2ND BATTALION, 4TH INFANTRY REGIMENT LEADER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

LTC MARK S. LESLIE

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PURPOSEThe purpose of this leader development seminar is to conduct an independent academic study of the Siege of Firebase Mary Ann, occupied by 1-46th

Infantry,23rd (Americal) Division, on 27-28 March 1971. The following group discussion will focus on leadership and tactical successes and failures that led to this battle and 30 US KIA and 82 US WIA with only 15 EKIA.

We relearned many of these same lessons in our security FTX. These timeless lessons learned provide a common frame of reference among the BN leadership and ensure these lessons are retained. This discussion is as much about character of leaders as it is about tactical lessons learned.

The discussion will focus around the war-fighting functions. Companies will focus their lessons learned on their assigned war-fighting function. Maximum of one slide with discussion points. How to present the information and who does what is at the Company commanders discretion. Each company commander will start off by stating where their company was when the attack was initiated.

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COMMANDER’S INTENT

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AGENDA W6 Introduction – Warrior 6

AO/AI- S3 Enemy Situation – S2 Event Summary – XO Mission Command – S1/HHC Movement and Maneuver – A/B Intelligence – S2, C CO Fires – FSO & CO FSOs Sustainment – S4, E CO, MEDO Protection – D CO Summary – XO

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AI

6

AI

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23rd ID

196th/ 23rd IDL

1-46th/ 96/23rd IDL

L C/1-46th

L HHC/1-46th

(-)

L E/1-46th

(-)

1/C/3-26 FA

(-)HHC/1-46thL

A/1-46thL

B/1-46thL

E/1-46thL

(-)

B/1-14th FA

(-)

AO

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L 2/C/1-46

L 1/C/1-46

L 3/C/1-46

Enemy- SIGACTs S2Previous FSB Attacks by the 409th VC Sapper Battalion

1. February 1965- VC employed mortars and demolition teams to reduce Camp Holloway near Pleiku to Shambles. (pg. 124)

2. October 1965- 9x man VC raiding force penetrated the Marine air facility at Marble Mountain near Da Nang. (pg. 124)

3. August 1968- Sappers raided the headquarters compound of the 5th Special Forces Group’s Command and Control North (CCN) on the outskirts of Da Nang (pg. 124)

4. May 1969- Sappers infiltrated the 101st Airborne Division’s FSB Airborne in the A Shau Valley

5. January 1970- Sappers raid into FSB Ross belonging to 1st Marine Division (pg. 124)

6. February 1971- Sappers walk into hilltop perimeter from the 198th LIB, Americal Division (pg 124)

7. March 1971- Sappers went through 101st

Airborne Division units on the perimeter of the Khe Sanh Combat Base (pg. 125)

8. May 1971- Sappers blow up fueling station at logistical hum of Cam Ranh Bay (pg.125)

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FSB Mary Ann

Key Highlights

-409th Sapper Battalion composed of approximately 260 Soldiers

-Sapper elements operate in 3-6 men teams

-After FSB Mary Ann, confirmed less than 20 x EKIA

-Enemy spent much of their time in area control and consolidation, not fighting. Overall they controlled the initiative-when, where, and with what intensity to strike.

-Enemy main attacks happened in early morning during lowest amount of illumination

-Probing attacks lasted no more than a minute

-Prolonged attacks lasted no more than 30-45 min due to anticipation for aerial support from Chu Lai

-Immediate Site exploitation critical to clearing objective (i.e. stealing watches, possible for future ambushes)

-No air assets so worked from the ground timing and positioning of mortars and machine gun assets to disrupt and/or destroy USF aerial platforms in the area

-Operational cycle was usually 1-3 small skirmishes a month prior to moderate or full scale attack. Moderate war of attrition by wearing USF down by thousands of small arms attacks.

Enemy PIRs:1. What are the

ingress/egress points of FSBs?

2. Where are the IDF assets located on the FSBs?

3. How long does it take USF elements to get air support from Chu Lai and/or reserve elements from FSBs

4. Who were the command leaders within 1-46th IN BN?

5. What is the COM/DIS of USF?

6. What are USF patrol routes and time?

7. What fortifications are in place to protect FSBs? (i.e. individual walls, ditches or fences, wires)

8. What are primary, secondary, and tertiary AoA and withdrawals?

9. Where are the USF Command Posts Located within the FSBs?

Security Element4x Men1x B-402x AK 472x Mines

Penetration4x Men2x AK 473x Bangalore2 Wire cutters

Assault5x Men2x B-4070x Shaped charges5x AT grenades

Assault4x Men2x AK-471x B-4050x Shaped charges5x AT grenades

Reserve Element13x Men1x Machine Gun30x Shaped Charges1x B-409 AK-47

Fire Support Element27x Men2x 82 mm Mortars4x AK-47s1x K63 radio

Assault Element

Assault Team 1 Assault Team 2

Sapper Raiding Party

Penetration4x Men2x AK-474x Bangalores

Assault5x Men1x B-4045x shaped charges2x AK-475x AT grenades

Assault4x Men1x B-4035x shaped charges2x AK-473x AT grenades

Assault2x Men1x B-401x AK-47

Cell 1

Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3

Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4

Enemy Composition/Disposition

T-0T+15T+25T+35

Summary of Sapper Attack• Weather conditions: moonless night, low clouds rolling

over the mountains, fog, visibility 20 meters• ~Early Morning Hours: Sappers Breach

~ 4 Lanes in Outer Double Strand Concertina at 100 meters

~ 4 Lanes middle barrier at 50 meters~ Sappers spread out across last barrier (30m)

• 0230: Vehicle Beacon Scans Shallow Slope / No movement

• 0240: Indirect Fire Attack Initiation• ~0240: Bunker 8 observes Sappers Rushing into and

over the trenches in Bunkers 7 and 6~ Sappers 3 man teams = Knock Out Bunkers~ Sapper 6 man teams = Destroy Priority Targets

• ~0244: First Satchel Charges ReportedPriority Targets: ~RPG 0.50 Quad~Satchel Charges to B-TOC

~Satchel Charges to C/1-46 CP• ~ Green Star Clusters Observed from Southwest;

suspected Sapper CP• 0250: First Defensive Fire Targets Initiated• 0320: First Helicopter Gunships on Station• ~0325: Sappers Evacuating from FSB

B

D

6 PAX

6 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

6 PAX

6 PAX

3 PAX

6 PAX

6 PAX

D

D6 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

D

82mm Mortar Section

82mm Mortar Section

CMD POST

Event Summery

Mission Command-HHC

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Recon and Security- Out-dated Firebase

- Obvious Target Along Enemy Supply

Trains

Occupation and Preparation

- “Garrison Mentality”- Lack of improvement

- No Deception Plan

Approach of Enemy Main Attack

- Unoccupied Guard Towers

- Weak structural network

Enemy Assault- Undetected Breach

- Enemy Massing effects

- No counter-measures

Counterattack- Non-existent

- No working alert plan

- No rehearsals

Consolidation and Reorganization

- Withdraw plan- Succession of

Command- C2 capabilities

Sequence of the Defense

Repo

rtin

g SALUTE, SALT, SPOT, React to Contact, 3 D’s

PACE Plan

Rehearsals (COMEX)

Additional Notes:

-Critical shortages: Mortars and crews from Alpha, Charlie, and Echo).

-Mortars a artillery lifted out by 27MAR to LZ Mildred, along with some of their crews.

-C.Co was the closest to meeting field MTOE strength due to other Companies being involved in the LZs.

MTOECompany Foxhole strength Authorized (1971) Authorized (2015)

Charlie 75 Understrength 131

Echo (Recon) 18 Understrength22

(Scouts)

HHC34

(Radiomen, medics, S2) Understrength 223Bravo Mortar 8 Met strength 6

Delta Mortar 4 Met strength6

(Alpha/Charlie)

Other US92

(Training teams, transient PAX, etc) N/A N/A

TOTAL US 231366

(scouts included in HHC #s)ARVN 21

TOTAL FRIENDLY 252 695

MTOE-S1

409TH VC Movement & Maneuver – A CO

Types of Offensive Operations

Theirs (3):Attack: “One slow, four quick”Slow PlanQuick AdvanceQuick Attack (3 sub types)Quick ClearanceQuick Withdrawal

Ambush

Sapper attacks

Ours (4):Movement to Contact (MTC)AttackExploitationPursuit

Characteristics of the Offense

Theirs (6):Attack planningAttack criteria and approvalPreliminary ReconRehearsals for the attackLogistics and securityEchelons of attack

Ours (4):SurpriseTempoConcentrationAudacity

409TH VC Sapper Attack

B

D

6 PAX

6 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

6 PAX

6 PAX

3 PAX

6 PAX

6 PAX

D

D6 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

3 PAX

D

82mm Mortar Section

CMD POST

N

CMD POST

T: BreachP: Allow DO FoM

T2: ClearP2: Neutralize

T: Est Foothold, o/o Pass DOP: Allow DO FoM

Provide C2 and FS

T2: SuppressP2: Suppress

Movement and Maneuver –BCO1-46th IN BN

16ADP 3-90

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Security Posture

-Purpose of fire base Mary Ann: …Support a Limited foray against the K-7 Corridor and the DAK rose Trail-two braches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

-Knight’s grunts had left other details undone, their complacency the result of a false sense of security because they have never encountered the enemy in greater than squad strength

-…no Indication of any enemy activity on the Mary Ann side of the River

-…..the troops regarded the hill more as a rear area than as the divisions most forward firing base (P.4)

-All construction projects on the hill had been halted, and the process of packing up had begun. The entire 196th Bd was, in fact, preparing for redeployment north to De Nang to relive 1 Marine Division

The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright.

Preparation

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4-10. The defense has inherent strengths. The defender arrives in the area of operations before the attackerand uses the available time to prepare. Defenders study the ground and select positions that allow themassing of fires on likely approaches. They combine natural and manmade obstacles to canalize attackingforces into engagement areas. Defending forces coordinate and rehearse actions on the ground, gainingintimate familiarity with the terrain. They place security, intelligence, and reconnaissance forces throughoutthe area of operations. These preparations multiply the effectiveness of the defense. Commanders continuedefensive preparations in depth, even as the close engagement begins.

Engagement Area Development 1-46th IN BN

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StepsI. Identify Enemy Avenue

of approach II. Determine Enemy Scheme of

ManeuverIII. Determine where to Kill the

Enemy IV. Emplace Key

Weapon Systems V. Emplace Mines

and Obstacles VI. Integrate Indirect

Fire VII. Conduct an

EngagementArea Rehearsal

Preparation

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-The trip flares were supposed to be disconnected each morning and re-laid each evening to avoid such mishaps, but that ritual was rarely observed (p.133)

- …both ground radars and all night-vision starlight scopes, had been sent to the battalion rear for maintenance p.135

-The outer apron of double concertina was one hundred meters from the bunker line….the sappers could walk right over the rust, mashed down junk.

-…but Doyle was unable to get chain-link fencing to secure these openings because the professionals were preparing to turn FSB Mary Over

-…claymore mines had not been deployed to kill the enemy but which had been thrown down into the wire after troops had removed the plastic explosives from each to heat their rations with.

Security

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-”I considered Listening posts outside the wire…a hazard…I considered the danger of people getting wounded”

-…he frequently found guards asleep when he walked the bunker line….

-During the day, the grunts would balk at conducting security patrols around the hill…… “they just come down here (down the hill) and then sham for awhile”

-…In the morning you couldn’t call up a bunker for a sitrep because you wouldn’t get an answer. You might get three out of twenty-two (p.138)

-On the night of the attack, understrength Company C left one perimeter bunker un occupied, although the many transients on the hill could have easily been used to man it

-…ran outside to get his M16, which was hanging outside the hooch in a laundry bag to keep it clean (p.207)

Disruption

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4-4. Defenders disrupt the attackers’ tempo and synchronization with actions designed to prevent them from massing combat power. Commanders employ disruptive actions to unhinge the enemy’s preparationsand attacks. Disruption methods include misdirecting or destroying enemy reconnaissance forces, breaking up formations, isolating units, and attacking or disrupting systems. Defenders never allow attackers to fullyprepare. They use spoiling attacks before enemies can focus combat power and counterattack before the attacking enemy can consolidate any gains. Defenders target command electronic warfare assets against enemy command and control systems and constantly disrupt enemy forces in depth.

-The men always occupied the same positions on FSB Mary Ann (p.169)

-….there was considerable deplay in firing defensive targets…the motors and howitzers actually on Mary Ann were supposed to fire the DTs… those crews, however, were presently fighting for their lives and could not man their guns.

-Gutsosky, who was trying to contact the mortar section via the landline running to the fire pits….the Mortars went unmanned in the chaos, the call unanswered (p.149)

Mass Effects

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Defenders seek to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power where they choose and shift it tosupport the decisive operation. Commanders retain and, when necessary, reconstitute a reserve andmaneuver to gain local superiority at the point of decision. Defending commanders may surrender someground to gain time to concentrate the defending force’s effects.

Commanders accept risk in some areas to mass effects elsewhere. Obstacles, security forces, andfires can assist in reducing risk. Since concentrating forces increases the threat of large losses fromweapons of mass destruction, commanders use deception and concealment to hide any necessary forceconcentrations.

Flexibility

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The conduct of the defense requires flexible plans. Commanders focus planning on preparations indepth, use of reserves, and the ability to shift the main effort. Commanders add flexibility by designating upplementary positions, designing counterattack plans, and preparing to counterattack.

-The troops couldn’t counterattack because they did not know were to go (p.150)

-…You didn’t know what to do- stay in the bunker because the mortars were landing so close, or go to the trenches and defend yourself and your bunker? (p.180)

-…CPT Knight was negligent in that he did not do what the SOP for firebase defense called to do….he did not implement the SOP.

VC IC PlanIC Assets-Recon Elements Sapper ElementsVC infiltrators posing as ARVN soldiersInformers & sympathizers (farmers, cooks, spies, ect.)local guerrillas

Execution-Recon teams would conduct area recon IOT determine mortar ranges to each target area.

Recon and Sapper elements also conducted probing attacks to gather insight on USF Patrol routes and COM/DIS.

VCs had internal informers who gave data on established patterns and habits of the FSB in regards to security and vulnerability spots of the FSB. Information gleamed from informers and sympathizers joined to data from direct reconnaissance via patrols, infiltration and probing attacks.

HPTs-Eliminate artillery officer on FSB-Destroy quad .50 machine guns-Destroy USF Command Posts & Key leaders-Destroy Artillery pieces within FSB

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Enemy CapabilitiesWeapons included:• AK-47s• 82-mm Mortars

• w/ CS capabilities • Grenades

• White Phosphorus• Explosive charge

• Satchel charges• 12.7mm MGs• CS [Tear] Gas• Wire cutters• Flares

Weather• Moonless evening• Low cloud cover rolling in

over the mountains

Effects on the Battlefield• Illumination flares barely

visible• Extended timeline for arrival

of aerial assets (Huey and medevac)

• No moon illumination makes it further difficult to see in the late evenings

• Jungle terrain offered ideal environment for ambushes and harassment tactics.

• Main tactics of the 409th VC Sapper were to delay attacks until nightfall leaving USF elements vulnerable to the terrain and weather effects

409th VC Sapper Battalion – S2

Concept of Enemy Operations:Phase 1:Strike with 82MM mortars to initiate contact once sappers have reached the line to infiltrate the FSB Mary Ann perimeter and destroy USF IDF assets and Machine Guns, to include disorient US soldiers with CS gasPhase 2: Sappers with hand grenades and satchel charges destroy key infrastructures (CPs, Supply Annex) and leadersPhase 3:Continued shelling with ammo with focus on Ammunition holding area, small arms weapons, and gather future mechanical ambush assets or to sell.

Intelligence – C CO1-46th IN BN

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• Division Intelligence• DIV SIGACTs

• Early Warning Devices• Sensors• Radars• Flares

• Reconnaissance and Surveillance Patrols

• Recon Platoon

Fires – FSO & CO FSOs409th VC Sapper BN

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1-46th IN BN• Fire integration in the defense of FB Mary Ann • Illumination on the defense • Utilize all FS assets available and ensure the other unit are tracking your TGTs.• Targets should be sent higher and to Adjacent units.• Effects of calling fire in danger close

M102 HowitzerCaliber: 105 mm (4.1 in)Effective firing range11.5 km (7.1 miles) 15.4 w/ RAPRate of Fire: 3 RPM

M114 HowitzerCaliber: 155mm (6.1 in)Effective firing range14.6 km (9.1 miles) Rate of Fire: 4 RPM. sustained 40rph

• Combined Arms Maneuver – fires integration • 409th VC Sapper BN utilized 82mm MTRS with HE and CS Gas.• The effect achieved was the disruption of the FBs ability to communicate higher

and mislead the Soldiers to believe the subsequent explosions from Sapper explosives were from IDF.

• The trigger for the use of the enemy IDF was the staging of the Sappers just outside the wire of FSB Mary Ann.

Sustainment – S4

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1-46th IN BN –• PAGE 20- “ BUNKERS WERE PRIMITIVE

• LTC Carvell request for the “ Material needed for permanent Fire Base Defense were denied by Division”

• RESUPPLY PLAN• Never a secondary or contingency plan

for resupply• Relied exclusively on Aerial Resupply

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Care Under Fire Guidelines

• This strategy will increase the unit’s combat effectiveness and it’s survivability

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Return fire and take cover.

Direct or expect casualty to remain engaged as a combatant if appropriate

Direct casualty to move to cover and apply self-aid if able.

Try to keep the casualty from sustaining additional wounds

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= Possible CCP Locations= BN Aid Station=Triage area

BAS

• Designate CCPs- Mark them for day and night• Rehearse a MASCAL • Triage- know who to evacuate first when the

time comes.

Sustainment –MEDO

1-46th IN BN Protection –D CO

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1-46th IN BN – DCO• Terrain picked for FB Mary Ann – 1LT Knighton

Advantages – Proximity to Ho Chi Min TrailDisadvantages – Open terrain in surrounded by High Ground

• Talk about the obstacles and what they could of done to improve – 1LT MayoSustains – Obstacles were inspected Improves – Obstacles emplaced but not observed

• Guard mount or security posture – 1LT JerniganPlan – Good planPrep – Poor preparationExecution – Complacency lead to poor execution

• Talk fighting position – 1LT AkesThreat Identified (MLCOA) – Bunkers arrayed to combat enemy’s MLCOAMaintenance – no improvement, no maintenance, and no supplementary positions

Summary – XO

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IG FindingsThe unit failed:* “increase the alert status of the FSB commensurate with the low illumination condition and predicted enemy offensive.” • “to conduct frequent practice alerts and adequate inspections.” • “to utilize listening posts or local patrols or to designate a reaction force.”• “to insure that anti-intrusion devices were employed.” • “to adhere to the fire base security and standard operating procedures.”• “to plan or ascertain the adequacy of artillery fire support.”• “to effectively plan for defensive and counter-mortar targets around FSB

Mary Ann.• “to integrate available South Vietnamese artillery resources at FSB Mary

Ann.”• To understand the importance of all the elements of decisive action. The

unit was preoccupied with offensive operations and over emphasized those to the practical exclusion of of the defense.”