International Phenomenological Society

Max Scheler on the Place of Man in the CosmosAuthor(s): Marvin FarberSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Mar., 1954), pp. 393-399Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104111 .Accessed: 04/09/2011 11:25

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DISCUSSION MAX SCHELER ON THE PLACE OF MAN IN THE COSMOS

Attempts of various kinds were made to stem the rising tide of evolu- tionary naturalism, and scientific philosophy in general. This was a primary motive of philosophical idealists at the close of the nineteenth century and in the first part of the twentieth century. Members of diverse tendencies and schools, who were normally at war with one another or otherwise engaged in internecine doctrinal strife, were in unison in opposing the naturalistic conception of man and his works. Prominent among the German philosophers were Professors Rickert, Eucken, Dilthey, Simmel, Weber, and Husserl; and similar reactions against naturalism were to be seen in other countries. Husseri devoted much effort toward combatting naturalism, as shown by his often-quoted essay, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."'

Husserl's collaborator, Professor Max Scheler, was preeminent among the anti-naturalists. Similarly, his "philosophical anthropology" was designed to provide an alternative, acceptable to fideists, to the theory of man of the special sciences. He was a most determined critic of the evolu- tionary theory in biology as well as of its philosophical influence; and he extended the arena of his critical activities to include Marx and Freud. Indeed, the "sociology of knowledge" which he did so much to popularize is an example of the non-Marxian Marxism which has managed to find a place in academic circles. For years an ardent spokesman of Catholic thought (Scheler had a "Catholic period"), he was also in some respects an ideological precursor of the Nazis.2 Fortunately for himself, however, he died before the accession to power of the Nazis.

In his little book on The Place of Man in the Conmo8,3 Scheler presents a summary of the main points of his "philosophical anthropology." The questions "What is man, and what is his place in being?" are central for Scheler. He points out that the problems of a philosophical anthropology had become of central importance in Germany, in wide circles, including philosophical scientists. In his opinion, the existing degree to which man had become a problem for himself had reached a maxmum in all known history. He states that the "mighty treasures" of the special sciences are to

I "Philosophie ale strenge Wissenschaft," Logos, Vol. I, 1910-11. 'Cf. V. J. McGill, "Scheler's Theory of Sympathy and Love," Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, University of Buffalo, Vol. II, March 1942. ' Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Otto Reichl Verlag, Darmstadt, 1928.

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be utilized, in order to develop a new form of self-consciousness and self- intuition. That Scheler was not the person to attempt to use those "treas- ures" is amply shown by his text, here as well as elsewhere.

Scheler reflects: If one asks an educated European what he understands by the word "man," then three sets of incompatible ideas occur to him, deriving from the Jewish-Christian tradition, from ancient Greece ("reason," the "logos," etc.), and from modern natural science and genetic psychology. Thus there is a theological, a philosophical, and a natural- scientific anthropology, but, Scheler declares, we do not have a unified idea of man. This is a strange conclusion to draw. The scientific view supersedes the others, as a matter of fact, and it is really unified, unless one injects a special requirement of unity into the discussion which cannot be fulfilled scientifically. Scheler betrays his misgivings. In his opinion, the ever growing number of special sciences which are concerned with man "conceal" the "essence" of man more than they "illuminate" it. He seems to be playing an assumptive game with the term "essence." Is the "essence" of man predetermined to be something different from the findings of the sciences? Presumably it must be something which no microscope or chemical tests can reach, and which no descriptive observations can ascer- tain. Scheler almost hopefully states that today all the three views of man cited above are greatly shaken, the Darwinian solution of the problem of the origin of man being completely discredited.4 This is indeed hopeful thinking on his part. Scheler's interest is in the "essence" of man in re- lation to animals and plants, and in the special metaphysical place of man.

The problem of determining man's "special place" requires that the meaning of "man" be defined appropriately. For Scheler, the term "man" must not be used to name the special characters possessed by men as a sub-group of vertebrates and mammals. It seems clear that the concept of man must be "loaded" from the outset, so that man is irreducible to nature. According to the traditional conception, the concept of man as the image of God presupposes the idea of God as a central point of reference. This concept of man, which is designated the "essential" view of man, is declared by Scheler to have a totally different meaning from the natural- scientific conception. Whether this "essential" concept of man, which assigns a special place to man as such, in contradistinction to all other living species, has any right at all, is the theme of Scheler's discourse. He makes no secret of his aim to champion the religiously inspired view of man in opposition to the view of man which is determined by the special sciences. His motivation is indicated clearly.

For Scheler, there is "a new principle" which makes man to be man, a

4Scheler's anti-evolutionism is set forth in some detail in his book, Der Formalis- mus in der Ethik und die materials Wertethik, Verlag Niemeyer, Halle, 1913-1916.

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principle opposed to life in general, which cannot be reduced to the "natural evolution of life." The term "spirit" names this principle. It is supposed to comprise the concept of reason, the intuition of essences, and goodness, love, etc. The act-center, in which spirit appears within finite spheres of being, is called a "person," in contrast to all functional "life" centers, which are called "mental" centers, viewed from within. In Scheler's view, man alone, insofar as he is a person, is able to "rise above" himself, as a living being, and from a center as it were "beyond" the space-time world, to make everything, including himself, to be the object of his knowledge. But this center cannot be a "part" of this world, Scheler main- tains, and hence it cannot have a definite locus in space and time. It can only be situated in "the highest ground of being." Thus, man is portrayed as an essence supervening upon himself and the world. But Scheler does not in the least justify his contention that man's "center" of activity is not a part of the world. The reader must reconcile himself as best he can to the thought of a real being without a locus in space and time. If he is accustomed to using words without bothering to inspect their meanings, he will perhaps go along with such expressions as "beyond space and time," just as he will think he is doing something when he speaks of "the highest ground of being."

Like his predecessors in the idealistic tradition-Schelling, for example- Scheler regards spirit as the only being that is itself not capable of being an object. It is construed as pure actuality, and as having its being only in the performance of its acts. The center of spirit, the person, is therefore neither being as an object nor as a thing, but only an essentially determined, ordered structure of acts. Other persons are also not capable of being objects. We must post-perform and co-perform their free acts, and "iden- tify" ourselves with the willing, the love, etc., of a person, with it itself. This line of thought leads readily to the "one super-singular spirit" which, Scheler thinks, we have to assume on the basis of the unbreakable connec- tion of "Idea" and "Act." The assumption of an order of "Ideas" inde- pendent of human consciousness is taken to require such a spiritual being. The "Ideas" are not "ante res," but are with the things, and are held to be generated in the eternal spirit in acts of continuous world-realization. When we think "Ideas," we do not merely find a being or essence already independent of us, but it is rather a "co-bringing-forth," a "co-generating" of the "Ideas" and of the values coordinated with eternal love, out of the "origin of the things themselves." It is a curious fact that Scheler should use expressions such as "origin" and "the things themselves" without explana- tion. How anything could "originate" from his supposed spiritual source remains wholly unexplained. The use of the expression "the things them- selves" is perhaps merely an interesting case of perseveration. It is a long

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way from Husserl's famous slogan, which expressed an appeal to "the things themselves." Scheler has gotten far away from "the things" (or the facts of experience) here, with his talk of "eternal love," "spirit," "generation," etc.

In order to make more clear the peculiarity of "spirit," Scheler considers the act of "ideation" as a specifically spiritual act. It is supposed by him to be an act completely different from all technical intelligence. What Scheler means by a "problem of intelligence" will be elucidated by an example which he gives: I now have a pain in my arm; how did it arise, and how can I get rid of it? That is a problem of positive science. But, Scheler goes on in his chosen philosophical direction, I can grasp the same pain as an example of the very strange essential condition, that this world has pain, evil, and suffering at all. Then I shall ask differently: What is pain itself, apart from the fact that I now have it here, and how must the ground of things be constituted for something such as "pain in general" to be possible? The reader will be tempted to ask whether this is an "in general" kind of question. The importance of nerves for pain would indicate that the answer is always "in particular," at least with regard to the natural world and actual experience. To be sure, a better example could have been chosen, and the performance could have been more skillfully executed.

"Ideation" is taken to be independent of the number of observations which we make, and of inductive inferences. The "essential forms of construction" of the world are grasped in one example of the region of essence which is in question. The knowledge that we thus gain is regarded as holding in infinite generality for all possible things which are of this essence. Such insights are regarded as valid "beyond the limit of our sensuous experience" and as "a priori." Scheler sees such "essential cognitions" as fulfilling two different functions: (1) It is said to provide the highest axioms for all the positive sciences, which first of all show us the direction of a fruitful observation, induction, and deduction through intelligence and discursive thinking. Scheler does not justify this bold, empty contention. That concepts are used in hypotheses will be agreed to by all, but no scientific methodologist would think of calling them "a priori" in Scheler's sense. Investigators in the "positive sciences" do not look to the alleged "highest axioms" for the direction of their observation. (2) There is the function for metaphysics, whose final goal is described as knowledge of absolute being. They are described in Hegel's words, as "windows to the absolute." Denying that essences can be reduced to empirical causes of a finite kind, Scheler argues that they can only be ascribed to the "one super-singular spirit." He is quite sure of that, but so far as demonstration is concerned, his procedure is simply to speak, or to write, depending upon the circumstances.

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Scheler speaks of Plato's vision of "Ideas" as turning the soul away from the sensuous content of things and into itself, in order to find the "origins" of things. This he takes to be the meaning of Husserl's procedure when he connects the knowledge of "Ideas" to a "phenomenological reduction." Scheler refers here to the procedure of "crossing out" or "bracketing" the accidental coefficient of existence of world-things, in order to gain their "essentia." While not in complete agreement with Husserl's theory of the "reduction," Scheler asserts that in it the act is meant which really defines the human spirit. Scheler's conception of the phenomenological reduction appears to be crude and incorrect. He seems not to have graped its real methodological nature, and to be viewing it in accordance with his own standpoint and needs. It is a rather objectionable mystical product that results from his exegesis, which comes close'to the type of misunderstanding according to which the "reduction" involves the "discarding" of reality. Thus, Scheler asks what it means, to speak of "de-realizing" (or "de- actualizing") or "ideating" the world. He disagrees with Husserl's view, that it means withholding judgments of existence; and he takes it to mean that the reality-factor itself is suspended by way of experiment, that it is annihilated, and to mean the setting aside of the "fear of the mundane." It is evident from his text that Scheler sees something that is correct, that he even catches a glimpse of the play of a method; but also that his antecedently accepted articles of faith and the firm drift of his philosophical persuasion lead him to talk of "annihilation" and emancipation from the "fear of the mundane." How quaint it is to see him endeavor to wreck and remove worlds without an instrument. Scheler talks of the "ascetic" act of "de-realization," and states that, if existence is "resistance," it can only consist in the suspension, in the placing out of play of that life-drive, in relation to which the world above all appears "as resistance," and which at the same time is the condition of all sense-perception of the accidental here-now-thus. But, in his view, this act can only be performed by that being called "spirit." Only spirit in its form as pure "will" can effect the inactualizing of the "feeling-drive-center" that Scheler regards as the mode of access to the "being real" of the real. Man thus turns out to be the living being that can be "ascetic" toward its life. Husserl's methodological terms "putting out of play," "suspension," "accidental here-now-thus," etc., are used, to be sure. But the admonition of the founder of modern phe- nomenology, to begin with the suspension of all beliefs in the interest of a radical philosophy of knowledge and experience ("until the final grounds"), is certainly not illustrated by Scheler. He has shown how easy it is to adapt the general phenomenological pattern to non-philosophical and non- scientific uses. Such practices-annihilating the world, asceticism toward life, the assumptive use of the term "spirit" and its transformation into

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"pure will" when needed, and the like-could best be obviated by a proper appraisal of the truth of naturalism, or, in short, by a critical philosophy of science.

"Life" and "spirit" are conceived by Scheler to be essentially different, and yet as related. Spirit is said to "ideate" life, whereas life alone enables spirit to get into activity and to realize works. Scheler criticizes the "natu- ralistic" theories, both mechanistic and vitalistic, for mistaking the relation- ship of spirit and life. They are accused of overlooking the essence of life in its peculiar nature and the peculiar structure of its laws, and of com- pletely missing the "originalness" and independence of the spirit.

Marx is mentioned under the heading of the "naturalistic-vitalistic" types, and Scheler refers to his critique of Marx's "historical materialism" in his "Sociology of Knowledge.", His brief rendering of Marx's thesis is as inadequate as his rendering of Husserl proved to be, and just as misleading. Marx is quoted as talking about "Ideas that have no interests and passion back of them" as "missing the mark" in world-history-and that means, Scheler states, powers that come from the "vital-and-drive sphere of man."

As for himself, Scheler is optimistic with regard to history. In his view, history in the large shows an increase in the role of reason, by way of an increasing acquisition of "Ideas" and values. He looks to philosophical anthropology to provide the basis for a philosophy of history and of culture. It is assigned the task of showing how, out of the "basic structure of man," all specific contributions and works of man go forth-language, tools, ideas of right and wrong, the state, myths, religion, science, etc. The "basic structure of man" is obviously to be treated apart from its naturalistic and cultural conditions, since all "naturalistic" theories have been renounced. And yet, everything that is known by way of the special sciences and the much-despised "naturalistic" theories must be packed away, in an appropriately frozen "essential" state, in order to make possible the "going forth" of the "works of man." Only a well-stocked hat ever allowed a rabbit to "go forth" from it. It is simply dishonest to renounce naturalistic procedures and then to make use of them covertly.

The question about man's place in the cosmos leads Scheler to ask finally: "Why is there a world at all, and why am 'I' at all?" The reader will reflect that not every string of words constitutes a real question. Presumably Scheler would not refer his question "Why am 'I' at all?" to an obstetrician. His line of thought and motivation lead him in quite a different direction. He states that one should apprehend the "essential necessity" of the connection between the consciousness of the world, the self, and the consciousness of God, whereby God is apprehended here as a "being through

5M. Scheler, "Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens," in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft.

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itself" with the predicate "holy." This "sphere" of "absolute being," whether it is accessible or not to experience or knowing, is regarded as belonging to the essence of man just as constitutively as his self-conscious- ness and world-consciousness. World-consciousness, self-consciousness, and God-consciousness are held to form an indissoluble unity of structure. Scheler regards the "world-ground" as being in man, as immediately apprehended and realized in man.

What has Scheler contributed toward determining man's place in the cosmos? To some extent he has contributed novelty: in degree and kind of obfuscation, in manner of crudeness in misrepresenting phenomenology and naturalistic theories. But also, curiously, there is novelty in the way in which he seems able to recognize significant ideas which might be made fruitful if treated subject to the canons of logic and on the basis of the sciences. As matters stand, Scheler presents a sorry, confused, and emi- nently unworthy picture in his attack on scientific philosophy, as well as in his dogmatic defense of selected articles of faith.

MARVIN FARBER.

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO.