Secretaria de Inteligencia Argentina

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PLEASE NOTE: Since its return to democracy, Argentina’s complex military/civilian intelligence system is currently undergoing change.These listings should be followed and reviewed. Other agency sites are being prepared. Therefore, with even more emphasis, while everyattempt has been made to confirm the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in this listing, Eye Spy Intelligence Magazinecannot be held responsible for inadvertent errors such as broken links, translation difficulties, new defined offices, or legislative structurechanges within respective departments and agencies. Further research can be conducted by following the links provided, and via referencematerial contained within recommended books and published literature. Mark Birdsall - Editor

SIN - SISTEMA DE INTELIGENCIA NACIONAL(National Intelligence System)

Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional (National Intelligence System - NIS)is the accepted base structure of Argentina’s national intelligencecommunity (NIC) adopted under Reform Law 25.520. in 2001.Reform Law 25.520. is often referred to in the legislation fields ofArgentina’s intelligence and security services found in these pages.

The following agencies represent Argentina’s primary intelligencegathering and security services:

Secretaría de Inteligencia(Secretariat of Intelligence, SI)

Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia(National Intelligence School, ENI)

Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales(Directorate of Judicial Surveillance, DOJ)

Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Criminal(National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence, DNIC)

Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Estratégica Militar(National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence, DNIEM)________________________________________________________________________

SI - Secretaría de Inteligencia (Intelligence Secretariat).Formerly Secretaria de Intelligence de Estada - SIDE.http://www.mundoandino.com/Argentina/Secretaria-de-Inteligencia

Secretaria de Intelligence de Estada defunct web sitehttp://www.side.gov.ar/

NOTES: Secretaria de Inteligencia (Intelligence Secretariat, SI) isthe premier intelligence agency of the Argentine Republic and

head of the country’s National Intelligence System. Chaired bythe Secretary of State Intelligence who is a special member ofthe Cabinet of Ministers, the Secretariat of Intelligence is atechnical and operational service charged with the collection andproduction of intelligence and counterintelligence in internal andforeign areas, as well as the analysis and formation of a nationalintelligence strategy in order to handle state affairs. The Secre-tariat is charged with the duty of producing a complete intelli-gence cycle. Structurally, SI has the biggest intelligence gatheringcapability in Argentina, due to its many operational directoratesand collaborations with other Argentinian intelligence agenciesinside and outside the country. SI’s current Secretary of StateIntelligence is Héctor Icazuriaga (since 2003).

SECONDARY NOTES: Under the law, the Secretariat is subordinatedto the National Presidential Office - President of Argentina.Presidenta de la Nacion Argentinahttp://www.presidencia.gov.ar/

In 2005, the Senate of Argentina abolished secrecy laws, it is notclear how it has affected the Secretariat. Even though the officialacronym was renamed ‘SI’ as the new intelligence system becameactive, Article 51 of the Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 renamesSIDE (Secretaria de Inteligencia de Estado) to SI (Secretaria deInteligencia) and abolishes secret decree 416/76. During most of itshistory it was called Secretaria de Inteligencia de Estado (Secretariatof State Intelligence, SIDE) and it still is referred to as SIDE by thepublic.

BACKGROUND

The Secretariat of Intelligence was created in 1946 when JuanPeron's first presidency established it by Executive Decree 337/46under the denomination of Coordinacion de Informaciones de Estado(State Intelligence Coordination, CIDE). Its mission was to act as anational intelligence agency to be run by civilian personnel and tohandle foreign and domestic intelligence operations for the federalgovernment.


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Before CIDE was established, national intelligence was jointlyhandled by the Division de Informaciones (Information Division, DI)of the National Presidential Office, and the military intelligenceservices such as the Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejercito (ArmyIntelligence Service, SIE) and the Servicio de Inteligencia Naval(Naval Intelligence Service, SIN). Even though throughout Argentina'shistory military intelligence organs have been involved in handlingboth internal and external intelligence, reforms enacted in the lastfew decades have legally given them a role alongside civilianmanaged services in the National Intelligence System. IntelligenceReform Law 25.520 also created the National Directorate ofStrategic Military Intelligence, charged with the coordination of all theArgentine Armed Forces military intelligence services.

The Secretariat (as it is commonly referred) had its first structuraland functional reform in 1956, under the Pedro Aramburu govern-ment when by Executive Decree 776/56 of 20 January, CIDEadopted the name Secretaria de Informaciones de Estado (Secre-tariat of State Information), and the subsequent famous acronym"SIDE". The newly restructured agency was closely modelled on theBritish intelligence system.

During Juan Carlos Ongania's government, SIDE was under theadministration of Gral. Senorans, one of the most well regardedSecretaries of Intelligence of all time. During those years, SIDEstarted to orchestrate its first complex foreign espionage missions,the staff was increased substantially to about 1,200, and theknowledge and operational capabilities were dramatically improved.

During Senorans administration, many Argentine women beganparticipating in what was then a male-only field. The Secretariatbegan appreciating certain advantages of the female sex, especiallywhen operations required the exploitation of human weaknesses.However, in 1966, Senorans restructured the Secretariat, expelling900 employees (of about 1,200 total), including all of the femaleintelligence operatives contracted at the time. It has been noted thatSenorans had a phobia of females, and would not tolerate womenworking in administrative positions.

In that same year, a failed kidnapping attempt of the Soviet Consul inBuenos Aires, led the USSR to enact a formal protest, threatening totake the matters to international organizations. Ongania, against hiswill, had no other choice but to ask Senorans to resign, the Secre-tary in his final statement exposed that "Consul Petrov commands agroup of spies of the KGB in Argentina".

After Senorans departure, women regained their positions in the civilintelligence community, but it was at that time, with the onset of theCold War, that the CIA began taking special interest in SIDE. Thegrowth of communist groups and guerrillas in Latin America, backedby Fidel Castro's regime, as well as the special interest the SovietUnion began to take in Latin America, made the American intelli-gence community influence what was then thought as an area ofminor concern to American interests in the war. The Secretariat ofIntelligence was no exception, the 'communist problem' was made apriority, and surveillance of foreign embassies and delegations ofcommunist countries became common.

Secret law Nº 20.195/73 came into effect on February 281973during the government of Gral. Lanusse, literally establishing themission, functions, personnel, and other important aspects of theagency; it is also known as the secret decree Nº 1.792/73, dated 9March 1973.

During the defacto government of Jorge Rafael Videla, on 13 May

1976, by Executive Decree 416 it adopted the name Secretaria deInteligencia de Estado. Under the National Reorganization Process,SIDE transformed itself into a secret police conducting espionage onguerrilla organizations, labour unions, or any other organization orperson considered subversive, or a supporter of subversiveactivities. SIDE also took part in coordinating Operation Condor withother Latin American intelligence services.

After the return of democracy in 1983, during Raul Alfonsin'sgovernment, SIDE began to renew its staff, and to become a civilianintelligence agency who would entirely focus its activities on nationalinterests. In December 2001, the Intelligence Reform Law wasapproved, Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 created the NationalIntelligence System. changing the structure, denomination andfunctions to adapt it to the new National Intelligence System.

In February of 2001, during the Fernando de la Rua government,SIDE was suffering from budget cuts (reduced by half) and politicalpressure to renew itself. The staff was reduced by half, 1,300personnel were laid off. One of the reasons given for the clean-upwere that many staff members had been involved in human rightsviolations during the National Reorganization Process. This restruc-turing included laying off personnel who were past their retiring ageaccording to the agency's standards, and removing most of thepersonnel from the return to democracy under the Alfonsin adminis-tration.

During October of 2003, under Nestor Kirchner's government, acrackdown on illegal phone taps, as well as political and ideologicalespionage was ordered to Secretary of Intelligence Sergio Acevedo.More than 160 personnel were expelled from the organisation forviolations of regulations. An integral security review was alsoconducted, later producing a report which stated several securityholes and cases of corruption and theft in the organisation (i.e, theftof food, extraction of gasoline from cars and poor security atfacilities.).

Counter-terrorism

In the aftermath of the 1992 Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires,SIDE augmented its focus on terrorist activities in the Triple borderregion. The lingering threat of another act of Islamic terrorism onArgentine soil, especially against Jewish entities in Buenos Aires,required the Secretariat to adapt to a previously unknown nationalsecurity threat.

Foreign intelligence agencies cooperated in the formation onsubjects as Islamic terrorism and how to neutralize it. The CIAprovided SIDE with extensive training, and experts from all over theworld were contracted to teach classes in the National IntelligenceSchool. SIDE also began instructing its personnel on Persian andArabic languages and history, and how to handle operations withpeople and organizations pertaining to such cultures.

After the 1994 AMIA Bombing, SIDE recognized that Islamicterrorism became an extremely serious threat to national security. Aplan codenamed Operation Centaur (Operation Centauro) to monitorterrorist organizations on the Triple border was orchestrated incooperation with the CIA, and included phone taps, mail intercep-tions, and covert surveillance of many suspects.

Its reports detailed the existence and activities of terrorist organiza-tions in the area, which benefited from the huge black market inParaguay and served as a financial laundering centre for otherorganizations abroad. A 1997 report including evidence of such



activities was shared with the intelligence agencies of the UnitedStates, Brazil, Paraguay, France and Germany. The Sala Patria group,Sala Patria was a covert operations group depending of theSubsecretariat of Foreign Intelligence. Two famous staff membersnamed by the Argentine press frequently, Alejandro Brousson andPatricio Miguel Finnen led this group. Sala Patria was first assignedto capture Enrique Gorriaran Merlo and then leading the AMIAinvestigation on foreign soil. The group was also involved in famousoperations such as the Nasrim Mokhtari fiasco, and the Telledinbribes. The group was recently dissolved, both Patricio MiguelFinnen and Alejandro Brousson no longer work for SIDE, and thegroup now became a division known as "Division 34: TransnationalCrime and International Terrorism". It is important to note that "Sala"is a group of people from many divisions of the organization puttogether to work on a specific operation, i.e: Sala Independencia,created to work on the investigation of the Israeli embassy bombing.formed to investigate clues about the AMIA bombing outside ofArgentina, started operating in Paraguay and gave crucial informa-tion that led to the capture of many suspected terrorists and theneutralization of a suspected plan to bomb the U.S. Embassy inAsuncion, Paraguay.

Organization

SIDE is the head of the National Intelligence System, and also thebiggest intelligence agency of Argentina. Executive and legislativeoversight of the intelligence system in Argentina, Geneva Centre forthe Democratic Control of Armed Forces. It depends of the NationalPresidential Office and reports to the President of Argentina, who isrequired to set the national intelligence plan and policy.

Besides being an intelligence agency that handles foreign andinternal intelligence, it also assists nationwide criminal investiga-tions, Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 created the National Directo-rate of Criminal Intelligence, charged with the coordination of internalcriminal intelligence from the security forces. Like the American FBI,SIDE frequently collaborates with the Justice System.

The Secretariat embodies special internal sub-organizations that aidits duties. The Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia (National IntelligenceSchool, ENI) acts as the main intelligence academy, training andrecruiting agents for SIDE, and providing tuition and assistance forpersonnel of other intelligence and law enforcement agencies. TheENI also analyses Argentine intelligence doctrine and gives special-ized intelligence postgraduate formation to students in the country,including courses given over the Internet.

In 2001, the Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 came into effect,subsequently making significant modifications to SIDE's traditionalinternal organization, as well as branching out some of its tasks toother newly created organizations such as the National Directorate ofCriminal Intelligence. The Intelligence Reform Law 25.520 alsoestablished new legislation regarding the Directorate of JudicialSurveillance, to make the organization more efficient and transpar-ent.

The President of Argentina is charged to assign the positions ofSecretary and Sub-secretary of Intelligence, but restrictions apply onthe Secretary of Intelligence's authority to assign his or her owncontracted staff to the organism. Article 24 of the IntelligenceReform Law 25.520 approved in 2001, mandates that no more than2% of the Secretariat's personnel can be appointed by the currentSecretary of Intelligence, and such personnel must exit the organiza-tion when the Secretary of Intelligence that appointed them ends histerm. Furthermore, such agents contracted by the Secretary areclassified as "assessing personnel" [Sic] and are included in theCabinet of Personnel.

The Secretariat itself counts with three Sub-secretaries of Interiorand Exterior Intelligence, and Apoyo (support). They are subse-quently codenamed A, B and C, or with numbers. In the foreign field,officers are usually disguised with diplomatic immunity in Argentineembassies and consulates around the world (practice common tothe world of espionage). The positions of 'Media consultant', 'Culturalattache', or 'Tourism consultant' are the most frequently used.

Objectives

The Secretariat's objectives in the functions of intelligence asmandated by law are:

Protect the general well being of society, prioritising the safeguardingof individual and collective rights in a frame of legality, integrity andobjectivity.

Identify and interpret, anticipated and coherently, threats againstnational territory as well as individual and collective human security,in function of the nation's vital interests.

Assist the different areas of the national government about thecapacities and vulnerabilities of the different actors -in the nationaland international spectrum- who might prevent the attainment ofnational objectives, thus collaborating in the process of decisionmaking.

Identify acts and processes that could be taken advantage of as"opportunities" in function of national interests.

Promote and strengthen the relations with the greater possiblenumber of foreign agencies and/or intelligence services, in order tocreate fluid channels of information exchange and intelligence.

Other more specific objectives of the Secretariat:

Headquarters of SIDE (SI) incentral Buenos Aires



Formulate the National Intelligence Plan (as mandated by Law25.250)

Coordinate the functional relations with the different members of theNational Intelligence System.

Collaborate with other areas of the government providing informationand intelligence in order to detect and neutralize potential terroristacts.

Produce information in time and opportunity on important actors,events and processes of the regional, continental and worldwideframe with incidence on the country.

Elaborate hypothesis international terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficof arms, etc., in the worldwide, continental and regional frames

Carry out intelligence in the regional scope to forecast of importantprocesses.

Respond to the requirements of the Bilateral Commission on Controlof Intelligence Organisms and Activities of the National Congress (asper Law 25.520)

Elaborated prospective scenarios in the international spectrum andevaluate its impact on the country.

Collaborate with the Justice system providing information necessaryto fight crimes such as smuggling, organized crime, money launder-ing, fiscal evasion, etc.

Assist different investigations authorised or ordered by competentjudicial authorities referred from crimes such as extortion, kidnap-ping, smuggling, drug trafficking, piracy of information technologymaterial, falsification of money, etc.

Plan and execute programs of qualification, training and improve-ment for the personnel of the Secretariat of Intelligence, the NationalIntelligence System, as well as for civil employees of other areas ofthe National Government.

Expand the bonds with public and private studies centres and NGOs,both in the national and international scope.

Subjects of interest

The Secretariat's main interest points are the following:

International terrorism, including the terrorist attacks against theArgentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) and the Israeli Embassyin Buenos Aires.

Religious fundamentalism.

Organized crime, including mafias, drug trafficking, arms traffickingand identity falsification.

Evolution of integration developments (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, FTAA,APEC, EU, etc.) and analysis of international economic negotiationsregarding free market.

Legal and illegal migrations and development of Indians of theWestern Hemisphere.

Proliferation of massive destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical,biological).

Ecological problems that can be considered potential risks fornational security.

National and foreign advances in scientific areas.

Evolution of the official politics on national defence and security.

Current situation in the South Atlantic, including Argentine Antarcticaand the Falkland Islands.

Analysis of political situations in major Latin American and Europeancountries with the purpose of identifying instability, conflicts andcrises which may cause a direct or indirect repercussions onnational interests.________________________________________________________________________

STRUCTURE________________________________________________________________________

Internally composed of three Sub-secretaries (Sub-secretariats):Interior, Exterior (Foreign), and Apoyo (Support). all of its divisionshave specific identification numbers assigned.

Subsecretaria de Inteligencia Interior (Subsecretariat of InteriorIntelligence) (8): responsible for production and dissemination ofintelligence in internal areas. For this purpose, it is subdivided intoseveral Direcciones (Directorates) which are in charge of specificpolitical, economic and social factors.

Direccion de Inteligencia Interior (Directorate of Interior Intelligence):responsible for searching and collecting of information on nationalaffairs, for which task it has technical, operational and managementareas.

Direccion de Reunion Interior (Directorate of Internal Collection):responsible for the collection and diffusion of intelligence corre-sponding to the internal areas. For the achievement of its mission itis subdivided in Departments assigned to specific political, eco-nomic and social issues.

Direccion de Observaciones Judiciales (Directorate of JudicialSurveillance) (84): responsible for carrying out telephone, mail, andother communication interceptions mandated by judicial officers.

Direccion de Contrainteligencia (Directorate of Counterintelligence)(85): responsible for counterintelligence and counterespionageactivities. It has intelligence and technical-operational areas whichcarry out specific duties.

Direccion de Comunicacion Social (Directorate of Social Communi-cation): responsible for the analysis and collection of publicinformation (i.e: mass media).

Subsecretaria de Inteligencia Exterior (Subsecretariat of ForeignIntelligence) (3): responsible of the collection and production ofintelligence on foreign areas.

Direccion de Reunion Exterior (Directorate of Foreign Collection):responsible for the collection and diffusion of intelligence on factsand/or processes pertaining to foreign affairs. It comprises differentareas with different technical and operational targets. It is responsi-ble for the liaison with foreign services (i.e: intelligence delegates inforeign countries).

Direccion de Inteligencia Exterior (Directorate of Foreign Intelligence)



(32): responsible for the production of state intelligence on theforeign area. For this purpose, it has specific areas analysingdifferent issues and the continental and global frame by country/country by country/in each country.

International Political, Economical and Social Processes.

Transnational Crime and International Terrorism (34)

Processes of the Proliferation of Weapons of Massive Destruction.

Subsecretaria de Apoyo de Inteligencia (Subsecretariat of SupportIntelligence): responsible for logistical support, staff, communica-tions and data-processing centres of the Secretariat. In order toachieve this it has several directorates in charge of these specificareas.

Facilities

The Secretariat is a nationwide intelligence agency, and has delega-tions and bases in most provinces of Argentina, as well as represen-tations in most important countries. Reports state that SIDE hasabout 24 operation bases around the world (within embassies).

Its main building is located in Ave. 25 de Mayo 11 (with a backdooraccess through Ave. Leandro N. Alem 10), at the heart of DowntownBuenos Aires, near to the Presidential Palace and Plaza de Mayo.Although the central base is the 25 de Mayo building and annexes,many buildings, known as bases or operation centres, are spreadthroughout the city of Buenos Aires.

The main building was built in 1929 by architect Alejandro Bustillo,for the original proprietary Federico L. Martinez de Hoz. Inauguratedin 1930, was originally used as a housing called "Martinez de HozBuilding". In 1940 the federal government bought it. Valued at U$S1.607.022, its street surface is 413 square metres, inside it is 5430square metres; and it has ten floors, the fifth floor being the Secre-tary of Intelligence's office, and the tenth floor the special operationsdivision.

Security on the facility is meticulously strict, the whole building iscovered with dark tinted windows, and when a person approachesthe door, guards inquire the visitor for his or her name and thereason of visit. Once they are approved to enter, they must gothrough a metal detector and be accompanied throughout the visit by

a staff member who will guide the visitor through the building andprovide the necessary magnetic card to access restricted areas.

Two annexes in Ave. 25 de Mayo are internally connected to themain facility thus extending the Secretariat's offices. Surveillancearound the whole surroundings of the Presidential Palace and Plazade Mayo is tight for obvious reasons. In the late 1960s, there was aserious incident when members of Montoneros breached thebuilding and stayed inside for a whole weekend, taking objects,folders, and other sensitive material.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the tenth floor of the CorreoCentral building was provided to the Secretariat to be used for mailinterception.

Infrastructure

Communications in the agency are a crucial infrastructure and policyissue. For the southern bases in Patagonia, communications isprovided by the Servicios y Tecnologia S.R.L. (SyT) company. Therest of SIDE's communications, phone tapping abilities, data transfer,etc. are handled by Telecom and Telefonica of Argentina, Movistar,Nextel, CTI Movil, and Compania de Radiocomuncaciones Moviles,S.A. Data processing computers for SIDE are provided by Bull.

In 2001, under Secretary of Intelligence Fernando De Santibanes, theSecretariat began a major upgrade of its computer infrastructure.

Personnel

Recent reports (since the Secretariat does not declare the exactamount of personnel it embodies) state that about 2,500-3,000employees operate within and outside of Argentina for the Secre-tariat. Only the Secretary and the Sub-secretary of Intelligence arepublic functionaries, the rest of SIDE personnel must act and worksecretly, as stated by the Intelligence Reform Law 25.520.

About 80% of personnel work in areas depending of the InteriorSubsecretariat, and the remaining on the Exterior and Support Sub-secretariats. According to the agent's rank, they get paid from 1.800to 2.678 Argentine Pesos a month; directors, reach $3.000 ARS.

Delegates abroad are inserted in the frame of the Ministry of ForeignRelations, but receive monthly salaries by the Secretariat. Their jobmainly consists of producing reports on current events of interests



Servicios) S.R.L, and Canteras Brandsen S.R.L. Apparently all ofthem are run by SIDE personnel, and are used for covert operationsinside of Argentina, and as well to set up agents in foreign countries.One known example is that of an agent acting as a broker ofEMCOSUD in Santiago de Chile.

Culture

The Secretary and Sub-secretary of Intelligence are referred as"Senor Cinco" (Mr. Five) and "Senor Ocho" (Mr. Eight) respectively,because of the location of their offices, the fifth and eight floor of the25 de Mayo building. Other aliases include "Senor Tres" (Mr. Three)for the Sub-secretary of Foreign Intelligence and "Senor Nueve" (Mr.Nine) for the Sub-secretary of Logistics. Cafeterias in buildings ofthe Secretariat are referred to as "casinos".

Although unconfirmed, the name "Senor Cinco" is alleged to the1956 restructuring of SIDE, closely modelled on the British MI6whose first director was Captain Sir George Mansfield Smith-Cumming. Often dropping the "Smith", Cumming used his initial "C"(Chief) as a codename which was also used by all subsequentdirectors of MI6. The name "Senor Cinco" was allegedly adaptedfrom it.

The main building in Ave. 25 de Mayo is referred to as "Central".Agents working for SIDE call the Secretariat simply as "La Casa"(The House). Foreign personnel whose function is to act as a linkbetween their agency and SIDE are referred as "COI". Also, spies aresometimes referred by politicians as "Servis", meaning somebodypertaining to "The Service" (in English).

The official mascot of SIDE is the Fox (Zorro). Among SIDE person-nel the Direccion de Observaciones Judiciales (Directorate ofJudicial Surveillance, DOJ) is referred to as "Ojota" (Sandal);furthermore, "Ojota" implies "Ojo" (Eye).

Numbers

An interesting and sometimes confusing fact about the Secretariat'sinternal organization is the use of a specially structured sequence ofnumbers to refer to different internal divisions. For example, theSubsecretariat of Interior Intelligence is numbered '8', and itsdependencies, such as the Directorates of Counterintelligence andJudicial Surveillance are numbered '84' and '85' respectively. Thesame case applies for the Subsecretariat of Exterior Intelligence, or'3', its divisions go from '32' for the Directorate of Foreign Intelli-gence to '34' for the Division of Transnational Crime and InternationalTerrorism.

Even though it is still hard to discern how exactly SI operate underthe law, the Secretariat is subordinated to the National PresidentialOffice, President of Argentina and is ruled by secret decrees andlaws. In 2005, the Senate of Argentina abolished secret laws, it isnot clear how it has affected the Secretariat. Even though the officialacronym was renamed to SI as the new intelligence system becameactive, during most of its history it was called Secretaria deInteligencia de Estado (Secretariat of State Intelligence, SIDE) and itstill is referred to as SIDE by the public.

Public media and fiction

As with most intelligence agencies, the Secretariat only makespublic statements when dealing with national issues or scandals. Forthe Secretariat, the AMIA investigation, the Sofia Fijman incident, andthe participation in the Senate Bribes scandal were the mostnotorious episodes of media attention.

in the country they are stationed in, as well as establishing links withthe local intelligence services.

Recruitment

Citizens are recruited into SIDE using a well-known and widely usedmethod by worldwide intelligence agencies during the Cold War. Theprocedure was simple, recruiting students from national universitiesbased on an assessment of their character, behaviour and intelli-gence.

The method was first used during the Ongania government, underthe command of Secretary of Intelligence Gral. Senorans, whohimself said "a person who enters at 20 years of age having studiedin an university, should be an excellent professional at 30 years ofage". During the process of recruitment, experts focused on fouressential points when assessing their targets:

Language and expressiveness.

Discretion in the way they dress.

A meticulous way of life.

Possession of personal life experiences allowing them to adapt theirpersonality to different situations.

When the student accepted the invitation to join SIDE, he was sent tobe trained in the National Intelligence School. Nevertheless, not allspies where chosen from universities; it was common that experi-enced agents recommended people they dealt with their personallife, and who they thought were apt to develop a career in the worldof intelligence.

Spies recruited that way were classified as "confidants", theyreceived a monthly pay while their abilities to carry out espionageactivities were being tested. Once a confident proved that they couldbe trusted they were promoted to the "contracted collaborators"category. In those cases, agents were targets of specific controls, an"covert" surveillance on them done by the counter-intelligencedivision.

If agents met their superiors expectations, they signed a temporarywork contract which was renewable periodically. In the "confident"career, the third step was denominated "temporary personnel"(Personal Temporario, in Spanish), as soon as they reached thatstage, they were allowed to take courses in the National IntelligenceSchool.

Finally, after two years of being assigned as temporary personnel,they were reassigned as permanent "civil personnel" (PC, inSpanish). There was not a specified period of time between thesteps of a "confident" and "civil personnel", there were cases ofpeople who took 15 years before they were fully integrated. SIDE isrecognised as a "very closed family". Staff are usually recommendedby existing operatives. Interviews with agents state that "the first ruleis to forget your name", and that new personnel are baptized with afake identity.

Associates

'Associates' are companies used for support in covert operations,known cases detailed by Argentine justice include masqueradecompanies such as: Tecnit, CF COM, OSGRA S.R.L, Tiumayu S.A,AMSUD S.A, EMCOSUD S.A, IDIS (Instituto de Investigaciones y



During the AMIA investigation, Claudio Lifschitz, a judicial employeeinvolved in the investigation wrote a book about his experiences andtheories that the Secretariat knew beforehand about the bombing andcould not stop it.

In 2005, Tiempo de Valientes, a comedy made by Damian Szifrondealt with the age old rivalry between the Secretariat and the FederalPolice. The Secretariat had a major role in the film's plot, it wasportrayed as containing very sinister and corrupt individuals for themost part. In the end, the movie vindicates the role of intelligence inthe national government.

In the American ABC TV show Alias, Nadia Santos (Mia Maestro) isan ex-SIDE agent who now works for the CIA. 'Argentine intelligence'has been referenced several times in the show.

Publications

Every three months, SIDE publishes an official magazine through theNational Intelligence School.

Books dedicated to the Secretariat's history and scandals includeLos sospechosos de siempre: Historia del espionaje en la Argentina

Los sospechosos de siempre: Historia del espionaje en la Argen-

tina, Jorge Boimvaser. The book was to be published in 1995, butthen Secretary of Intelligence Hugo Anzorreguy allegedly made amonetary deal with its author and Editorial Planeta to hold off on thebook's publication. The book was finally published in 2001, andactually is one of the most complete sources of information abouthistorical SIDE facts, even though it elegantly evades a cleardefinition of its inner structure.

In July 2006, ‘SIDE: La Argentina Secreta’ by Gerardo Young waspublished. Young's book is aimed towards more personal aspects ofthe Secretariat, such as its most famous members, internal rules,and details about its management and operations.________________________________________________________________________

HISTORICAL OPERATIONS - SIDE________________________________________________________________________

DIRTY WAR

The SIDE played a role during the “Dirty War” and participated toOperation Condor, the international network of South Americanintelligence agencies. A secret detention camp for Operation Condorin Buenos Aires, known as Automotores Orletti (also known asTactical Operations Centre 18), functioned under the orders of SIDEfrom 1976 to 1979.

One of the most important operations carried out by SIDE was theplanning of a triple assassination attempt in Europe with thecollaboration of the Chilean DINA, and the Uruguayan intelligenceservice. The objective was to murder, if possible at the same time,three special personalities living in Paris, France: Isabel Allende(daughter of Salvador Allende, Chile), Rodolfo Matarollo (member ofthe ERP, Argentina), and Enrique Erro (ex-senator, Uruguay), all ofthem opposed the South American defacto regimes, and well knowndissidents. The idea was originally suggested by DINA directorManuel Contreras, and was planned out in the Billinghurst base inBuenos Aires, previous approval of Argentine dictator Jorge RafaelVidela.

The assassinations were to be carried with 9 mm or 22 calibre gunsbrought to France via Argentine diplomatic carriage. The operation

failed due to the Argentine Ambassador’s reluctance in Paris to givethe bag to the agents without first revealing what was in it.________________________________________________________________________

OPERATION MARYLIN

When Hector Jose Campora assumed the presidency of Argentinaon 25 May 1973, Cuba sent a wave of diplomats and officialdelegates to Argentina, proposing that was the time to resumecultural interchanges with the Argentine government. However, theArgentine intelligence services, under the hood of the anti-commu-nist paranoia that covered much of the western hemisphere thosedays, distrusted the real motives for the influx of the Cubans.

It was then that an analyst in the Secretariat discovered a humanweakness in the Cuban delegates: their extreme sensitivity for blondewomen that stood out. The 'La Biela' cafe bar in the neighbourhoodof Recoleta was a common place for the Cubans to be spottedhunting for their female counterparts by SIDE agents.

The Secretariat orchestrated a plan to infiltrate, assess and obtaininformation as fast as can be possible. In this operation, the mainactors would be blonde women, SIDE began recruiting capablewomen in known 'hot' spots of the city, some of them managed bypeople closely connected with the Secretariat.

Three women were cited for an interview in downtown Buenos Aires,proposed a job opportunity that involved establishing a solid andstable link with the Cuban delegates, all accepted. They would bepaid almost the same money they earned at their previous jobs, plusa few honouraries for the services provided. During a week, theagents were taught basic intelligence theories and practices, theyobserved photographs of the Cubans they were going to 'mark', andthey had time to elaborate complex ‘backstories’ for their supposedidentities.

The director in charge of Operation Marylin selected divorcedwomen with children on purpose, so they would not raise anysuspicions in their families or targets. The three females claimed towork doing 'sales' for a living, allowing them to be available at manyhours in which to be in direct contact with the Cubans. Finally, aftera subtle approximation scene played out in the 'La Biela' cafe bar,two of the Cuban delegates fell for the trap, but the third oneapparently was not interested in establishing relations.

After six weeks of observations and wire-taps (the spies made sureto plant the Cuban's rooms with microphones), the Cuban embassyunexpectedly ordered its delegates to return to La Habana. SIDE didnot obtain any relevant information about their suspicions that theCubans were assisting and supporting Argentine leftists groups, butthe agency realised that women are a very useful tool in theespionage world. All three females that participated in the operationwere offered permanent jobs in SIDE; only once accepted, the restwent back to the Buenos Aires night scene.

Operation Marylin proved that using women to exploit weaknesses inmen was a feasible and convenient method of extracting informa-tion, and observing both foreign and internal adversaries of Argen-tina. Although the real insertion of females into the Argentineespionage community started in the mid-1960s, during the 1970s,one of Argentina's most agitated eras, the women of SIDE startedplaying a crucial role in its operations.



________________________________________________________________________

OPERATION VEINTE ANOS

On 28 October 1995, Enrique Gorriaran Merlo, Argentina's mostwanted terrorist, was captured in the little town of Tepoztlan, 60miles away Mexico City, and flown back to Argentina in a planerented by SIDE. Merlo had been involved in numerous criminal,activities during the 1970s and 1980s, most notably the assassina-tion of Anastasio Somoza Debayle on 17 September in Paraguay,and for orchestrating the 1989 attack on the La Tablada militarybarracks by the MTP group.

Merlo, who claims it was a kidnapping orchestrated by SIDE,Gorrarian Merlo's narration of the story of his kidnapping waspublished in a Pagina/12 newspaper interview. had travelled toMexico to meet with Mexican politicians of the PRD, who werecooperating in an international push to free the guerrillas responsiblefor the La Tablada attack who were, and still are, serving prison termin Argentine jails. Merlo arrived in the Mexican capital with a fakeUruguayan passport, where he soon realized that the Mexicansecurity forces were following him. He thought they were just doingbasic surveillance on him to see if he was doing any illegal activity inMexican territory.

On 28 October he spotted three Argentine-looking men in TepoztlanSquare, "one of which -he said- looked like he was from theArgentine intelligence service or the police". Merlo was driving afriend's truck, after spotting the Argentinians, he tried to lose hisentourage of followers by driving into the town of Cuatula. A fewminutes later, Merlo claims he was stopped, surrounded, and shotseveral times until he put his hands out the truck's destroyedwindow.

Merlo goes on to claim that the Mexican security services hand-cuffed him, and made him face the Argentine, who nodded silently(affirming that he was who they were looking for).

Merlo was taken into the Mexican Migrations Department, where heclaims was interrogated three times by SIDE agents. The last timethey interrogated him, they asked if he was Gorriaran Merlo, heanswered back "yes", and simultaneously asked for asylum. (Mexicohas a tradition for giving asylum to politically prosecuted people inother Latin American countries). One of the Mexican police man toldthem that there was "receptiveness" about his request, but at five inthe morning, Mexican authorities took him to the airport and put inhim in SIDE's plane, where the same SIDE agent from Tepoztlan andthe interrogation was present.

The operation was carried out by the Sala Patria group of theSecretariat. Gorrarian Merlo served prison time in Argentina for hiscrimes, but was later pardoned in 2003 by President EduardoDuhalde.

AMIA investigation

Judicial reports during the investigation have displayed sufficientevidence of SIDE's involvement in the AMIA case investigation. In2003, President Nestor Kirchner signed a decree that opened allSIDE's files (about 15,000) and allowed the ex-Secretary of Intelli-gence, Hugo Anzorreguy, and many intelligence personnel involvedin the case (including Horacio Antonio Stiusso, Patricio MiguelFinnen, and Alejandro Brousson) to be available to declare in theinvestigation about Judge Galeano's mishandling during his job asofficial judge of the case.

Several critics blame SIDE for failing to stall the attack on the AMIAas the warnings of an impeding attack on Argentine soil werereceived. Judicial evidence presented during the AMIA investigationshow that the Argentine Embassy in Beirut, the Brazilian IntelligenceService, and the Argentine Consulate in Milan warned SIDE about theattack on the Jewish organization.________________________________________________________________________

OPERATION CABILDO

Juan Jose Galeano, the judge in charge of the AMIA Bombinginvestigation, asked Hugo Anzorreguy to help him advance theinvestigation by bribing a key witness who refused to testify, CarlosTelledin. The Secretariat provided 400 thousand dollars so he wouldchange his testimony, thus forcing progress on a case that had beenstuck for two years.

SIDE explicitly participated in the operation to give the money toTelledin's wife, Ana Boragni in a Lloyds Bank located on Ave. Cabildoin Buenos Aires. The public importance about this operation is that itexplicitly implied SIDE working to orchestrate a cover-up in the AMIAcase.

The operation was described thoroughly by SIDE agents whotestified later on, during President Nestor Kirchner's push for truthand new leads on the case.

Surveillance of foreign embassies

During the 1960s, SIDE set up constant surveillance on embassiesfrom the Eastern bloc as well as other communist nations in BuenosAires.

During the investigation of the AMIA case, then counter-intelligenceoperations director Horacio Antonio Stiusso, was asked about whySIDE had been tapping the phone lines and setting bugs in theembassies of Iran and Cuba in Buenos Aires. Stiusso alleged thatthose tasks were simply counter-intelligence operations and had norelationship with the AMIA case. Nevertheless, in 1998, Argentinafired many Iranian diplomats on the basis of "phone taps" thatprovided evidence Iran was involved in the AMIA bombing.________________________________________________________________________

OPERATION CIPRES

In the late nineties, Nasrim Mokhtari an Iranian prostitute andhairdresser, who was believed to be involved with an Iranian supportgroup that helped carry out the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in1992, and the AMIA building in 1994, was tricked by the Secretariatinto coming back to Argentina from Europe.

The information on her involvement came from Wilson Dos Santos,a suspect in the AMIA case. Dos Santos was a Brazilian taxi boy andthief who did a significant amount of smuggling in the Triple Frontier.Mokhtari had a romantic relationship with Dos Santos in BuenosAires, and claims he knew about the plot to bomb the AMIA buildingthrough her connection in the Buenos Aires Islamic community. It issuspected that Dos Santos worked, or works for the BrazilianIntelligence Service, or the Brazilian Police.

Furthermore, a few weeks before the bombing, Dos Santos enteredthe Argentine, Israeli, and Brazilian consulates in Milan, Italy, to warnabout the up-coming attacks. There was no trace of him until he wascaptured in Switzerland years later, holding 8 passports, and



extradited to Argentina on charges of false testimony, of which he iscurrently serving prison time.

When Dos Santos was declared for the Argentine justice ministry,even though there were weak points in his statements, he namedMokhtari and alleged she knew about the bombings (he later testifiedthat he warned the consulates on information he got from her).

The Argentine justice system, needing new leads because of all thepressure that put on them to solve both bombings, ordered SIDE tofind Mokhtari and bring her back to Argentina for interrogation. Aplan codenamed Operation Cipres was orchestrated to locate her inEurope and bring her back to Argentina. Once located in Switzerland,she was conned into coming back to Argentina by SIDE agents, whoposed as meat businessmen who proposed her a job as a translatorto do business with Iran.

The operation was carried out by the Sala Patria group, and it hasbeen said that the operation cost the Secretariat about half a milliondollars, which included locating her, paying costs, agents and buyinginformation in Cyprus, France, Belgium and Switzerland. The Frenchintelligence service also helped SIDE locate Mokhtari in while shewas living in Paris, France.

Mokthari was on an Air France flight to Montevideo, Uruguay, thatmade a stop in Buenos Aires. When she got off to change planes,she was arrested by a special counter-terrorism team of the FederalPolice. Mokhtari was eventually let free, there were no sufficientproofs to incriminate her in anything, or even being involved in theIranian support group that carried out the AMIA bombing.

A restriction on leaving the country was imposed on her, and laterlifted, but Nasrim Mokhtari had already lost her contacts in Paris,had no money, and become a publicly known 'international terrorist'.The Secretariat declined to provide sufficient accommodations forMokhtari to stay in Argentina, and Iran did not want her in its territorybecause of the sufficient international problems she brought to themwith Iran being blamed in participating in the AMIA bombing. Shecurrently is hospitalized at a mental institution in Buenos Aires.________________________________________________________________________

BREAKDOWN OF CIA RELATIONS

In January of 2001, the Pagina/12 newspaper published an articleon the Secretariat's troubled relations with the American CIA. Alongwith the article was a photo and personal details of Ross Newland,then CIA Station Chief in Buenos Aires, who was expected tobecome head of the Latin American division in the CIA. Officialreports say that the CIA wanted SIDE to investigate the operations ofthe Russian Mafia and ex-KGB agents who had just arrived inArgentina. The reasons were that the Russian Mafia was usingArgentina as an intermediate country for smuggling illegal aliens tothe U.S. At the time, Argentinians did not require visas for touristvisits to the United States, and obtaining Argentine citizenship hadrecently been relatively easy.

Other reasons to investigate the recently arrived ex-KGB and RussianMafia was that many ex-CIA and ex-FBI personnel had privatesecurity businesses in Argentina and in many other Latin Americancountries. The arrival of the Russian gang in Argentina put theirbusinesses at risk of competition. A few months before, Newland, a50-year-old who loved living in Buenos Aires, accused SIDE offollowing him and fellow CIA operatives in Argentina, as well asdoing audio surveillance on them.

Information leaked out that Patricio Finnen and Alejandro Brousson,two old notorious important staff members of the Secretariat, wereresponsible for carrying out the operation from the Billinghurst base.The Americans were not the only ones affected by the Secretariat'speculiar attention, the Israeli Mossad and the German FederalIntelligence Service (BND).

American reports state that the Secretariat never helped the CIA onits requests, instead, the U.S. alleged that SIDE helped the "newcom-ers" insert themselves in the market by selling them information. TheCIA became furious since they had historically contributed funds forSIDE to do their operations, and SIDE was indirectly helping theRussians in their smuggling operation. They expected the Secretariato be on their side, and to make the 'Russian problem' a governmentissue, therefore putting pressure on the Russians.

The head of the Secretariat's counter-intelligence service at the time,retired Major Alejandro Broussoun, an ex military servicemen fromthe Argentine Army Engineers Corps, and an ex-follower of the ultra-nationalist right wing Carapintadas organization in the 1980s and1990s, was blamed by the CIA for the leak of their station chief onthe popular newspaper.

The United States investigation into the incident with SIDE, revealedthat the picture and information of Ross Newland was given to thenewspaper by the Secretariat itself. Meanwhile, SIDE tried to repairrelations by explaining the scandal through another theory.

At the end of the scandal, with Ross Newland's identity uncovered,and the episode becoming a major embarrassment for the U.S. andArgentina in the worldwide intelligence community, the CIA removedits Station Chief from Argentina, and said they were going topermanently move their offices to Montevideo, Uruguay because oftheir problems working together with SIDE. Also, as a result of this,the head of the SIDE counter-intelligence service, retired MajorAlejandro Brousson was expelled because of the American diplo-matic pressure to punish the responsible of an act they considered"a violation of game rules" (in the intelligence community, that is).

The scandal not only put a stain in the CIA's relations with SIDE, butalso made the Americans distrust the Argentine intelligence commu-nity which they had come to collaborate extensively during theCarlos Menem administration.________________________________________________________________________

BRIBES IN THE SENATE

In 2001, the National Executive Power (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional,PEN) under President Fernando de la Rua used the Secretariat'sreserved funds to orchestrate the bribery of several senators in theArgentine Congress. The motive behind the operation was to assurethe promotion of the new labour reform law that the De La Rua waspromoting. When it became known to the public the level of involve-ment of the Executive Branch a national scandal broke out, and DeLa Rua's administration took heavy criticism.

The Secretariat was then under the command of banker Fernando DeSantibanes, a close friend of then President De La Rua, whopromised to make sweeping changes to the Secretariat of Intelli-gence. The opposition parties in Argentina, specially during thegovernment of Carlos Menem, saw SIDE as a political tool andpromised sweeping reforms if it won the 1999 presidential elections.

After the details participation of SIDE in scandal became publiclyknown, then President Fernando de la Rua asked then Secretary of


Intelligence, Fernando De Santibanes to resign. He is currentlycharged with participating in the Senate bribes case.

Recently more details were described about the operation byPontacuarto, the participation of SIDE was so deep to even includevisits of people involved with the bribes to the main SIDE headquar-ters.________________________________________________________________________

ASSASSINATION OF PIQUETEROS

The Justice system and the press blame the Secretariat participatingin the organization of events on 2002 that led to the deaths of DarioSantillan and Maximiliano Kosteki, two piqueteros that were protest-ing in the Pueyrredon Bridge in Buenos Aires. Both men were shot inthe back by Buenos Aires Police's officers armed with shotguns.

Months before the tragedy, the Secretariat had produced intelligencereports that the Piqueteros' assemblies and protests were beingattended by the Colombian extremist group FARC. Furthermore,minutes before the assassinations, there were three phone calls,between Alfredo Fanchiotti, a policeman involved in the incident, andthe Sub-secretary of Intelligence, at the time, Oscar Rodriguez.

During the trial, police officers involved in the scene that day,declared that a man from SIDE approached them and told them that"Today there will be incidents", furthermore incriminating theSecretariat on the assassinations.

Carlos Soria, then Secretary of State Intelligence, later declared that"democracy works in order, we needed to establish order", makingthe public theory that the assassinations were orchestrated by SIDEto psychologically reduce the Piqueteros movements motivation andtheir influence in Argentine society.

The assassinations, which sparked outrage by Piquetero groups,made then interim President Eduardo Duhalde to call for electionsearlier than planned, and since then, the federal government hasestablished a non-repressive policy towards the Piqueteros.

In 2005, President Nestor Kirchner, signed a decree that released allof the Secretariats's files about the tragedy to the public, and madesome SIDE staff and agents available for questioning if necessary.The files released don't include any relevant information in them.

Nobody in SIDE has yet been charged with participating in the case.On the second anniversary of the assassinations, protesters andpiqueteros marched towards the Billinghurst base were the phonecalls originated and proceeded to deface the property and manifestpublic outrage towards the organization. It was the first time everpeople protested at one of SIDE's facilities.________________________________________________________________________

The Defunct SIDE archives (limited) can be viewed at:http://web.archive.org/web/19970619124458/www.side.gov.ar/SIDEOOO.htm________________________________________________________________________

CIM - Central de Inteligencia Militar(Military Intelligence Center, CIM)NOTES: CIM is an Argentine intelligence agency liaising andoverseeing the functions and operations Argentina’s Armyintelligence services.

________________________________________________________________________

DOJ - Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales(Directorate of Judicial Surveillance)NOTES: Dirección de Observaciones Judiciales (Directorate ofJudicial Surveillance, DOJ) sometimes referred to as ‘ Division orDirectorate 84’ is an Argentine intelligence service responsiblefor intercepting communications as required by judicial officers.It is part of the Secretaría de Inteligencia (SI), the main intelli-gence agency; and is a subagency of the National IntelligenceSystem. The DOJ is located in a tall, nondescript building on Ave.de los Incas 3834, in Buenos Aires. The building has an internalsurface of 27,000 square feet and an estimated monetary valueof US$ 1,577,443. Before moving into its own building it oper-ated out of Telecom Argentina’s Belgrano facility.

SEFECONAR - Servicio Federal de Lucha contra elNarcotráfico(Federal Counternarcotics Service)________________________________________________________________________

DNIC - Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Criminal(National Directorate of Criminal Intelligence)NOTES: Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia Criminal is an Argen-tine intelligence agency and part of the National IntelligenceSystem. It depends of the Secretaria de Seguridad Interior(Secretariat of Interior Security), which itself depends of theMinistry of Interior; the DNIC is not a division of the SIDE, whichhas its own Directorate of Interior Intelligence.

The Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia Criminal (NationalDirectorate of Criminal Intelligence, DNIC) was initially created bythe 1992 Interior Security Law 24.059 as Direccion Nacional deInteligencia Interior (National Directorate of Interior Intelligence,DNII).

In December of 2001, as the new Intelligence Reform Law25.520 passed, the National Intelligence System was created,and Article 47/48 renamed the old DNII to its current name.

At the time of the writing of the 1992 Interior Security Law24.059, the National Aeronautical Police (Policia AeronauticaNacional, PNA) was controlled by the Argentine Air Force,therefore, the handling of its information was done by militaryintelligence. In 2005, after the Southern Winds Narcobags


DOJ headquarters inBuenos Aires


Scandal, President Nestor Kirchner dissolved the PNA, andcreated a civil organism similar to the National Gendarmerie andthe Naval Prefecture, the Airport Security Police (Policia deSeguridad Aeroportuaria, PSA). DNIC also handles intelligencefrom the mentioned organism that has inherited from the military-controlled PNA.

DNIEM - Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia Estratégica Militar(National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence)NOTES: Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia Estrategica Militar(National Directorate of Strategic Military Intelligence, DNIEM) isan Argentine intelligence agency part of the National IntelligenceSystem, created by the 2001 Intelligence Reform Law 25.520. Itis structurally dependent of the Ministry of Defense. Its mainmission is to produce strategic military intelligence and analysis.The intelligence services of the Argentine Armed Forces (see thislist) have the job of producing strategic operational and tacticalintelligence for the planning and conduction of military operationsas well as the national strategic intelligence plan. DNIEM’scurrent director is Carlos Anibal Aguilar.

ENI - Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia(National Intelligence School)http://www.eni.gov.ar (ENI’s web site is undergoing review)

NOTES: ENI is the national intelligence academy of the ArgentineRepublic. It depends of the Secretaria de Inteligencia, the mainintelligence agency; and it is a dependent sub-organization of theNational Intelligence System. Its motto is “De Omni Re Scibili” or“From Every Knowing Thing”.

History

The School was created on 24 January 1967 by Executive DecreeN° 17/1967. It was initially established in the fifth floor of a tradi-tional building located on Diagonal Norte and San Martin avenues inBuenos Aires. On 5 June that year it instructed its first class topersonnel of the Secretariat of Intelligence.

In 1982, the school was moved to the building on Ave. Libertad1235, where it functions today. Since 1992, it established studentsexchange with foreign countries, strengthening the links with manyforeign intelligence agencies.________________________________________________________________________

ORGANISATION - ENI________________________________________________________________________

OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON ENI’S MISSION AND ROLE

Its mission is the instruction and recruitment of the Secretariat ofIntelligence's personnel with a specialized technical and humanisticformation, the analysis and study of the national intelligence doctrineand providing of online courses and long-distance teaching foragents who belong to the Secretariat and other Argentine intelligenceor security organisms.

Graduating from the ENI awards a title and diploma certified by theNational University of La Plata, Buenos Aires.

Facilities

The School's main building, a big belle epoque academic-stylemansion, is located on Ave. Libertador 1235 in Buenos Aires.Estimated to be worth about U$S 724.178, it was built in 1922 and

a parking lot was added in 1970. It has small rooms and woodenfloors, a street surface of 2.515 m2 and an internal surface of 3.775m2.

The ENI mansion is protected by a heavy 5.000 kilogram steel gateand a constant surveillance through a closed circuit television(CCTV) system that records all activity around the building. TheSchool also has a library of 7000 volumes, and through its webpageit offers online courses to all regions and provinces of Argentina.

Director

Mrs Silvia Beatriz Cucovaz de Arroche is the current director; havinga geographical sciences degree, is considered a highly-experiencedand valuable woman with a long history in the Secretaria deInteligencia. Mrs Cucovaz was also a professor at the Faculty ofHistory and the Geographical Sciences School of the University ofSalvador, at the Faculty of Business of the University of BuenosAires, and at the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Mar de laPlata.

Her previous jobs in SIDE included being the intelligence delegate inthe Argentine Embassy in Germany (Bonn), the Director of ForeignIntelligence, the Chief of Strategic Affairs, the Advisor of theSecretary of Intelligence, and an ENI professor.

She has participated in many conferences of international organiza-tions, most notoriously serving as Chairman of arms and explosivesexperts at the United Nations disarmament area. In Argentina, she isalso Counsellor of the Council of International Relations (CARI) andmember of its International Security Committee.

Cucovaz wrote many dossiers and books such as ‘El rol de losservicios de Icia en el campo de la contraproliferacion’ and ‘Croatiaas a stabilizing factor for peace in Europe; proceedings from anInternational Symposium’.

Seal

The ENI seal (Escudo) is a Spanish-style coat of arms, composed ofa chess board, symbol of strategy; a triangle, representing straight-ness; and a fox, which signifies the force of intelligence. The whitecolour represents the virtues of obedience and firmness; the blackrepresents honesty; and the green symbolizes an oath to service.The ENI motto appears in Latin words: "De Omni Re Scibili", whichmeans "From every knowable thing".

Staff and materials

During the 1960s, teachers in the ENI were mainly retired militaryofficials who specialized in the intelligence service, or exceptionally,in the infantry branch. The materials taught were completely writtenin Argentina, usually by the military.

Recruitment and training

Citizens that are recruited for SIDE (see SIDE's recruitment proce-dures), are expected to go through the ENI's screening and trainingprogram before becoming a part of the organism.

During the 1960s, the basic courses that were taught by the schoolincluded specific materials that no agent with a pretension ofpassing could fail. Teachers taught normal subjects on the matter ofespionage, such as the ability to open any kind of lock they couldencounter with very basic tools. Photography, distant following of



subjects, infiltration, and even lip reading formed part of the menu ofbasic knowledge taught.

Establishing a well known method used by the CIA and otherintelligence agencies, agents that passed all the exams could moveon to the final steps of their training, which included: shootingpractice, weapons handling, and personal defense.

Students in the ENI, are not only taught basic theories, skills andtechniques about intelligence and SIDE, but also the developing oftheir "instinct" is heavily promoted. During "class", there are several"immediate reaction" tests. For example, these tests can be hidden ina simple routine, such as making students do a simple task, likeworking with a document. When the student least expects it, asimulation of a small fire break out begins, which helps evaluate astudent's response capability under spontaneous and stressfulsituations.

Students must be fully aware and attentive to their teachers and thematerial they are being taught. By being attentive it means remem-bering and analysing any detail that could alter the routine of theclassroom, like a phone call received by a professor to his/hercellphone, or if he or she suddenly coughs strongly.

After the bell rings, without notice, students are usually interrogatedabout the previous circumstances, therefore evaluating a number of"correct answers". That is, seeing how attentive to details they were,and their capability to remember, analyse and discern all kinds ofinformation, acts, things said, etc.

The second level of teaching is not reachable without first passing awhole set of psychological and physical examinations. Afterwards,the program becomes more complex, that means that the assign-ments become more technical, with subjects like Electronic Intelli-gence, where students are submerged into the art of phone tappingand the other uses of electronics in the intelligence world.

If a student gets good grades, then he or she can become a part ofSIDE.

Magazine

SIDE publishes every three months a magazine called "La Revista dela Escuela Nacional de Inteligencia" ("The Magazine of the NationalIntelligence School") about the studies and works of Argentiniansand foreigners on the subject of intelligence.

Contact

Available phone and fax numbers: 4752-4001, 4812-4930 (FAX),4812-9230, 4812-4577, 4813-6132, 4813-2947, 4813-7736,4811-1041/42/43/44/45, 4811-44930, 4812-9230 (FAX).________________________________________________________________________

Sofia Fijman incident

Sofia Fijman was a 75 year old, middle-class, Argentine woman whofed cats that inhabited the garden of the ENI building. On 26February 1998, she was killed by Ricardo Dattoli (a SIDE agent whowas in charge of the ENI's security) who closed the 5.000 kilogramsteel gate while she was feeding the cats through it.

Fijman's hand became trapped in the gate, subsequently draggingher and causing a fatal injury to her head. Allegations by Fijman'sdomestic employee state that Dattoli told her "We are going to killyou, and the cats", as he warned her not to feed the cats any more.

Ricardo Dattoli, an agent who got paid 1,700 Argentine Pesos (U$S1,700 at that time) for working six days a month doing a 36 hoursurveillance shift and then resting for five days, claimed that heactivated the door opening mechanism (when no car was going in orout, and Fijman was feeding the cats) because he fell and acciden-tally pushed the switch.

He described the incident stating that he fell and accidentallyactivated the mechanism because his shoe laces were untied. WhenDattoli activated the gates to open, and trapped Fijman's hand bydoing so, an Australian tourist couple was passing by LibertadAvenue. The man tried to stop the gate, he uses physical force andcalls for help, but finally the gate overpowers him and kills thewoman. During that time, Dattoli did not activate the button to makethe gate close and free the woman, even though there was a buttonfor it.

Even though Dattoli could see what was happening through thevideo surveillance system, he did not do anything to avoid furtherdamage to Fijman. The judicial investigation stated that the video ofthe incident has "edited parts", and that the part where Fijmanreceives the fatal wound has been erased. Since the incident, the ENImoved all its guards to other units or facilities and has changed itsgate mechanism to a manual opening and closing procedure ratherthan a fully-automatic one.

The investigation reported that 8 cameras and 16 monitors werefocused on the ENI's entrance. Dattoli and his accomplices werewatching from the inside of the Mansion, and did nothing to stop theincident.

Dattoli has been sentenced to 10 years in prison for premeditatedmurder.________________________________________________________________________

SIPBA - Inteligencia de la Policía Bonaerense(Buenos Aires Police Intelligence)NOTES: The Service is an internal intelligence agency of Argen-tina. It is the intelligence service of the police of Buenos AiresProvince, and it is controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.

SIGN - Inteligencia de la Gendarmería Nacional Argentina(Argentine National Gendarmerie Intelligence)NOTES: Inteligencia de la Gendarmeria Nacional Argentina (ArgentineNational Gendarmerie Intelligence) is the intelligence service of theArgentine National Gendarmerie, commonly referred as SIGN(Servicio de Inteligencia de la Gendarmeria Nacional, NationalGendarmerie Intelligence Service) within the Intelligence Secretariat.

Inteligencia de la Policía Federal Argentina(Argentine Federal Police Intelligence)NOTES: The Service is the intelligence wing of the Policia FederalArgentina, and it is controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.

PFA - Policia Federal Argentina(Argentine Federal Police)http://www.policiafederal.gov.ar/NOTES: Self-described as an FBI-type organisation, the Service iscontrolled by the Ministry of the Interior.

OFFICIAL STATEMENT

Argentine Federal Police) is a nationwide police force, it is the federalpolice agency of Argentina, with detachments in each of thecountry's provinces, with a jurisdiction and organization similar to



the United States' FBI. Because of this, most routine police work iscarried out by the provincial police (equivalent to state police in theUnited States), with the exception of the capital city of Buenos Aires,where the PFA also assumes the role of the local police.

History

The history of this police force starts in 1580 and is divided in threestages. The first one includes the Policia de Buenos Aires (BuenosAires Police), for the first three hundred years up to 1880. Thesecond stage (1880-1943) corresponds to the Policia de la Capital(Police of the Capital), and the last one to the present PFA (since1943).

General Organization

The PFA is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The organization isheaded by the Chief of the PFA, the Comisario General, assisted bythe Deputy Chief of the PFA.

The PFA's main facility, known as the Departamento Central dePolicia, is located at 1650 Moreno Street, Buenos Aires.

The organization and departments of the PFA:

* Jefatura(Headquarters)

* Subjefatura(Sub-headquarters)

* Superintendencias(Superintendencies)

* Superintendencia de Administracion(Superintendency of Administration)

* Superintendencia de Bienestar(Superintendency of Welfare)

* Superintendencia Federal de Bomberos(Federal Superintendency of Firemen)

* Superintendencia de Interior(Superintendency of Interior)

* Superintendencia de Investigaciones Federales(Superintendency of Federal Investigations)

* Superintendencia de Planificacion y Desarrollo(Superintendency of Planning and Development)

* Superintendencia de Seguridad Metropolitana(Superintendency of Metropolitan Security)

* Superintendencia de Personal, Instruccion y Derechos Humanos(Superintendency of Personnel, Instruction and Human Rights)

* Superintendencia de Policia Cientifica(Superintendency of Scientific Police)

* Superintendencia de Comunicaciones(Superintendency of Communications)

* Direcciones Generales Autonomas(General Autonomic Directorates)

* Direccion General Autonoma de Asuntos Juridicos(General Autonomic Directorate of Legal Affairs)

* Direccion General Autonoma de Asuntos Internos (GeneralAutonomic Directorate of Internal Affairs)

Superintendencies are commanded by a superintendente, a lesscommon word in Spanish. Both superintendente and the much morecommon Spanish word comisario normally translate into English assuperintendent, which creates some translation problems whendiscussing Argentine police services.________________________________________________________________________

SPECIAL PARAMILITARY POLICE INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY UNITS________________________________________________________________________

Grupo Albatros(Albatross Group)NOTES: A special operationsservice of the ArgentineNaval Prefecture. Located inthe province of Buenos Aires,it conducts river andmaritime operations in thelakes and rivers and anything close to the coast line. In addition toCounterterrorist missions, Albatros conducts search and rescuemissions and responds to criminal gangs and activities.

BEOH - Brigada Especial Operativa Halcón(Hawk Special Operations Brigade)NOTES: BEOH is a special operations division of the Buenos AiresPolice in Argentina.

BACKGROUND

Argentina did not possess a viable counter-terrorist capability until1978, when it hosted the football World Cup. At that time, themilitary dictatorship ruling Argentina accepted the possibility thatsuch a widely-televised event was a likely forum for a terroristincident. The result was the formation of a special counter-terroristteam, the Brigada Halcón.

Today, the unit is made up of seventy-five commandos, subdividedinto fifteen-man tactical teams. Each team has two snipers, onemedic, one negotiator, an explosive ordnance disposal expert, acommunications specialist, an intelligence specialist, and eighttactical troops.

Initial training is divided into three two-month stages. Skills such ascombat shooting, helicopter insertion, HALO/HAHO parachuting,explosives, sniping, intelligence gathering, martial arts, and offen-sive driving are covered in this period. The unit also handles VIPprotection and is also responsible for hijacked aircraft throughout thenation. While many current members are veterans of the ArgentineArmy, the Brigada Halcón is under the operational control of thefederal police, under the direct command of the Buenos Aires PoliceDepartment.

Brigada Halcón members use foreign weapons and gear, as well aslocally manufactured protective gear and uniforms. Weaponsinclude: GLOCK 17, HK MP5, M4 Carbine, HK UMP, M16A2 and theFranchi SPAS-12 shotgun. For sniping purposes the Heckler & KochG3 GS/1 is commonly used.

This special operations group was involved in the "Ramallo massa-



cre", when operatives from the Brigada Halcón shot dead onealleged bank robber and his two hostages.

GEOF - Grupo Especial de Operaciones Federales(Federal Operations Special Group, GEOF)NOTES: GEOF is a special security unit of the Argentine FederalPolice trained to strategically perform counterterrorist andcounternarcotics missions. It is also used for VIP protection andhostage rescue situations.

BACKGROUND

The GEOF is a specialized police unit of the General Directorate ofInternational Terrorism and Complex Crimes. Although the existenceof special forces in Argentina began in 1930, the unit was officiallycreated after the AMIA bombing. In 1994 its first section wasestablished in Tucumán and in 1997 a second division was consti-tuted in Rosario. In 1998 the Buenos Aires group was formed.

The unit's main training course lasts for 20 weeks and is divided intwo sections. Only 15% of applicants are approved. Trainingsubjects include sniping, HALO/HAHO parachuting, martial arts,offensive driving, and explosives. The GEOF trains regularly withspecial units of other countries including the FBI Hostage RescueTeams, the US Army Green Berets and numerous SWAT groups. TheGEOF, nicknamed 4T because it operates throughout Argentina (4T -“todo tiempo-todo terreno” - “all time-all land”).

TOE - Compañía de Tropas de Operaciones Especiales(Special Operations Troops Company)NOTES: TOE is the premier special operations force of the Santa FeProvince Police, Argentina.

BACKGROUND

The service was created on 4 May 1990, and answers directly to theChief of the Province Police. Operatives and officials of TOE havereceived specialist training by organisations such as Britain’s NCIS,and Israel’s YAMAM.________________________________________________________________________

Inteligencia de la Policía de Seguridad Aeroportuaria(Airport Security Police Intelligence)NOTES: The Service is the intelligence agency of the Policia deSeguridad Aeroportuaria of Argentina.

UIF - Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera(Financial Intelligence Unit)

DEDICATED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

J-2 - Jefatura de Inteligencia del Estado Mayor Conjunto delas Fuerzas Armadas(Intelligence Department of the Joint General Staff of the ArmedForces)NOTES: J-2 Intelligence - Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. J-2 isan Argentine federal agency in charge of controlling all themilitary intelligence services. The name J-2 refers to Jefatura 2,the official denomination assigned to military intelligencedivisions of each service branch.

SEFECONAR - The Servicio Federal de Lucha contra elNarcotrafico(Federal Counternarcotics Service)

NOTES: SEFECONAR is an Argentine intelligence agency withspecial police tasks closely modelled on the American DrugsEnforcement Agency (DEA). It was created through the ExecutiveDecree N° 717 of 18 April 1991, and it is currently under thejurisdiction of the Sedronar. A matter of controversy, its existencehas not been acknowledged by the Menem administration.

CRIM - Central de Reunión de Inteligencia Militar(Military Intelligence Collection Center)NOTES: Army Intelligence, including a G-2 within the Army GeneralStaff and a Military Intelligence Collection Center (CRIM)3, withseveral small units all over the country and formerly known as ArmyIntelligence Battalion 601 (Batallón de Inteligencia 601).

SIE - Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército(Army Intelligence Service)web site under constructionhttp://www.ejercito.mil.ar/EMG/Jef2icia/Icia1.htmNOTES: The intelligence section[s] of Argentine Army. It is a partof J-2 and report directly to the Army's Jefatura II (the GeneralStaff's intelligence service). The Service is made up of a varietyof intelligence groups, companies and units. Also within theService is Batallón de Inteligencia 601 and 602 2 Combat ArmyIntelligence Detachment and several specialist intelligencecollection units.

SIN - Servicio de Inteligencia Naval(Naval Intelligence Service)NOTES: SIN is the intelligence agency of the Argentine Navy. It ispart of J-2 and under the jurisdiction of the Navy General Staff.Its current director is Vice Admiral IM (Infanteria de Marina)Enrique Salvador Olmedo. SIN’s duties include gathering navalintelligence relevant to Argentina.

SIFA - Servicio de Inteligencia de la Fuerza Aérea(Air Force Intelligence Service)NOTES: SIFA is the intelligence wing of the Argentine Air Force. Itis part of J-2 and it's current director is Commodore Garcia. SIFAis a primary component within the Air Force Staff.

AFOE - Agrupacion de Fuerzas de Operaciones Especiales(The Special Operations Forces Group)NOTES: AFOE is a special operations unit of the Argentine Army,created on 6 December 2005 as the first operational element ofthe Proyecto Ejercito Argentina 2025. It consists of the 601 AirAssault Regiment, the 601 Commando Company, and the 602Commando Company; and it is designed to act under the RapidDeployment Force command.________________________________________________________________________

Ministra de Defensa(Ministry of Defense)http://www.mindef.gov.ar/index.asp

[2007 REORGANISATION]Link to pdf of the 2007 modernisation and restructuring ofArgentina’s armed forces.________________________________________________________________________

Servicio de Hidrografía(Argentina Navy)Navalhttp://www.mindef.gov.ar/hidrografia.html



EA - Ejercito Argentina(Argentina Army)www.ejercito.mil.ar/

Fuerza Aerea Argentina(Argentina Air Force)www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar/________________________________________________________________________

PNI - Prefectura Naval Argentina OrganizationNOTES: Within the range of national institutions, the Prefectura NavalArgentina Organization - PNA is a part of the National IntelligenceSystem, Safety and Security Force and reports to the DomesticSecurity Secretariat and President.SIPN - Inteligencia de la Prefectura Naval ArgentinaNOTES: The Service is the intelligence agency of the ArgentineNaval Prefecture.

PNA Intelligence tasks have been performed since its historicalbeginning in 1756, when the first Captainship of the Port wasestablished, with primarily police functions related to the safety ofnavigation or the port area. However, 12 March 1951 marks amilestone in its history, as a provision from the Commandant- at thattime known as National Maritime Prefect- provided for the creation,on a provisional basis, of the Information and Security Division,which finally became the present Service, after undergoing differenttransformations.

The Intelligence Service, as an advisory body to the top rankauthorities of the Institution and to the Central Government, iscontinuously and permanently involved in the collection, analysisand integration of the data required in the jurisdictional area and itsenvironment.

Within that framework, the spectrum of incumbent tasks is verywide. Its activity is reflected in the production of intelligence on allkinds of actions which are likely to endanger the operation of portsand waterways, as well as the safeguard of the maritime, river,fishing and port interests of the Nation. In addition, the preservationof the ecological balance and the fight against a number of offences,such as drug trafficking, currency forgery, terrorism, smuggling , theillegal traffic of people or those circumstances affecting the freeoperation of PNA as a security force, constitute the permanent goalsof the Intelligence Service activities.

PNA comprises different working committees of the NationalIntelligence Central Office. At the Interior Security Secretariat, PNApersonnel perform different functions intended to meet the require-ments necessary for the maintenance of the basic principles laiddown by the Interior Security Law, such as freedom, life, theinhabitants’ property, rights, guarantees and the full validity ofdemocratic institutions.

At its Intelligence Units, which are distributed all along the maritime,river and lake coasts - operationally integrated to the organizationstructure of the Area Districts, Districts and Units - a human teamespecially trained for the demands of these times performs itsactivities advising the operations’ leaders and being supported byadequate technical elements.

The dynamics of the integration process among member countriesof the Mercosur generated -from the police viewpoint- the need forimplementing a work style which had been already used in othercommunities, such as the European. In that respect, the exchange of

information and intelligence with national bodies as well as agenciesfrom the involved countries, was intensified with the purpose ofcarrying out a constant follow-up of the criminal organizations whichconstitute a real danger to society.

The PNA can also be defined as a specialized Police Service withparticular dimensions, directed towards functions such as the Safetyof Navigation Police, Security and Public Order Police, Judicial Policeand Navigational Issues Police. Likewise, Prefectura provides manyother services within the scope of its functions, such as Environ-mental Preservation Police, Maritime and River Fishing Police, and -by delegation- Customs, Migratory and Sanitary Auxiliary Police.

The PNA does not only have a wide geographical field of action,characterized by particular local problems, buy also carries out awide spectrum of highly technically complex functions within aswitching environment under increasingly technological develop-ment. Within this context, the safety of life and property at sea, inport and on shore is a high priority activity demanding timely andaccurate responses. In order to meet these requirements, the PNAhas adopted a flexible and adjustable approach, keeping in mindcentralized standards and executive decentralization.

SENIOR MANAGEMENT AREA

Prefectura Nacional (Commandant’s Office): it is the body by meansof which the Commandant directs the Service at the top level, withthe assistance and counselling of the General Secretariat, theIntelligence Service, the Naval Technical and Legal Advisory Serviceand the High Rank Officer Council and Consultative Councils.

Subprefectura Nacional (Vice Commandant’s Office): through thisbody the Vice Commandant assists the Commandant in planning thewhole range of PNA activities, monitoring and controlling alldepartments and units at the highest level.

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AREA

It consists of the Safety of Navigation Police Direction, the Safetyand Judicial Police Direction and the Environment ProtectionDirection. They report to the Commandant, as the remainingdirections do. These Directions perform a Naval Police Service withauxiliary police functions, the normative and registry aspects thereofand their supervision.

SUPPORT AREA

It consists of the Personnel, Material, Training and AdministrationDirections, which are responsible for the recruitment, distribution,support and maintenance of personnel and materials, as well as theeconomic, finance and accounting management of Prefectura.



OPERATIONAL AREA

It consists of the Operations Direction. Its purpose is to ensure thatstatutes, rules and orders are enforced. With this purpose it coordi-nates the work of its different units in order to guarantee that PNAfunctions are fulfilled at every point within its jurisdiction.

Scope and Geographical Deployment

The geographical features of the different areas in which PrefecturaNaval Argentina (PNA) carries out its functions impose differentmodalities on the tasks performed by this service.

According to the provisions of its Organic Act, PNA performs itstasks in the following areas: seas, lakes, rivers, channels andnavigable waters devoted to interjurisdictional traffic and trade; portsunder national jurisdiction; Argentine Antarctic Territory; Malvinasand other South Atlantic islands; sea and river shores and beaches;Maritime Frontier Security Areas; and navigable river shores.

PNA carries out its function on vessels in jurisdictional waters andon Argentine flag vessels at high seas and foreign ports, as regardsmatters connected to navigation safety

Enforcement, navigation administrative affairs supervision, and in allcases which fall outside the jurisdiction of a local State according tothe provisions of public international law.

PNA operational structure and administrative resources are organ-ized according to the different areas of activities and functionsimposed by legislation. The territorial jurisdiction is divided into 10Prefecturas de Zona (Coast Guard Districts), each one with severalunits, as follows:

Prefectura Naval Argentina Districts distributions

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1- UPPER PARANÁ DISTRICTIt is made up of the following units: Prefectura de Posadas;Prefectura de Iguazú; Prefectura de San Javier; Subprefectura de ItaIbaté; Subprefectura de Ituzaingó; Subprefectura Libertador GeneralSan Martín; and Subprefectura de Eldorado.

This area has the largest number of Reinforced Detachments andunits of all PNA. Here the river forms the natural borderline withBrazil and Paraguay.

The river extension and narrowness, as well as the wild vegetation,create a favourable environment for drug trafficking, smuggling andother offences.

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2- UPPER URUGUAY DISTRICTThe following units can be found within its jurisdiction: Prefectura dePaso de los Libres; Prefectura de Santo Tomé; Subprefectura deMonte Caseros; Subprefectura de Yapeyú; Subprefectura de Alvear;and Subprefectura de Garruchos.

In this area the river forms the natural borderline with Brazil andUruguay and PNA’s main duties here are the prevention and controlof drug trafficking and smuggling as well as the migratory control.

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3- UPPER PARANÁ AND PARAGUAY DISTRICTEIt comprises Prefectura de Barranqueras; Prefectura de Corrientes;and Prefectura de Formosa; Subprefectura de Reconquista;Subprefectura de Goya; Subprefectura de Paso de la Patria;Subprefectura de Itatí; and Subprefectura de Pilcomayo.

This is a heavy traffic area, and trade vessels mainly sail to and fromParaguay. Continuous migratory control and strict surveillance iskept on this borderline area in order to prevent and control drugtrafficking and smuggling. In addition, there is an increasing sportsfishing activity.

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4- LOWER URUGUAY DISTRICTIt includes Prefectura de Concepción del Uruguay; Prefectura deConcordia; Subprefectura de Gualeguaychú; Subprefectura deColón; Subprefectura de Salto Grande; and Subprefectura deFederación.

Recreational boats, trade vessels and sand and boulder barges areactive in this area. Here the river forms the natural borderline withUruguay and PNA is therefore in charge of preventing and controllingdrug trafficking and smuggling.

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5- LOWER PARANÁ DISTRICTThe following units can be found within its jurisdiction: Prefectura deSan Nicolás; Prefectura de Villa Constitución; Prefectura de Rosario;Prefectura de San Lorenzo; Prefectura de Santa Fe; Prefectura deParaná; Subprefectura de Ramallo; Subprefectura de Diamante; andSubprefectura de La Paz.

This is a heavy traffic area engaged in farming exportation and liquid



fuel transport, with a large number of recreational boats. It is theonly waterway to and from Alto Paraná and Paraguay ports.

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6- DELTA DISTRICTIt is composed of: Prefectura de San Isidro; Prefectura de Tigre;Prefectura de Campana; Prefectura de Zárate; Subprefectura deOlivos; Subprefectura de Escobar; Subprefectura de San Pedro;Subprefectura de Guazú Guazucito; and Subprefectura deParanacito. This area shows an important traffic of sea-going andpassenger vessels as well as ships engaged in national andinternational coastal sailing. Moreover, the highest number ofrecreational boats in the country are found in this area.

***************************7- RIVER PLATE DISTRICTThe following units are found: Prefecturas de Buenos Aires;Prefectura de Dock Sud; Prefectura de La Plata; and SubprefecturaGeneral Lavalle.

The port of Buenos Aires receives a large percentage of the totalsea-going and coastal sailing traffic. Dock Sud and La Plata portsare not only well-prepared to receive chemicals, oil and by-productsbut also well-equipped with casualty prevention equipment.

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8- ARGENTINE NORTHERN SEA DISTRICTIt consists of the following units: Prefectura de Mar del Plata;Prefectura de Quequén; Prefectura de Bahía Blanca; Prefectura dePuerto Madryn; Subprefectura de Patagones; Subprefectura de SanAntonio Oeste; and Subprefectura de Rawson.

The area’s main features are fishing activities, at Mar del Plata andMadryn ports, and large grain terminals with deep sea ports, locatedat Quequén and Bahía Blanca. Fruits and vegetables from the uppervalley of Río Negro are sent abroad through San Antonio Oeste.

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9- ARGENTINE SOUTHERN SEA DISTRICTPrefectura de Comodoro Rivadavia; Prefectura de Puerto Deseado;Prefectura de Río Gallegos e Islas Malvinas; Prefectura de RíoGrande; Prefectura de Ushuaia e Islas del Atlántico Sur;Subprefectura de San Julián; and Subprefectura de Santa Cruzcomprise the Argentine Southern Sea District.

Fishing activities are very important at Deseado and Punta Quillaports, and Comodoro Rivadavia is the most important port devotedto oil traffic in the country. Moreover, Ushuaia port is a strategicallyimportant area and constitutes the last continental call on the way toAntarctica.

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10- COMAHUE AND LAKES DISTRICTOver 80 navigable lakes are found in the southern provinces ofNeuquén, Río Negro and Chubut.

Recreational boating is very important - many passengers visit thelakes as well as the national parks in the region. This area isparticularly controlled by Prefectura de San Carlos de Bariloche,Subprefectura de Neuquén and their corresponding units due to thehigh ecological sensitivity of the area.

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SER 2000 DATA BASE ON DEFENCE ISSUEShttp://www.ser2000.org.ar/

NOTES: SER 2000 origins lie in the years of Argentina transition todemocracy, shortly before the latest military uprising, when a groupof political, military and academics agreed on the need to create aspace for mature dialogue between these sectors. This dialoguecalled for the urgent need to establish common communicationcodes to truly overcome those problems that historically had limiteda harmonious and productive relationship between civil authoritiesand the military.

Inteligencia del Servicio Penitenciario Federal(Federal Penitentiary Service Intelligence)

ADC - Asociacion por los Derechos Civiles(Association for Civil Rights)http://www.adc.org.ar/home.php?iDOCUMENTO=540&iTIPODOCUMENTO=1NOTES: ADC is a non-profit, non-governmental and non-partisanorganization. It was founded in 1995 in Argentina with the purposeof contributing to the establishment of a legal and institutional culturethat would guarantee fundamental rights to the inhabitants ofArgentina, based on respect for the Constitution.


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