Section 15 -22

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Section 15 ndash Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Lansang vs Garcia [GR No L-33964 December 11 1971]

THE SUPREME COURT HAD AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THEFACTUAL BASES OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OFHABEAS CORPUS A majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensusthat it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases forthe issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos 889 and 889-A (suspending theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be detained forthe crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines which area haslately been reduced to some eighteen provinces two subprovinces and eighteencities with the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected byPresidential Proclamations Nos 889-B 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine theconstitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article IIIsec 1 par 14 and Article VII sec 10 par 2 of the Philippine Constitution andconsidering that the members of the Court are not agreed on the precise scope and

nature of the inquiry to be made in the premises even as all of them are agreedthat the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect the Court RESOLVED thatthese cases be set for rehearing on October 8 1971 at 930 AM

Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation as amendedPursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution two (2) conditionsmust concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to thewrit to wit (a) there must be invasion insurrection or rebellion or mdash pursuantto paragraph (2) section 10 of Art VII of the Constitution mdash imminent dangerthereof and (b) public safety must require the suspension of the privilege ThePresidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and

there is actually a state of rebellion and that public safety requires that immediateand effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order secure thesafety of the people and preserve the authority of the State

In our resolution of October 5 1971 We stated that a majority of the Court hadtentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of theexistence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos889 and 889-A and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such basesin the light of the requirements of Article III sec 1 par 14 and Article VII sec10 par 2 of the Philippine Constitution Upon further deliberation themembers of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authorityto inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the

constitutional sufficiency thereof

Indeed the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute norunqualified The authority conferred by the Constitution both under the Bill ofRights and under the Executive Department is limited and conditional The preceptin the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule as well as an exception thereto Whatis more it postulates the former in the negative evidently to stress its importanceby providing that (t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

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suspended It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension ofthe privilege in cases of invasion insurrection or rebellion mdash or under Art VII ofthe Constitution imminent danger thereof mdash when the public safety requires itin any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such periodthe necessity for such suspension shall exist For from being full and plenary theauthority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed confined andrestricted not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to itsexistence but also as regards the time when and the place where it may beexercised These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions markestablish and define the extent the confines and the limits of said power beyondwhich it does not exist And like the limitations and restrictions imposed by theFundamental Law upon the legislative department adherence thereto andcompliance therewith may within proper bounds be inquired into by courts of

justice Otherwise the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would bemeaningless Surely the framers of our Constitution could not have intended toengage in such a wasteful exercise in futility

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that ourpolitical system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that thesuspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that systemnamely individual freedom Indeed such freedom includes and connotes as wellas demands the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss anddissent from as well as criticize and denounce the views the policies and thepractices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwiseimproper or inimical to the commonweal regardless of whether his own opinion isobjectively correct or not The untrammeled enjoyment and exercise of such rightmdash which under certain conditions may be a civic duty of the highest order mdash isvital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and

wholesome growth and development

Manifestly however the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is oneenjoyed and exercised not in derogation thereof but consistently therewith andhence within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution andthe context of the Rule of Law Accordingly when individual freedom is used todestroy that social order by means of force and violence in defiance of the Rule ofLaw mdash such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government tooverthrow the same thereby committing the crime of rebellion mdash there emerges acircumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementionedguarantee or protection by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswhen public safety requires it Although we must be forewarned against mistaking

mere dissent mdash no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be mdash for dissidenceamounting to rebellion or insurrection the Court cannot hesitate much less refusemdash when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly establishedor cannot reasonably be denied mdash to uphold the finding of the Executive thereonwithout in effect encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law ofthe land and depriving him to this extent of such power and therefore withoutviolating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Laws the Court is calledupon to epitomize

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Jackson vs Macalino [GR No 139255 November 24 2003]

Section 1 Rule 102 of the Rules of Court as amended provides that except asotherwise expressly provided by law the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to allcases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of hisliberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the personentitled thereto The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve aperson from unlawful restraint It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted totest the right under which he is detained Section 4 Rule 102 of the said Rulesprovides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized

Sec 4 When writ not allowed or discharged authorized mdash If itappears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in thecustody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or byvirtue of a judgment or order of a court of record and that the courtor judge had jurisdiction to issue the process render the judgment or

make the order the writ shall not be allowed or if the jurisdictionappears after the writ is allowed the person shall not be discharged byreason of any informality or defect in the process judgment or orderNor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of aperson charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or ofa person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment

The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of theBureau of Immigration

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal supervening events may bar his release or

discharge from custody What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detentionas of at the earliest the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus foreven if the detention is at its inception illegal it may by reason of samesupervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 Rule 102 be nolonger illegal at the time of the filing of the application Any such superveningevents are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of thedetained person

Moreover the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration with the CID offered topost a bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessarydocuments to establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in thePhilippines By offering to post a bail bond the petitioner thereby admitted that he

was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of theCID1[35]

Rules on Habeas DataRules on Writ of Amparo

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v Zubiri et al L-16745 December 17 1966) When no substantialrights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest thecorresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filedaccordingly it is sound judicial discretion to allow them (Rexwell Corpv Canlas L-16746 December 30 1961) (Panganiban vs Vda deSta Maria 22 SCRA 708 712)

Flores vs People [GR No L-25769 December 10 1974]

Section 17 ndash Right Against Self-Incrimination

United States vs Tan Teng [GR No 7081 September 7 1912]

The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection theexamination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that

the defendant was suffering from said disease As was suggested by JudgeLobingier had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his personthere certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken forthe purpose of using the same as evidence against him So also if the clothingwhich he wore by reason of blood stains or otherwise had furnished evidence ofthe commission of a crime there certainly could have been no objection to takingsuch for the purpose of using the same as proof No one would think of evensuggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated taken fromthe defendant could not be used against him as evidence without violating the rulethat a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself

The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignmentof error is not a new question either to the courts or authors In the case of Holtvs US (218 US 245) Mr Justice Holmes speaking for the court upon thisquestion said

But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be awitness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moralcompulsion to extort communications from him not an exclusion ofhis body as evidence when it may be material The objection inprinciple would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and comparehis features with a photograph in proof Moreover we are notconsidering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibithimself for when he is exhibited whether voluntarily or by ordereven if the order goes too far the evidence if material is competent

To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimonyof a physician or a medical expert who had been appointed to make observations ofa person who plead insanity as a defense where such medical testimony wasagainst necessarily use the person of the defendant for the purpose of making suchexamination (People vs Agustin 199 NY 446) The doctrine contended for by

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the appellants would also prevent the courts from making an examination of thebody of the defendant where serious personal injuries were alleged to have beenreceived by him The right of the courts in such cases to require an exhibit of theinjured parts of the body has been established by a long line of decisions

The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not becompelled to be a witness against himself is simply a prohibition against legal

process to extract from the defendants own lips against his will an admission ofhis guilt

The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at thefact of a defendant even for the purpose of disclosing his identity Such anapplication of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permittedSuch an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses can notviolate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill because it does not call uponthe accused as a witness mdash it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonialresponsibility Mr Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the

accused is not testimony but his body his body itself

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare ndash ldquono man is bound to accuse himselfrdquo

Villaflor vs Summers [GR No 16444 September 8 1920]

The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a womanto permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnantviolates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code ofCriminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States

and practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidenceproviding that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witnessagainst himself (Presidents Instructions to the Philippine Commission Act ofCongress of July 1 1902 section 5 paragraph 3 Act of Congress of August 291916 section 3 paragraph 3 Code of Criminal Procedure section 15 [4] UnitedStates Constitution fifth amendment) Counsel for petitioner argues that suchbodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision therepresentative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of theconstitutional provision The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscalwhile it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on anidentical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner

The maxim of the common law Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare was recognized inEngland in early days but not in the other legal systems of the world in a revoltagainst the thumbscrew and the rack A legal shield was raised against odiousinquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extortunwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime ofperjury The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonialcompulsion As forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contraryto the fundamentals of republican government the principle was taken into the

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American Constitutions and from the United States was brought to the PhilippineIslands in exactly as wide mdash but no wider mdash a scope as it existed in old Englishdays The provision should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit butwith a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its benefits and its abuses (Readthe scholarly articles of Prof Wigmore in 5 Harvard L R [1891] p 71 and 15Harvard L R 1902 p 610 found in 4 Wigmore on Evidence pp 3069 et seq andU S vs Navarro [1904] Phil 143)

Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back oncemore to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial Aswe view it the object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of personswho violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men Criminal procedurethe rules of evidence and constitutional provisions are then provided not toprotect the guilty but to protect the innocent No rule is intemended to be so rigidas to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truthNo accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend toestablish the truth For instance under the facts before us to use torture to make

the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehoodBut no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to bedetrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order toacquit a guilty person

Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense which on firstimpression is a shock to ones sensibilities we must nevertheless enforce theconstitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reasonthereof undeterred by merely sentimental influences Once again we lay down therule that the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in anycriminal case to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against

compulsory testimonial self-incrimination The corollary to the proposition is thatan ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible The proviso is thattorture of force shall be avoided Whether facts fall within or without the rule withits corollary and proviso must of course be decided as cases arise

It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable anddisinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not toembarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary Indeed no objectionto the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or bydoctor of the same sex can be seen

Beltran vs Samson [GR No 32025 September 23 1929]

The question then is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from thefiscals dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the lattershandwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to befalsified constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of theconstitutional provision under examination

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same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the policeThe taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel being apurely mechanical act is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination26 proscribes the useof physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and notthe inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material Purely mechanicalacts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak hisguilt hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required 27 Theessence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion that is thegiving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act28 Hence it has beenheld that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physicalexamination to determine her pregnancy29 and an accused may be compelled tosubmit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body formedical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which wascontracted by his victim30 to expel morphine from his mouth31 to have the outline

of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints32 and to bephotographed or measured or his garments or shoes removed or replaced or tomove his body to enable the foregoing things to be done33

Chavez vs Court of Appeals [GR No L-29169 August 19 1968]

AN ACCUSED MAY INVOKE HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION AT THEONSET AND REFUSED TO BE PRESENTED IN THE WITNESS STAND Petitionersplea on this score rests upon his averment with proof of violation of his right mdash constitutionally entrenched mdash against self-incrimination He asks that the hand ofthis Court be made to bear down upon his conviction that he be relieved of the

effects thereof He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that No personshall be compelled to be a witness against himself fully echoed in Section 1 Rule115 Rules of Court where in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall beentitled (e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself

It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war withthe fundamentals of a republican government that [i]t may suit the purposesof despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty andpersonal freedom Mr Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background ofthis constitutional inhibition thus The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusarehad its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods ofinterrogating accused persons which has long obtained in the continental system

and until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688 and theerection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exerciseof arbitrary power was not uncommon even in England While the admissions ofconfessions of the prisoner when voluntarily and freely made have always rankedhigh in the scale of incriminating evidence if an accused person be asked to explainhis apparent connection with a crime under investigation the ease with which thequestions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character the temptation to pressthe witness unduly to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant to push him into a

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corner and to entrap him into fatal contradictions which is so painfully evident inmany of the earlier state trials notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton andUdal the Puritan minister made the system so odious as to give rise to a demandfor its total abolition The change in the English criminal procedure in that particularseems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion but upon a generaland silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand But however adoptedit has become firmly embedded in English as well as in American jurisprudence Sodeeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the mindsof the American colonists that the states with one accord made a denial of theright to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law so that amaxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence became clothed in thiscountry with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment (Brown vs Walker161 US 591 597 40 Law ed 819 821) Mr Justice Malcolm in expressivelanguage tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days in arevolt against the thumbscrew and the rack An old Philippine case [1904]speaks of this constitutional injunction as older than the Government of the UnitedStates as having its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of

interrogating the accused person and as having been adopted in the Philippinesto wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiringaccused persons to submit to judicial examinations and to give testimonyregarding the offenses with which they were charged

So it is then that this right is not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement ofwhich is left to the discretion of the court it is mandatory it secures to adefendant a valuable and substantive right it is fundamental to our scheme of

justice Just a few months ago the Supreme Court of the United States (January29 1968) speaking thru Mr Justice Harlan warned that [t]he constitutionalprivilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent

and foresighted

It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not betreated with unconcern To repeat it is mandatory it secures to every defendant avaluable and substantive right Tantildeada and Fernando (Constitution of thePhilippines 4th ed vol I pp 583-584) takes note of US vs Navarro suprawhich reaffirms the rule that the constitutional proscription was established onbroad grounds of public policy and humanity of policy because it would place thewitness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury and of humanitybecause it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every speciesand degree of which the law abhors

Therefore the court may not extract from a defendants own lips and against hiswill an admission of his guilt Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsorydisclosure directly or indirectly of facts usable against him as a confession of thecrime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime Because it ishis right to forego testimony to remain silent unless he chooses to take thewitness stand mdash with undiluted unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will

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Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use ofviolence it may be the product of unintentional statements Pressure whichoperates to overbear his will disable him from making a free and rational choice orimpair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient So ismoral coercion tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of thedefendant

With the foregoing as guideposts we now turn to the facts Petitioner is adefendant in a criminal case He was called by the prosecution as the first witnessin that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof Petitionerobjected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination This he broadened by theclear-cut statement that he will not testify But petitioners protestations were metwith the judges emphatic statement that it is the right of the prosecution to askanybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused and thatdefense counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness standThe cumulative impact of all these is that accused petitioner had to take the standHe was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself The foregoing

situation molds a solid case for petitioner backed by the Constitution the law and jurisprudence

Petitioner as accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinarywitness Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness standand claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot athim an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse toanswer any and all questions For in reality the purpose of calling an accused asa witness for the People would be to incriminate him The rule positively intends toavoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person tofurnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction This rule may apply

even to a co-defendant in a joint trial

And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accusedshall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself is not the probability ofthe evidence but it is the capability of abuse Thus it is that it was undoubtedlyerroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words

What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him counsel

And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on thewitness-stand including the accused

If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time forcounsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when thecourt feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him

Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answerquestions which would incriminate him

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But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness-stand

Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burrs Trial Robertsons Rep I 208244 quoted in VIII Wigmore p 355 while a defendants knowledge of the factsremains concealed within his bosom he is safe but draw it from thence and he isexposed mdash to conviction

The judges words heretofore quoted mdash But surely counsel could not object tohave the accused called on the witness-stand mdash wielded authority By thosewords petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force they deprived him of his willto resist they foreclosed choice the realities of human nature tell us that as hetook his oath to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth no genuineconsent underlay submission to take the witness stand Constitutionally soundconsent was absent

Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners [GR No L-25018 May 26 1969]

The broad all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause1 wheneverappropriately invoked has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever sincethe adoption of the Constitution2 Bermudez v Castillo3 decided in 1937 was quitecategorical As we there stated This Court is of the opinion that in order that theconstitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection andnot a dead letter it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable tothe person invoking it As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion Theprovision as doubtless it was designed would be construed with the utmostliberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served 4

Even more relevant considering the precise point at issue is the recent case ofCabal v Kapunan5where it was held that a respondent in an administrativeproceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness standat the instance of the complainant So it must be in this case where petitioner wassustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be thefirst witness of the complainants he being the party proceeded against in anadministrative charge for malpractice That was a correct decision we affirm it onappeal

It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while thematter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or

employee may acquire manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawfulincome there is clearly the imposition of a penalty The proceeding for forfeiturewhile administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect Thecase before us is not dissimilar petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged Hecould suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as amedical practitioner for some an even greater deprivation

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To the argument that Cabal v Kapunan could thus distinguished it suffices to referto an American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character 10 In thelanguage of Justice Douglas We conclude that the Self-Incrimination Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth that it extends itsprotection to lawyers as well as to other individuals and that it should not bewatered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of alivelihood as a price for asserting it We reiterate that such a principle is equallyapplicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege topractice the medical profession

The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Boardand intervenors-appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions theanswers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred It istrue that one aspect of such a right to follow the language of another Americandecision 11 is the protection against any disclosures which the witness mayreasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead

to other evidence that might be so used If that were all there is then it becomesdilutedlawphi1ntildeet

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence As far back as1905 we had occasion to declare The accused has a perfect right to remain silentand his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt 12 Only last year inChavez v Court of Appeals 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez we reaffirmed thedoctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant to forego testimony to remainsilent unless he chooses to take the witness stand mdash with undiluted unfetteredexercise of his own free genuine will

Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern The constitutional guarantee alongwith other rights granted an accused stands for a belief that while crime should notgo unpunished and that the truth must be revealed such desirable objectivesshould not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the highsense of respect accorded the human personality More and more in line with thedemocratic creed the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of themost heinous crimes is given due weight To quote from Chief Justice Warren theconstitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens 14

It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle ofhumanity on which this right is predicated precluding as it does all resort to force

or compulsion whether physical or mental current judicial opinion places equalemphasis on its identification with the right to privacy Thus according to JusticeDouglas The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizento create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to hisdetriment 15 So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of aright to a private enclave where he may lead a private life That right is thehallmark of our democracy 16 In the light of the above it could thus clearly appearthat no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the

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decision now on appeal We hold that in an administrative hearing against amedical practitioner for alleged malpractice respondent Board of Medical Examinerscannot consistently with the self-incrimination clause compel the personproceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent

Mapa Jr vs Sandiganbayan [GR No 100295 April 26 1994]

Our immunity statutes are of American origin In the United States there are twotypes of statutory immunity granted to a witness They are the transactionalimmunity and the used-and-derivative-use immunity Transactional immunity isbroader in the scope of its protection By its grant a witness can no longer beprosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction Incontrast by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity a witness is onlyassured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not beused against him or her in a subsequent prosecution In Kastigar vs US therationale of these immunity grants is well explained viz

The power of government to compel persons to testify in court orbefore grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmlyestablished in Anglo-American jurisprudence The power to compeltestimony and the corresponding duty to testify are recognized in theSixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted withthe witnesses against him and have compulsory process for obtainingwitnesses in his favor

But the power to compel testimony is not absolute There are anumber of exemptions from the testimonial duty the most importantof which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory

self-incrimination The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamentalvalues and aspirations and marks an important advance in thedevelopment of our liberty It can be asserted in any proceeding civilor criminal administrative or judicial investigatory or adjudicatoryand it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonablybelieves could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to otherevidence that might be so used This Court has been zealous tosafeguard the values that underlie the privilege

Immunity statutes which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence are not incompatible with these values Rather theyseek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of theprivilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizensto testify The existence of these statutes reflects the importance oftestimony and the fact that many offenses are of such a characterthat the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are thoseimplicated in the crime Indeed their origins were in the context ofsuch offenses and their primary use has been to investigate suchoffenses (E)very State in the Union as well as the District ofColumbia and Puerto Rico has one of more such statutes The

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ALL DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURTS ARE SUBJECT TO THEAUTOMATIC REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT REGARDLESS WHETHER THEACCUSED JUMPED BAIL OR DOES NOT INTEND TO APPEAL As the accusedremains at large up to the present time the issue that confronts the Court iswhether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence Theissue need not befuddle us In the 1910 ground-breaking case of US vs Lagunaet al we already held thru Mr Justice Moreland that the power of this Court toreview a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either bythe accused or by the courts viz

It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of convictionand sentence thereunder by the trial court does not in realityconclude the trial of the accused Such trial is not terminated until theSupreme Court has reviewed the facts and the law as applied theretoby the court below The judgment of conviction entered on thetrial is not final can not be executed and is wholly without

force or effect until the cause has been passed upon by theSupreme Court In a sense the trial court acts as a commissionerwho takes the testimony and reports thereon to the Supreme Courtwith his recommendation While in practice he enters a judgment ofconviction and sentences the prisoner thereunder in reality untilpassed upon by the Supreme Court it has none of the attributes of afinal judgment and sentence It is a mere recommendation to theSupreme Court based upon the facts on the record which arepresented with it This is meant in no sense to detract from thedignity and power of Courts of First Instance It means simply thatthat portion of Spanish procedure which related to cases where capital

punishment was imposed still survives

The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in whichcapital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trialcourt is one having for its object simply and solely the protection ofthe accused Having received the highest penalty which the lawimposes he is entitled under that law to have the sentence and all thefacts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before thehighest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality maybe clearly and conclusively determined Such procedure ismerciful It gives a second chance for life Neither the courtsnor the accused can waive it It is a positive provision of the

law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions(Emphasis supplied)

It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme Court the recordor any part thereof of any case in which there shall have been anacquittal or in which the sentence imposed is not death unless suchcase shall have been duly appealed but such sentence shall beexecuted upon the order of the court in which the trial was had The

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records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have beenimposed by any Court of First Instance whether the defendantshall have appealed or not and of all cases in which appealsshall have been taken shall be forwarded to the Supreme Courtfor investigation and judgments as law and justice shalldictate The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk ofthe Supreme Court within twenty days but not earlier than fifteendays after the rendition of sentence

We hold however that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudencemandating our review of all death penalty cases regardless of the wish of theconvict and regardless of the will of the Court Nothing less than life is at stakeand any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible We must strive to realize this objective however elusive it maybe and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appealor has escaped Indeed an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he isguilty but because of his wrong perception of the law Or because he may want to

avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon Or because of his frustration andmisapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities Nor should theCourt be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convictescapes Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty casesNo litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the ConstitutionThe power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assurethe People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimesthat slight but even more in crimes that shock the conscience Thisconcern cannot be diluted

The Court is not espousing a soft bended approach to heinous crimes for as

discussed above we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penaltyregardless of the will of the convict Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policythat the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determinationof this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last effective hedgeagainst an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court This enlightenedpolicy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends allrights a matter of societal value that transcends the personal interest of aconvict The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escapeof a convict which is a problem of law enforcement Neither should this Court bemoved alone by the outrage of the public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimesfor our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the socialweather Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to

have rights just because of his conviction This principle is implicit in ourConstitution which recognizes that an accused to be right while themajority even if overwhelming has no right to be wrong

Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice [GR No 132601 October 12 1998]

8132019 Section 15 -22


The main challenge to RA No 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored onArticle III Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the impositionof cruel degrading or inhuman punishment The prohibition in the Philippine Billagainst cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard againstgovernmental oppression of the subject which made its first appearance in thereign of William and Mary of England in An Act declaring the rights and liberties ofthe subject and settling the succession of the crown passed in the year 1689 Ithas been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of America) andinto most constitutions of the various States in substantially the same language asthat used in the original statute The exact language of the Constitution of theUnited States is used in the Philippine Bill The counterpart of Section 19 (1) inthe 1935 Constitution reads Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel andinhuman punishment inflicted In the 1973 Constitution the phrase becamecruel or unusual punishment The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting unusualpunishment even if not cruel It was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentationin penology Consequently the Committee reported out the present text which

prohibits cruel degrading or inhuman punishment as more consonant with themeaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject

Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel degrading andinhuman punishment considering that (1) RA No 8177 fails to provide for thedrugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection the dosage for each drug to beadministered and the procedure in administering said drugs into the accused (2)RA No 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of executiontime of notification the court which will fix the date of execution whichuncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict and (3) thepossibility of botched executions or mistakes in administering the drugs renders

lethal injection inherently cruel

Before the Court proceeds any further a brief explanation of the process ofadministering lethal injection is in order

In lethal injection the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney andwheeled into the execution room A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein inthe inmates arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution At the wardenssignal a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous line Thedeadly concoction typically includes three drugs (1) a nonlethal dose of sodiumthiopenthotal a sleep inducing barbiturate (2) lethal doses of pancuroniumbromide a drug that paralyzes the muscles and (3) potassium chloride which

stops the heart within seconds The first two drugs are commonly used duringsurgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles the third is used in heartbypass surgery

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a crueldegrading or inhuman punishment In the oft-cited case of Harden v Director ofPrisons this Court held that [p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture ora lingering death but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of

8132019 Section 15 -22


that word as used in the constitution It implies there something inhuman andbarbarous something more than the mere extinguishment of life Would the lackin particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injectionrender said law cruel degrading or inhuman The Court believes not For reasonshereafter discussed the implementing details of RA No 8177 are matters whichare properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials

Petitioner contends that Sec 16 25 of RA No 8177 is uncertain as to whichcourt will fix the time and date of execution and the date of execution and timeof notification of the death convict As petitioner already knows the court whichdesignates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused thatis after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case and has affirmed the

judgment of the lower court Thereupon the procedure is that the judgment isentered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation and 10 days thereafter therecords are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgmentfor execution Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor thetime of notification As to the date of execution Section 15 of the implementing

rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of RA No8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out not earlier thanone (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has becomefinal and executory without prejudice to the exercise by the President of hisexecutive clemency powers at all times Hence the death convict is in effectassured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the deathpenalty became final and executory wherein he can seek executive clemency andattend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of wanton pain in case of possiblecomplications in the intravenous injection considering and as petitioner claims that

respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice andadministration of lethal injection is concerned renders lethal injection a crueldegrading and inhuman punishment Such supposition is highly speculative andunsubstantiated

Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out theexecution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutionalproscription against cruel degrading or inhuman punishment In a limited senseanything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress and since punishmentimports pain or suffering to the convict it may be said that all punishments arecruel But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime for this reason is togo unpunished The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted

man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment not the necessary sufferinginvolved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely Numerous federaland state courts of the United States have been asked to review whether lethalinjections constitute cruel and unusual punishment No court has found lethalinjections to implicate prisoners Eighth Amendment rights In fact most courts thathave addressed the issue state in one or two sentences that lethal injection clearlyis a constitutional form of execution A few jurisdictions however have addressedthe merits of the Eighth Amendment claims Without exception these courts have

8132019 Section 15 -22


found that lethal injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment Afterreviewing medical evidence that indicates that improper doses or improperadministration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to havelittle training in the administration of the drugs the courts have found that the fewminutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation

What is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaningas public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice and must draw itsmeaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of amaturing society Indeed [o]ther (US) courts have focused on standards ofdecency finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that itcomports with contemporary norms The primary indicator of societys standard ofdecency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the countryslegislatures to the sanction Hence for as long as the death penalty remains in ourstatute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by theConstitution we must confine our inquiry to the legality of RA No 8177 whoseconstitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioners challenge We find that

the legislatures substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty fromelectrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein

Section 20 ndash Non-Imprisonment for Debt

Serafin vs Lindayag [AM No 297-MJ September 30 1975]

Lozano vs Martinez [GR No L-63419 December 18 1986]

Section 21 ndash Double Jeopardy

People vs Obsania [GR No L-24447 June 29 1968]

REQUISITES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY An appeal by the prosecution in a criminalcase is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardyCorrelatively Section 9 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides

When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted or the caseagainst him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the expressconsent of the defendant by a court of competent jurisdiction upon avalid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in formand substance to sustain a conviction and after the defendant hadpleaded to the charge the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or

the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for theoffense charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustrationthereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarilyincluded in the offense charged in the former complaint orinformation

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of anaccused the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution (a)

8132019 Section 15 -22


a valid complaint or information (b) a competent court (c) the defendant hadpleaded to the charge and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted or thecase against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his expressconsent

DISMISSAL WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED From the above-quoted statement it is clear that what in Salico was repudiated in Labatete was thepremise that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the conclusionthat a dismissal other than on the merits sought by the accused is deemed to bewith his express consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to pleaddouble jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a secondindictment for the same offense This Court in Labatete merely pointed out thatthe controverted dismissal in Salico was in fact an acquittal Reasoning acontrario had the dismissal not amounted to acquittal then the doctrine of waiverwould have applied and prevailed

In Cloribel the case dragged for three years and eleven months that is from

September 27 1958 when the information was filed to August 15 1962 when itwas called for trial after numerous postponements mostly at the instance of theprosecution On the latter date the prosecution failed to appear for trial and uponmotion of the defendants the case was dismissed This Court held that thedismissal here complained of was not truly a dismissal but an acquittal For it wasentered upon the defendants insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trialand by reason of the prosecutions failure to appear on the date of trial (italicssupplied)

Considering the factual setting in the case at bar it is clear that there is noparallelism between Cloribel and the case cited therein on the one hand and the

instant case on the other Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on theerroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and suchinfirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo and not on the right of theaccused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute Theappealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminatethe action on the merits whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases thedismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposedthat the Government did not have a case against the accused who in the firstplace is presumed innocent

The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine quanon conditions first the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant

personally or through his counsel and second such dismissal must not be on themerits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal Indubitably the case atbar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have beenpreserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence

Paulin vs Gimenez [GR No 103323 January 21 1993]

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DOUBLE JEOPARDY For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners thefollowing requisites must have been obtained in the original prosecution

a) a valid complaint or informationb) a competent courtc) the defendant had pleaded to the charge andd) the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him

was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent(People v Obsania 23 SCRA 1249 [1968] Caes v IAC 179 SCRA 54[1989])

Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which findsapplication to the case at bar has been laid down by this Court as follows

However an appeal by the prosecution from the order ofdismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitutedouble jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion or with the

express consent of the defendant (2) the dismissal is not an acquittalor based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of thecase and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court ispurely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect the casewould have to be remanded to the court of origin for furtherproceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant(People v Villalon 192 SCRA 521 [1990] at p 529)

For double jeopardy to attach the dismissal of the case must be without theexpress consent of the accused (People v Gines 197 SCRA 481 [1991]) Where thedismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused he is

deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy In the case at barthe dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners Double jeopardy thus did notattach This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was examined and formallyintroduced in People v Salico (84 Phil 722 [19491) where Justice Felicisimo Feriastated

when the case is dismissed with the express consent of thedefendant the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution forthe same offense because his action in having the case dismissedconstitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege for thereason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trialon the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him

(See also People v Marapao (85 Phil 832 [1950]) Gandicela v Lutero(88 Phil 299 [1951]) People v Desalisa (125 Phil 27 [1966]) andmore recently People v Aquino (199 SCRA 610 [1991])

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACQUITTAL AND DISMISSAL In People v Salico (supra)distinctions between acquittal and dismissal were made to wit

8132019 Section 15 -22


Acquittal is always based on the merits that is the defendant isacquitted because the evidence does not show that defendants guilt isbeyond reasonable doubt but dismissal does not decide the case onthe merits or that the defendant is not guilty Dismissals terminate theproceedings either because the court is not a court of competent

jurisdiction or the evidence does not show that the offense wascommitted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or thecomplaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form andsubstance etc (at pp 732-733)

CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN DISMISSAL IS DEEMED FINAL Jurisprudence recognizesexceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final disposing of thecase once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accusedhimself to wit

1 Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by theaccused after the prosecution has rested which has the effect of a

judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal

2 Where the dismissal is made also on motion of the accused becauseof the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure toprosecute (Caes v IAC 179 SCRA 54 [1989] at pp 60-61)

Philippine Savings Bank vs Bermoy [ GR No 151912 September 26 2005]

The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged withthe same offense in two separate pending cases or (b) the accused is prosecuted

anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of suchoffense or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case 19 The last is based on Section 2 Rule 122 of the Rules of Court20 which provides that[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order except if the accusedwould be placed thereby in double jeopardy

In terms of substantive law the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the ordergranting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence andthe consequent acquittal of the accused as it will place the latter in double

jeopardy Generally the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal madewith the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place theaccused in double jeopardy However this rule admits of two exceptions namely

insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In the casebefore us the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground ofinsufficiency of evidence xxx Hence it clearly falls under one of the admittedexceptions to the rule Double jeopardy therefore applies to this case and thisCourt is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused22 (Emphasis supplied)

8132019 Section 15 -22


The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without anybasis As the Court explained in People v Velasco mdash

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trialcourt cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness overthe rights of the citizen when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x xThus Green [v United States] expressed the concern that (t)he underlying ideaone that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudenceis that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to makerepeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense therebysubjecting him to embarrassment expense and ordeal and compelling him to live ina continuing state of anxiety and insecurity as well as enhancing the possibilitythat even though innocent he may be found guilty

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity fairness and justice an acquitteddefendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality ofhis acquittal The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of

acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches tothe protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction The interest in thefinality-of-acquittal rule confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty is easy tounderstand it is a need for repose a desire to know the exact extent of onersquosliability With this right of repose the criminal justice system has built in aprotection to insure that the innocent even those whose innocence rests upon a

juryrsquos leniency will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding

Related to his right of repose is the defendantrsquos interest in his right to have his trialcompleted by a particular tribunal xxx [S]ocietyrsquos awareness of the heavy personalstrain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested

in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicateits very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws The ultimate goal isprevention of government oppression the goal finds its voice in the finality of theinitial proceeding As observed in Lockhart v Nelson (t)he fundamental tenetanimating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able tooppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process Because theinnocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment the Constitutionconclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair

Petitioner together with the Solicitor General contends that the Court can inquireinto the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal ofCriminal Case No 96-154193 was void They contend that the trial court acted with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when itdisregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spousesrsquo identity

The contention has no merit To be sure the rule barring appeals from judgmentsof acquittal admits of an exception Such however is narrowly drawn and is limitedto the case where the trial court act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process ie the

8132019 Section 15 -22


prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx or that the trialwas a sham xxx

Lejano vs People of the Philippines [GR No 176389 January 18 2011]

But as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places theaccused under double jeopardy The Constitution provides in Section 21 Article IIIthat

Section 21 No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment forthe same offense x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of beingpunished for the crime of which he has already been absolved There is reason forthis provision of the Constitution In criminal cases the full power of the State isranged against the accused If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the

accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted the infinite power andcapacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventuallyoverwhelm the accused in terms of resources stamina and the will to fightAs the Court said in People of the Philippines v Sandiganbayan

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting thesovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for thesame offense would arm the government with a potent instrument ofoppression The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall notbe permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for analleged offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment expense

and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxietyand insecurity as well as enhancing the possibility that even thoughinnocent he may be found guilty Societyrsquos awareness of the heavypersonal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individualdefendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to asingle criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in theenforcement of criminal laws

Of course on occasions a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possibleBut the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved theaccused gravely abused its discretion resulting in loss of jurisdiction or when amistrial has occurred In any of such cases the State may assail the decision by

special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65

Icasiano vs Sandiganbayan [GR No 95642 May 28 1992]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT ATTACH WHEN THE FIRST ACTION ISADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE It is therefore correct for the Sandiganbayan tohold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the

8132019 Section 15 -22


Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in characterwhile the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature

When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnelunder its supervision and control it acts as personnel administrator imposingdiscipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies Administrativeprocedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules Substantial evidence issufficient to sustain conviction Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan onthe other hand while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrativecase require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt

To avail of the protection against double jeopardy it is fundamental that thefollowing requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution (a) a validcomplaint or information (b) a competent court c) a valid arraignment (d) thedefendant had pleaded to the charge and (e) the defendant was acquitted orconvicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated withouthis express consent All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the administrative

case which should take case of petitioners contention that said administrative caseagainst him before the Supreme Court which was as aforestated dismissedentitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in theSandiganbayan

The charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for graveabuse of authority manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued two (2)orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago Ordinarily complainantsavailable remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with theRules It is only when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing thequestioned orders can abuse partiality or incompetence be imputed to the judge

Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing judge (petitionerIcasiano) was taken instead administrative and criminal cases were filed againstthe judge for issuing the orders

It is precisely for this reason among other that the administrative case againstpetitioner was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit and yet it cannotbe assumed at this point that petitioner is not criminally liable under RA 3019 par3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention In fact the Ombudsman hasfound a prima facie case which led to the filing of the information

DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT ATTACH IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION In anycase the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present

prosecution since double jeopardy does not apply As held in Cirilo Cinco et al vsSandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines a preliminary investigation(assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which double

jeopardy attaches

In Gaspar vs Sandiganbayan this Court also held

8132019 Section 15 -22


Moreover there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to conductanother preliminary investigation of a case under review by it (him)On the contrary under Presidential Decree No 911 in relation to Rule12 Administrative Order No VII the Tanodbayan may upon reviewreverse the finding of the investigator and thereafter `where he findsa prima facie case to cause the filing of an information in courtagainst the respondent based on the same sworn statements orevidence submitted without the necessity of conducting anotherpreliminary investigation

People vs Balisacan [GR No L-26376 August 31 1966]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY REQUIRES A VALID PLEA This Court now turns to Section 2Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which provides that The People of the Philippinescannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy Thepresent state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies

even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy(People vs Ferrer L-9072 October 23 1956 People vs Bao 106 Phil 243 Peoplevs de Golez 108 Phil 855)

The next issue therefore is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People vs Ylagan 58 Phil 851 People vs Quimsing L-19860 December23 1964) In the present case it is true the accused had first entered a plea ofguilty Subsequently however he testified in the course of being allowed to provemitigating circumstances that he acted in complete self-defense Said testimonytherefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision mdash had the effect of vacating

his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead anew onthe charge or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him Thiswas not done It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at thetime the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal there can be no double

jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein

DOUBLE JEOPARDY WILL NOT ATTACH IF THE PROSECUTION WAS DENIED ITSRIGHT TO DUE PROCESS Furthermore as afore-stated the court a quo decidedthe case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to presentits evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant In doing so it clearlyacted without due process of law And for lack of this fundamental pre-requisite itsaction is perforce null and void The acquittal therefore being a nullity for want of

due process is no acquittal at all and thus can not constitute a proper basis for aclaim of former jeopardy (People vs Cabero 61 Phil 121 21 Am Jur 2d 235McCleary vs Hudspeth 124 Fed 2d 445)

It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal the trial judge belowalready gave credence to the testimony of the accused In fairness to theprosecution without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge We deemit proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under

8132019 Section 15 -22


another judge of the same court in one of the two other branches of the Court ofFirst Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag

People vs City Court of Silay [GR No L-43790 December 9 1976]

DISMISSAL ON THE GROUND OF DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WILL SET IN MOTIONDOUBLE JEOPARDY EVEN IF THE SAME HAS BEEN ACTIVELY SOPUGHT BY THEACCUSED It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motionof the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had restedits case calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency towarrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt resulting in a dismissal of the case onthe merits tantamount to an acquittal of the accused

In the case of the herein respondents however the dismissal of the charge againstthem was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other

dismissals at the instance of the accused All the elements of double jeopardy arehere present to wit (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance tosustain a conviction of the crime charged (2) a court of competent jurisdiction and(3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested itscase amounting to the acquittal of the accused The dismissal being one on themerits the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot beinvoked

Esmentildea vs Pogoy [GR No L-54110 February 20 1981]

DISMISSAL BASED ON THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DISMISSAL ON THE

MERITS The petitioners were insisting on a trial They relied on their constitutionalright to have a speedy trial The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not incourt Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case Thepetitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissalHence the dismissal placed them in jeopardy

Even if the petitioners after invoking their right to a speedy trial moved for thedismissal of the case and therefore consented to it the dismissal would still placethem in jeopardy The use of the word provisional would not change the legaleffect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs De la Costa 66 Phil 134 Gandicela vs Lutero88 Phil 299)

If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial heshould ask not for the dismissal but for the trial of the case After theprosecutions motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of thecourt the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and consequently fails toprove the defendants guilt the court upon defendants motion shall dismiss thecase such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant (4 MoransComments on the Rules of Court 1980 Ed p 202 citing Gandicela vs Lutero 88Phil 299 307 and People vs Diaz 94 Phil 714 717)

8132019 Section 15 -22


The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because theprosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses didnot appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would barfurther prosecution of the defendant for the same offense

People vs Pineda [GR No L-44205 February 16 1993]

PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITAL OR DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WITHOUT THECONSENT OF THE ACCUSED IS NECESSARY TO SET IN MOTION DOUBLEJEOPARDY Withal the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense isnot an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first

jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction acquittal or termination of thecase without the consent of the accused (People vs Miraflores 115 SCRA 586[1982] Nierras vs Dacuycuy 181 SCRA 8 [1990])

In People vs Miraflores (supra) the accused therein after he had pleaded to the

charge of multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No 88173 and subsequent tohis arraignment on a separate charge of Murder in Criminal Case No 88174invoked the plea of double jeopardy but Justice Barredo who spoke for the Courtwas far from convinced

But the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is thatwhen he invoked the defense of double jeopardy what could havebeen the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began Itis settled jurisprudence in this Court that the mere filing of twoinformations or complaints charging the same offense does not yetafford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is

being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense for the simplereason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is thatthe accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case orthat the same has been terminated without his consent (Bulaong vsPeople L-19344 July 27 1966 17 SCRA 746 Silvestre vs MilitaryCommission No 21 No L-46366 March 8 1978 Buscayno vsMilitary Commissions Nos 1 2 6 and 25 No L-58284 Nov 19 1981109 SCRA 273)

From the conclusion thus reached it would appear that one simply charged mayclaim possible jeopardy in another case However a closer study of the caseadverted to reveals that the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the

accused therein was not only charged but he actually admitted his guilt to thecharge of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and moreimportantly he was convicted of such crime and commenced serving sentenceVerily there was no occasion in said case to speak of jeopardy being properlyinvoked by a person simply charged with an offense if he is again charged for thesame or identical offense It may be observed that in City Court of Manila theaccused therein pleaded on the first offense of which he was charged andsubsequently convicted unlike in the scenario at bar where private respondent

8132019 Section 15 -22


entered her plea to the second offense But the variance on this point is of nosubstantial worth because private respondents plea to the second offense is asaforesaid legally incomplete to sustain her assertion of jeopardy for probableconviction of the same felony absent as there is the previous conviction acquittalor termination without her express consent of the previous case for estafa and itbeing plain and obvious that the charges did not arise from the same acts In shortin order for the first jeopardy to attach the plea of the accused to the charge mustbe coupled with either conviction acquittal or termination of the previous casewithout his express consent thereafter

People vs Tampal [GR No 102485 May 22 1995]

DISMISSAL OF A CASE BASED ON ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TOSPEEDY TRIAL MAY BE APPEALED WITHOUT VIOLATING THE RIGHT AGAINSTDOUBLE JEOPARDY In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accusedto speedy trial courts carefully weigh the circumstances attending each case Theyshould balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people

who violate its penal laws Both the State and the accused are entitled to dueprocess

In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial courts should do more than amathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduledhearings of the case What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial areunjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of timeWe reiterate our ruling in Gonzales vs Sandiganbayan

the right to a speedy disposition of a case like the right tospeedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended

by vexatious capricious or oppressive delays or when unjustifiedpostponements of trial are asked for and secured or when withoutcause or justifiable motive along period of time is allowed to elapsewithout the party having his case tried Equally applicable is thebalancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been deniedhis right to a speedy trial or a speedy disposition of a case that matterin which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense areweighed and such factors as non-assertion of his right and prejudiceto the defendant resulting from delay are considered

Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy Thethree (3) requisites of double jeopardy are (1) a first jeopardy must have attached

prior to the second (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated and(3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first Legal

jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment (2) before a competent court(3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when thedefendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwiseterminated without the express consent of the accused

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the highest and then go down step by step bringing the man into jeopardy forevery dereliction included therein neither can it begin with the lowest and ascendto the highest with precisely the same result (People vs Cox 107 Mich 435quoted with approval in US vs Lim Suco 11 Phil 484 see also US vsLedesma 29 Phil 431 and People vs Martinez 55 Phil 6 10)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE SECOND OFFENSE DOES NOTEXIST AT THE TIME THE FIRST JEOPARDY ATTACHES This rule of identity does notapply however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of thefirst prosecution for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility forthe accused during the first prosecution to be convicted for an offense that wasthen inexistent Thus where the accused was charged with physical injuries andafter conviction the injured person dies the charge for homicide against the sameaccused does not put him twice in jeopardy This is the ruling laid down by theSupreme Court of the United States in the Philippine case of Diaz vs US 223US 442 followed by this Court in People vs Espino GR No 46123 69 Phil471 and these two cases are similar to the instant case Stating it in another form

the rule is that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for whichthe defendant is responsible which changes the character of the offense andtogether with the facts existing at the time constitutes a new and distinct offense(15 Am Jur 66) the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indictedfor the new offense

This is the meaning of double jeopardy as intended by our Constitution for it wasthe one prevailing in the jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgatedand no other meaning could have been intended by our Rules of Court

Accordingly an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily

included in another offense for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the firstprosecution for otherwise if the second offense was then inexistent no jeopardycould attach therefor during the first prosecution and consequently a subsequentcharge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy By the very nature ofthings there can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance and our Rules ofCourt cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a condition where suchcondition in reality does not exist General terms of a statute or regulation shouldbe so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice oppression or anabsurd consequence It will always therefore be presumed that exceptions havebeen intended to their language which would avoid results of this character (In reAllen 2 Phil 641)

People vs Adil [GR No L-41863 April 22 1977]

DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT In Silva there was no question that theextent of the damage to property and physical injuries suffered by the offendedparties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor case wasprosecuted What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs People 85 Phil766 in which it was held

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This rule of identity does not apply however when the secondoffense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution forthe simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for theaccused during the first prosecution to be convicted for an offensethat was then inexistent Thus where the accused was charged withphysical injuries and after conviction the injured dies the charge ofhomicide against the same accused does not put him twice in

jeopardy

So also is People vs Yorac 42 SCRA 230 to the following effect

Stated differently if after the first prosecution a new fact superveneson which defendant may be held liable resulting in altering thecharacter of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offensethe accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for thenew offense

In People vs Buling 107 Phil 112 We explained how a deformity may beconsidered as a supervening fact Referring to the decision in People vs Manolong85 Phil 829 We held

No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries hadcaused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand As nothingwas mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity andthe loss of the use of the right hand we presumed that such fact wasnot apparent or could have been discernible at the time the firstexamination was made The course (not the length) of the healing of

an injury may not be determined before hand it can only be definitelyknown after the period of healing has ended That is the reason whythe court considered that there was a supervening fact occurring sincethe filing of the original information

People vs Relova [GR No L-45129 March 6 1987]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME ACT The first sentence ofArticle IV (22) sets forth the general rule the constitutional protection againstdouble jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense thatis different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution although boththe first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts The

second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the generalproposition the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is availablealthough the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offensecharged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Codeprovided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts

Put a little differently where the offenses charged are penalized either by differentsections of the same statute or by different statutes the important inquiry relates

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to the identity of offenses charged the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlierand the subsequent offenses charged In contrast where one offense is chargedunder a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute the criticalinquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committedand which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses the constitutionalprotection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constituteor have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the sameacts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute

The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses undertwo different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are chargedand another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipalordinance and another offense under a national statute If the second sentence ofthe double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution convictionor acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to anotherprosecution for the same act under a national statute An offense penalized by

municipal ordinance is by definition different from an offense under a statute Thetwo offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated bydifferent rule-making authorities mdash though one be subordinate to the other mdash andthe plea of double jeopardy would never be The discussions during the 1934-1935Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely forthe purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to asituation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence

The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examiningthe essential elements of each of the two offenses charged as such elements areset out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved The

question of identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability bothunder a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed in the firstinstance by examining the location of such acts in time and space When the actsof the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other intime and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the sameoccasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same or acontinuing intent or voluntary design or negligence such acts may beappropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penalliability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance anda national statute)

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection

against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not tobe understood with absolute literalness The identity of offenses that must beshown need not be absolute identity the first and second offenses may beregarded as the same offense where the second offense necessarily includes thefirst offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the secondoffense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof Thus for theconstitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available not all the technical elementsconstituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the

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second offense The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person bymultiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another arenonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technicalelements As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned inPeople vs del Carmen et al 88 Phil 51 (1951)

While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for thesame offense it seems elementary that an accused should be shieldedagainst being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a singleact Otherwise an unlawful act or omission may give use to severalprosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer toimagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act oromission by simply adding or subtracting essential elements Underthe theory of appellant the crime of rape may be converted into acrime of coercion by merely alleging that by force and intimidation theaccused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin (88 Philat 53 emphases supplied)

By the same token acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasionand are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form amoral unity should not be segmented and sliced as it were to produce as manydifferent acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that anenterprising prosecutor can find

Section 22 ndash Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

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suspended It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension ofthe privilege in cases of invasion insurrection or rebellion mdash or under Art VII ofthe Constitution imminent danger thereof mdash when the public safety requires itin any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such periodthe necessity for such suspension shall exist For from being full and plenary theauthority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed confined andrestricted not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to itsexistence but also as regards the time when and the place where it may beexercised These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions markestablish and define the extent the confines and the limits of said power beyondwhich it does not exist And like the limitations and restrictions imposed by theFundamental Law upon the legislative department adherence thereto andcompliance therewith may within proper bounds be inquired into by courts of

justice Otherwise the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would bemeaningless Surely the framers of our Constitution could not have intended toengage in such a wasteful exercise in futility

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that ourpolitical system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that thesuspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that systemnamely individual freedom Indeed such freedom includes and connotes as wellas demands the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss anddissent from as well as criticize and denounce the views the policies and thepractices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwiseimproper or inimical to the commonweal regardless of whether his own opinion isobjectively correct or not The untrammeled enjoyment and exercise of such rightmdash which under certain conditions may be a civic duty of the highest order mdash isvital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and

wholesome growth and development

Manifestly however the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is oneenjoyed and exercised not in derogation thereof but consistently therewith andhence within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution andthe context of the Rule of Law Accordingly when individual freedom is used todestroy that social order by means of force and violence in defiance of the Rule ofLaw mdash such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government tooverthrow the same thereby committing the crime of rebellion mdash there emerges acircumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementionedguarantee or protection by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswhen public safety requires it Although we must be forewarned against mistaking

mere dissent mdash no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be mdash for dissidenceamounting to rebellion or insurrection the Court cannot hesitate much less refusemdash when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly establishedor cannot reasonably be denied mdash to uphold the finding of the Executive thereonwithout in effect encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law ofthe land and depriving him to this extent of such power and therefore withoutviolating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Laws the Court is calledupon to epitomize

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jeopardy attaches


8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












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8132019 Section 15 -22



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8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22














8132019 Section 15 -22











jeopardy attaches


8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22


8132019 Section 15 -22










8132019 Section 15 -22



jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22














8132019 Section 15 -22











jeopardy attaches


8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22


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8132019 Section 15 -22



jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22











jeopardy attaches


8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22


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8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22


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8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22


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jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









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8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22












8132019 Section 15 -22


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jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






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8132019 Section 15 -22


8132019 Section 15 -22










8132019 Section 15 -22



jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22


8132019 Section 15 -22










8132019 Section 15 -22



jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22










8132019 Section 15 -22



jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22



jeopardy










8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






8132019 Section 15 -22









8132019 Section 15 -22






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Section 15 -22

Documents

Transcript of Section 15 -22