Saul Kripke Reference and Existence the John

7/23/2019 Saul Kripke Reference and Existence the John

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REFERENCE AN D EX ISENCE


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REFER ENCE AND EX ISENCE

he John Locke Lecures

Saul A. Kripke

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Saul A. Kripke

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Library o Congress Caaloging-in-Publicaion DaaKripke, Saul A.,

Reerence and exisence : he John Locke lecures / Saul A. Kripke.pages cm.

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o

My Faher


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CONTENTS

Preace ix

Lecure I: Ocober , Lecure II: November , Lecure III: November ,

Lecure IV: November , Lecure V: November , Lecure VI: December ,

Reerences

Index


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ix

PREFACE

Some ime ago I ound mysel browsing hrough Moores Some

Main Problems o Philosophy, looking or a passage I wished o quoe.

Te passage was no here, bu I came across he ollowing: I hope

Proessor Wisdom was righ in hinking ha his book was worh

publishing. I consiss o weny lecures which I delivered a Mor-

ley College in London in he winer o . Te book, however,

was only published in .I mus admi he nding cheered me up a bi, since I was mysel

in a similar siuaion, rying o prepare or publicaion a se o lec-

ures I had delivered in as he John Locke Lecures a Oxord,

and wondering wheher publicaion would sill be o some ineres.

My lecures were eniled Reerence and Exisence, and he ac

ha hey have now become he book you are reading (I was going osay, he book you have in your hands, bu who knows i ha is rue

anymore?) indicaes ha, wih some repidaion, I have nally pub-

lished my John Locke Lecures.

Tere are diffi cul decisions ha need o be made when pre-

paring or publicaion maerial writen (or spoken!) long beore. I

have ried o adop a airly conservaive atiude oward he original


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lecures, inervening only when, i seemed o me now, i was needed.

Alhough I have added mos o he oonoes, replaced passages ha

could use claricaion, compressed some ha now seemed oo long

(or diffi cul o comprehend), and even exended some ha seemed

oo shor, I can say ha he nal ex remains aihul o he lecures

as hey were delivered. Tis is so even hough he view o negaive

exisenials saed a he end was highly complicaed and one ha I

was no wholly saised wih, even a he ime, nor ye oday. Bu iis no as hough, a presen, I am wholly saised wih or preer any

alernaive.

Probably he mos subsanial conribuion o he lecures was he

onology o cional and myhical characers, conceived o as absrac

objecs whose exisence depends on he exisence or non-exisence o

various cional or myhological works. I ook naural language as myguide, which jus quanies over hese hings. Tus, I did no inend o

apply he noion o Vulcan, phlogison, or oher vacuous heoreical

names o a more recen vinage, which are myhological objecs only

in a highly exended and perhaps even meaphorical sense o myho-

logical. However, I am no enirely sure o he difference in principle

beween such erroneously posulaed scienic eniies and he g-ures o myh (which were, afer all, genuinely, hough wrongly,

believed o be real). So perhaps I should have exended he reamen

o hem as well, as some have assumed I did. Bu he use o naural

language as a guide perhaps reveals an essenial difference.

I have some sor o memory o Michael Dummet having saed

in a lecure ha names ofen regarded as simply empy are in ac

names o cional characers. I canno a he momen veriy his, nor

he relaion o his views o hose in my lecures. Bu i his memory is

correc, hen Dummet deserves credi as an inspiraion or hese lec-

ures. In ac, in he discussion session o my paper Vacuous Names

and Ficional Eniies (a precursor o hese lecures, now published


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P R E F A C E

in Philosophical roubles), Dummet said: Wha you alked abou

his morning mosly relaed o over cion inended as such and,

indeed, recognized as such. And I go along wih much o wha you

said abou ha. (Te discussion ook place in March o and was

subsequenly published as he Second General Discussion Session

in Synhese).And in he same year, in his book on Frege, he wries:

We should no, as Frege ofen does, cie as examples o nameshaving sense bu no reerence personal names used in cion, or

hese have in ac only a parial sense, since here is no saying

wha would warran ideniying acual people as heir bearers;

while he use o a name in lierary criicism o reer o a cional

characer differs again rom is use incion, or here, while he

sense is quie specic, he reerence does no ail.(Dummet : )

All his is quie consisen wih my posiion, alhough he reader

would nd his brie saemen diffi cul o ollow.However, i my

memory o his inuence on my views is correc, I mus have heard

him make similar claims on some previous occasion.Alhough he presen lecures were never ormally published

unil now, he ranscrip has been available a he Oxord Universiy

library or many years,and i has had, since hen, a modes lie o is

. Dummet e al. (: ). My hanks o Romina Padr or his reerence.. My hanks o Gary Oserag or his reerence. Dummet gives, as examples o genuinely

empy names, Vulcan (atribued o Geach); a ciious Sanord suden (concoced by realsudens) whom he adminisraion or an enire semeser was convinced acually exised;and anoher, hypoheical example.

. I also wan o menion ha, independenly o hese lecures, Peer van Inwagen has publishedwo papers advocaing a very similar view. (See van Inwagen and .) I haven madeany deailed comparison.

. Unorunaely, he apes o he lecures have no been preserved and, as ar as I know, no

record o he quesion periods exiss.


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own, passed on among members o he proession, someimes even

being discussed and criicized in prin. One such case is Nahan

Salmons work. In various wriings,he has argued ha I ough o

have made greaer and more effecive use o he onology o cional

characers I propose. Insead o saying ha Conan Doyle onlypre-

ends o name any one eniy, why no say ha he doesname one

eniyhe cional characer? Te preense is o name an acual

person. (I hink some oher people may have aken me his way obegin wih.) Salmon also wishes o exend he view o oher such

cases o cional or myhological eniies. I do no choose o eval-

uae his view here. I probably have no decided wha I hink.

(Salmon himsel recouns he skepical reacions he has someimes

received.) A he momen I am inclined o believe ha here may be

problems wih some aspecs o his accoun.Many people have helped bring hese lecures o prin. Tey

were originally ranscribed by Henry Hardy, and I wan o hank

him or his work and or his insisence ha hey appear. Many col-

leagues, sudens, and members o he audiences where hese lec-

ures were presened have made remarks and conribuions, and I

have ried, o he bes o my recollecion, o acknowledge hem inhe relevan places. I hope I will be orgiven i I have orgoten o

menion someone or include some conribuions.

As i was he case wih Philosophical roubles, he Saul Kripke

Cener (SKC) a Te Graduae Cener o Te Ciy Universiy o

New York proved crucial or he publicaion o he presen lecures.

In paricular, I would like o hank Gary Oserag or ediing he

maerial and or helpul suggesions, and especially Romina Padr

. See Salmon (), (), and (). Similar views are also deended by Amie Tomasson(see Tomasson and ).

. I should be added ha even Salmon hinks ha here are cases o genuine empy names. And

see he case o Sam Jones in my own ex.


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or puting ogeher a rs draf, and or her commens, advice, and

encouragemen during he rewriing process. I was heir enhusi-

asm or he maerial ha nally persuaded me ha i ough o ap-

pear. Working wih hem and he oher members o he SKC, especially

Jeff Buechner and Monique Whiaker, has been, as always, a pleasure.

I am graeul o he adminisraion o he Graduae Cener or

heir ineres in my work. In paricular, I would like o hank Provos

Chase Robinson and my chair, Iakovos Vasiliou, or giving me imeoff o nish he book.

Te proposal o publish he lecures was very well received by

my edior a Oxord Universiy Press, Peer Ohlin, and wo anony-

mous reerees. I am graeul o Peer, as well as he reereesyou

know who you are, and I hink I know i, oo. Peers saff a OUP has

been, once again, very helpul.Finally, I would like o hank my aher who,pacehis many years,

sill manages o be ineresed in my progress.


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REFERENCE AN D EX ISENCE


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Lec ure I

October ,

I hope he ile o hese lecures gives some indicaion o heir con-en. A while ago, in anoher place, I gave some lecures called

Naming and Necessiy.I wish here o coninue wih some o he

opics I discussed here, in order o ie up some loose ends. I don

know o wha exen I can presuppose he conens o hose lec-

ures;perhaps I will ge a clearer picure o ha when he audience

has jelled, so o speak. Bu I wish especially o discuss wo areas

which I didn have he ime and space o cover in N&N, and o

raise a couple o opics relaed o hem. One o hem, which is per-

haps he more imporan o he wo, is he whole opic o how

naming relaes o exisence, in paricular he problem o vacuous

names and reerence o wha does no exis, o cional eniies,

o exisenial saemens, and he like. Te oher area which I

inend o cover (I say inend advisedly because he work on he

rs opic may expand or conrac) is ha o speakers reerence and

. Henceorh, N&N. Te lecures were given a Princeon Universiy in and were rspublished in as par o a larger collecion edied by Donald Davidson and Gilber Har-man. Tey subsequenly appeared in book orm in . See Kripke (/).

. Remember ha when he presen lecures were given, in ,N&Nwas only recenly pub-lished. I suppose ha now he reader has a considerable advanage over he audience hen,hough some mus have been amiliar wih he earlier work, or I wouldn have been inviedo give he John Locke Lecures!

. Tese opics are discussed more briey in Vacuous Names and Ficional Eniies (Kripkeb), a precursor o hese lecures given earlier in a a conerence a he Universiy o

Connecicu.


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R E F E R E N C E A N D E X I S T E N C E

semanic reerence. By speakers reerence I mean reerence as

used in such a phrase as Jones was reerring o Smih when he said

ha a old hypocriehis is reerence by a speaker. Te oher

relaed noion o semanic reerence would be used in such a sae-

men as: he phrase he auhor o Waverley reers in English o Sir

Waler Scot. Tis pair o opics is suggesed by Donnellan ().

Now le me sar ou wih he rs o hese major opics.

No problem has seemed o represen a more perplexing philo-sophical conundrum han ha o he use o names which have no

reerenceor, no o beg he quesion agains Meinong (hough

I will beg i perhaps pracically rom here on ou), names which

appear o have no reerence. We can also use names or imaginary

eniies. Te ac ha we can do so has been aken o be an almos

conclusive argumen in avor o one philosophical view as opposedo anoher. Mill, as I suppose mos o us know, held ha proper

names had denoaion bu no connoaion: when you use a name

is semanic uncion consiss simply in reerring o an objec, and

nohing else. I does no reer o he objec by giving i properies

which pick he objec ou as a descripive phrase does. I you call a

man he man who corruped Hadleyburg, you have reerred o himby virue o describing him as he (unique) man who corruped

Hadleyburg. Bu i you simply call him Sam, you have simply

called him ha and have atribued no properies o him. Te con-

rary view was aken boh by Frege and by Russell as applied o wha

are ordinarily called proper names in English. According o Frege

. Te maerial on his disincion was subsequenly published in Kripke (). Te mater isalso discussed briey inN&N(/: , noe and he accompanying ex).

. I had in mind he sory by Mark wain, acually iled Te Man ha Corruped Hadley-burg. When I gave hese lecures (and also inN&N; see Kripke /: ), I replacedha by who, no remembering he original ile. I sill hink ha who is wha accords wihnaural English idiom, and do no know why Mark wain used ha in he ile. So I have

decided o leave who in he ex.


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O C T O B E R ,

and Russell, a proper name doesn differ rom a denie descripion

in his respec. I oo assigns cerain properies ha uniquely charac-

erize he objec, and he objec is picked ou as heobjec which has

hese properies. I isn jus simply a erm wihou any descripive

conen, or connoaion, as Mill hough.

One o he hings ha seemed o be crucial in avor o he view

o Frege and Russell here, as opposed o ha o Mill, was he prob-

lem o exisence. For we can surely, or example, raise he quesionwheher Moses really exised, and even, i you like (hough we

would probably be wrong in his case in doing so), come up wih

a negaive answer. Bu i someone concludes ha Moses never

exised, she surely is no using his name wih he semanic uncion

simply o reerring o an objec, and hen denying o ha objec ha

i has he propery o exisence. On he conrary, she is simplysaying ha here is no such objec. I Mill were righ, and he whole

uncion o naming were simply reerence, i seems hard o see how

she could make such a saemen or raise such a quesion. Once she

used he name, she would be presupposing ha here was an objec

o be reerred o; she couldn in addiion ask abou i wheher i

exised or no. Much less could she conclude ha i doesn reallyexis, ha here is no such hing.

Tis in paricular has been held o be conclusive agains any kind

o Millian paradigm. Also, o course, we can use proper namesas

when we raise he quesion o wheher Moses exisedwihou

knowing wheher hey have reerence or no. Moreover, we can

make denie saemens such as: I Moses really exised, he was

no born in he Renaissance, since a book abou him was writen

. Moses (Napoleon, ec.) no longer exiss srikes me as rue, and expressing he ac ha heindividual reerred o is dead, no longer wih us, even hough he once was. o my ear, hesimple Moses (Napoleon, ec.) does no exis is no he bes way o express he mater.

In my own discussions, I always imagine he quesion as being wheher he eniy everexised.


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beore he Renaissancesomewha beore. And we can also,

o course, use names wihou hinking ha hey have reerence a all.

Tis is wha goes on in cional discourse when we alk abou Sher-

lock Holmes, reer o Sherlock Holmes, and he like.

Frege and Russell gave a airly uniorm and common soluion o

his problem, which I suppose you all know. Tey in good par

arrived a i independenly. Tey had wo docrines (or maybe our?).

Firs, hey held ha exisence is no a rs-level bu a second-levelconcep (his is o use Freges erminology as opposed o Russells).

By his hey mean ha alhough we meaningully use he word

exiss o say o a propery or predicae ha i is or is no insani-

aed, as when we say ha here are igers, and ha here are no round

squaresha igers exis, bu round squares do nohe word

exiss here expresses, so o speak, a propery o properies, wheherhey are insaniaed or no: i holds o a propery i i is insaniaed.

Tis is wha Frege calls a second-level concep.o deny ha i is a

rs-level concep is o deny ha here is a meaningul exisence

predicae ha can apply o objecs or pariculars. One canno,

according o Frege and Russell, say o an objecha i exiss or no

because, so hey argued, everyhing exiss: how can one hen divideup he objecs in he world ino hose which exis and hose which

don?

Russell alks abou his in he lecures Te Philosophy o Log-

ical Aomism. In he discussion ollowing he fh lecure, some-

one asks he ollowing:

. We could call hese plural exisence saemens: hey asser or deny, as he case may be,ha a propery or predicae is insaniaed.

. For Frege his saemen wasn really sricly accurae, since he held ha conceps wereunsauraed and were exensional; his doesn agree wih conemporary usage o he ermproperies. Tese deails don mater or presen purposes; he saemen above ges he

relevan ideas across.


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O C T O B E R ,

Q: Is here any word you would subsiue or exisence which

would give exisence o individuals? Are you applying he word

exisence o wo ideas, or do you deny ha here are wo ideas?

(Russell a: )

Ta is, are here wo ideas, one, exisence as applied o conceps

where he concep is insaniaed, and he oher, exisenceas applied

o individuals in saemens ha would say o an individual ha iexiss? Russell answers:

Mr. Russell: No, here is no an idea ha will apply o individuals. As

regards he acual hings here are in he world, here is nohing a

all ha you can say abou hem ha in any way corresponds o his

noion o exisence. I is a sheer misake o say ha here is anyhinganalogous o exisence ha you can say abou hem. [. . .] Tere is

no sor o poin in a predicae which could no conceivably be alse.

I mean, i is perecly clear ha, i here were such a hing as his

exisence o individuals ha we alk o, i would be absoluely im-

possible or i no o apply, and ha is he characerisic o a misake.

(a: )

Second, however, i seems ha in ordinary language we clearly

do alk as i we applied exisence o individuals. For example,

. As I said, Frege, oo, held ha exisence is no a predicae o individuals. He hough ha heundamenal error in he onological argumen was ha i reaed exisence as a rs levelconcep. (See Frege b: .)

Anoher relevan quoaion is his: I do no wan o say i is alse o say abou an objecwha is said here abou a concep; I wan o say i is impossible, senseless, o do so. Tesenence Tere is Julius Caesar is neiher rue nor alse bu senseless; he senence Tereis a man whose name is Julius Caesar has a sense, bu here again we have a concep, as heindenie aricle shows (Frege d: ). (In he second senence, according o Fregesusual pracice, one ough o pu Julius Caesar in quoaion marks, bu I am quoing rom

he ranslaion given.)


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someone can raise he quesion wheher Napoleon really exised.

Te nineeenh-cenury logician Richard Whaely raised his ques-

ion in his book Hisoric Doubs Relaive o Napoleon Buonapare

(Whaely ), and concluded ha Napoleon undoubedly didn

exis because, as Hume argued, you shouldn accep a sory i i is

oo anasici is more reasonable o suppose ha people are lying

(and, in his case, he sory is quie anasic). Te idea which

applies here has o course been applied o he Gospels, oo. (Tiswas Humes inen, hough he more explicily discusses he Pena-

euch.) Anyway, one can raise he quesion wheher Napoleon re-

ally ever exised, and in his case give an affi rmaive answer, hough

maybe some hisorian would come up wih a negaive one some-

imes. (Whaely did, or a leas preended o do so, and i is a any

rae logically conceivable ha he was righ.) Bu we are a leasraisinghe quesion o exisence o an individual.

Frege and Russell, again as I suppose mos o you know, answered

his quesion by heir analysis o proper names. o each proper name,

hey held, here corresponds a crierion or propery picking ou

which individual is supposed o be named by he name. So, in he case

o Napoleon, such a crierion migh be being he leader o he orcesha were deeaed a Waerloo, or various oher hings, anasic

hings ha we have heard abou Napoleon. (Acually ha one was no

so anasic.) Te name will mean: hehing which saises he crie-

rion in quesion. One can affi rm he exisence o Napoleon, meaning

by i ha he concep being deeaed a he Batle o Waerloo

is uniquely insaniaedha is, ha he concep being heone and

only person who was he leader o he deeaed orces is insaniaed.

. Tis piece was o course acually a polemical spoo agains Humes essay O Miracles(Hume ). Te poin was ha on Humes principles, one would jus as well conclude haNapoleon was a ciious or non-exisen gure. I is clear rom he piece isel ha Napo-

leon was sill alive when i was writen.


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O C T O B E R ,

So, according o Frege and Russell, he soluion is as ollows:

wih each proper name one associaes some predicae ha is sup-

posed o be uniquely insaniaed. I in ac here is a hingAwhich

uniquely insaniaes he propery in quesion, hen one says ha

Napoleon exiss, or, in he general case, haAexiss; i no, one says

haAdoes no exis. Bu one is never really affi rming o an objec

ha i exiss or no; one is insead affi rming or denying o apredicae

ha i is uniquely insaniaed. And his seems o correspond, ocourse, wih he acs. Wha would a hisorian be doing i he asked

wheher Napoleon really exised? He wouldn rs nd Napoleon

and hen look a him very careully o see wheher or no he really

exised. Raher, he would see wheher here was any one person

who answers o he properies in he sories we have heard abou

Napoleon, or, a any rae, mos, or enough, o hem.Tis general docrine presumably applies o he paricular case

where wha we have beore us may be a lierary or myhological

work, or a hisorical repor, bu we don know which. Say we have

he sory abou Moses: wha do we mean when we ask wheher

Moses really exised? We are asking wheher here is any person

who has he properiesor a leas enough o hemgiven in hesory. In a amous passage in Philosophical Invesigaions, Witgen-

sein, alking abou his very case, says ha we mean various hings

when we say ha Moses did no exis, namely ha he Israelies did

no have a single leader when hey wihdrew rom Egyp, or ha

heir leader was no called Moses, or ha here could no have been

anyone who accomplished all ha he Bible relaes o Moses, and

so on. I shall perhaps say, Witgensein says, by Moses I under-

sand he man who did wha he Bible relaes o Moses, or a any

rae, a good deal o i (: ). Here Witgensein is ollowing

Frege and Russell. He doeswan o modiy hem in one respec, in

allowing ha here is a cluser o properies picking he person ou,


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raher han jus a single one, and ha his cluser will have rough

edges: ha is, here will be indeerminae cases in which i is impos-

sible o say wheher we would conclude ha Moses exised or no.

Bu he divergence here is unimporan or my purposes. Many

moderns (by moderns I mean people who are alive oday)have

ollowed Witgensein in hinking ha his would be one respec in

which Frege and Russell need modicaion.

Tus, according o he orhodox docrine, when we have, les say,a lierary work beore us, or a hisory ha may be hisorical repors or

may be cion, we know nohing else abou a person apparenly

named in such a sory oher han wha occurs in his sory. Ten

and his is he paradigm which has been generally accepedo a-

rm he exisence o, say, Sherlock Holmes, is o say ha here is a

unique person saisying he properies atribued o Holmes in hesory. o deny Holmess exisence is o say ha here isn any such

person, or any such unique person, anyway (maybe here are en o

hem, and we couldn say which one was Holmes). Tis hen is he

orhodox docrine.

One should pay ribue o he power o he Frege-Russell

analysis here. Acually, in he case o exisence he analysis is evenmore powerul in Russells version, I would say, han in Freges.

. Ta is, in . I could have menioned Searle (), as I did inN&N.. Alhough I ake he Frege-Russell docrine o analyze names in cion according o he

same paradigm ha Frege used or Arisole, he name o a hisorical gureha is as heunique person (or oher objec) ullling he soryI now nd i hard o nd an explicisaemen in Frege abou he senses o names in cion. For example, he says Alhough heale o William ell is a legend and no hisory and he name William ell is a mockproper name, we canno deny i a sense (Frege c: ). Bu he says litle as o wha hissense is. Similarly, alking abou Te Odyssey, he says ha he name Nausicaa, whichprobably does no sand or [bedeue] or name anyhing, . . . behaves as i i names a girl,and i is hus assured o a sense. And or cion he sense is enough (Frege a: ). Buonce again he does no speciy wha his sense is. Te view ha I have called he Frege-Russell docrine on cion does appear o me deniely o be held by Alonzo Church, a

more recen Fregean.


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O C T O B E R ,

Ta is, i is more unied, because Russell in general analyses ou

descripions and names in avor o predicaes, and he analysis

comes ou in precisely he same way in he case o he exisence

saemens as in any oher case. In he Frege version, he exisence

saemens would have o be reaed a bi specially, as when one

analyses he quesion o wheher Moses really exised or no.

Te power o he Frege-Russell docrine, which explains why i

has so uniormly held he eld in philosophy since henperhapsunil recenlyhas been he way i gives clear and uniorm soluions

o a variey o problems, o which his was one. I similarly analyses

puzzles abou ideniy saemens, abou reerence in inensional con-

exs, and abou jus how names and singular erms can ge a reerence

a all. I analyses hem in a singularly uniorm way which seems o rea

every differen case successully.Any heory which ries o give analernaive accoun has go o show wha is wrong wih his beauiul

picure, and pu orward an alernaive and equally powerul picure in

is place. Tis is wha I am rying o make a sar a doing inN&N.

In hose lecures I presened a view ha differs rom ha o

Frege and Russell, and is closer, a any rae, o ha o Mill in various

respecs. o say everyhing in he amous almudic phraseI donknow i any o you have ever heard o isanding on one oo, he

views discussed in N&Ndiffer rom ha o Frege and Russell, par-

icularly in he ollowing ways.

. However, his way o puting hings glosses over a grea deal, since i is well-known haFrege and Russell had very differen views o denie descripions. Frege applied he sense-reerence disincion o denie descripions, and held ha he reerence changes in inen-sional conexs, whereas Russell (as we would see him oday) analyzes denie descripionsas complex quaniers (acually dened in erms o he universal quanier and ruh-uncions and ideniy), and gives a differen soluion o he problem o inensional con-exs. (For some o my own discussion o hese opics see Kripke and .) InN&N,I consanly reer o he Frege-Russell docrine, mosly having in mind wha hey wouldhold in common abou (ordinary) proper names o hisorical gures, or names o cionalcharacers, ec. In he presen lecures, I have especially in mind how boh would deny ha

exisence is a predicae o pariculars.


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Firs, I held ha proper names, as opposed o mos denie

descripions, are rigid. According o Frege and Russell, a proper

name means a denie descripion. For example, he name Moses

means, les say, he man who led he Israelies ou o Egyp. I ha

is wha he name Moses means, and i we wished o alk abou a

siuaion in which some oher man had led he Israelies ou o

Egyp, hen in using he name Moses in couneracual siuaions,

we would be using i o reer o he man who in hose siuaionswouldhave led he Israelies ou o Egyp, and his would no be Moses

himsel. Tus, according o Frege and Russell, i heir analysis were

correc, such a name as Moses would be non-rigid. I would reer o

differen people in differen siuaions. On he conrary, I argued,

when we use he name Moses i always means or reers o heman,

he paricular man, whoI suppose hey are righ abou he resin acled he Israelies ou o Egyp. Acually I rejec heir view on

his quesion oo, bu le us accep i or a momen. So Moses is

o mean heman who in ac led he Israelies ou o Egyp. We use

he name Moses rigidly o reer o a cerain man, and we use i o

reer o ha man even when alking abou couneracual siuaions

in which he man didn lead he Israelies ou o Egyp.Tis is one respec in which I hink ha Frege and Russell were

wrong, and Mill would have been righ: Frege and Russell would

have affi rmed ha such a saemen as Moses led he Israelies ou

o Egypor, in Witgenseins modicaion, Moses, i he exised,

did many o he hings he Bible relaes o himis analyic and

hereore presumably a necessary ruh, whereas i seems o me o

be plainly a coningen ruh. Some oher man han Moses migh

have done all hese hings, and Moses migh have done none o

hem. In ha case i would have been alse; i would no have been

he case. So, ar rom being analyic, i is no rue in all possible

worlds.


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O C T O B E R ,

Second, I held ha even in deermining reerence in he acual

worldand his is a differen issuewe do no generally use prop-

eries ha we believe o be saised by he objecs o pick hem ou.

Raher, some picure like his is o be held: someone iniially

bapizes he objec, picking ou he objec perhaps by poining o i,

or perhaps by is properies, or perhaps by some oher device.

TenI ollow Mill herespeakers wish only o preserve he reer-

ence o he name, and as he name is passed rom link o link, i oneperson wishes o use i in he same way as she heard i, she uses i wih

he same reerence as he speaker rom whom she heard i. Te name

ges spread hroughou he communiy, and down hrough hisory,

wih only he reerence preserved. All sors o myhs may arise abou

he objec which are no really rue o i. I may even become he case

ha he grea bulk, or perhaps all o wha is believed uniquely o iden-iy he objec, in ac ails o apply o i. I ried o subsaniae his by

a batery o counerexamples o he usual view. I don hink ha I

will go ino hem a his poin, bu I migh review hem laer.

One quesion which I didn rea was he very quesion o exis-

ence, and I wish o ll his lacuna herehe quesions are in ac

very elaborae. Bu beore I do so le me say a litle bi more abouwha Russell in paricular held abou empy names and exisence.

Russell, unlike Frege (here I ake back everyhing I said abou him

beore!), agreed wih Mill ha proper names have denoaion bu

no connoaion. Where I spoke o he Frege-Russell view as op-

posed o ha o Mill, I perhaps should have spoken o he Mill-

Russell view as opposed o ha o Frege. I was hereore slighly

inaccurae. Why did I speak in ha way? Because when you come

up wih anyhing ha anyone would ordinarily call a name, Russell

(even his is somewha inaccurae) would agree wih Frege abou i

as agains Mill. Russell would hold ha such a name does have a

sense given by a descripive phrase. (He really held ha here is no


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such hing as Fregean sense, bu les leave ha ou: he divergence

isn imporan here. See noe .) Bu hen, since he offi cially agrees

wih Mill, he holds ha he hings ha we ordinarily call names

aren really names, and ha we have o leave i o analysis o dis-

cover wha he genuine names really are.

One o he crieria ha are demanded by his argumen o apply

o namesgenuine names o genuine objecsis ha hey have o

name objecs such ha we can even meaningully raise he ques-ion abou wheher hey exis. In paricular, i canno be subjec even

o Caresian doub wheher such objecs exis. Now Russell hough

you could have an invenory o which objecs could be named, which

are, in his own erminology, objecs o acquainance. Te mos plau-

sible candidaes or his were ones own immediae sense-daa; or

ones immediae sense-daa are hings which are no subjec o Car-esian doubby deniion. I I have a sense-daum o a yellow

. Some years ago, long afer he presen lecure was delivered, Gideon Makin emphasized ome ha or Russell sense-daa were somehing physical. See he rs secions o Te Rela-ion o Sense-daa o Physics (Russell b). Since his paper was writen reasonably closeo he lecures I am quoing, i is probable ha Russell has no changed his mind. Exacly

wha ypes o physical eniies he has in mind in his paper is raher obscure o me, bu idoes no seem o affec he main discussion in he presen lecure. Tey are indubiableobjecs o acquainance and are relaively eeing.

I should add ha in saying ha Russellian sense-daa are no open o CaresiandoubI was inuenced by Anscombes ormulaion ha he bearers o he only genuine propernames are exisens no open o Caresian doub (Russells objecs o immediaeacquainancesense-daa, ec.) (Anscombe : ). Tis ormulaion is o coursesricly meaningless according o Russell, since i uses exisence as a predicae o he sense-daa. Neverheless, I hink i capures wha Russell had in mind in his docrine o acquain-ance wih sense-daa. Russell wries:

Some o our belies urn ou o be erroneous, and hereore i becomes necessaryo consider how, i a all, we can disinguish knowledge rom error. Tis problemdoes no arise wih regard o knowledge by acquainance, or, whaever may behe objec o acquainance, even in dreams and hallucinaions, here is no errorinvolved so long as we do no go beyond he immediae objec: error can onlyarise when we regard he immediae objec, i.e. he sense-daum, as he mark o

some physical objec. (Russell : )


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O C T O B E R ,

speck in ron o me, I can be in no doub, or no Caresiandoub, as

o wheher i really exiss. In ha case here is no poin in raising he

quesion wheher i exiss, and he quesion wheher hishis

yellow speck in ron o meexiss, can simply be dismissed as

meaningless, i one wans, because here is no issue o be raised.

Russell also hough a various imes ha here were oher

objecs o acquainance, genuinely nameable. One example, when

he believed in such an eniy, migh be he Caresian sel.

I would seem ha once a sense-daum or visual impression has

disappeared, i won have he saus o a nameable objec, because

one may, as Russell was well-known or arguing, misrus ones

memory abou wheher such a hing really exised afer all. Once

again in he lecures on logical aomism Russell emphasizes his

belie. In he quesion period, he is asked:

Quesion: I he proper name o a hing, a his, varies rom

insan o insan, how is i possible o make any argumen?

(a: )

Te poin is ha i Russell is righ, he objecs which can be genu-inely named are very eeing. Once you move your head, hings are

no he same, and according o his heory one has alogeher a new

se o objecs o be named Sam, Harry, and so on. So how can you

. In he paper Knowledge by Acquainance and Knowledge by Descripion, published origi-nally in , Russell speaks o genuine proper names, ha is, words which do no assign apropery o an objec, bu merely and solely name i, and claims ha here are only wo words

which are sricly proper names o pariculars, namely, I and his (Russell a: ). How-ever, in a oonoe added in , he says: I should now exclude I rom proper names in a sricsense, and reain only his (see page , noe ). Te caegory o genuine proper names,naming objecs o acquainance, now seems o be ha o Te Philosophy o Logical Aomism.In general, his picure o genuine objecs o acquainance seems o have narrowed progressively

since he inroduced i in On Denoing, hough i was raher narrow here already.


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make a deducive argumen? For i he premise conains names, he

conclusion will conain hese very same names, and no longer be a

par o he language when you are hrough. He replies:

Mr. Russell: You can keep his going or abou a minue or wo.

I made ha do [he had hen pu a do on he blackboard] and

alked abou i or some litle ime. I mean i varies ofen. I you

argue quickly, you can ge some litle way beore i is nished.

I hink hings las or a nie ime, a mater o some seconds or

minues or whaever i may happen o be.

Quesion: You do no hink ha air is acing on ha and changing

i?

Mr. Russell: I does no mater abou ha i i does no aler is

appearance enough or you o have a differen sense-daum.

(a: )

I is only he sense-daum ha matershowever, you would beter

be careul o hold sill. I could no do i. Tis picure may seem

raher anasic; neverheless I have no ound in subsequen philos-

ophy an adequae reply o he argumens ha moved Russell o

such an answer.

Witgensein ook he argumen up in he racaus. He held

ha nameable objecs (he called hem simply objecs, whereas

Russell called hem pariculars) had o be par o he necessary

urniure o he world, hings ha could no have ailed o exis.

Tose hings which have only coningen exisence are no really

objecshey are combinaions o genuine objecs. By his I mean

no ha he real objecs are molecules, or somehing like ha, bu

ha when we say ha his able migh no have exised, o course we

mean ha he molecules comprising i migh no have been ormed

in he combinaion ha appears as his able. Tey migh have had


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O C T O B E R ,

anoher arrangemen. And ha is wha we mean whenever we alk

abou coningen exisence.Bu he genuine objecs are par o he

necessary urniure o he worldhey are he same in all possible

worlds. And his oo seems o ollow rom he argumens. Because i

he only uncion o naming is reerence, and we can even raise he

quesion o exisence, hen we can say ha an objec migh no

have exised; we can speak o he coningency o he ac ha i

doeso do his would be o make singular exisence saemensmeaningulas Moore poined ou (see nex lecure).

Witgensein is ollowing Frege and Russelland here, I hink,

especially Russell. I is ineresing o noe ha he wo require-

mens ha hey place on he exisence o hese objecsone,

indubiabiliy, and he oher, he Witgenseinian requiremen ha

hey have necessary exisenceare incompaible. For i wouldseem, a leas o me, ha nohing more plainly has coningen exis-

ence han ones own immediae sense-daa, ones own immediae

visual impressions. Righ now I am having a bunch o hem, bu I

migh no have had hese sense-daa a all. How could I have

avoided having hem? Well, i he atendance a my lecures had

been differen, i I mysel had no urned up, i I had come in anddecided o alk wih a blindold. In any one o hese cases I would

have had no a single one o hese sense-daa. Or I could have been

sho dead beore he lecures began, or I migh never have been

. Obviously we shouldn be misled by my example o he molecular heory, since hisexample depends on empirical consideraions abou physics. Bu he poin is ha any ques-ion o coningen exisence mus really be a quesion o wheher objecs do or do no relaeo each oher in various ways. Te genuine simple objecs are he same in all possible worlds.

. In he beginning o he lecures Te Philosophy o Logical Aomism, Russell saes ha heis expounding ideas ha he go rom Witgensein. Some ideas may indeed reec his inu-ence. Te racaushad no been writen ye (or a leas, no seen by Russell), and Russell

was in no conac wih Witgensein, as he saes. Probably he ideas in hese lecures shouldreally be atribued o Russell himsel. As is well-known, when Russell did wrie an inro-ducion o he racaus, Witgensein srongly disapproved o i and hough i supercial

and a misundersanding o his ideas.


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born. So hese eniies cerainly have coningen exisence; i any

eniy has necessary exisence, i isn hese. Nor is he sel a

necessary exisen eiher, or I migh never have been born.

Somehing mus have gone wrong here, or he requiremens

ha are placed on he objecs have led hese wo philosophers

working ogeher o conclusions which are incompaible and con-

radicory: i is essenially he same argumen, rs applied in he

episemological sphere, and second applied in, so o speak, hemeaphysical sphere, which leads o he wo conclusions.

I has been a bi o a quesion, in he exegesis o he racaus,

wheher Witgenseins objecs are in ac Russellian objecs,

wheher hey are in ac ones own immediae percepions, or a leas

include hem. I don wan o go ino an exegeical quesion, and

perhaps couldn conclusively argue his, bu i would seem ha iWitgensein had his wis abou him on his mater, he objecs

couldn be ones own immediae sense-daa, because such objecs

would ail o saisy he mos elemenary requiremens o he heory.

Tereore, unless he simply ailed o noice his, he didn believe

ha hese were he objecs. O course, people can ail o noice

hings, so perhaps he argumen isn conclusive.Anyway, people did seem o ail o noice ha one and he same

argumen leads o wo conclusions which are quie incompaible.

I know o no objec ha I could menion, a leas among he relevan

pariculars, which would saisy he crierion boh o necessary

. I mus admi ha in he argumen I give here I was cerainly no aware o Russells noion osensibilia as se ou in Russell (b). According o ha paper, hough sensibiliabecomesense-daa only in virue o a person geting acquained wih hem, hey exis anyway,as wha would have been seen, ec. rom a cerain perspecive. Tus he ac ha someonessense-daa would no exis i he were no looking a cerain way is only analogous o he acha no man can be a husband wihou geting married. I nd his docrine o he real exis-ence o sensibilia raher conusing, bu since hey are supposed o be physical objecs,I would ake i ha hey do no have necessary exisence. None o his is menioned in Rus-sell (a).


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O C T O B E R ,

exisence and o indubiable exisence. (Well, perhaps he saemen

should be raher sronger: I know or cerain o no objec which is a

paricular and which saises jus he single crierion o necessary

exisence.)Since here are hese incompaible conclusions some-

hing mus be wrong wih he analysis; bu ha is no o say wha.

I is ineresing o noice his case because very ofen he idea o

episemological cerainy or a prioriy (really hese wo episemo-

logical noions are no o be idenied wih each oher) has beenidenied wih ha o necessiy. I inveigh agains his very srongly

in N&N. In paricular, I say ha, even i i were indubiable ha

Moses really exised, ha he mus acually have done mos o he

hings relaed o him in he Bible, ha is no o say ha he sae-

men ha, i Moses exised, he did hese hings, is a necessary ruh,

or in couneracual siuaions i would have been alse. Anyway,in his case he divergence is so grea ha one is led o sweepingly

incompaible conclusions.

Now I wan o say somehing else abou and agains Russell a

his poin. He inroduces his very special caegory o logically

proper names in order o solve a philosophical problem: since one

canno meaningully ask o a paricular wheher i exissor i oneis reerring o a paricular, hen o course i exissRussell wishes

o creae a special caegory o pariculars which can be named and

which indubiably exis. Tis is supposed o eliminae he need o

analyze negaive exisenial saemens or his special case. Nega-

ive exisenial saemens arise in paricular when we discuss c-

ion. We say ha Sherlock Holmes, Dick racy (is he known in his

counry?), Jupier, and Pegasus do no really exis. Tey occur in

cion. Russell doesn wan o have a realm o cional exisence,

so he analyses hese saemens as: no unique hing saises he

. Well, some have argued ha he Deiy is a paricular ha necessarily exiss.


35/185


condiions laid down in he sory. In he case o genuine names or

immediae sense-daa his problem is no supposed o arise, and

ha is why he creaes his caegory. Well, I hink he ailed o avoid

he problem or his very case, even i one agrees wih him ha he

exisence o ones own immediae sense-daa is no subjec o Care-

sian doub, so ha he quesion o exisence canno meaningully be

raised.

Ordinarily, when I ell a sory I ll i wih names o people, bu inhis case le us suppose ha I am a Russellian who likes o use Rus-

sellian logically proper names. I am sill wriing a sory, so I wrie i

abou immediae sense-daa o mine; only in his case hey can be

imaginary. So I do no see a yellow speck over here, bu I will wrie

a sory or mysel, or my own use, in which I suppose ha I do, and

give i he proper name Mailda. Tis, in he conex o he sory,would represen me as ullling a perecly legiimae Russellian

process o naming. Now, commening o mysel abou his sory,

poining ou ha i is only a sory, I say Well, o course Mailda

doesn really exis. Because i is only a sory, I am no having a

sense-daum o a yellow speck in ron o me, hough I hen go on o

ell he sory abou wha is happening o me as a resul o seeing hisyellow speck. Te sory could conain even a name o an acual

sense-daum, say Aloysius, and I would say ha Aloysius really

does exis. Jus because somehing occurs in he sory, i does no

mean ha he eniy so named is cional. Tere are cional sories,

or example, abou Napoleona real personand in commening

on hose sories one says ha Napoleon really exised, bu his

aihul dog Fido in he sory did nohe is rom he cional par.

So here oo I could say: So, Aloysius really exiss; Mailda does no.

. Here and hroughou his discussion, I am wriing as i he Russellian noion o sense-daum

were clear and unconroversial. Bu I do no commi mysel o his.


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O C T O B E R ,

Tis is a perecly good commen o make, and i uses in he one

case a genuine Russellian proper name, Aloysius, and in he oher

case a puaive such name, Mailda, which is being assered here o

be only cional. I does so or precisely he same reasons as would

apply i one were naming people, and precisely he same quesions

o analysis or proper accoun should arise.

One should no say here ha Mailda and Aloysius are no

really names: Aloysius was sipulaed o be such a genuine namei is being conrased here wih Maildaand Mailda oo is a pu-

aive genuine Russellian proper name, bu in ac i names nohing.

One should no say ha eiher o hese are really denie descrip-

ions. For one hing his would give a alse accoun o he acs as

I jus saed hem. For anoher, wha denie descripions could

hey be? Well, Aloysius isn supposed o be a denie descripion;I inroduced i as he reverse. Perhaps hen one could argue ha

Mailda urns ou really o be a denie descripion? Well, wha

denie descripion is i?

One candidae migh be, he yellow speck I see in ron o me

say ha i is really used as shor or ha. Bu ha can be righhe

sory migh no asser a all ha here is only one yellow speck inron o me. Id be luckier perhaps i ha were so, bu i migh say

ha here was a bunch o hem, and pick one o hem ou, calling i

Mailda. So he name could no reer o heunique yellow speck

I see in ron o me, nor could Mailda be analyzed as being he

hing I call Mailda, because I may elsewhere in oher conexs

genuinely use Mailda as he name o an ordinary woman, hough

I do no so use i here. Nor could i be used as equivalen o he

yellow speck I call Mailda. Perhaps a some earlier ime I called

some yellow speck Mailda, or perhaps even a he presen ime

here is some yellow speck (even now in ron o me) which I call

Mailda. Bu in he sory I am no using Mailda o reer o ha


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speck: I am simply, because o my ondness or i, naming my c-

ional objec afer he speck. Te same hing would more plausibly

work wih people. O course, one can ry o ge around his wih he

hing ha I call Mailda in his sory, where his very senence oc-

curs in he sory, bu one had beter no go o haa leas in a

hurry. Te problems wih such sel-reerence are well-known, and

presumably one should no leap ino hem here.

A any rae, even aside rom such argumens, I hink such anaccoun obviously alsies he acs. Wha is going on in a sory such

as his one is ha one is romancing o onesel ha one is giving a

genuine Russellian proper name o an objec. Russell hinks he has

solved he problem because, i he is righ, he objecs he names have

indubiable exisence. Ta ges rid o he problem o a possible

misake, ha is, o hinking ha here is a Napoleon when here isnreally one, bu i does no ge rid o he possibiliy o empy names

and, hence, o negaive exisenials. I does no ge rid o he possi-

biliy o cionaldiscourse conaining such puaive names. Tere-

ore i does no ge rid o negaive exisenial saemens, or hough

he answer o he quesion Does Mailda exis? will be rivial

i will be obvious o he man who ells he sorysill i will be neg-aive. Mailda does no really exis; Aloysius does. One can draw

his conras, and so Russell does no avoid he problem.

his paricular argumen agains Russell seems o me o

show somehing imporan. For he problem o singular negaive

exisenialso being able o say ha A does no exis (say, ha

Moses does no exis)was supposed o be an argumen which was

conclusive agains any Millian ype o paradigm, any paradigm

. Tis can supplemen he argumen agains Russell used by Moore (b: ), whichpoins o he ac ha ones own immediae sense-daa have coningen exisence. See

Lecure II, noe and accompanying ex, or discussion.


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O C T O B E R ,

which made he exisence o a reeren essenial o he semanic

uncion o naming. Wha abou cion? i is immediaely said.

Tere are names which jus don reer.

Jus he conrary seems o be he case. Te exisence o cion is

a powerul argumen or absoluely nohing: i canno setle he

quesion as beween he Russellian heory and he Millian heory,

nor can i setle he quesion beween Mills heory and any oher

heory. ake a semanic heory which says ha he essenial seman-ic properies o names are such-and-suchor example, he Mil-

lian heory, where having a reeren is an essenial eaure o a name,

or Russells, where his is rue or genuine proper names, bu, as

I said beore, no or wha we ordinarily call proper names.Sup-

pose some crierion or oher is given: now, wha do you say abou a

cional case? Doesn ha represen a big problem which can adju-dicae beween one heory and anoher? Isn i a problem or Mills

heory, where here canno be names wih no reeren, as appears o

be he case in cion? Well, no, I hink i does no, because when one

wries a work o cion, i is par o he preense o ha cion ha

he crieria or naming, whaever hey are, are saised. I use he

name Harry in a work o cion; I generally presuppose as par oha work o cion, jus as I am preending various oher hings,

ha he crieria o naming, whaever hey areMillian or Russel-

lian or wha have youare saised. Ta is par o he preense o

his work o cion. Far rom i being he case ha a heory o he

. Alhough some migh argue ha here are senses in which hey really do. I will deal wih halaer.

. I is also worh noing ha Mill would have had o supplemen his accoun by some heoryor crierion o how he reerence o a name is deermined, or he answer canno simple be

jus ha we poinindeed, is prety clear ha is no generally he case ha reerence isdeermined ha way. In my own case, where I held a view which is a any rae closer o Millhan ha o his successors, i no enirely ha o Mill, he crierion is given by a hisoricalchain in which he reerence is ransmited rom link o link. Bu he answer really doesn

need o be deal wih here. (I is one o he main poins oN&N.)


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reerence o names ough o make special provision or he possi-

biliy o such works o cion, i can orge abou his case, and hen

simply remark ha, in a work o cion, i is par o he preense o

ha work o cion ha hese crieria are saised. Perhaps wha

makes i a work o cion is ha hese crieria are no in ac saised

(and usually oher hings in he sory), bu he preense is jus ha:

a preense.

So I will call his Te Preense Principle, o give i a name.

I his is so, i would apply o any heory o naming whasoever. And

in paricular, as I jus poined ou, i applies even o Russells noion

o logically proper names. Wha is one doing in he cional case?

One is preending as par o he work o cion ha one has a Rus-

sellian logically proper name here, and Russell does no avoid his

possibiliy eiher. So, ar rom his being a crucial es case or he-ories o naming, i should be a es case or nohing whasoever.

One can very well say ha, as in Mill, i is an essenial par o he

semanic uncion o naming ha here be a reeren. Ten, in a

work o cion, one preends ha his essenial uncion is ullled.

I do hereoreiI go by his principlehave o draw he conse-

quence ha, or a ollower o Mill, he proposiions ha occur in awork o cion would only be preended proposiions, so o speak.

For example, i someone says Mailda is bohering me in a work o

cion, wha proposiion is being expressed here? On Russells view

he proposiion would conain as is consiuens he hing Mailda,

and hen relaional properies, and maybe some oher hings, which

. I hink ha many philosophers have observed ha cion is a preense, and ha he namesoccurring in i are preenses o being names. However, when I gave he presen lecures,I was unaware ha Frege appears o be he rs auhor explicily o noe his (see Fregec: ). I disagree wih Frege on one poin. When a proper name o a hisoricalgure appears in a work o cion, such as ha o Napoleon in olsoys War and Peace,Frege seems o hink i does no really sand or Napoleon, whereas I hink i does. For a

uller discussion, wih he passage rom Frege, see Kripke (b: , noe ).


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O C T O B E R ,

correspond o he phrase bohering me. Bu since here is no such

hing as Mailda, here is no such proposiion. One is simply pre-

ending ha here is. Te same would go or he more generalor

general-Milliancase, where i is being preended ha a more

mundane reeren, say a person, really exiss, and proposiions are

being saed abou him. Since here is no such person, here are no

such proposiions. (I will elaborae on his laer.)

In he case o preense in cion here are some obvious quali-caions. Firs, o course i need no be assered in he work o cion

ha he name used in he work o cion is he characers name in

he ordinary sense. InLolia, Nabokov says, in ac, ha he names

have been changed o proec he innocen. Second, given a work o

cion, i need no in heory ollow a correc philosophical heory o

reerence. O course he work o cion may cionally say hasome incorrec heory is he case. Bu his case is a rare excepion

probably arising only in heory. Normally a work o cion will say

no such hing, and can be assumed o provide no specic heory o

reerence.

Tis Preense Principle, I hink, would apply even i he Frege-

Russell analysis were correc, and his shows how wrong he analysishas gone, as given in he orhodox version. Suppose Frege and

Russell were righ and he essenial uncion o naming (in is ordi-

nary use) iso give a descripive propery o an objec, and hereby

pick i ou. I don hink i ollows, anyway, ha heir analysis as

adaped o he case o cional works is correc. For remember heir

analysis. I says ha a name in cion means hehing saisying he

properies saed in he sory, or a any rae mos o hemhe

unique hing. However, remember ha he sory is a preense,

. For example, in On Denoing, Russell says ha i we wan o analyze senences abouApollo, we look a a classical dicionary and see ha he phrase means he sun god (see

Russell : ).


41/185


preending ha he condiions or ordinary naming are saised.

Ten, all ha should be required is ha in he sory i is presupposed

ha here are some properies by which he narraor picks he hing

ou, bu noha hese properies are saed in he sory, or even, i

he properies are saed, ha hey are given correcly. One can see

clearly now wha an incorrec accoun o he acs abou cion he

Frege-Russell heory gives, even supposing i is correc in a non-

cional case.Firs, i says ha he proper name means hehing saisying he

properies in he sory. o affi rm exisence is o affi rm ha here is a

uniquehing saisying he properies in he sory. Tis is radically

alse. Why he uniqueness? Why should he sory say anyhing ha

even puaively idenies an objec uniquely? I alks abou, very

eeingly, a cerain all man, Sam Smih, who accosed he hero onhe corner o some sree. Now does ha mean ha only one all

man ever accosed he hero o he sory on some sree? Or i may

say jus ha Sam Smih is a all man and ha he hero knew him:

i says I I were a all man like Sam Smih, I would be such-and-

such. Does ha really imply ha Sam Smih is he unique all man,

or even he unique all man abou whom he hero ever so mused?I need no even mean ha here is a unique all man called Sam

Smihabou whom he hero so mused. Perhaps here are several.

Sill, he was represened as musing abou a paricular all man, Sam

Smih, on his paricular occasion. Te sory need no even pua-

ively asser uniqueness.

Second, i is held ha i here is an objec which uniquely sa-

ises he properies atribued o he objec in a sory, hen i is no

a sory: he hing really exiss, and he accoun is no cional a all.

Bu he common pracice o auhors is jus he very reverse. Tey

prin a he beginning o heir sory: Te names used in his sory

are cional, and any resemblance o characers living or dead is


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O C T O B E R ,

purely coincidenal. Suppose a person, believing himsel o be pos-

sessed o a valid sui or invasion o privacy, sues he auhor o such

a sory, and proves in cour ha he uniquely saises he properies

menioned in ha sory. Ten will he judge necessarily rule on

behal o he plainiff? I hink no. Suppose he auhor can show ha

he never heard o his man; ha he deniely wasn wriing abou

him; ha i was indeed a coincidence, jus as he said. Ten a reason-

able judge would rule agains he plainiff, agains Frege, againsRussell, and agains Witgensein, and hold ha he auhor had a

valid deense, hough his person uniquely s he sory.

Finally, he oher way around, Frege and Russell would claim

ha i no person s he sory a all, hen one can conclude ha, say,

Sherlock Holmes does no exis. Tis is radically alse. I ails o dis-

inguish beween a work o cion abou a hisorical person, and awork o cion abou a cional characer. ake he Napoleon case

ha I menioned beore. Suppose, in he year , only one o

hese cional sories abou Napoleon survives. Can one hen con-

clude ha Napoleon never exised, or a leas ha, as used in his

sory, he name Napoleon reers o no one? No, one canno. Tis

sory is sill a sory abou a real man, alhough he only hing osurvive in his case is cional. So I emphasized in N&N ha,

hough he case o Moses is no a counerexample, he case o Jonah

in he Bible may be. Some biblical scholars argue, and one can quoe

hem, ha hough he sory abou Jonah is enirely cional, he

. When I gave hese alks, A. J. Ayer inormed me (alhough he said i didn affec he philo-sophical poin I was making) ha I was no correc in English law (which is very avorableo plainiffs in libel cases). I menioned his in he discussion aferwards, and someoneremarked ha I would be righ in American law. Naurally, he greaer he coincidenceinvolved (and he larger he corpus), as in he oaliy o he Sherlock Holmes sories, hemore unlikely i is ha here should be some unique person who, by some coincidence,maches hese sories bu has no connecion wih Conan Doyle. Bu, however unlikely i

may be, i is no impossible.


43/185


man Jonah really exised. Tis was one o he legendary accouns

(unorunaely he real hisorical ones have no survived) abou a

genuinely exising Hebrew prophe.

Since I am over ime, I will sop here. I should menion ha i is

in he analysis o his very case ha I hink he Frege-Russell heory

goes even more wrongin he couneracual siuaion. I will deal

wih ha nex ime, no oday as expeced.

I have argued (a) ha he Frege-Russell heory is no demandedby he exisence o cional worksin ac no paricular heory is

demandedand (b) ha, as i is saed, i solves he problems ha

i raises abou hese works incorrecly. I hink ha i even incorrecly

applies isel o hese works: one shouldn say ha one uses he

predicaes in he sory; one should jus say ha i is par o he pre-

ense o he sory ha here are such properies ha pick he objecsou, known o he narraor. O course, o say hese hings is no o

give a posiive and correc accoun, since we haven deal wih he

problems abou he exisenial saemens and so on. And ha,

o course, will be he nex imporan ask.

. SeeN&N(Kripke /: , noe ). Bu maybe his wasn he scholarly consensusI hough i was. I have since seen wriers ohers han he one I quoe sae he conrary.I doesn mater, since as I said, he view could be rue, wheher or no here was evidenceor i.

Also, even a he ime I gave he presen lecures, hough maybe I didn know i hen,I could have used Moses insead as an example. Te amous biblical scholar Marin Nohhough ha Moses was a hisorical gure, bu (conrary o he impression one would gerom Witgenseins discussion) ha he had litle o do wih he exodus rom Egyp, or moso he bes-known hings relaed abou him in he Penaeuchal accoun. (Te rue coreabou him is guidance ino he arable land.)

Perhaps I should add ha since hen, I have read auhors even more unavorable o he

hisoriciy o he exodus. Bu hese are quesions no o be discussed here.


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Lec ure I I

November ,

Las ime I argued ha he ypes o names which occur in cionaldiscourse are, so o speak, preended names, par o he preense

o he cion. Te proposiions in which hey occur are preended

proposiions raher han real proposiions; or raher, as we migh

pu i, he senences preend o express a proposiion raher han

really doing so.

I also argued ha, even i one reserved he erm proper name

or hose which Russell would recognize as logicallyproper names

(genuine as opposed o ordinary names), he same phenomenon

would arise: in such a case here would also be a caegory o pre-

ended names which occur in cion, where I ancy or preend ha

I name a Russellian sense-daum, or visual impression, or wha have

you. I is rue ha in he Russellian case he speaker o he language

could regard hese names as a separae semanical caegory, open o

her own inspecion, as long as he language is conned o hersel.

Ten he speaker o he language can always ell wheher she has

genuinely named an objec wih which she is acquained, or is sim-

ply preending o do so. Neverheless, here is his semanical cae-gory o preended names. I would no be reducible o he caegory

o denie descripions according o any simple paradigm as he

one Russell suggess, he hing saisying mos o he properies in

he sory. One would be able o make saemens such as Mailda

does no exis, bu Aloysius does, using a preended name Mailda

and a genuine logically proper name Aloysius o make he conras.


45/185


Te problem o heir analysis would be quie similar o ha in he

ordinary case where one admis ha people, planes, ships, shoes,

and sealing wax can be named. So why no ry he same hing in he

general case as one would in he Russellian special case?

One reason perhaps has been ha people have assumed ha

wha semanical caegory a erm belongs o should be open o in-

rospecion by any user o he senence. I one regards preended

names or cive names as a semanical caegory separae rom or-dinary names, hen he presen accoun depends on denying his

assumpion. For in he case o ordinary cion which is communi-

caed o ohers, hough i will be rue perhaps ha he auhor

knows wheher she is using a preended name or really denoing

an objecwheher she is spinning cion or elling he ruh

her hearers may be under he wrong impression, or may be uncer-ain wha is going on. And even he auhor hersel may a an

appropriae laer ime orge wha she was doing. I so, hen he

hearer, or he auhor a a laer dae, will be under he misaken im-

pression ha somehing is a name when in ac i is no: i is merely

a preended name.

So we also have o allow a caegory o misakes ha such andsuch is a name, and a caegory o misakes ha such and such a sen-

ence genuinely expresses a proposiion. Tis can happen no only

when one is reading a work which one hinks no o be cion when

i is, or when one is unsure wheher i is cion or no: i can also

happen in oher ways as well. An example would be he naming by

some asronomers o a hypoheical plane Vulcan which was

hough o cause cerain perurbaions in Mercury. I was laer dis-

covered ha no such plane did cause hese perurbaions, and his

paved he way or he general heory o relaiviy. Here he asrono-

mers were, on my view, under a misaken impression ha hey had

named a plane when hey inroduced he name; and when hey


46/185

N O V E M B E R ,

utered senences conaining he name Vulcan i was a misakeo

suppose ha hey expressed proposiions, raher han a case o pre-

ense. And mos o wha I say abou preense, hough no perhaps all

(you can check i ou or yourselves), will apply muais muandis

wih he erm misake in place o preense.

Las ime I alked abou wha a bad analysis I hough he

Frege-Russell view gave o our asserions ha Moses does exis or

ha Sherlock Holmes does no. I said ha heir analysis o hesesaemens, when hey are assered, as some unique person, who

has mos o he properies in such and such a sory, exiss ails o

ake accoun o he correc logical properies involved. In ac, I

argued ha even i heir heory o how reerence was deermined

were correc hey should no assume ha o say ha Sherlock

Holmes exised would be o say ha he properies in he sorywere saised. Tey should raher have he auhor preend ha

here exis denie descripions which deermine he reeren,

hough hese descripions need no be given in he sory isel:

he sory may no speciy anyhing which is even puaively

uniquely ideniying.

I wan also o say how his view goes over or modal properies.How does he Frege-Russell analysis work here? I have argued in

N&N, and would reierae here, ha in modal conexs he analysis

comes off even worse. Frege and Russell (and Witgensein, who

deal wih his paricular example, as quoed in Lecure I) wish o

hold ha Moses exiss is o be analyzed as some one unique per-

son led he Israelies ou o Egyp and so onwhaever else he

Bible says. Les jus suppose or breviy ha i is jus leading he

Israelies ou o Egyp which is in quesion. Now how does his

work ou hypoheically, or raher, couneracually? I seems o me

ha i works ou especially badly in his case. For Moses could have

exised even hough no one led he Israelies ou o Egyp. He


47/185


himsel migh have exised and simply ailed o do so, or whaever

reason. Te converse ails also, o course. Some unique person

migh have led he Israelies ou o Egyp, even i Moses had never

been born. Someone else migh have done so in his place. Tere

migh indeed be a view o hisory ha one unique person is

uniquely called orh by some kind o meaphysical principle o

perorm a desined ask. One should no however atemp o prove

his view simply by an analysis o proper names, and heir connec-ion wih exisence saemens. Bu he analysis supposed here

would do so.

I should menion in his connecion a kind o reply ha has

naurally suggesed isel o readers, and is in ac menioned in

N&N, bu apparenly no answered, or a any rae no answered

o everyones saisacion, since I have goen his reply in spie ois earlier menion. I someimes use modal argumens o argue

ha, or example, Moses canno mean heman who led he Isra-

elies ou o Egyp because, aer all, i migh have been he case,

as I jus said, ha Moses didn lead he Israelies ou o Egyp.

Now one reply o his has been in erms o he Russellian noion

o he scope o a descripion. Suppose he erm Moses did abbre-viae he man xwho Led he Israelies Ou o Egyp:

Now I can argue ha Moses doesn mean his by saying ha i is

possible ha Moses didn lead he Israelies ou o Egyp:

2. LIOE(M)

. Bu see he views abou he hisorical Moses menioned in Lecure I, noe . Here I can be

aken o be assuming ha he Penaeuchal accoun o Mosess role is subsanially correc,a leas enough o i o saisy he condiions in he passage I cie rom Witgensein.


48/185

N O V E M B E R ,

Whereas i couldn be possible ha heman who led he Israelies

ou o Egyp didn lead he Israelies ou o Egyp:

I can easily be poined ou ha under Russells heory o de-

scripions he saemen represened by () has wo inerpreaions,

owing o Russells noion o scope.One inerpreaion says ha i is

possible ha here is a man such ha he was he only man who ledhe Israelies ou o Egyp, and didn do so:

4. ( )(LIOE!( ) LIOE( ))x x x

(Te exclamaion mark here is my own noaion and means ha x,

and only x, led he Israelies ou o Egyp.)Ta is cerainly a con-

radicion.Bu here is anoher inerpreaion which would give he de-

scripion he large scope: here is an x such ha x in ac led he

Israelies ou o Egyp uniquely, and i is possible ha hedidn:

5. ( )(LIOE!( ) LIOE( )) x x x

And ha is no a conradicion. () says ha i is possible ha someone

boh led he Israelies ou o Egyp and didn: ha is a conradicion.

Bu i is no a conradicion o say ha here is someone who led he

Israelies uniquely ou o Egyp and i is possible ha he migh no have.

In his case anyway, I don in ac hink his objecion is correc i

one goes hrough he deails o my argumen.Bu I will leave i here.

. For a more elaborae discussion o his noion see now Kripke ().. Te exclamaion poin afer a predicae has a differen meaning in Principia Mahemaica.

(!x) is ofen used o mean here is a unique x, and his usage moivaed he presen noa-ion, which is needed here.

. In ac, as I have argued in he preace o N&N, he argumen really applies o simple sen-

ences, wihou modal operaors. For more on his, see he preace o N&N (Kripke/: ).


49/185


Le me jus speak o how i migh apply o our special case, because here

i seems o me o be especially weak as a deense o a descripivis

analysis o proper names. Suppose i was no Moses did no lead he

Israelies ou o Egyp which was in quesion bu Moses does no exis:

6. E(M)

And now we wan o speak o he possibiliy o his in modal con-

exs. For example, we migh, supercially, wrie I migh have been

he case ha Moses would no have exised, as his:

7. E(M)

Ta is, he wouldn have exised under cerain circumsances. (I re-

ally should always be careul o use he subjuncive here, because

ha is wha I mean. I you use he indicaive you are generallyspeaking episemically raher han couneracually.) I is possible,

hen, ha Moses wouldn have exised under cerain circumsances:

Moses migh no have exised.

Now, can we here use he Frege-Russell analysis o Moses as

he descripion he man who led he Israelies ou o Egyp

uniquely o analyze ()? I one runs i he way I wan, one gesaccording o me he wrong analysis. Te analysis ha I was sugges-

ing was ha () would mean I is possible ha here was no a

unique person who led he Israelies ou o Egyp:

And his seems o me no o be an analysis o he original. Bu healernaive would be, i one ried o do i parallel o his case, o say

Tere is a man who, in ac, uniquely led he Israelies ou o Egyp,

and i is possible ha ha person wouldn have exised under cer-

ain circumsances:

9. ( )(LIOE!( ) E( ))x x x


50/185

N O V E M B E R ,

Ta is, here is in ac someone who led he Israelies ou o Egyp,

and he migh no have exised, say i his moher hadn given birh o

him, even i someone else did lead he Israelies ou o Egyp.

Te rouble wih rying he same scope device here is ha i vio-

laes he basic principle o Frege and Russell ha exisence is no a

predicae o individuals, ha i is a second-level raher han a rs-

level concep. Because o ha, hisanalysis, a leas, is ruled ou. One

can say here is someone whom I ideniy as he unique personwho led he Israelies ou o Egyp and hemigh no have exised,

because hemigh no have exised here makes no sense by isel.

Tere may be some way ou o his, bu i is no sraighorward.

And his is aside rom any objecions ha migh be raised o his

argumen in he general case.One migh hink ha he diffi culy

here is very special o he case o exisence. I don hink i is paric-ularly. I hink i suggess ha his is no he reply in he general case

eiher, bu raher ha he erm Moses, as I argued, should be

regarded no as abbreviaing a descripion which can designae di-

eren objecs in differen possible worlds, bu as rigidly designaing

a cerain man o whom we hen say ha he migh no have led he

Israelies ou o Egyp under cerain circumsances, ha he mighno have exised under cerain circumsances, and so on. So he

Frege-Russell analysis is especially diffi cul o mainain in his

paricular case.

. Again, see he relevan pages in he preace oN&N.. Many have conneced Russells analysis wih he Kanian docrine ha exisence is no a

predicae, and have even assered ha Russell gave a precise ormulaion o he docrine(see, or example, Quine : ). I don really wish o go ino heavy Kanian exegesis, in

which I am hardly compeenand maybe no even ligh Kanian exegesis. Bu I do wan osay his. Kan also alks abou he eeling ha i exisence were a predicae i would seem oapply analyically, whereas in ac asserions o exisence are synheic. Bu whaever hisposiion is (and i is somewha obscure) i doesn seem o me, as ar as I am able o read him,o be ideniable wih ha o Frege and Russell.

Kan says ha exisence is a logical predicaebu no a real predicae, ha when we deny

exisence o a subjec we don deny a predicae o i, bu raher rejec he subjec ogeher


51/185


So my view is ha i is perfecly legiimae o atribueexisence o individuals, wheher Russellian sense-daa or

anyhing else. Moore already argued even in connecion wihRussellian sense-daawhich, as we have seen in Lecure I,he regarded as he only proper pariculars ha can have logi-cally proper namesha Russell was wrong in concludingha no meaning could be given o exisence as a predicae ofindividuals, since i would be impossible for i no o apply,

and his is he characerisic of a misake. Moore says:

[I]n he case of every sense-daum which anyone ever

perceives, he person in quesion could always say wih

ruh of he sense-daum in quesion Tis migh no have

exised; and I canno see how his could be rue, unless

he proposiion Tis does in fac exis is also rue, and

herefore he words Tis exiss signican.

(b: )

Here I am in agreemen wih Moores argumen, as opposedo Russell and Frege. I mus be perfecly legiimae o a-ribue exisence o individuals, because one can inelligibly

say ha hey migh no have exised. I myself do no resriche poin o Russellian sense-daa, hough Moore did so

because he wished o follow Russell in hinking of hese as

wih allis predicaes. Bu he nowhere, as ar as I know rom a very cursory sudy, says haexisence doesn apply o hings a all, ha i is only a second-level propery which reallyapplies o conceps. He jus says ha when we apply exisence o or deny i o an individual

we are no doing he same hing as when we atribue a propery o or deny i o ha indi-vidual. And hough his posiion is somewha vague, perhaps, i doesn seem o me ha ihas o be idenical wih he Frege-Russellian posiion. I migh, i given a sharp ormulaion,

be deended when he Frege-Russellian posiion was rejeced. All i says in isel is hasomehow saying o an objec ha i exiss is differen rom ascribing a propery o i, in heordinary sense o propery. Alhough his is vague, i has an inuiive appeal independen ohe docrine ha exisence should no be ascribed o individuals a all.

. Noice ha he argumen ha even preended names or sense-daa mus be allowable, asdescribed in Lecure I, can be used o supplemen Moores argumen abou sense-daa. See

noe and accompanying ex.


52/185

N O V E M B E R ,

he only genuine individuals. Bu for me he poin can bemore general. Tough his paricular piece of chalk in fac

exiss, i migh no have, as Moore argued agains Russelleven in he case of sense-daa.

Russell argues ha if exisence applied o individuals, iwould be absoluely impossible for he propery no o

apply, and ha his is characerisic o a misake. Moores argu-

men would appear o show ha somehing is wrong here. Now, in

he Frege-Russellian apparaus o quanicaion heory isel herewould seem o be a naural deniion o saying ha xexiss:

10. E( )x

Namely ha here is aywhich is x:

11. ( )( = )y y x

(where xandyare boh variables ranging over objecs). So i is hard

or me o see ha hey can consisenly mainain ha exisence is

only a second-level concep (in he Fregean erminology) and does

no apply o individuals.

Bu wha abou he argumen ha i is absoluely impossible or

i no o apply? O course, i is he case ha or every xhere is aysuch hay= x:

12. ( )( )( = )x y y x

In oher words, or every x, xexiss will be a heorem o quanica-

ion heory, and so i will presumably be necessary. A any rae, I agree

wih Russell ha i couldn have been he case ha somehingdidn exis. Tings are no o wo kinds, exisers and nonexisers.

() is hus a necessary ruh. Te necessiy o () can be writen as:

13. ( )E( )x x

. I one hough ha some objecs (say, numbers) didhave necessary exisence, his would be

a signican ac abou each such objec and should imply a orrioriha he objec exiss.


53/185


However, his should no be conused wih everyhing has necessary

exisence.

14. ( ) E( )x x

O course i is his second sep ha Moore denies when he poins

ou ha under cerain circumsances his piece o chalk, say, or

even his Russellian sense-daum, wouldn have exised. Tus,exisence should no be conused wih such a predicae as sel-iden-

iy, where no only he analogue o (), bu he analogue o ()

does hold. (Here I assume ha somehing is sel-idenical even

wih respec o couneracual siuaions where i would no exis.)

Tere are, however, modal sysems proposed in he lieraure, in

which one could deduce () rom (), indeed could deduce(x) P(x) rom (x)P(x). Acually, here are some in which he

wo saemens can be shown o be equivalen, ha is, ha he con-

verse holds.I discussed in Kripke () wha I believe here o be

he allacy in any such derivaion; I won discuss i again here. An-

oher source o conusion may lie in he ollowing observaion. Sup-

pose ha, o ollow he line we have been aking, o express aproposiion abou Moses, and o use he name Moses as a name,

here has go o be an objec reerred o, namely, Moses. Ten how

could Moses does no exis ever have been rue? For i here hadn

been a Moses, we wouldn have been able o use his name; we

wouldn have been able o say so; and perhaps even he proposiion

ha Moses doesn exis isel wouldn have exised. o ake he

. Prior () showed ha his inerence holds in S. Applied o exisence, his would implyha only a consan domain semanics is possible in quanied S, which seems o me noo be rue, hough I mysel was aken in by his view in my rs paper on quanied modal

logic (Kripke ).


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oher line is o say ha i would have been around, bu inexpressible

by or inaccessible o us.

Les suppose ha i here had been no way o speak o Moses

in ha way, one couldn have said ha Moses did no exis, or even

ha he proposiion wouldn have exised. So how could i be rue

o any possible world ha Moses wouldn have exised in i? We

couldn have said so i he didn. Tis, i seems o me, is a unda-

menal conusion. One should no ideniy wha people wouldhave been able o say in hypoheical circumsances, i hey had

obained, wih wha we can say, o hese circumsances, perhaps

knowing ha hey don obain. I is he later which is he case

here. We do have he name Moses, and i is par o our language,

wheher i would have been par o our language in oher circum-

sances or no. And we can say, o cerain hypoheical circum-sances, ha in hose circumsances Moses wouldn have exised;

and ha our saemen Moses exiss is alse o hose circum-

sances, even hough we migh go on o say ha under some such

circumsances, had hey obained, one would no have been able

o say wha we can say o hose circumsances. (Perhaps, i one

wishes o ake his view o proposiions, he proposiion wouldnhave exised o be expressed, le alone ha we couldn have

expressed i.) Sill, we do have his orm o language and we do

have his proposiion. In jus he same way we can say, o cerain

hypoheical circumsances, ha lie migh no have exised in he

. I was assuming here ha wha does no exis (ever) canno be named. So, had Moses neverexised, he couldn have been named. Bu perhaps his isn always so, i he hypoheicalnonexisen eniy could be specied. Perhaps he person ha would have exised, had aparicular sperm unied wih a paricular egg and had here been normal developmen (nospliting ino wo idenical wins, or damage o he union, enough o say one doesn havehe same person), is compleely specied and could be given a name, even i he union didno acually occur. Similarly, one mig

Saul Kripke Reference and Existence the John

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