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CLAWSAUTUMN 2010

Cent

re for land warfare studies

victory through vision

cLAWs

C e n t r e f o r L a n d W a r f a r e S t u d i e S

SCHOLAR

WAR

RIOR

AUTUMN 2010

Centre For Land WarFare StudieS

SCHOLAR WARRIOR

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cLAWs

SCHOLAR WARRIOR

CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES

new delhi

EDITORIAL COmmITTEE

EDITOR-IN-ChIEF Maj Gen dhruv C Katoch SM, VSM (retd) additional director, CLaWS

mANAgINg EDITOR Col ashwani Gupta deputy director, CLaWS

DEpUTy EDITORS rohit Singh aditi Malhotra

Scholar Warrior is published by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLaWS), new delhi. CLaWS is an autonomous think-tank dealing with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflict and terrorism. CLaWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy oriented in approach.

For submission of articles, commentaries, review articles and book reviews, please see “notes for Contributors” given at the end of the Journal.

Mailing addresseditor, SCHoLar WarriorCentre for Land Warfare StudiesrPSo Complex, Parade roadnew delhi 110010, india.tele: +91-11-25691308, Fax: +91-11-25692347email: [email protected] Website: http://www.claws.in

© Centre for Land Warfare Studies, new delhi.

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disclaimer: Some of the articles have been sourced from publications of renowned de-fence experts and commentators. the copy-right of these articles rests with the respec-tive authors and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies does not accept any liability of error therein.

Contents

From the editor-in-Chief’s desk v

readings for officers vii

SECTION I ä StrateGiC iSSueS• Kashmir’s Faultlines 2

• Special Powers for armed Forces: We need Clarity, not emotions 5

• the Wages of the nuclear deal 8

• Maoist threat, deploy Babus, not army 11

• indian industry at Landmark defence tender 17

• india Successfully tests Missile intercept Capability 19

• Light Combat Helicopter 24

SECTION II ä CHina WatCH• ThePeople’sLiberationArmy 28

• China’s View of South asia and the indian ocean 32

SECTION III ä PriSM on PaKiStan• Pakistan has Lost touch with the nation 46

• night of the Generals 49

• Pakistan army sends Politco-Military Signals

to india through “ex azm-e-nau” 52

• Pakistan army 57

• School of infantry and tactics, Quetta 60

SECTION IV ä reGionaL neiGHBourHood• Perspectives on reconciliation options in afghanistan 64

• time has come to accept the de Facto Partition of afghanistan 68

• Website Leaks thousands of afghan War docs 71

• Strategic Culture and threat Perception of afghanistan 74

• unending Crisis in nepal: the options Before india 80

• nepali Politics in the Grip of Catch-22 83

• nepalese Woes require indian Support 86

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• the thimpu SaarC Summit: an overview 89

• Why india needs Myanmar on its Side 91

• a China-north Korea-Myanmar “axis” in the Making? 94

• Consolidating Bangladesh 98

• Pranab Mukherjee’s Visit to dhaka: towards Great integration? 104

• Lessons from the War in Sri Lanka 106

• China’s Foray into Sri Lanka and india’s response 113

SECTION V ä CYBer WarFare• Counter China’s Laptop Warriors 118

• Spy Game: india readies Cyber army to Hack

into Hostile nations’ Computer Systems 121

SECTION VI ä MiLitarY teCHnoLoGY• BraHMoS Supersonic Cruise Missile 124

• army Plans to Buy tank Busting Missiles from uS 128

• Bulk Production Clearance for 40 mm uBGL 131

• army orders 1 Million Pieces of Grenade developed

by drdo’s Chandigarh Lab 132

• Prithvi-ii test-Fired Successfully 134

• after two Failures, nuclear-Capable agni-ii Successfully test-Fired 136

• Pakistan navy tests its Strike Capability in arabian Sea 138

• China Sets up First Cyber Base 139

SECTION VII ä MiLitarY HiStorY• Gulf War i: the 100 Hour War 142

• Brig Mohammed usman, MVC: the Lion of naushera 156

• raid on enemy Penga Post - May 17/18 1965 162

notes for Contributors 169

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From the Editor-in-Chief’s Desk

it gives us great pleasure to bring out yet another CLaWS publication, our new

biannual journal - ‘Scholar Warrior’. amongst the present list of CLaWS publications,

the CLaWS Journal has established a niche for itself amongst defence officers and

the strategic community in matters relating to national security and strategic issues.

in addition, Manekshaw Papers, issue Briefs, monographs and books published by

CLaWS on subjects of contemporary military interest have been very well received.

Scholar Warrior now aims to bring to the officer community a selection of articles in

a convenient format to create a higher level of awareness on contemporary military

and strategic issues.

the job of the soldier remains as always to defend the motherland from external

aggression and internal disorder. But the circumstances under which the soldier of

today has to carry out the given task have altered considerably. technology has been

one of the important constituents which have led to a change in methods of waging

war. improved means of communications allied with increase in range, accuracy

and lethality of weapon systems has led to the ongoing revolution in military affairs

which continues to impact on conflicts across the globe. the metamorphosis which

has taken place in the conduct of war fighting over the last century has been quite

striking as evinced by operation ‘desert Storm’ in1991, operation ‘iraqi Freedom’

in 2003 and the ease with which the taliban – al Qaeda combine was ousted from

afghanistan in 2001 in operation ‘enduring Freedom’ post the September 11 attacks

by the al Qaeda on the united States.

another striking aspect of modern conflict is the all pervasive presence of the

media. While the Gulf wars were beamed directly to millions of homes across the

world, the Kargil conflict of 1999 was vividly beamed to indian drawing rooms

across the country highlighting once again the power of the media in shaping

public opinion and in contributing to realisation of end state objectives.

the challenges we continue to face in india range across the spectrum of

conflict. While the army is currently engaged in sub conventional conflict in

Jammu and Kashmir and north east india, its primary task still remains to

defend our borders from conventional threats. the role of leadership in such an

environment cannot be overemphasised and is the bedrock on which our army

stands. an important constituent of leadership is situational awareness, not only

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of affairs military but the broader geo-strategic and geo political concerns of the

nation. ‘Scholar Warrior’ was conceived to promote such awareness in the army’s

leadership at sub unit, unit and formation level.

today, the lines between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war

are getting blurred. a miscalculation at the tactical level may result in collateral

damage which could in certain circumstances have a disproportionate strategic

effect. Presently, the army is conducting very effective counter insurgency and

counter terrorism operations both in J&K and north east india. these operations

are being conducted under the glare of an all pervasive and sometimes intrusive

media, as also under the scrutiny of very visible and articulate human rights

organisations. the army not only has an enviable record with respect to human

rights but has zero tolerance to such rights being violated in any form. However,

in a large organisation, where troops are operating in difficult conditions for

long periods of time, some mistakes are bound to be made. the need for the

leadership to be sensitive to such issues and take remedial action quickly cannot

be overemphasised otherwise the gains made over years of hard work in winning

the hearts and minds of the populace can be squandered in a matter of days.

an understanding of the dynamics of such issues also forms an important

component of leadership and man management.

as of now, the army in most field stations is heavily committed in operations

and in Peace time is heavily engaged in other duties. the overall shortage of officers

in the army further adds to constraints in time. By combining informative articles

impacting on india’s security concerns in one journal, ‘Scholar warrior’ hopes to

give the necessary inputs and information to our officers in a convenient and easily

accessible format which we hope will also be intellectually stimulating. We shall be

focusing on strategic issues, China, Pakistan, the regional neighbourhood, cyber

warfare and military technology. a section on military history has also been added

along with a first person account of a small scale action which brings out valuable

lessons on command at various levels. We hope this journal will prove to be useful

and we look forward to feedback and comments from you to further improve its

effectiveness. We wish you all ‘Happy reading’.

Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM (retd)editor-in-Chief Scholar Warrior

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Readings for Officers

ALI AhmED ä IDSA

the profession of arms has a striking disadvantage for its practitioners. this is that

opportunities for its practice are few and far between. in all of india’s wars, only a

partial fraction of the army has been exposed to the cut and thrust of combat.

therefore, the substance of the profession has to be acquired vicariously. However,

the nature of continual deployment in field areas comprising either counter

insurgency or in difficult terrain and weather conditions makes up for the lack of

exposure to high intensity war. ironically, a job well done in the former leads to

deterrence and consequently lack of experience of war. nevertheless, even while

accretion of experience may be had along a career span, there is a case for reading

not only to supplement it but more importantly to make sense of it.

the army is already cognizant of this. it has an introductory course to military

studies at the academy stage in the form of a military history capsule. the text for

this requires a definite makeover, not only in content and readability, but also its

presentation. even though the subject is broached in sessions with the dS, rather

than left solely to aeC instructors, serious academic attention is recommended.

the next stage is in the unit, under a watchful 2iC. But given the pace of life these

days, the mentorship system has all but vanished. reading is more eclectic and

less curricular. the Part B and Part d promotion exams are there for enhancing

exposure. But, connotations associated with ‘exams’, do little to nudge officers

into reading. reading is nevertheless a popular pastime, with officers usefully

taking to self-development and management related books. this is all for the

good, indicating that the intent and energy exist and could be usefully capitalized

on. What then needs to be done?

a change over at the Staff Course entrance exam stage from replicating the

pattern of promotion exams in the Military History paper, of a campaign study

and biographies, to a more contextual Military Studies paper may be useful. a

wider mandatory reading can be prepared by the Mt 2, comprising selections

from its Golden Hundred. this could cover the gamut of military studies including

technology, military history, military sociology, strategy and international relations.

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this need not be confined to indian texts or experience. Since an officer is aware of

when he is to come up for the exam, preparation in terms of reading can start even

half a decade earlier. this would get the officer acquainted with the context of his

profession, even while the other papers test the content bit. the exam questions

can be framed in line with that of the net for defence and strategic studies. Past

papers are available at the uGC website for reference.

it is an ill-informed belief that officers at the spear end and tactical level can do

without contextual knowledge and sensitivity. this is a sure fire way to create Colonel

Blimps. this conception has already changed. Great strides have been made such

as placing a plethora of reading on the intranet and Wan, such as notably that of

the Junior Command course. it is important to keep the challenge stern enough for

those rising in their careers to ultimately make their minds receptive to demands at

the operational and strategic levels. While all would of course not be so privileged,

they would be none the worse off since it would better prepare them for exit into

the civilian world.

as part of reading habits, once the initial set is consumed such as the timeless

one by Major KC Praval, the officer is ready for the next higher level. the india

specific set need not be restricted to wars and biographies of military heroes.

While books such as those of LP Sen, John dalvi, dK Palit etc are available in

formation libraries, academic works need to supplement their narration. these

include earlier output of authors such as Sumit Ganguly and the more recent one

by military historian Srinath raghavan on conflicts of the nehruvian era. Works

by academics, such as Kaushik roy and Sundaram, need the encouragement of

purchase, review and mention.

ever since india’s rise, its military has gained academic attention. Works

interpreting india’s rise, such as by Stephen Cohen, S Paul Kapur, Peter Lavoy

etc are useful since these are based on access to india’s strategic community. the

work of Kanwal, Manpreet Sethi and raja Menon helps grapple with military

issues including the exotic nuclear ‘backdrop’. this helps in acquainting the

practitioner with the significance of operational engagements, such as, for

instance, proactive stance preparedness or raisings of mountain divisions. there

being an anachronistic sanction against talking ‘shop’ in messes, it is perversely

taken as infra-dig to discuss such issues. Suffice it to say this can only be tyranny

of insecure seniors.

Care needs to be taken by libraries to tap the higher end book market such as

that of routledge and Sage. the Sixth Pay Commission emoluments surely make

these accessible. numerous defence ‘glossies’ now are in the market with veterans

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and the defence industry driving ideas and selling products. Websites of Service

think tanks, such as this one, keep the officer updated. Web groups of course-mates

enable circulation of material for reference at leisure. a discerning eye needs to be

cultivated so as to not lose time chasing down quality reading. the military profile

of generals such as Petraeus, Panag etc indicates that reading provides ballast to

careers. that should be incentive enough in this competitive world to sometimes

also take a book to bed!

SeCtion i

StrateGiC iSSueS


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Kashmir’s Faultlines

S.K. SINhA ä September 29, 2010

The Asian Age

the Kashmir Valley has been burning for three months. over 100 stone-pelting

youth have got killed. thanks to a governance deficit, both in Srinagar and delhi,

the situation appears out of control.

Zia-ul-Haq islamised Pakistan and this spread to Kashmir. in 1990 there was

ethnic cleansing of over three lakh Kashmiri Pandits and several dozen Hindu

temples were destroyed, but the plight of Kashmiri Pandits was glossed over and

there was a virtual blackout of information about the vandalising of dozens of

temples. in 2007, to appease the People’s democratic Party (PdP), the gov ernment

took the bizarre dec ision of providing money for the families of terrorists killed

in en c ounters with security forces. this does not happen elsewhere in india or

anywhere else in the world.

to appease the national Con ference (nC), the governm e nt is now considering

its demand for au tonomy — the Supreme Court, the election Commission and

the Comptroller and auditor Ge neral would not have any jurisdiction in Kashmir,

there would be an elected governor from the state and no Central services, like

iaS and iPS. the PdP, under the garb of self-rule, wants dual currency and a joint

state legislature with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) in Kashmir. Perhaps then

the “misguided” young boys in terrorist camps in PoK would also be allowed to

return. all this will severly undermine india’s sovereignty in Kashmir.

Pakistan launched repeated conventional wars to grab Kashmir but failed

each time. it also failed to do so through terrorism. Since 2008, religious frenzy

has been aroused and mass upsurges organised on the basis of manufactured

lies. in 2008, a 100-acre of barren land at Baltal, traditionally used as a base camp

for amarnath pilgrims, was diverted to the Shrine Board for `2.2 crore. Since

ownership remained with the state, the board could put up only prefabricated

shelters. this land is unapproachable and uninhabitable for eight months in a

year due to snow and yet a canard was spread that Hindus were being brought

to settle in Baltal and change the demography of the Valley, like israel had done

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in Palestine. a mass movement of gigantic dimensions erupted. to appease the

agitators, the government cancelled the land diversion order and ordered the

virtual disbandment of the Shrine Board. after three months of counter-agitation

in Jammu, status quo ante was restored. in 2009, two women drowned in a river at

Shopian. a mass movement was started on the basis of diabolical concoction of

facts about the women being raped and killed by security personnel. Fraudulent

medical reports were prepared and false witnesses produced. the Valley was

held to ransom for two months. ultimately the Central Bureau of investigation

unravelled the truth.

Having tested the waters in 2008 and 2009, the emotive issue of azadi was

exploited for a mass movement in 2010. the agitation took the “peaceful” form

of stone-pelting. Sympathy was aroused through portraying “young, innocent”

boys being brutally killed by the police. over 2,000 security force personnel have

been injured due to stone-pelting. this is hardly known, nor is the fact that some

1,000 Baluchis have been killed by the Pakistan army in the last one year. the

religious card was used to extend the agitation outside the Valley. Protests were

organised against an american pastor’s threat to burn the Quran, which did not

happen. nowhere else in the Muslim world did violence occur on this score.

the Kashmir problem has been communalised in the state, and by the

organisation of the islamic Conference internationally. Hitherto indian Muslims

outside Kashmir had kept themselves aloof from the issue. But now the Jamiat-

ulema-Hind has announced a convention of 10,000 Muslims of all sects at

deoband on october 4 to express solidarity with Kashmiri Muslims. this can

hold the most dangerous consequences in Muslim majority districts in West

Bengal, Bihar, assam and Kerala.

delhi sent a parliamentary delegation to Kashmir after three months. Some

members called on secessionist leaders who had refused to meet the delegation.

one of them, a former Cabinet minister who had campaigned in the election with

an osama bin Laden lookalike by his side, declared that the ongoing movement

in Kashmir has no Pakistani connection.

the army is being constantly demonised for human rights violations when

its record is far superior to that of the uS army in iraq and afghanistan or the

Pakistan army in Baluchistan and Waziristan. unlike them, we have never used

airstrikes or artillery against militants in Kashmir. the army has been prompt in

action against human rights violators. over the years, 1,514 cases against the army

were reported of which 1,470 were found to be false. action was taken against

70 individuals, dismissing them from service and awarding imprisonment from


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two to 14 years. india has also been humane in dealing with secessionist leaders.

Syed ali Shah Geelani, the veteran secessionist leader, suffering from cancer, was

refused a visa by the uS for medical treatment because of his terrorist connections.

He went to Mumbai where dr Sameer Kaul, a Kashmiri Pandit, operated on him,

treating him with competence. on return to Srinagar, Mr Geelani said india is in

illegal occupation of Kashmir and the international community should impose

economic sanctions against her.

Gen. Musharraf ordered airstrikes in Baluchistan on the hideout of the

veteran leader akbar Bugti, who was killed. in Kashmir, instead of tough action,

periodic troop withdrawals have taken place. now there is talk of amending

or scrapping the armed Forces Special Powers act. this brings to mind what

Winston Churchill said: “an appeaser is one who feeds the crocodile, hoping that

it will eat him last.”

the writ of the state must run in the Valley forthwith and further

communalisation checked. Without curbing the freedom of the press, we should

ensure that the media does not act as the mouthpiece of the secessionists.

the law on sedition must be enforced. among Kashmiri Muslims, not all are

secessionists, but those who are need to be politically isolated from the rest. a

political solution acceptable to all should be evolved through dialogue but this

must be strictly within the framework of the indian Constitution.


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Special Powers for Armed Forces We Need Clarity, not Emotions

LT gEN VIjAy ObEROI (RETD) ä July 11, 2010

The Tribune

the armed Forces (Special Powers) act, 1958, better known as aFSPa, has been

brought out of wraps at various opportune times – opportune for those who have

either something to gain, i.e. the insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir, political

parties always ready to fish in troubled waters, with an eye on electoral gains or

those who are regular establishment-baiters, who have made it a habit to take the

plunge headlong in any controversy with the belief that if it is against an organ of

the government, it needed to be opposed!

Many have called aFSPa a draconian law and have vehemently supported its

repeal, but having read quite a few of their views and watched them pontificating

on tV, i am convinced that most lack even a rudimentary, let alone in-depth

knowledge on the subject. this act has been in force for over five decades because

it was essential for the conduct of smooth counter-insurgency operations by the

army. it will continue to be needed as long as the army is employed on counter-

insurgency/ terrorism tasks.

the act was promulgated on September 11, 1958. the rationale for bringing

the act on the statute book needs to be appreciated. When the army was first

employed on counter-insurgency tasks in nagaland in the 1950s, two aspects

came to the fore immediately. First, unlike in the case of maintenance of law

and order, when the army is called out in ‘aid to the civil authority’, where

time is available to employ the police before committing the army, operations

against insurgents are entirely of a different genre, as the insurgents do not

give any time for such niceties.

the insurgents we are fighting today are heavily armed, they act speedily,

commit heinous crimes and disappear. unless the army counters such actions


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with speed and not wait for orders from higher civil or military authorities,

nothing would be achieved.

Secondly, the soldiers and officers of the army had to be protected from

prosecution for consequential action taken against insurgents in good faith as

part of their operations. Here too, the act does contain the important caveat that

the army personnel can be prosecuted with the Centre’s sanction, if their actions

warrant it. there is, therefore, no blanket immunity from the laws of the land.

over the years, some army personnel have indeed been prosecuted where

a prima facie case existed. However, it is also true that due to the exceptional

care which all army commanders take when their troops are employed against

insurgents, such cases are few and far between. after the initial employment in

nagaland, the employment of the army on counter-insurgency tasks continued

increasing, till it was progressively employed in all the north-eastern states for

such tasks. along with such employment, aFSPa was also invoked in all affected

states.

When insurgency erupted in Srinagar in 1990, the act was extended to the

Valley. Later, as the activities of the insurgents spread, first to the Poonch-rajauri

area, then to doda and Bhadarwah and finally to the whole state, the entire state

was brought under the act’s purview in stages. it can thus be seen that aFSPa

was invoked progressively only when the situation required the deployment of

the army.

the army is designed and structured for fighting external enemies of the nation.

Consequently, they are not given any police powers. However, when the nation

wants the army to conduct counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations,

then they must be given the legal authority to conduct their operations without

the impediment of getting clearances from the higher authorities. if this is not

done, they would be unable to function efficiently and defeat the insurgents and

terrorists at their own game. it is for this reason that the act gives four powers to

army personnel. these are for ‘enter and search’, ‘arrest without warrant’, ‘destroy

arms dumps or other fortifications’ and ‘fire or use force after due warning where

possible’. once again, there is a safeguard in the act, which stipulates that the

arrested person(s) will be handed over speedily to the nearest police station.

the law stipulates that aFSPa can be imposed only after the area in

question is declared a ‘disturbed area’ by the state government concerned.

When this writer was the director-General Military operations (dGMo) and

the army was asked to deploy in the doda-Bhadarwah area, we requested for

the invocation of the act. the state government was reluctant to do so on


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account of political considerations, but we did not commence operations till

the act was invoked.

Clearly, the army has no desire to get embroiled in counter-insurgency tasks.

it is not the army’s job. However, despite over 50 years of insurgency in our

country, the state police as well as the central police forces (CPos) have not been

made capable of tackling insurgency. Consequently, in each case the army was

inducted to carry out counter insurgency/ terrorist operations. if the national

leadership tasks the army for conducting such non-military operations, then

it is incumbent on the leadership to provide the legal wherewithal to all army

personnel employed on such tasks.

it is only then that the operations will be conducted in the usual efficient

manner of the army and would be result-oriented. they also must be legally

protected. it is because these two aspects have been catered for that the army

has been neutralising the insurgents and terrorists, so that normalcy is restored

and the political leaders and officials can restart governing.

Source: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100711/edit.htm#3


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The Wages of the Nuclear Deal

bRAhmA ChELLANEy ä august 15, 2010

Live Mint

The N-deal has turned out to be what the US mandated, not what the Prime

Minister had assured India

the quiet signing of the reprocessing agreement on 30 July has completed the

last remaining bilateral element of the nuclear deal with the uS. the multilateral

elements are not only complete, but also being implemented. For example, india

already has brought 16 of its nuclear facilities under permanent international

inspection—a number scheduled to progressively go up to cover two-thirds

of all indian nuclear installations within four years. in addition, india is set to

shut down, by this year-end, its main military-production workhorse, the CiruS

reactor—the biggest cumulative contributor of weapons-grade plutonium to the

country’s stockpile.

Yet, despite the deal being in force, india continues to battle major technology

controls. China has greater access than india does to uS high technology, and this

is unlikely to change after the ongoing obama administration review of uS export

controls. Because the review is being driven by the barely disguised business goal

to increase uS share of the Chinese market so as to reduce the yawning trade

deficit, the China-india access gap can only widen in Beijing’s favour.

What tangible benefits, strategic or otherwise, has the deal yielded for india?

Let’s face it: the americans were more honest than the indians about the deal.

the final deal has turned out to be in line with what the uS Congress mandated,

not what the indian Parliament had repeatedly been assured by Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh. in fact, the deal conforms fully to the provisions of the 2006

uS Hyde act. the Congressional ratification legislation—the 2008 nuclear

Cooperation approval and non-Proliferation enhancement act (nCanea)—

actually tightened some of the Hyde act provisions. the indian side had publicly


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claimed that the Hyde act would not determine the final deal, with some in

authority even seeking to creatively differentiate between “operative” and “non-

binding” parts of that act. it had further been claimed that the 123 agreement,

once ratified, would become the “last expression of the sovereign will” and override

all other laws including national laws. these too-clever-by-half arguments have

fallen flat on their face. nothing can be more embarrassing to the indian side than

the fact that the bilateral accords it negotiated and signed—the 123 agreement

and the reprocessing pact—match up to uS congressional stipulations.

Worse still, the accords have been made subservient to uS law. take the 123

agreement, which neither contains the international-law principle (found in the

uS-China accord) that neither party will invoke its internal law as justification

for a failure to honour the accord, nor provides (found in the uS-Japan or uS-

South Korea accord) for an arbitral tribunal to settle any dispute. as the nCanea

makes explicit, “nothing in the (123) agreement shall be construed to supersede

the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde act”. as a result, the final deal ends

up giving the uS specific rights—enforceable through the pain of unilateral

suspension or termination of cooperation—while saddling india with obligations.

the nCanea actually records that the promise of uninterrupted fuel supply is a

“political”, not legal, commitment. it cannot be anything else because the 123

agreement itself confers an open-ended right on the uS to suspend fuel supplies

straight away while issuing a one-year termination notice. in fact, as a corollary

to that right, the uS has retained the prerogative in the reprocessing accord to

unilaterally suspend its reprocessing consent to india.

What stands out about the final deal are the four “nos” for india: no binding

fuel-supply guarantee to avert a tarapur-style fuel cut-off; no irrevocable

reprocessing consent; no right to withdraw from its obligations; and no right

to conduct a nuclear test ever again. the no-test obligation constitutes the first

instance in the nuclear age where one nuclear-weapons power has used a civilian

cooperation deal to impose such a prohibition on another nuclear-weapons state.

the CiruS’ impending dismantlement is another weapons-related obligation

thrust on india.

no country in history has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent or

paid heavier international costs for its nuclear programme than india. despite

asia’s oldest nuclear programme, india now has the world’s smallest nuclear

arsenal— smaller than even Pakistan’s. More significant is that india still does

not have a single Beijing-reachable nuclear missile in its inventory or production

line. it is against that background that the nuclear deal marks a turning point.


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the lasting legacy of this deal, in which the indian government invested

considerable time and diplomatic resources, will be to ensure that india stays

enmeshed in its struggle to build regionally confined nuclear-weapons capability

while becoming more reliant than ever on conventional arms imports to meet

its basic defence needs. if ever there was hope of india becoming a full-fledged

nuclear-weapons state such as China, that prospect has passed.

a closer relationship with the uS is in india’s own interest. But it could have

been built without a deal that carries serious, long-term costs. indeed, such are

the wages of the deal that india has refrained from speaking up on regional-

security issues that directly impinge on its interests, including the continuing

transfer of offensive uS weapon systems to Pakistan, now the largest recipient of

the uS economic and military aid in the world. islamabad, in fact, has managed

to cut its own deal to buy two China-origin reactors without the burden of

conditions cast on india.

Source: http://www.livemint.com/2010/08/15215312/the-wages-of-the-nuclear-deal.html


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Maoist Threat, Deploy Babus, not Army

bhARAT VERmA ä editor

Indian Defence Review

The Big PictureConfronted with the Maoist menace, Civil Administration’s incompetence is

making mountain out of a molehill by suggesting induction of the military.

the threat posed by the Maoists to the union cannot be compared to the LoC

in Kashmir or the northeast. on borders, there is direct support of the external

players. Both, in terms of creeping invasion by islamic fundamentalists that

results in demographic changes, as well as, to infiltrate fundamentalists to

equip and train the local sympathizers to subvert the Civil administration.

Couple this with the military threat posed by China and Pakistan directly. if

the military dilutes its vigil on the volatile borders, union of india will soon

lose major chunks of its territory. this constitutes the primary role of the

army.

the clamor by many to bring in the army and the air Force to resolve the

Maoist threat ignores the key question: is the threat posed gigantic enough to

warrant deployment of the army? or is the Civil administration creating mountain

out of the molehill because its level of incompetence is now beyond redemption?

the schedule and the resources required to host the Commonwealth Games

by india were well considered at the time of bidding for the games. With barely

60 days left, we are not prepared. there was no threat posed by the Maoists,

the northeast insurgents or the terrorists to disrupt the preparations. Yet the

Civil administration flounders despite a well-defined objective and demands

induction of 300 military personnel.

the same incompetence is visible in other aspects of the civil

administration. Millions of ton of wheat procured at the taxpayer’s expense

for distribution to the poor segment of society was allowed to rot in the rains.


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a state within the union creates ‘counter insurgency’ school for the police

without basic facilities like firing range and skilled officers to train personnel.

two courses pass out and declared ready to take on the Maoists! if the CrPF or

the state police personnel remain unskilled, untrained and underequipped,

and led by ‘incompetence’, causalities are bound to be high. there are no bad

units, only bad officers!

the security threat posed by the Maoists to the union is relatively small

compared to the externally supported insurgency and terrorism faced by

the army in Kashmir and the northeast. the known external support to the

Maoists is very little, possibly because their activity is centered in the interior

of india. they are more of a rag tag bunch that largely fight with weapons

looted from the police armory, or are country manufactured. due to Civil

administration’s abdication of authority, they successfully manage to loot

police stations for weapons, attack jails and free inmates and run armament

factories. these concessions conceded under duress amounts to dereliction

of duty by the Civil administration. in the military such negligence will invite

immediate court martial.

the Maoist threat rated as ‘biggest’ to the union is not because the Maoists

are better armed and financed than the Jihad Factory on our borders but due to

the threat posed from within that disrupts the growth of the nation. a family or

a nation that lacks harmony within is incapable of handling external threats. in

somewhat similar circumstances, the Chinese conquered tibet and the Maoists

are poised to capture nepal. With the american led Western Forces slated to

withdraw from afghanistan in July 2011, defence of india’s borders will demand

extra military muscle. nevertheless, india’s potential to outmaneuver both

its adversaries is immense, provided the Civil administration learns to govern

efficiently.

in the first place, if the Civil administration which implies the ‘executive”

was moderately competent, delivered justice, was responsive and enforced ‘rule

of law,’ and did not allow the gradual slip of territories in to the hands of the

miscreants, the problem would not have arisen. the state true to the prevalent

culture of ‘logic of convenience’ abdicated its responsibility by distributing arms

to the locals to fend themselves in the garb of ‘Salwa Judum’. the common man,

out of fear is forced to support the Maoists, in absence of protection from the

legitimate local administration. the Maoists are made to look very tall due to the

ineptitude and callousness of the administration. the poor generalship in 1962

by the military and the political leadership made the Chinese look very tall. the


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historical truism is that the Chinese have never won a war.

the second key question: in the near future, in addition, will we ask the

indian army to take over the running of Municipality, Commonwealth Games,

health services, policing, or Kerala that is emerging as a terrorist hub, besides

tackling the Maoists who almost control forty percent of the union’s territory? or

do we take strong corrective measures to set right the Civil administration, which

is practically falling apart?

our adversaries are aware that the union of india is as strong or as weak as

its army. they will be delighted to see the indian army diverted from its primary

external role to resolve the internal strife. Such diversion will help the forty-two

terrorist training camps running in PoK to shift to Srinagar! in any case, army with

huge shortage of officers is already in an overstretch and any further deployment

against Maoists will result in an extraordinary strain.

two beefed up army divisions with integral air element is adequate to

dismantle the Maoist infrastructure within one year. the civil administration

projects it at seven years. this seven-time magnification is approximately the

level of incompetence acquired since independence.

the third key question: after the army brings the situation under control- what

next? once the army in a short time manages to restore the adverse situation, will

the Civil administration take over its responsibility to renew its writ and relieve

the army for the more urgent primary role? the idea behind the induction of the

indian army in the northeast and J&K was again to restore the adverse situation

and thereby create conducive environment for the political process to start.

this was an enabler, but the Civil administration spurned the gains. the Civil

administration in Kashmir, and not the army should carry out ‘Sadbhawana’

movement. the indian army initially met many reverses, but persevered, and

finally got on to ‘top-of–the-situation’. However, the Civil administration till

date fails to take charge. the end result is that the indian army finds itself in a

quagmire. it is mired in a role that is not primary to it.

this is one of the many reasons as to why the army should not get deployed

to resolve the Maoist problem spread over forty percent of the land within. in

such an eventuality the Civil administration will never ever gear up to make itself

competent, accountable and responsible for its primary task. the only reason

that would justify army’s deployment is a scenario wherein the Maoist threaten to

territorially split india from inside. Panic buttons are being pressed unnecessarily,

due to a magnified illusion created out of sheer ineptitude. Luckily, time favors

the Civil administration to acquire and hone the essential skills to resolve the


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problem, since the menace largely has internal dimensions.

the final question: How to resolve or minimize the internal security threat to

avoid a divided house while confronting the two front external threats?

The Blueprintthe lopsided indian pacifism may be good for an individual’s soul but has proved

to be suicidal for the nation’s security. the wobbly Civil administration for

decades is on the withdrawal mode with its influence shrinking on the external

periphery as well as within. they leave their posts in the interiors and hide

behind fortifications preferably in the state capitals or in new delhi. the Maoists

or similar forces occupy the vacuum.

to overcome the ‘withdrawal’ culture of the state, there is the need to

inject offensive orientation in the otherwise pacifist approach of the Civil

administration and the political class. this requires import of military thinking

and skills to create the necessary administrative ability to positively influence

and dominate the ground. notwithstanding the bureaucracy’s apathy towards

the armed forces, because of the burden of pacifism, such skills can only come

from the military.

First, to reclaim the situation in favor of the state, the army should make the

Maoist affected districts as the area of annual training at divisional level. two

division level exercise conducted for forty-five days each in turns, for a period of

one year continuously, will make an enormous difference.

the army by its sheer presence will facilitate the Civil administration in

restoring the union of india’s writ in the affected areas. incase the military is

fired upon, it will fire back to defend its assets and carry on with conduct of the

exercise, without getting involved in the nitty-gritty of local administration. it

may be underscored that between ‘existence of state’ and anarchy, military is the

decisive instrument. Military power, therefore, needs to be employed intelligently

and must be given a free hand to ruthlessly restore the writ of the state.

Military wherever deployed, keeps its eyes and ears glued to the ground to

gather local intelligence for its own security. this intelligence can be shared with

the Civil administration to counter the Maoists. army can very well dismantle the

Maoist bases located inside the thick forest by its sheer presence while conducting

military exercise.

Large-scale army exercises are hugely beneficial to the local economy.

Moreover, it instills confidence in the local people and the administration.

From this very core where military exercises will be conducted, the Para-


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military, the police, the district magistrate etc. can begin to restore the writ of the

union. the Civil administration should expand outwards in the interior of the

districts on the ‘hub and spoke’ principle.

Second, to simultaneously leverage the impact of the army presence, the Civil

administration should handpick a team of officers known for their integrity and

the ability, to be inducted in the affected areas. the truth is that the army can

only create an environment conducive to civil governance. if the bureaucracy

cannot supervise, insurgency will reappear.

third, militarization of the indian mind, particularly in the Civil

administration to restore a balance between extreme form of pacifism

and action is essential. BSF was raised by military officers initially and did

well. the assam rifles (Para-military) officered by army is effective in the

northeast. it is the operational wing of the nSG, on direct deputation and

officered by the army that delivered in Mumbai 26/11. therefore, the need

to propagate military skills in the civil is essential. this will equip the Civil

administration to deal with the internal armed threats as also govern with

efficiency. Whenever the civil set up choose to be militarized, it succeeded

in neutralizing the threat—KPS Gill during insurgency in Punjab and the

Greyhound Commandos of andhra Police delivered.

the lateral induction of military personnel into the Civil administration

will benefit on multiple counts. First, it will keep the military young which is an

operational necessity. Second, it will bring military skills and ethos in the iaS, iFS

and Police and Para-military. the turf wars to keep the military authorities at bay

by the civil setup must stop, if they desire to ensure that the writ of the union runs

throughout the nation. Putting a retired Major General in the advisory board of

the unified Command to tackle the Maoists is being neither here nor there! the

soldiers’ color service in the army should be reduced to ten years from seventeen

and he should be inducted subsequently into the Para military and the police.

this would keep the army young and beef up the skills in the civil.

the police and the Para-military should get at least hundred new recruits

from each state trained every year for the next five years at the nearest army

regimental training Centre along with the army recruits. Similarly, at least a

hundred police, Para-military and iPS officers should be trained with the officer

Cadets in the officer training academy every year. this manpower should form

the nucleus of the armed Police Constabulary, both in the states and the centre in

future. in the short term, a Lt General, seconded to the Home Ministry from the

army, should head the CrPF. He must be allowed the freedom to induct retired


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military officers and soldiers on attractive terms of service to make the CrPF

fighting fit on ‘war footing.’ in pacifist india, unfortunately, decision-making

on ‘war footing’ translates in to forming a committee – an endless endeavor,

followed by a GoM! We need to learn the art of ‘flat decision-making’ to face the

internal and the external challenges. Quick, bold, fair and accurate decision-

making is vital for the good health of the state. the biggest threat to india today

is by the indians and not by the Chinese or the Pakistanis. Just, efficient and firm

administration is the foremost necessity. otherwise, india may soon become a

replica of the failed state, Pakistan.

Source: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/07/blueprint-to-tackle-the-maoists-2.html


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Indian Industry at Landmark Defence Tender

AjAI ShUKLA ä august 9, 2010

Business Standard

india’s defence industry is poised at a landmark. on august 25, four indian

companies — three private and one public — will submit bids in the defence

ministry’s first-ever ‘indian industry only’ competition to develop a high-tech

weapon system for the defence forces. the four companies — tata Motors; the

Mahindra Group, L&t and the Ministry of defence (Mod)-owned ordnance

Factory Board (oFB) — are competing to design and build 2,600 new-generation

Future infantry Combat Vehicles (FiCVs) to replace the indian army’s aging fleet

of russian-designed BMP-iis.

in an american-style showdown, two of these vendors will be nominated to

develop a prototype each and the winning design selected for the FiCV. While

the cost of developing and manufacturing 2,600 FiCVs can only be roughly

estimated, senior executives from two of the competing companies say that

the bill could add up to rs 50,000 crore. this will make it india’s most expensive

defence contract so far. infantry Combat Vehicles (iCVs) are lightly armoured,

highly mobile, tracked vehicles that look like small tanks. travelling deep into

enemy territory alongside tank columns, each iCV carries 7-8 infantry soldiers.

these jawans, once dismounted, physically occupy and defend captured

territory until the slower-moving infantry divisions can catch up with the strike

formations. Mod will fund 80 per cent of the cost of developing the FiCV, while

the selected contractor will pay the rest 20 per cent. it has been mandated that the

FiCV must have an indigenous content of at least 50 per cent. With a development

time of 7-8 years, the FiCV should be ready by 2018. this indigenous development

of an FiCV has been enabled by the defence Procurement Procedure of 2008

(dPP-2008), which lays down a “Make” procedure for developing “high-tech,

complex systems” through indian industry. Following this procedure, Mod

surveyed private and public industry to zero in on potential contractors. the


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four companies identified were then issued with an expression of interest (eoi),

which listed out the capabilities that the army expected from the FiCV.

Sources familiar with the eoi say that the FiCV will be operated by three

crewmembers, and carry seven additional soldiers with combat loads; it must

provide protection from bullets fired by 14.5-millimetre calibre weapons; it must

be amphibious, i.e. capable of floating in water; it must be air-transportable, which

would imply a maximum weight of 18-20 tonnes; and it must have a cannon and

be capable of firing anti-tank missiles. in their responses to the eoi on august 25,

each of the four competitors will detail their proposal for developing the FiCV, the

key project milestones, the estimated capital expenditure, the technology they

will include and how that will be developed or purchased, and the minimum

order that they would need to set up a financially viable production line. those

responses will be evaluated by the Mod’s integrated Project Management

team, which will select two contractors. over a fixed number of years, the two

contractors will develop their respective FiCV prototypes.

the indian army will select the better of the two by carrying out field trials.

But this is not a winner-takes-all competition. Since the Mod wants to retain two

production lines, the winner will be given 65-70 per cent of the order, the runner-

up will build 30-35 per cent of the army’s requirement of FiCVs, provided that the

company agrees to build the winning design at the same cost as the winner. With

two assembly lines operating, india’s private defence players expect that the FiCV

contract will create an ecosystem of suppliers extending far beyond the winner of

the contract. Brig Khutab Hai, who heads the Mahindra Group’s defence business,

says: “the FiCV project will be a huge boost to the indian defence industry in

r&d, manufacture, and in developing tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers from the small

and medium sector industries.”

this attempt by the Mod to harness private contractors is backstopped by the

public sector: the defence r&d organisation believes that it will be approached

for key technologies; and the ordnance Factory Board, which manufactures

the BMP-ii at Medak, in andhra Pradesh, for production assistance. at least

two of the private contractors believe that it would be wasteful to set up a new

production line. Says a senior executive in one of the contending companies:

“ordnance Factory, Medak, is a national asset and it would be lying idle at that

time. We could build the FiCV at Medak — on a government-owned-company-

operated basis — instead of setting up a brand new facility.”

Source: http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/indian-industry-at-landmark-defence-

tender/403994/


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India Successfully Tests Missile Intercept Capability

OLIVER bLOOm ä July 26, 2010

Center for Strategic and international Studies

even as domestic and international

controversy rages on u.S. missile defense

plans and its aims, we should not forget that

the united States is hardly alone in pursuing

the development of national missile defense.

Kyodo news international reported today

that india test-fired on Monday a ballistic

interceptor missile off the orissa coast and

it successfully destroyed a ballistic missile,

officials said.

According to the news report,

The interceptor was fired from Wheeler Island

in eastern India and destroyed a modified

Prithvi-II surface-to-surface missile fired from

Chandipur in the same state.

The interceptor missile hit the target missile at

an altitude of 15 kilometers, the Press Trust of

India news agency said, quoting S.P. Dash, head of the Integrated Test Range off

Orissa coast.

India plans to deploy a missile defense shield by 2012 after the completion of a

series of trials, according to the organization.

this successful test follows an unsuccessful missile intercept back in

March, when, following the test firing of a Prithvi ii surface-to-surface

target missile, the interceptor failed to launch due to technical problems.


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india has, however, conducted three successful missile defense tests since

2006.

india has plans for a two-staged missile defense system to be deployed by

2012; as Xinhua news explained in March,

In the first stage, the anti-missile system could be used to intercept the incoming

ballistic missiles within the range of 2,000 km, while the second stage’s missiles

could intercept the ballistic missiles of more than 2,000 km.

Within phase one of the planned aBM systems,

[T]here will be two layers of interceptions by the anti-missile system. The

upper layer of interception will be carried out over 50 km from the ground

by Indian Prithvi Air Defense missile, and the lower interception will be

conducted at the height of 30 km above the earth by the Advanced Air Defense

[AAD] system.

the recent successful test was of the aad system. the second phase of

the planned aBM system will be able to intercept intermediate-range and

intercontinental ballistic missiles (irBMs & iCBMs). the high speed missiles are

aimed to intercept missiles with ranges of over 5,000 km.

india’s missile defense plans are indicative of the two strategic threats that

dominate india’s thinking: Pakistan and China. in the short term, india remains

more concerned with the missile threat posed by Pakistan, and therefore, has

devoted the first phase of its program to that threat. From india’s historical

record on missile defense, the importance of Pakistan looms large. Following the

Pakistani purchase of M-11 missiles from China in 1995, india purchased S-300

missile defense systems from russia, which are effective against aircraft, cruise

missiles and shorter-range ballistic missiles. Following the 1999 Kargil War, india

began initial development of its aBM system (phase one), that included the

Pad and aad systems, with the former providing an exo-atmospheric intercept

capability, and the latter providing a second layer of endo-atmospheric intercept

potential. recent tensions have only pushed development of the phase one

system even further. as india’s strategic focus has expanded, however, it has

increasingly come to see China as a greater long-term rival than Pakistan. and

thus, its future aBM plans deal far more with Chinese capabilities than Pakistani

capabilities. For example, China’s 2007 anti-satellite test prompted indian air

Chief Marshal P V naik to note that


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[Indian] satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our

neighborhood possesses one.

india has embraced the development of a comprehensive missile and

satellite defense system that clearly has China more than Pakistan in mind. as

the times of india explains, the indian defense Ministry’s May 2010 “technology

Perspective and Capability roadmap” argues

India has no option but to get ready for “star wars” in the future, with countries like

China working overtime to develop advanced ASAT (anti-satellite) capabilities

with “direct-ascent” missiles, hit-to-kill “kinetic” and directed-energy laser

weapons.

the Space review succinctly elaborated on present circumstances,

The Indians see China as their main competitor and nation of concern (regarding

space capabilities) in the region…. The Indians may have decided that they

should be able to cover all contingencies for future conflicts. The Pakistanis are

already well within range of Indian ballistic missiles, and by developing this

long-range missile capability, the Indians will be able to counter China as well.

They can point to the 2007 Chinese ASAT test as an example of the pressing need

for reciprocal capability…. And since China reportedly held its own hit-to-kill

missile defense test in January 2010, this just adds more justification to those

who feel that India must have a missile defense system in order to keep up with

regional capabilities.

Phase two of india’s aBM plans are also indicative of their long-term strategic

thinking. the second phase of the missile defense system will be of similar nature

to the u.S. terminal High altitude area defense (tHaad) missiles. india today

reported on the phase two plans and noted

defence analysts feel that Phase 2 of the missile defence shield is almost certainly

meant to defend India from China’s arsenal of ICBMs. China is the only Asian country

which has an ICBM arsenal, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

developing a Phase 2 intercept program is a far more daunting task that

Phase 1. as india today explained


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Phase 2 was far more challenging because it calls for detecting ICBMs hurtling at

twice the speeds of intermediate range missiles. It not only requires bigger interceptor

missiles flying at hypersonic speeds of between six and seven times the speed of sound

(present interceptor speeds are between Mach 4 and Mach 5) but also radars to detect

incoming ICBMs at ranges of over 1500 kms as opposed to the current detection

ranges of over 600 km.

regardless of the specific concerns that have prompted india to pursue

its various aBM plans, the implications for strategic stability are quite

worrisome. in the face of improved indian aBM capabilities, Pakistan and

China will each have incentives to either expand their offensive forces (to

overwhelm the fledgling indian system) or to develop costly missile intercept

systems of their own (in both cases, similar to the dilemma faced by the

russians after the u.S. announcement of Sdi back in the 1980s). not only

could an arms race in asia be incredibly destabilizing, but presumably no

one wants a country like Pakistan, with questionable nuclear security, to

begin expanding its arsenal. and while we shouldn’t expand this hypothetical

too far beyond its initial parameters, the ripple effects from a Southeast

asian arms race would easily extend beyond the continent, as other nuclear

powers, especially the united States, see the expansion of Chinese nuclear

and/or defense capabilities as a threat and begin a push to modernize and/

or expand their own capabilities.

Here we can see that india’s missile defense plans may then be more

destabilizing than any plans the united States has. assuming american missile

defense systems remain primarily geared towards confronting the threats

posed by regional missile threats and rogue ballistic missile threats, China and

russia should have less reason to engage in a costly arms race (though whether

they subscribe to this belief is unclear). in the case of india, however, the

systems are clearly directed not towards rogue actors, but towards two strategic

competitors, both of whom are unlikely to stand idly by as india improves its

capabilities. thus, a dangerous strategic competition between nuclear-armed

great powers seems more likely. it may be easier for the united States to make

a case about the defensive utility of a system designed against rogue states

than a capability clearly geared towards strategic competitors. Ballistic missile

intercept capability is ultimately a situational capability whose defensive or

offensive nature is determined by the parties involved, not inherent in its own

nature.


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Ghazala Yasmin wrote for institute of Strategic Studies islamabad and

explained

An Indian BMD system – whatever its shape and size, whatever its operational

shortcomings – will have a major political and psychological impact on both

Pakistan and China. Both Pakistan and China would respond to an Indian BMD by

bringing quantitative and qualitative changes in their nuclear forces, deployment

postures, and perhaps go for missile defences of their own. India would in turn

be affected by a buildup of offensive weapons and technologies by Pakistan and

China, and would have to enhance its own capabilities in response. This action-

reaction spiral is likely to give rise to a regional arms race.

not only would China and Pakistan be worried by indian developments, but

india itself may be inclined to take more provocative measures should it feel that

it possesses a viable defensive system. in particular, india may be more inclined

to make provocative moves vis-à-vis Pakistan (respond to another terrorist attack

like Mumbai militarily, or to make a preemptive move on Kashmir, for example),

actions that could easily exacerbate instability and degenerate into armed

conflict, with the specter of a nuclear exchange always looming above.

in fact, in an attempt to improve its security, india may in fact be doing the

opposite. as the Space review worryingly noted

India’s ASAT plans are worrisome because in the Indians’ anxiety to keep up with

China, they may unexpectedly create the exact thing that they are trying to avoid:

a conflict in or about space. If their statements are misunderstood or if they ratchet

up the rhetoric, they may thrust India into the position of having to hope that its

missile defense interceptors do, indeed, serve as able ASATs.

india clearly has no intensions of fostering instability in Southeast asia or

sparking costly arms races, but in its attempts to reduce its vulnerability vis-à-

vis China and Pakistan, it may very well do both. india should carefully heed the

strategic writings from the Cold War that illustrated how potentially destabilizing

missile intercept systems can be, and instead, look to defuse any arms race through

arms control, rather than accelerate it through missile defense development and

deployment.

Source: http://csis.org/blog/india-successfully-tests-missile-intercept-capability


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Light Combat Helicopter

LT gEN (RETD) bS pAWAR, pVSm, AVSm

the first flight of the

indigenous Light Combat

Helicopter (LCH) took

place at the Hindustan

aeronautics Ltd (HaL)

complex in Bangalore on 29

March 2010. though an year

behind schedule and facing

criticism for having gone

several hundred kilograms

over its stated weight of 2.5

tons, the maiden flight was a landmark achievement, specially so when the indian

air Force (iaF) and indian army are currently looking for the replacement of their

present fleet of Mi-24 attack helicopters. these helicopters, though refurbished for

night operations, are vintage compared to the present family of attack helicopters

in the world.

a frared predator in the modern battle field, the attack helicopter is a key

weapon system with any army. it involves the most complex aeronautical, stealth,

senor and weapons technologies. the LCH aims to gatecrash an exclusive club of

state-of-the-art light attack helicopters, which includes eurocopter’s tiger, Bell aH-

iZ Super Cobra and China ultra secret Zhisheng 10 (Z-10). the LCH is a derivative

of the advance light helicopter (aLH) and the weaponried aLH. the concept is

good and similar to the one adopted by denel aviation of South africa in the early

nineties, wherein, the rooivalk attack helicopter was basically derived from the

Super Puma. the LCH utilizes the dynamic components of the aLH in terms of

gearboxes, the main and tail rotors and most importantly, the engine used is the

more powerful Shakti engine, which is fitted in the latest version of the aLH, duly

tested in high altitudes. the state-of-art-the-art glass cockpit would be a feather

Light Combat Helicopter during

its maiden flight at Bangalore


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in the cap for the LCH. the mission computer is likely to be developed in house,

as was done for the light combat aircraft (LCa)for the iaF. a major change has

been made to the fuselage, wherein the standard attack helicopter configuration

of tandem seats for the pilot and weapon system operator has been adopted. the

critical system are duplicated and protected. the LCH will have stealth features

and crashworthy landing rear for better survivability. Lessons learnt from the aLH

design, including maintainability have incorporated.

the above approach has an inherent advantage as most of the critical

systems, including weapon and associated systems would have been proved on

the weaponised aLH. the major share of testing required will be for performance

and stability , both with and without armament. With the experience of weapon

integration on the aLH the weapon integration on armament package for the LCH

is lethal. it includes a 20 mm turret mounted cannon, unguided 70 mm rockets,

air-to-air missiles and the anti-tank guided missile (Helina), the helicopter version

of the nag atGM. Which is being develop indigenously with a range of 7 km.

However, the excess weight is a major cause of concern, notwithstanding the

assurance of the HaL to reduce the same. there is no doubt that the heavy amour

needed for protection against enemy fire, conflicts with the need for a light, highly

mobile helicopter, that can twist and dodge and hover stationary, the LCH is

required to operate at high altitudes, where the excess weight will adversely affect its

performance in terms of pay load carriage (weapons and ammunition). Presently, it

is 580 kg mere then the required empty weight of 2.5 tons. HaL has emphasized that

the excessive weight will be reduced to a large extent in the subsequent technology

demonstrators. this is a serious issue, which the HaL will have to address urgently.

an indigenous attack helicopter is a step in the right direction as it can be

factored to suit the terrain and climatic conditions of our area of operations,

whereas an imported attack helicopter would have a lot of limitations and it may

not possible to carry out major modifications due to the small numbers involved.

Further, most of the key technologies involved in the design of LCH have already

been proven in the aLH and the armed aHL currently under evaluation.

the LCH should compare well with the eurocopters tiger, augusta’s Mangusta

and the Bell aH-1Z Super Cobra, as it is approximately in the same weight class. if the

development programme is not delayed and runs as per schedule the LCH should

enter service by 2015-2016. the induction of this attack helicopter will certainly

enhance our comet potential and be a force multiplier. For the interim period the

plan is to import two squadrons worth of state-of-the-art modern attack helicopters.

accordingly, a fresh request for proposal (rFP) has been issued as the one issued


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earlier was cancelled by the defence ministry due to technical reasons. this is likely to include all the leading attack helicopter manufacturers like Boeing (apache Longbow), Bell aH iZ (Super Cobra), augusta Westland (Mangusta), eurocopter (tiger) and russian Kamov (Ka-50) and Mil (Mi-28).

LCH Specificationsl Crew 2l Length 15.5ml Height 4.7m (15 ft 4 in)l empty weight 2550kgl Loaded weight 4000kgl useful load 2950 kg (6503 ib)l Max takeoff weight 5,500kgl Powerplant 2xHaL/turbomeca Shakti turboshaft, 900kW (1200 hp) each

Performancel Maximum speed 275 km/h (148knots,171 mph0l Cruise speed 260 km/h (140knots,161 mph)l range 700km (297nm, 342mi)l Service ceiling 6400 m (21,300 ft)l rate of climb 12m/s (2362 ft/min)

Armamentl Guns M62 20 mm cannon on nexter t turentl rockers unguided rockets l Missiles MBda air-to-air missiles air-to-surface missiles anti-radiation missiles Helina atGMl Bombs iron bombs Cluster bomb units Grande launcher

Source: Indian Military Review, Volume 1, number. 5, 2010, idYB Group

Additional Reading l War or peace on the indus? by John Briscoe

Source: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=623&u_id=132

l rethinking our Mine Warfare Policy by dhruv Katoch, CLaWS Website

SeCtion ii

CHina WatCH


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Cent



cLAWs


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The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

PLa is the unified military organization of all land,

sea, strategic missile and air forces of the People’s

republic of China. the PLa was established on

august 1, 1927 — celebrated annually as “PLa

day” — as the military arm of the Communist

Party of China (CCP). the People’s Liberation

army’s insignia consists of a roundel with a

red star bearing the Chinese characters for

“eight one” referring to august 1, the date of

the 1927 nanchang uprising. the PLa is the world’s largest military force, with

approximately 3 million members and has the world’s largest (active) standing

army, with approximately 2.25 million members. the PLa comprises five main

service branches consisting of the PLa Ground Force, PLa navy (PLan), PLa air

Force (PLaaF), Second artillery Corps (strategic nuclear or missile force), and the

PLa reserve Force.

the PLa is formally under the command of the Central Military Commission

of the CCP. the Ministry of national defense, which operates under the State

Council, does not exercise any authority over the PLa and is far less powerful

than the Central Military Commission (CMC). the ministry assures continuing

CCP control over the armed forces, and its primary role is that of a liaison office

with foreign militaries. troops around the country are stationed in seven military

regions and more than 20 military districts.

Chairman Hu Jintao has defined the missions of the PLa as:-l Consolidate the ruling status of the Communist Party l Help ensure China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in

order to continue national development. l Safeguard China’s expanding national interests l Help maintain world peace


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the PLa General Headquarters are composed of the following departments:l General Staff department (GSd) l General Political department (GPd) l General Logistics department (GLd) l General armaments department (Gad) (sometimes translated as General

equipment department).

the People’s Liberation army uses a system of military regions. the military

regions (Mr) are divided into military districts, usually contiguous with provinces,

and military sub-districts. Mr handle day-to-day peacetime management of the

PLa. in time of war, a WarZone operational Command is setup to take control

of all aspects of the military operation in that area. each Mr is commanded

by a Lieutenant General, though some are commanded by full Generals. Mr

commanders (Siling Yuan ) are assisted by several deputy commanders (Fu Siling

Yuan), including the regional air force commander and naval commander, if

naval forces are present within the Mr; a political commissar ( Zhengzhi Weiyuan

or Zhengwei ); and a number of deputy political commissars (Fu Zhengwei).

the Mr are:l Shenyang Military region l Beijing Military region l Lanzhou Military region l Jinan Military region l nanjing Military region l Guangzhou Military region l Chengdu Military region


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PLA Order of Battlebeijing military Region

27th group Army 38th group Army 65th group Army

80th infantry Brigade 82nd infantry Brigade 188th Mechanised Brigade 235th Mechanised Brigade armoured Brigade artillery Brigade aaa Brigade engineer regiment Signal regiment

112th Mechanised division 113th Mechanised division 6th armoured division artillery Brigade air defence Brigade 8th Helicopter regiment Special operations Group 4th engineer regiment Chemical defence regiment Signal regiment electronic Warfare regiment

80th infantry Brigade 82nd infantry Brigade 188th infantry Brigade 235th infantry Brigade armoured Brigade artillery Brigade aaa Brigade engineer regiment Signal regiment

Shenyang military Region

16th Group army 39th Group army 40th Group army

46th infantry division 69th infantry division 4th armoured division 48th infantry Brigade 68th infantry Brigade artillery Brigade aaa Brigade Signal regiment engineer regiment

115th infantry division 116th Mechanised division 3rd armoured division 190th Mechanised Brigade artillery Brigade air defence Brigade 9th Helicopter regiment Special operations Group engineer regiment Chemical defence regiment Signal regiment electronic Warfare regiment

118th infantry Brigade 119th infantry Brigade 191st infantry Brigade armoured Brigade artillery Brigade aaa Brigade engineer regiment Signal regiment

Lanzhou military Region

21st group Army 47th group Army Xinjiang military District

61st infantry division 12th armoured division 19th artillery Brigade aaa Brigade Special operations Group Signal regiment electronic Warfare regiment engineer regiment Chemical defence regiment Pontoon Bridge regiment

55th infantry Brigade 56th infantry Brigade 139th Mechanised Brigade armoured Brigade artillery Brigade aaa Brigade Signal regiment engineer regiment

4th infantry division 6th infantry division 8th infantry division 11th infantry division 1st independent regiment 2nd independent regiment 2nd artillery Brigade aaa Brigade 3rd Helicopter regiment 9th engineer regiment nanjiang Military district

jinan military Region

20th group Army 26th group Army 54th group Army

58th Mechanised Brigade 60th infantry Brigade armoured Brigade artillery Brigade aaa Brigade engineer regiment Signal regiment 91st Pontoon Bridge regiment

8th armoured division 77th infantry Brigade 138th infantry Brigade 199th infantry Brigade 8th artillery Brigade air defence Brigade 7th Helicopter regiment Signal regiment electronic Warfare regiment Special operations Group Chemical defence regiment

127th Mechanised division 162nd infantry division 11th armoured division artillery Brigade air defence Brigade 1st Helicopter regiment Signal regiment


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Nanjing military Region

1st group Army 12th group Army 31st group Army

1st Mechanised division 10th armoured division 3rd infantry Brigade artillery Brigade air defence Brigade Signal regiment engineer regiment Chemical defence regiment

2nd armoured division 34th infantry Brigade 36th infantry Brigade 179th infantry Brigade artillery Brigade aaa Brigade engineer regiment Chemical defence regiment Pontoon Bridge regiment

86th infantry division 91st infantry division 92nd infantry Brigade armoured Brigade artillery Brigade air defence Brigade Signal regiment Pontoon Bridge regiment

guangzhou military Region

41st group Army 42nd group Army

121st infantry division 123rd Mechanised division armoured Brigade artillery Brigade air defence Brigade Signal regiment engineer regiment Pontoon Bridge regiment

124th Mechanised division 163rd infantry division 9th armoured Brigade 1st artillery division air defence Brigade 6th Helicopter regiment Special operations Group Signal regiment electronic Warfare regiment engineer regiment Chemical defence regiment

Chengdu military Region

13th group Army 14th group Army Tibet military District

37th infantry division 149th infantry division armoured Brigade artillery Brigade air defence Brigade 2nd Helicopter regiment Special operations Group engineer regiment Signal regiment electronic Warfare regiment

31st infantry division 40th infantry division armoured Brigade artillery Brigade air defence Brigade Signal regiment engineer regiment Chemical defence regiment Pontoon Bridge regiment

52nd infantry Brigade 53rd infantry Brigade 54th infantry regiment Signals regiment Shannan Military Sub-district Xigaze Military Sub-district nyingchi Military Sub district


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China’s View of South Asia and the Indian Ocean

DEAN ChENg

the Heritage Foundation

Abstract: The Indian Ocean is becoming increasingly important to China’s

economic and security interests. China appears to be pursuing what has been

widely characterized as a “string of pearls” strategy of cultivating India’s neighbors

as friendly states, both to protect its economic and security interests and to balance

a “rising India.” With Chinese influence in the region growing, it is essential that

the U.S. not fall behind in the Indian Ocean, but maintain a steady presence in

the region, both to signal its resolve to stay engaged and to avoid the difficulties of

reentering a region.

as the People’s republic of China (PrC) expands its global economic and

security interests, one region of growing importance to Beijing will be the indian

ocean area. not only must a significant portion of China’s oil imports transit this

region, but one of China’s enduring friends (Pakistan) and one of its long-time

rivals (india) border this region, as well as China’s sensitive tibetan flank.

BackgroundHistorically, China dealt mostly with the kingdoms of Southeast asia and had

relatively little interaction with South asia. imperial Chinese interactions with

the indian ocean region were oriented mainly toward the Burmese and thai

civilizations, through which trade routes passed from southern China.

By contrast, despite both China and india having civilizations that are

thousands of years old, there were only very limited exchanges between imperial

China and india. the Himalayan mountain range, the absence of a consistent

Chinese maritime tradition, and the path of least resistance, which led north

and west to the eurasian steppes, all limited Chinese interactions to the south.

thus, while both China and india were some of the most powerful nations of the

ancient world, they were relatively insulated from each other.


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european colonialism ended Chinese and indian isolation, both from each

other and from the rest of the world, yet it affected the two major asian powers

very differently. india was conquered by the British and directly colonized. in the

period of decolonization, the indian Subcontinent was partitioned into Hindu-

majority india and Muslim-majority east and West Pakistan (now Bangladesh

and Pakistan, respectively).

By contrast, although China retained nominal sovereignty, the Chinese view this

period as the “Century of Humiliation.” From 1840 to 1945, China lost control of its

destiny. during this period, foreigners collected China’s tariffs and taxes, were immune

from Chinese law and prosecution, and ultimately were able to dictate China’s fate.

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong

made a point to say that China would now “stand up.” For Mao and the rest of the CCP

leadership, their victory marked the return of the ability of the Chinese to dictate their

own future. this had two implications for Chinese views of South asia.

the first implication is that Chinese territory is a unitary whole and inviolable.

the “Century of Humiliation” saw foreign intrusions into China, the creation of

concessions, and even the forcible removal of territory from Chinese control

(e.g., Hong Kong and taiwan). this would no longer be tolerated. in the South

asian context, from the perspective of the CCP leadership, tibet, like taiwan, is

part of China, and any threat to Chinese control is wholly unacceptable.

the other implication is that China’s borders have been unduly affected

and influenced by foreign pressure and domination, especially through the

application of “unequal treaties.” Consequently, now that China is strong, it is

Beijing that will determine whether it accepts the current borders or not. More

to the point, from its perspective, China is under no obligation to accept borders

that were demarcated by more powerful foreign parties.

indeed, in order to “correct” border issues, the Beijing leadership has displayed

a willingness to use force to underscore its position, as in the 1969 clashes with

the Soviet union and the 1962 Sino– indian War.

Contextin addition to the colonial period, several other factors continue to influence

Chinese perceptions of the indian ocean region.

The first is the Sino–Soviet split. Between 1949 and 1960, China and the Soviet

union were close allies. the Soviet union, from Beijing’s perspective, was a fully

developed major power, capable of challenging the united States. it was also a

senior partner, capable of helping China to move from a largely agrarian country


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to an industrialized power. China expected diplomatic, economic, industrial,

and military assistance from the Soviet union.

Yet by the time of the split in 1960, there was deep Chinese suspicion of the

Soviets. this disharmony was rooted in a number of factors, including questions

of who would lead the Communist bloc after the death of Stalin, ideological

differences between Beijing and Moscow, and the Soviet failure to lend support

to the PrC during the various taiwan crises of the 1950s. another component,

however, was Soviet Premier nikita Khrushchev’s decision to support the indians

on sovereignty over Kashmir, a position that irritated China.

the Sino–Soviet split resulted in extreme Chinese animosity aimed at the Soviets,

which was seen in a variety of ways, not least of which were the Sino–Soviet border

clashes of 1969, the only case of two openly nuclear-armed powers engaging in direct

combat. it also resulted in the Soviets providing further support to india, including arms

sales, leading the Chinese to see a new delhi–Moscow entente directed at themselves.

The second is that China is not the Soviet Union. Whereas the uSSr was an

autarkic nation with global political ambitions and military capabilities, but

only very regional, if not primarily local, economic interests, China is a highly

connected nation with regional military capabilities and global economic

interests. For the first time in modern history, China is a major economic player:

it exports t-shirts, washing machines, and computers, not revolution.

this is reflected not only in the various container ships that leave Chinese ports

for foreign destinations, but also in the fleets of oil tankers and break-bulk carriers

that are carrying oil and ore to feed the Chinese economy. the globalization of

China’s economy has meant an unprecedented reliance on the seas for China’s

economic well-being.

Linked to this is the third consideration: As its economy has grown, China

has become increasingly dependent on foreign imports to fuel and sustain its

economy. China became a net oil importer in 1993, the second largest consumer

of oil in 2003, and the third largest importer of oil by 2004. in 2010, Chinese oil

imports are expected to total 210 million tons, a 5.5 percent increase over 2009

imports. Much of this oil is brought to China by tankers from the Persian Gulf via

the indian ocean and the Strait of Malacca.

Chinese Relations with South Asian Statesthese various factors heavily influence China’s relations with its southern

neighbors along the indian ocean littoral, especially india, but also Pakistan,

Burma, and Sri Lanka.


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Sino–Indian Relations. From Beijing’s perspective, the most important nation

in the South asian region is india. india and China are the two most populous

nations on earth. indeed, india is expected to surpass China sometime in the

2020s.

Sino–indian relations have often been rocky. While the two states enjoyed

relatively peaceful relations in the first few years after the founding of the People’s

republic in 1949, the situation rapidly deteriorated, and relations between the

two powers have often been frosty. Several factors have played into this, but

perhaps the most important factor was and is the border issue between the two

countries.

the precise demarcation of the border between China and india remains a

contentious issue for both sides. there are two main swathes of territory involved

in the outstanding claims by each side: aksai Chin, west of nepal, which is Chinese

territory claimed by india, and arunachal Pradesh (“South tibet,” as the Chinese

refer to it), east of nepal, which is indian territory claimed by China. in each case,

thousands of square miles of territory are at stake, further complicated by the

sensitivity of the regions.

the confluence of border issues and minority relations first arose in 1950

because of the Chinese occupation of tibet. in the chaos of the first Chinese

revolution (in 1911), tibet had declared itself independent in 1913 and expelled

the Qing officials who oversaw the area. While this independence was not

recognized by any major foreign governments, nor by the nationalist Chinese

government, the region was essentially on its own until 1949. then, with the

CCP victorious in its struggle with the nationalists, China moved against tibet.

in 1950, several veteran divisions of the People’s Liberation army (PLa) were

committed to retaking the region, and the tibetan forces rapidly collapsed.

For the first time in modern memory, this put Chinese military forces on the

indian doorstep. equally important, both in 1950 and in the subsequent failed

tibetan uprising of 1959, tibetan refugees fled to india, including the current

(14th) dalai Lama, where they established a community in exile. this is an

essential part of the current controversy over the town of tawang, which is not

only a holy Buddhist site, birthplace of the 6th dalai Lama, but also a stopping

place for the current dalai Lama as he fled from tibet.

tawang also encapsulates the problem of historical border disputes. China

claims that tawang is actually Chinese territory because it refuses to accept the

McMahon Line as the border. that line was established in 1914 between the

tibetan authorities and the then British colony of india. From the perspective


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of Mao and his successors, the McMahon line was imposed upon China and

has no validity as the actual border.

Meanwhile, China and india also dispute their border west of nepal, in the

area known as aksai Chin. the aksai Chin was part of the indian princely state

of Jammu and Kashmir established in 1846, but the Chinese never accepted

it as part of india. it was the Soviet decision to back the indian claims to the

aksai Chin, over the claims of China and Pakistan, which both soured Beijing on

Moscow and new delhi and helped to push islamabad and Beijing together.

the border issues came to a head in october 1962, when the Chinese escalated

what had been a series of border skirmishes into a full-blown war. the initial border

clashes between Chinese and indian forces were precipitated by the discovery that

China had built a road through aksai Chin (completed in 1957), catching the indians

by surprise. in the eastern sector, where tibet abuts india, Chinese forces crushed

their indian counterparts and advanced deep into india, formally occupying the

aksai Chin. China maintains control of the aksai China in the western sector, but

withdrew its forces from the eastern sector, what is now the indian state of arunachal

Pradesh. However, China still claims the eastern sector and calls it “South tibet.”

Since 1962, the two sides have maintained an uneasy peace. during the 1980s,

there were artillery barrages between the two sides. in the 1990s, the two sides signed

several agreements that they would try to resolve the border situation peacefully,

and in 2005, they even reached an agreement on guiding principles for resolving the

border issue. nonetheless, recent reporting indicates that both the Chinese and the

indians are reinforcing their presence in the region, as China makes more public

comments about their claims to tawang and arunachal Pradesh in general.

Indian Military Capabilities. While the Chinese military has been modernizing

steadily for the past two decades, Chinese military planners cannot look to the

south with absolute equanimity. in the first place, the indians have had far easier

access to advanced military technology from around the globe than the PLa.

For example, one of the effects of the Sino–Soviet split and the subsequent

animosity between Beijing and Moscow was that russia happily supplied india

with more advanced weapons. indeed, for much of the Cold War, the indian

military relied heavily on the uSSr for its most modern equipment. this continues

to be the case, despite warmer relations between Beijing and Moscow.

the russians, for example, have sold the Su-30MKi, a variant of the Su-27/

Su-30 airframe to india, which is seen as more advanced than the Su-30MKK,

the version supplied to the PrC. Meanwhile, in a just-inked deal between russia

and india, the russians have (finally) agreed to sell india the aircraft carrier


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Admiral Gorshkov and a complement of MiG-29K fighters. india also maintains

the distinction of being the only nation to have ever leased nuclear-powered

submarines. in the late 1980s and again in 1991, it leased a Soviet Charlie II-class

SSGn (nuclear-powered guided missile submarine) and is leasing theNerpa,

an Akula-class SSn (nuclear powered attack submarine) for 10 years. this has

helped india gain some of the experience necessary to build its own nuclear-

powered attack submarines.

Furthermore, india is also seen as a different case than China by the united

States, at least in terms of access to high technology. this is apparent in the area of

space technology, which is of growing potential military import. as a case in point,

the Moon Mineralogy Mapper on the Chandrayaan-1 lunar exploration spacecraft,

which identified significant amounts of water on the Moon, was an american

instrument package. By contrast, it will likely be a very long time before the u.S. is

willing to place any kind of comparable sensor system on a Chinese satellite.

in addition, China must worry about india’s nuclear capabilities. the

recent tests of the agni-ii and agni-iii missiles, with ranges of 2,000 and 3,000

kilometers, respectively, means that india is developing the capability to threaten

major Chinese cities, such as Chengdu and Kunming in western and southern

China. While the Chinese are unlikely to fear an indian nuclear first strike, they

cannot neglect the existence of an independent nuclear force that exists apart

from the united States and russia.

even long-term demographic differences between China and india have

military implications. although both China and india have more than a billion

people, the demographics are very different. China has a population bulge, a

legacy of Mao Zedong’s Great Proletarian Cultural revolution, when he pushed

Chinese families to have as many children as possible, followed by deng Xiaoping

and the one-child policy. as a result, China has the 4-2-1 phenomenon, in which

one child is supporting two parents and four grandparents.

Such demographic conditions not only have social welfare implications, but

also suggest that China may have fewer people coming of military age by the mid-

2020s. Moreover, given the importance of the children to maintaining the welfare of

both parents and grandparents, any conflict involving heavy casualties would likely

generate significant social tension, if not outright instability. the popular reaction

to the deaths of hundreds of children in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake provides a

potential warning in this regard.

india, by contrast, appears to have a more sustainable demographic

composition, with people under the age of 15 remaining around 30 percent


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of the population between now and 2020. that is, evidence indicates that the

indian population will not age the way the Chinese one will. in 2020–2030,

when india surpasses China in overall population, india will not only be more

populous, but also likely have a larger percentage of its population of military

age. For Chinese military planners, this would suggest that, after 2020, China

may face the unprecedented challenge of confronting an opponent able to field

larger armies than its own.

For the PrC, such prospects do not make a conflict with india inevitable.

rather, they highlight the importance of China’s southern flank and the dynamic

nature of the Sino–indian balance of power. equally important, it casts a harsh

light on the potential vulnerability of China’s sea lanes of communications.

a strong indian military, fielding both nuclear and advanced conventional

capabilities, could hold the PrC at risk both directly and indirectly.

Economic Issues. unlike the taiwan–China situation, the Sino–indian security

relationship is not balanced by a substantial economic one. While Sino–indian

economic ties have expanded, they are still relatively limited. in 2000, Sino–indian

trade totaled only about $2.2 billion, with Chinese exports to india accounting for

$1.5 billion. By 2008, bilateral trade had expanded by perhaps 25 times, to some

$50 billion. Moreover, this was more equalized, with indian exports to China

totaling $20 billion, and Chinese exports to india comprising some $32 billion.

While india is not a major trading partner for China, Beijing is new delhi’s

second largest trading partner behind the u.S. the level of u.S.–China trade

far outstrips that of u.S.–india trade levels. China, for example, had a $333

billion trade relationship with the united States in 2008, 10 times its trade with

india. Meanwhile, u.S.–india trade totaled only about $65 billion in 2009.

Sino–pakistani Relations. While China’s relations with india have generally

been rocky, its ties with Pakistan have been much better. Pakistan established

formal diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1950, one of the very first countries

to recognize the People’s republic of China rather than the republic of China.

although Pakistan later joined both Cento (Central treaty organization) and

Seato (Southeast asia treaty organization), this did not impinge heavily on Sino–

Pakistani relations. Similarly, despite the embargos and sanctions placed on China

during the Korean War, Pakistan maintained trade and diplomatic ties to the PrC.

once Sino–indian relations deteriorated, China and Pakistan had a further

reason to align—their common enemy of india. While the two states have not

formally allied against india, both sides clearly benefit from a relationship that

can tie down significant indian assets along multiple fronts and force indian


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planners to divide their attention. thus, there are reports that, in the midst of

the 1965 indo–Pakistani War, China repeatedly charged india with violating the

Chinese border near Sikkim, at the other end of the Sino–indian border from

Pakistan, raising the specter of an armed response. While there were no actual

clashes at this time, it is possible that any such Chinese actions were intended to

relieve pressure on Pakistan, which was losing in that war, by threatening india

with the possibility of a second front.

More concretely, China has long been willing to help Pakistan with arms

development and access. China, for example, was instrumental in helping to

establish Pakistan’s arms industry. China has also long supplied the Pakistani

military with a range of military systems, including tanks, naval combatants, and

combat aircraft. For example, China and Pakistan currently coproduce the K-8

trainer and the JF-17 thunder/FC-1 Xiaolong, a few examples of Chinese weapons

coproduction with foreign partners.

Perhaps of greatest concern is the likelihood of Chinese assistance with

missiles and nuclear weapons. China has supplied Pakistan with the M-11 series

of short-range ballistic missiles. China has helped Pakistan build two nuclear

reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjab Province and is considering building

two more nuclear reactors at the same site. Beijing must weigh potential negative

international reaction to such a move, however, because it is a member of the

nuclear Suppliers Group, which forbids nuclear transfers to countries that are

not signatories of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. it has the option of seeking

a waiver of the prohibition or proceeding in spite of the prohibition. in addition,

a. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, claims that the PrC helped Pakistan

develop its nuclear weapons, including the provision of nuclear materials. While

this claim has not been officially corroborated or acknowledged, the story is a

reminder of the close Sino–Pakistani ties in strategic systems.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has been willing to take measures to ensure continued

Chinese support. these include clamping down on uighur radicals from China’s

restive Xinjiang province attending terrorist training camps in Pakistan’s tribal

border areas. if Pakistan failed to take action to stem the radicalization and

training of uighur separatists on its territory, islamabad would likely alienate the

Beijing leadership and seriously jeopardize the strategic relationship between

Pakistan and China.

Economic Relations. one of the first planks of Sino–Pakistani relations was

economic, with trade relations started in 1950. By 2002, bilateral trade amounted

to some $1.8 billion, and has since grown to some $7 billion as of 2008. this is,


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however, a small fraction of Chinese trade with the united States or the nations

of east asia.

While Sino–Pakistani trade is limited, there have been a number of high-

profile developments. the most often cited example is the Chinese economic

assistance and cooperation in the development of the port of Gwadar. Beijing

provided both financing and workers for the port’s development, including $200

million as an initial investment and the construction of three multipurpose

berths. While the port’s location provides a convenient facility near the Persian

Gulf, but outside the Strait of Hormuz, it has not yet generated income for the

Pakistani economy due to a lack of transportation infrastructure connecting

the port with Pakistan’s road and rail network. the port does serve, however, to

diversify Pakistani naval facilities.

at the same time, there is much speculation that the port may serve as a

western terminus on the indian ocean for the movement of oil or other supplies

into China. this would significantly reduce the exposure of the Chinese oil lifeline

in the indian ocean, eliminating the need to transit those waters and pass through

the Malacca Strait.

Chinese Relations with Other Indian Ocean Nationsin addition to india and Pakistan, China has a range of relations with the other

states of the indian ocean littoral. it has been suggested that China is cultivating

relations with many of these states, both to forge a nascent anti-india political

coalition and to access military facilities so that China itself can counter india.

this latter approach has sometimes been referred to as the “string of pearls”

approach.

burma. China is one of the few states to support the regime in Burma. this

is due to a combination of geopolitical and economic considerations. Burma’s

irrawaddy Valley has long been a strategic path into China. the Burma road of

World War ii is merely the most well known example, and a version of the Silk

route transited the irrawaddy into Yunnan as well.

Moreover, Burma has potential oil and natural gas reserves. the ability to

access those oil reserves would again limit Chinese vulnerability to interdiction

of its sea lines. not surprisingly, China is helping to construct oil pipelines across

Burma and into China. it is also helping to construct new port facilities in Sittwe,

dawei, and Mergui.

Meanwhile, Burma, lying to the east of india, constitutes yet another potential

area of worry for indian strategic planners. Strategically, Burma and China have


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been engaged in a variety of security cooperation measures. the PrC is the

largest source of arms for the Burmese military, supplying a variety of systems,

including trucks, artillery, and communications equipment. Chinese support

has been sustained, even after Burmese crackdowns in 2009 led several thousand

refugees to flee Burma into southern China.

in return, Burmese willingness to allow the PLa access to its territory potentially

allows China to maintain a close watch on indian military developments. of

particular interest are the Coco islands, from which China can watch indian

space and missile launches. they are also 18 kilometers from the indian-held

nicobar islands, which one indian foreign minister has characterized as essential

for allowing india to monitor the Malacca Strait.

Sri Lanka. China also has a long history of good relations with Sri Lanka.

indeed, Sri Lanka, along with Pakistan, was one of the first non-Communist

countries to establish relations with the PrC, recognizing the PrC in 1950. Given

the long history of positive relations between the two states, it is not surprising

that Beijing has provided Colombo with military and political support during its

long counterinsurgency, including significant supplies of fighter aircraft, naval

combatants, and a variety of other military equipment.

equally important, Chinese support has the added attraction that Beijing

does not “interfere” in the domestic affairs of the nation receiving the aid. this

appeal has been at work not only in Sri Lanka, but also in Pakistan and Burma.

thus, there were few Chinese criticisms of Sri Lankan efforts to deal with the

Liberation tigers of tamil eelam (tamil tigers). of course, this is a sharp contrast

with Western nGos and governments, which expressed concern that the Sri

Lankan counterinsurgency methods were excessively brutal. For example, the

united States suspended aid to Colombo in 2007 on human rights grounds.

nor are relations between the two states purely military. Chinese Vice Premier

Zhang dejiang, in his recent visit to Sri Lanka, expressed the hope that the two

states would deepen their cooperation in such areas as “infrastructure, industry,

communication, energy, education, culture, tourism.”as with other indian ocean

states, China has been assiduous in economic cooperation with Sri Lanka. two

ongoing projects are the norochcholai Coal Power Project and construction of

a large container port at Hambantota, with some $300 million in funding from

China’s export-import Bank.

the norochcholai Coal Power Project involves the construction of a 300-

megawatt coal-fired generator, with the potential for expansion to 900 megawatts.

the plant would help meet likely Sri Lankan power requirements for the coming


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decades. interestingly, Sri Lanka produces no fossil fuels of its own and will

therefore need to import the coal needed for the plant. this may well involve

coal imports from China, one of the world’s largest coal producers.

Meanwhile, the Hambantota port project will help to improve an

underdeveloped portion of Sri Lanka. at the same time, it is recognized that

there are also strategic benefits for the PrC. at a minimum, it would provide “a

convenient mid-way point on the sea-routes between China, and the Middle

east and africa. the port development and the oil-bunkering/storage facilities,

when completed in Hambantota, would be a mutually beneficial asset to both

countries.” there is concern in some quarters that this assistance will also result

in Chinese naval access to the port.

Prospects for the FutureFor the foreseeable future, Chinese strategic planners will need to pay increasing

attention to China’s indian ocean flank. in the short term, China is concerned about

its growing dependence on the sea lanes of communications for sustaining China’s

economic growth. in 2010, for the first time, China imported more than 50 percent

of its oil consumption. Chinese President Hu Jintao has already raised the issue of

the Malacca Strait. there is little question that it is a key chokepoint on China’s oil

supply routes. Part of China’s interest in developing alternative ports and pipelines,

such as in Pakistan and Burma, would seem to be motivated by a desire to reduce the

criticality of the Malacca Strait.

even if China’s oil lifeline did not have to transit the Strait of Malacca, it would

nonetheless traverse significant portions of the indian ocean. the growth of the

indian navy means that Chinese economic development is potentially at the

mercy of india, as well as the united States. the forging of indian security links

with Japan and the united States is therefore a source of concern.

this is likely an essential part of what is driving Chinese efforts to cultivate

india’s neighbors as friendly states, beyond the “string of pearls” strategy that

China is said to entertain for the indian ocean region. that is, China is more intent

on cultivating close ties, including but not limited to military ties, with the various

South asian states than necessarily focusing on surrounding and isolating india.

the latter is simply a byproduct of the larger goal of ensuring that China’s southern

flank and the attendant oil lifeline are secure and populated by friendly states.

Balancing india is likely to be a growing Chinese concern, not simply for the

security of China’s oil lifeline, but also because of india’s overall growth. Just as the

u.S. is concerned about a “rising China” and how to deal with a growing Chinese


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economy that provides substantially more wherewithal for a variety of purposes,

so Chinese leaders are confronted with the potential of a “rising india.”

While the united States is already an established, advanced state, China is not.

that is, from the Chinese perspective, the united States and much of the West are

already wealthy societies. the american economy, still the world’s largest, allows

the u.S. to maintain substantial military capabilities, sustain a high standard

of living at home, and still have resources for a range of other purposes, from

diplomacy and foreign aid to a space program.

China is less developed, and while Chinese economic growth over the past

several decades has been impressive, any gains must be divided across 1.2 billion

to 1.3 billion people. therefore, on a per capita basis, China is still a developing

country. the potential concern is that india will catch up with China before China

catches up with the united States or even Western europe. all of this means that

China must devote more attention and effort to staying ahead of india because it

has less of a margin for error.

Recommendations for U.S. PolicyFor the united States, the need to balance the PrC, among other factors,

necessitates greater cooperation with india. new delhi, for its part, also is

interested in strengthening ties to the u.S., partly as a hedge against a rising

China, but will maintain its foreign policy principle of “strategic autonomy” and

seek partnerships with a variety of nations.

Deepening Indo–U.S. Cooperation. throughout the Cold War era, the u.S.

and india experienced rocky relations, given india’s closeness to the Soviet

union. However, beginning from the late years of the Clinton administration

through the George W. Bush administration, the u.S. has sought to deepen and

improve its relations with india. this has included several forms, including a

willingness to sell advanced weapons to india; technology cooperation in a

number of fields, including space systems; and a willingness to provide india

with nuclear technology. the very range of areas of potential cooperation is

encouraging because it signals that Washington–new delhi relations are not

simply a matter of containing China, but inherently beneficial across a breadth

of topics. the united States should sustain this effort at broad interaction and

deepen its strategic ties with india.

Expanding U.S. Cooperation with Other Indian Ocean Nations. While the

u.S. is engaging india and continuing its partnership with Pakistan, it should

also seek to remain closely engaged with the other states of the indian ocean


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littoral. if China has succeeded in expanding its footprint in South asia, it is in

part because it has not had much competition.

in the military arena, this includes promoting u.S. navy port visits to states

that border the indian ocean and expanding the international Military education

and training Program for officers drawn from South asian militaries. in the non-

military arena, it should encourage students from nations in the region to attend

schools in the united States. Such personal exposure to the u.S. often has long-

lasting impacts. Meanwhile, the united States should support aid programs to

the area, not only at the nation-to-nation level (e.g., the international Monetary

Fund), but also at the more personal level. the Grameen Bank, which was one

of the pioneers of microcredit, was founded in Bangladesh. encouraging such

grassroots efforts would require minimal amounts of capital, but could have

enormous impact by promoting not only business but also social stability.

maintaining a Strong U.S. presence in the Region. Secretary of defense robert

Gates appears sanguine about cuts in the u.S. navy, even questioning whether it is

necessary to maintain 10 carrier battle groups when other nations have none. Such

comments, however, betray a failure to account for not only how long it takes the u.S.

to build an aircraft carrier and its support ships, not to mention training its attendant

air wing, but also the undesirability of allowing others to catch up.

it is essential that the u.S. not fall behind in the indian ocean. the region

is about as far from the united States as it is possible to be, but the u.S. should

strive to maintain a steady presence in the region, both to signal its resolve to stay

engaged and to avoid the difficulties of reentering a region. the yearlong Chinese

presence in the anti-piracy patrols off the Gulf of aden, coupled with Chinese

comments regarding the prospect of creating a base infrastructure in the region,

suggests that the PrC intends to be a long-term player in the area. the united

States can ill afford to cede this vital region to the PLa.

Source: http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/china-s-view-of-south-asia-and-the-indian-ocean

Additional Readingl Chinese brass with Hu’s characteristics by Joseph Y Lin

Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LH12ad02.html

l China-Pakistan railway Project by debasish Chaudhuri, ViF

Source: http://www.vifindia.org/China-Pakistan-railway-Project

Dean Cheng is research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security affairs in the asian Studies

Center at the Heritage Foundation.

SeCtion iii

PriSM on PaKiStan


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Cent



cLAWs


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Pakistan has Lost Touch with the Nation

FARzAND AhmED ä august 14, 2010

India Today

While Pakistan didn’t celebrate its 63rd independence day on Saturday out of

deference to the 14 million people affected by unprecedented floods, its media

talked of missing empathy and failures of Pakistan as a nation. Leading daily the

nation in an editorial said curtly “the state of Pakistan has lost touch with the

nation and every successive government fails to deliver to the people the very

basics which Pakistan was supposed to provide”. dawn on the other hand said

in its editorial said: Somehow the level of empathy that ought to be on offer is

missing this time round. according to the un, some 13.8 million people have

been displaced or otherwise affected by this summer’s floods while over 1,500

have been killed”.

Miseries greater that Tsunami & Haiti it is said that the number of affected people are now greater than those hit by the

2004 tsunami and the earthquakes in Kashmir and Haiti in 2005 and 2010. a total

bigger, it should be stressed, than the victims of those three terrible disasters put

together. Yet, the kind of spontaneous public support, large-scale donations and

assistance by volunteers that was in evidence following the 2005 earthquake is

nowhere to be seen.

true, some organisations are doing their bit and the government is scrambling

to make up for its initial failures. But still there is something missing: widespread

giving and the ability to relate to the plight of people who have lost everything.

“in part, perhaps, the public has not been so generous in its support

because the death count has been nowhere near the devastation caused by the

2005 earthquake. also, it must be remembered that earthquakes are sudden

cataclysmic events and can kill thousands within minutes while floods build up

over time. there is often an advance warning, at least in the lower riparian areas,


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and this can lead to a sense of inevitability and the feeling that there is little one

can do in response. nothing is further from the truth. there is plenty that we

as a nation can and must do to help those whose lives have been shattered by

the ongoing floods. We need to open our hearts, and our wallets, to our fellow

Pakistanis. the immediate concern is relief work but the long-term rehabilitation

that most affectees will require should not be forgotten.

Quaid’s Pak is missing the nation on the other hand was more scathing. it said: Sixty three years today

we became an independent nation, as a result of the vision and sheer struggle

of the Quaid-i-azam Mohammed ali Jinnah. the inspiration for Pakistan was

also embedded in the thinking of allama iqbal, but to make Pakistan a reality

required a man as determined and single minded in his pursuit of a homeland

for the Muslims - but one where every citizen would be free and equal and the

nation would move forward on the basis of unity, Faith and discipline.

“Yet sixty three years later, we have lost sight of the Quaid’s Pakistan. He

stressed the evils of corruption and nepotism and our leaders have succumbed to

these evils and imbibed them as part of their political creed. He stressed equality

for all which would result in national unity yet today we are torn apart by ethnic

and sectarian cleavages and are seeing our minorities live under a constant cloud

of insecurity.

“While Jinnah saw women as being a major driving force for national

development, and women indeed played a key role in the independence

movement, sixty three years later women are still struggling against abuse.

Quaid-i-azam saw Pakistan as an islamic welfare state but today the poor are

becoming increasingly marginalised as the gap between the rich and them

increases. education, which the Quaid saw as essential has lost its significance

for successive rulers till we have been reduced to seeing the farce of the ruling

elite flaunting their fake degrees while genuine degree holders can barely get

employment.

US lethal embrace “the Quaid saw Pakistan as a leader within the Muslim World and a state which

would conduct its foreign relations on a basis of equality and mutual respect and

dignity. and in our early years we were in the forefront of supporting Muslim

causes but successive rulers pushed us into a dependency mode where a costly

flirtation with an imperialist uS became the norm. Whenever the uS winked at us,


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we rushed into its lethal embrace and today we are once again suffocating in this

embrace which is killing our people even as it destabilises the state structures.

“the state of Pakistan has lost touch with the nation and every successive

government fails to deliver to the people the very basics which Pakistan was

supposed to provide. it is not that we have no achievements. our nation has

rallied around and risen from the ashes of one crisis after another. We have

achieved goals against all odds including our nuclear capability. despite

economic setbacks, military debacles and a constant cyclical disruption of the

state’s political structures we have continued to make progress and keep abreast

of global developments, albeit at a slower pace than we could have. this land

is rich in resources but these are being depleted and destroyed by a hostile and

corrupt state structure and a continuous stream of inept governments.

“today, as we stand in a flood-devastated Pakistan with depleted resources

and an out of synch state and government, it is the people who with all their

suffering continue to be the hope for the green and white. it is the people who

always continue to rise to defend their freedom and their country and who always

will. as long as there is this nation of Pakistan there will always be hope. after all,

we are Pakistan. Let us raise the standard of unity, Faith and discipline again.

Source: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/109000/Column:%20Window%20on%20Pak%20

Press/pakistan-has-lost-touch-with-the-nation-.html


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Night of the Generals

VIKRAm SOOD ä July 29, 2010

Deccan Chronicle

this is not the first time that a Pakistan army Chief has decided to stay

on beyond his scheduled date of departure. the version that the civilian

government of Prime Minister Yousaf raza Gilani granted Gen. ashfaq Parvez

Kayani this extension is a myth that very few believe. in fact, speculation and

justifications for his extension were making the rounds in islamabad in early

summer this year.

By May 2010, there were articles, sponsored undoubtedly, suggesting that

Gen. Kayani had become indispensable to the scheme of things in Pakistan; that

Pakistan was passing through a critical phase and continuity as the army Chief

was essential; that Gen. Kayani would not seek extension but would gracefully

accept if invited to serve the country for a little while longer.

Pakistani analyst ayesha Siddiqa had earlier commented that a decision to

extend the term would depend upon three factors — an agreement within the

GHQ, a nod from the united States and support of the government. With the

Zardari-Gilani government perennially on the backfoot, there would have been

very little resistance from the political setup. it is true that the uS would like

continuity and Gen. Kayani became the preferred option, as he was perceived to

be able to deliver on uS objectives.

in the immediate future, Gen. Kayani will have to keep the war on terror

against selected sections going, keep the uS at arm’s length when it relates to

the Pakistan army’s other strategic assets considered vital to its perceived aims

in afghanistan and india without any stoppage of funds from the uS. He will

also have to make some arrangements for those who will feel they have been

deprived of the top slot because of this extension. For instance, at least 16

lieutenant-generals — some of whom are now corps commanders — are due to

retire after november 23, 2010 and before Gen. Kayani’s extended term expires

in november 2013. this includes Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha, Gen. Kayani’s successor

as iSi chief and who is already on a year’s year extension. Gen. Pervez Musharraf


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had not extended the terms of his generals but accommodated them in civilian

assignments.

increasing numbers of Pakistani military officers who will now be due for

promotions as major-general and lieutenant-general or equivalent will be those

recruited during Gen. Zia-ul Haq’s days of excessive islamisation.

the Pakistan army — with its ultimate control on policies relating to india,

afghanistan and the nuclear button — has shown remarkable tactical brilliance

in enhancing its position in its own country but has left the country with very

little resilience to tackle its major internal socio-economic problems. outsiders

see the march of folly of a nation with a crumbling economy, dwindling exports

and the sole source of dollars being handouts by the uS and the international

Monetary Fund, with terrorists knocking at various doors even in Punjab. Yet

it continues to convince its people that “enemy” india is still trying to undo

Pakistan. in the process, Pakistan has been involved in a two-front jihad, has

punched above its weight and thus finds itself in the middle of a crippling and

tragic blowback. Caught in the brinkmanship of its rhetoric, Pakistan’s rulers are

unable to retreat from the cul de sac into which they have pushed their country.

Pakistan’s tragedy has been that its civil society is today under siege from

islamic radicals and the army, and these radicals and terrorists have been raised

by the army. With all other systems of law and order collapsing, civil society is

dependent on the same army for its own security and well-being. that is why at

various moments in the history of Pakistan whenever the army has been seen to

take over the reins upfront, there have been many from within this liberal society

who actually showered accolades on the army.

the invisible hand of rawalpindi was patently visible in the fiasco of the

recent talks in islamabad. now that we have Gen. Kayani in charge of policy

towards india and afghanistan for the next three years, we should expect some

hardening of attitudes. Pakistan’s tactics in Jammu and Kashmir have already

begun to change. terrorist violence in the Valley has diminishing returns for

Pakistan under the present circumstances; it wins Pakistan no new friends and

attracts adverse attention from the uS. We take solace behind encouraging

statistics, but they tell only a part of the story. Stone-throwing tactics in the Valley

portrayed as a people’s movement in the new tactic where the state is made to

look increasingly helpless and vicious.

Pakistan’s postures on india are not going to be affected by the recent

disclosures by WikiLeaks. despite the usual exultation in india forever looking

for Western approval, the leaks do not say anything new. they are more about the


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uS. the speed with which uS national security adviser James Jones supported

the Pakistan government immediately after the disclosures, confirming uS

commitment to deepening partnership with afghanistan and Pakistan, the

manner in which afPak special envoy richard Holbrooke certified Pakistan was

part of the solution in afghanistan and the timing of the release of $500 million

during Hillary Clinton’s islamabad visit (where she called on Gen. Kayani) —

these only confirm the desperation of america’s afghan situation. Besides,

Gen. Kayani’s and the iSi chief’s closeness to the Haqqani networks, their close

liaison and protection of the Quetta Shura impinge directly on the uS effort in

afghanistan. Pakistan has strengthened its assets in afghanistan by inducting

Lashkar-e-tayyaba terrorists into afghanistan.

Pakistan carefully assessed the limitations of uS military power and indian

decibel. the americans had needed Pakistan to launch into afghanistan in 2001;

nine years later they need Pakistan to come to an honourable arrangement in

afghanistan, whatever that might be. Given the paranoia that affects Punjabi

officers in the Pakistan army along with the desire to avenge 1971, there is need

for india to prepare for the future and strengthen its defence and intelligence

capabilities substantially — in quality and quantity. We face multiple fronts —

Pakistan, China, terrorism and the unguarded sea.

While india-Pakistan talks may become desirable at some future date under

suitable circumstances, they are neither irreversible nor uninterruptable. india

must dispel the impression that there is no option except to talk to Pakistan and

lose on the negotiating table what we have won on the battlefield. therefore,

between the option to talk and total war there are several options that can be

exercised and we should be prepared for the long haul.

Source: http://www.deccanchronicle.com/dc-comment/night-generals-717


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Pakistan Army sends Politco-military Signals to India through “Ex Azm-e-Nau”

DR. SUbhASh KApILA ä april 21, 2010

South asia analysis Group

Introductory Observations Pakistan army’s massive war-readiness exercise codenamed “eX aZM-e-nau iii

(new resolve)” has been underway since april 10, 2010 and scheduled to culminate

on May 15, 2010. the massive exercise involving more than 50,000 troops began in

the Bhawalpur desert area of South Punjab and will culminate in northern Sindh. the

Pakistan army has significantly gone much out of the way to highly publicise “eX

aZM-e-nau iii” for both the domestic audience and the international media, more

specifically india. Hence this Paper has no intention to repeat military details of eX

aZM-e-nau iii which stand covered in the media already.

Massive military exercises of this magnitude are held periodically to validate war

doctrines and operational strategies. However, the Pakistan army has not conducted

an exercise of this magnitude for 20 years. this draws more attention as to what

impelled the Pakistan army to go in for such a massive military exercise when at

least 70,000 – 1,00,000 troops of the Pakistan army are currently deployed in military

operations in South Waziristan, orakzai and Khyber regions. this in addition to

Pakistan army deployments in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Baluchistan.

Pakistan army eX aZM-e-nau iii further draws attention in that it is being

held contextually in the backdrop of united States pressures on Pakistan army to

divert more troops from india’s border to the afghanistan border.

one has also to take note that in eX aZM-e-nu a fair share of united States supplied


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military hardware is being employed, especially offensive strike assets like F-16 fighter

aircraft and attack Helicopters. With eX aZM-e-nau iii being publicly proclaimed

as an ‘india threat-Centric’ exercise it follows that despite uS protestations to the

contrary, uS supplied military hardware would be used against india.

eX aZM-e-nau iii also incorporates the Pakistan air Force ex-HiGH MarK

in which the entire Pakistan air Force assets from Skardu in the north to Karachi

in the South are dovetailed.

eX aZM-e-nau iii timing, magnitude, the contemporary contextual

backdrop and more importantly the much publicised ‘india threat-Centric’

operational orientation of this exercise suggest that the Pakistan army intends to

send politico-military signals to india, more pointedly.

this Paper would accordingly like to examine the following issues: l eX aZM-e-nau iii: operational Features are “india threat-Centric”l eX aZM-e-nau iii: the afghanistan Connectionl Pakistan army’s Politico-Military Signals to india through eX aZM-e-naul Strategic reality Check for indian Policy establishment

EX AZM-E-NAU III: Operational Features are “India Threat-Centric” expectedly, the Pakistan army cannot provide any other operational orientation

to such a massive exercise. Pakistan army’s primacy in Pakistan’s history and its

numerous coups have taken place by whipping-up anti-india hysteria.

the major operational features of eX aZM-e-nau iii that need reiteration are: l Pakistan army has emphasised, directly and implicitly, that this exercise has

been designed to validate military doctrines to meet an indian military threat

and to neutralise india’s much vaunted CoLd Start War doctrine. the Pakistan

army to assuage Western concerns is emphasizing that this exercise is purely a

defensive warfare exercise focussing on conventional warfare only.l this is misleading on both counts. it is learnt, and is logically so, that

Pakistan’s use of strategic assets are built-in in the exercise. Similarly, eX

aZM-e-nau, on available information, is focussing on “counter-offensives”

(offensive warfare) as opposed to “counter-attacks” (defensive warfare).l the geographical extent of this exercise extending from South Punjab to

Sindh with a secondary threat in the Sialkot Sector incorporated in eX aZM-

e-nau suggests that it is intended to defeat india’s multiple thrusts as part

of CoLd Start War doctrine and also an indian diversionary Corps strike

launched against Sialkot.


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EX AZM-E-NAU III: The Afghanistan Connection Strangely, one cannot but help observing that Pakistan army’s two major and

massive exercises have an afghanistan connection.

Pakistan army conducted eX ZarB-e-MoMin(1989) in its first flush of

victory of claiming that it was instrumental in forcing the exit of Soviet army

from afghanistan, as the cats-paw of the united States.

twenty years later, the Pakistan army is now conducting eX aZM-e-nau

iii with a heady sense of personal satisfaction of CoaS Gen Kayani that he has

single- handedly re-oriented the united States in a u-turn in favour of the Pakistan

army. in this case too the quid-pro-quo is that Pakistan army will facilitate the uS

military exit from afghanistan and the united States conceding’ strategic space’ in

afghanistan to the Pakistan army.

in the present context, the conduct of eX aZM-e-nau against the afghanistan

backdrop, the sidelining of india by the united States on afghanistan, all carry

politico-military implications for india. in both cases american military hardware

and financial largesse flowed-in preceding Pakistan army major exercises.

Pakistan Army’s Politico-Military Signals to India Through EX AZM-E-NAUPakistan army’s political signals to india through eX aZM-e-nau have to be

viewed as more tangential than direct. the following need to be considered: l india may rejoice and revel in its infatuation with the uS-india Strategic

Partnership, but when the chips are down, the united States will always throw

its dice in favor of the Pakistan army.l Pakistan army, its strategic sensitivities and interests in afghanistan would be

upheld by the united States, disregarding india’s objections to the contrary.l Pakistan army could prevail over the united States to make india yield on the

Kashmir issue.

Can one blame the Pakistan army for having such perceptions and the

claim of the Pakistan army on priority attention and tilt of the united States?

the facts speak for themselves.

Militarily, the signals that emanate from the Pakistan army to india through

eX aZM-e-nau are more direct. these are: l Pakistan army, notwithstanding its commitments on the afghan border and

a de-stabilizing internal situation is militarily capable of repelling any indian

military offensives emanating from india’s CoLd Start War doctrine.


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l Pakistan army will not confine itself to defensive “counter-attacks” in its

operational doctrines. Pakistan army will resort to “counter-offensives”

against india to force it to recoil from its CoLd Start War doctrine multiple

trusts.l overall, therefore today, Pakistan army is operationally trained,

organizationally structured, and well equipped with military hardware to

fight a “one and a half front war” or even a “two front war” with india.

Strategic Reality Check for Indian Policy Establishment the indian policy establishment needs to recognize Pakistan army’s eX aZM-e-

nau as a wake up call. the politico-military signals are clear.

in fact, Pakistan army’s politico-military signalling to india is taunting in nature.

it has signalled, we are prepared to effectively defeat india’s CoLd Start War

doctrine, but are you (india) ready with the political will to launch CoLd Start War

doctrine and are the indian armed Forces well-equipped to successfully execute

this war doctrine?

Perceptions between military adversaries count and the Pakistani perception

reflected in the Pakistani newspaper daWn editorial of april 20, 2010 should be

an eye-opener for the indian policy establishment:

“While Cold Start does raise new and troubling questions about the possibility of

war between India and Pakistan, it has not quite captured the imagination of the

civilian bosses of the Indian Armed Forces. Major technical and resources questions

aside, there is some uncertainly about whether the politicians and bureaucrats in

India are committed to new doctrine as Pakistan side suggests.”

reticently, on a sensitive issue that has grave implications for india’s national

security, all that one can say is that the indian policy establishment needs a

strategic reality check on the following issues:l india’s current Pakistan policy of peace at all costs. do such political postures

prompt the above perceptions in Pakistan?l india’s war readiness for successful implementation of CoLd Start War

doctrine. is Pakistan army seeing glaring voids in india’s offensive warfare

capabilities?l india’s political will for hard decisions. Has Pakistan army drawn wrong lessons

from india’s lack of strong response to Mumbai 9/11 and earlier major incidents of

terrorism?


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l in the highly surcharged and current tense india-Pakistan relations, is india’s

war-readiness receiving a 24X7 political scrutiny and oversight?

the answers can best be given by india’s policy establishment.

Lastly since the united States and afghanistan are the predominating factors in

the Pakistan army strategic calculus, does the indian policy establishment need to

recalibrate and carry out mid-term corrections in its united States and afghanistan

policies. What perceptions are being generated when the Pakistan army sees india

being sidelined by the united States on afghanistan and india withdrawing 30,000

troops from Kashmir, because Pakistan army made uSa prevail over india on this

issue.

Concluding Observations the Pakistan army was badly in need of refurbishing its professional image both

domestically and externally. domestically, the Pakistan army image was dented

as till a few months back it was reluctant to take head-on the internal threats that

were looming large. externally, the reluctance of the Pakistan army to undertake

ground offensives to tackle insurgents in the frontier regions and instead rely

only on F-16 fighter aircraft strikes, attacks helicopter strikes and heavy artillery

bombardment spoke poorly of its professional capabilities and its propensity for

ethnic genocide reminiscent of its record in then east Pakistan.

eX aZM-e-nau iii has provided an opportunity for the Pakistan army to redeem

its image. Publicizing the exercise widely was intended to shore up its image

domestically.

Publicizing it widely externally has enabled the Pakistan army to send politico-

military messages and particularly to india. the central message to india was

that Pakistan army is ready in all respects to offset india’s military advantages

and especially those centered on the CoLd Start War doctrine.

Source: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org//papers38/paper3772.html

Additional Reading l exercise azm-e-nau-3: an assessment by dhruv Katoch

Source: http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=550&u_id=82


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Pakistan Army

the Pakistan army is the largest branch of the Pakistan armed Forces, and is

mainly responsible for protection of the state borders, the security of administered

territories and defending the national interests of Pakistan within the framework

of its international obligations. the Pakistan army a total strength of 520,000,

about the size of of the army of the united States, with a reserve element of

500,000 who have a reserve obligation up to the age of 45 years. the Pakistan

army structure in many ways has a close resemblance to the British indian army

structure at the end of the nineteenth century.

Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army.htm

GHQ- Rawalpindi

rohit Singh, CLaWS


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

rohit Singh, CLaWS

Pakistan Army Order of Battlepunjab - Strike Corps

I Corps mangla II Corps multan

6 armoured division Kharian 1 armoured division Multan

17 Mechanized infantry division Kharian 40 infantry division okara

37 Mechanized infantry division Gujranwala

punjab - holding Corps

IV Corps Lahor

10 infantry division Lahore

11 infantry division Lahore

XXX Corps gujranwal XXXI Corps bahawalpur

2 artillery division Gujranwala 26 Mechanized division Bahawalpur

8 infantry division Sialkot 35 infantry division Bahawalpur

15 infantry division Sialkot 40th infantry division okara


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Sindh j&K, FANA

V Corps Karachi X Corps Rawalpindi

16 infantry division Hyderabad northern area Command Gilgit

18 infantry division Hyderabad 12 infantry division Murree

25 Mechanized infantry division Malir 19 infantry division Jhelum

23 infantry division Gujrat

West Front

balochistan NWFp / FATA

XII Corps Quetta XI Corps peshawar

33 infantry division Hyderabad 7 infantry division Mardan

41 infantry division Hyderabad 9 infantry division Kohat

Other major Commands

iSi (inter-Services intelligence) engineer-in-Chief Pakistan army

army air defence Command erra (earthquake reconstruction &

rehabilitation authority)

army Strategic Forces Command

Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/army-orbat-div.htm


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

School of Infantry and Tactics, Quetta

Si&t being the premier institution for training junior leadership of Pakistan

army, which prides itself to be the custodian of infantry combat culture. it’s main

focus is on integrated / combined arms training parameters.

Emblem of The School of Infantry and Tactics: initially, the School’s emblem

featured a bayonet fixed on a red coloured roman shield and remained in vogue

till 1956. Later, in 1957 round shaped emblem was adopted; the bayonet retained

its central place on round shield.

after independence from British rule, the infantry School was established at

Kakul in 1947. Colonel n J G Jones, MBe was appointed the first Commandant

of the School on 12 January 1948. the School was moved to its present location

at Quetta in 1948 and was assigned the responsibility of weapons training only.

tactical training was organized under the Command and Staff College Quetta.

the institution continued to function as “inFantrY SCHooL” till the end

of 1956. in January 1957, the School was reorganized and the tactical wing

from the Command and Staff College was amalgamated in it. Consequently,


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

the School was renamed as “tHe SCHooL oF inFantrY and taCtiCS”. in

1981 a research and development Wing was added to the School. the wing is

responsible for conducting trials on infantry weapon systems, reviews, tactical

doctrines and updating all military publications. Since its inception this wing

has made substantial contributions to the army in general and the School in

particular. When Pakistan began participating more effectively in united nation

Missions, a need was felt to impart pre-departure training to the officers and

men proceeding on such assignments. in order to meet this requirement, Peace

Keeping training Cell was added to the School in 1994. the cell is responsible for

educating officers of Pakistan army and friendly countries in duties related to

employment under aegis of united nations.

Location: the School is located five kilometres north-east of Quetta, the

capital city of Balochistan Province. Quetta. Located at a height of over 5000 feet

above sea level, it is surrounded by barren mountains with several peaks towering

to a height of over 10,000 feet.

Courses: the School conducts number of courses in a year with a duration

varying between 4 to 22 weeks. details are as under:-

Officers Courses l Mid Career Course- 20 weeks duration (6 weeks Junior Staff Course, 13 weeks

tactics leg and 1 week nuclear Biological and Chemical defencetraining)


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Young Officers CourselWeapons Portion- 9 weeks (4 weeks Small arms, and 5 weeks Heavy Weapon

Course)ltactical Portion- 12 weeks (8 weeks Basic infantry Course for infantry and

other arm officers,5 weeks advance infantry Course for infantry officers

only)

Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) CourseslJunior non Commissioned officers Course- 13 weeks (4 weeks weapon,9

weeks tactical portion)lanti tank Guided Missile Course- 6 weeksladvance Leadership Course- 8 weekslnuclear Biological and Chemical defence instructors Course

Combined Coursel Mortar Course- 6 weeks (officers, Junior Commissioned officers, non

Commissioned officers)lSniper Course- 4 weeks (officers and non Commissioned officers)

Specialised Courselunited nations Peace Keeping Course- 6 weeks lin situ training (2 x weeks) of units earmarked for united nations Peace

Keeping at their respective locations.

Source: official Website, School of infantry and tactics, Quetta http://www.sitquetta.edu.pk/

index.htm

SeCtion iV

reGionaL neiGHBourHood


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Cent



cLAWs


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Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan

DR. DAVID j. KILCULLEN ä Senior Fellow

Center for a new american Security

The Afghan Campaign in Contextthe first thing to realize about afghanistan, in the context of counterinsurgency,

is that it isn’t one. to be sure, an insurgency is one component of our problem

in afghanistan today, and therefore a counterinsurgency response is one

necessary component of our effort there. But the effort is much broader than

counterinsurgency.

in my opinion it is best understood as a stability operation: the insurgents

matter primarily because they de-stabilize afghanistan, and they are only one

of several things that de-stabilize the country. Bad behavior by government

officials, corruption and abuse by officials and by local power-brokers as well as

within the international aid effort, deliberate de-stabilization by afghanistan’s

neighbors, and a thriving illicit drug trade are also critically important de-

stabilizing factors. if the taliban were to disappear tomorrow, and these other

issues were not addressed, then a new taliban would emerge within months to

take the place of the old, as the underlying drivers of conflict – corruption, abuse

and foreign de-stabilization – would not have been addressed. this, in fact, has

actually happened twice already in afghanistan. the international community

defeated the taliban in 2001 and again in 2003-2004 only to see the movement

re-invigorate and spread once again. in my judgment, what is driving the conflict

is a cycle of instability, which we could summarize as follows: afghanistan is

experiencing a cycle of increasing instability and violence, with four key drivers:l Corruption and criminality in the government, societal elites and the

international assistance effort, which enables and encourages


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l bad behavior by government officials and power-brokers, which in turn

creates l popular rage and disillusionment, which empowers the insurgency.l the war against the insurgents creates opportunities and incentives for

corruption and criminality, driving the cycle onward.

Because this is a cycle, each element in the problem must be addressed

concurrenty, not in sequence. this implies that extremely strenuous efforts at

government reform, countering corruption and improving accountability are,

or should be, key components of the campaign, alongside efforts to counter

the insurgency. the problem is not the insurgents alone, it is the instability

they create, along with the other drivers of instability. We need to address that

instability directly, if we ever hope to make the country stable enough so that we

can leave without thereby destabilizing the broader region.

State of the CampaignWe are currently experiencing four major problems in afghanistan, most of

which are well-known and of long standing. at the political level, our most critical

problem is the credibility, viability and legitimacy of the afghan government. in

this form of warfare you are only as good as the government you are supporting,

and this is a government which lacks credibility in the eyes of many afghans, lacks

legitimacy in the eyes of many in the international community, and therefore

needs extremely substantial reform if it is to be a viable partner.

at the strategic level, the critical problem is the timeline – the anticipated

July 2011 deadline to begin handing over control for security to the afghan

government. this deadline makes every other problem a crisis, it prompts the

afghan population to sit on the fence because they believe we are leaving and

they fear being targeted by the taliban once we leave, it undermines confidence

on the part of the Karzai government and so encourages disunity and the seeking

of peace terms with the taliban, it creates a fear of abandonment on the part

of the northern alliance commanders which may encourage thoughts of civil

war or secession, it encourages us to continue seeking short-term, quick-fix

solutions, and it is deeply damaging to economic confidence.

at the operational level, the key problem is the continuing active safe haven

in Pakistan for the afghan taliban. unless this safe haven begins to be seriously

addressed, the taliban can survive tactical defeat in afghanistan, retreat to their

safe haven and await a favorable opportunity to return to the fight once we

leave.


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at the tactical level, the key problem remains lack of resources: the lack

of sufficient troop numbers (especially afghan troop numbers) to provide

permanent security presence to the bulk of the population, the lack of good-

quality police, the lack of local civilian officials who are both competent and

locally legitimate, lack of certain key military enablers and civilian specialists.

all these problems must be addressed as a matter of extreme urgency if we

wish to turn the campaign around. all these problems, with the exception of the

timeline, are long-standing issues in the campaign. and all these problems will

require congressional leadership of a very high order.

Relevant New Developmentsi would like to conclude by drawing the committee’s attention to certain new

developments that may influence your deliberations. Firstly, at last week’s Kabul

conference, there was significant discussion of a 2014 timeline for the afghan

government to assume complete security responsibility. i believe this is a positive

development as it extends the timeline into somewhat more realistic territory –

but the damage to afghan public confidence created by last year’s announcement

of the July 2011 deadline will remain unless specifically addressed. Second,

the district Stabilization Framework now being pursued by uSaid and the

uS Military represents a significant development – focusing on stability in its

own right, at the local level, and applying a concerted effort to target sources of

instability.

third, the committee should note that the afghan parliamentary elections

are currently scheduled for 18th September 2010, with approximately 2,500

candidates running (roughly 405 of them women). Candidates are already

experiencing intimidation and targeted killing from the taliban, and from corrupt

power brokers – this is an important inflection point in the campaign, especially

in the light of last year’s disputed Presidential elections, and thus getting it

right is extremely important. this will require resources and strong pressure for

accountability and security.

Fourth, although civilian casualties remain a very troubling aspect of any

counterinsurgency campaign, the committee should note that significant

progress was made in some aspects of this problem under General

McChrystal’s leadership. in the twelve months to June 2010, 94 afghan

civilians were killed in coalition airstrikes, compared to 226 in the preceding

12 months. Several thousand innocent civilians were killed by the taliban in

the same period.


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Finally, the committee may wish to consider the issue of negotiations with

certain key leadership elements of the insurgency. there is nothing necessarily

wrong with talking to the enemy as such – most successful counterinsurgencies end

in a negotiated solution, after all – but it is critically important that we talk from a

position of strength, and i do not believe we are in such a position of strength, given

the problems in the campaign that i already outlined. a focus on reconciliation/

reintegration at the local level, as distinct from a “grand bargain” with taliban

leadership, is more appropriate at this stage.

Source: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Kilcullen_Senatetestimony.pdf


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Time has come to accept the de facto partition of Afghanistan

bRAhmA ChELLANEy ä July 18, 2010

The Sunday Guardian

as the afghanistan war approaches its 10th anniversary, it is a reminder that

this is the longest foreign war in american history. the u.S. war effort is clearly

faltering, to the extent that afghan President Hamid Karzai has started exploring

the possibility of cutting his own deal with the taliban.

if defeat is beginning to stare the u.S. in the face, it is largely because of

President Barack obama’s botched strategy. obama has designed his twin troop

surges not to militarily rout the afghan taliban but to strike a political deal

with the enemy from a position of strength. But as Cia director Leon Panetta

admitted recently about the taliban, “We have seen no evidence that they are

truly interested in reconciliation.”

Why would the taliban be interested in negotiating a deal with the americans

when obama publicly declared, just weeks after coming to office, that he was

interested in a military exit from afghanistan? the taliban and their sponsors,

the Pakistan military, simply want to wait out the americans.

unable to bring the taliban to the negotiating table, the obama

administration is searching for credible options to fend off defeat. While the

u.S. has no cost-free option, its least bad option, according to robert Blackwill,

is to accept the de facto partition of afghanistan. Blackwill, who served as u.S.

ambassador to india, deputy national security advisor for strategic planning

and presidential envoy to iraq in the George W. Bush administration, says in

an article that de facto partition offers the only alternative to strategic defeat.

that option means that the u.S. will end ground operations in afghanistan

but use air power and its special forces to attack taliban strongholds in

afghanistan’s Pashtun-dominated south and east while ensuring that the


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

non-Pashtun northern and western afghan regions retain their present de

facto autonomy.

Blackwill has picked up the de facto partition idea from M.J. akbar, who has

been advocating it for a while. this idea meshes with the thesis this writer has

been propounding that the way to contain the scourge of international terrorism

is to stop treating as sacrosanct the existing political borders of afghanistan and

Pakistan. there is continuing reluctance in the international policy discourse

to face up to a central reality: the political border between these two problem

countries has now ceased to exist in practice.

the so-called durand Line, in any event, was an artificial, British-colonial

invention that left the large Pashtun community divided into two. Set up in 1893

as the border between British-led india and afghanistan, the durand Line had

been despised and rejected by afghanistan for long as a colonial imposition.

today, that line exists only in maps. on the ground, it has little political,

ethnic and economic relevance, even as the afghanistan-Pakistan region has

become a magnet for the world’s jihadists. a de facto Pashtunistan, long sought

by Pashtuns, now exists on the ruins of an ongoing islamist militancy but without

any political authority in charge.

the disappearance of the af-Pak political border seems irreversible. While the

writ of the Pakistani state no longer extends to nearly half of that country (much

of Baluchistan, large parts of the north-West Frontier Province and the whole

of the Federally administered tribal areas), ever-larger swaths of afghanistan

are outside the control of the government in Kabul. the Pakistani army has lost

increasing ground to insurgents in the western regions not because it is weaker

than the armed extremists and insurgents but because an ethnic, tribal and

militant backlash has resulted in the state withering away in the Pashtun and

Baluch lands. Forced to cede control, the jihadist-infiltrated Pakistani military

and its infamous inter-Services intelligence agency have chosen to support

proxy militant groups, in addition to the taliban.

the international reluctance to come to terms with the new reality is because

of the fundamental, far-reaching issues such acceptance would throw open.

it is simpler to just keep up the pretense of wanting to stabilize Pakistan and

afghanistan within their existing political frontiers.

take u.S. policy. as if determined to hide from this reality, Washington is now

pursuing, at least outwardly, a military approach toward afghanistan through a

troop “surge” and a political strategy toward Pakistan centered on the tripling of

non-military aid. the plain fact is that the entire war effort has been focused on


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the wrong side of the durand Line. a forward-looking af-Pak policy demands

consistency in approach toward these two interlinked countries and recognition

of the 2,640-kilometer durand Line’s disappearance. the ethnic genie cannot be

put back in the bottle.

to arrest further deterioration in the afghan war, the u.S. military needs to

focus less on al-Qaeda — a badly splintered and weakened organization whose

leadership operates out of mountain caves — and more on an increasingly

resurgent taliban that operates openly and has sanctuaries and a command-

and-control structure in Pakistan.

the obama administration complains that a weak, corrupt government

in Kabul is driving afghans into the taliban’s clutches. So, it has sought to do

business directly with provincial governors and tribal leaders and seek their help

to set up local, iraq-style militias to assist the u.S. forces. Yet in Pakistan it is doing

the opposite: propping up a shaky, inept central government while pampering

the military establishment that is working to undermine the civilians in power.

despite the generous u.S. aid, the 2010 Failed States index ranks Pakistan as the

10th most failed state on earth.

Let’s be clear: Pakistan and afghanistan, two artificially created states with no

roots in history that have searched endlessly for a national identity, constitute

the most dangerous region on earth. they have emerged as the global epicenter

of transnational terrorism and narcotics trade. additionally, Pakistan is where

state-nurtured terrorism and state-reared nuclear smuggling uniquely intersect.

Yet, as if the forces of terror can be boxed in, the u.S. is now scaling back

its objective to regionally contain rather than defeat terrorism — a strategy that

promises to keep the af-Pak problem as a festering threat to global security.

Given that this region has become ungovernable and borderless, it seems

pointless to treat the existing political frontiers of afghanistan and Pakistan

as sacrosanct when the af-Pak fusion term itself implies the two are no longer

separate entities. the time has come to start debating what kind of a new political

order in the Hindu-Kush region could create stable, moderate, governable

and ethnically more harmonious states. accepting the de facto partition of

afghanistan can serve as a first step in that direction.

Source: http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!4913C7C8a2ea4a30!1227.entry


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Website Leaks Thousands of Afghan War Docs

ANDREW LEbOVICh ä July 26, 2010

Foreign Policy

the website WikiLeaks.org released roughly 92,000 government documents

related to the war in afghanistan from 2004-2010 yesterday evening, after giving

the documents to the new York times, the Guardian, and Germany’s der Spiegel

weeks ago (nYt, Guardian, Guardian, der Spiegel, nYt). Composed in large

measure of “secret” reports and cables from the u.S. military, the initial review of

the documents reveals new details about multiple aspects of the war, including

civilian casualties caused by international forces, the increased use of sometimes

unreliable armed drones, Pakistan’s alleged role in supporting various taliban

and militant factions and suspicion of iranian involvement as well, secret special

operations task forces that hunt taliban and al Qaeda leaders, formerly unrevealed

reports that the taliban may have used heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles

against coalition helicopters, and increased evidence that afghan government

corruption is undermining efforts to win over the afghan population (Wash Post,

aJe, Cnn, Guardian WSJ, atlantic, danger room, Guardian, Guardian).

the collection also documents the alarming rise in taliban use of improvised

explosive devices (ieds), noting that in the period in question that ieds alone

killed approximately 7,000 afghans (Guardian). and C.J. Chivers has a must-read

piece closely examining reports from Combat outpost Keating, the isolated post

in e afghanistan that would eventually be nearly overrun by taliban after it had

been ordered to close (nYt).

Many of the reports document civilian casualties and links between current

and former elements of Pakistan’s inter-Services intelligence (iSi) and the taliban

and al Qaeda (Guardian, nYt, WSJ). details of civilian casualties come from 144

reports filed on different incidents, including last September’s u.S. airstrike on

a gasoline truck in Kunduz that killed scores of civilians, and incidents where

american, French, British and Polish forces fired on or shelled afghan civilians


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

(Guardian, Guardian). the reports also note high-level cooperation between the

iSi and militants, from training to supporting plots to assassinate afghan President

Hamid Karzai, and an allegation that former iSi head Hamid Gul met with three

presumed al Qaeda representatives in South Waziristan to plan a suicide bombing

against u.S. forces (nYt, Guardian). However, much of this reporting came from

single informants and afghan officials hostile to the iSi, leading the Guardian’s

declan Walsh to write that the reports, “fail to provide a convincing smoking gun

for iSi complicity,” in aiding the insurgency (Guardian).

american and Pakistani officials condemned the document’s release

(Bloomberg, aJe, aFP, BBC, nYt). the leak comes as House and Senate

democrats are debating how to approve additional funding for the war (Lat).

and the documents also emerge when afghanistan’s neighbors have grown

increasingly worried about closer relations between afghanistan and Pakistan,

a fact that may change due to political pressure generated by the documents’

release (Wash Post, Guardian, WSJ).

Back and Forthu.S. forces searched furiously this weekend in afghanistan’s Logar province after

two u.S. navy personnel went missing Friday (Lat, Wash Post, nYt). While u.S.

officials said the men were still listed as missing, a taliban spokesman said and

afghan officials confirmed that one sailor was killed in a firefight, while taliban

forces were detaining the other (Cnn, Wash Post, WSJ, Lat, Bloomberg).

the taliban took control of the village of Barg-e-Matal in the isolated e afghan

province of nuristan on Saturday, for the second time in recent months (tolo,

Wash Post). reports Sunday night indicated that u.S. and afghan forces were

engaged in combat with taliban elsewhere in the same district, and the afghan

defense Ministry said afghan forces had retaken the village (aP).and the afghan

government will investigate reports that an unidentified rocket struck a village in

Helmand province, killing 40-45 civilians (dawn).

Arrivals and DeparturesChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff adm. Mike Mullen took a whirlwind trip

to india, Pakistan and afghanistan this weekend, where he urged a crackdown

on militant groups like Lashkar-e-taiba and the Haqqani network, toured nW

Pakistan by air, and expressed the u.S. commitment to afghanistan and support

for President Karzai’s plan to reconcile some taliban elements (Voa, rFi, Cnn,

toi).


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in a ceremony marked by ViPs, humor, and some regret at the way his

career ended, Gen. Stanley McChrystal retired from the u.S. army on Friday

in a ceremony at Ft. Mcnair (Lat, Wash Post). and a new study of 15 months

of data from afghanistan has concluded that McChrystal’s restrictive rules

of engagement curbing air strikes and operations led to a drop in insurgent

violence in some areas of afghanistan (BBC).

Drones, Drones, Dronestwo suspected u.S. drones struck a house in the angoor ada area of South Waziristan

Saturday, killing at least 16 fighters of unknown nationality (et, BBC, aJe, Cnn). three

subsequent strikes occurred Sunday, one in Shaktoi just inside South Waziristan,

another the other near Miram Shah in north Waziristan, killing at least 19 fighters,

and a third also reportedly struck targets in South Waziristan (BBC, aP, dawn, WSJ).

these strikes would mark 101 under obama, and 50 this year.

elsewhere, Pakistani forces claim to have killed 34 militants in bombing

raids in Kurram and orakzai agencies, while in the naushehra district of Khyber-

Pukhtunkhwa province, the taliban allegedly killed the son of the province’s

information Minister, who was openly critical of the group (dawn, aP). a suicide

bomber struck near the minister’s home Monday, killing at least seven but

missing the minister, who was not home at the time (aP, dawn, aJe, et). Partisan

killings continued this weekend in Pakistan’s financial capital of Karachi (dawn,

daily times, Geo tV). and Pakistani officials separately acknowledged that

failed times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad met with Pakistani taliban leader

Hakimullah Mehsud and other leading figures (aFP).

at least 30 Pakistanis have been killed in flooding in the southwestern province

of Baluchistan, while the aP reports on Pakistan’s worsening water crisis (Cnn,

aP).

Peace Through FruitSecretary of State Hillary Clinton’s offer last week to help Pakistan export mangos

to the u.S. is only the latest instance of using mangoes to bridge gaps between

Pakistan and others (aBC). the u.S. will help finance a $21 million program to

upgrade Pakistan’s mango farming and processing infrastructure, though it is

unclear if that will help the image of the u.S. in the country.

Source: http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/26/daily_brief_website_leaks_thousands_of_

afghan_war_docs


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Strategic Culture and Threat Perception of Afghanistan

RSN SINgh ä august 9, 2010


afghanistan has geographical interface with energy-rich West asia and Central

asia as also with nuclear capable China and Pakistan. its direct interface with

india is precluded by Pakistan occupied Kashmir. nonetheless, afghanistan

remains an important factor in india’s security calculus.

the export of terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir from afghanistan has been

the most pressing concern for india. the role played in the hijacking of an indian

aircraft by islamic fundamentalists demonstrated the level of viciousness that the

taliban regime had acquired. a friendly and stable government in afghanistan

can mitigate much of india’s security concerns.

afghanistan shares a 76 km boundary with China, 936 km with iran, 2,430

km with Pakistan, 1,206 km with tajikistan, 724 km with turkmenistan and 137

km with uzbekistan. this 1,240 km long (east to west) and 565 km wide (north to

south) mountainous (50 per cent country above 2,000 mtrs) country has seriously

impacted on the security sensitivities of all its neighbours.

afghanistan’s destabilisation has engendered the movement of a large

number of refugees (approximately 6 million) to iran, Pakistan and tajikistan.

the presence of refugees in these countries and particularly Pakistan has created

serious social and internal security problems, which include drug trafficking and

impetus to the clandestine arms market. even ‘Stringer’ surface-to-air missiles

supplied by the uS to Mujahideen groups during the Soviet occupation of

afghanistan were reportedly on sale.

the fundamentalist and terrorist elements in afghanistan are known to have

developed regional and global links. the islamic Movement of uzbekistan (iMu)

cadres have been receiving active support from such elements in the past. in fact,


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the iMu cadres fought alongside the taliban against the Coalition Forces. all the

Central asian States have been severely afflicted by smuggling of drugs that are

cultivated in afghanistan. the country’s destabilising potential is enormous.

Historically, afghanistan’s mountains are characterised by a number of passes

of great strategic importance, including the Khyber Pass (1,027 mtrs) leading

to the indian subcontinent. Between Quetta (Pakistan) and Pakistan’s border

with China, there are more than 200 passes leading into afghanistan, of which

nearly 50 per cent are motorable. the existence of these passes had facilitated

guerrilla operations by the Mujahideen against the Soviet forces. even at present,

they hold the key to the defence and security of afghanistan, especially from the

taliban forces, which have melted away in the region.

Strategically, afghanistan is of great importance to Pakistan. Pakistan has

always considered its lack of strategic depth vis-à-vis india as its greatest geo-

strategic disadvantage. a friendly and amenable afghanistan, in Pakistani

perception, can compensate for this disadvantage during hostilities with

india. Moreover, the durand Line, which demarcated the boundary between

afghanistan and British india in 1893, has always been repudiated by most of the

afghan regimes. the line divides the Pashtuns who have strong ethnic affinities

into two. in the 1980s, there were some 10 million Pashtuns in Pakistan and 6

million in afghanistan. the clamour for reunification by the Pashtuns in the two

countries could exacerbate under a non Pak-friendly regime in afghanistan. it

was because of such imperatives that Pakistan propped up the taliban regime.


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the most important leverage Pakistan has is the access to the sea that it provides

to landlocked afghanistan. For afghanistan, Karachi located at a distance of 1,700

km is the nearest and most accessible port.

So far this leverage has been ineffective due to economic regression in

afghanistan, but its potency is likely to increase as and when an economic

turn around takes place. afghanistan has some oil and gas of its own, but not

enough to qualify as a major strategic concern. its northern neighbours i.e. the

Central asian republics by contrast contain reserves, which could be critical

to future global supply. But Central asia’s energy reserves are worthless unless

they are efficiently moved and marketed. the oil and gas supply of the Central

asian republics continues to be predominantly predicated on the old Soviet

union pipeline network that terminates in russia. this dependency gives russia

a huge leverage over the Central asian States. the uS has been rooting (albeit

selectively) for alternate pipeline routes in order to extricate the Central asian

republics from russian dependence. Piping it through iran does not appear to be

a possibility given uS-iran relations. Piping it through China will be prohibitive

in cost. Potentially, the most attractive energy markets are in South asia i.e. india

and Pakistan, where demand is booming and competitors are scarce.

in fact, it would be far more profitable than pumping it west and selling it in

europe. But the pipeline network that would carry oil and gas has to necessarily

pass through afghanistan. Certain quarters allege that it was the economic

consideration, especially the interests of its oil industry that weighed on the uS

to acquiesce to Pakistan propping up of the taliban Government. Subsequently,

it was the issue of refuge provided by the taliban regime to osama bin Laden

and his al Qaeda cadres that dominated all other considerations. in the inter-

play between security and economics, the latter began to override. the 9/11

incident forced the uS to adopt a drastic military course. For the world, the

strategic importance of afghanistan from the geo-political point of view was

yet again underscored.

afghanistan has always been a robust buffer against competing influences.

the iranian revolution has had little impact on it. China was prevented from

making any inroads. Pakistan’s attempt to dominate afghanistan has been

rebuffed time and again. the erstwhile Soviet union’s southward expansion

plans were put paid to in afghanistan. the key to regional and global stability,

therefore, lies in the positive encouragement to afghanistan’s buffer status by the

international community. if afghanistan could turn positively neutral, it would

bring immense economic benefits to itself.


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Threat Perceptionafghanistan’s strategic importance and geo-political location has rendered

it a constant victim of internal and external power struggles, conflicts and

combat. it was an apple of discord between russia and Britain in the 19th

century and between uSa, uSSr during the Cold War. at the un Millennium

Summit in September 2001, the ousted (by taliban) afghan President rabbani

had lamented that “foreign interference had turned our land into a terrorist

training camp, a centre for drug smugglers and a base for spilling instability.”

Most of the regimes in afghanistan have been vulnerable to machinations

by vested powers. Historically, there has been no external power that has

exercised a benign influence on the country. even during the uSSr’s decade-

long physical occupation of afghanistan in the ‘80s, the efforts at development,

administration and governance were ideology dominated.

While the uS may have achieved its strategic aims in arming the Mujahideen

during the Soviet occupation, the afghan society as a consequence degenerated.

it gave a fillip to islamic fundamentalism and gun culture, which arguably

culminated in the rise of the taliban and subsequently 9/11. it is no wonder,

therefore, that socially and economically the country has remained stagnant.

afghanistan continues to be extremely vulnerable to religious, political and

economic manipulation by regional and extra-regional powers.

afghanistan is home to several ethnic linguistics and tribal groups. rivalry

and armed hostilities have been common between them. Historical and

geographical factors have contributed to the preservation of its diversity. in the

‘80s afghanistan experienced a most drastic decline in its population. nearly

one-third of the population fled the country. even the ‘90s were characterised

by civil war and unrest. the country continues to suffer from internecine

warfare, acute poverty, a decaying infrastructure and its lands pock marked

with landmines.

the estimated 28.7 million population of afghanistan is composed of

various ethnic groups i.e. Pashtuns – 44 per cent (predominant in southeastern

parts), tajik – 25 per cent (west, northwest interior and northeast), uzbek – 8

per cent (northern borders) and Hazara – 10 per cent (central afghanistan). the

remaining 13 per cent constitute turkmen, Baloch and others. the many diverse

ethnic groups have not been able to psychologically integrate themselves into

a nation. the policies of various afghan governments have been such that one

or the other ethnic group has invariably felt marginalised and alienated. For

more than 200 years (1748-1973) all the kings who ruled afghanistan were of


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Pashtun extraction. even the taliban Government was overwhelmingly Pashtun

dominated.

it is indeed the first time in afghanistan’s history that the (present)

government, even though an interim one, has disproportionate representation

of tajiks and uzbeks. of the 38 Generals chosen by defence Minister, Fahim in

February 2003, to constitute the general staff of the army, 37 were tajik. after the

victory of the northern alliance over taliban, such a reaction was expected, but

in the long run an inequitable power structure can prove to be self-destructive.

nation building cannot be achieved by marginalisation and parochialism. the

warlords who are in government positions have been showing a great deal of

reluctance in amalgamating their militias into the national army. there is always

the danger that in the event of a change in political and ethnic equations, the

cycle of internal attrition may recommence, thus pushing the country into yet

another period of regression. this problem is historical and traditional and poses

the biggest threat to afghanistan’s peace and stability.

Poppy cultivation in afghanistan is a major ever-growing concern for the

entire world community. drug cultivation and trafficking is not only causing

instability in afghanistan, but has also become the most important source of

financial sustenance for terrorist outfits. it is estimated that more than 70 per

cent of the world’s narcotics originate from afghanistan. the total area planted

with poppies was 1,52,000 acres in 2003 compared to 76,900 acres in 2002

and 42,100 acres in 2001. in fact, in the year 2003, afghanistan produced the

highest amount of opium since 1999, estimated at 36,000 metric tonnes. as per

a recent united nations office on drugs and Crime (unodoC) report, opium

production increased by 64 per cent in 2004 compared to 2003. this is the

highest drug production in afghanistan’s history and the largest in the world.

a quarter of afghanistan farmers are believed to be engaged in poppy

cultivation. While the farmers involved, at an average utilise 27 per cent of

their land for poppy cultivation, it accounts for 60 per cent of their income.

the increase in opium production is ascribed to persistent poverty, high opium

prices and loans from traffickers. the lack of control by the Hamid Karzai

Government in many areas of afghanistan dominated by warlords has enabled

poppy cultivation and drug trafficking to thrive. the Central asian republics

are being used as transit routes as well as selling point for drugs produced

in afghanistan. this has spawned many drug cartels and syndicates in these

countries. the security of these countries is being increasingly imperilled by this

problem. opium production also militates against the restoration of authority


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by afghanistan’s central government because it creates large incentives for the

warlords to retain their fiefdoms. Whatever the drawbacks and pitfalls of the

taliban regime, it had made some cogent moves to deal with the menace, and

did make significant headways.

Source: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/08/strategic-culture-and-threat-perception-

of-afghanistan.html

Additional Readingl america must give the south to the taliban by robert Blackwill

Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7caa5128-94f3-11df-af3b-00144feab49a.html

l end of the game by K. Subrahmanyam

Source: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/end-of-the-game/645627/0


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Unending Crisis in Nepal The Options Before India

K V RAjAN

The Tribune

any indian visitor to nepal these days would be aghast to note the depth and

intensity of nepalese resentment against india, seemingly cutting across party

lines, and encompassing vast sections of the media and civil society elite.

in Kathmandu, india is widely accused today of being patronising, arrogant,

insensitive, inconsistent and insincere. the most recent episode of the visit of

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s special envoy ran into a controversy despite

the fact that all sections of nepalese society, including the Maoists, were agreed

that his credentials for the job were impeccable and that india’s concern at the

prolonged political stalemate in nepal was justified. if eyebrows were raised, it

was because of the timing, of the fact that for some reason the host government

was not consulted on the visit, and due to insinuations that the Madhesi parties

were urged by india to be “united” — meaning against the Maoists in their bid

to form a new government.

the indian embassy has also become a special target for criticism; but this

is by no means a rare occurrence. every indian ambassador to Kathmandu —

the present writer not excepted — at one time or another has been accused

of harbouring pro-Consular aspirations. the seriousness of the charge at any

given time is usually in inverse proportion to the degree of political stability in

Kathmandu.

if nepal’s “psyche” is one side of the coin, india’s policy is the other. india’s

”two-pillar” policy towards nepal-of strengthening multiparty democracy

while supporting the monarchy — implemented with inconsistency for over a

decade, became part of history with the arrival of the Maoists and abolition of the

monarchy in 2006, a development towards which india incidentally contributed

by helping to bring the Maoists and mainstream parties together against the

Palace. When the Maoists actually emerged in the Constituent assembly elections


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in 2008 as the single largest party, india was stunned, but feigned satisfaction,

much as did Mark twain after being bashed up badly by a bully in school (Young

twain is supposed to have said proudly: “i did it! i put my nose firmly between his

teeth, and brought him down heavily on the ground on top of me.”)

unfortunately, deep down, india could not digest the prospect of the

Maoists becoming a decisive force in the evolution of “new nepal”. it,

therefore, (at least in nepal’s perception) supported the successful bid to

replace the Prachanda government last year with a rather unwieldy coalition

under Mr Madhav Kumar nepal of the mainstream CPn (uML). it has stood

by this coalition until the resignation by Prime Minister nepal recently, as

part of the uML deal with the Maoists to extend the life of the Constituent

assembly for one more year beyond May 28, when it would have expired

without completing the task of writing the Constitution.

in the absence of a coherent long-term policy suited to the evolving situation

in nepal, india’s recent actions, as nepal moved from one unsuccessful election

for a new Prime Minister to another, appeared to many to have been guided by

the need to prevent the Maoists from returning to power, rather than by any

steadfast vision of how it could assist nepal as a nation to overcome its challenges

and achieve sustainable peace.

ironically, even as india is criticised for interference in nepal’s internal affairs,

most political leaders, including the Maoists-indeed most sections of society —

seem to acknowledge the need for india to use its leverage in facilitating a freely

arrived at, nepalese-owned, end to the present crisis.

Should the Maoists be given a second opportunity on the basis of their

verbal assurances? Should india seriously explore the possibility of creating an

environment of what one could term “strategic trust” with the Maoists, in which

indian sensitivities on core issues of security concern would be respected, while

giving the Maoists space in which they adjust to the needs of being a progressively

more responsible and moderate democratic force? or should it throw its weight

behind the mainstream parties, which insist that they are not against the Maoists

coming back to power, but would like to see some evidence that this time around,

they are serious about disarming and fulfilling their other commitments under

the peace agreement? this is the dilemma india faces.

in a sense, both sides are right: the Maoists in pleading that they should not

be cornered, that it would be difficult for them to give up their only trump card-

an armed militia---without first coming to power; and the traditional parties, in

asking for a prior time-bound Maoist road-map towards transformation into a


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normal civilian party, before letting them in. Some middle ground will have to

be found.

the main task now is to save the prevailing peace and proceed with the task

of constitution building. there may be no alternative to allowing the Maoists as

the single largest party to be accommodated in the power structure on terms the

Maoists consider to be acceptable, but on the basis of credible commitments of

cooperation in the peace process. india should persevere in making whatever

contribution it can towards this end, without being unduly distracted by the anti-

indianism currently polluting the bilateral atmosphere. it may need to adjust its

diplomatic style, but should be clear about the real priorities.

even as the political situation is being tackled, india needs to think innovatively

about bilateral cooperation. the experience of the Mahakali treaty has shown

that political instability need not come in the way of developing cooperation on

the basis of transparency and cross-party consensus, nepalese ownership and

interest, and shared perceptions of a stable mutually beneficial relationship

based on trust and interdependence. a massive programme for accelerating

inclusive development in nepal, in which the Maoists as well as other parties

would have a stake and shared ownership, and for which nepal’s voters would

eventually give all of them credit, would also help address the problem of anti-

indianism that erupts every now and then, like old Faithful at Yellowstone.

an indian effort that is aimed at improving the economic prospects of the

nepalese, irrespective of the political situation, should go some way in removing

the perception that political expediency is the sole basis for indian policy. it

would also stem the increasing exodus of people from nepal by offering them

the hope of a better future in their own country.

Source: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100818/edit.htm# 4

Mr. KV Rajan was india’s ambassador to nepal from 1995 to 2000.


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Nepali Politics in the Grip of Catch-22

R.K REgmEE

Nepal News

Will the advocates of neutrality continue to take the previous stand? Will

they be indifferent towards the reality of nepal? Will they disable the people-

mandated Constituent assembly? these are the questions which are emerging

as more important for people today than how Prachanda and Poudel will

finish their race.

as the third round august-2- Prime Ministerial poll draws closer, nepali

top leaders find themselves rather tightly-gripped in what could be termed the

situation of Catch-22, the famous term coined by Joseph Heller in his novel to

mean no way out. all politicians had first taken the poll to be a solution to the

deadlock facing them, felt relieved and, therefore, passionately pursued it as

the most convenient democratic fast track to provide the country with a viable

alternative government through Legislature Parliament.

Candidates Prachanda and Poudel can neither withdraw nor secure majority

to close the chapter. none of their parties - uCPn-Maoist and nepali Congress-

can tell them to drop out of race because the measure could be suicidal in the

game of power politics. their adventure for support at bilateral, multilateral

dialogue has until thursday not been more than simple socialization.

the due process of parliament demands that voting to pick up new Premier

should continue until a successor of care taker PM Madhav Kumar nepal

emerges. nothing short of decisive result would end it. the process is indifferent

about the worries the endless voting might cause. Bypassing it would be highly

undemocratic. amending the rules could be highly opportunistic.

those who did not vote in the past two rounds appear to be determined in

making neutrality as an issue of political prestige. the CPn uML boss Jhala nath

Khanal describes his last minute withdrawal as a great sacrifice for consensus

politics and urges his fellow contestants to follow suit. the joint front of Madheshi


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parties is putting forward series of conditions as bargain for support which the

competing parties might simply not be able to fulfill.

Cause of failureWhy did the second round of voting fail to deliver results? the answer is simple:

Maoists could not campaign convincingly that Prachanda, if elected, would be a

different Prime Minister this time. they could not clarify the misunderstanding

that other parties have about them particularly their way of high-handedness in

ruling-times, acting forcibly as key- opposition party, imposing their communist

party agenda upon others and ignoring the existence of other parties in politics.

nepali Congress, in its efforts for majority votes for Poudel, could not

capitalize on its silent, obedient policy that it pursued for 13 months while

joining and somewhat blindly backing the CPn-uML-led government. it could

not win trust of non-Maoist parties about its potentiality to ultimately provide a

government with two-third majority, which is regarded as the need of the hour in

nepali politics. nC mediators also failed to communicate to non-Maoists about

the futility of political neutrality at the PM-poll.

advocates of neutrality in PM election knew what they were doing. But they

could not sympathetically analyze how their strategy might victimize the people

in the long run. the delay in electing a full fledged Premier triggers a chain of

chaotic atmosphere marked by trends such as continuing care taker government,

indifferent governance, administration without a sense of accountability,

negligence in law and order, disarrayed development works, and more suffering

for people.

negotiation-experts, taking advantage from the fresh memory of 2010-

experience of South african World Cup Football have begun to compare

Prachanda-Poudel fiasco in parliamentary poll to the football match in which

celebrity players play faithfully well. “they kick, dribble, punt, head, pass, shoot

and show all acrobatic tricks of playing the ball with passionate zeal,” they

say adding “but unfortunately all their blasts go wide of the mark; fail to score

rendering the whole game as nothing but a lacklustre event.”

The neutrality – clutchthe politicos with the neutrality –card have a great role to play at the moment. if

they do not change their strategy, the Prime Ministerial run off in the third round

would also be indecisive. it will have to go for the fourth round. this will project

the Legislature Parliament as incompetent to offer the country the minimum


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basics for a functional government. it will hurt the image of the Constituent

assembly which has already been damaged by the way politicians extended its

tenure two months ago.

a weak parliament in times when the constitution is not ready and major

issues of conflict have not been settled is not what the country needs today.

advocates of neutrality should understand this reality clearly before they act

neutral in the parliament next week. as they know well, neutrality by itself is an

abstract notion. it should always be viewed against the backdrop of time, space

and reality behind issues.

Will the advocates of neutrality continue to take the previous stand? Will

they be indifferent towards the reality of nepal? Will they disable the people-

mandated Constituent assembly? these are the questions which are emerging

as more important for people today than how Prachanda and Poudel will finish

their race. nepalese woes require indian support.

Source: http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/-featurearchive/7927-nepali-politics-in-the-grip-

of-catch-22.html


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Nepalese Woes Require Indian Support

bRIg SK ChATTERjI (RETD) ä May 24, 2010

Rediff News

india’s neighbours, the two mountain kingdoms -- nepal and Bhutan -- are a

study in contrast. While Bhutan made a peaceful transition to democracy, guided

all along by its monarch, nepal travelled a torturous route from absolute to

constitutional monarchy, and finally ordered eviction of its monarch from the

royal palace through an elected assembly.

in Bhutan, law and order is barely an issue, nepal has already plodded

through the experiences mirroring a civil war. While Bhutan exports power to

india earning substantial revenue, Kathmandu households wobble in darkness.

Bhutan offers the world a new methodology of measuring a nation’s progress:

Gross national Happiness instead of GdP. nepalese await deliverance from

pathological deficits in every walk of life; most of all, a secured future.

nepal’s painful journey to a peaceful developing state remains an elusive

dream for its citizens and a seemingly unattainable goal for its elected leadership.

the most important event in its history, the exercise in drafting of the Constitution

plods along with barely any time left for the instrument to be ready by May 28,

the deadline for the project’s fruition.

along with drafting of the Constitution the most pernicious issue that the

nepalese are faced with is the induction of Maoists into the army. With barely

3,000 plus weapons having been surrendered, the call by Maoists to enroll 19,600

men into the army is both unrealistic and amateurish. add to it the fact that the

Maoist Chief Prachanda has already been recorded on video, accepting the fact

that the party inflated the numbers of its cadre.

the elections in nepal did not provide a clear mandate, though the Maoists

would have surprised even their own mentors, the intelligence agencies, as

also possibly the nepalese educated middle class by the magnitude of their

electoral success. it was a clear reflection of how the rank and file nepalese


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had been denied his basic needs for decades. However, having been sworn in

as prime minister, the immature handling of power and the rush with which

Prachanda tried to usher in changes that affect the fundamentals of nepalese

social fabric, would have distanced them from the very segment that voted

their party to single largest party status.

an equally immature move by the Maoists was the calling of an indefinite

general strike recently, which caved in within a week of its initiation. it

inconvenienced none more than the poorer sections of nepalese society. now,

with the Constitution writing process having remained incomplete, nepal is to

decide on either accepting a presidential writ followed by another election, or

continue with the present dispensation. of course, on the sidelines is the threat

by Prachanda to unilaterally propound a Maoist-authored Constitution. the

implications of such a move can only be more corrosive.

though the nepalese prime minister has been categorical about his

government not resigning, it may not be altogether unwise to go in for another

election rather than continue to remain in power with a wafer thin majority. the

primary reason for considering another round of polling stems from the fact that

the Maoists seem to have lost the charm that they had, because of their inept

conduct, post the formation of the present Parliament. in fact, the Maoists could

return with a sizably lesser number of seats; a setback that will induce some

realistic thinking in the party.

as far as the possibility of Maoists returning to the jungle and restarting

their insurgency is concerned, firstly, returning to the bush has never been an

easy option for any insurgent movement whose cadres have lived a comfortable

life for some time and whose leadership has been enjoined legitimate political

power. Secondly, a fair proportion of arms in its inventory have been surrendered,

though, it is of course not possible to believe that all weapons have found their

way to government armouries.

Lastly, there would also be dissensions within the party, with some

of the leaders perceiving the fact that changes in a party’s fundamental

strategy for gaining power cannot be undertaken every other day. india

influencing events in nepal has been viewed sceptically for long. as

such, the requirement for the indian establishment is to be muted and

circumspect, while addressing the needs of all nepalese stakeholders,

foremost being the people. it needs to be accepted that the transition to

democracy and writing a new Constitution, with the backdrop of a strong

insurgency with leftist leanings, cannot be achieved so very soon. it will


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be best to let nepal decide its course while facilitating harmonisation

between its contesting power blocks.

Simultaneously, it is essential to keep Prachanda from reaching a state of

desperation. it would be judicious to relieve him of what weighs on him the most

-- the rehabilitation of his party’s cadre. However, Prachanda needs to come to

terms with the fact that no army can absorb insurgents en mass. the nepalese

army has not said no to absorb Prachanda’s bush fighters.

they want it to be done as per the laid down recruitment standards for nepalese

to join their army. it is definitely not possible to absorb an old insurgent who was

given the rank of a brigade commander in Prachanda’s force as a brigadier in the

nepal army. officers in no professional army can be political appointees. the

nepalese army also wants other avenues of rehabilitation utilised.

nepal cannot continue to drift. the volatility shimmering in the mountain

kingdom can barely withstand more turmoil. it is in our and nepalese interests to

address the fundamental problems in that state, keeping nepalese sensitivities at

the core. there is the need to facilitate the growth of nepalese industry, address

the population’s basic needs like the massive power cuts, revive tourism, deny

footholds to fundamentalist elements of Lashkar-e-tayiba’s ilk, and, most of all,

create an atmosphere of trust between its domestic political stakeholders.

the trust deficit that we also face in nepal’s streets needs to be addressed

through a properly orchestrated information campaign, backed by liberal

investments.

Source: http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/may/24/nepalese-woes-require-indian-support.

htm


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The Thimpu SAARC Summit An Overview

Asian Tribune

though the just concluded 16th South asian association for regional Cooperation

(SaarC) summit in thimphu got a bit overshadowed by the india-Pakistan Prime

Ministers’ long delayed meeting, the joint declaration “towards a Green and

Happy South asia,” adopted by the countries cannot be underestimated.

after the summit on april 28 and 29, there was a statement on the main theme

of climate change, and a promise for planting ten million trees in the region to

mitigate deforestation. also, the leaders of eight SaarC countries (afghanistan

included) agreed to establish an inter-governmental expert group on climate

change to monitor regional policy implementations. Besides, the leaders vowed

to collectively combat terrorism and expressed concern over the threat which

jeopardizes ‘peace, security and economic stability’ of the region. the Maldives

would be the next venue for the next Summit scheduled in 2011.

they also resolved to commission a study, for presentation at the 17th summit,

on ‘’Climate risks in the region: ways to comprehensively address the related

social, economic and environmental challenges’’. the SaarC leaders sought a

fresh approach to global climate talks. they also wanted a observer status for

the regional grouping at the Cancun conference in Mexico on global warming

to be held later this year. it was decided all SaarC countries will undertake

advocacy and awareness programs on climate change promote the use of green

technology and best practices to promote low-carbon sustainable and inclusive

development of the region.

the statement also stressed on evolving national plans, and where

appropriate regional projects, on protecting and safeguarding the archeological

and historical infrastructure of South asia from the adverse effects of Climate

Change. a SaarC inter-Governmental Marine initiative will be commissioned

to strengthen the understanding of shared oceans and water bodies in the

region and the critical roles they play in sustainable living to be supported by


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the SaarC Coastal Zone Management Center. the member-states also resolved

to commission a study, for presentation to the 17th summit, on ‘’Climate risks

in the region: ways to comprehensively address the related social, economic and

environmental challenges’’. the inter-governmental expert group on Climate

Change shall meet at least twice a year to periodically monitor and review the

implementation of this statement and make recommendations to facilitate its

implementation and submit its report through the senior officials of SaarC to

the SaarC environment Ministers.

Sri Lanka’s role as the current Chairman came for praise by the Bhutan

Prime Minister. Manmohan Singh found time to briefly interact with the leaders

present in Bhutan. of course, the highlight of the summit was that indian Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh chose to start all over again the dialogue process

with Pakistan. on the margins of the thimphu summit, he agreed to begin talks

with Pakistan that were suspended after the Mumbai attack in november 2008.

in return, he has got assurances from his counterpart, Yousaf raza Gilani, that

islamabad will indeed act against the sources of anti-india terrorism on Pakistani

soil. a section of the Congress is not sure of the sustained peace process, in the

background of Pakistan delinking terror with other issues like Kashmir. Like

his two predecessors, inder Kumar Gujral and atal Bihari Vajpayee, the PM

believes that a durable peace with Pakistan is critical for the realisation of india’s

aspirations of peace and prosperity at home, and a larger role in world affairs.

there is also the question if india was nudged by the uS not to focus on only

terror in talks with Gilani. But in a big step, the Foreign Ministers of the two

countries are to meet soon.

Source: http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/05/03/thimphu-saarc-summit-overview


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Why India Needs Myanmar on Its Side

gURmEET KANWAL ä July 26, 2010

Rediff News

‘China has made rapid advances into Myanmar.... radars have been reported

to have been erected on Myanmar’s west coast to monitor indian missile tests,’

notes Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (retd). Senior General than Shwe, Myanmar’s

head of State, is currently on his second visit to india in six years. He comes at a

time the international community has initiated the first steps to gradually open

up to Myanmar and elections are due in that country later this year.

aung San Suu Kyi, perhaps the most famous prisoner in the world after

nelson Mandela, met Western diplomats in Yangon, including united States

assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell in november 2009. Speculation

was rife at that time that sanctions would soon be lifted. india’s relations with

Myanmar, a devoutly Buddhist country, have been traditionally close and friendly.

Geographically, india and Myanmar share long land and maritime boundaries,

including in the area of the strategically important andaman and nicobar islands

where the two closest indian and Myanmarese islands are barely 30 km apart.

it is not so well known that Myanmarese ports provide india the shortest

approach route to several of india’s north-eastern states. the first decade of the

21st century has witnessed growing strategic engagement between india and

Myanmar. according to the ministry of external affairs, relations with Myanmar

have become truly multi-faceted, ‘with cooperation in a range of developmental

and other projects in the areas of roads, power, hydro-carbon, oil refinery,

transmission lines, telecommunications and information technology.’

india’s national interest lies in a strong and stable Myanmar that observes strict

neutrality between india and China and cooperates with india in the common

fight against the insurgencies raging in the border areas of both the countries.

For india, Myanmar is a bridge with Southeast asia. in fact, it is a bridge between

the countries comprising the South asian association for regional Cooperation


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(where Myanmar has observer status) and the association of Southeast asian

nations.

the key drivers of the india-Myanmar strategic relationship are cooperation

in counter-insurgency operations and the need for india to ensure that Myanmar

is not driven into Chinese arms through indian neglect of its security concerns

and arms requirements. indian insurgent groups (nSCn, uLFa and the Manipur

rebels among others) have been operating out of bases in the weakly controlled

areas across the borders of the indian states of Manipur and Mizoram and

Myanmarese rebels, primarily the Chins and the arakanese, have often taken

shelter on the indian side.

it is in the interest of both countries to cooperate with each other to fight these

insurgent groups in a coordinated manner. in april-May 1995, during operation

Golden Bird, a joint operation, approximately 40 insurgents were been killed

and a huge cache of arms was recovered. Since then the two armies have been

cooperating with each other for mutual benefit. in november 2001, the Myanmar

army had raided several Manipuri rebel bases, rounded up almost 200 rebels and

recovered 1,500 guns.

india-Myanmar cooperation is also essential to control narcotics trafficking

and to curb the proliferation of small arms in the region. China has made rapid

advances into Myanmar and established close political, military and economic

relations. Myanmar provides China the shortest land route access to the northern

indian ocean. China has signed a long-term agreement with Myanmar for the

exploitation of its hydrocarbon reserves and for the transportation of oil and gas

through a 1,100 km overland pipeline from Kyaukryu port in Myanmar to the

border city of ruili in Yunnan. this pipeline will reduce the distance by 1,200 km

and make China less dependent on the Malacca Straits.

China is also developing Sittwe as a commercial port on the west coast. it is

natural that Chinese naval activity in the Bay of Bengal will soon follow. China has

also been stepping up arms sales to Myanmar as other nations, including india,

are loath to sell offensive military hardware to the country. China is reported to

have told Myanmar to take artillery guns from north Korea in return for rice.

radars have been reported to have been erected on Myanmar’s west coast

to monitor indian missile tests. this is not a positive development, as it will

further increase Myanmar’s dependency on China. However, indications from

the military regime are that it does not want China to exercise undue influence

in Myanmar’s internal affairs.

recent reports of Myanmar’s quest for the acquisition of nuclear weapons


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from north Korea (with Chinese and Pakistani help), though uncorroborated,

are of concern to india as nuclear weapons in the hands of yet another military

regime would not be conducive to long-term strategic stability in South asia. if the

news about Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions is true, the international community

must adopt all measures necessary to prevent the emergence of another nuclear

weapon State in the region and india must help.

While india is concerned with the slow pace of progress on the issue of

national reconciliation and the consequent delay in installing a democratically

elected government in power in Yangon, the strategic scenario compels india to

balance its security concerns with its support for the emergence of democratic

rule. it is only through close engagement that india can promote leverages with

the ruling regime to nudge it gently towards national reconciliation. india must

also increase its economic footprint in Myanmar, particularly in areas that are

contiguous to india. the military regime is firmly entrenched in power -- the

monks’ agitation notwithstanding. Sanctions and other diplomatic pressures

have not worked in the past and are unlikely to work in the future.

the fear psychosis of Myanmar’s military junta is being exploited by China

and this cannot be in the interest of either india or any of the other democracies

of the free world. it is important to end Myanmar’s isolation and to allay its

fears that the whole world is ganging up against it. india and the other regional

powers can play a positive role in the re-entry of Myanmar into the international

mainstream so that it can be nudged towards becoming a strong and stable

democracy that is also mature and responsible and willing to play by the rules

and traditions governing international relations. Perhaps multi-national talks,

which include india, China, Japan, aSean and other stakeholders, would be the

best way forward.

Source: http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jul/26/why-india-needs-myanmar-on-its-side.

htm


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A China-North Korea-Myanmar “Axis” in the making?

RAjARAm pANDA

idSa Comment

the suspected north Korea-Myanmar nuclear links are a potential destabilizing

factor in india’s immediate neighbourhood. even as the international community

is battling to find ways and means to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating

table, the Six-Party talks from which it walked out in april 2009, a leaked un

report has claimed that north Korea is defying un sanctions and is engaged in

exporting nuclear and missile technology to such countries as iran, Syria and

Myanmar.1 if Myanmar’s nuclear weapons quest is indeed true, the immediate

concern for india is finding another nuclear state along its eastern border, which

will drastically alter the security situation in the region.

the un report, which was prepared by a panel of experts that monitors

sanctions against north Korea after it conducted the nuclear weapons test

in 2006 and again in 2009, accused Pyongyang of using shell companies and

overseas criminal networks to export the technology. the 47-page report that

was leaked in new York in late May 2010 listed north Korea’s sanctions violations,

including four cases of arms exports. the panel accused Pyongyang of using “a

number of masking techniques.” Pyongyang was found to be “falsely labelling

the contents of shipping and giving inaccurate information about their origin

and destination.” as an impoverished economy desperate to earn some foreign

exchange, Pyongyang is suspected of exporting “nuclear and missile technology

with the aid of front companies, middlemen and other ruses.”

earlier, during a visit to the thai resort island of Phuket in July 2009 for the

regional security meeting, uS Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had expressed

concerns about the growing military cooperation between north Korea and

Myanmar and the possibility of nuclear links between the two.


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as in the case with north Korea, some military officers in Myanmar have

defected to other countries and revealed startling details about the military

junta’s nuclear weapons development programmes. However, the junta is not yet

appropriately positioned to launch such a programme due to lack of technology

and resources, and therefore the programme remains primitive at the moment.

Yet, the junta’s intention seems to be clear and the ultimate goal seems to be to

acquire nuclear weapons and make Myanmar a nuclear weapon state.

the report was commissioned by the dissident group democratic Voice of

Burma (dVB) and was co-authored by robert Kelly, a former senior nuclear

inspector with the international atomic energy agency. after reviewing the

photographs and equipment in Myanmar, Kelly came to the conclusion that the

equipment was “for chemical processes needed to make uranium compounds

in various stages of processing, such as uranium hexafluoride for enrichment

and bomb reduction vessels for uranium metal.” However, Khin Maung Win, the

deputy director of the oslo-based dVB is of the opinion that the military junta is

“still far from developing a nuclear weapon because they are using very primitive

technology.” this led to the cancellation of a planned visit by uS Senator Jim

Webb to Myanmar, who felt that the visit would be “unwise and potentially

counter-productive.”2 Webb, the chairman of the uS Senate Foreign relations

Subcommittee on asia and the Pacific, and a leading proponent of greater

engagement with Myanmar, seemed to have been persuaded by the report’s

findings and felt that the time was inopportune to undertake the visit.

the main source of information for the report was Major Sai thein Win, who

defected from Myanmar, and whose evidence corroborated rumours already

in circulation. Win, seen as an “army deserter’ by Myanmar since February

2010, had a degree in power engineering from State technical university in

Moscow, and is believed to have smuggled out files and photographs of critical

sites in Myanmar3 Kelly described Win “as Myanmar’s version of Mordechai

Vanunu, the israeli nuclear technician who revealed details of the Jewish

state’s nuclear programme in 1986.”4 the photographs provided by Win could

as well have been faked since modern technology makes it possible. But since

the pictures were consistent with other available information, the suspicion

appears credible. However, the view that Myanmar’s nuclear programme is

“poorly planned, unrealistic” and that it is seeking “the highest and most

difficult technologies, such as laser isotope separation, using machine-shop

drawings of unprofessional quality and photo evidence of crude items” seems

closer to the truth.


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the reaction from the military junta was of denial. the ruling junta denounced

the allegations as “baseless accusations that are politically motivated” and

clarified that it had no intention of building an atomic bomb. it brushed aside the

report expressing Western concern that Myanmar has nuclear cooperation with

north Korea. the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign affairs accused the

West of aiming “to undermine the political process as Myanmar is striving for

democracy by holding general elections this year.”

though Yangon severed ties with north Korea in 1983 following a failed

assassination attempt by north Korean agents on former South Korean President

Chun doo-Hwan during the latter’s visit to Myanmar, their bilateral ties have

warmed up in recent years. the junta has admitted to inking a deal with russia

to build a nuclear reactor for its civilian sector, though the reactor was never built

because of insufficient resources. Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign affairs rejected

the charge that the junta ignored un Security Council sanctions resolutions by

permitting a north Korean vessel to dock at a port in Myanmar in april 2010,

clarifying that the ship was unloading and loading cargo unrelated to the targeted

weapons activities. the ministry’s statement reminded the West that Myanmar

is a member of the nPt and the Southeast asia nuclear-Weapons Free Zone

treaty and “has been actively participating in the united nations Conference on

disarmament in Geneva as a founding member.”5

Myanmar which has been under military rule since 1962 has been accused

of violating a un Security Council ban on north Korean arms exports imposed

in June 2009. When the uS assistant Secretary of State for east asian and Pacific

affairs Kurt Campbell visited Myanmar in May 2010, he expressed concern about

Myanmar’s links with north Korea with respect to an arms shipment.

as noted earlier, india has a legitimate reason to worry about the military

junta’s nuclear plan. an axis of sorts seems to be emerging between China, north

Korea and Myanmar, which is detrimental to india’s interests. the situation gets

further complicated as Myanmar’s links with China gets further strengthened.

notwithstanding the economic bonhomie between india and China, there exists

huge trust deficit between the two as China expands its strategic reach and builds

up close ties with countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar.

as much as 87 per cent of the total investment in Myanmar has come from

China.6 China’s investment in Myanmar is focused mainly on strategic projects

such as in energy and natural resources. Chinese corporations are involved in 90

hydropower, mining and oil and gas projects across Myanmar. the Chinese aim

seems to be procuring gas and oil for its landlocked southern Yunnan province.


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“the pipeline is designed to open the indian ocean for fuel shipments and act as

a means to circumvent the congested Straits of Malacca, through which over 70

per cent of China’s current oil and gas imports travel.7 a study undertaken by Lex

rieffel suggests that as far as Myanmar is concerned, its earnings from the growing

energy sector will double in the next five years.

China’s real intentions can probably be measured from the fact that while the

uS imposed sanctions on the import of precious stones from Myanmar, China’s

presence in that country’s gem mining and export industry soared. Like in the

case of north Korea, Myanmar has emerged as one of China’s closest allies in

recent years. though China claims to be pursuing a policy of non-interference in

the domestic affairs of both north Korea and Myanmar and does not tie politics

to business, tacit Chinese endorsement of the policies pursued by Pyongyang

and military junta in Myanmar has emboldened them to persist with policies that

are detrimental for peace and stability in the region. the possible emergence of a

China-north Korea-Myanmar ‘axis’ will be an unwelcome prospect for india.

Source: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/aChinanorthKoreaMyanmaraxisinthemaking_

rpanda_170610


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Consolidating Bangladesh

bhASKAR ROy

South asia analysis Group

the Bangladesh opposition’s reaction to the indian $ one billion credit line

(dhaka, august 07) and indian Finance Minster Pranab Mukherjee’s brief visit to

dhaka for the signing occasion revealed the visceral anti-indianism that remains

even today among a significant section of people in Bangladesh led by the BnP

and the Jamaat-e-islami (Jei) and their affiliates.

the twenty year credit extendable by another five years for specific important

infrastructure projects comes with an interest rate of 1.7 percent. this rate is lower

than even that of the international financial institutions including the World

Bank and the asian development Bank (adB). it is the largest credit line india

has given to any country. not written in the agreement, however, is the possibility

that new delhi could write off part of the credit if dhaka found it difficult to

repay with interest. this is a political decision resting with new delhi, but would

depend upon bilateral relations. on the other hand, if the BnP-Jei opposition

returned to power in Bangladesh they could annul this agreement.

this leads to the question as to why the BnP-Jei alliance is willing to see

their country suffer underdevelopment than work with a friendly, large neighbor

much more developed, and capable and willing to assist? Briefly, the answer is

complex and lies in the history of partition of the subcontinent, and liberation of

Bangladesh in 1971. all these decades one was witness to Muslim-Hindu divide,

fight for secularism by the liberal and intellectual sections, and cultural and

linguistic divide between Pakistan (West Pakistan) and Bengalis of Bangladesh

(east Pakistan).

it is difficult to unravel in a sentence or a paragraph the issues, conflicts,

revenge and emotions involved from 1947 till now, and with no end in sight.

the cumulative result is, however, here to see. the language movement of

1952 (precursor to the liberation war), liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 when,

india was forced into a role to end Pakistan army’s pogrom against Bengalis,


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assassination of Prime Minister and founder of Bangladesh Sk. Mujibur

rehman in 1975, and overturn of the country’s secular constitution of 1972

by the 5th amendment influenced by Gen. and President Zia-ur-raheman,

late husband of Begum Khaleda Zia.

While there is no question of today’s Jei leaders having collaborated with the

Pak army to exterminate Bengalee sympathetic to independence, history will

have to dig deep to find out the truth about some Bengalee officers who joined

the liberation force, the Mukti Bahini, against the Pak army. topping the question

list is why Zia-ur-reheman, a Sector Commander of the Mukti Bahini, whose

questionable claim to first announcing the independence of Bangladesh, turn

pro-Pakistan including opening the gate to political rehabilitation of the Jei, the

perpetrators of horrendous crimes against humanity in 1971.

the BnP-Jei led four party alliance which ruled Bangladesh from 2001-

2006 under Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, may go down in history as the

darkest period of Bangladesh. under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia with the Jei

manipulating in the background, Bangladesh came close to be designated as a

terrorist state. Pakistan and its intelligence agency the iSi, was given a free run

of the country. three attempts were made on Sk. Hasina’s life and the sponsors

were allegedly acting on iSi’s advice. the HuJi, which is sponsored by the iSi was

involved along with a BnP Minister in the first attack. the third attack in 2004

which almost killed Sk. Hasina also directly involved serving BnP Ministers.

Sk. Hasina is the main living symbol of the liberation war, being the daughter

of Sk. Mujibur rehman, and also the break up of Pakistan in which the Pak army

suffered a humiliating defeat. the Pakistani military establishment has never

forgiven the Sk. Mujibur family for that, until Sk. Hasina is removed from the scene.

in Sk. Hasina they also sense of revival of the old Bangladesh-india closeness of

1971-75 period. therefore, the fact that Sk. Hasina’s life is under pervasive threat

needs no emphasis. under Khaleda Zia’s leadership, the Bangladeshi agencies

and the Jei not only brought in the iSi, but the iSi brought with them the most

sought after international criminal dawood ibrahim. dawood lives in Karachi

under the protection of the iSi and fronts its dirty work in many cases. Khalida

Zia’s elder son, tareque reheman, hobnobbed with dawood, the iSi, along with

Bangladeshi politicians like Jei amir, Matiur reheman nizami, to wage terrorist

war against india at the behest of the Pak army and iSi. the details have been

meticulously recorded by the liberal Bangladesh media. recently, nizami and

two other top leaders who are under arrest on multiple charges, confessed that

they funded terrorist organizations especially the outlawed Jamaatul Mujahidin


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Bangladesh (JMB) to create chaotic conditions in the country to scuttle the war

criminals trial.

as Prime Minister from January 2009, Sk. Hasina’s immediate priorities

included eradication of terrorism from Bangladesh, and extend cooperation to

the region to root out this scourge. She has scored significant success. But she

has a long battle ahead. the Pakistani agencies are not going to relent. they do

not want to lose Bangladesh as a terrorist launching pad against india, and they

have their friends in Bangladesh dedicated to this cause. there are basically two

major forces working in Bangladesh. one is the force led by Sk. Hasina and her

progressive political partners who are focussed on development and stability.

the other is the one led by the BnP and Jei determined to work at Pakistan’s

behest against india, and establish a surrogate relationship with Pakistan at the

state level, at whatever the cost to the country.

it is, therefore, no surprise to hear Khaleda Zia describe the indian credit

line as “suicidal” and her combine of Jei and others describing access to india to

transport indian goods through Bangladesh to its north east states as threatening

the security of Bangladesh. the BnP-Jei combine appear most worried with the

growing india-Bangladesh relations, as this one cooperation has the potential

to expand to include other countries of the sub region for mutual beneficial

cooperation. along with india, nepal and Bhutan will have access to Bangladesh

ports through indian territory. there will also be trade routes for mutual trade and

development. the most important would be power inputs from nepal and Bhutan

to Bangladesh’s power starved infrastructure. in conjunction, the connectivity

could extend through Myanmar to South east asia creating a large swath of

countries cooperating and reciprocating mutually in distributed development.

the hub of this connectivity will be Bangladesh, and if this is achieved under the

awami League led government it could sound the death knell for the contrarians.

People need jobs, food education for their children, and security of their lives

which they lost for a period when the Jei and BnP backed JMB terrorists went on

a murderous rampage from august 17, 2004.

the pot of gold at the end of this rainbow would be creation of huge number of

jobs in Bangladesh in a number of Sectors. Such developments will not only help

blue collar worker but also white collared workers – engineers, architects, executives,

accountants and what have you. For the opposition, these developments are a

huge challenge. they may have their dedicated cadres, but it is the people that

matter at the husting. the Jei has started losing support because of the widespread

news about their leaders’ involvement in terrorism. the BnP has no development


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plan to offer as an alternative. But pushed to the wall, these elements are going to

hit back ferociously.

Here is Sk. Hasina’s challenge. Since she became Prime Minister for the

second time, Sk. Hasina has demonstrated maturity having learnt from the

past. diplomatically, she scored high points in substance, convincing foreign

governments and businesses that the Bangladesh her government was creating

was one devoted to seeking development and stability, eschewing religious bigotry,

sectarianism and terrorism. the move to return to the 1972 constitution albeit

with some sentimental religious issues but with secularism at its foundation has

found resonance in the democratic states and governments across the world.

domestic politics, however, is a great challenge. there are historical and

contemporary ghosts that have to be exorcised. the most important among

those, Sk. Mujibur rehman’s assassination has been addressed finally. But this

does not complete the process of exorcism as the demons are there to overturn

all. in terms of natural justice, the murders of Sk. Mujib’s kitchen cabinet in

november 1975, and that of pro-liberation intellectuals must be brought to a

conclusion quickly. in this context, it must be noted that anti-liberation and anti-

awami League intellectuals and legal luminaries are growing in a meticulously

planned surge.

the trial of war criminals must be concluded urgently. it is no secret that there

are foreign countries who are opposed, some of which support Pakistan and

hold Bangladesh expatriate jobs as a bargaining chip. nGos from some of these

countries, on the other hand, fund religious extremism and obscurantist islamic

terrorist organizations in Bangladesh even today. Prime Minister Sk. Hasina is

the only person who can take a call on this. Connected with the external pressure

are those figures, political parties and religious nGos in Bangladesh who are

involved in attempts to eliminate and change the direction of Bangladesh. Sk.

Hasina needs to consider the following very carefully. if she goes ahead with the

war criminals trial and eradicate the obscurantism, Bangladesh may suffer some

economic consequences. But given the global situation enabling to-day, that

may not happen.

on the other hand, if she gets paralyzed to inaction by such “possible” threats,

Bangladesh will be overwhelmed by the resurgence of the force she is fighting.

the onus is on Sk. Hasina. Sk. Hasina, the awami League, and their liberal and

progressive political supporters need to turn the clock back to 1971 and the initial

years of independence to reassess who their friend were during those years, and

look to the future. History is the age old teacher to chart out the future.


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of course, geopolitics is ever changing, depending upon self interest. But

there are also constants in geopolitics for similar reasons. Pakistan has been

discussed in this paper and islamabad’s strategy on Bangladesh and india is not

going to change for a long time. revenge for 1971 is written in stone in the GHQ,

rawalpindi. China did not intervene in the indo-Pak war over Bangladesh for

its own domestic compulsions at that time, including perceived strategic threat

from Japan. otherwise, Beijing was in support of islamabad, and recognized

Bangladesh diplomatically only after Sk. Mujibur rehman was assassinated and

Pakistan accorded diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh. Beijing, therefore,

recognized Bangladesh only when a pro-Pak and anti-india government came to

power in dhaka through an illegal coup.

China’s 1971 policy towards Bangladesh still endures. it is well known among

strategic analysts and some Bangladesh politicians that Beijing decided in 2004 to

support the BnP-Jei combine for the next elections as they perceived an awami

League government would allow in indian influence. they were supporting

Pakistan’s policy. But the astute Chinese took a very sophisticated path. they

invaded Bangladesh through perfectly legal infrastructure and military assistance

to maintain their hold.

the ever changing americans have a very complex strategic policy. in 1971 or

the 1970s, Pakistan and China were cold war allies against the Soviet union and

india. today, it has changed to new areas, with terrorism as the highest priority

and reentering asia. Leaving india aside, the Soviet union now represented by

russia, came to nascent Bangladesh’s assistance in more ways than one. there

are others who empathized with Bangladesh’s liberation struggle from Western

europe to South east asia and Japan. they have not changed their positions.

it was a wise decision for the Bangladesh government to go with russia to

construct its first nuclear power project. russia is a more experienced and has

the demonstrated expertise to construct nuclear power plants abroad. it is better

equipped than China to upgrade Bangladesh’s armed forces development, an

issue Sk. Hasina has promised to enlarge. China has been heavily dependent on

russia for its own military modernization. it is for dhaka to decide whether it will

go to the main vendor or the secondary vendor.

the above are just small pointers that Bangladesh should consider. it must

also look closely under a microscope the ultimate interest of each country which

are wading into Bangladesh. dhaka must also introspect why Myanmar, which

is so dependent on China, refused to agree to China’s proposal for road-cum-

waterway from Kunming of China through Myanmar into the indian oceans.


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in the agreement Beijing offered to nay Pyi daw, there were ingredients that

directly assaulted Myanmar’s sovereignty. it is a critical time for Bangladesh to

introspect deeply keeping history in mind, and diversify its foreign relations. it

is upto dhaka, a sovereign and independent country, to decide on its policies. at

the end of it the awami League lead government has to prove itself to the people

of the country.

Source: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers40/paper3987.html


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Pranab Mukherjee’s Visit to Dhaka Towards Great Integration?

hARUN UR RAShID

institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

the publicly-stated purpose of india’s Minister for Finance, Pranab Mukherjee’s

visit to dhaka on 7 august 2010 for about six hours is to witness the signing

of the uS$1 billion loan agreement to Bangladesh for 14 projects related to

infrastructure, river dredging and power transmission from india. the mainstream

opposition party BnP, however, strongly criticized the agreement for harsh and

unfair conditions of the loan, alleging that the projects covered by the loan would

benefit india more than Bangladesh and called upon the government to cancel

the loan agreement, while the government of Sheikh Hasina stoutly defended

the loan which would be used for infrastructure of interconnectivity and would

make the country a hub of economic activities within the region.

analysts say the real purpose of Muhkerjee’s visit is to calm down the

anxiety within the Bangladesh government leaders about the painfully slow

implementation of matters that were accorded priority in Bangladesh, in the ‘joint

communiqué’ released after the Bangladesh Prime Minister’s visit to new delhi

from 10-13 January. it may be recalled that the visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister

to new delhi this year ushered in a new era of opportunity in bilateral relations

and put in place a comprehensive framework of cooperation in all possible areas.

While india gives top priority to transit facilities through Bangladesh

to northeastern india and denial of sanctuary for indian insurgents in

Bangladesh, Bangladesh’s top priority rests on water sharing, and water

management of common rivers (54 rives flow to Bangladesh from india),

implementation of land border agreement of 1974 and duty and hassle free

access of Bangladesh’s products to india’s market. With regard to bilateral trade,

both countries agreed “to address removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers”


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and establishing border hats on selected areas including on the Meghalayan

border. Bangladesh wanted to open the border hat on Bangladesh-Meghalaya

border on 14 april (1st day of Bengali Year) but could not be opened. recently

Bangladesh Commerce Minister expressed his disappointment at the delay in

establishing border hat and removing tariff and non-tariff barriers

People expected that by this time at least an ad-hoc water sharing accord on

the teesta river would be concluded and no Bangladeshi national would be killed

because it was agreed that respective border guards would “exercise restraint”

to prevent loss of lives but as of mid July, 101 Bangladeshi nationals have been

killed by the BSF. Furthermore, nothing tangible occurred with regard to the

implementation of the 1974 Bangladesh-india Border agreement.it is noted that

although extensive discussions are taking place at the government-to-government

level on bilateral issues, the public in Bangladesh want results on the ground.

as the saying goes, the proof of the pudding lies in eating. Many Bangladesh

people believe that india with its vast resources and more than a trillion dollar-

economy, would be forthcoming in following the ‘Gujral doctrine’ which

means strict reciprocity is not intended for smaller neighbours and whatever

accommodation india is able to give, it provides without reciprocity. regrettably

many in Bangladesh take india’s promises with caution because in the past,

either the promises were not delivered or were put into cold storage due to the

federal-state bureaucratic maze in india.

in the book ‘the Jamdani revolution’ (2009), india’s former Foreign Secretary

and High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Krishnan Srinivasan writes: “the political

will and attention span have been lacking in new delhi…in other words the

indian government has tended to allow the hardliners and Hindu chauvinists to

set the agenda for its policy towards Bangladesh, when a more rational approach

would have been to come to some understandings on dhaka’s agenda”

We hope that the visit of the indian Finance Minister will bring benefits to

the Bangladeshi people in facilitating the early implementation of core bilateral

issues; cutting off the bureaucratic hurdles in india. Finally, the state of overall

indo-Bangladesh relations has to be viewed in the context of the public opinion

in Bangladesh. Public opinion will be easily won over when benefits become

evident from india’s action on the ground. the sooner it is done; the better it will

be for promotion of bilateral relations.

Source: http://www.ipcs.org/article/south-asia/pranab-mukherjees-visit-to-dhaka-towards-

greater-integration-3208.html

Mr harun ur Rashid, Former Bangladesh ambassador to the un, Geneva


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Lessons from the War in Sri Lanka

VK ShAShIKUmAR


Conduct of Operationsthis is how the Sri Lankan government described (through a Ministry of defence

Press release) the war strategy of its defence forces on May 18, 2009 after the

annihilation of the Ltte.

“Security forces have marked a decisive victory in the humanitarian operations

launched against terrorism by killing almost all senior cadres of the Ltte. the

security forces commenced this humanitarian operation in august 2006 by

liberating the Maavil aru anicut with the objective of wiping out terrorism from

the country. an area of 15,000 square kilometres was controlled by the Ltte

terrorists by 2006. now the forces have completely liberated the entire territory of

Sri Lanka from the Ltte terrorists. after liberating the eastern Province from the

clutches of terrorism on the 11th of July in 2007, the troops launched the Wanni

humanitarian operation to liberate the innocent civilians from the terrorists in

2007.”

“the operation was launched by three battle fronts. on March 2007, the

57th division of the army under the command of Major General Jagath dias

commencing its operations from Vavuniya marched towards the north. they

gained control of the Kilinochchi town on the 2nd of January this year, which

was considered as the heartland of the Ltte. in parallel to this, the 58th division,

then task Force one, commanded by Brigadier Shavendra Silva commenced

its operations from the Silavathura area in Mannar in the western coast of

the island. after capturing Poonaryne and gaining total control along the

western coast the division moved towards Paranthan. Subsequently, the 58th

division then captured elephant Pass, Paranthan, Kilinochchi, Sundarapuram,

Pudukudiyiruppu and finally the eastern coast of the country. the 58th division


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has recorded the most number of victories against the Ltte during the course

of the humanitarian operation. the 59th division of the army, commanded

by Major General nandana udawatta opened another battle front in Welioya

area in January 2008. the troops of this division achieved a land mark victory

on the 25th of January this year by capturing the Ltte administrative hub,

Mullaitivu.”

“Meanwhile, the 53rd and 55th divisions of the army supervised by Major

General Kamal Gunarathne and Brigadier Prasanna Silva respectively, conducted

their operations beyond the Muhamale and nagar Kovil Forward defence Line.

they consolidated elephant Pass and Chalai, marking the liberation of the entire

Jaffna peninsula from the terrorists. a total of five divisions and four task Forces

were engaged in operations against the Ltte in the recent past. entering the last

phase of the Wanni humanitarian operations troops of the 53rd, 55th, 58th and

59th divisions jointly conducted the world’s largest hostage rescue operation

and liberated nearly 263,000 civilians by yesterday (May 17, 2009) morning. With

liberating all the civilians held as hostages by the Ltte the military operations

against the Ltte have reached a decisive juncture with the security forces

entrapping the top Ltte rankers to a small patch of land in Mullativu. the army

has launched massive attacks targeting leaders of the Ltte since last night.

almost all top Ltte leaders were killed in these attacks and the troops have also

recovered all their bodies.”

“the air Force, the navy as well as the Police also contributed a lot for the

success of these operations. destroying of ten ships of the Ltte considered as

floating arms storages could be defined as another significant achievement by the

navy. this helped a lot to destroy the military strength of the terrorists. the navy

also implemented a special marine security programme to avert possible escape

of Ltte leaders via sea routes. Parallel to this, the air Force carried out accurate

air raids on identified Ltte targets. indicating the accuracy of the air raids of the

Sri Lankan air Force, on 2nd of november 2007, then Ltte political head thamil

Selvan and four senior Ltte cadres were killed in an air raid. By transporting

injured troops and their requirements the air Force played a pivotal role in the

fight against terrorism. Parallel to this the Police secured the law and order of

the country by averting Ltte activities to disrupt the day to day life in the south.

detaining Ltte suspects and recovery of large hauls of weapons by the Police

was another reason for the success of the Wanni humanitarian operation.”

this official version of the war operations by the Ministry of defence was

released after being vetted by defence Secretary Gothabaya rajapakse. Careful


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planning and crafty military tactics led to the swift and surgical defeat and

elimination of the Ltte. even as the Ceasefire agreement (CFa) was called off in

January 2008, the Sri Lankan armed forces were well stocked with multi-barrel

rocket launchers, heavy artillery, precision guided missiles and bunker busters.

Between 2002 and 2005 the recorded violations of the CFa by the Ltte stood at

3,800 while the government committed 350 violations. after two major attacks

by the Ltte in the north and the east and the assassination attempt of General

Sarath Fonseka by a pregnant suicide bomber, President Mahinda rajapakse

ordered the commencement of military operations to militarily eliminate the

Ltte. in 2007 the east was liberated and Karuna, a Ltte child soldier who grew

up to take over as the terror outfit’s eastern Commander, and then eventually

broke away in 2004, was made the Chief Minister of the eastern province.

By december 2008 the Sri Lankan air Force had launched 400 air strikes. the

Ltte realized that it had under-estimated the resolve and resources of the Sri

Lankan army and that it just did not have the depth to fight a conventional war. So

as the military advanced, the Ltte retreated taking the civilians with them. When

the troops marched into Kilnochchi, the HQs of the Ltte, it was a ghost town. By

april 2009 the Ltte along with its civilian captives were boxed in a 12 km stretch

of coastal land, which the government declared as a no Fire Zone. it was declared

as a civilian safety zone, which basically meant that the military would not resort

to heavy artillery bombardment inside this zone to avoid civilian casualties. the

daring military operation to rescue the entrapped civilians and the eventnal

killing of the top Ltte leadership is described by the Sri Lankan government as

the “biggest humanitarian operation” in the world. it is indeed one of the most

fascinating surgical military operations ever undertaken. eventually 300,000

civilians were liberated and housed in the Menik relief Camps in Vavuniya. in

the early days of april 2009 the official government estimate was merely 70,000.

So how did the military prise open the human shield, liberate the civilians

and get to the Ltte leadership? Here’s the inside story. By the third week of april,

the Ltte along with their civilian captives were bottled up in a rectangular 12 km

no Fire Zone (nFZ) coastal stretch, with the nanthi Kadal (lagoon) on the West

and the indian ocean on the east. the navy had set up a marine cordon sanitaire

and the army laid siege on the land with troops of the 59 division covering the

West and Southern sides of the lagoon and the 53, 55 and 58 divisions choking

north and north-West approaches. the objective of the military operation was to

bifurcate this last coastal stretch under Ltte occupation to facilitate the escape

of entrapped civilians. the long coastal stretch from South of Chalai, once a


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major Sea tiger base, to Karayamullivaikai was already under army control. on

april 18, 2009 Lt General Sarath Fonseka spent his day at the Field Headquarters

confabulating with his core team of army commanders and studying the aerial

surveillance visuals taken by the unmanned aerial Vehicles (uaVs) of the

Sri Lankan air Force. But what was critical to the success of the army was the

stupendously brave and accurate ground intelligence gathering by troops of the

Long range reconnaissance Patrol (LrrP). elements from LrrP had infiltrated

the nFZ where the Ltte was holed up disguised as civilians and these army

intelligence operatives provided the crucial inside information that eventually

proved crucial for the success of the military operations.

From the Field HQ in Vauniya, General Fonseka hooked up on the army line

with Brigadier Shavendra Silva, one of the illustrious war heroes of Sri Lanka. He

told Brigadier Silva that the plan to launch the “biggest hostage rescue operation”

in the world was final and that he was being tasked to execute it. Brigadier Silva,

commander of the 58 division, by then had already accumulated a trail of glorious

battle milestones from Mannar in the West Coast to Mullaitivu in the east.

the 58 division, positioned just 300 metres away from the nFZ, had faced

the brunt of Ltte suicide attacks for more than a week as the Ltte desperately

tried to prevent the army’s final assault. Waves of suicide bombers tried to

breach 58 divisions defences at Velayanmadam, Puthumatallan and east of

Puthukkudiyirippu. But the brave soldiers of this division continued their

formidable and aggressive hold of the Forward defence Line. Brigadier Silva was

given a free hand to put together his best team for the final assault on the Ltte

to free the trapped tamil civilians. the 9th Gemmu Watch Battalion, 8th Gajaba

Battalion, 11th Sri Lanka Light infantry Battalion, the 2nd Commando Battalion

under the command of Colonel ralph nugera and 1st Special Forces Battalion

under the command of Colonel athula Kodippili were handpicked for the rescue

operation.

the plan was simple: Breach the Ltte’s defence Lines and create a safe

passage for the entrapped civilians to escape. But this was easier said than

done because the Ltte had built a three kilometer earth wall or bundh from

Puthumatallan to ampalavanpokkanai. Behind this earth wall were the bulk of

the civilians who were being used as human shields. three attack formations

were constituted. the alpha Group comprising the 2nd Commando troops along

with the 8th Gajaba Battalion were tasked to attack the northern edge of the earth

bundh. the Bravo Group comprising 1st Special Forces and the 11th Sri Lankan

Light infantry were to assault the southern edge of the earth bundh and the 9th


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Gemmu Watch Battalion, the Charlie Group, was tasked to clear a safe passage

for civilian egress.

on a dark Sunday night, april 18, at 11.40 pm, the rescue operation began as

all assault formations equipped with night vision devices quietly waded through

the nanthi Kadal lagoon, advancing deep into enemy lines. the troops were given

2 am as the H Hour to reach the earth bund. the moment the troops reached the

bundh they engaged the Ltte guard positions on the earth wall. the Ltte offered

stiff resistance firing mortars and heavy artillery, but were soon overpowered by

superior tactics and reinforcements from the 58 division. even as the troops

overran Ltte defences, the Charlie Group of the 58 division cleared mines and

ieds and provided covering fire for the civilians to rush over to government

controlled territory secured by 55 division. immediately, check points were set

up to screen the escaping civilians to ensure that Ltte suicide bombers didn’t

cross over in the melee. as dawn broke on april 19, more than 41,000 civilians

had crossed over into army controlled area north of Puthumatalan. on same day

again in the dead of the night the second phase of the operation was launched to

cut off the Ltte’s access to the coast as troops of the 58 division tried to link up

with troops of the 55 division advancing along the coast.

the link-up of the two army divisions eventually happened by Wednesday –

april 21, 2009. By then more than 100,000 civilians had escaped from the Ltte’s

clutches. amongst them were daya Master, Ltte media spokesman and George

Master, english translator of the Ltte leadership. as they crossed over the army

check point at Puthumatalan, a civilian spotter employed by the army identified

them and immediately alerted the troops. the duo were immediately taken

into custody and transported to Colombo for interrogation. Hundreds of Ltte

fighters disguised as civilians also crossed over into army controlled area. Many

including child soldiers were apprehended. at the last count more than 3,000

Ltte cadres were arrested as they tried to cross over from the nFZ as civilians.

By now the Ltte had been squeezed into a 5 km zone with its access to sea

severely constrained. exactly a month after the rescue operation was launched

the Ltte was exterminated on May 18, 2009. two days before this momentous

development the Ltte tamely admitted defeat, marking the end of asia’s longest

running civil war that left approximately more than 70,000 dead in pitched

battles, suicide attacks, bomb strikes and assassinations. on May 16, 2009

Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the Ltte’s chief of international relations, said in a

statement on the pro-rebel tamilnet website that the war was at “its bitter end”.

“We have decided to silence our guns. our only regrets are for the lives lost and


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that we could not hold out for longer,” he added, calling for peace negotiations.

But the military refused to let up in their offensive, saying troops were pushing

on to recapture “every inch of land” held by the Ltte, which at that point in time

was estimated at less than a square kilometre (half a square mile) of jungle. Forty

eight hours later it was all over as the government information department sent

out a text message to cell phones across the country announcing the killing of

Prabhakaran along with his top deputies, Sea tigers Commander Soosai and

Ltte’s intelligence chief, Pottu amman.

The Eight Fundamentals of Victory

First Fundamental: political Will

the first fundamental of this approach was unwavering political will. rajapakse

clearly conveyed to General Sarath Fonseka: “eliminate the Ltte.” to the outside

world he conveyed the same message differently: “either the Ltte surrenders or

face, their end.”

Second Fundamental: Go To HellFollowing from the first, the second principle of rajapakse’s ‘how to fight a war

and win it’ is telling the international community to “go to hell.”

Third Fundamental: No Negotiations

naturally, the third fundamental was no negotiations with the Ltte. “the firm

decision of the political hierarchy not to go for talks with the Ltte terrorists

until they lay down arms had contributed significantly to all these war victories,”

affirms Fonseka.

Fourth Fundamental: Regulate media

With just one version of the war available for the media to report, the Sri

Lankan government ensured an unidirectional flow of conflict information.

the information put out by the Ltte’s official website, tamilnet, could not

be independently verified on the ground because access to the war zone was

regulated and controlled. this was a vital fourth principle in the strategic matrix

of the rajapakse model.

Fifth Fundamental: No Cease-Fire

rajapakse’s brother, Gotabhaya rajapaksa, who consistently maintained that


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military operations would continue unhindered. “there will be no ceasefire,” was

Gotabhaya’s uncompromising message. the clear, unambiguous stand enabled

other prominent personalities in the rajapakse cabinet to speak in a uniform

voice.

Sixth Fundamental: Complete Operational Freedom

Gotabhaya rajapakse’s appointment to the post of defence Secretary was made

precisely to break this political logjam. Gotabhaya had a military past. He had

taken voluntary retirement from the SLa. He had retained his long standing

friendship with Lt General Sarath Fonseka. Gotabaya met Fonseka and asked

him, “can you go for a win”? the battle-hardened veteran said “yes, but you will

have to permit me to pick my own team.” Gotabaya and Mahinda agreed. “We will

let the military do its job, while we hold the fort, politically,” they told Fonseka.

this deft political arrangement worked because both, Gotabhaya and Fonseka,

were recruited and commissioned into the army at the same time.

Seventh Fundamental: Accent on young Commanders

the other critical element was empowering young officers as GoCs to lead the

battle. “i did not select these officers because they are young. But they were

appointed as i thought they were the best to command the battle. i went to the

lines and picked up the capable people. i had to drop those who had less capacity

to lead the battle. Some of them are good for other work like administration

activities. therefore, the good commanders were chosen to command this

battle.

Eighth Fundamental: Keep your Neighbors in Loop

the seventh fundamental was india and an unsigned strategic partnership

agreed by new delhi and Colombo. india played a crucial part in the Sri Lanka

military operations by providing intelligence and other kinds of tactical support.

“the moral support, whatever support india gave us, is what they should have

given to us. it is their duty to help us in this stage,” is President rajapakse’s

rather candid admission of the indian involvement. “i can’t demand, i shouldn’t

demand anything from a neighboring country. i request.” the first significant

request from Colombo was naval intelligence and intelligence on the movement

of Ltte owned merchant navy vessels.

Source: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2009/10/lessons-from-the-war-in-sri-lanka.htm


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China’s Foray into Sri Lanka and India’s Response

R N DAS ä august 5, 2010

idSa

When the four-day visit of Sri Lankan President Mahinda rajpaksa to new

delhi from 9 June was followed by the visit of the Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang

dejiang to Colombo from 12 June, it looked like a co-incidence. But analysts and

observers would not agree so. it was rather Sri Lanka’s fine balancing act to keep

both these mighty neigbours in good humour, while at the same time benefitting

from both.

Be that as it may, China’s foray into Sri Lanka in recent years has somewhat

heightened india’s engagement in the island nation, separated by the small stretch

of the Palk-Strait. the growing friendship between China and Sri Lanka may not

be a matter of concern to india, but new delhi cannot afford to gloss over China’s

increasing presence there. unlike india, China and Sri Lanka do not share cultural

and linguistic affinity and proximity or political culture or even affiliation to any

multilateral body like the Commonwealth. in spite of this asymmetry, China’s

strategic interest and aid diplomacy have led to close cooperation between the

two, much to the anxiety of india.

ever since the epithet ‘string of pearls’ gained currency, there have been some

concerns among strategic analysts and commentators about China’s help and

assistance in the construction of the Hambantota port on the indian ocean in

Sri Lanka. there is a perception that it may be detrimental to india’s strategic

and security interests. While the harbour is generally perceived as an engineering

marvel, analysts view it as a symbol of the growing relationship between Beijing

and Colombo with China lending $360m for the first phase of the project.

Hambontota is in the family constituency of President rajpaksa. Building

Hambontota is estimated to have cost $1 billion and it is being built in four


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phases over the period of fifteen years. the project, which envisages building oil

and gas terminals, berths and port facilities, like those at Gwadar in Pakistan, has

potential for dual use. the port in Hambontota, deeper than the one at Colombo,

is to be used as a refueling and docking station for the Sri Lankan navy. although

China and Sri Lanka claim that this is merely a commercial venture, its future

utility as a strategic asset for China cannot be ruled out.

Hambontota port is a robust example of China’s purposive engagement with

Sri Lanka which began in 1950s. a peep into the bilateral interaction between

the two countries is suggestive of how Beijing had been making efforts to court

Sri Lanka to establish its footprints there. the most glaring example of this is the

rubber- rice agreement of 1952, which has been renewed from time to time. the

agreement ‘was said to be too attractive and a boon to Sri Lanka for it not only

provided a market for its surplus rubber but obtained its access to low priced

food-grains so much needed.’ Yet another major breakthrough in the bilateral

relationship between China and Sri Lanka was the Maritime agreements of July

1963 which had provided for most favoured nation treatment for the contracting

parties’ commercial vessels engaged in cargo and passenger services to and from

these two countries or a third country.

over the years, the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka has increased so much

so that there is no major infrastructure project in which the Chinese have not

invested. it is estimated that China was Sri Lanka’s biggest source of foreign

funding in 2009, providing $ 1.2 billion, or nearly triple the $424 million given

by the number two overseas lender, the asian development Bank. Besides the

much-touted Hambantota port, other projects in which China has invested

include an oil-storage facility, a swanky airport, a coal-fired power plant and an

expressway. it is also rebuilding the main roads in the war-shattered north and

east, and constructing a modern performance arts center. it has also sold diesel

railway engines and earth moving equipments.

the relationship between the two countries received a major boost during

the recent three-day visit of 30 member delegation led by Chinese Vice-Premier

Zhang dejiang to Colombo, during which as many as six agreements were

signed. the agreements cover highways development, enhanced cooperation

in information technology and communication, development of maritime

ports and the second phase of the Hambontota Port development Project and

maintenance of the Bandernaike Memorial international Conference Hall.

Beijing offered $200 million to Sri Lanka for the second phase of the Hambontota

port. Mr. Zhang who met President rajpaksa, reiterated China’s commitment to


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the economic development of Sri Lanka. a statement issued by the Sri Lankan

President’s office described the meeting as cordial and constructive. it further

said that the Sri Lankan President thanked China for its continued assistance

in the efforts to defeat terrorism and economic and social development both

during and after the conflict. as a gesture of goodwill, Beijing recently donated

30 Chinese motorcycles to President rajpaksa’s younger brother Basil rajpaksa,

a minister in his brothers’ cabinet, for use by officials in his constituency. in the

past few years, particularly during the regime of President rajpaksa, China and Sri

Lanka have forged a comprehensive strategic relationship. it is a revelation that

President rajpaksa has visited China five times while in office and three times

before assuming the office, which recently prompted the state-owned Sunday

observer to comment that the ‘silky relationship’ has reached new heights during

the rajpaksa era.

although india has always maintained a friendly and cordial relationship

with Sri Lanka and has extended support and assistance, China’s recent inroads

into Sri Lanka have accelerated india’s engagement in the island nation more

proactively, thoughtfully and imaginatively. it is against this backdrop that the

visit of President rajpaksa to india in June and the subsequent visit of india’s

naval Chief to Sri Lanka assume importance. the most significant outcome of

the visit of the Sri Lankan President was that the two countries agreed to promote

dialogue on security and defence issues and step up high level military exchanges

and training. the two sides agreed to institute an annual defence dialogue

between the two governments and to promote the use of space technology for a

variety of societal services. india offered to extend bandwidth to set up satellite-

interactive terminals in Sri Lanka. india also agreed to assist in rebuilding the

Palay airport and the Kankesanthurai Harbour and offered its help in renovating

the duraippah stadium and constructing a cultural center in Jafna. these

proposals clearly reflect india’s eagerness to retrieve some of the lost grounds to

China.

the two leaders also agreed on establishing the Consulate-General of india in

Jafna and in Hambantota to reinforce consular cooperation and friendly links. the

independent Sunday times of Sri Lanka, referring to india’s proposal to open a

Consulate in Hambantota, commented that the indian move to open a Consulate

is ‘because of indian fear of the growing Chinese influence in Hambantota

district, particularly in view of China’s involvement in the harbour development

project. it is believed that the issue of China’s rising profile in the island nation

was raised by india during the meeting with the Sri Lankan President. rajapaksa


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is understood to have addressed india’s concern by assuring Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh that the Chinese workers would quit the island nation once

the projects are completed.

Sri Lanka’s balancing act between these two mighty neighbours is stastesmanly.

reassuring india of Sri Lanka’s time tested trust and confidence in an interview

to a leading english daily, President rajpaksa recently said, ‘we are a non-aligned

country. our neighbours are indians. i always say, indians are our relations. From

the time of asoka, we have had that culture… but that doesn’t mean we won’t get

commercial benefits from others; from China, or Japan, or whoever. they will

come here, they will build and they will go back. india comes here, they will build

and they will stay. this is the difference…”

although india is not competing with China in Sri Lanka and india’s’ narrative

with Sri Lanka has its own resonance, in view of China’s foray into the island

nation, india should do the following:

First, a visit at the highest political level either by the President or the Prime

Minister should be planned, prior to which either the external affairs Minister

or the Chairman rajya Sabha/ Speaker Lok Sabha may pay a visit leading a

delegation. there should be more exchange of Parliamentary delegations

between the two Parliaments.

Secondly, the number of iteC slots and iCCr scholarships for Sri Lankan

nationals and students should be increased. Since english is the common

language of instruction in both india and Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankans will prefer

india for many reasons including cultural and linguistic proximity.

thirdly, the SaarC Speakers and Parliamentarian Conference, which is now

defunct, should be activated to provide a platform for meetings on the margins.

Fourthly, the indian Culture Center in Colombo should come out with imaginative

programmes to showcase indian culture. Lastly, and most importantly, there

should be a strategic dialogue between idSa and Sri Lankan think tanks.

Source: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasForayintoSriLankaandindiasresponse_rnda

s_050810#footnoteref5_5xgyjjq

SeCtion V

CYBer WarFare


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Cent



cLAWs


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Counter China’s Laptop Warriors

gURmEET KANWAL

The Economic Times

Former national security adviser M K narayanan had told the times, London,

before laying down his office that China’s cyber warriors had hacked into

computers in the PMo on december 15, 2009. at least 30 computers may have

been penetrated. Last year, Chinese cyber spies were reported to have broken

into and stolen documents from hundreds of government and private offices

around the world, including those of the indian embassy in the uS.

the Chinese army uses more than 10,000 cyber warriors with degrees in it to

maintain e-vigil on China’s borders. on June 23, 2009, the uS secretary of defence

robert Gates had authorised the creation of a new military command that will

develop offensive cyber-weapons and defend command and control networks of

the uS armed forces against computer attacks.

China’s cyberwar doctrine is designed to level the playing field in a future war

with better-equipped western armed forces that rely on revolution in Military

affairs (rMa) technologies and enjoy immense superiority in terms of weapons

platforms and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (iSr), and command

and control networks.

Soon after the Gulf War in 1991, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC)

had called for a detailed study of the concept of people’s war under conditions of

informationisation, implying increasing attention to the application of it to the

conduct of conventional conflict.

Since then, the scope of the cyberwar doctrine has been expanded to

develop capabilities necessary to take control of all major networks that

drive the world’s economic engines such as banking, stock exchanges, power

distribution, transportation and telecommunications if it becomes necessary.

People’s Liberation army (PLa) analysts have called the rMa an informationised

military revolution with Chinese characteristics. the PLa is seeking to contest


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the information battle with its space-based, airborne, naval and ground-based

surveillance and intelligence gathering systems and its new anti-satellite, anti-

radar, electronic warfare and information warfare (iW) systems.

according to China’s White Paper on national defence, “in its modernisation

drive, the PLa takes informationisation as its orientation and strategic focus.”

denial of information, strategic deception and psychological surprise have for

long been an integral part of Chinese military doctrine. the Chinese are devoting

considerable time and energy perfecting iW techniques to target the western

armed forces that are becoming increasingly dependent on the software that run

computer networks and communication.

the Chinese call their pursuit of iW and other hi-tech means to counter

the overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities of the western

alliance ‘acupuncture warfare’. acupuncture — or paralysis — warfare is described

as “paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of his command, control,

communications and information as if hitting his acupuncture point in kung fu

combat”. in 5-10 years, China will develop greater depth and sophistication in its

understanding and handling of iW techniques and information operations.

With indian society increasingly dependent on automated data processing

and vast computer networks, india is vulnerable to such iW techniques. the fact

that it can be practised from virtually any place on earth even during peacetime

makes acupuncture warfare even more diabolical. india can ill-afford to ignore

this new challenge to its security. india should adopt an inter-ministerial, inter-

departmental, inter-services, multi-agency and multi-disciplinary approach to

dealing with emerging cyber warfare threats. Since no single agency is charged

with ensuring cyber security, a nodal agency must be created to spearhead

india’s cyberwar efforts under a national cyber security adviser who should

report directly to the nSa. the armed forces must be part of the national effort

from the beginning so that emerging tactics, techniques and procedures can be

incorporated into doctrine and training.

a twin-track strategy must be followed: defensive to guard india’s vulnerable

assets, such as military command and control networks and civilian infrastructure

dependent on the use of cyberspace, as well as offensive to disrupt the adversary’s

command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information,

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4i2Sr) systems, and develop leverages that

can be exploited at the appropriate time. With some finest software brains

in the world available to india, it should not prove to be an insurmountable

challenge. as for vulnerable computers like those in the PMo and the armed


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forces headquarters, the only fail-safe option is to ensure that none of them is

connected to the internet.

this is too important a field to allow the traditional indian approach —

digging heads in the sand while waiting for the threat to go away — to hold sway

and react only when the adversary has reached Panipat and is knocking on the

gates of delhi. in this case, the nothingness of cyberspace connects China’s

laptops warriors directly with delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and

Hyderabad and other indian cities, as also india’s strategic establishments.

Source: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5649399.cms


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Spy Game India Readies Cyber Army to Hack into Hostile Nations’ Computer Systems

hARSImRAN SINgh & jOjI ThOmAS phILIp ä august 6, 2010

The Economic Times

Borrowing a page from China’s art of cyber war, the government is giving shape

to an it infrastructure setup manned by a small army of software professionals

to spy on the classified data of hostile nations by hacking into their computer

systems. it workers and ethical hackers who sign up for the ambitious project

will be protected by law, says the proposal being discussed by senior government

administrators. the expertise of these professionals will be used to go on the

offensive or preempt strikes by breaching the security walls of enemy systems.

the strategy of taking the fight to hackers was drafted at a high-level security

meet on July 29 chaired by national Security advisor Shiv Shankar Menon. the

meeting was attended by the director of intelligence Bureau as well as senior

officials of the telecom department, it ministry and security agencies, documents

seen by et show. departments whose officials were present at the meeting did

not respond to et emails. the government is worried about spying and sabotage

from neighbouring countries, particularly China and Pakistan, after a spate of

assaults on its computer systems in recent times. the Citizen Lab at the university

of toronto said in april that a clique of hackers based in China had conducted

extensive spying operations in india, pilfering confidential documents from the

defence ministry. though Beijing strongly denied any role in the attacks, the

investigation pointed to the Chinese government’s tacit approval of the spying

operations. the technical reconnaissance bureau of the People’s Liberation

army that is responsible for signals intelligence collection is headquartered

in Chengdu, where the hackers had set up base. according to the government

proposal, the national technical research organisation (ntro) along with

defence intelligence agency (dia) will be responsible for creating cyber-offensive

capabilities. ntro is a key government agency that gathers technical intelligence


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while dia is tasked with collating inputs from the navy, army and air Force. the

ntro will also suggest measures to ensure legal protection to recruits, a move

that is expected to coax software professionals into joining the government group

because under the indian it act, hacking is punishable with imprisonment up

to three years, or carries a fine up to `2 lakh, or both. “even if the offense is done

on a computer on foreign soil, it is punishable under indian laws,” says cyber

lawyer Pavan duggal, adding that the it act will have to be changed for “patriotic

stealth operations”. Mr duggal welcomed the efforts to establish a hacker group,

pointing to the explosive growth in assaults on indian systems recently. Last year,

600 computers belonging to the external affairs ministry were hacked, allegedly

by Chinese groups. the hackers also managed to steal crucial documents from

the computers of the defence establishment then. Vikas desai, lead technical

lead of network security firm rSa, said the government’s efforts can be classified

as ethical hacking. “Many countries and organisations in the world already

have this kind of infrastructure,” he said. in sheer numbers at least, recruitment

may not be a problem. the country is due to produce nearly 5.71 lakh technical

graduates and postgraduates in 2010, says it lobby group nasscom. there is also

a teeming workforce in india thanks to large anti-virus and software companies

such as Mcafee, Microsoft, intel establishing r&d labs here. the government is

not taking chances, however. the nSa’s national Security Council Secretariat has

directed the Hrd and it ministries to introduce cyber security in the curriculum

of iits and education institutes. the government also plans to amplify efforts

to strengthen its cyber armour. a national testing Centre to check all types

of hardware and software being sourced by departments for spyware will be

established to prevent india’s computers from coming under attack. the nSa

has also asked the defence research & development organisation (drdo) and

dia to magnify efforts against electromagnetic-pulse bombs that can interrupt

wireless signals inside the country. it has also directed the dia to harden its

transient electroMagnetic Pulse emanations Standards, known as teMPeSt in

military parlance. Hardening teMPeSt to a geek means lowering the chances of

interception of data transferred by defence agencies on the internet. to enable

this, the government wants to involve engineers and scientists from the iits

and indian institutes of Science to develop highly-encrypted algorithms, in

large numbers. the high-level meeting notes that government’s cyber efforts are

stumped by its ability to produce no more than 3-4 such algorithms in a year.

Source: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6258977.cms?prtpage=1

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BRAHMOS Supersonic Cruise Missile

BraHMoS is a two-stage missile with a solid propellant

booster engine as its first stage which brings it to

supersonic speed and then gets separated. the liquid

ramjet or the second stage then takes the missile closer

to 3 Mach speed in cruise phase. Stealth technology and

guidance system with advanced embedded software

provides the missile with special features.

the missile has flight range of up to 290-km with

supersonic speed all through the flight, leading to

shorter flight time, consequently ensuring lower

dispersion of targets, quicker engagement time and

non-interception by any known weapon system in

the world.

it operates on ‘Fire and Forget Principle’,

adopting varieties of flights on its way to the target.

its destructive power is enhanced due to large kinetic

energy on impact. its cruising altitude could be up to

15 km and terminal altitude is as low as 10 meters. it

carries a conventional warhead weighing 200 to 300

kgs.

Compared to existing state-of-the-art subsonic

cruise missiles, BraHMoS has:l 3 times more velocityl 2.5 to 3 times more flight rangel 3 to 4 times more seeker rangel 9 times more kinetic energy

the missile has identical configuration for land, sea

and sub-sea platforms and uses a transport Launch

Canister (tLC) for transportation, storage and launch.


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Special Featuresl universal for multiple platformsl “Fire and Forget” principle of operationl High supersonic speed all through the flightl Long flight range with varieties of flight trajectoriesl Low radar signaturel Shorter flight times leading to lower target dispersion and quicker engagementl Pin point accuracy with high lethal power aided by large kinetic energy on

impact

StatusBraHMoS is the first supersonic cruise missile known to be in service.

induction of the first version of BraHMoS Weapon Complex (n1) in the

indian navy commenced from 2005 with inS rajput as the first ship. all future

ships being built and ships coming for mid-life upgradation will be fitted with

the missile.

the indian army has also received the first regiment of BraHMoS missile,

Block i (a1), with the formation of n816 missile regiments and commencement

of deliveries from 2007.

In Servicel Ship based Weapon Complex (inclined & Vertical Configuration)l Land based Weapon Complex ( Vertical Launch Configuration from Mobile

autonomous Launcher)

In Progressl air launch versionl Submarine launch version

the cannisterised missile is capable of being launched vertically from

underwater state and will be tested soon from a submerged platform.

deployment depends on the requirement of the indian navy or navies of

friendly countries.

the air launched version has been developed and has lesser weight and

additional rear fins for aerodynamic stability during separation from the

aircraft and launch. the missile has gone through complete cycle of ground

trials. the required modifications in Su-30 MKi for interface with the missile


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launcher and integration with the weapon control of the aircraft are being

carried out together with indian air Force and Sukhoi design Bureau. the

air-trials will commence in 2010 with deployment in indian air Force by

2012.

Source: Brahmos aerospace Website, http://www.brahmos.com/content.php?id=10&sid=10

bRAhmOS cruise missile test-firedIndian Express, September 6, 2010

adding a new feather to india’s missile prowess, 290-km range BrahMos

cruise missile was on September 5, successfully test-fired as part of trials by

the army from the integrated test range (itr) at Chandipur off the orissa

coast.

“user’s trial of BrahMos conducted by the indian army was successful,” itr

director S P dash said after the missile blasted off from a mobile launcher at

around 11:35 am from the launch complex-3 of the test range near here.

the trial was conducted for achieving the maximum range of 290 km of the

supersonic missile, he said. the missile can fly at 2.8 times the speed of sound

carrying conventional warheads up to 300 kg for a range of 290 km and can

effectively engage ground targets from an altitude as low as 10 metres.

developed in a joint venture with russia, the sophisticated BrahMos

cruise missile is capable of being launched from submarines, ships, aircraft

and land-based Mobile autonomous Launchers (MaL), a defence research

development organisation (drdo) official said. one regiment of the 290-km

range BrahMos-i variant, consisting of 67 missiles, five mobile autonomous

launchers on 12x12 tatra vehicles and two mobile command posts, among

other equipment, is already operational in the army.

Similarly, the navy has started inducting the first version of BrahMos missile

system in all its frontline warships from 2005, defence sources said. the army,

on its part, is set to induct two more regiments of the BrahMos Block-ii land-

attack cruise missiles (LaCM), designed as “precision strike weapons” capable

of hitting small targets in cluttered urban environments, they said.

BrahMos-ii can potentially be used for “surgical strikes”, including at

terrorist training camps, without causing collateral damage. BrahMos Block-

ii variant has been developed to take out a specific small target, with a low

radar cross-section, in a multi-target environment. the BrahMos missile is a


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two-stage vehicle that has a solid propellant booster and a liquid propellant

ram-jet system.

the first flight test of the BrahMos was conducted on June 12, 2001 at the itr

at Chandipur in orissa coast and the last trial of the naval version of BrahMos

was carried out in a vertical mode successfully on March 21, 2010 from indian

navy ship inS ranvir off the orissa coast.

Source: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/brahmos-cruise-missile-testfired/677699/2


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Army Plans to Buy Tank Busting Missiles from US

July 21, 2010

the indian army intends to buy the uS-designed Javelin anti-tank guided

missile to equip its troops with the capability to defeat enemy armour systems.

the defence ministry is expected to issue a letter of request (Lor) to the uS

government for a potential sale of the weapon system used by the uS Marine

Corps, the uS army and 11 other nations. india plans to buy Javelin under

the foreign military sales (FMS) programme, a government-to-government

transaction between the uS and friendly countries. the fire-and-forget weapon

system is a joint venture between uS aerospace and defence giants raytheon

Company and Lockheed Martin.

JavelinJavelin is the world’s first manportable, fire-and-forget, mediumrange missile

system. the compact, lightweight missile is designed for one-soldier operations

in all environments. it enhances direct-fire capability against armored vehicles,

buildings and field fortifications. the system consists of a missile in a disposable


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launch tube and a reusable Command Launch unit (CLu) with a trigger

mechanism and the integrated day/night sighting device for surveillance, and

target acquisition and built-in test capabilities and associated electronics. the

CLu, powered by a disposable battery, provides the capability for battlefield

surveillance, target acquisition, missile launch, and damage assessment.

the Javelin’s CLu provides battlefield surveillance and target acquisition

capabilities. the Javelin night vision sight (nVS) is a passive i2r system. the nVS

enables observation of things that are not normally visible to the human eye. it

receives and measures ir light emitted by the environment. the nVS converts

the ir light into an image for the gunner. the ir image also allows the gunner to

identify enemy armor targets, his first priority to engage and destroy.

the round consists of a disposable launch tube assembly, battery coolant

unit (BCu), and the missile. Missile range is 2000 meters. the missile locks on

to the target before launch using an infrared focal plane array and on-board

processing, which also maintains target track and guides the missile to the target

after launch. Javelin missile’s tandem warhead is a Heat type. this round utilizes

an explosive shaped charge to create a stream of superplastically deformed metal

formed from trumpet-shaped metallic liners. the result is a narrow high velocity

particle stream that can penetrate armor.

Salient features Weight 28 kg

Length 1.76 meters

range 2000 m (max) 75 m (min)

Warhead type Heat

Warhead Weight 8.4 kg

armor Penetration 600+ mm

Launching Platforms man portable crew of 2

Advantages of Javelinthe portable system is easy to separate into main components and easy to set

up when needed. the Javelin (although still very heavy) is lighter than the other

missiles and their necessary parts. although the CLu’s thermal imaging may

hinder aiming, its thermal targeting allows the Javelin to be a fire-and-forget

system. this gives the firer an opportunity to be out of sight and possibly moving

to a new angle of fire, or out of the area by the time the enemy realizes they are

under attack. this is much safer than using a wire-guided system where the firer


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must stay stationary to guide the missile into the target. another advantage is the

Javelin’s power at impact. the missile’s tandem shaped charge warhead is made

to penetrate reactive armor. the soft launch capability of the Javelin allows it to

have only a minimal backblast area. in addition to reducing the visible launch

signature from the enemy, this enables the Javelin to be fired from inside a wide

variety of structures, which gives the Javelin advantages in urban fighting.

Disadvantagesthe main drawback of the complete system is its 22.3 kg total weight. another

drawback of the system is the reliance on a thermal view to acquire targets. the

thermal views are not able to operate until the refrigeration component has

cooled the system. the manufacturer estimates 30 seconds until this is complete,

but depending on the ambient temperature, this process may take much longer.

the next issue is cost. a single Javelin unit costs about $125,000, and a missile

costs about $80,000. also, the operator has no opportunity to correct the flight

of the rocket after launch (when the target contrasts poorly with the terrain, the

missile can miss).

Source: Federation of american Scientists, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/javelin.htm

designation Systems http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-148.html

Hindustan times http://www.hindustantimes.com/army-plans-to-buy-tank-busting-missiles-

from-uS/article1-575705.aspx


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Bulk Production Clearance for 40 mm UBGL

the army has accorded Bulk Production Clearance (BPC) to the 40 mm under

Barrel Grenade Launcher (uBGL). uBGL is designed and developed by the

armament research and development establishment (arde), Pune, and

manufactured at ordnance Factory, trichy. arde developed this equipment as

a result of the post operation Vijay ‘Brainstorming session on Mountain warfare’

held in new delhi. this equipment has successfully undergone rigorous user

and troop trials at various locations, followed by directorate General Quality

assurance (dGQa) evaluations to assess the life of uBGL, and BPC trials for

consistency in performance prior to induction.

on induction of uBGL, the fire power of rifles 5.56 mm inSaS and aK-47

(romania) has been enhanced, and the tactical gap of the maximum range of

hand grenade and the minimum range of mortar has been filled. the barrel of

uBGL is made of aluminum alloy with micro arc oxidation coating process. the

synergy between drdo and dGoF is worth mentioning in this venture.

Source: drdo newsletter, Vol. 30, no. 8, august 2010.


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Army Orders 1 Million Pieces of Grenade Developed by DRDO’s Chandigarh Lab

July 21, 2010

The Tribune

about a decade after being designed, the army has approved bulk production

of lightweight modular hand grenades developed by the defence research and

development organisation (drdo) for induction. an order has been placed

with the ordnance Factory Board for supplying one million hand grenades to

the army.

Known as Shivalik, these would replace the existing M-36 He grenades, the

original version of which dates back to the Second World War. developed by

drdo’s Chandigarh-based terminal Ballistics research Laboratory, the new


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grenade overcomes the safety hazards posed by the existing grenades. the M-36,

according to the drdo, has a severe reliability problem due to its flawed fusing

system and uneven fragmenting pattern, making it unsafe even for the thrower.

Shivalik uses a modular plastic body and pre-formed cylindrical mild steel

fragments for uniform distribution of fragments to overcome these deficiencies.

additional features have been incorporated into the fuse’s arming mechanism

to ensure greater safety during storage, transportation and airdropping.

Fragmentation distribution can also be controlled for use in offensive or defensive

roles by attachment of a fragmentation sleeve. the use of plastic has also resulted

in reduction of the grenade’s overall weight. unlike earlier grenades, it can be

para-dropped if urgent re-supplies are needed and can function in temperatures

ranging from minus 20 to 55°C.

Besides the Shivalik, the army has also approved bulk production of the add-

on 40 mm under-barrel grenade launcher (uBGL) that is attached to rifles for

increasing their firepower. the uBGL, which can be mounted on the inSaS as well

as aK-47 rifles, was developed keeping in view the global trend in technology for

small arms from the concept of point-target capability to area-target capability.

Capable of night-firing, it fills the gap between the maximum range achieved by

a hand grenade and the minimum range of a mortar while giving better accuracy

than both. another unique weapon under development by the drdo is the “chill

grenade”, which uses extract of Bhut Jolokia, certified as the world’s hottest chilli

and is native to the northeast. Part of a range of equipment being developed by

the drdo for counter-insurgency and internal security operations, the chilli-

grenade is non-toxic and non-lethal and functions like tear-gas used by the

security forces. its pungent fumes can smoke out terrorists or hostile elements

from hideouts.

Source: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100722/main6.htm


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Prithvi-II Test-fired Successfully

y. mALLIKARjUN ä July 19, 2010

The Hindu

HYderaBad: nuclear weapons-capable, medium

range surface-to-surface Prithvi-ii ballistic missile

was successfully test-fired from the integrated test

range (itr) at Chandipur, off the orissa coast, on July

16, 2010. the missile was fired by the personnel of

the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) from a mobile

launcher at 6.50 a.m. as part of the user training

exercise. aided by a state-of-the-art navigation

system, Prithvi-ii achieved a high degree of accuracy

as it splashed down within a few metres of the target

in the sea after a six-minute flight. the trial met all

the mission objectives

While the single-stage, liquid propelled missile

is capable of striking targets at a maximum range

of 350 km, it was tested for a lesser distance, an

official of the defence research and development

organisation (drdo) told theHindu from the itr.

a number of radars, electro-optical and telemetry

systems, located along the orissa coast, monitored

the trajectory of the missile and evaluated all parameters in real time. two naval

ships anchored near the target point tracked and witnessed the terminal event.

the nine-metre-tall Prithvi-ii has already been inducted into the air Force. it

can carry payloads ranging from 500 kg to 1,000 kg and has features to deceive

anti-ballistic missiles.

its guidance system enables it to carry multiple payloads for multiple ranges. it

can also carry different conventional warheads, including sub-munitions, cluster


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munitions and pre-fragmented explosives. S.K. Vasudeva, Chief Controller, r &

d (Strategic Systems); V.L. n. rao, Programme director, air defence; avinash

Chander, director, advanced Systems Laboratory; S.P. dash, director, itr; and

other senior officials from the drdo and the SFC witnessed the launch.

V.K. Saraswat, Scientific adviser to the defence Minister, congratulated the

drdo scientists and armed forces personnel for the success of the mission.

the Prithvi is the first of the missiles developed under the country’s integrated

Guided Missile development Programme. it now has two variants — air Force

version (Prithvi-ii) and naval (dhanush) — both having a range of 350 km.

Source: http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/19/stories/2010061964131500.ht m


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After Two Failures, Nuclear-capable Agni-II Successfully Test-fired

May 18, 2010

Times of India

after two failures in a row last year, india tested its nuclear-capable agni-

ii ballistic missile successfully from Wheelers island off the orissa coast on

Monday morning. the tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC) test-fired the

2,000-km-plus agni-ii, which carries a one-tonne warhead, in a “user training

trial’’ towards making the two-stage, solid-fuelled missile fully operational in the

country’s nuclear arsenal.

“agni-ii, which is around 20 metres tall and weighs 17 tonnes, was tested

for the full range and met all mission objectives. With this launch, the SFC

has carried out launches of agni-i (700-km), agni-ii and agni-iii (3,500-km)

within a time span of five months,’’ said a defence ministry official. drdo

officials, incidentally, have blamed the two agni-ii failures last year, on May

19 and november 23, on manufacturing problems rather than any design and

development defect.

at present, the only ballistic missiles which can be said to be “100% operational’’

are the short-range Prithvi missile (150-350 km) and the 700-km-range agni-i. Both

agni-ii and agni-iii are still in the process of being inducted by the SFC. india’s most

ambitious strategic missile agni-V, in turn, will be ready for its first test only by early-

2011. With a proposed range of 5,000-km, agni-V will have near iCBM capabilities

(strike range in excess of 5,500-km) and give india’s “dissuasive deterrence posture’’

against China some credible much-needed muscle.

interestingly, agni-V will be a canister-launch missile system to ensure it

can be swiftly moved closer to the border with China to bring the entire country

within its strike envelope. as reported earlier, drdo is also working on MirV

(multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) technology for the agni


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series of ballistic missiles. an `MirVed’ missile can carry a bunch of nuclear

warheads in a single payload, each of which can hit different targets along

separate trajectories.

Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/after-two-failures-nuclear-capable-agni-ii-

successfully-test-fired /articleshow/5941459.cms


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Pakistan Navy Tests its Strike Capability in Arabian Sea

March 12, 2010

associated Press of Pakistan (aPP)

Pakistan navy Fleet tested its fire

power in the north arabian Sea

to assess the lethality, precision

and efficacy of its weapon

systems. this was announced

in an iSPr (navy) press release

issued here on Friday. it said that

admiral noman Bashir, Chief of

the naval Staff, witnessed the

event. this included successful firing of a variety of missiles and torpedoes from

Pn ships, submarines and aircraft.

Commander Pakistan Fleet, Vice admiral tanveer Faiz, was overall incharge

of the firing serial. Chief of the naval Staff on this occasion expressed his

complete satisfaction on the operational readiness of Pn fleet and commended

the officers and men for their commitment and professionalism. the weapons

tested included newly inducted weapon systems, such as anti surface missiles

from F-22 P Frigate and air-to-surface missiles from P3C aircraft.

an important feature of the event was firing of subsurface-to-surface missiles

from agosta 90B submarines. the target set was successfully engaged. earlier,

the weapons firing zone spread over hundreds of miles at sea was cleared of all

merchant ships and fishing craft through extensive range clearance operations

to ensure safe conduct of the activity.

Source: http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=98296&it

emid= 2


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China Sets Up First Cyber Base

July 23, 2010

The Asian Age

Pti- the Chinese military has opened its first cyber base headquarters but has

assured that the facility was not aimed at launching cyber war. People’s liberation

army (PLa) on Monday launched the centre dedicated to handling all types of

cyber threats and related issues.

the centre marks the debut of a new force in China to tackle potential cyber

threats and to safeguard national security; PLa daily reported but did not

mention the location of headquarters. it marks the emergence of China’s military

power in information support and security, the daily said. “the setup of the base

just means that our army is strengthening its capacity and is developing potential

military officers to tackle information-based warfare,” a top army official said,

denying the perception that it was aimed at penetrating other country’s networks

for disrupting them.

the base will be used to gather online information and “build up walls” to

safeguard confidential military information, he added. “it is a ‘defensive’ base

for information security, not an offensive headquarters for cyber war,” he was

quoted assaying by Global times.

He also said that the question about whether to build a cyber war headquarters

similar to that of the uS or not had triggered a heated debate among some senior

military officials in China. the current level of information technology in the

Chinese army lags behind that of the uS. Meanwhile there are 13 dnS servers

around the globe, of which the root server and nine others are all located in uS,

he said.

Li Fei, a network security expert at the national defence university, told the

Global times that the major purpose for establishing the base was to enhance

the army’s strength in network defence, but he refused to give details about the


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base. Cyber security attracted worldwide concern recently. Some foreign media

blamed Chinese hackers for a string of attacks on some websites that belong

to government agencies and military institutions in other countries, including

some sensitive ministries in india.

refuting the reports, the national Computer network emergency response

team (CnCert) of China said “most foreign countries that developed advanced

informational system and cyber technology are equipped with professional

hacker teams.”

“they never mention their cyber force but keep rumour mongering and

overstating the cyber threat from Chinese hackers, which conversely reflect

they’re covering up their political purpose of building up a cyber army,” Zhou

Yonglin, an official with CnCert, Xinhua news agency reported.

Source: http://www.asianage.com/international/china-sets-cyber-base-hq-631

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Gulf War I The 100 Hour War

ROhIT SINgh

CLaWS

the Persian Gulf region

Introductionthe Prussain army of Frederick the Great with a few more than 20000 men, met

and defeated a French army of more than double the number at the battle of

rossbach in the 18th Century. on September 19, 1415, the english army of Henry

V comprising about 6000 men inflicted a stunning defeat on a French army of

25000 at the Battle of agincourt.

in June 1967, the iraeli defence Forces launched preemptive strikes against

a coalition of arab nations and decimated their ground forces. But all of these


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battles pale by comparison to the scope and margin of victory gained by the

combined forces of the Coalition in operation desert Storm. an army of 500,000

men was crushed at a cost of fewer than 100 lives. a force of over 40 divisions,

with 4000 tanks, was completely destroyed for a loss of fewer than 10 tanks.

Coalition front-line fatalities in the ground portion of the campaign worked out

to less than one man killed per enemy division destroyed.

OriginsMost of the Persian Gulf remained under British occupation till the Second

World War. after gaining independence from Britain in 1932, iraq had started

laying claims to Kuwait. it said that Kuwait was historically a part of the ottoman

empire’s province of Basra. Britain’s aim was to limit iraq’s access to the sea

and maintain its domination over the Persian Gulf. after Kuwait was granted

independence in 1961, iraq claimed it as its 19th province. iraq did not recognise

Kuwait till 1963 and also the boundary between iraq and Kuwait.

throughout the Cold War, iraq had been a Soviet union ally. But, after the

iranian revolution the united States began to cultivate its ties with iraq in order

to undermine iran. it provided diplomatic and military support to iraq during

the iran-iraq War. However, iraq’s support to the abu nidal group (a Palestinian

terrorist organisation operating with official support from Baghdad) continued

to remain a sticking point in iraq-uS relations. When iraqi President Saddam

Hussein expelled the group to Syria at the united States’ request in november

1983, the reagan administration sent donald rumsfeld to meet President

Hussein as a special envoy and to cultivate ties.

By the time the ceasefire with iran was signed in august 1988, iraq was virtually

bankrupt, with most of its debt owed to Saudi arabia and Kuwait. iraq pressured both

nations to forgive the debts, but they refused. iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding

its oPeC quotas and driving down

the price of oil, thus further hurting

the iraqi economy. the collapse in

oil prices had a catastrophic impact

on the iraqi economy. the iraqi

Government described it as a form of

economic warfare, which it claimed

was aggravated by Kuwait slant-

drilling across the border into iraq’s

rumaila oil field.


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The Invasion of Kuwaitiraq had been carrying out a troop buildup on the iraq-Kuwait border in the

garb of exercises. on 31 July 1990, the negotiations between iraq and Kuwait

at Jeddah broke down. Kuwait was invaded at 0200 h on 02 august 1990 in

a two-pronged assault led by the iraqi republican Guards. the main thrust

of the attack was moving southwards from the iraq-Kuwait border along the

highway into Kuwait city. after two days of intense fighting most of Kuwait’s

armed Forces disintegrated. Kuwait city was taken by the republican Guards.

the iraqi’s assaulted the dasman Palace, the royal residence of the emir of

Kuwait, Jaber al-ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, which was defended by the emiri

Guard supported with M84 tanks. in the process, the iraqis killed Sheikh Fahad

al-ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, the emir of Kuwait’s youngest brother. Most of

the royal family fled to Saudi arabia. after the decisive iraqi victory, Saddam

Hussein installed his cousin, ali Hassan al-Majid (later known as Chemical ali

and now executed) as the governor of Kuwait. the republican Guards positioned

themselves on the Saudi border. the Kuwaiti oil fields were impounded and

atrocities carried out on Kuwaiti citizens.

after the invasion, the united nations Security Council (unSC) imposed

economic sanctions (resolution 661) and economic blockade (resolution 665) on

iraq. iraq offered to withdraw from Kuwait but linked it up with israel withdrawing

from Gaza and West Bank, and Syria from Lebanon. a series of diplomatic moves

and negotiations by major western countries failed to break the impasse.


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Operation Desert Shield Saudi arabia had loaned some 26 billion dollars to iraq during the iran-iraq war.

as the post war iraqi economy crumbled, Sadam Hussein hoped that it would not

have to pre-pay the debt as iraq had defended Saudi arabia’s interest from iran.

(iran being a Shia country is a threat to Saudi arabia as it feared the influence of

the iranian revolution from reaching Saudi arabia; most of the Saudi oil fields lie

in Shia dominated areas).

as Saudi arabia was unwilling to forgive the debts Saddam Hussein launched

a tirade against the Saudi Kingdom and accused it of being a uS puppet. the

presence of iraqi forces in Kuwait directly threatened Saudi arabia’s oil fields. on

the request of King Fahd and due to the fear of an iraqi invasion of Saudi arabia,

the uS President George H.W. Bush invoked the Carter doctrine and launched

“operation desert Shield” for the defence of Saudi arabia. this “wholly defensive”

doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8 august, iraq declared Kuwait to be

the 19th province of iraq and Saddam Hussein named his cousin, ali Hassan al-

Majid as its military-governor.

two naval battle groups with the aircraft carriers, uSS dwight d. eisenhower

and uSS independence were positioned in the Persian Gulf by 8 august 2008.

they were later joined by the battleships uSS Missouri and Wisconsin. 48 F-15

aircrafts commenced patrols of the iraq-Kuwait-Saudi arabia border areas. the

united States military buildup in the area reached 5,43,000 troops. (twice the

number mobilised during the iraq invasion of 2003).

the objectives of op desert Shield were to defend Saudi arabia, effect iraq’s

withdrawal from Kuwait and bring stability to the Persian Gulf region. the other

objectives were to protect uS citizens in the area and destroy WMds alleged to

be possessed by iraq.

Iraqi Military in 1990iraq had the fourth largest army in the world. it was the largest army at the time

in the Persian Gulf with heavy artillery and mechanised forces. it also possessed

the Scud missiles with a 750 Km range. it had an air force with modern aircrafts.

in comparison its navy was relatively small.

Operation Desert Stormthe multi-national offensive campaign, “op desert Storm” was referred as the

“Mother of all Battles” by Saddam Hussein. the four phases of the campaign

were:


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

l Strategic air campaignl air Supremacyl destruction of strategic assetsl offensive ground campaign

resolution 678, passed on 29 november 1990 by the unSC gave iraq a

withdrawal deadline until 15 January 1991, and authorised “all necessary means

to uphold and implement resolution 660,” and a diplomatic formulation

authorizing the use of force if iraq failed to comply.

Strategic Air Campaign: the air campaign was launched on 17 January

1991. over 1,00,000 sorties were flown over six weeks. the initial strikes were

primarily against iraqi air defence sites. in the second phase of the air battle,

iraq’s command and control facilities were targeted. in the third phase, iraqi

Scud missile launchers, naval facilities and research centres were targeted.

the iraqi air force was flown to iran. the coalition forces lost 44 aircrafts due

to iraqi action. iraq launched Scud missile attacks. 39 such missiles landed on

israel causing some property damages but little casualties. in one Scud attack in

dhahran in Saudi arabia’s eastern Province, 28 uS soldiers were killed. the iraqis

also burnt oil fields and spilled a large quantity of oil into the Persian Gulf.

the Coalition air campaign managed to achieve total air supremacy, later

facilitating deep ground operations and evolving the concept of airLand battle.

the iraqi supply was reduced from 20 K tons to 2 K tons per week. the targeting of

iraqi Command and Control facilities rendered its ground forces ineffective as iraq

had a highly centralised command and control with no initiative being encouraged

at the lower levels.

on 29 January 1991, the iraqi forces attacked the strategically important

but lightly defended Saudi city of Khafji. in the battle that lasted for two days

nearly 60-300 iraqi soldiers were killed. 11 uS troops were killed when an aC-130

helicopter gunship was shot down.

Operation Desert Sabrethe four phases of the war were:-l Phase 1- advance into Kuwait and iraq. l Phase 2- invest Kuwait City and advance upto the euphrates river.l Phase 3- Capture Kuwait City and destruction of the republican Guards.l Phase 4- advance to Baghdad.


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Liberation of Kuwait: on 23 February 1991, the 1st Marine division, 2nd

Marine division, and the 1st Light armored infantry crossed into Kuwait and

headed toward Kuwait City. they overran the well designed, but poorly defended,

iraqi trenches in the first few hours. Kuwaiti forces soon liberated Kuwait City.

Most iraqi soldiers in Kuwait opted to surrender rather than fight.

By 26 February 1991, iraqi forces had begun retreating from iraq. they

adopted a scorched earth policy in which 737 Kuwaiti oil fields were set on fire.

the u.S. Vii Corps in full strength and, spearheaded by the 3rd Squadron

of the 2nd armored Cavalry regiment (3/2 aCr), launched an armored attack

into iraq early on 24 February, just to the west of Kuwait, taking iraqi forces by

surprise. Simultaneously, the u.S. XViii airborne Corps launched a sweeping

“left-hook” attack across the largely undefended desert of southern iraq, led by

the 3rd armoured Cavalry regiment (3rd aCr) and the 24th infantry division

(Mechanized). the left flank of this movement was protected by the French 6th

Light armoured division daguet.

a long convoy of retreating iraqi troops formed along the main iraq-Kuwait

highway. although they were retreating, this convoy was bombed so extensively

by Coalition air forces that it came to be known as the Highway of death.

Hundreds of iraqi troops were killed. Forces from the united States, the united

Kingdom, and France continued to pursue retreating iraqi forces over the border

and back into iraq, eventually moving to within 150 miles (240 km) of Baghdad

before withdrawing from the iraqi border.

one hundred hours after the ground campaign started, on 28 February, President

Bush declared a cease-fire, and he also declared that Kuwait had been liberated.

Casualties

IRAQCivilian: an investigation by Beth osborne daponte estimated civilian fatalities

at about 3,500 from bombing, and some 100,000 from other effects of the war.

military: a report commissioned by the uS air Force based on PoW accounts

estimated iraqi Military casualties to be around 20,000 (including 10-12,000 in

the air campaign).

MNFuS 148 battle-related deaths (35 to friendly fire), a further 145

americans died in non-combat accidents.


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uK 47 deaths (9 to friendly fire)

France 02

Kuwait suffered 37 deaths

Saudi arabia 18

egypt 10

uae 06

Syria 03

State of Iraq Army after the War42 out of 68 divisions rendered ineffective for combat.

3700 MBts destroyed.

2400 aFVs destroyed.

2600 artillery pieces destroyed.

Air Force36 aircrafts and 6 helicopters destroyed.

Multi National Force

US28 aircrafts and 5 helicopters destroyed in combat.

10 ac and 17 HePtrs due to non combat losses.

UK, ITALY, KUWAIT & SAUDI ARABIALost 9 aircrafts and 2 in training.

the Gulf War brought to fore the theory of war which had the following salient

features:

National Will to carry out war: a systematic Pr campaign was carried out in

the uS which led the Senate to vote in favour of war.

political goals achieved by war: the Coalition forces re-affirmed their

supremacy in the Persian Gulf region and came to the defence of Saudi

arabia. Politics and economy came to be closely interlinked in the end-state

of warfare, uS aimed to corner sizeable influence in the Gulf oil reserves due

to the war. the aim of warfare transformed from mere territorial aims to geo-

political interests.

World Opinion: the importance of creating just causes or a favourable

international opinion before military intervention was highlighted.


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Diplomacy: diplomacy and negotiations were an important ingredient in

the intervening periods between the various stages of war and different crisis.

diplomacy was quickly resorted to to buy time for military action and build on

gains of military victory. Several peace embassies by the uS and other european

nations helped create the justification for military action and provided an

alternate path to war.

Study Strategy and Operational Art: the uS forces had carefully studied

the iraqi campaigns of the iran-iraq war and evolved their own operational art

accordingly. the top-heavy iraqi command and control structure of the former

war led to the coalition forces to target the enemy C2 assets in the initial stages

of the campaign itself. this led to the breakdown of leadership and control over

the iraqi ground forces.

Air Land battle: the concept of air Land battle evolved prominently with the

Gulf War. the advantages of achieving total air supremacy over the modern-day

battlefield, thus enabling swift maneuver by ground forces was demonstrated.

CNN War: the war in the Persian Gulf was touted as the first modern day

televised war. reporters embedded with frontline coalition units beamed reports

back home, thus bringing the common man and the soldier close. it also helped

in generating favourable opinions for the countries waging the war. on the other

hand, there were allegations of censoring and restricted access to reporters.

Lessons LearntTechnology: Precision-guided munitions, such as the united States air Force guided

missile aGM-130, were heralded as key in allowing military strikes to be made with

a minimum of civilian casualties compared to previous wars, although they were

not used as often as more traditional, less accurate bombs. Specific buildings in

downtown Baghdad could be bombed whilst journalists in their hotels watched

cruise missiles fly by. Precision-guided munitions amounted to approximately

7.4% of all bombs dropped by the coalition. other bombs included cluster bombs,

which disperse numerous submunitions,[116] and daisy cutters, 15,000-pound

bombs which can disintegrate everything within hundreds of yards.

technology was the key in defeating a numerically superior enemy.

Air Dominance: the importance of the air component in war gained

prominence. a devastating air campaign which destroyed the enemy’s C2 and

air defence assets enabled successful ground campaigns to be launched. the

enemy’s SCud missile launchers and aircrafts were also targeted on the ground.

this helped them in carrying out swift and un-hindered maneuvers.


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Surprise and Deception: the Coalition Forces carried out an effective

mobilisation by carrying out a ground exercise in January 1991. at the same time,

an amphibious show of force in the Persian Gulf led Saddam Hussein to divert

four of his divisions to the eastern flank. this weakened the iraqi force levels

along the Kuwaiti border from where the ground invasion was finally launched.

the forces also gave signal signatures of their HQ at old location.

Logistics: the targeting of iraqi logistics prior to the main battle led to the

rout of their ground forces as they were unable to systematically mobilise their

units and sustain them for battle.

Communication, EW , IW & psychological Warfare: the importance of

electronic means for secure communication, rendering the enemy’s C2 assets

ineffective before the actual campaign was highlighted. electronic Warfare and

information Warfare emerged as battle concepts and tools to gain moral and

psychological ascendancy over the enemy.

Salient features of the War

Surprise and Deceptionl Simulate build up in the traditional areas to reinforce en’s perceptions and

threat analysis.l Conceal build up as part of mov to traditional areas in garb of trg and launch

on the line of march.l retain the capability to launch from concentration areas. l in areas of own intrest keep build up a well guarded secret.l retain amph capability to pose threat in a vulnerable sect.

Command and Controll uS employed world wide command and control system.l iraqis centralised command and control due to break down in comn crippled

iraqi forces from fighting coordinated battles.l recommend integrated operation at theatre level. l Synergised employment of force multipliers.l FMCP at corps level.

High Tech War and Technological Asymmetryl MnF resorted to employment of high tech weapon systems, iraqi forces

lacked the following :


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l access to satellite imagery and high tech surveillance means.l redundancy in iraqi command and control setup.l technological gap in weapon systems fielded by MnF and iraq.l the future warfare will rely on improved technology. l achieve ideal mix of man and machine. l achieve essential technological edge and develop electronic Warfare

capabilities and programmes.

Communicationl need for inter service C31 systems. l Survivability of sys, indigenous backup.l accretion in eW capability.l information warfare technology.

Intelligencel Battle field transparency.l integration of surveillance resources and intelligence sharing in real time l imporatnce of denial of information.

Ground Operations

Fixed defences:l dCB defence with viable fwd zone as zone of decision essential.l depth in defence.l Concept of filling ditches with oil to set aflame.l obstruction without being covered by fire is redundant. l employment of mobile reserves to restore situation.l employment of MoGs.

Obstacle Breachingl recommend Fae capability.l introduction of CLMC towed by a vehs.l intro of Cet.l HB capability to establish brigade size bridge heads.

additionally, the capability to establish helicopter bases in enemy depth was

also highlighted.


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the role played by the uS training and doctrine command (tradoC) also

needs to be studied.

Conclusionit is likely that staff colleges and Schools of instruction around the world will

study desert Storm for generations to come. attempts to explain the success of

desert Strom will have to examine various sources. However the salient features

upon which hinged the success of the Coalition Campaign were the vitality of air

power, leadership, motivation, equipment and state of the art technology. the

war also highlighted the fact that realistic training is essential and that troops are

more important than equipment.

the combination of the best troops with the best equipment was

unstoppable. the iraqis fought hard for eight years against iran, but they

threw in the towel in 100 hours. they had been subjected to an intense

bombing campaign for five weeks. this broke their motivation and will to

fight. Many units were on the verge of physical collapse as the Coalition

forces had crippled their logistics. the line troops of the Coalition armies

lacked experience in warfare although they had combat experienced officers

at battalion and above levels. on the other hand, the iraqi army which had

eight years of experience in positional warfare failed to face a mobile warfare

scenario. realistic training gained by the navy’s top Gun and air Force’s red

Flag program and the army’s national training Centre readied soldiers for

realistic maneuvers. the proof was there to see in desert Storm.

in the end it was the experienced and professionally competent leadership

of the Coalition forces which gave their men and women the motivation and

direction to wage a successful campaign. it is said that lopsided victories occur

when one side is very smart and the other side is very stupid. iraq suffered at the

alter ego of one man, Saddam Hussein and his top-heavy leadership structure.

their most experienced and professional leaders were purged, leaving only yes-

men in the fray. the poor quality of leadership and lack of initiative at the junior

levels led to the rout of the largest army in the Persian Gulf which had resolutely

battled iran for eight long years.

(referred from various sources)


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MANEUVERE WARFARE

Op Desert Sabre: 24-27 FEB 1991


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Suggested Readings1. the Gulf War 1991 by alastair Finlan. 95 pgs.

2 . desert Storm: a Forgotten War by alberto Bin, richard Hill, archer Jones. 286 pgs.

3 . operation desert Shield/desert Storm: Chronology and Fact Book by Kevin don Hutchison.

274 pgs.

4 . at War in the Gulf: a Chronology by arthur H. Blair. 144 pgs.

5 . the eagle in the desert: Looking Back on u.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War by William

Head, earl H. tilford Jr. 356 pgs.

6 . arms over diplomacy: reflections on the Persian Gulf War by dennis Menos. 180 pgs.

7 . the Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and diplomacy by Christopher C. Joyner.

262 pgs.


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Brig Mohammed Usman, MVC The Lion of Naushera

ROhIT SINgh

CLaWS

“those Whom the Gods Love, die young”

Brig Mohammed usman was only 12 days away from his 36th birthday when he

laid down his life for the motherland. But in his short lifetime, he achieved more

than most mortals who live twice as long or more.

Brig usman’s valour, courage and tenacity against fearful odds played a

crucial role in 1948 when a newborn nation faced its first test in battle. His deeds

are now part of the legends of naushera and Jhangar.

Early Lifeusman was born on 15 July 1912 at Bibipur in azamgarh district of erstwhile

united Provinces (now uttar Pradesh). His father, Kazi Mohammed Farook was

a police officer and went on to become the Kotwal of the main police station in

Banaras. (Varanasi). one of Farook’s two brothers, Gufran was a Brigadier in the

army.

Courage came to usman at a young age, when at the age of 12 he jumped into

a well to save a drowning child. His father wanted him to join the civil services,

but due to a speech defect, he tried the police but failed as his tutor thought

he was mocking him. nevertheless, he did not give up and tried for the army.


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He was enlisted along with 10 other indians in the last batch of indian officers

to pass out of Sandhurst. among 45 cadets, he came 30th in the order of merit.

incidentally, Sam Manekshaw was three days junior to usman as the British

preferred to give seniority to the King’s Commissioned indian officers (KCios)

rather than the first batch of cadets from iMa dehradun which included Sam

Manekshaw, Smith dun and Mohammed Musa, who went on to command the

armies of india, Burma and Pakistan respectively.

usman went on for his mandatory one year attachment with a British

regiment. He was commissioned in 5/10 Baluch (Jacob’s rifles). after some

regimental and staff duties, usman found himself with 16/10 Baluch in the

arakan (Burma) towards the end of the second world war. Here, he served as

the battalion’s 2iC along with Zoru Bakshi, who later became one of the most

decorated General of the indian army.

Zoru Bakshi had led a dogra company in attacking a hill feature in arakan. He

had recommended usman who was officiating as the Co, the name of Bhandari

ram for the highest award of Victoria Cross. usman’s citation was however

downgraded by Lt Col LP ‘Bogey’ Sen who had just joined the battalion as the

Co and was reluctant in recommending for the highest award. But, usman did

not give up and took up the matter with the Commander 51 Brigade. it was to

his credit and determination that Bhandari Lal was finally awarded the Victoria

Cross.

51 Brigade formed part of 25 indian division, which was disbanded after the

War but raised again post-independence after Brig usman’s sacrifice at Jhangar.

incidentally, this division is responsible for the same sector which usman had

reclaimed for the nation in 1948.

after the war, the indian army raised two Parachute Brigades, namely 50 Para

Bde and 77 Para Bde. usman underwent the qualifying jumps at Chaklala and

enlisted for Parachute duties. Brig Mohammed usman commanded 77 Para Bde

and was dispatching troops to Multan, Jacobabad, Lahore, rawalpindi to contain

the communal storm that was building up towards the partition.

The 1947 Kashmir InvasionMeanwhile, the situation in J&K had turned grim following the tribal invasion

supported by regular Pakistan army troops. By october-november, indian troops

air dashed into Srinagar were chasing the tribesmen from Badgam, Baramulla, uri,

Zojila and Kupwara. in the Jammu division, 50 Para Bde had relieved Kotli but Mirpur

fell to the invaders. 400 soldiers and 10000 refugees had flocked to Jhangar.


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50 Para Bde was holding on to Jhangar and naushera. at this time, the

command of 50 Para Bde passed on to Brig usman from Brig Paranjpe who had to

be evacuated due to medical reasons. Jhangar which was being held by 1 rajput

less a company was soon overrun by the invaders. 1 Para (Punjab) suffered 55

dead and 46 wounded in defending Jhangar. By January 1948, the enemy was

dominating all the four roads leading out of naushera.

The Capture of KotGen KM Cariappa who was then commanding the deP (later Western Command)

landed at naushera air field and remarked at Brig usman that he wanted Kot as a

present from him. Kot, situated 9 kms to the north-east of naushera was the highest

feature in the area and dominated the naushera defences. Brig usman launched ‘op

Kipper’ (Kipper being the nickname of Gen Cariappa) on 31 Jan/1 Feb 1948.

3 Para (Maratha) captured Pathradi and uparla from the right while 2/2 Punjab

took Kot from the left. 7 Cavalry and a company less of Mahar Medium Machine

gunners were in supporting role. the enemy suffered 156 dead and 200 wounded.

this was the first major reverse suffered by the enemy. Several enemy counter attacks

on Kot were beaten back due to a clever positioning of troops by Brig usman.

on 6 February 1948, a major enemy offensive against tain dhar comprising

some 11000 tribals and another force of 5000 attacked Kangota and redian. the

attack on tain dhar was bravely beaten back by 1 rajput and 3 Para (rajput)

which had reinforced the feature. one picket of 1 rajput lost 24 of its 27 men.

it was in the actions at tain dhar that nk Jadunath Singh worn his Param Vir

Chakra (PVC). after this action, the tibal invaders lost their will to fight and were

replaced by regular troops.

Jhangar is regained50 Para Bde and 19 infantry Bde launched ‘op Vijay’ on 14 March 1948 to capture

Jhangar from two axis. 19 Brigade took the north axis while 50 Para Bde consisting of

3 Para (Maratha), 3 Para (rajput), 1 Patiala and one company of 3/1 Punjab attacked

from another direction. Prior to the attack, Brig usman had issued a Special order of

the day exhorting his men into battle. a brief extract of the order is place below:

…..the eyes of the world are on us. the hopes and aspirations of our

countrymen are based upon our efforts. We must not falter, we must not

fail them…..

to every man upon this earth


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death Cometh soon or late

and how can man die better

than facing fearful odds

For the ashes of his fathers

and the temples of his gods

… So forward friends, fearless we go to Jhangar. india expects everyone

to do his duty.

Brig usman had worked out a very intelligent artillery fire plan for the battle

of Jhangar. He had brigaded all the 24 field guns and the Mortars of the three

battalions. He had concentrated them on a limited front targeting the highest

point of the feature, which was attacked first. once the barrage lifted, the troops

were already at the enemy trenches taking them by surprise.

3 Para (Maratha) secured Pir thal naka on 17 March 1948 and uparli Karhali

on 18 March and then pressed on to Susloti dhar along with a company of 3 Para

(rajput). Brig usman soon followed up with his HQ.

3 Para (Maratha) and 1 Patiala advancing on a two battalion front secured Pt

3399.

19 infantry Brigade had already entered Jhangar and ‘op Vijay’ was complete.

50 Para Brigade secures Jhangar19 infantry Brigade withdrew to naushera and 50 Para Bde was tasked with

holding Jhangar. Several enemy counter attacks were beaten back in the next

three months, two major ones on 16 april and 10 May, 1948. an attack by 3 Para

(Maratha) and 2 rajputana rifles on MG Hill (from 19 inf Bde) suffered reverses

due to faulty intelligence on enemy strength on that feature.

Like rana Pratap, Brig usman had taken a pledge in december 1947 that he

would not sleep on a cot till he had avenged the loss of Jhangar. For three months

he slept on the floor which was cold in the winter months. now for the first time,

he slept on a cot borrowed from a nearby village.

in June 1948, own aerial reconnaissance observed manned gun positions to

the south of Jhangar. HQ JaK Force issued instructions to 50 Para Bde to provide

overhead protections to the bunkers and trenches. But this warning was not

taken seriously as the enemy had never shelled Jhangar after it was recaptured.

the Brigade HQ was nothing more than a series of tents.

Brig usman had restored the low morale of 50 Para Bde after the fall of Kotli and

Jhangar. the battles of naushera and thal naka bear testimony to his dynamic


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leadership and charismatic personality. He was very popular with both officers

and men. He had a delightful sense of humour, and could remain cheerful even

in the most trying circumstances.

He was quick to reward a person for his good deeds and bravery but was

also a hard taskmaster. He could not stand men who failed to perform to their

optimum levels. Still, he gave a fair hearing before reprimanding a person. He

believed loyalty was a two-way street and always stood up for his subordinates.

in one such instance, his Brigade intelligence officer had sent a signal to the

HQ JaK Force giving the six-figure map reference of one of our own positions

which was later shelled by the enemy. a signal from HQ JaK Force demanded the

Captain’s skull on a plate for his carelessness. a weary Captain SC Sinha (who was

on attachment with the Brigade from 3 Para (Maratha) walked into Brig usman’s

office with the signal. Brig usman without speaking a word and looking at the

Bio, scribbled a note and handed it over to the officer. the reply to division HQ

read: “a six-figure map reference of our own position in question may have been

news to the JaK Force HQ, but i assure you it was no news to the enemy”. this was

the last that was heard of the matter.

3 July 1948: The Lion is MartyredBrig usman held a meeting every evening at 5.30 in the sand model room which

was nothing more than a couple of tents rigged together. on 3 July, he held

the meeting half an hour earlier and it was over by 5.30. the enemy shelled

the tents at 5.45 PM. Four 25-pounder shells landed about 500 m north of the

crossroads. the shelling was countered after Brig usman located and directed

fire on the enemy oP located at Pt. 3150. Brig usman was taking a walk in his

HQ when one of the enemy shells hit a rock near the Signals room. this is how

the lion of naushera and Jhangar made the supreme sacrifice in defence of his

motherland. the rock stands testimony to his sacrifice and a memorial has

been built over it at Jhangar.

the funeral of Brig usman was attended by Prime Minister Pandit JawaharLal

nehru, the Governor General Lord Mountbatten among thousands of civilians.

His body is interned at the campus of Jamia Milia university in new delhi.

Such was the aura of Brig usman that Jinnah had offered him to switch over

to Pakistan promising perks and promotions. Pakistani newspapers regularly

carried incorrect news of his death to demoralise indian troops. one such news

report was carried by a Pakistani daily in late June prompting his brother to

inquire from HQ Western Command about his safety. Brig usman’s reply to the


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signal from HQ Western Command read: “i am fit and flourishing- still in the

world of the living.”

ironically, Brig usman died a few hours after this message reached HQ

Western Command.

Brig usman was somewhat of a showman but yet a simple and down to earth

person. Serving with the dogras in Burma, he had turned into a vegetarian. He

exhorted his men to keep a fast on tuesdays so that the food could be distributed

to the villagers. a bachelor, a bulk of his salary was spent in providing education

to poor children.

He was religious yet a staunch loyalist. on receiving reports that 50000 tribal

marauders had taken refuge at a mosque near naushera and that our troops

were hesitant in firing at the religious structure, he reached there personally and

ordered fire to be opened stating that the place no longer remained religious as it

had been occupied by marauders.

Brigadier Mohammed usman, one of only 18 Brigadiers in the army at the

time of independence was posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his

gallant leadership and command of 50 Para Bde at naushera and Jhangar. it is

to the credit and courage of such fine officers the country owes its freedom to. a

true patriot and war hero, his name will always be enshrined in the annals of the

indian army.

on 3 July 2006, the nation remembered Brig Mohammed usman whose

courage and leadership continue to inspire men-in-uniform, generation after

generations. a day-long martyrdom function was organised at drdo auditorium

in new delhi to mark the 58th death anniversary of the war hero.

to commemorate the martyrdom of Brig usman, a series of special functions

was organised including a wreath-laying ceremony at his grave in Jamia Milia,

felicitation of his family members and screening of a film based on his life. among

those who were present on the occasion included defence Minister, Mr Pranab

Mukherjee, army Chief, Gen JJ Singh, Vice Chief of the army Staff, Lt Gen S

Pattabhiraman and Colonel of the Parachute regiment, Lt Gen nirbhay Sharma.

Reference: Leadership in the indian army: Biographies of twelve soldiers by Lt

Gen VK Singh, PVSM (retd)


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Raid on Enemy Penga Post – May 17/18 1965

LT COL (RETD) A K (SAm) ShARmA

“Buzzards Feast in Summer-moonshine”

in May of 1965, 4/3 Gr was holding the Cease Fire Line (CFL), now called the

Line of Control (LoC) on Chhawa West in the general area ramulidhara in the

25 infantry division Sector of J&K. Facing us was 9 Baluch. From our piquets, at

night, we could see the glow of the lights of the Mangla dam on the Jhelum in PoK.

Since october 1964 the entire divisional sector had become very active. daily

spats occurred between the Gurkhas and Baluchis and then the area would erupt

into a veritable cauldron of fire. ambushes too were frequent. Just a fortnight

earlier a road opening Party (roP) of the battalion had been ambushed by the

wily Baluchis right inside our area. the leading scout had been hit, but he fired

back emptying his SLr magazine into the fleeing enemy before collapsing owing

to loss of blood. after last light, it was a sight to see enemy tracer from heavy

automatics lining and criss-crossing the valley. raids were the order of the day

and the general policy was that the raiding of an indian post had to be replied by

a counter raid in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) within 24 hours as a reprisal.

the Penga raid was conceived out of this policy.

on 15 May 65, one of the Battalions in the Kalal Gap was raided by the

Pakistani’s and was mauled badly. the Pakistanis took away five bodies and


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later cut off their heads and propped them on stakes in a macabre exhibition of

senseless brutality. as a reprisal to this act, the Penga raid was launched.

it was but natural that Maj Chanda of alpha Company should draw the short

straw. no – the short straw did not even figure. But it should give the readers

an indication of his popularity with the battalion headquarters. Chanda was

officiating for the company commander, Maj Surinder Kshatri who was away on

compassionate leave when the balloon went up for the raid. Maj Kshatri had first

mooted the operation to the then Co, Lt Col rK duleep Sinh. the company was

deployed on the CFL right opposite the Penga Post. Kshatri had assessed that the

three bumps on the feature were held by a platoon.

24 hours were given to get ready for the raid. on 17 May 1965 at 1700h Chanda

briefed the raid party off a black board sketch on Piquet 564, ‘Sansar’ with both

the Co Lt Col SdS Yadava and the Second-in-Command Maj Bhagwant Singh

Gill in attendance. the 2iC reminded the whole lot not to come back with out a

positive identification like a weapon, or even the tauko (head) of the enemy or

even a PoW. the Co further enjoined all to up hold the good name & honour of

the paltan by making the raid a successful venture. the SM, dil Bahadur Gurung

further gingered up the boys reminding them of the deeds of valour of their

forefathers, with many a ‘hoi ki hoi nas’.

Major J ‘Guruji’Chanda was the raid party commander. the six sub groups

under him were commanded as under: -l 2/Lt ‘Paoche’ Gangte - Support Group Commanderl 2/Lt aK ‘Sam’ Sharma - assault Group Commander no. 1l 2/Lt ‘Mota’ Yogendra Singh - assault Group Commander no. 3l Sub rik Bahadur Gurung - assault Group Commander no. 2l 2/Lt o P Verma - Fire Base 1l 2/Lt L Colney - Fire Base 2

individual sub group commanders briefed the men allotted to them on the

ground, giving all an opportunity to have good look at their objectives & routes and

tied up minor details. 2/Lt a K Sharma (Sam) discovered that he had Hav aspur of

the Sniper Section as his no 2 along with Hav Hum Bahadur and rfn dash Bahadur

of a Coy, as also rfn Kharka Bahadur of the Mt. apart from aspur, who had been

his instructor in a unit pre-course cadre and knew him some what, Sam had never

met the others. So it really warmed the cockles of his heart to see them operate as

they did in the execution stage of the raid, which since raising in october 1962 was

the first blooding of the paltan, and that too in an offensive action.


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Just to preserve the notions of security, even the adjutant was left in the dark.

2/Lt Paotinlal Gangte, a Manipuri kuki and also a great one for a sense of history

and the momentous occasion, kept merrily clicking away on his camera and

recorded the event for posterity. troops set out for Penga immediately after last

light and after an uneventful approach march in the summer moonshine arrived

at the rV after about an hour and a half. at this point, Sub Mandhoj Gurung of B

Coy got annoyed with one of his men and in the pre-combat jitters ticked him off

at the top his voice, little realising that the enemy was then with in earshot. this

was to prove almost disastrous.

as soon as Gangte confirmed on the radio that his support group was in

position, the raid party moved towards the release point at the base of the Penga

feature, the assault groups moving in their laid down order of march. as per the

plan, each group was to carry out a final check at the release point and then on

a given signal raid their respective objective. But well before reaching the release

point, when still in a dry nullah bed, the enemy opened up with a barrage of

weapons including two to three Browning medium machine guns, firing from

the flanks and depth. evidently Mandhoj Gurung’s outburst a few minutes earlier

had led to the loss of surprise and the ensuing reception to the raid party was

therefore particularly warm.

as with all troops who have never been into battle before, the Gurkhas faced

with such heavy volume of fire, went to ground. Chanda realising that the show

could no longer be orchestrated yelled to the party to rush their respective

objectives. But in that heavy cacophony of fire to which the raid party was

subjected, nobody got up. at this point of time leadership was called for and

Chanda along with his young officers who much to their credit did not take cover,

but kept standing got everybody up with a bit of butt-kicking and haranguing of

the troops (aphno beizzati garuncha? Gorkhali ko beizzati garaunch? Paltan ko

beizzzati garauncah? uth! uth! uuuth!)

Well ‘uth’ they did and soon the groups were moving towards their objective,

the officers leading the way. Sam’s objective was the Left Bump, Yogi’s the right

Bump with the aim to also capture the much coveted and prized Browning

machine gun and Sub rik Gurung’s objective was the Centre bump. Chanda was

moving along with rik Gurung and to his left. the enemy fire seemed unending

and along with it was spewed, a stream of urdu cum Multani invective and

damnation in the fires of hell for the Kafirs.

With firing and screaming emanating from all sides the confusion in the

battlefield was intense. Chanda had reached the release point towards the Centre


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Bump and Sam, moving to the Left Bump, came rushing after him herding his

group towards the Left bump. at this point, in the confusion of darkness, Sam

mistook Chanda for the enemy and fired the full burst of his 9 mm Sten machine

carbine at him. Providentially, however, not a single bullet found its mark! the

confusion was soon resolved and after a moment of panic realising what he had

done, Sam resumed the charge to the Left Bump from its flank and rear. He went in

blazing away from his carbine, in a regular rambo-style, throwing hand grenades

as he closed in. rfn Kharke was to his left and to his right was rfn dash Bahadur.

aspur and Hum Bahadur provided the rear protection to Sam who was not yet

twenty years old and looked even younger. as he approached an enemy bunker

he noticed an enemy soldier descending the reverse slope of the Left Bump. Sam

got into position to fire at the enemy but to his horror and utter consternation

he discovered that just at that moment it had jammed as, sadly, was the wont of

this weapon. the next best option was to use the bayonet but at this moment,

rfn Kharka Bahadur, seeing the enemy soldier lunging determinedly towards

his commander, held his sten gun from its muzzle end and clubbed the enemy

soldier on his head, with its wooden butt. the enemy soldier wobbled, and even

as he did so, Sam snatched his rifle and yelled at his comrades to withdraw to the

rV. this rifle was the only trophy the raid party was to bring back, snatched from

the hands of a Pathan soldier.

in the meanwhile, Sub rik Bahadur Gurung, went to the right bump and

inflicted severe damage on the enemy. according to him, he bayoneted three of

the enemy and killed a few of them. While all this was going on, CHM Sidhiman

Gurung, of ‘a’ coy came back and told Chanda that he was wounded. Chanda

asked him what happened and he replied “ Huzoor, Subedar sahib le pet man

bayonet ghonp diyo “. that brought down rik Bahadur’s claim to two. Chanda

sent Sidhiman Gurung back to the rV all by himself. there was no time for

niceties such as finding any body to accompany him. Later he was carried piggy

back to Sansar, by the men in turn.

Yogi could not make it to the enemy Browning emplacement. He and his

group were pinned down by heavy fire from the post. He almost was killed in

action! He still has the jungle-hat with bullet-hole about a centimeter below

the crown! By this time, it was between 0030 and 0100 and Chanda blew the

whistle for the groups to return. the troops were quick to comply. once together,

someone asked the company commander why he had blown the whistle so soon.

it had appeared to be an action of only about five minutes. in actual fact, the

operation had lasted for about 25 minutes or more.


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the support group stayed put, while all the three assault groups withdrew to

a pre-determined rV to regroup. it was then discovered that rfn Kharka Bahadur

Gurung was missing from Sam’s group. Chanda asked Sam to go back with his

group and look for him. Sub rik Bahadur was asked to accompany them. Sam

was leading his boys back again, only to discover that no one was following him!

He was wild, but Sub rik Bahadur came to his ‘rescue’, and taking a 2 inch mortar

from its number, told Sam; “Saab, apapne admi le kar dhundene jao. Main ap ko

yahan se covering fire deta hun”. Sam was aghast at such conduct from a very

senior JCo, but as he had a job to do, therefore herded his boys (all except Hav

Hum Bdr who feigned ‘tauko dhukhe cha’-headache) back on their feet and

trotted back towards the rear of the Left Bump, where he had last seen Kharke,

physically.

they searched in all the possible nooks and crannies, the nullahs, behind

bushes of rhododendron, the stunted pine and bramble, but in vain. Hav aspur

Gurung even called out Kharke’s name. at this, some of the enemy started to wail

and cries of , “Bhago, Bhago, kafir phir aa gaye hain” rent the air. aspur let go a

long burst from his Sten Machine Carbine, in their direction, and withdrew.

When news of the missing sepoy reached the brigade HQ, Brig uBS Verma,

Commander 80 infantry Brigade Commander ordered another search party

to be sent. Sam volunteered for this one, being his moral duty. Mota Yogi and

Gangte, being the comrades in arms in every sense of the term, volunteered as

well. Chanda had no option but to accede to their request. they retraced their

steps to the Left Bump and its rear, but in vain once again. Sam, Gangte and

Yogi, thought nothing of sitting down for a pow-wow right in front of the Left

Bump, and examined the options open to them. it was decided to send back Yogi

to report back the situation to Chanda. Yogi showed reluctance to leave Sam &

Gangte behind in very close proximity of the enemy. Sam lost his shirt on him

and drawing his khukri hit him on his back-side with an admonishment-cum-

command, ‘Yogi, do as you are told and quit worrying about my safety. We can

look after our selves. there are a number of folds in the ground and the bullets

will not be able to get us”.

Yogi did as he was bid, only to rejoin after some time with the orders that

yet another search had been ordered by the Brigade. Sam was back again, this

time followed only by one nK Kharka Bahadur of a Company, who was not

even part of his assault group; but was his gaonle as he later mentioned. the

two scoured the terrain yet again, but again in vain. Sam was held back by

nk Kharka Bdr when he insisted on entering enemy bunkers for the search,


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

with the hissed comment, ‘Kya kar raha hai Saab? Ham ko marvana hai? ap ko

dushman pakar kega, Chalo wapis”. the matter was reported all the way up

the channel, with orders for yet another search. this time no one volunteered.

Sam went in again this time all alone and with out even his Sten Machine

Gun, armed only with a drawn 11 inch khukri.

daylight was approaching when permission to abandon search was accorded.

this was just as well as the Pakistanis were homing on to our location with their

infantry mortars. to achieve a clean break, Chanda ordered Sub Mandhoj Gurung

to engage the enemy bunkers on the reverse slope of the Left Bump. the JCo

proceeded to bring down a heavy volume of fire with the 2 inch mortars, with a

lot of gusto and verve. nk Jhabi Lal on Sansar, was contacted on the wireless and

ordered to open up with the 3 inch mortars behind the Bumps to prevent any of

the enemy reinforcements joining them as also to keep the enemy heads down

to prevent effective fire on the raid party. they did their job very well and indeed

no reinforcements came. these mortars took a heavy toll on the enemy and it

was reported on the un MiGoP channels, that it accounted for almost all of the

enemy 9 killed and 27 wounded.

Half way back to the piquet, as per the pre-determined time the raid

commander started enquiring whether support group had started withdrawing.

He could not raise Paoche on the wireless, though he called out his call sign several

times. When he could not raise Gangte even after 30 minutes, he got worried.

But within about 5 minutes thereafter Paoche gave the signal that he had started

withdrawing. Much relieved, the complete raiding party got back to the picket

somewhere between 0300 and 0400h. Later, on enquiry, Paoche revealed that his

group had been pinned down by enemy fire and for sometime he just could not

move. So he lit his torch and threw it a distance away which had desired effect of

the enemy fire shifting on to the lighted torch just as he thought it would. all that

was excellent and very nice but after he managed to extricate his group, he went

back to retrieve his torch! that’s why the delay in his coming on the wireless!

the raid party had to halt frequently as the injured CHM Sidhiman Gurung

had to be carried. Jemadar Kundhoj Gurung of a coy had also been wounded by

grenade shrapnel and had also to be helped out. it was a relief for all to finally

make it back to the FdLs.

as they sat down for the debriefing by about 0600 or 0700, things were gloomy

and Chanda could feel the glare of the Co burning his back for coming back

without Kharke. He did not even shake any body’s hand, as was customary, he

was so disappointed and angry. anyway the deed was done. While debriefing was


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

going on, someone noticed Fat Yogi’s jungle hat. it was jungle hats those days, as

helmets would have been noisy. a bullet had cleanly passed through it without

messing up Fat Yogi’s forehead. the jungle hat was supposed to be kept for future

but insensitive as we are to history – it was not. So was the rifle Sam brought back,

but for one regulation or the other, this trophy also did not materialize. a point of

interest here: whilst inspecting it, it took the unit armourer all his savvy and skill

to strip the bolt off it; it was jammed so hard!

Later that day or the day following, came the news of enemy casualties.

next day Sam did find the Penga post abandoned but for a few enemy soldiers.

through the field glasses he clearly noticed drove upon drove of turkey buzzards

as they perched on the parapets of the post and partied and feasted on the enemy

dead. Since they were at a higher elevation, the battlefield could be seen quite

clearly.

after last light the Pakis tried to close in, on to the indian piquets, 564, 565 and

566, but were detected, and engaged by 3-inch mortar defensive fire. nk Jabi Lal

of the 3-inch mortars, kept his mortar numbers busy the whole night. the news

of the Pakistani casualties cheered up the Battalion to quite an extent particularly

the Commanding officer. Maj Gen amrik Singh, GoC 25inf div was clearly very

happy with the results achieved by 4/3 G r and said so in his after action report

to 15 Corps; a ‘candidly, plucky raid’ it was, he said.

that is how 4/3 Gr recalls the Penga raid. one is reminded of a quote from

ernest Hemingway. Writing in the introduction to ‘Men against Fire’, he says; “as

they get further and further from a war they have taken part in, all men have

a tendency to make it as they wish it had been rather than how it really was.

So every year in July, the anniversary of the month when i got the big wound, i

read ‘the Middle Parts of Fortune’, and it all comes back to me as though it was

not yesterday, nor long ago, but as though it were this morning before day light

and you were waiting there dry mouthed, for it to start.” this account is hence a

record of what happened on that fateful day so many years ago. it is a record free

from any embellishment. Men react differently when under fire. Some actions

are heroic. others markedly less so. But each operation has a story to tell and

lessons to be learned. the Penga raid is certainly one such action.


SCHOLAR WARRIOR

Notes for Contributors

generalthe SCHoLar Warrior welcomes professional articles on warfare and conflict, national security and strategic issues, especially those related to the art and science of land warfare including sub-conventional conflict in the indian context. articles may be submitted by serving and retired members of the armed forces as well as civilians in india and abroad. articles on aerospace and maritime issues and those on foreign policy and international relations having a bearing on land warfare are also welcome. the Journal particularly encourages articles from younger members of the armed forces.

Manuscripts: Contributors should submit their manuscripts (main articles, commentaries, review articles and book reviews) by e-mail, with one hard copy being sent separately by post. all material must be original, unpublished and should not have been submitted for publication elsewhere. Main articles must have a length of 3,000 to 4,000 words. Commentaries and review articles must not exceed 1,500 to 2000 words.

Book reviews: Book reviews must contain the name of the author, the title of the book reviewed, particulars of the publisher, place and date of publication, number of pages and price. authors who wish to have their book considered for review should ask their publisher to send a copy to the editor, SCHoLar Warrior.

Submission: Since manuscripts will be sent out anonymously for peer review, the authors should omit their identity from the manuscript. the author’s name, rank, unit/institutional affiliation, e-mail id, postal address and telephone number should be submitted on a separate cover page. each article must be accompanied by an abstract of about 250 to 300 words. a four to five line (or 75 words) biographical note describing the author should accompany the manuscript. Manuscripts should be typed in double space, including endnotes and references, with 1.5 inch (3.0 cm) margins, on one side of a4 size paper.

acceptance and revision: intimation regarding suitability of the article for publication will be given within 30 days of its receipt in normal cases. articles not accepted for publication will not be returned. the editorial team reserves the right to edit articles for better clarity and to ensure that the style conforms to the style of the SCHoLar Warrior. However, views expressed by an author will not be altered. authors should be prepared to revise their manuscript based on the suggestions made by the reviewers and the editorial team.

Honorarium: a suitable honorarium will be paid for articles accepted for publication. the SCHoLar Warrior may also commission articles from time to time.

mandatory Certificates l retired armed forces officers and civilian authors should submit a certificate of originality, clearly

stating that the article is original and unpublished and has not been submitted for consideration elsewhere.

l Serving members of the armed forces must submit the necessary clearance certificates in terms of the relevant rules and regulations pertaining to their respective Services.

l Serving army officers must submit three certificates. v First, a certificate of originality, clearly stating that the article is original and unpublished and has not

been submitted for consideration elsewhere. v Second, a certificate from the author stating that s/he has not used any official information or material

obtained in an official capacity while writing the article submitted. v third, a certificate from her/his Superior officer stating that there is no objection to the publication

of the article. v the format of the latter two certificates is given in Para 21 (a) and (b) of Sao 3/S/2001/Mi.

l responsibility for obtaining army HQ dGMi (Mi-11) clearance in respect of articles pertaining to subjects specified in Paras 13 and 14 of Sao 3/S/2001/Mi, will be that of the officer herself/himself.

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also be short. use of Pronouns: articles should be written in third person. Writing in first person should be avoided completely – unless the author is over 65 years old!

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Abbreviations: l all abbreviations must be given in full at their first use in the text; for example, Comprehensive test Ban

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Referencing Style: references should be typed in the form of the following example on first appearance:(a) books: Michael Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: routledge, 1989), p. 26.

(b) Edited Volume: James der derian (ed), International Theory: Critical Investigations (new York: new York university Press, 1995).

(c) Articles in journals: Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, no.

2, June 2003, pp. 187-202. in case of two journals having a similar title, the place of publication must be mentioned, e.g., international affairs (London) and international affairs (Moscow).

(d) Articles in Edited Volumes:


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tom nairn, “the Curse of rurality: Limits of Modernisation theory” in John a. Hall (ed), The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1998),

pp. 107-34

(e) articles in newsmagazines: Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan: on the Brink,” The Week, november 4, 2007, p. 45.

(f) articles from newspapers: M. K. Bhadrakumar, “new regionalism in Central asia,” The Hindu, July 14, 2004.

(g) references to Websites: united nations development Programme, “arab Human development report 2003”, http://www.undp.org/rbas/ ahdr/english2003.html, accessed on october 27, 2007.

(h) reports and documents: l united nations, unCed, the Global Partnership for environment and development (new York: united

nations, 1992).l Canberra Commission, report on the elimination of nuclear Weapons (Canberra: Commonwealth of

australia, 1996). available on the internet at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html>

(i) Conference Papers: Michael Williams, “the discursive Power of Community: Consideration on the european ‘Security

Community’”, draft Paper presented at the conference on Power, Security and Community: ir theory and the Politics of eu enlargement, Copenhagen october 9-12, 1997.

(j) unpublished theses and dissertations: Christopher Strawn, “Falling of the Mountain: a Political History and analysis of Bhutan, the Bhutanese

refugees and the Movement in exile”, dissertation submitted to the university of Wisconsin, uSa, 1993, Chap. 4.

on subsequent reference (unless immediately following the first reference, in which case ibid. will be used) please use n. with the number of the note given earlier e.g. n.1, n.2.

Copyright: the copyright of all materials published lies with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLaWS), new delhi. authors may, of course, use the article elsewhere after publication, provided that prior permission is obtained from CLaWS and due acknowledgement is given to the SCHoLar Warrior. authors are themselves responsible for obtaining permission to reproduce copyright material from other sources.

Five offprints of each article will be provided to the author and in case of more than one author, to the senior author. a complimentary copy of the printed journal will be provided to each author.

Mailing address: all manuscripts should be addressed to:

the editor SCHoLar Warrior Centre for Land Warfare Studies rPSo Complex, Parade road new delhi 110010, india tel: +91-11-25691308 email: [email protected] Website: www.claws.in

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