim to provide a definitive definition

of the concept of “community security” or an exhaustive

list of its component parts. Rather it offers the concept of

community security as a catalyst for a broader and more

“North-centric” conversation about security (and safety)

in the North based on conversations and interviews with

Northerners in the context of several research projects

conducted by the Centre for the North. One of these

projects is looking at the conditions of and determinants

for “thriving communities.” The conclusions that can be

drawn from this research include the one that communities

will not be able to thrive unless a basic capacity to meet

security needs and build resiliency is provided at the

community level.

PlaciNG coMMuNity Security iN PerSPective

The concept of “community security” proposed in this

report draws on relevant aspects of both human secur-

ity and societal security, but better captures the specific

security concerns of Northern communities2 in order to

address this distinctly Northern perspective.3

The concept of human security, with its focus on people

(as opposed to territories) and their basic needs (as

opposed to armaments), more closely aligns with these

Northern perspectives on security. However, it still falls

short because the referent object remains the nation rather

than the community—the indicators developed in the 1994

2 For the purpose of this project, a Northern community is defined as a settled group of 100 residents or more congregated in Canada’s North.

3 Duhaime, “Sustainable Development: Questioning the Concept,” 11–45; Zellen, On Thin Ice.



United Nations Human Development Report are designed

to “provide an early warning of whether a country [. . .] is

heading toward social disintegration and possible national

breakdown.”4 Moreover, this definition was originally

designed for developing nations in crisis, especially those

that have suffered violent conflict (such as Afghanistan,

Angola, Haiti, Iraq, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sudan, and

Zaire) as opposed to developing regions of a developed

nation, such as Canada’s North.5 Consequently, while

some indicators of human security (e.g., food security,

job and income security) might be relevant to Northern

communities, other indicators (e.g., human rights viola-

tions, ethnic or religious conflicts) are less relevant.6

More research is needed to confirm the suggested elements of community security and determine their impact on the security and resilience of Northern communities .

The concept of societal security originated in Scandinavia.

“A civil and civilian concept that potentially covers all

non-military risks and threats to society,” it was part

of the updating and reorganizing of the “total defence”

concept used during the Cold War and is designed for

domestic policy-making by developed states.7 The defin-

ition put forth by Esther Brimmer, Director of Research

at the Center for Transatlantic Relations (Paul H. Nitze

School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins

University), does reflect some of the specific security

inter ests of Northerners, including those related to

cohesion (democracy, rule of law and civil liberties,

education, welfare, and pluralism) and physical protec-

tion (infrastructure, public health, natural disaster relief,

environmental quality, and anti-terrorism measures).8

4 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994, 38.

5 Ibid., 42–43.

6 Ibid., 38.

7 Bonin and others, Focal Report 2.

8 Brimmer, “From Territorial Security to Societal Security,” 31.

However, societal security also ultimately focuses on the

nation (i.e., society as a whole) rather than on individual

communities. The concept also:

� presupposes homogeneous socio-economic develop-

ment across society, as well as a relatively mature

national crisis- and risk-management organization

and infrastructure;

� provides advice that is narrowly directed at the

challenges of cooperation and coordination of

local and national resources; and

� focuses on threats to “critical societal functions”

(similar to Canada’s critical infrastructure sectors)

but provides no tools to identify specific threats to

diverse and geographically dispersed communities.

SuGGeSted eleMeNtS of coMMuNity SecurityIt is proposed that “community security” includes the

capacity of a community to recognize and address

threats to, and fulfill opportunities for, meeting its

inhabitants’ basic needs and developing a basic level

of resiliency, including the capacity to:

� promote socio-economic development;

� protect the environment;

� provide health services;

� provide public safety and security; and

� establish effective governance.

Further research is required to confirm these elements

and determine their impact on the security and resilience

of Northern communities. There may be a requirement

for other capacities that have not yet been identified. It

is important to keep in mind that these capacities have

been determined largely based on information from

interviews with Northerners and Northern researchers.

What follows is a discussion of the identified capacities.

The discussion is not intended to be exhaustive; rather,

it is intended to broaden and deepen the conversation

about capacity for security and resiliency at the com-

munity level in Canada’s North.



Socio-ecoNoMic develoPMeNt

Socio-economic security emerged as the key (and perhaps

the broadest) component of community security, encom-

passing adequate social infrastructure (e.g., schools and

skills training, housing, counselling services, social

assistance) and a healthy economy. Risks to Northern

communities include:

� a lack of economic diversity (and thus, job and

skill shortages);

� housing affordability, shortages, crowding, and

poor conditions;

� limited access to education, health, and social services;

� lack of critical (water, energy, transportation,

communication) infrastructure;

� loss of culture and traditional way of life, due to rad-

ical socio-economic and demographic changes; and

� higher rates of drug-related and violent crimes, which

represent risks to the socio-economic development of

many Northern communities.9

In some Northern communities affected by megaprojects,

too great a focus is placed on economic development

rather than community development. Consequently,

infrastructure that supports the community lags behind

that which facilitates commercial projects. Many remote

communities, particularly in the Far North, lack adequate

banking as well as credit and investment facilities. For

example, residents of Baker Lake in Nunavut must rely

on ATMs and the local grocery store to obtain cash

because there is no local bank.10

Northerners feel some deaths could be prevented if Northern communities had better access to search and rescue services .

Findings from an integrated Working Group for a Nunavut

Suicide Prevention Strategy, published in 2010, determined

that “people’s living situations [in Nunavut] have changed

rapidly and radically; that as a result, the traditional ways

are breaking down; and that Inuit today are straddling

9 Sisco and Stonebridge, Toward Thriving Northern Communities.

10 CBC News, “No Bank in Baker Lake Despite Mining Boom.”

two cultures and facing unique challenges.”11 One of the

most devastating manifestations of issues related to culture

loss is “the unprecedented number of suicides and suicide

attempts in recent decades, largely among youth.” 12

eNviroNMeNt

Environmental security concerns in Northern commun-

ities are related primarily to harsh weather conditions

and remoteness of location, climate change, and the

harm inflicted on the environment by natural and man-

made disasters. Compared with the South, the North is

vast, comprising 80 per cent of Canada’s land mass but

only 7 per cent of its population.13 The relative remote-

ness of some communities, combined with the colder

temperatures, wilderness conditions, and the challenges

that are increasingly emerging from climate change

represent major environmental threats to Northerners.

For example, harsh weather conditions and “[t]hin ice

[are] claiming the lives of . . . hunters every year.”14

Northerners feel some of these deaths could be prevented

if Northern communities had better access to search and

rescue services. However, the SAR teams are stationed

far from most of Canada’s remote or hard-to-reach areas.

And while they may be trained in Arctic rescue, they

aren’t located there. As Exhibit 5 shows, the majority

of SAR technicians are stationed in Canada’s southern

regions. Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Trenton, for

example, which commands search and rescue in the

vast majority of Canada’s North, is closer to Quito,

Ecuador, than it is to the Canadian military base at

Alert, Nunavut.

Northerners who were interviewed for this project

expressed concern about the growing potential for

environmental accidents caused or aggravated by

economic development activity and the inability to

11 Bobet, Towards the Development of a Nunavut Suicide Prevention Strategy.

12 Ibid.

13 Based on data from Statistics Canada, “Profile for Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Divisions, and Census Subdivisions, 2006 Census.”

14 Sisco and Stonebridge, Toward Thriving Northern Communities; The Great Warming, “Interview With Sheila Watt-Cloutier.”



respond to such disasters in a timely fashion, given the

limited access to emergency services in some Northern

communities. (They also expressed similar concerns

regarding natural disasters.)

health

According to some interviewees, economic development

is frequently initiated in Northern communities without

provision of the necessary essential health services.

Generally, research participants viewed this as an out-

come of poor policy planning and coordination at and

between all levels of government. The “[l]ack of local

hospitals and shortage of health professionals, and food

and water security issues are all contributing factors

to poor health outcomes in Northern communities.”15

Community representatives did not make reference to

local concerns regarding contaminants in traditional or

“country” food sources, but researchers in the natural


exhibit 5Search and Rescue Technicians in Canada

Source: The Centre for the North (The Conference Board of Canada).

Comox, BCCold Lake, AB

Winnipeg, MB

Trenton, ON

Bagotville, QC

Goose Bay, NL

Gander, NL

Greenwood, NS

VictoriaSRR

TrentonSRR

HalifaxSRR

434

17

29

4

4

12

27

Legend: Search and rescue regions (SRR) and search and rescue technicians

Trenton SRR Halifax SRRVictoria SRRNorth–South boundaryNumber of SAR techs43



sciences have noted that they are finding increased levels

of various carcinogens and other contaminants, such as

methyl mercury, in Northern marine and wildlife.16

Indeed, a forthcoming Conference Board of Canada

report notes that “country food is often contaminated

with toxins that global atmospheric and oceanic currents

bring to the Arctic, including persistent organic contamin-

ants (e.g., PCBs, DDT, chlordale, and toxaphene), heavy

metals (e.g., arsenic, cadmium, lead, nickel, mercury),

sulphur and nitrogen compounds, radioactive contamina-

tion, and oil pollution. These toxins then enter the food

chain and threaten the wildlife as well as the people who

depend on hunting, fishing, and gathering for their major

food sources.”17 Further, food security is an especially

prevalent concern among Northern communities without

outbound road access because food staples arrive only by

air—and air transport is dependent on favourable weather

conditions. Moreover, the cost of flying in goods inflates

the cost of food staples, making them less affordable.18

Public Safety aNd Security

Community representatives noted that access to reliable

and immediate emergency and police services in Northern

communities is often challenged by both the limited size

16 Alaska Native Science Commission, “Transboundary Arctic Contamination.”


18 Ibid.

of police units and the long distances between specialized

police and other emergency responders. Interviewees in

the Northern communities all shared a concern about pub-

lic safety, particularly with regards to high rates of crime.

According to statistics from the 2006 census, Northern

regions have much higher crime rates than seen in the

South.19 Further, these higher crime rates in the North

have been linked to “rapid, large-scale population growth

in some, largely resource-based, communities, as well as

low education and employment.”20

Political GoverNaNce

Community representatives and Northern researchers

have all noted that local governance is often adequate in

terms of its commitment to the security of the community.

However, intergovernmental relations and jurisdictional

barriers often inhibited the capacity of local governments

and community members to address common security

concerns. A lack of intergovernmental communications

and consultations has, in some instances, led to juris-

dictional overlap and conflict that can slow approval

processes and inhibit the overall effectiveness of policy

development and implementation.21

19 Ibid.; Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Security—Crime Rates.”


21 Ibid.


This report examined three dimensions of security

in the North—Arctic security, Northern security,

and community security—in order to provide a

more comprehensive picture of the security challenges

in Canada’s North. Arctic security refers to the protection

of Canada’s sovereignty and of its Arctic territory, people,

and environment from remote threats and undesired

influences. Northern security includes the protection

and resilience of people, critical infrastructure, and the

environment against all threats and hazards. The third

dimension—community security—is the most important

for Northerners. They see the community—rather than

the individual, the state, or the nation—as the primary

referent object of living a secure life. Community secur-

ity includes the capacity of a community to recognize

and address threats to, and fulfill opportunities for,

meeting its inhabitants’ basic needs and developing

a basic level of resiliency.

the third dimension—community security—is the most important for Northerners .

Security in Canada’s Greater North cannot be adequately

understood through Southern conceptions of security

alone. We need to build a lens that takes the local and

regional particularities in the North into account and

allows us to factor in the cultural and socio-economic

development context in all its diversity across the

Greater North. This report develops the concept of

community security, based primarily on interviews with

Northerners (public officials, private sector executives,

and researchers). More work is needed to deepen and

broaden our understanding of the community dimension

of security in Canada’s North. Specifically, this concept

could be better understood via a comprehensive and

region-specific threat assessment in the North and the

Conclusion

chaPter 5

chapter Summary � This report examines three dimensions of

security in the North in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the security challenges facing Canada’s North.

� Security in Canada’s Greater North cannot be adequately understood through Southern conceptions of security alone.

� More work is needed to deepen and broaden our understanding of the community dimension of security in Canada’s North.



development of a set of clear indicators that identify and

measure the security needs and the capacity to provide

security and build resilience of a given community in

these regions. This broadened understanding and future

defined set of indicators could be used to enhance our

understanding of the essential elements that determine

the resilience of that community.

As the level of community security within the hundreds

of communities in Canada’s North is better understood,

this knowledge will better guide the development of pub-

lic policies, strategies, and programs that can address the

greatest threats to the security and resilience of Canada’s

Northern communities.


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