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Security KritikContentsSecurity Kritik11NC42NC9Links10Economy11Environment12Generic14Hegemony17Humanitarianism18Terrorism20War22Warming23Impacts24Violence25Environment26Extinction30Root Cause31Policy Paralysis32VTL33Alt34Alt Security Discussions35Alt Solves Ecology36Alt Solves - Politics38Alt Sovles - Education40Perm42Reps Debate45Reps Shape Reality46Reps First48Reps matter49Realism51Realism Bad52Realism Is False54AT: Realism Inevitable57K Tricks58Case is a Lie59Prediction Impossible62Prior Question63Serial Policy Failure (Environment)64FW65FW K First66FW Discourse Key68Epistemology First70A2 Section73Cede The Political74Extinction First75Threats Real77Util78AFF79Always VTL80Epistemology Defense81Epistemological Focus Bad82Empiricism Good83Predictions Good84Realism Good85Impact Framing87Extinction First88Impact Turns89A2: Ethics90Perm Key to Confront Threats91Perm Includes Realism92Boggs93Alt Turns94Discourse/representations96Impact D war97Impact D Structural Violence98Environmental Threats Real99Biosecurity Solves100

1NCThe 1AC creates a never ending chain of threats, creating a sense of inevitable securitization of internal relations. We must attempt to reject forms of security rhetoricGrondin 04(David, Assistant Professor, Member of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Ph.D., Political Science (International Relations and American Studies), Universit du Qubec Montral, Montral, 2008. M.A., International Relations, University of Toronto, Toronto, 2001. B.A., American History, Universit du Qubec Montral, Montral, 2000. Rethinking the political from a Poststructualist Stance http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf) //ACTNeorealist and neoclassical realism offer themselves up as a narrative of the world institutional order. Critical approaches must therefore seek to countermemorialize those whose lives and voices have been variously silenced in the process of strategic practices (Klein, 1994: 28). The problem, as revealed in the debate between gatekeepers of the subfield of Strategic Studies (Walt, 1991), is that those analyses that contravene the dominant discourse are deemed insignificant by virtue of their differing ontological and epistemological foundations. Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as national security have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, [] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the real world, a world that only exists in the analysts own narratives. In this light, Barry Posens political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War 11U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. [] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that [d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. [] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how `ctures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as the state is a rational unitary actor, the state is the main actor in international relations, states pursue power defined as a national interest, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derians genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for. 10 These scholars cannot refer to the essentially contested nature of realism and then use realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, [] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere relativism and/or to endless deconstruction in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of national security. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the Cold War. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the reality of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as reality. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts, 12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a national security state. 14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War,the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992:76). The term national security state designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology the discourse that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined Americas national identity by reference to the un-American other, usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge it would have amounted to an act of disloyalty (Hogan, 1998: 18). 15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the new national security ideology. It posits an American way, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the countrys democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which to say is to do, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, [] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious national unity on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence a power socially constructed, following Max Webers work on the ethic of responsibility to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the unified Self, the national society (the nation). 16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft, 17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the states very conditions of existence are generated 18.

Securitization creates all possibility for violenceFriis 2000(Karaten, UN Sector at Norweigan Intitute of International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies, From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2) //ACT The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital O). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of ontological security, which means ...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls strangers). This is because they ...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized, and does not threaten the community, ...but the possibility of ordering itself (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneurs mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: Over and over again we see that the liberals within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Nortons (1988:55) words, The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self. Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of daily security. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its innocent reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a natural necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total solution (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

The alternative is to reject the 1ACs security rhetoric

Only a critical analysis of IR can create better education and policy makingBiswas 07(Shampa, International Relations Theorist, Millennium Journal of International Studies Dec 1st 2007, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/36/1/117.full.pdf+html) //ACTOne of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of liberal bias and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and concerned citizen groups within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying professionalisation that goes with it. Expressing concern with academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a culture of professionalism where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular expert cultures have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)16. The most serious threat to the intellectual vocation, he argues, is professionalism and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of specializations and the cult of expertise with their focus on relatively narrow areas of knowledge, technical formalism, impersonal theories and methodologies, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power. 17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as organic intellectuals involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of intellectual articulation.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where relevance is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Saids searing indictment of US intellectuals policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic for or against and costs and benefits analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of intellectual relevance that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21 It is not surprising that the cult of expertise that is increasingly driving the study of global politics has occurred in conjunction with a larger depoliticisation of many facets of global politics, which since the 1980s has accompanied a more general prosperity-bred complacency about politics in the Anglo-European world, particularly in the US. There are many examples of this. It is evident, for instance, in the understanding of globalisation as TINA market-driven rationality inevitable, inexorable and ultimately, as Thomas Friedmans many writings boldly proclaim, apolitical.22 If development was always the anti-politics machine that James Ferguson so brilliantly adumbrated more than a decade ago, it is now seen almost entirely as technocratic aid and/or charitable humanitarianism delivered via professionalised bureaucracies, whether they are IGOs or INGOs.23 From the more expansive environmental and feminist-inspired understandings of human security, understandings of global security are once again increasingly being reduced to (military) strategy and global democratisation to technical recipes for regime change and good governance. There should be little surprise in such a context that the war on terror has translated into a depoliticised response to a dehistoricised understanding of the roots of terror. For IR scholars, reclaiming politics is a task that will involve working against the grain of expertise-oriented professionalism in a world that increasingly understands its own workings in apolitical terms. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic for or against and costs and benefits analysis can simply not be raised.2NCLinksEconomyEconomics expands security threats to marketsthe desire to achieve economic security authorizes wars to protect world systems of capital.Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, "Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End" ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html)Today, a similar set of circumstances, brought on by economic globalization, seems to be developing and imposing costs and risks on the very people it is intended to benefit. In this context, talk of "economic security" becomes, once again, a speech act that seeks to legitimate a policy that promises very real insecurity for many. The market is a place full of risks, and only those who are willing to take risks in the market are likely to reap great benefits; given the logic of the market, these same individuals also risk bankruptcy and personal economic insecurity (an outcome only too evident in Orange County California's declaration of bankruptcy and Mexico's economic travails). Indeed, as Beverly Crawford's chapter seems to suggest, in a world of economic globalism, in which states must collaborate to foster global capitalism, and the processes of production, consumption, and accumulation become decoupled from individual states, it becomes more and more difficult to constitute an Other that might be transformed into a threatening enemy, thereby legitimating the differential degrees of personal and national security awarded by the market. We have seen some feeble efforts, based on notions of economic competitiveness and technological innovation, and given illustration in Michael Crichton's xenophobic and misogynistic Rising Sun, but these seem not to be very persuasive. A few argue that we (the United States) must become more like the Other (Japan) if we are to be made secure. 16 How different this is from the world(s) of Morgenthau and Waltz! Business and capital are only too aware of this paradox, whereas the world of states and military power seems blissfully oblivious to it. For capital, there are no enemies, only competitors; indeed, the market, while competitive, is a realm of cooperation, not conflict, as is often assumed. 17 Markets are rule-governed institutions and, to get along, you must go along. In the marketplace, nonexclusive identities are prized, not shunned, and multiple identities are encouraged in the name of consumer taste and "autonomy." This world is, as Kenichi Ohmae puts it, truly "borderless." 18 Not only are there no borders between countries, there are no borders between market and consumer, either. What can security possibly mean in such a world? Not everyone is, of course, a participant in the market; indeed, there are billions of people and dozens of countries that are not. In spite of warnings about instability as the "enemy," these people and "states" are neither enemies nor threats to us in either an objective or intersubjective sense. Rather, the places in which many of them are found are more akin to realms constituted or consumed by chaos. The inhabitants of these zone participate in neither statist politics nor global markets as we understand them, not so much out of choice or desire as out of the logic of economic globalization driven by capitalism and the industrial coalition. But these zones of chaos are not just places "outside" of space or time; paradoxically, perhaps, they are sites of political experimentation, from which are emerging "world systems" that, if successful, could ultimately undermine the relative orderliness of the peaceful zones of the industrial coalition.

EnvironmentEnvironmental conflict is linked to security concernsDetraz 11[Nicole: International Relations, University of Memphis "Threats or Vulnerabilities?" August 2011, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v011/11.3.detraz.html, CL]The environmental conflict discourse links the environment and environmental problems to traditional security concerns, including a general concern for state security. Most authors who use an environmental conflict discourse focus on the possibility that groups within society will engage in violent conflict over natural resources. These conflicts can be the product of scarcity13, abundance14, or dependence15 on natural resources and are typically understood to threaten the stability of the state. The primary challenge is to identify those most immediately at risk of conflict and design policy interventions to avoid conflict and ensure state stability. This is largely understood to be the responsibility of state institutions. Due to the sense of urgency embedded in this discourse, policies are likely to be aimed at short-term adaptation strategies as a means of avoiding violent conflict. The environmental security discourse is concerned with the negative impacts of environmental degradation for human beings. While environmental conflict is largely state-centric and can still directly be linked to military security, environmental security is much more closely linked to notions of security at an individual level, or human security.16 It is important to note, however, that the concerns embedded in environmental security are more specific than the general concept of human security, which can refer to anything that negatively impacts the safety and survival of humans. In this discourse, the threat is located in negative consequences of environmental damage and those who are vulnerable are all human beings.17 This concept of human vulnerability is widely used in general discussions of global environmental change, and climate change in particular.18 According to Gaillard, much of the literature on vulnerability focuses on "the susceptibility to suffer damage in a potentially dangerous event, either natural, economic or political."19 In the context of these debates, vulnerability stresses the condition of humans being susceptible to individual and collective harm because of environmental change.

Environment destruction rhetoric uses Cold War thinking and justifies violence and structural violenceFranke 04(Volker, McDaniel College of Swag, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era Sage Publications, 2004, p.155-157, pdf) //ACTThe title of Jon Barnetts book The Meaning of Environmental Security suggests an effort to tackle one of the issuesenvironmental degradationwhose importance had been masked by Cold War-era concerns over nuclear war and the spread of communism. But Barnetts book does much more than that. It provides a piercing critique of the traditional security discourse that convincingly shows how conventional (Cold War) thinking obscures both the causes and consequences of environmental degradation and its effects on human security. While environmental security has traditionally focused on conflict over scarce resources and its prevention at the state level, Barnett provides readers with an alternative way to conceptualize security based on environmental justice and peaceful methods for resolving social and political inequities. Although Barnetts book is specifically about environmental security, its greatest benefit lies in the fact that its human-centered approach to conflict resolution can serve as a useful frame for addressing the security needs of people in other areas in the twenty-first century. Barnetts attempt to place lived experiences of real people at the heart of his reformulated conception of environmental security provides a constructive extension of many purely theoretical attempts to reframe security after the Cold War. Barnett provides a succinct outline of both traditional and critical approaches to environmental security and very effectively deconstructs how traditionalists have misidentified the security needs of the twentyfirst century. Environmental insecurity has traditionally been defined either in terms of threats to national security that arise directly from environmental degradation, or in terms of the human impacts on the security of the environment itself (ecological security). Barnett discusses each of these understandings in detail and points to their respective shortcomings. Those shortcomings lead him to advocate a third approach, namely to understand environmental security in terms of the ways in which environmental degradation threatens the security of people. For Barnett, environmental degradation and insecurity are a product of the structural inequalities inherent in the development/underdevelopment dynamic. Environmental insecurity, or the vulnerability of people to the effects of environmental degradation (p. 17), is caused either by resource scarcities or by the overloading of planetary sinks (i.e., the accumulation of wastes emitted from dispersed sources combined with the biospheres decreased capacity to absorb these wastes). Defined this way, environmental insecurity becomes a social problem that is magnified by globalization and modern consumption patterns. Barnett explains that this overconsumption and lack of redistribution produces a double insecurity whereby longstanding vulnerabilities arising from underdevelopment and impoverishment are compounded by an intensifying suite of risks associated with environmental degradation (p. 20). Using many concrete examples, Barnett convincingly illustrates that while environmental insecurity is a problem of adaptation for the developed industrialized West, in the underdeveloped parts of the world it is a matter of life and death (p. 21). Following his description of the security problems that await us in the twenty-first century, Barnett discusses traditional conceptions of security as the constitutive principle of the modern nation-state as found in classical Realist theories of security. He summarizes a number of the commonly voiced criticisms against this conception, from conceptualizing security solely in terms of military power to the poststructuralist critique that for all the emphasis placed on the integrity of nation-state, there is a general absence of theorization about the nation state itself (p. 29). Expectedly, this analysis leads to a discussion of the securitization of others (i.e., the identification of others who threaten the cohesion of the nation-state, thereby legitimizing extreme measuressuch as the use of force against outsiders, surveillance tactics, and control of political activity within the statetaken to ensure national survival). In this context, Barnett carefully examines the thesis that environmental degradation will lead to violent conflict and concludes that it commonly serves to justify existing institutions and traditional methods of conflict resolution. The thesis, Barnett argues, assumes that people in the South will resort to violence in times of resource scarcity. Consequently, it legitimizes the ethnocentric juxtaposition of the barbaric, primeval other against the civilized self, thus justifying attempts by the North to maintain order. One of the highlights of the book is certainly chapter 6.

Generic

The 1AC creates a never ending chain of threats, creating a sense of inevitable securitization of internal relations. We must attempt to reject forms of security rhetoricGrondin 04(David, Assistant Professor, Member of the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Ph.D., Political Science (International Relations and American Studies), Universit du Qubec Montral, Montral, 2008. M.A., International Relations, University of Toronto, Toronto, 2001. B.A., American History, Universit du Qubec Montral, Montral, 2000. Rethinking the political from a Poststructualist Stance http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/rewriting_national_security_state.pdf) //ACTNeorealist and neoclassical realism offer themselves up as a narrative of the world institutional order. Critical approaches must therefore seek to countermemorialize those whose lives and voices have been variously silenced in the process of strategic practices (Klein, 1994: 28). The problem, as revealed in the debate between gatekeepers of the subfield of Strategic Studies (Walt, 1991), is that those analyses that contravene the dominant discourse are deemed insignificant by virtue of their differing ontological and epistemological foundations. Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as national security have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, [] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the real world, a world that only exists in the analysts own narratives. In this light, Barry Posens political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War 11U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. [] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that [d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. [] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how `ctures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as the state is a rational unitary actor, the state is the main actor in international relations, states pursue power defined as a national interest, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derians genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for. 10 These scholars cannot refer to the essentially contested nature of realism and then use realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, [] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere relativism and/or to endless deconstruction in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of national security. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the Cold War. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the reality of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as reality. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts, 12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a national security state. 14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War,the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992:76). The term national security state designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology the discourse that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined Americas national identity by reference to the un-American other, usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge it would have amounted to an act of disloyalty (Hogan, 1998: 18). 15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the new national security ideology. It posits an American way, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the countrys democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which to say is to do, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, [] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious national unity on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence a power socially constructed, following Max Webers work on the ethic of responsibility to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the unified Self, the national society (the nation). 16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft, 17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the states very conditions of existence are generated 18.

HegemonyPrimacy discourse ascribes fear to potential challengersmilitarized responses and war are inevitable with balance-of-power policies.Campbell 98 (David, Campbell, professor International Politics at University of New Castle, "Writing Security; United States Foreign Policy the Politics of Identity" p. 31-33)Most important just as the source of danger has never been fixed, neither has the identity that it was said to threaten. The contours of this identity have been the subject of constant (re)writing; no rewriting in the sense of changing the meaning, but rewriting in the sense of inscribing something so that which is contingent and subject to flux is rendered more permanent. While one might have expected few if any references to national values or purposes in confidential prepared for the inner sanctum of national security policy (after all, don't they know who they are or what they represent?) the texts of foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America. In this sense, the texts that guided national security policy did more than simply offer strategic analysis of the "reality" they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with the scripting of a particular American identity. Stamped "Top Secret" and read by only the select and power few, the texts effaced the boundary between inside and outside with their quasi-Puritan figurations. In employing this mode of representation, the foreign policy texts of the postwar period recalled the seventeenth-century literary genre of the jeremiad, or political sermon, in which Puritan preachers combined searing critiques with appeals for spiritual renewal. Later to establish the interpretive framework for national identity, these exhortations drew on a European tradition of preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to instill the desire for order but they added a distinctly affirmative moment: The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand - which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old War ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless "progressivist" energies required for the success of the venture. The European jeremiad thrived on anxiety, of course. Like all "Traditionalist" forms of ritual, it used fear and trembling to teach acceptance of fixed social norms. But the American jeremiad went much further. It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. The very concept of errand after all, implied a state of unfulfillment. The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England's Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome. Whereas the Puritan jeremiads were preached b y religious figures in public, the national security planners entreated in private the urgency of the manifold dangers confronting the republic. But the refrains of their political sermons have occupied a prominent place in postwar political discourse. On two separate occasions (first in 1950, and t hen in 196), private citizens with close ties to the foreign policy bureaucracy established a "Committee on the Present Danger" to alert a public they perceived as lacking resolve and will to necessity of confronting the political and military threat of communism and the Society Union. More recently, with Pentagon planners concerned about the "guerillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives" said to be "nibbling away" at the United States, proclamations that the fundamental values of the country are under threat have been no less insistent. As Oliver North announced to the U.S. Congress: "It is very important for the American people to know that this is a dangerous world; that we live at risk and that this nation is at risk in a dangerous world." And in a State Department report, the 1990s were foreshadowed as an era in which divergent political critiques nonetheless would seek equally to overcome the "corruption" and "profligacy" induced by the "loss" of "American purpose" in Vietnam the "moral renewal." To this end, the rendering of Operation Desert Shield-turn-Storm as an overwhelming exhibition of America's rediscovered mission stands as testament. The cold war, then , was both a struggle that exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union and a struggle into which any number of potential candidates, regardless of their strategic capacity, were slotted as a threat. In this sense, the collapse, overcoming, or surrender of one of the protagonists at this historical junction does not mean "it" is over. The cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if we recall that the phrase cold war was coined by a fourteenth century Spanish writer to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, we come to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase demotes is a struggle over identity: a struggle that is no context-specific and thus not rooted in the existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union. Besides, the United States-led war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western (and particularly American) interpretive dispositions that predominated in the post-World War II international environment - with their zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all response, and the willingness to draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between us and them - were not specific to one state or ideology. As a consequence, we need to rethink the convention understanding of foreign policy, and the historicity of the cold war in particular.

HumanitarianismHumanitarianism used by the aff has become synonymous with military actions and must be questionedDillon & Reid 2000(Michael, Julian, researches politics, security and war & PhD in Politics, Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency Sage Publications, Jan 2000, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644986)//ATLiberal humanitarians have, for example, become politicized, geopolitically ambitious, and sometimes warlike in pursuit of lib- eral peace. They have also found themselves in alliance with the institutions of international political economy and governance as well as with branches of the military. Increasingly, the policies and practices of "political conditionally" are also suborning them. Deals and contracts have inevitably to be struck with local political groupings in order that aid might be delivered to the needful in areas of political turbulence. Political conditionality is, however, more than this local pragmatism. At a policy level, it refers to the ways in which government and international-aid agencies are in- creasingly making the delivery of aid conditional on the recipients meeting the good governance criteria that global liberal politics specifies for them. At a local level, it means calibrating the deliv- ery of aid to effect the internal politics and maneuvering of war- ring groups so that political settlements sought by international coalitions - such as the one, for example, that currently manages Bosnia - might be secured. In order both for policy-level practices and local political arm twisting to work, governments and inter- national organizations must secure the compliance of the large number of nongovernmental organizations that populate the zones of "complex emergency." These of course provide many sig- nificant conduits for aid. The vast majority of them are, however, effectively the subcontractors of governmental organizations and of international agencies. Their prized independence is problem- atic, and their classification as nongovernmental is sometimes equally so. Effecting political conditionality requires their participation. To the extent, however, that they comply - and their very capacity to resource themselves and operate may be intimately de- pendent upon their good standing with these governmental and international agencies - their "impartiality" and humanitarian ideals are compromised. In such circumstances, they run the deadly risk of becoming identified as active participants in conflicts rather than impartial ministers to the needy and afflicted that are created by them. But many NGOs are not mere passive victims of this develop- ment, as it were, squeezed by the demands of political condition- ality. They themselves also actively promote political conditionally inasmuch as they, too, pursue a liberal agenda of promoting human rights, accountability, and the formations and practices of civil society. In this, then, they are willing allies of political condi- tionality rather than suborned humanitarians. The distinction between the political and the humanitarian that has created the space for humanitarian action is often thus conflated by the actions and ambitions of NGOs as much as it is by the good-governance policies and political conditionality pursued by governments. Needless to add, the distinction between civil and military that helps underwrite the category humanitarian is one that has also been conflated by the theory and practice of modern war. Much is made of the ways in which the insurgency and coun- terinsurgency conflicts and ethnic violence of the developing world do this. But the process began in the developed world - with the introduction, for example, of total war, strategic bombing, the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, and the adoption of (nuclear) deterrent strategies. Some of these continue to deter- mine the formulation of official defense and strategic policies there. In sum, bipolarity once allowed subscription to the liberal dis- tinctions of civil/military, humanitarian/political, and governmental/nongovernmental to effect a "humanitarian" position that eschewed the political realism of the ideological conflict of the Cold War. Humanitarianism claimed then to be a space that was itself a kind of zone of indistinction. That is to say, here relief was on offer irrespective of religious, political, or other distinctions. The advent of global liberal governance now represents the official propagation, however, of such distinctions, together with their al- lied governmental practices and institutions. These have become one of the principle means by which global power currently cir- culates and operates. In doing so, global liberal governance quite literally threatens nongovernmental and humanitarian agencies with recruitment into the very structures and practices of power against which they previously defined themselves. Where once they practiced and enjoyed the space afforded by the claim that they were without power - specifically, power politics - it is evident now that they are not. Major nongovernmental humanitarian relief and development agencies are often also structured more like and operate more like multinational corporations than voluntary workers. Their spokesmen and women act and sound like the se- nior international diplomats and policymakers that they are. As hu- manitarian NGOs increasingly devote themselves to the promotion of liberal governmental policies - for example those of trans- parency and accountability - they, too, have to meet penetrating questions about the legitimacy, accountability, and transparency of their own practices. Doing good, especially by insisting on follow- ing the Hippocratic injunction to do no harm - the classic gov- ernmental maneuver of effecting power by denying one's own po- liticality - is a fiction now increasingly difficult to sustain in the context of global liberal governance. TerrorismTerrorism discourse masks state violence and represents the legitimation of the international security crisis.Der Derian 1995 (James Der Derian, Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, Arms, Hostages, and the Importance of Shredding in Earnest: Reading the National Security Culture)Just as Nietzsche alleged the precession of meaning to facts, North-the factotum of terror and counter-terror-preceded the factoids of terrorism. To be sure, there are some commonly accepted "facts" about international terrorism. A selection of Rand corporation documents on international terrorism reveals the following: over the last ten years terrorists have seized over fifty embassies and consulates, held the oil ministers of eleven states hostage; kidnapped hundreds of diplomats, businessmen and journalists; made several hundred million dollars in ransom money; assassinated Lord Mountbatten and President Sadat and the former premier of Italy, attempted to assassinate the president of France, the Pope, and Alexander Haig (a near miss with a rocket launcher when he was supreme allied commander of NATO). Terrorist incidents and their severity have increased over the last ten years, but most terrorist actions involve few or no casualties: they are symbolic acts of violence. Compared to the ruthlessness and destructiveness of states, or even to natural disasters, terrorism is a mere nuisance. Yet it is cause for crises of state, media spasms on a seismic scale, and the hyper-production of institutes, conferences, and books on terrorism. Why is this? International terrorism does represent a crisis, but not in terms of body-counts or a revolutionary threat to the states-system. On a political level, the simulacrum of terrorism, that is, the production of a hyperreal threat of violence, anticipates a crisis of legitimation.9 What this means is that international terrorism is not a symptom or a cause or an effect of this systemic crisis: it has become a spectacular, micro-cosmic simulation. International terrorism simulates a legitimating crisis of the international order; conversely, counter-terrorism is a counter-simulation, an attempt to engender a new disciplinary order which can save the dominant legitimacy principle of international relations.10O n a representational level, the spectacle of terrorism displace-and distracts us from-the signs of a pervading international disorder. As a result, much of what is read and written of terrorism displays a superficiality of reasoning and a corruption of language which effects truths about terrorism without any sense of how these truths are produced by, and help to sustain official discourses of international relations. This was repeatedly evidenced by the proceedings and documents of the Iran-contra hearings, in which our reason of state was exposed as ideological expediency and redressed as principled policy. If the reader of terrorism is to break out of the dominant cultural economy, in which each of us acts as a factotum of factoids, that is, a transmitter of official truths, then some critical interpretive skills must be deployed. Along with an empirical study of the salient sources of disorder around us, we need a genealogy of our knowledge of international terrorism and legitimacy, of how consumers in this cultural economy arrive at some shared assumptions about the exchange-value of both. One goal, then, of a cultural reading is to reach a better under-standing of whether these assumptions or constructions of terrorism and legitimation serve to preserve principles and practices beneficial to the international order, or whether they forestall the knowledge necessary to deal effectively with an increasing fragmentation, a diffusion of power, and a sustained challenge to the sovereign state's once-natural monopoly of force: in short, the neo-medievalism alluded to earlier.

Threats cannot be calculated objectively or holistically threats are based upon arbitrary calculations of danger. The risk of terrorism is based upon false calculations its occurrence is minimal. Campbell 92[David: Australian political scientist, written four books, PhD from Australian National University, and has been a professor at several universities. Writing Security University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis p. 2]This understanding of the necessarily interpretive basis of risk has important implications for international relations. It does not deny that there are 'real' dangers in the world: infectious diseases, accidents, and political violence (among other factors) have consequences that can literally be understood in terms of life and death. But not all risks are equal, and not all risks are interpreted as dangers. Modern society contains within it a veritable cornucopia of danger; indeed, there is such an abundance of risk that it is impossible to objectively know all that threatens us.3 Those events or factors which we identify as dangerous therefore come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. Moreover, that process of interpretation does not depend upon the incidence of 'objective' factors for its veracity. For example, HIV infection is considered by many to be America's major public health issue, yet pneumonia and influenza, diabetes, suicide, and chronic liver disease were all (in 1987) individually responsible for many more deaths.4 Equally, an interpretation of danger has licensed a 'war on (illegal) drugs' in the United States despite the fact that both the consumption level of, and the number of deaths which result from, licit drugs exceeds by a considerable order of magnitude that associated with illicit drugs. And 'terrorism' is often cited as a major threat to national security even though its occurrence within the United States is minimal (seven incidents without fatalities in 1985 according to the FBI) and its contribution to international carnage minor

WarThe affirmatives description of war as an ever-present threat fosters a crisis-based politics that actively creates an unethical relationship with militarism that creates error replication which makes violence inevitable.Cuomo 96(CHRIS J. CUOMO is assistant professor of philosophy and womens studies at the University of Cincinnati. She teaches courses in ethics, feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy, environmental ethics, and lesbian and gay studies, fall 1996)Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women. on people living in occupied territories. on members of military institutions. and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct aendered and national identity. and because the.- justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars. and other closely related social phenomena. such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood. media violence. and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options. crisis- based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed. omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace. the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege. and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism. to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict. creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs. or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened. and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the General presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific. state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time. and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.

Warming

Global Warming is not currently a securitized threat; however the 1AC speech act causes the securitization of warmingBuzan & Waever 10(Barry, Ole, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security Cambridge, p.465-466, April 2010, http://blogriobranco.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/buzan.pdf) //ACTGlobal warming It is an illusion (a nice sounding but ultimately false slogan) that environmental problems generally are global, that they show the limits of the nation-state because they respect no frontiers. Most environmental problems are heavily shaped by geography, and are often local (e.g., a polluted lake, river, or piece of land) or at most regional (air pollution drifting across borders but not across the globe). A few very high-profile cases of securitised environmental issues are global or at least transregional: the depletion of the ozone layer and global warming (climate change). These are global in the sense that they are responded to by negotiations among all states where all become more or less dependent on each other. In another sense, global warming is interesting for producing distinct subgroups with shared interests and mutual dependence but along non-regional lines (yet shaped by geography): e.g., AOSIS, the Alliance of Small Island States, is a group of states with shared interests they would more or less disappear with rising sea levels, but they are spread across the globe. As yet, however, and despite considerable help from Hollywood, global warming and other global environmental threats (such as asteroids and comets crashing into the earth) have not been successfully securitised. They are certainly on the political agenda, but are not yet widely seen as first-priority existential threats demanding emergency action. Transnational organised crime Although transnational drugs mafias have a long history, organised crime has in recent years taken increasingly international shape. Much of this is regional because it takes a network character, andmuchof its business is land-based, such as smuggling drugs, people, or arms across borders, and therefore distance matters this is ceteris paribus easier over short than long distances. Accordingly, right after the fall of communism, the Russian mafia started challenging the Italian in much of Europe, only to be followed by Albanians stronger on the crucial capital in this business: ruthlessness. A decade later, however, the scene is gradually shifting from a regional set-up to an increasingly global one, where the Japanese and Chinese organisations penetrate Europe, and various kinds of smuggling (of drugs, migrants, women, guns) and money laundering take on a more global scale. Transnational crime is substantially deterritorialised but, although it has achieved standing as a political issue, it is not yet generally securitised (Shelley 1995; Viano 1999; Mandel 1999; Williams 2001) in this global respect. In analyses of particularly troubled (sub)regions like the Andean and the Balkans, it has become increasingly common to point to organised crime as a key security problem (Corpora 2002; Hansen 2002), but then again it is on a (sub)regional scale, not global. ImpactsViolenceSecuritization creates all possibility for violenceFriis 2000(Karaten, UN Sector at Norweigan Intitute of International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies, From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths, http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2) //ACT The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital O). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of ontological security, which means ...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls strangers). This is because they ...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized, and does not threaten the community, ...but the possibility of ordering itself (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneurs mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: Over and over again we see that the liberals within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Nortons (1988:55) words, The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self. Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of daily security. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its innocent reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a natural necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total solution (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

EnvironmentSecurity causes environmental destructionChernus 86(Ira, professor of religious studies at Univeristy of Colorado, Dr. Strangegod; on the symbolic meaning of nuclear weapons 1986) //ACTWe lose the subtleties and nuances of human complexity and see the world in absolutes, "us versus them." We view human relationships in terms of the mythic, apocalyptic vision, a vision whose ultimate promise is the annihilation of "their" machine and unlimited license for "our" machine to do whatever it wants. In fact, the ultimate goal of machine people is always to have total dominance, unlimited autonomy to manipulate the environmentboth human and naturalin endless technological ways. Thus the machine God also shapes our relationship with our physical and material environment, leading us to the environmental crisis that we now face. Again, the fouling of the air, water, and land was hardly begun in the nuclear age, but the symbolism of the Bomb makes it much more difficult to escape from this predicament too. Behind our callousness toward the natural realm there is not only a desire for quick and easy profit, but a more fundamental view of ourselves as radically separated from nature. In the battle of the machines to dominate the elements, we are clearly on the side of the machineswe are the machinesand this battle is seen in radically dualistic, even apocalyptic, terms. Thus, having no meaningful relationship with nature, we are free, perhaps even compelled, to manipulate it endlessly. The transformation of raw materials into manufactured goods thus becomes our primary goal and value; if the Bomb is God, then t