Schiller - Germany's Other Terrorists - 1987

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Germany's other terroristsDavid Th. Schiller

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Germany's Other Terrorists

David Th. SchillerBerlin, West Germany

Abstract When analyzing terrorism in Germany, atten-tion normally focuses on the Rote Armee Fraktion, betterknown as Baader-Meinhof gang. Already in the early years of

th e RAFthere existed different groups, such as the Movement2nd June, which often rivaled and strongly critized the elitistavant-gardism of Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, and GudrunEnsslin. Today only a small fragment of the some 350terroristacts and 500acts of sabotage (1985 statistics) can be attributedto theRAF. Germany's other terrorists, theRevolutionary Cellsand autonom ous/anti-imperialist groups have long agooutdoneth e RAF and become a much graver threat to the internalsecurity of the Federal Republic. Though similarities in rhe-

toric and operational approach exist between the RAF and

these groups, theexisting underlying differences arestrong and

until recently have prevented cooperation. The hunger strike

campaign of the win ter 1984/1985 app ears topresent a change inpolicies onbehalf of the Cells.

Germany's Baader-Meinhof Gang, also known as the Red ArmyFaction (RAF) has been active s ince April 3,1968, when AndreasBaader and Gudrun Ensslin along with two friends started their

urban guerrilla campaign with incendiary bombs in two Frank-

furt department stores. Numerous other bombings, assassina-

tions, and kidnappings were to follow; despite police

countermeasures and arrests of core members the gang con-

tinued on its way, gaining the logistical support of foreign like-

Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume 9, Number 1

0149-0389/87/030087-00$02.00/0Copyright © 1987Crane, Russak &Company, Inc.

87



88 David Th. Schiller

minded grou ps and establishing a close working relationship withPalestinian terrorist organizations. The RAF campaign wasbrought to a climax in autumn 1977, when gang members ab-duc ted and later killed Hanns-M artin Schleyer, a leading figure inWest Germany's postwar industry, while four Palestinians hi-jacked a Lufthansa plane.

Though leftist sympathizers turned away from the RAF afterthe Schleyer murder and police efforts caused a decline in thegang's activities, the Red Army Faction is still very much asecurity threat as was evidenced at the beginning of 1985: In thecourse of a three-month-long "offensive," imprisoned RAF-

members went on a hunger strike while outside commandoescommitted some forty bomb and arson attempts. The new wavewas brought to an end after two RAF members assassinated aMunich industrialist in his home, a short time after the FrenchAction Directe murdered General Audran. For some analyststhis appeared to prove the existence of a new Europe-wide terrornetwork of RAF, AD, and the Belgian CCC. "Euro-terrorism"filled the headlines and was much speculated about.

While the RAF gets most of the attention with its large-scalebombs, its pompous declarations, and its assassination attempts,one tends to forget that the West German left-wing terrorist

movement is not as monolithic as it might appear. Even duringthe best years of the RAF, parallel organized groups with dif-ferent theoretical ideas and social backgrounds, existed: TheMovement 2nd June originated in Berlin, and remained apartfrom the Baader-Meinhof Group for quite some time, thoughsome members obviously cooperated with RAF teams. Sim-ilarity, the Revolutionary Cells, which came into existence inFrankfurt in 1972-1973, insisted on their operational indepen-dence from the RAF and were often very critical of the formergang's "elitist attitudes." While the June 2nd members declaredopenly the fusion of their movement into the RAF in 1980, theCells, known mostly by the abbreviation RZ, have continued todevelop their own operational style and are now judged to bemore dangerous than the RAF.1 Today not a week passes bywithout a bombing or arson attempt perpetrated by the revolu-



Germ any's Other Terrorists 89

tionary cells or similar small anarchist groups who emulate theRZ style.The Revolutionary Cells (RZ) first appeared in the Frankfurt-

Wiesbaden area, where they developed from the same studentleft-wing scene from which the 2nd June recruited its mem-bership in Berlin. Early RZ activists came from the local residen-tial squatter movement, from disenchanted anti-Vietnam protestgroups, or such organizations as the Red Help, a radical leaguesupporting the "political priso ners" of the RA F. From the begin-ning, the RZ denounced the elitist, hierarchical structure of theBaader-Meinhof underground and their arrogance. Though lead-

ers did exist—for instance, Wilfried Boese in Frankfurt who laterheaded the Entebbe hijacking—the Cells prided themselves ontheir close-knit relationship, using the term "the family" whenreferring to their group among themselves.2 Though critical ofthe RAF's style, the early RZ members were sympathetic to theRAF's political aims, voicing their acknowledgment of the "his-torical role of the RAF for the guerrilla war in Germany." Likethe RAF and the June 2nd, the Frankfurt RZ cadre developedcontacts with Palestinian organizations, namely the People'sFront for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Apparently theCells developed two different branches in 1973-1974: one, theGerman or local branch consisted of members and sympathizerswilling to operate on a part-time level while still living theirnormal, civilian existence. The other, the "Europe" or "outside"group, represented the hard core, whose activists due to earlierincidents had thought it more opportune to go underground,change their identities, and eventually leave the Federal Re-public. For these, the Palestinian connection became an elementof survival.

RZ-members, along with other German terrorist exiles fromthe R AF and June 2nd, were drafted into Wadi Had dad's interna-tional branch of the P FL P and in the following y ears participatedin a series of transnational attacks, among them the OPECincident, planned and headed by the terrorist mercenaryRamirez I. Sanchez (known as "Carlos"). With the Vietnam Waras a m otivating elem ent in the p roclaimed anti-imperialist strug-




gle relegated to the past, the RZ like the other Germ an extremistgroups were hard up for a new flag to wave and the Palestinianlargely replaced the earlier cause. Also—according to Hans-Joachim K lein— the PF LP lent logistical and financial supp ort tothe Cells, which caused the local RZ branch to direct theiractivities toward Jewish and Israeli targets in West Germany andBerlin in order to obtain that support. On the other hand, adifferent type of RZ began to ferment in these ye ars from 1974 to1977 at the local level. Criticism of the RAF and its strategy grewafter th e mu rders of Buback, Ponto, and Schleyer, causing a rapiddecline in the symp athies of the leftists and liberals, who h itherto

had regarded the terrorists as misguided youngsters only revolt-ing against the oppressive establishment. While bombs againstGermany's newspaper imperium, the Springer Publishing House,had received the acclaim of most left-wingers, even of universityprofessors and artists, the bloodshed of 1977 brought a turn-around in leftist public opinion.

A New Concep t of Terrorist Action

Within G erman radical circles the time was ripe for taking stockof the past years. Already in 1977, certain terrorist splinter

groups, such as Norbert Kroecher's Stockholm-based German-Swedish gang, had thought about different ways to enlist theundecided , the disench anted, and th e angry ones. The result wasa 200-page manual, later known as the "Kroecher text book,"which was to act as a guidebook for individuals and small groupswilling to start violent action, resistance, and underground oper-ations. The manual calls for the creation of small, close-knit cellsand gives detailed "how to" information for the building ofbombs, incendiary devices, and booby traps, the planning andexecution of assassination attempts as well as the stealing ofcars, tapping of phones, the establishment of safehouses, and

avoidance of police observation. From that point of view, theKroecher manual is not very original, most of its details havingbeen taken from earlier pamp hlets, all of which are based on theSwiss army manual Total Resistance edited by Major von Dach.But the manual, found in a safehouse of the Swedish-German




Kro eche r gang, goes one step further: A m assive popular front isenv isioned , in which every radical leftist can jo in in the resist-ance by a m ultitude of small sabotage actions against rep resenta-tives of "the system": teache rs, policemen, businessmen, judg es,politicians. The manual describes a multitude of sabotage pos-sibilities: phone calls, bomb threats, the deflating of tires ofprivate vehicles, glueing door locks and ticket vending m achinesas well as other simple mechanical destruction. Rioting andresidential squatting are seen as a part of this "worldwide anti-zombie resistance movement."

Clearly a different concept of terrorism was planned by the

author of the manual: different from the elitist approach of theRAF, the textbook calls for a widespread, small-scale type ofmilitancy, not the well-trained urban guerrilla with his constantlogistical needs and problems, but a new type of do-it-yourselfextremism, which would lead the young radical from occasionalsmall token s of resistance against the establishm ent on a step-by-step path to more serious acts of revolutionary activity, givinghim more training and expertise along the way. The Kroechermanual can also be interpreted as an attempt of the full-timeunderground to touch base with the still radical but less com-mitted leftist community, which at that time was drifting away

from dreams of worldwide anti-imperialist revolutions to morehomegrown areas of concern, such as environmental subjects,university disputes, housing problems, etc. Kroecher and someof his German gang members originally came from the Berlinbased 2nd Ju ne before they were drawn into cooperation w ith theRAF through contacts with the Heidelberg Socialist PatientsCollective, with Siegfried Haag and other s from the RA F circle.In the manual, some of the anarchist phantasies of the early 2ndJune reappear. There is also some evidence that Kroecher andhis group had con tacts w ith West German revolutionary cells andthat the manual was thus influenced by theoretical considera-

tions, which evolved during the same time in the local branchesof the RZ .In th e summe r of 1978 a small, 19-page pamphlet w as circulated

in leftist radical groups, revealing an RZ imprint. Called "TheBrave Little Tailor" (after a fairy-tale figure), it echoes some of



92 Da vid Th. Schiller

the concepts of the Kroecher manual, calling for a host of minorsabotage activities against the "terror from above." Examplesare given of how untrained persons can perpetrate lesser acts ofsabotage against construc tion sites, machines, and veh icles; howthey can counter "the state's omnipotence" with small gasolinebo m bs, terror-inducing telepho ne calls, spraypainting of politicalgraffiti, and the buildup of a cell-type structure. Similar demandsare voiced in underground periodicals which act as a commoninformation exchange and a base for political argumentationbetween the cells and groups and their sympathizers. In contrastto th e R AF ideology, the new. concep t for undergro und activismdoes not demand the total commitment of their members, thechange of identities and the life of a fugitive, which RAF urbanguerrilla warfare asks for. Where the Baader-Meinhof group sawthemselves as an avant-garde fighting in the "metropoles of im-perialism for the worldwide revolution in concert with ThirdWorld liberation groups," the new concept to which the RZsubscribed remained on a very grass-roots and populist level.Targets had to be in a clearly visible relation to some localprotest or source of discontent—such as the price increase inFrankfurt's public transportation system, which prompted theRZ to destroy dozens of ticket-vending machines. Instead ofcreating—and attracting new recruits—with the RAF type guer-

rilla myth, the RZ wanted to keep the operations on a simple,easy-to-copy base to demonstrate that "resistance is feasible."The RZ correctly analyzed that one of the weak elements in theRAF system, which had caused so many arrests of members,was the elaborate conspiratorial scheme, with its demands forsafehouses, co nstantly changing identities, cars, and money. TheRevolutionary Cells did not regard the full-time, professional"fighter" as an idol to strive for; they would only go und ergroundif and when the situation demanded it. Otherwise they wouldcontinue their normal, everyday life, remain students or workerswith a normal identity, live in their own appartments and avoid

any type of behavior normally associated with the terrorist un-derground. Their concept of daily pinprick attacks and smalloperations on the local or regional level made high technical ormilitary expertise unnecessary.




The law enforcement authorities, which for so long had beenconfronting the more visible RAF, were for a long time lessconcerned with the more elusive RZ, which were dubbed"Feierabendterroristen" (after-hours terrorists) because of theirmode of operation. The first recognition of the RZ's real dimen-sions came more through an accident than through police searchmethods: in June 1978 a Heidelberg student, Hermann Feiling,24 , accidentally triggered a bomb he had planned to leave at theArgentine Consulate in Munich. The explosion cost him the lossof his sight and bo th his legs and brough t the p olice onto the righttrack. Shortly after being operated on, Feiling talked and di-

vulged much information on the set-up of his cell and the hard-ware depots his cell had placed in various locations aroundHeidelberg and M annheim. Large amounts of arms and ammuni-tion were found which were either of East European origin,obviously logistical help from PLO gro ups, or cam e from NATOdepo ts. By accident the police had unraveled one end of a revolu-tionary cell, which obviously had contact to the RAF and the"outside" branch of the RZ. The other end of the cell remained'hidden. Feiling later refused to cooperate with the authorities,his girlfriend and other m embers of his cell disappeared and havebeen on the wanted lists since. Similar attempts of the Germanpolice to throw some light on the set-up and personal connec-tions of the cells were in vain, mostly for lack of evidence. Onesuspect, Rudolf Raabe, who appeared to be the RZ's contactwith the Irish INLA in 1979, was arrested on his return to theFRG, but was only tried on a minor charge.

By 1982 the BKA, Germany's Federal Bureau of Investiga-tions, had indications that Revolutionary Cells had been respon-sible for at least 132 bombings or arson attacks in the pastdecade, the damag e amoun ting to some 50 million Deu tschmark .Also the RZ were though t to be responsible for the mu rder of theHessian Minister Karry and attacks on lawyers in Berlin, where

the RZ had merged with the remnants of the 2nd June. At thistime, the new concept of terrorism had obvious found many newfriends. The number of existing cells was estimated to be in therange of 50-100 groups w ith som e 300-500 mem bers, centering inthe Rhine-Main area, the Ruhr district and Cologne, in Berlin




and the Stuttgart-Karlsruhe-Heidelberg triangle. Still, barely adozen search warrants for suspected RZ members existed, whilesmall-scale bombings and sabotage events occurred daily, someof which carried the RZ imprint. But for the majority no recog-nized group claimed responsibility.

"Guerilla diffusa"

At the beginning of the 1980s, a potentially large field had openedfor the recruitment of persons believing in the RZ-type conceptof terrorism. Not unlike the 1968 student revolt, a new wave of

youth unre st had grown since 1979, mainly focusing on environ-mental problems. Rallies against nuclear powerplants becamemore violent. Residential squatting groups surfaced in Freiburgand Berlin, similar to those of the D utch and the S wiss, clashingwith police forces in nightlong riots. Berlin, where 150 houseswere occupied by illegal residents, became a Mecca for disori-ented youngsters, who felt left out by a society plagued withunemployment. Attention shifted from time to time from thesquatter problem to other subjects, such as the construction siteof a planned third runway for Frankfurt's airport, the Pershingmissile shipments to South Germany, or nuclear plants in dif-ferent areas of the FRG . In 1981 barely a w eek went by without atumultous rally or violent riots somewhere in Germany.

The Revolutionary Cells focused in leaflets and their under-ground journal, Revolutionary Wrath, on these elem ents of youthunrest, bringing them into a larger anti-American, anti-imperi-alist context. Fusing the populist protest actions into a wide-spread scheme of violent militancy, the RZ selectedenvironmental and pacifist concerns as new rallying points, allthe time urging that their program of small-scale terrorist ac-tivism be undertaken by anybody willing to confront the "ever-present structural violence"3 of the capitalist society.

Imitators and emulators of the RZ concept were easily found:The theme of the Kroecher manual and the "Brave Little Tailor"is copied in a 75-page book let ap pearing in 1981 un de r the titleGuerilla Diffusa, and authored by "so m e autonomous groups ofautonomous individuals," as the introduction says. The example



Germ any's Other Terrorists . 95

is taken from the Italian anarchists and some chapters do de-scribe the experiences of Rome's "city Indians" and autonomousgroups. Like the earlier manuals, the Guerilla Diffusa advises onhow to sabotage power lines and telephone connections, how tomix Molotov cocktails, and build caltrops. The central statemen tis expressed in a chapter called "Security for the Eighties" inwhich the anonymous author describes his own path into mili-tant activism, outlining the existence of various "autonomous"or "spontaneous" groups emulating the example set by the revo-lutionary cells without calling themselves specific names: "Thecommando declarations do not give names, everywhere there are

fires, explosions . . . while the RAF cadres operate in a weak-ened state abroad and have to deal with one defeat after another,the joy of destruction is spread in the FRG, and the pigs haven'tyet found a conc ept. The B KA is confronted by a chaotic m ass ofbom bers and rio ters, who are invisible and absolutely confusingto the logical, straightforward mentality of German law-and-order fetishists. They haven't found a strategy and those pullingthe strings. . . . Everywhere spontaneous revolutionary cellshave come into existence but they don't need that name. Thestreetfighters an d p yromaniacs of the movement have copied theRZ m o de l. . . regular and irregular small groups develop, whichvery secretly take on themselves the planning and execution ofan attack . . . then wait for the echo , listen for critique and praise,then discuss the effect. The activists remain legal and should nipany neuro tic profiling and false fighter myths in the bud . . . eachgroup acts independently, has no name, and exchanges informa-tion with others only sporadically. Names are changing, themilitant attack stays broadly spread against the many vulnerablepoints of the state (diffusa). . . . "

The ever-present urge "to do something," found in so manyleft-wing radicals, is readily exploited by those behind the RZan d guerilla diffusa model. While the anti-nuke and peace grou ps

are strongly criticized for their pacifist approach and declarednonviolence, they remain n onetheless a potential recruiting fieldfor the terror ists. A cell or auton om ous g roup may very well haveits beginning at a rally against a nuclear power plant, whereblack-clad, helmeted rioters battle against police with sticks,




slingshots, and stones. Its members may be recruited from theradicals among a squ atter group or from the "streetfighters" whohover on the edges of an other wise peaceful dem ons trationagainst NATO p olicies. The group or cell can fall ap art after a fewweeks or months, as even the RZ have permitted certain mem-bers to "retire" from the urban guerrilla existence.

While these cells and autonomous groups today are responsi-ble for more than 200 bombings and arson attemp ts p er year, it isdifficult to give a clear-cut statistical assessment of this threat orthe damage it creates. Nor is there much definite knowledgeabout the numbers of perpetrators, the group setup, or the inter-

group contacts available. To some security analysts, the actionsperpetrated within the framework of the guerilla diffusa conceptdo not represent more than political hooliganism without a clearideological background. Others argue that these activities mightvery well be steps on the way to real terrorism and point to theexamples of the late sixties and early seventies, when left-wingradicals entered the RAF, 2nd June, and RZ after an appren-ticeship of riots, sq uatting, and num erous low-intensity acts thenknown as Spafiguerilla ("jest or fun guerilla").

Creating an Atmosphere of Insecurity

Guerilla diffusa is less an organizational pattern than a set ofspecific low-intensity terrorist tactics, in which individuals andsmall groups conform their radical resistance against state andsociety. Not much is currently gained by trying to analyze therelatively few declarations, programs, and discussion papers au-thored by the autonomous groups, the RZ, and its female branchRote Zora, which has made an enforced appearance since 1983.To get a corre ct view of the sco pe of the threat and the extent ofthese activities it is necessary to look at targets and modes ofoperation:

Ba nk s, wh ether foreign or national, appea r as prime targets forall kinds of sabotage attempts, ranging from time bombs, incen-diary dev ices, and simple throwing of Molotov cocktails throughsmashed windows to such nuisances as spraypainting and metalglue in doo rlocks. In a similar vein, departm ent stores and large




supermarkets are attacked. Both are "traditional" symbols ofcapitalism and worldwide exploitation and are seen as accom-plices in the financing of imperialist schemes, oppression of thepeople through new housing schemes, and similar "crimes." Ona lower level, business is hampered—especially around Christ-mastime—by false bomb alarms, the dispersal of stinkbombs, ortampering with the displayed merchandise.

As construction programs, such as the building of nuclearpower plants, the enlarging of Frankfurt airport, new highways,or business towers often touch environmental concerns, the ter-rorists's solidarity with the popular protest movements are ex-

pressed by sabotage against construction companies, theirequipment, and their vehicle pool. Within five months, fromOctober 1981 to February 1982, nine bombing incidents tookplace against the airport installations or firms related to theconstruction of the third runway—all were claimed by the RZ.La ter othe r branch es of the same construction firms were hit, notin Frankfu rt, bu t in far-off Berlin and Dusseldorf. At the height ofthe squatter unrests in Berlin an average of ten incidents permonth were recorded in the city—gasoline bombs against banks,furniture stores, and construction companies, all perpetrated inrelation to the local squatters-vs.-the-city issue. Not a few of

these incidents caused damage of more than half a million Deu-tschmark.Increasingly sabotage acts are directed against computer

firms, data centers, sales offices, and related electronic factories.For the past two or three years the big-brother theme has been agrowing sentiment in populist left-wing protest organizations,and as many of these firms are related to military researchprojects and have U.S. connections, this falls readily into thewider anti-American, anti-NATO campaign, which has becomethe c entral pro test th em e since 1981. Military and civilian in-stallations of the U.S. forces as well as American firms such as

ITT or Sperry-Univac are prime targets in the terrorist campaignagainst "U.S. imperialism." Firms in the Ruhr area received aspree of letter bombs prior to President Reagan's visit to WestGermany in June 1982, while an RZ-concerted bombing cam-paign was directed against U.S. army installations, motor pools,



Germany's Other Terrorists 99

Seen from the terrorists' viewpoint, the guerilla diffusa con-

cept has been quite successful and is here to stay—after hun-

dreds of bombings and more than 200 million Deutschmarks

worth of damage the authorities remain still very much in the

dark about the perpetrators' network, their background, and

connections. Meanwhile, the terrorists gain more and more expe-

rience and enjoy a nationwide reputation, creating more emu-

lators with every successful event. While setbacks might occur,

there is a vivid tendency to move toward more serious targets

and a higher sophistication in the operational field with some

cells and groups. What started as political rowdyism has long ago

crossed the borderline to low-intensity terrorism and will defi-nitely remain a security problem equal to the RAF.

Notes:

1. Already in 1978 the BKA judged theRevolutionary Cells to be the

"curren tly strongest terrorist forma tion." This judgm ent has beenechoed in the annual press conferences of Federal Attorney Rebmannevery year since then.

2. Much information on theearly, international bran ch of the RZ was

revealed by Hans-Joachim Klein in his book Return to Humanity

(Hamburg, 1979) inwhich hedescribed his ownentry into the Frankfurtcell of Wilfried Böse, his participation in the OPEC hostage-taking, and

his subsequent dropping out of the terrorist underground. The bookalso carries som e interviews w ith Klein byDerSpiegel and various RZ

declarations and documents on Klein's desertion which had earlierappeared in left-wing u nderground periodicals.

3. The "structural violence" inherent in the capitalist system, a

theme developed as an element in conflict and peace research by JohanGaltung in the early seven ties, often acts as legitimization for the use of

violence by leftist radicals.4. For statistical estimates the author has used the annual accounts

of the Federal "Office for the Protection of the Constitution," BKA

statistics,and his own

compilationsof

terrorist events.Some quotations were drawn directly from thepamphlets m entionedin this paper, others stem from various underground periodicals such as

th e Revolutionary Wrath and Radikal, which are used by autonomouscircles as an information and debating base.

Schiller - Germany's Other Terrorists - 1987

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