Security Council Istanbul Retreat:The Security-Development Nexusin Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa

FEBRUARY 2014

Introduction

Since the years of independence, Africa has been through successive genera-tions of conflict from the struggle to complete the continent’s liberation fromcolonization, to border issues, proxy wars, ethnicity-based conflicts, and,more recently, conflicts linked to governance crises. Nevertheless, thecontinent has experienced an overall trend of improvement since the 1990s.Violent conflicts have declined both in number and intensity. Recent positivedevelopments have been recorded in countries including Somalia, Sudan, andSouth Sudan—before a violent conflict erupted in December 2013 between thegovernment and rebel forces led by former vice president Riek Machar. Africahas also made remarkable progress in the fields of democracy, economy,mediation, and conflict prevention, as well as regional cooperation andintegration. However, challenges remain. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)is still fragile, and situations in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Malihave raised new concerns. Crime and trafficking are expanding across WestAfrica and the Sahel region, and terrorist groups with connections in Libya,Somalia, and Sudan are also causing growing concern. Moreover, the connec-tion of problems from the Gulf of Guinea to Somalia calls for new approachesto tackle global insecurity. These new approaches must include a comprehen-sive vision, adjust traditional peacekeeping models to new threats, andcombine resources usually deployed in isolation. With a focus on the security-development nexus in conflict prevention andresolution in Africa, members of the United Nations Security Councilattended their fourth Istanbul Retreat on April 6–7, 2013. Convened by thegovernment of Turkey, the first Istanbul Retreat was held in June 2010 toprovide an informal forum for Security Council members to discuss topics onthe agenda of the council. Previous meetings respectively addressedpeacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding; strengthening preventivediplomacy and mediation; and new political realities in the Middle East andNorth Africa. In 2013, the retreat aimed to identify ways of addressing thechallenges facing Africa from a security and development perspective and todiscuss possible suggestions to transform the continent’s potential for peace,security, and sustainable development into reality. A number of questionswere offered for consideration:

On April 6–7, 2013, the government

of Turkey hosted the 4th Istanbul

Retreat of the UN Security Council

in Istanbul, Turkey. The retreat

provides an informal forum for

Security Council members to

discuss topics on the agenda of the

council. Participants aimed to

identify ways of addressing the

challenges facing Africa from a

security and development perspec-

tive and to discuss possible sugges-

tions to transform the continent’s

potential for peace, security, and

sustainable development into reality.

This meeting note summarizes the

key themes of the retreat and was

drafted by Mireille Affa'a-Mindzie,

research fellow of IPI’s Africa

program. The note reflects the

rapporteur’s interpretation of the

meeting and not necessarily the

views of all of the participants.

IPI owes a debt of thanks to its many

generous donors. In particular, IPI

would like to thank the government

of Turkey and the Permanent

Mission of Turkey to the United

Nations for making this project

possible.

2 MEETING NOTE

• How can the international community helppostconflict countries?

• What role can the international community andregional organizations play to promote coopera-tion?

• How can mediation and reconciliation efforts bestrengthened and be incentivized?

• How can the rule of law be strengthened? • How can security sector reform be better

supported, and what lessons can be learned fromrecent experiences?

• How can the international community helpcreate a vibrant private sector in postconflictcountries?

Turkey’s Initiatives toStrengthen the Security-Development Nexus inAfrica

The Security Council members attending theretreat were briefed on Turkey’s efforts to advancesecurity and development in Africa. Convincedthat Africa is to play an important role in the nextdecade and that there could be no internationalpeace and security unless there is peace andstability in the region, Turkey is increasinglyplaying an influential role across the Africancontinent. Turkey held the first Turkey-AfricaCooperation Summit in Istanbul in 2008. Over thepast five years, it has increased the number of itsembassies in Africa from twelve to thirty-five, withsubsequent mobilization of the business sector,implementation of development projects, anddelivery of humanitarian aid. In Ethiopia, suchcooperation has jumped from one Turkishcompany with investments worth $15 million, to341 companies worth $3 billion. The Turkishgovernment is also involved in seeking solutions tosecurity and development challenges in countriessuch as Guinea, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, andSudan. In Somalia, Turkey is working to promotepolitical reconciliation through facilitation andmediation. Turkey organized two conferences onSomalia in cooperation with the United Nations,respectively in 2010 and 2012. The Second Istanbul

Conference, “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for2015,” focused on achieving progress in politicaland security fields as well as promoting state -building and economic reconstruction. The confer-ence saw the participation of the transitionalfederal government leadership, regional adminis-trations, and representatives from wide-rangingsegments of Somali society, including youth,women, business communities, elders, religiousleaders, the Somali diaspora, and more than fiftycountries. Turkey has also been facilitating talksbetween the Somali federal government andSomaliland since April 2013. In August 2011, Turkish Prime Minister RecepTayyip Erdoğan made the first international high-level official visit to Mogadishu in twenty years, avisit that facilitated approximately $300 million ofdonations by the Turkish people to Somalia.Following the visit, Turkey opened an embassy inMogadishu, and the Turkish government and civilsociety launched a large-scale humanitarian anddevelopment aid campaign in Somalia. Hospitalswere rehabilitated; basic services were expanded;and extended to many areas; roads were paved;Mogadishu streets were cleaned with regulargarbage collection services; and about 100,000cataract operations were performed by Turkishdoctors in two years. Following the restoration ofthe Mogadishu airport, Turkish Airlines startedflights to Mogadishu in March 2012. At the time ofthe retreat, Turkish Airlines remained the onlyairline company operating regular flights toMogadishu. Turkey also encourages the profes-sional and well-educated Somali diaspora to bevisible in their home country and play their role inadvancing development and security. Security and governance are prerequisites foreconomic development. Such development shouldtake into account the subregional dimension, andcooperation among the countries in the Horn ofAfrica should be reinforced to address the crisis inSomalia. With this perspective, Turkey openedembassies in all Horn of Africa countries. Turkey isalso developing relations with subregional organi-zations, including the IntergovernmentalAuthority on Development (IGAD), to supporttheir efforts to stabilize Somalia. Turkey hascontributed $1 million to the African UnionMission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012. The

country also contributes police officers to five UNmissions in Africa and to internationalpeacebuilding efforts. Furthermore, Turkeyannually allocates $200 million to the leastdeveloped countries (LDCs) of which thirty-threeout of fifty countries are in Africa.1 It has success-fully applied for observer status with the AfricanUnion (AU) and with a new candidacy for a non-permanent seat at the Security Council for the years2015 and 2016, Turkey seeks to contribute furtherto large-scale efforts to peace and security in Africa. Besides Somalia, Turkey maintains strongrelations with Sudan, and it established relationswith South Sudan immediately after its independ-ence by opening an embassy in Juba. These initia-tives aim to ensure the sustainability of subregionaland international peace efforts. Turkey submittedto both countries a list of confidence-buildingmeasures aimed at economic development andoffering suggestions on how to use both sides’assets. Turkish Airlines is to start Istanbul–Khartoum–Juba “peace flights.” Turkey’s approachis that of promoting reconciliation. As such,Turkey advocates that the border between Sudanand South Sudan should not be considered a matterof national security. And in the Abyei region,Turkey suggested the creation of a zone ofcommon interest since it considers that neither ofthe two countries would be able to control theborder. The Turkish government is planning topursue this mediation and facilitation work in theSudan regions of Darfur and South Kordofan. In the Sahel, Turkey has contributed to the trustfund established to support the African-ledInternational Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).While further efforts are needed to understand theconflict and identify the appropriate strategies forending the crisis, these efforts should address both(1) the need to make Tuareg communities part ofregional cooperation initiatives and (2) nationalconsolidation in Mali. Turkey also worked in Nigerin 2012 to help the country handle the food crisis. Additional areas of Turkey’s cooperation towardan effective security-development nexus in Africacover democratization, security sector develop-ment, and the question of sanctions. In regard to

the latter, while recognizing that the adoption ofsanctions is sometimes necessary, the impact long-term isolation has on potential polarization andconflict resolution efforts must be highlighted.Thus, a more constructive approach could bepromoted, which consists in encouraging sanc -tioned countries to “accept the rules of the game.”In Eritrea for example, Turkey continues toadvocate for the end of sanctions imposed on thecountry, while encouraging regional cooperationand integration. The discussions at the Istanbul Retreat focusedon thematic questions including: security sectorreform (SSR) and development, strengthening ofthe rule of law, and conflict resolution in complexand emergency situations. These themes werediscussed with reference to cases including theDRC, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, andSudan. In addition, the retreat provided anopportunity for the participants to consider theAU’s efforts to strengthen the security-develop-ment nexus in Africa.

Regional Efforts toStrengthen the Security-Development Nexus inAfrica

The AU is increasingly becoming an importantactor of regional peace and security. After theRwandan genocide and conflicts in the Great Lakesregion that caused millions of casualties, the 2000AU Constitutive Act proclaimed a principle ofnon-indifference five years before the internationalcommunity endorsed the responsibility to protect,which established the right of the union tointervene in cases of international crimescommitted in any of the state parties.2 The AU aimsto achieve unity of the African continent and isgradually devising the tools for a clear andtransparent contribution to the prevention,management, and resolution of conflicts as well asto postconflict peacebuilding and reconstruction inAfrica. A number of institutions have been established,

SECURITY COUNCIL ISTANBUL RETREAT 3

1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “The Least Developed Countries Report 2012: Harnessing Remittances and Diaspora Knowledge to BuildProductive Capacities,” New York: United Nations, 2012, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ldc2012_en.pdf .

2 Article 4(h), African Union Constitutive Act, adopted in 2000 in Lomé, Togo, entered into force in 2001.

4 MEETING NOTE

including the fifteen-member Peace and SecurityCouncil (PSC); the African Standby Force based onfive regional brigades; the Continental EarlyWarning System also built on regional mechanismsto help detect peace and security threats before theyescalate into open conflict; a Panel of the Wisecomposed of eminent personalities who have directaccess to African leaders and reflect the African wayof resolving conflicts; and the Peace Fund, whichreceives funding from the AU regular budget as wellas partners’ contributions, and can provide limitedfunding to some activities of the AU. In addition, the AU has developed principles andinstitutions to advance and monitor human rightsand the rule of law across the continent. Emphasisis put on universal human rights principles sharedby Africa with the rest of the world. Monitoringorgans include the African Commission and theAfrican Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.Comprised of members of national parliaments,the Pan-African Parliament also contributes tomonitoring governance in Africa. These organscomplement various decisions adopted on theprohibition of unconstitutional changes of govern-ment. Further, the AU Constitutive Act and the2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections andGovernance provide for the imposition of sanctionson any country undergoing a coup d’état orunconstitutional change of government. Both from a normative and an institutional pointof view, the AU is gearing up to become an activeand effective partner of the UN in the promotion ofpeace and security across the continent. At thesame time, the AU aims to remain flexible enoughto be able to adjust to new and unforeseen horizonsas it is constantly being tested by crisis situationsacross the continent.FINDING SOLUTIONS TO AFRICANCRISES

Trying to make the best use of existing resources,the AU promotes an integrated approach to peaceand security that includes conflict prevention,peacemaking, and peacekeeping. The entireconflict resolution spectrum must be consideredbefore the most conducive solution is adopted todeal with a specific situation. This includesexploring all peaceful options before any militaryintervention is decided upon. If needed, some kindof military presence can be initiated, including

before any peace agreement, and the AU’s peacesupport can move from one intervention tool toanother, depending on the situation. From thecontinental organization’s perspective, peacesupport should start with Africans, who wouldthen have to turn to the UN for peacekeeping, sinceit is ultimately responsible for international peaceand security. The UN should be called upon whenthe situation is ripe—as it eventually was inBurundi, Darfur, and Sudan—or when theoperation moves to a stage the AU cannot yetsustain. However, the meeting participantsobserved that both organizations do not alwaysagree on what needs to be done and when eachorganization should act. This observationemphasizes the critical need for the UN, especiallyat the level of the Security Council, to gain a clearerunderstanding of where the AU’s role begins andends. Participants also highlighted the need for thedialogue between the UN Security Council and theAU Peace and Security Council to be nurtured. The celebration of the fifty-year anniversary ofthe Organisation of African Unity in 2013 providedan opportunity to initiate a reflection on theevolution of the continent since the end ofcolonization as well as on the tools and resourcesneeded to address complex conflict situations.Under the theme of the African Renaissance, thejubilee celebrations also sought to better preventand resolve conflicts, as well as to properly articu-late efforts to develop the continent. This exerciseshould help address the underlying causes ofconflict across Africa, namely the challenges posedby weak security sectors and governance, which callfor a continental response framework that has thepotential to project Africa to the future. Supported by the UN, the AU is promoting aregional approach to finding solutions to crises inthe DRC and the Great Lakes region, in Somaliaand the Horn of Africa, as well as in Mali and theSahel. THE CRISIS IN MALI

From the beginning of the crisis in January 2012,the international community failed to handle Malias a complex emergency at both the regional andinternational levels. The progressive weakening ofthe government could in part be attributed to thecombination of repeated Tuareg secessionistmovements almost every decade since independ-

ence; the presence of radical Islamist groups thathad found root in northern Mali; and theemergence of narco-criminals. This weakening wasonly accelerated by the development of corruptionwithin state institutions. The situation furtherescalated with the decline of government authorityin the north, combined with the fallout from theLibyan crisis in a context where then presidentAmadou Toumani Touré, who was ending hissecond and last term, was reluctant to make anymajor decision to contain the degradation of thesituation. The AU took preventive diplomacy initiatives toaddress the crisis. A Peace and Security Councilmeeting was held on March 20th in Bamako toaddress the situation in the north and adopt an AUstrategy in the Sahel.3 The meeting condemned therebellion and devised strategies to address the crisispeacefully. The Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS) and the Sahel corecountries were requested to find a solution. Themilitary coup took place two days after the Bamakomeeting, accelerating the occupation of the north,the loss of control by the central government ofover two thirds of its territory, and the collapse ofthe army. Joint efforts have since been implemented by theAU, ECOWAS, and core countries in the Sahel,and discussions with the UN led to the transforma-tion of the African-led International SupportMission to Mali (AFISMA) into the United NationsMultidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missionin Mali (MINUSMA) in late April. For the AU, itwas important that the new mission take on boardthe legacy of the operation conducted since thebeginning of the crisis; closely connect with andbuild on regional efforts; and take into account theavailability of countries in the region to assist invarious ways beyond a military contribution.Regional cooperation efforts were pursued with ameeting held in March 2013 in Nouakchott,Mauritania, which brought together all Mali’sneighbors to consider ways to deepen their securityrelationships. The meeting reflected on intelligencesharing and the coordination and strengthening ofborder control measures, with the objective tocombat more effectively terrorism and transna-

tional criminal networks operating in northernMali and neighboring countries that may haveabsorbed criminals after the successful militaryoperation conducted by France and Africancountries. A few lessons can be learned from the initialregional and international responses to the crisis inMali and the Sahel. The first lesson comes from thechallenge the international community was facingto speed up its response to the developments in theWest African country. The Security Councilseemingly overly reliant on the region, which wasnot equipped to resolve the crisis. This misunder-standing led to a considerable loss of time, and itwas only when the terrorists took the initiative tomove southward in January 2013 that the interna-tional community became alarmed. The secondlesson learned from the crisis is the need to adaptthe international community’s intervention tool -box to new crisis situations, including the terroristthreat. For an intervention to have the desiredeffect on the ground, each situation must bestudied thoroughly and clearly addressed based onits specific context. In Mali, the multidimensionalnature of the conflict has been highlighted, withfactors mixing ethnicity, religion, and ideology.Therefore, defeating terrorism will involve bothfighting its ideological element and addressing itsroot causes. This includes offering alternatives tothe youth involved in these criminal activities andaddressing long-standing community grievances. Itis anticipated that the UN integrated strategy forthe Sahel will provide the international communitywith suggestions for addressing these conflictfactors. THE UN-AU PARTNERSHIP ANDPEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES INDARFUR

In Darfur, ongoing stabilization in some parts ofthe region coexists with a worsening securitysituation in other parts. For the Security Council,this difficult context is the result of Sudaneseauthorities obstructing the work of the AfricanUnion/United Nations Hybrid Operation inDarfur (UNAMID)—a unique situation thecouncil is grappling with. For the AU, aside fromissues related to the hybrid nature of the mission,

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3 African Union Peace and Security Council, Declaration on the Situation in the Sahel Region, 314th Meeting at Ministerial Level, PSC/MIN/DECL(CCCXIV),Bamako, Mali, March 20, 2012, available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-eng.pdf .

the challenges faced by UNAMID are linked to avery strong central government in Khartoum and apowerful army and intelligence services, whichimpose high levels of interference on the work ofUNAMID. This situation justifies greater SecurityCouncil and Peace and Security Council supportfor the hybrid mission. In the broader context of South Sudan’sindependence, with the tripartite AU implementa-tion panel led by former South African presidentThabo Mbeki, the convergence between the twocouncils has been successful in bringing changes onthe ground and encouraging both Sudan and SouthSudan to cooperate and achieve progress—suchconvergence is considered to be perhaps the mostpragmatic instrument to tackle conflict situationsin Africa. The AU could benefit from convergencein other areas of cooperation, for example withregard to governance standards and the prohibi-tion of unconstitutional changes of government.THE AU AND CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION

Linking security to development efforts, the AUhas launched an ambitious integration plan thatforesees the establishment of an African commonmarket by 2017, an African economic communitywith a single currency by 2023, and the integrationof the continent by 2025. The proposed timelineswill be reexamined and reviewed on the basis ofimplementation progress or the lack thereof.Advancing regional integration in Africa requiredfinding a balance between AU members that weremore gradualist and those that were in favor ofimmediate integration. A compromise was reachedon the implementation of a gradual and rationalintegration. This integration is based on the eightRegional Economic Communities (RECs)recognized by the AU, and it aims to convince theRECs to unite and form a larger group. Theseefforts have begun with a bloc that is likely tochange the dynamics of integration on thecontinent: the Common Market for Eastern andSouthern Africa (COMESA), the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC), and the EastAfrican Community (EAC). It is hoped that suchintegration efforts will be emulated in the otherAfrican regions. Meanwhile, development projects such as theNew Partnership for Africa's Development

(NEPAD) are being implemented, which plannedfor minimum integration. NEPAD was created in2001. It is founded on six pillars that includeagriculture and food security, climate change andnational resource management, regional integra-tion and infrastructure, human development,economic and corporate governance, as well ascross-cutting issues such as gender, capacitydevelopment, and information and communica-tions technology. It aims to eradicate poverty andplace Africa on a path to sustainable growth anddevelopment. Complementing the NEPAD, theDeclaration on Democracy, Political, Economic andCorporate Governance, adopted in June 2002 byAfrican leaders, established the African PeerReview Mechanism (APRM). Thirty-threecountries have joined the APRM process as of April2013; seventeen of which have been reviewed. In addition, the AU considers borders as a criticalelement of security and sustainable development.With support from the German government, theAU Peace and Security Department has developeda border demarcation program that is increasinglyambitious. Demining programs, the creation ofsafe markets, schools, nursery places, etc. are beingdevised for border areas to become “bridges ofintegration.” In the Great Lakes region, Rwandanand Burundian immigration officers already shareoffices at the border. It is an example the AU wishesto multiply across the continent. Joint developmentprograms have also helped to prevent conflict,namely between Rwanda and Uganda. Withincreased impetus from the EAC, regional projectson electricity and infrastructure development forexample have been implemented. Such projectsfacilitated a shift from past frictions to collabora-tion efforts among populations who started torealize that there was a mutual interest and benefitin “doing things together.” Despite these efforts, peace and securitychallenges on the continent continue to scare offinvestors. Perceptions of corruption negativelyimpact regional economic prospects. Political andeconomic development is felt only at certain levelsof the society and not by the entire population; andissues of elections and the implementation ofwinner-take-all systems increasingly pose peaceand security risks. The retreat emphasized theimportance of political will for national actors tocarry out programs and maintain institutions since

6 MEETING NOTE

the international community can only complementlocal efforts but not replace them (except inextreme circumstances). Security sector reform(SSR), especially in postconflict Somalia, providessuch necessity.

Security Sector Reform andDevelopment: The Case ofSomalia

KEY SSR CHALLENGES

Often due to a militarized political culture, studieshave established that the propensity of violentconflict is highest where there was previous violence.Three basic components were identified for anypostconflict SSR program. These include building aset of capable and responsible security institutions;establishing legitimate security and governanceprinciples and norms; and restoring and strength-ening the judicial framework. At the same time,because every state or society perceives and definessecurity according to its context and culture, there isno single mode of SSR. Yet in general, SSR anddevelopment should help restore the rule of law andensure the protection of vulnerable populations—including by putting an end to arms trafficking,advancing respect for human rights and humani-tarian law, and strengthening accountability. Agender perspective should also be integrated intoSSR, since gender equality is inherent to any socialand inclusive approach and in order to increasesuccess and sustainability. SSR should furtherrebuild the economy and facilitate a more equitablesharing of resources for people to distancethemselves from violence and illegal activities. For over twenty years, Somalia was consumed bycrime, sectarian conflict, and war. This situationdrew the Horn of Africa region into instability, andcriminal activities rose despite important local,regional, and international efforts. Extremism andterrorism took root, and piracy flourished off thecoast of Somalia, causing incalculable damages toeconomic growth and development opportunities.Undeniable progress was made since the liberationof Mogadishu in August 2011 and the liberation ofthe southern port of Kismayo a year later by

AMISOM, as well as a successful electoral processin 2012. Looking a few years back, not many wouldhave thought Somalia would be where it is now,and the country is currently at the best place it hasbeen in the last two decades. However, while muchhas been achieved, a lot still needs to be done,raising impatience at the slow pace at which thedividends of change are taking place. Somalia’shistory and the nature of the decades-long conflictmake SSR and disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration (DDR) of former combatants partic-ularly timely to help consolidate and advance thegains achieved in recent months in both politicaland security areas. Key elements of SSR in thecountry should include: supporting the campaignagainst al-Shabaab; restoring security in therecovered areas; and supporting regional forcesand AMISOM, which are currently tasked withstabilizing the country. Though President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoudcame to power during the absence of any securityinfrastructure, he soon started to assert his control.A new head of the army was appointed, and thenew government successfully lobbied the SecurityCouncil for the temporary suspension of the armsembargo.4 The Somali government also indicatedits intention to revise the country’s nationalsecurity and stabilization plan and to take the leadof international SSR plans. This effort results,among others, from the government’s successfulcoordination with the international community, arare phenomenon particularly for fragile andconflict-affected countries. However, for SSRefforts in Somalia to succeed, four key internal andregional challenges have to be mapped out andaddressed. First, an important barrier to successful SSR anddevelopment in Somalia was seen in the absence ofan overall SSR and a long-term national securitystrategy, which the international community couldrally around and support. A strategy was presentedat the May 2013 Somalia conference in London,where the Somali government detailed its plans fora national security architecture and for developingits armed forces, including the police and theintegration of militias.5 A work in progress, the

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4 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2093 (March 6, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2093.5 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Somalia Conference 2013: Communiqué,” May 7, 2013 available at

www.gov.uk/government/news/somalia-conference-2013-communique .

draft strategy will include such issues as inclusive-ness, civilian oversight, accountability, respect forhuman rights and the rule of law, and will cover thejustice sector, in addition to the military and thepolice. The proposed strategy constitutes a signifi-cant move and presents the internationalcommunity with the challenge of how best to offersupport. Second, SSR in Somalia is challenged by the needto decide on the timeframe of SSR plans. While thecurrent context of political accommodation stilldrives an oversized military force, a criticalquestion is to decide when a national dialoguecould be initiated on the fundamental securityrequisites in Somalia. In many contexts, due to thelong-term nature of SSR, it is only after basicstability has been achieved and DDR processeshave been implemented that SSR plans are realized.This is not yet the case in Somalia, where thedifficult task of protecting the populations remainsto be fulfilled. Moreover, in the context of thecountry’s federal structure and the relationshipbetween the central government and the regions—especially the outstanding issue of Somaliland—animportant question to answer is whether SSR couldbe led by a transitional government or whether theprocess must be delayed until after the election of anew government in 2016. Third, as a national process, SSR must beanchored in national ownership and cannot beisolated from other national strategies. Clearmonitoring and evaluation processes must ensureand maintain progress. The collapse of the Somaliarmy in the 1990s, the raise of al-Shabaab, and theproliferation of armed groups and militiasinevitably led to the breakdown of the overall stateapparatus. Beyond SSR and the reconstruction ofthe national army in a manner that reinforces otherinstitutions, an appropriate balance must be foundbetween the center and the peripheries—Somaliland, Puntland, and more recentlyJubaland—and the capacity of the central govern-ment to contribute to security in a substantial andcoherent manner must be established. These effortscan build on the positive atmosphere created in thecountry after the 2012 elections. Further, effortscan also capitalize on the positive experience of the

dynamic Somali market economy over the twenty-year crisis, and look at SSR as security sectorbuilding through development instead of fordevelopment. Moreover, reconciliation can bepromoted in original ways to encourage al-Shabaabmembers to take a more positive part in therebuilding of the country. For example, recom -mendations were made to the Security Council togradually ease sanctions on the al-Shabaab-dominated charcoal trade, depending on noticeableSSR progress, while at the same time identifying apotential local industry that can constitute analternative to charcoal.6

Fourth, since Somalia is located in a region wherestability is often tenuous, regional dynamics arealso significant. The more the Somali governmentbecomes legitimate, the stronger it will need toarticulate national interests, which may increasetensions with neighboring countries. Two mainfactors can help overcome this challenge. On theone hand, the new Somali authorities will have theresponsibility to specify the country’s securityresponsibilities and partnerships with some of itsneighbors in the region by clearly articulating inthe constitution the intangibility of borders. On theother hand, Ethiopia as well as Kenya’s participa-tion in AMISOM contributed to the liberation ofSomalia from terrorism and helped dissipatesuspicions of their involvement in Somalia. Effortsshould therefore aim at implementing a SSRprocess that has both national and regionalownership, building on complements and notcompetition.THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’SSUPPORT

Somalia has several opportunities to seek supportfrom the UN—which conducted a strategic assess-ment of its next engagement in the country and iscommitted to help the government implement thestrategies it has identified—its member states, aswell as regional and subregional organizations,many of which combine the benefits of experience,expertise, and resources. While there is no lack ofwillingness or resources for SSR, it is important todo it right. Taking into consideration its highlyeconomic nature, one recommendation was madeto design affordable security forces that could

8 MEETING NOTE

6 African Union, “The African Union Calls on the UN Security Council to Strengthen Its Support to the AU Mission in Somalia,” Press Release, Addis Ababa,October 30, 2012, available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-com-somalia-30-10-2012.pdf .

ensure financial sustainability of SSR in Somalia. Other difficult tasks and choices lying ahead forthe UN and the international community includeinternational coherence and coordination, and thechallenge of a “piecemeal approach” that couldresult in the Somali army and police being trainedby different countries using different approaches.In that regard, the fight against piracy couldprovide a useful analysis with respect to interna-tional coordination. In 2013, there had been nosuccessful attack as of March, following a 75percent decline in piracy attacks in 2012 comparedto 2011. Moreover, the limited presence of theinternational community on the ground inMogadishu, the horizon of a UN peacekeepingoperation with the potential rehatting ofAMISOM—a process which should take placebased on clear benchmarks and in consultationwith the AU—and the need to find the mostappropriate way to provide support and technicalassistance to the Somali government whilemaintaining national ownership are additionalchallenges the international community needs toovercome. Acknowledging that SSR goes to the heart of eachcountry’s national sovereignty, the AU hasdeveloped an SSR policy framework, to whichLuxembourg provided bilateral support, and whichis anticipated to be an important tool for SSRacross Africa. From the AU perspective, the defini-tion of specific benchmarks should lead toAMISOM’s withdrawal by 2020, after the territorialexpansion and consolidation is completed.Meanwhile, Somalia is expected to have a finalconstitution by 2015, which should provide adurable solution to the issue of federalism, define acoherent organization of the state built on citizen-ship rather than on the logic of clans, and ensure aqualitative change in the country’s institutions.Peacebuilding initiatives should facilitate thelaunch of economic projects with quick impact,and which provide jobs for the youth. From 2016,assuming the set timeline is respected, AMISOMwill begin a gradual drawdown and progressivelyhand over to the Somali defense and security forcesthat need to be prepared to take ownership of their

national security. In parallel, regional structuresshould be developed to take charge of regionalsecurity. In addition to UN and regional support, theEuropean Union (EU) has contributed $400million to peace efforts in Somalia since 2008.Between 2011 and 2013, the EU, which is particu-larly concerned with the cross-regional dimensionof the situation in Somalia and possible connec-tions with current security challenges in the Sahel,has contributed $300 million to support a compre-hensive approach that includes development,security sector reform, addressing humanitarianchallenges, and fighting piracy.7 The EU alsoprovides a major financial contribution toAMISOM by paying for peacekeeper allowances—an area that the EU considers will requireadditional partners to continue on a broader basis.The EU is also involved in training Somalia’snational army. Twenty-three European trainershave so far taught 3000 Somali soldiers in trainingactivities that were recently moved from Uganda toSomalia. The training provides military expertisewhile also bringing Somali soldiers together in adivided country. In September 2012, the EUappointed its first ambassador to Somalia after overtwenty-one years. Participants at the retreat emphasized the needfor international efforts in Somalia to find the rightbalance between sustainable interest and a clearexit strategy to avoid excessive dependency. Withthe 2012 strategic review by the UN of what itsrenewed presence in Somalia can be and theadoption of Resolution 2093 in March 2013, UNpeace efforts in Somalia must be complemented byintensive peacebuilding activities and moreattention should be paid to development in acountry where 73 percent of the population lives onless than $2 a day.8

Again, this implies that reforming and buildingthe security sector should not be looked at in anisolated manner. Instead, SSR and developmentmust go in tandem with all other sectors includingthe economy. In that regard, short-term challengessuch as the humanitarian crisis and piracy must beaddressed, including by strengthening efforts to

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7 Africa-EU Partnership, “The EU Increases Its Support for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa with EUR 40 Million,” August 1, 2011, available atwww.africa-eu-partnership.org/newsroom/all-news/eu-increases-its-support-conflict-prevention-and-resolution-africa-eur-40-million .

8 UNDP in Somalia, “Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty,” available at www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/mdgoverview/overview/mdg1/ .

10 MEETING NOTE

establish a common judiciary and correctionalsystem. Due credit must be given to the interna-tional community for the military means providedand the current success in the fight against piracy.However, it is also critical to address long-termchallenges. The root causes of the decades-longconflict in Somalia should be clearly identified andtackled to prevent any relapse. In addition tosecurity at sea, piracy should also be dealt with onthe shores of Somalia. In that regard, the provisionof basic social services such as health andeducation, and employment opportunitiesespecially to the youth, can serve as a viable alterna-tive to piracy. Moreover, communities can berebuilt and strengthened by building resilience andadvancing development. And because weak armiesoften only reflect weak states, governance issuesshould also be dealt with, including a reform of therevenue sector.

Strengthening the Rule ofLaw

The World Bank’s World Development Report 2011on conflict, security, and development acknowl-edged that little work had been done on the linkbetween the lack of legitimacy in key nationalinstitutions, weak state security capacity, justiceand jobs for citizens, and cycles of violence in low-income fragile or conflict-affected countries.9However, while the rule of law is one of the firstelements that needs to be reestablished in apostconflict context since it helps to restoreconfidence at all levels in the society, issues ofpublic safety, jobs, and the fight against impunityare not always given immediate priority. While there is no set of established standardsdefining the rule of law, it is considered anindispensable element to a more peaceful, just, andprosperous world. Culture and the specific contextwhere the rule of law is to be implemented shouldbe taken into account to avoid the imposition of aset of exogenous rules. Some of the issues formingpart of substantive rule of law include the fightagainst corruption and the protection of humanrights and gender—namely women’s access tojustice and fighting against gender-based violence.

Strengthening the rule of law by building statelegitimacy also calls for free, fair, and peacefulelections. By providing electoral assistance tocountries, the UN can play a critical role inmitigating the risks of violence attached to electoralsystems favoring winner-take-all approaches. Inpostconflict contexts, addressing land issues canfurther serve to reinforce the credibility of the stateand citizens’ confidence in the government, anddetermine success or lack thereof of the rule of law.Moreover, norms such as those regulating extrac-tive industries can also serve to enlarge the scope ofthe rule of law. On the ground, three aspects illustrate the practi-cality of the concept of the rule of law: (1)rebuilding and strengthening failed or fragilestates; (2) promoting justice and fighting impunity;and (3) the creation of a framework makingcountries attractive to investment. For fragile or failed states, including manycountries exiting from conflict, state presence is notoften perceived by the citizens. Thus, the rule oflaw seeks to help the state assert itself and beperceived for what it is by rebuilding citizens’understanding of the law, bringing back citizenconfidence in the state, and providing notablesecurity benefits. In Liberia, with a $50 millioncontribution by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF),the international community began implementingthe concept of security and justice hubs. Theproject has been operationalized by the establish-ment in the same compound of a police station, atribunal, and a prison. A total of seven justice hubsare to be created. In the long term, it is anticipatedthat a representation of the finance ministry will beadded to the hub. While further efforts are neededto equip these hubs with competent personnel,issues of training and resources continue to hinderthe functioning of police stations and judicialinstitutions across the country. In addition to building and strengthening thestate, the rule of law is about justice and therejection of impunity. In the DRC for example, theUN helped strengthen military justice byestablishing prosecution support cells, which arecomposed of trained military and civilian prosecu-tors and police investigators. The UN further

9 World Bank, World Development Report 2011 Overview: Conflict, Security, and Development, Washington DC, 2011, available athttp://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Overview.pdf .

SECURITY COUNCIL ISTANBUL RETREAT 11

supports mobile court sessions, which havepronounced several dozens of judgments to date.Moreover, during the attack of Goma in November2012, MONUSCO (the UN Stabilization Mission inCongo) helped evacuate a number of prosecutorsand judges to places of safety. Again, these effortshelp the state to regain the confidence of its citizensby ensuring that the law applies to all equally. Inpostconflict contexts, attention should be paid toperceptions that one side is exercising a victor’sjustice, a situation that can corrode the possibilityof effective change. This was the case in Côted’Ivoire, where the work of the national commis-sion of enquiry, established in June 2011 followingthe violence that marred the November 2010presidential election, had raised concerns about theimpartiality of the investigation and prosecution ofcrimes committed by both former presidentLaurent Gbagbo’s and President AlassaneOuattara’s sides. Whether countries have or havenot signed the Rome Treaty establishing theInternational Criminal Court (ICC), impunity isgenerally condemned and the choice inprosecuting certain crimes becomes one betweennational and international justice. A third component of the rule of law is to make acountry attractive to investments by fightingcorruption and creating job opportunities for thedisenfranchised. This is true regarding bothdomestic and foreign investments. In Mali, thecorruption of the national army was recentlyexposed by evidence that the vast majority of themilitary equipment of the Movement for Unity andJihad in West Africa (MUJAO) did not come fromformer Libyan leader Kaddafi’s arsenals, but theywere actually sold to the extremist groups by thecorrupt and disgruntled members of the Malianmilitary.10 In South Sudan, Khartoum’s payment ofoil revenues in cash has also been identified amongthe causes of the new country’s corruption and lackof transparency practices. National measures areneeded to fight corruption. In addition, countriesthat are at the receiving hand of corruption fundsshould commit to asset recovery principles and beencouraged to return the illicit wealth obtainedthrough corruption to countries often in need ofresources for reconstruction. And besides corrup-

tion, nepotism is another obstacle to transparencyand equitable sharing of national resources, andsuch allegations in Liberia have raised concern. For the UN, while the rule of law is a technicalquestion, it is also a political one as it contributes toensuring that the international community handlespost-crisis exit strategies during crisis better. TheUN’s efforts to strengthening the rule of law are ledby the deputy secretary-general, who is entrustedwith cross-system coordination. In fragilecountries, the Department of Political Affair’spolitical missions generally include a SSR or rule oflaw component. To complement these efforts, theGlobal Focal Point for Police, Justice andCorrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations (the GlobalFocal Point) was created in 2012.11 Jointly locatedwithin the Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) and the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP), the GlobalFocal Point will improve ongoing efforts to buildthe rule of law in crisis and postconflict countriesby facilitating the availability of people, skills, andknowledge, as well as a better implementation ofthe policies needed for strengthening the rule oflaw in crisis and conflict contexts. Despite thisprogress, greater efforts are needed and strongerSecurity Council involvement is necessary for moreeffective action in building and strengthening therule of law.THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THERULE OF LAW

Over the past sixty years, the Security Council hasadopted many resolutions making use of evolvingtools and resources. However, limited resultscompared to increasingly high expectations, issuesof time, ownership, and approaches havesometimes raised concerns. Part of the problemwas identified in the “curative mode” approachadopted by the Security Council, rather than amore preventive one. With regard to the rule oflaw, a suggestion was made for the Council toemphasize a “preventive primacy” of the rule oflaw, looking at countries that are not yet on itsagenda but where the justice system and the policeare not working properly and could later on lead to

10 Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Mali,” Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, January 14, 2013, p.7, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf .11 UN Department of Peacekeeping and UN Development Programme, “Fact Sheet: Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections,” available at

www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/2012_12_07_The_Fact_Sheet_for_Global_Focal_Point_Dec_2012.pdf .

conflict. At the same time, participants at theretreat recalled that it is also part of UNDP’s role toencourage a more preventive approach to the ruleof law. The September 2012 high-level meeting of theUN General Assembly on the rule of law does notseem to have produced sufficient outcomes, andthe need was emphasized for a follow-up discus-sion of the topic.12 A suggestion was made for theUN to facilitate a new debate on the rule of law, fora better understanding of its meaning and itsrelationship with democracy, security, anddevelopment; this is a debate that should alsoinvolve regional organizations. And beyond theUN system, synergies are being developed withother institutions, for example the World Bank, tostrengthen the rule of law. DPKO is working onestablishing links with the Bank’s units that dealwith weak states. And in May 2013, the president ofthe World Bank accompanied the UN secretary-general in a visit to the Great Lakes region. The UN’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law arenot without challenges. The human rights duediligence policy adopted in 2011,13 which applies tosecurity forces trained by or cooperating with theUN, reached a crucial point in its implementationfollowing the attack of Goma by the M23 rebels ineastern Congo in November 2012. With mass rapesreportedly committed by soldiers of two units ofthe Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), the UNhas been pressing the Congolese authorities to actand launch prosecutions. As of April 2013, onlytwo cases have been decided upon. One enduringchallenge lies in the continuous explanation, by theCongolese authorities, of the efforts that are beingmade to implement the rule of law and fight againstimpunity. And while it is not sure that this is theright way to go, it is increasingly considered thatconcrete action must be taken. The UN has threat-ened to suspend its cooperation with the twoFARDC units involved in the event that thegovernment fails to prosecute the alleged perpe -trators. Participants at the retreat emphasized the factthat “we cannot have democracies without aculture of democracy.” To reinforce the interna-

tional community’s efforts supporting the consoli-dation of the rule of law in fragile and conflict-affected countries, bilateral initiatives and regionalcooperation should provide incentives forstrengthening democracy and the rule of law, andthey should help operate change particularly incountries that are not the object of particularattention of the Security Council. In that regard,lessons can be learned from Europe after 1989,where former USSR countries were encouraged torespect the rule of law in order to receive EUassistance. Aid conditionality can be considered forgovernments that do not respect the rule of law. InSomalia for example, suggestions were made forthe government’s counterterrorism efforts toensure that human rights standards are respected,and consequences—including the possiblewithdrawal of support—must be attached to thecountry’s failure to meet these standards.

Conflict Resolution inComplex Emergencies

Complex emergencies refer to conflicts that arelargely internal, where a series of political, social,and economic factors result in the completebreakdown of state authority. Responding toconflict, the UN calibrates its interventions to eachsingle case, handling both stick and carrot. In thecase of complex emergencies, the UN hasestablished multidimensional peace operations,which combine both military and civilians capabi -lities. THE UN RESPONSE TO COMPLEXEMERGENCIES IN AFRICA

Of the current fifteen UN peacekeeping missions inthe world, seven are in Africa. These missions cover68.5 percent of the overall peacekeeping budget, 75percent of the military personnel, and 78 percent ofthe police personnel with the two exceptions of theUN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara(MINURSO) and the UN Interim Security Forcefor Abyei (UNISFA). In Africa, the UN works withsubregional organizations such the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS)and the International Conference on the Great

12 MEETING NOTE

12 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/1, Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National andInternational Levels, Resolution A/RES/67/1, November 30, 2012.

13 United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, Identical Letters Dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of theGeneral Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110, March 5, 2013.

Lakes Region (ICGLR), a cooperation which variesaccording to these organizations’ effectiveness.While this relationship should be carried forward,it is important not to lose site of the continentalperspective. New and emerging peace and security threatscannot be dealt with using traditional peacekeepingmethods. Therefore, “robust peacekeeping” waspioneered by integrating lessons learned in the1990s from conflicts in the Balkans and Rwanda.These lessons include for example, the use of forceto protect civilians. In that regard, a new step, “onan exceptional basis and without creating aprecedent or any prejudice to the agreed principlesof peacekeeping” was made with the establishmentof an intervention brigade in the DRC byResolution 2098 in March 2013. The interventionbrigade responds to the necessity to giveMONUSCO and the Congolese army the means todurably neutralize and disarm groups in easternDRC. Moreover, this new instrument should serveas a deterrent, an illustration seen in the March2013 rendition of rebel leader Bosco Ntaganda,who had been under an ICC arrest warrant since2006, as well as the renditions of an increasingnumber of rebels trying to find a way out. However,for the new intervention brigade, the challenge is todemonstrate its efficacy—an efficacy that wasstrengthened in July 2013 by the deployment ofunmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the DRC’sKivu provinces. The success of the new interven-tion brigade will also be conditioned by enhancedcivilian action, including greater efforts by theCongolese government to improve service deliveryand promote reconciliation. In Mali and Somalia, security challenges areincreasingly complex with the appearance ofasymmetric warfare and guerilla tactics usingimprovised weapons, attacks against populatedareas, and the immersion of combatants in thecivilian population. Additional challenges resultfrom the difficulty to identify possible interlocutorsfor dialogue. In these contexts too, it is critical forthe UN response to evolve. A political tracksupporting the establishment of the legitimatestate’s authority must be combined with improvedsecurity to protect the political process and stateinstitutions where they exist and to protect civiliansincluding by using force. At the same time, it is critical to minimize the

risks the UN may incur by protecting its legitimacyand credibility. In Mali, this concern can be takeninto account by addressing three considerations:• Clarifying the thin line between protection of

civilians and peace enforcement in the context ofthe proliferation of asymmetric attacks;

• Ensuring that the peacekeeping operation has theadequate capability, namely the necessarymobility, force multipliers, and informationgathering or intelligence; and

• Defining, in the case of a parallel force designedto address the terrorism issue, the relationshipbetween the peacekeeping mission and theparallel force to ensure its effectiveness, consid-ering the large size of the country and its difficultconditions of operation.

Resolution 2100 established the UN Multi -dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission inMali (MINUSMA), which began its mandate onJuly 1, 2013. MINUSMA’s mandate covers thestabilization of key population centers and supportfor the reestablishment of state authority through -out the country; support for the implementation ofthe transitional road map, including the nationalpolitical dialogue and the electoral process; protec-tion of civilians; and the promotion and protectionof human rights, national and international justice,humanitarian assistance, and cultural preservation.The Security Council also authorized Frenchtroops, within the limits of their capacities andareas of deployment, to use all necessary means tointervene in support of elements of MINUSMAwhen under imminent and serious threat, uponrequest of the secretary-general.THE LINKS BETWEEN PEACEKEEPING,PEACEMAKING, AND PEACEBUILDING

In some cases, peacekeeping, understood as theprevention of violence and hostilities, can appear as“the enemy” of peacemaking or the need to resolvepolitical issues. Peacekeeping can end up pushingthe political issues under the carpet. Using the caseof the DRC, participants at the retreat observedthat a UN presence on the ground went throughdifferent phases since 1960. After more than fiftyyears, the UN seems to have become part of thecountry, and there are risks of collapse should it betaken out of Congo. While no alternative has beenoffered, peacekeeping in the DRC seems to havemostly helped to maintain the status quo.

SECURITY COUNCIL ISTANBUL RETREAT 13

Concerns have been raised about the importantand increasing demand for peacekeepers, the highcost of the mission with an annual budget of $1.5billion a year (compared to $1.45 million spent ondevelopment programs) and the overreliance onpeacekeeping to lead the country’s security,policing, and development efforts. Besidespeacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and mediationshould remain a priority. The peacemaking processcan help create a new environment and offer newperspectives; the international community musthelp increase local capabilities to inject them intothe society. In addition, while it is important not tolose sight that numbers often reflect a reality of theneeds on the ground, a constant review ofpeacekeeping operations should help assessregularly the situation to right size the numbersand tools with a view to adjusting the strength ofpeace operations to the specific context. Addressing the root causes of conflict is critical.In that regard, the comprehensive political frame -work and the intervention brigade created in theDRC are expected to bring a new ground on whichto build peace further.14 In Mali, where there was nopolitical process yet as in the Congo as of April2013, the new UN stabilization force and theperspective of recovering the country’s territorialintegrity were encouraged to incentivize theauthorities in Bamako to begin the politicalprocess. Greater effectiveness can there fore resultfrom the utilization, by the internationalcommunity, of all the tools in its toolbox. At theend of the day, multidimensional peacekeepingshould represent only one process, throughout itsvarious phases of peacemaking, peacekeeping, andpeacebuilding. And to facilitate an earlier phase outof peacekeeping missions, a timely consideration of the integration between peacekeeping andpeacebuilding should be encouraged from thedeployment of the mission.THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUSAND THE FUNDING DISCREPANCYBETWEEN PEACEKEEPING ANDDEVELOPMENT

Development remains the best guarantee againstconflict and relapse into conflict. For the UnitedNations, the nexus between security and develop-

ment must also therefore be looked at from thepoint of view of the coexistence of the SecurityCouncil’s mandate with other organs.Discrepancies must be addressed and a just balanceof funding for peacekeeping operations and fordevelopment programs should be encouraged. Inaddition to the DRC, the difference betweenpeacekeeping and development funding was notedin Darfur, where the situation has to a certainextent stabilized after the July 2011 Dohaagreement. However, the mission budget remainsclose to $1.5 billion per year. The United NationsOperation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) budget isapproximately $600 million, while only $25 millionis spent on development. Participants at the retreat agreed, each caseshould be looked at from a specific context.However, there is no certainty that the interna-tional community prefers peacekeeping operationsto development, unless such operations need to bedeployed. In fact, peacekeeping can facilitate theemergence of the rule of law and securityframeworks for the development of nationalinstitutions. And in some cases, peacekeepingoperations share humanitarian agencies’ dilemmaabout when to transit from immediate relief todevelopment. Considering the situation in theDRC where development remains to be achieveddespite the considerable amount of money pouredinto peacekeeping efforts, some participants feltthere is a need for a candid discussion onpeacekeeping and on ways to put an end to cyclesof conflict. Greater investment in development and theimplementation of comprehensive programs toaddress the underlying causes of conflict must beconsidered. Another suggestion for linkingpeacekeeping to development efforts is thepreparation of exit roadmaps, articulated with thehost country. Such roadmaps would (1) describeprogress in the country since the establishment ofthe mission, and (2) assess further needs in terms ofeconomic development, basic social services,employment, and the rule of law for example.These roadmaps could also serve to prevent suddenrequests of withdrawal of peacekeeping missionssuch as those seen in the Central African Republic

14 MEETING NOTE

14 African Union, “Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, Addis Ababa,” Ethiopia, February 24,2013, available at www.peaceau.org/uploads/scanned-on-24022013-125543.pdf .

and Chad in 2010, which caught the SecurityCouncil by surprise. When violent conflict comes to an end, lingeringissues can be an impediment to development. Thishas played out after South Sudan’s independencewith the interruption of development initiatives inboth Sudan and South Sudan, and a heavy milita-rization of the region to the detriment of theeconomy and local populations. The decision ofSouth Sudan to shut down its oil production inJanuary 2012 following a dispute with the northover transit fees also had disastrous consequencesfor both countries. Moreover, though the 2005Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the worstforms of violence in the south, peace remainsfragile and under continuous threats in the borderregion of Abyei, and in Sudan’s South Kordofanand Blue Nile. In Darfur—which has beendevastated since 2003 by the war between thecentral government and the rebels—competitionfor water as well as political, social, and economicdevelopment challenges remain an obstacle to anyconstructive remedy.THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEPEACEBUILDING COMMISSION

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has animportant role to play and joint efforts are neededto bring it to its full potential. In Liberia, thePeacebuilding Fund (PBF) supported the establish-ment of justice hubs, and a similar initiative isanticipated in the DRC. However, the retreatparticipants admitted the PBC is not well known,and a number of policymakers are still trying tofigure out where to put this new institution in theirbureaucracy and to decide on its economic, social,or political nature. Another difficulty faced by thePBC and PBF is the initial confusion about theirobjectives and the expectation that the structurewould be a significant generator of funds. While most of the country configurationsprovide good added value, their members are notdevelopment or advocacy specialists and thesuccess of each configuration significantly dependson the personality of the ambassador running theconfiguration. Further, the PBC and PBF servemore as structures to mobilize support in and fromNew York. To reinforce the UN peacebuilding

architecture, suggestions were made towardstronger backing from the Security Council; thedevelopment of more realistic expectations of whatboth the PBC and the PBF can achieve; and greaterclarity in the division of work between the PBC inNew York and UN country offices on the ground.In Liberia, which is considered one of the PBC’ssuccess stories, the Commission is hardly known.And in CAR, despite the PBC and PBF beingconsidered a useful contribution to the politicaldialogue, the long absence of a chair for the countryconfiguration was seen as a disadvantage that ledthe country’s most recent crisis. At the regional level, the AU has developed apostconflict reconstruction and developmentpolicy, which seeks to complement the work of thePBC. The policy aims to respond to the PBC’slimitations with regard to the number of countriessupported in Africa, some of them not necessarilyin the most difficult of situations. Detecting andaddressing the root causes of conflict should fosterprevention while deterring escalation risks. And tosupport postconflict reconstruction and stimulatethe security-development nexus, the AU haslaunched the African Solidarity Initiative, a supportmobilization initiative backed by the AfricanDevelopment Bank and the UN EconomicCommission for Africa.15 However, the participantsat the retreat observed that while adding morecountries to the PBC’s list would seem beneficial, italso carries the risk of overburdening a nascentadministration as well as interlocutors in countrieswhere the necessary structures remain to be built.

ConclusionThe discussion at the fourth Istanbul SecurityCouncil retreat underscored three main prioritiesthe international community must take intoaccount in its efforts to develop and reinforce thesecurity-development nexus in conflict preventionand resolution in Africa.NEW PEACEKEEPING PARADIGMS

Both in the DRC and Mali, the emergence of newpeace and security threats has led to originalresponses by the international community. Themultiplication of armed groups in eastern DRCmade the establishment of an intervention brigade

SECURITY COUNCIL ISTANBUL RETREAT 15

15 African Union, “Assembly, Decision on African Solidarity Initiative for Support to Post-Conflict Reconstruction Development (PCRD) in Africa,”Assembly/AU/Dec.425(XIX), Nineteenth Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 15–16, 2012.

possible. The intervention brigade is anticipated toreinforce the protection of civilians in the region byneutralizing armed groups and deterring futurehuman rights violations. New peacekeepingapproaches were also deemed necessary to respondto emerging asymmetric warfare and guerillatactics that armed groups are using in Mali andSomalia. As a result, improved security has beenplanned under MINUSMA, whose peacekeepingmandate is complemented by an authorizationgiven to French troops in Mali to use all necessarymeans to intervene in support of the mission whenunder imminent and serious threat. Beyond the development of new peacekeepingapproaches, the retreat highlighted the importanceof balancing peacekeeping and peacemakingprocesses, and the need to prevent peacekeepingfrom being seen as “the enemy” of peacemaking.Peacekeeping efforts on the ground, which shouldbe regularly assessed and adjusted to actual needs,must be combined with an effective peacemakingprocess that can help devise new perspectivesfostering peace and reconciliation. By strength-ening the UN peacebuilding architecture andmaking use of all the tools in its toolbox, theSecurity Council will be in a position to managecrisis exit better.SSR AND DEVELOPMENT

Support to national SSR and developmentprograms is part of the council’s efforts to pave theway to successful crisis exits. For the internationalcommunity, this support requires overcoming thefollowing four challenges: (1) develop and implement effective international

coherence and coordination to prevent a toocommon piecemeal approach of SSR

programs; (2) find the most appropriate way to provide

support and technical assistance whilemaintaining national ownership;

(3) find the right balance between sustainableinterest and a clear exit strategy; and

(4) address the root causes of conflict. To tackle the root causes of conflict, greaterinvestment should be made in development. Fromthe early stages of peacekeeping operations,stronger links must be established betweenpeacekeeping efforts and development programs.The funding discrepancies noted betweenpeacekeeping and development must be addressed,and the preparation of exit roadmaps shouldprovide an up-to-date assessment of the develop-ment needs throughout the peacekeeping phase.STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW

Strengthening the rule of law is another strategyhelping the international community to betterprepare for crisis exits. For the Security Council,effective rule of law development calls for strongerinvolvement and the development of innovativeapproaches such as a new emphasis on “preventiveprimacy” of the rule of law; linking peacekeepingefforts with other institutions including the WorldBank to facilitate a better comprehension of therelationship between the rule of law anddemocracy, security, and development. In pursuingits efforts to respond to new and emerging peaceand security threats and better prepare for crisisexit, the Security Council can rely on the interven-tions conducted by a growing number of actorsthrough bilateral and multilateral efforts. Turkey,the EU, and the African Union provide suchsupport.

16 MEETING NOTE

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