Sanders v. State, Alaska (2015)

7/25/2019 Sanders v. State, Alaska (2015)

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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFICREPORTER.

Readers are requested to bring errors to the at tention of the Clerk of the Appel late Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, em ail

[email protected].

THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

RYANJOHNSANDERS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATEOFALASKA,

Respondent.

)

) SupremeCourtNo.S-15403

CourtofAppealsNo.A-10943

SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-07-00018CR

OPINION

No.7058October9,2015

)

)

)

)

)

)

))

PetitionforHearingfromtheCourtofAppealsoftheStateof

Alaska,onappealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateof

Alaska,ThirdJudicialDistrict,Anchorage,MichaelSpaan,

Judge.

Appearances: Michael Schwaiger, Assistant Public

Defender,andQuinlanSteiner,PublicDefender,Anchorage,

forPetitioner.KennethM.Rosenstein,AssistantAttorney

General, Office of Special Prosecutions & Appeals,

Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General,

Juneau,forRespondent.

Before: Fabe,ChiefJustice,Stowers,Maassen,andBolger,

Justices,andMatthews,SeniorJustice.*[Winfree,Justice,

notparticipating.]

FABE,ChiefJustice. BOLGER, Justice,with whomSTOWERS, Justice, joins,

dissentinginpart.

* SittingbyassignmentmadeunderarticleIV,section11oftheAlaska

ConstitutionandAlaskaAdministrativeRule23(a).
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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I. INTRODUCTION

Acriminaldefendantontrialfortwomurderssoughttoadmitarecording

ofaphonecalltothepolice,placedbyayoungwomanwhohadsincedied.Onthe

recording,theyoungwomantoldapoliceofficerthatoneofthevictimshadtoldherthat

bothvictimswereconspiringtoattackandrobthedefendant.Insupportofhismotion

to admit the recording, the defendant argued that the recording was critical to his

defense,whichcenteredonjustifiedself-defenseandheatofpassion.Thedefendant

invoked the hearsay exceptions for a declarants then existing state of mind, an

unavailabledeclarantsstatementagainstpenalinterest,andtheresidualexceptionfor

unavailabledeclarants, aswellashis constitutionalright topresenta defense. The

superiorcourtdeniedthemotion.Thejury,presentedwithnoevidenceofthealleged

conspiracytoattackandrobthedefendant,convictedhimoffirst-andsecond-degree

murder.Heappealed,andthecourtofappealsaffirmedhisconviction.

We granted thedefendantspetition for hearing todecidewhether the

deceasedwitnesssstatementshouldhavebeenadmittedattrial.Weconcludethatit

shouldhavebeenadmitted,andwethereforereversethedefendantsconvictionsand

remandforanewtrial.

II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

1. Theincident

OnNewYearsEve2006,RyanSandersshotandkilledTravisMooreand

AshleeRichardsathishome.SandershadinvitedMooretoagatheringatSanderss

apartmentafterMoorecalledhimseveraltimesthatevening.MoorearrivedinanSUVwithRichards,RavenKetzler,andhisgirlfriend,SherrellPorterfield. Moore,whowas

carryinganunloaded9mmcaliber Beretta pistol,enteredSanderss apartment with

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PorterfieldandRichards,whowascarryingapushknife.1Thethreeleftamachetein

theirSUValongwithKetzler,whodidnotcomeintoSanderssapartmentduringthe

more than thirtyminutestheother three were inside. Ninepeople were present in

Sanderssapartment:Sanders;Moore;Richards;Porterfield;Sanderssbrother,Joseph;

Sanderssone-year-olddaughter;Sanderssgirlfriend,Melissa;Sanderssgirlfriends

brother,Jeremy;andJeremysgirlfriend,MaryJane.

According toSanderss statement to the police, hewas talking inhis

bedroom with his brother and Moore when Moore pulled out his Beretta and hit

Sanderssheadwithit,splittingopentheskinabovehiseyebrow.Sandersfelltothe

groundbetweenhisbedandthewall,reachedforanearby.38caliberrevolver,andshot

atMoorefourorfivetimes.TwobulletsstruckMoore.AccordingtoSanders,everyone,

includingMoore,ranfromtheshots.Moorecollapsedanddiedoutsidetheapartment

alongsidethewalkwayleadingtothefrontdoor.

Sanders,whoclaimedhewasunsurewhetherhehadhitMoore,grabbed

a.40caliberGlocksemi-automatichandgunandranoutside.Hesawablackcoatwith

furonitrunningtowards[the]SUVandrememberedthatMoorehadbeenwearinga

bigblackjacketwithfuronit.Sandersstatedthathepursuedandshotattherunning

person,notnoticingMooresbodyasheranpastit.TherunningpersonwasRichards.

SandersshotRichardsninetimes,andatenthbulletgrazedherhand.Richardswas

pronounceddeadatthehospital.

SandersclaimedthathestoppedshootingafterRichardsfellandthathewas

five to ten feet away. Forensic evidence and some witness testimony, however,

suggestedthatsomeshotswerefiredintoRichardsaftershefell.Sandersalsostatedthat

1 Apushknifeisaweapondesignedtobegraspedsothebladesticksout

fromthefrontofthefist. See People v. Owens,2dCrim.No.B248606,2014WL

3667199,at*1n.3(Cal.App.July24,2014).

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hedidnotrealizethathehadbeenshootingatsomeoneotherthanMooreuntilafterit

wasover,whenheapproachedRichardsandsawherhairandthensawMooresbody

for the first time while returning to the apartment. Richards was an overweight

Caucasianwomanwithhairpasthershoulders.MoorewasafitAfrican-Americanman

withshort-croppedhair.

Backinhisapartment,SandersputdownhisGlockandwaited.Beforethe

policearrivedSandersaskedhisgirlfriendsbrother,Jeremy,togetthe.38outofthe

apartment.Jeremyhidthe.38inaparkinglotunderneathacar,wherethepolicelater

foundit.

ThefirstpoliceofficerarrivingonscenehadtoswervetomisstheSUVin

whichMoorearrivedandwhichwaspullingoutofthedriveway.Afterstoppingfora

momentwhenitalmosthitthefirstofficerscar,theSUVcontinuedtotrytoleave. The

secondofficertoarriveblockedthestreet,stoppingtheSUVfromleaving.

Sanders,holdingareallybloodytoweltohishead,toldthefirstofficer

thathehadbeenhitintheheadwithapistolandthenshottwopeopleandthathisGlock

wasinsideonthecoffeetable.Whilebeingquestionedlateratthepolicestation,Sanders

deniedthatanyweaponsotherthanadisassembledrifle,MooresBeretta,andSanderss

Glockhadbeenintheapartment.Whenthepolicestatedthatsomeonehadgottenridof

agunandtheyhadrecoveredit,Sandersthenadmittedthatthe.38wasinvolvedandthat

hehadaskedJeremytoremoveitfromtheapartment.Sanderssaidthathedidsoand

lied about it only because he had recently bought the .38 under questionable

circumstances.SandersalsostatedthathehadnoideawhyMooreattackedhim,butthat

Moore and Joseph, Sanderss brother, had real problems because some people,

includingJoseph,hadbeenatMooreshouseandsomemoney[came]upmissing.

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2. CarmelaBacodsstatementtothepolice

Two days after the shootings Detective Mark Huelskoetter, the lead

detectiveinthecase,receivedaphonecallfromCarmelaBacod,whichherecorded.2

The17-year-oldBacoddescribedaseriesofeventsstretchingbackabouttwoweeks

now,whichhadstartedwhenRyanSanders,hestolemoneyfromoneofourfriends.

SheexplainedthatRichardshadbeenherbestfriendsincethirdgrade,thatshehad

knownMooreforacouplemonths,andthatshehadmetKetzleronce.Shestatedthat

shehadnevermetSanders. Bacodreportedthatshewassupposedtogowiththemto

theirhouse. .. thatnight,andcorrectlystatedthatKetzlerandPorterfield,bothof

whomshephysicallydescribed,hadbeenpresentalongwithMooreandRichards.

BacoddescribedaphonecallwithRichardsaboutaweekandahalfago,

inwhichRichardstoldBacodthatRichards,Moore,Ketzler,andPorterfieldhadbeen

hangingoutwithSandersonenightwhentheyallfellasleepandwokeuptodiscover

Sandersgone,alongwithmoneythathadbelongedtoKetzler.BacodtoldDetective

Huelskoetterthattheywantedtogobeathimuptogetthemoneyback,andthat

Ashlee[Richards]justtoldmethattheywantedthemoneyback,andthentheywere

gonnajumpemforit.BacodalsotoldDetectiveHuelskoetterthatRichardstoldme

thatearliertheytriedbeforeorsomethinglikethat,andRyansbrothergotmador

somethingandpulledagunon[RavenKetzlers]face,orsomethinglikethat.Andshe

answeredaffirmativelywhenDetectiveHuelskoetteraskedher,[Y]ouknowthatTravis

[Moore]wantedtobeatRyan[Sanders]upoverthemoney?and[W]hentheywere

goinovertherethatwasprettymuchtheidea,isthatTravis[Moore]wasgonnabeat

[Sanders]up?

2 Atranscriptofthecallfollowsthisopinionasanappendix.

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Later in the call, Bacod was more circumspect. When Detective

HuelskoetteraskedherifsheknewthatkindatheplanwasthatTravis[Moore]andhis

girlfriendandAshlee[Richards]andandsomeothergirlnamedRaven[Ketzler]were

gonnagooverthereandessentiallyjumpthemtogettheirmoneyback,Bacodstated,

Notnotjump,like,youknow,like,talk.Shethenstated,Butobviouslytheyre

young,so,youknow,theresgonnabeviolenceinit.ButIcouldntstopthem. 3

BacodgaveDetectiveHuelskoetterhername,dateofbirth,phonenumber,

andaddress.Shetookhisnameanddirectphonenumber,whichsherecordedwithapen

sherequestedfromhermother,andtoldhimshewouldcallifshethoughtofanything

else.

SanderswasnotinformedofBacodscalltoDetectiveHuelskoetteruntil

March2008,morethanayearlater.BeforetrialandlessthanthreemonthsafterSanders

hadlearnedofhercall,Bacodwaskilledinacaraccident.

B. Proceedings

1. Charges

Ten days after the shootings Sanders was indicted on five counts:

first-degreemurderofMoore(CountI),first-degreemurderofRichards(CountII),

second-degree murder of Moore (Count III), second-degree murder of Richards

(CountIV),andtamperingwithphysicalevidence(CountV).

2. MotioninliminetoadmitBacodsstatement

In February 2009 Sanders filed a motion in limine to admit Bacods

statementattrial.Sandersarguedforadmissionbaseduponhisdueprocessrightto

presentadefenseandAlaskaRulesofEvidence803(3)(thestateofmindexceptionto

Accordingtothetranscript,BacodandDetectiveHuelskoetterweretalking

overoneanotherduringthisexchange.

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hearsay)and804(b)(3)(theexceptionforstatementsagainstanunavailabledeclarants

interest)forRichardssstatementtoBacod,and804(b)(5)(theunavailabledeclarant

residualhearsayexception)forBacodsstatementtoDetectiveHuelskoetter.

ThesuperiorcourtdeniedSanderssmotion,statingthatMs.Richards[s]

statementstoMs.BacodregardingherintentiontogototheDefendantsresidencewith

Mr.MoorearenotadmissibleunderRule803(3)ascircumstantialevidencethateither

Ms.Richards[or]Mr.MooreplannedtorobandassaulttheDefendant.Thesuperior

courtstateditsunderstandingofthespecificsofRichardssstatement:

There is no evidenceMs. Richards actually stated she or

Mr.MooreplannedtoassaultandrobtheDefendant. Inthe

recordedstatement,Ms.BacodextrapolatestheinevitabilityofviolencefromMs.Richards[s]statements....Asearlier

noted,Ms.BacodstatesthatMs.Richardstoldthemthey

were going over to the Defendants residence to talk.

Ms.Bacodaddedthattherewouldlikelybeviolence,butshe

doesnotstatethatMs.Richardsaffirmativelystatedtheir

intentionwastoroborassaulttheDefendant.

RegardingtheapplicabilityofRule804(b)(5)toBacodsstatement,the

superiorcourtstatedthat[t]hetrustworthinessofthestatementmaynotbeestablished

bycorroboratingevidencecitingRyan v. State,4whichinturncitedtheUnitedStates

SupremeCourtcaseIdaho v. Wright5andthereforedidnotconsideranyextrinsic

corroboratingevidence.Thesuperiorcourtstateditsunderstandingofthespecificsof

Bacodsstatement:

TherelationshipbetweenMs.Bacod,theDefendant,

andtheshootingvictimsinthiscaseisessentiallyunknown.

Itisclearthatallfourpartieswereinthesamesocialcircle,

buttheonlyevidenceoftheirrelationshipstooneanotheris

4 899P.2d1371,1375(AlaskaApp.1995).

5 497U.S.805,822-24(1990).

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_______________________________________________

containedintherecordingitself....Thelackofevidencein

thisrespectdoesnotindicateanymotivationforMs.Bacod

tolieintheDefendantsfavor,butneitherdoesitexplainher

motivationforcallingthepolicetospeakagainstherfallen[ ]friends.6

WhileitistrueMs.Bacodmadeherstatementtoa

governmentagent,Ms.Bacodwasnotunderoathandthere

werenosubsequentinterviewswhereDetectiveHuelskoetter

or any other government agent could cross-examine

Ms.Bacod regardingher statements or otherwise test her

knowledge and veracity. The Detective merely took

Ms.Bacodsstatementsandindicatedhemightcontacther

again. Ms. Bacod gave herstatement telephonically and

thereisnowaytotellwhereshewasorwhoelsewasinthe

roomwhenshemadethecall.Thestatementssimplyarenot

sotrustworthythatadversarialtestingwouldaddlittletoits

reliability.21

21

Ryan, 899 P.2d at 1375 (quotingIdaho v.Wright,497U.S.at821);see also Vaska v. State,135P.3d

1011,1020(Alaska2006).

3. Trial

TrialtookplaceinAugust2010.Noneofthenineadultswhowereatthe

housetestified.NoevidencewaspresentedregardingRichardsspushknifeorthe

macheteintheSUV.7 Bacodsstatementwasnotintroduced,andnoevidencewas

6 Wenotetheconundrumcreatedbythecourtsstatementthatthelack of

extrinsic evidence regarding the relationship between Bacod, Sanders, and others

countedagainstBacodsstatementsadmission,giventhecourtspriorconclusionthat

extrinsic evidence could not be considered when determining the statementstrustworthiness.

7 OnthefirstdayoftrialtheStatemovedforaprotectiveorderpreventing

Sandersfrommentioningthepushknifeandmacheteduringvoirdireandhisopening

(continued...)

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presented that Ketzler stayed in the SUV. The superior court instructed the jury

regarding five defense theories: justified self-defense, heat of passion, defense of

premises,defenseofathirdperson,andreasonablemistakeoffact(regardingRichardss

identity).

Duringopeningstatementsandclosingarguments,theStatemaintainedthat

self-defense and defense of others did not apply because Sanderss actions were

excessive.TheStatepaintedSandersasaliarwhoalsohadotherslieforhim,andit

questionedwhetherMoorehadactuallybeenthefirstaggressor.TheStatecontended

thateveniftheheatofpassiondefenseinitiallyapplied,Sandershadtimetocooldown

whilehegrabbedthesecondgunandchasedMooreoutoftheapartment. TheStatealso

contendedthatnojustificationcoulddefendagainstthefirst-degreemurderofRichards

becauseitwouldbeanunreasonablemistakeoffacttobelievethatshewasMooreorthat

shewasarmed.

Duringopeningandclosingarguments,counselforSandersarguedthat

Sandershadbeentruthful,statingthatheimmediatelytookresponsibilityforthetwo

deaths,waitedquietlyforthepolice,putdowntheGlockinasafeplace,andanswered

thepoliceofficersquestions.SandersscounselarguedthatSandersquicklytoldthe

truthaboutthe.38andthathehadliedatfirstonlybecausehewasworriedaboutthat

gunsprovenance. CounselforSandersarguedthatSanderscommittedno crimein

killingMoore,whohadattackedhimwithoutwarninginhishome,becauseitwasself-

defense. HiscounselalsoarguedthatevenifSandershadnotactedinself-defense,he

7

(...continued)statement.Thecourtgrantedthisrequestbecausetherewasnoevidencethattheknife

wasbrandishedatSandersorthatheknewoftheknife,anditadmonishedSanderss

counselnottomentioneitherweaponinvoirdireorhisopeningargument.Thecourt

indicateditwouldtakeuptheissuelaterifevidenceofeithertheknifesormachetes

relevancedevelopedduringthetrial.

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actedintheheatofpassion.Counselfurtherarguedthathehadmadeareasonable

mistake of fact regarding Richardss identity, given the low lighting outside, the

similarityofRichardssandMoorescoats,andthefast-paced,freneticsituation.

ThejuryfoundSandersnotguiltyoffirst-degreemurderofMoore,but

guiltyofthelesserincludedsecond-degreemurderofMooreunderCountI.Thejury

alsofoundSandersguiltyoftheremainingcounts,ascharged:first-degreemurderof

Richards, second-degreemurder ofMooreundera different theory,8 second-degree

murderofRichards,andtamperingwithphysicalevidence.Byreturningtheseverdicts,

thejuryrejectedallfivedefensetheories. 9

4. Appealtothecourtofappeals

OnappealSandersarguedthatthesuperiorcourthaderredbyrefusingto

allowhimtointroduceBacodsstatementattrial.10 Thecourtofappealsconcludedthat

8 Differentsecond-degreemurdertheorieswereusedforthelesser-included

second-degreemurderoffensesunderCountsIandIIandthesecond-degreemurder

offenseschargeddirectlyinCountsIIIandIV.

9

Thejurywasinstructedthatjustifiedself-defensewasacompletedefensetofirst-degreemurder,second-degreemurder,andmanslaughter.Ifthejurybelieved

SanderskilledMooreinjustifiedself-defense,itwouldhavefoundSandersnotguilty

ofallchargesrelatedtoMooresdeath.Instead,thejuryfoundSandersguiltyofthe

second-degreemurderofMooreundertwotheories.

Thejuryalsowasinstructedthatheatofpassionwasadefensetothelesser

includedsecond-degreemurdertheoriesbutnotthedirectsecond-degreemurdercharges.

ThejuryfoundSandersguiltyofall second-degreemurderoffenses,demonstratingthat

itdidnotbelieveSanderskilledMooreorRichardsintheheatofpassion.

10 See Sanders v. State,Mem.Op.&J.No.5991,2013WL6229377,at*1

(AlaskaApp.Nov.27,2013).Sandersalsoarguedthatthesuperiorcourterredby

allowingtheStatetointroducehisgirlfriendsandhisbrothersfalsestatementstothe

police: Detective Huelskoetter testified that Sanderss girlfriend said that Sanderss

(continued...)

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the superior court did not abuse [its] discretion by finding Bacods statement

inadmissible,stating:

BacodtoldthepolicethatRichardssaidtoherthattheywere

going to go over toSanderss residence toconfront him.

Bacodaddedthatshethoughttheconfrontationwaslikelyto

beviolent.

....

In the present case, Sanders offered Bacods

out-of-court statements for the purpose of proving that

RichardsandMoorewenttoSandersshouseintendingtouse

violencetoretrievemoneyfromSandersorhisbrother. But

even according toBacod,Richardsneversaidthatsheor

Mooreintendedtouseviolence;insteadRichardssaidthattheywishedtotalktoSandersaboutthemoney. InBacods

statements to the police, she acknowledged that the

possibilityofviolencewasonlyherspeculation,orherafter[ ]the-factglossonherconversationwithRichards. 11

Likethesuperiorcourt,thecourtofappealsquotedRyan v. Stateforthe

propositionthatevidenceadmittedundertheresidualhearsayexceptionsmustpossess

particularizedguaranteesoftrustworthinessmakingitsotrustworthythatadversarial

testingwouldaddlittletoitsreliability.12Thecourtadded,[T]herewasessentially

10(...continued)

brotherfiredarifleinsidetheapartment;healsotestifiedthatSanderssbrothersaidthat

MoorefiredatSandersfirst.Id. at*1,*5-6. TheStatelabeledbothstatementsliesin

itsclosingargumentwhilequestioningSanderssveracityandwhetherMoorewasthe

firstaggressor.Thecourtofappealsconcludedthattheadmissionofthesestatementswaserror,butwasharmless.See id.at*1,*7.

11 Id.at*1,*5.

12 Id.at*5(quoting899P.2d1371,1375(AlaskaApp.1995)).

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noevidenceregardingBacodspotentialmotivationforcontactingthepolice.13 The

courtofappealsupheldthetrialjudgesruling. 14

RegardingSanderss argumentthattheexclusionofBacodsstatement

violatedhisdueprocess right topresentadefense,thecourtof appealsstated,[I]n

general,atrialcourtdoesnotcommiterrorbyproperlyapplyingtheevidencerules. 15

Thecourtofappealsthenconcluded:Wehavepreviouslypointedoutthelackof

reliabilityofBacodsrecordedstatementtoestablishthepropositionforwhichitwas

offered. Weconcludethatthetrialcourtsproperapplicationoftheevidencerulesdid

notunfairlylimitSanderssabilitytopresentadefense. 16

Chief Judge Mannheimer concurred with the courts opinion, writing

separatelytopointoutthatSanderswishedtointroduceRichardssstatementtoprove

Mooresfutureactions.17ChiefJudgeMannheimercitedtheCommentarytoRule803(3)

(thestateofmindhearsayexception)toexplainthattheRuledoesnotallowalitigant

tointroduceone personsstatementabout theircurrentmentalstate(includingtheir

current plans) for the purpose ofproving another persons future actions.18This

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 See id.at*7-10(Mannheimer,C.J.,concurring).

18 Id.at*8(emphasisinoriginal).

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provided, in his view, an additional reason that the contested statements were not

admissible.19

5. Petitionforhearing

Sandersfiledapetitionforhearingwiththiscourt,andwegrantedit,in

part,onwhetherexclusionofCarmelaBacodshearsaystatementtotheinvestigating

detectivewasreversibleerror.

SandersarguesthatBacodsstatementwasadmissibleundertheRulesof

Evidence using both Rule 803(3) (the state of mind hearsay exception) and

Rule 804(b)(5) (the unavailable declarant residual hearsay exception) to show

RichardssintentandconductingoingtoSanderssapartmentonNewYearsEve.

Sandersalsoargues,basedonhisconstitutionalrighttopresentadefense,thatBacods

statementwasadmissibletoshowboth RichardssandMooresintentandconductin

goingtoSanderssapartment.Sandersarguesthatthefailuretoadmitthestatement

underthesetheorieswaserrorandthattheerrorwasnotharmless.

III. STANDARDOFREVIEW

Atrialcourts[f]actualfindingsarereviewedforclearerror.Wewill

reverse...factualfindingsonlywhen,afterareviewoftheentirerecord,weareleft

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.20 When the

admissibilityofevidenceturnsonaquestionoflaw,suchasthecorrectscopeor

interpretationofaruleofevidence,weapplyourindependentjudgment.... 21

19 See id.at*8-10.

20

Lee v. Konrad,337P.3d510,517(Alaska2014)(footnoteandinternalquotationmarksomitted).

21 Barton v. N. Slope Borough Sch. Dist.,268P.3d346,350(Alaska2012)

(quotingCity of Bethel v. Peters,97P.3d822,825(Alaska2004)). Incontrast,whenwe

(continued...)

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Underthedenovostandardofreview,weadopttheruleoflawthatismostpersuasive

inlightofreason,precedentandpolicy.22 Wealsoreviewconstitutionalinterpretation

issuesdenovo.23

IV. DISCUSSION

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifyingatthetrialorhearing,offeredinevidencetoprovethetruthofthematter

24 25asserted. Asageneralrulehearsayisnotadmissible, buttheRulesofEvidence

containexceptions26anddefinecertaintypesofout-of-courtstatementsasnothearsay. 27

Theproposedevidenceinthiscasecontainstwolevelsofhearsay,eachofwhichmust

be individually admissible for the exclusions Sanders challenges to have been

21(...continued)

reviewatrialcourtsdecisiontoadmitorexcludeevidencesolelyasanapplicationof

acorrectlyinterpretedruleofevidencetothefactsoftheinstantcase,weapplytheabuse

ofdiscretionstandardofreview.See Greene v. Tinker,332P.3d21,31,37-38(Alaska2014)(evaluatingforabuseofdiscretionatrialcourtsdecisiontoadmittestimonyof

late-identifiedwitness).

22 Barton, 268 P.3d at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted);see also

ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.,322P.3d114,122

(Alaska2014).

23 See Khan v. State,278P.3d893,896(Alaska2012).

24 AlaskaR.Evid.801(c).

25 SeeAlaskaR.Evid.802.

26 See AlaskaR.Evid.803-04.

27 SeeAlaskaR.Evid.801(d).

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erroneous.28IfeitherRichardssstatementtoBacodorBacodsstatementtoDetective

Huelskoetterwasinadmissible,theproposedevidencewasentirelyinadmissible.

A. Richardss Statement To Bacod Was Admissible As Evidence of

Richardss Then Existing State Of Mind Under Alaska Rule Of

Evidence803(3).

UnderAlaskaRuleofEvidence803(3),[a]statementofthedeclarants

thenexistingstateofmind,emotion,sensation,orphysicalcondition(suchasintent,

plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health) offered to prove the

declarantspresentconditionorfutureaction,isnotexcludedbythehearsayrule.

SandersarguesthatRichardssstatementtoBacodwasadmissibletoshowRichardss

intentandconductingoingtoSanderssapartment.Weagree.

Thesuperiorcourtfoundthat[t]hereisnoevidenceMs.Richardsactually

statedsheorMr.Mooreplannedtoassaultandrob[Sanders].Instead,thesuperior

court concluded, Ms. Bacod extrapolates the inevitability of violence from

Ms.Richardssstatement. Thecourtofappealsagreed,statingthatevenaccordingto

Bacod,RichardsneversaidthatsheorMooreintendedtouseviolence;insteadRichards

saidthattheywishedtotalktoSandersaboutthemoney. 29Thecourtofappealsalso

concluded that [i]n Bacods statements to the police, she acknowledged that the

possibility of violence was only her speculation, or her after-the-fact gloss on her

conversationwithRichards. 30

WedisagreewiththisinterpretationofBacodsstatement.Bacodsfirst

recordedwordstoDetectiveHuelskoetterwere,Everythinghappened,andshe told me,

28 See AlaskaR.Evid.805.

29 Sanders v. State,Mem.Op.&J.No.5991,2013WL6229377,at*5

(AlaskaApp.Nov.27,2013).

30 Id.

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like,actuallyitsbeengoinonforlike,abouttwoweeksnow.Um,theRyan

Sanders,hestolemoneyfromoneofourfriends,andtheywantedtogobeathimupto

getthemoneyback.(Emphasisadded.)Bacodlaterstated,Ashlee just told methat

theywantedthemoneyback,andthentheyweregonnajumpemforit,andsaid[s]he

told me thatearliertheytriedbeforeorsomethinglikethat.(Emphasisadded.)Shealso

answeredintheaffirmativewhenDetectiveHuelskoettertwiceaskedherdirectquestions

verifyingthatMoorewasplanningtogobeatupSanders:

Q. So butyouknow thatTravis[Moore]wantedto

beatRyan[Sanders]upoverthemoney?

A. Yeah.

Q. And thatwhentheyweregoinovertherethatwas

prettymuchtheidea,isthatTravis[Moore]wasgonnabeat

[Sanders]up?

A. Yeah.

Only after verifying with Detective Huelskoetter that Porterfield and

Ketzler,whowerebothstillalive,hadbeenpresentthenightoftheshootingdidBacod

partiallybacktrack:

Q. So,now,justletmeseeifIunderstandcorrectly,that

youknewthatkindatheplanwasthatTravis[Moore]andhis

girlfriendandAshlee[Richards]andandsomeothergirl

named Raven [Ketzler] were gonna go over there and

essentiallyjumpthemtogettheirmoneyback?

A. Not-notjump,like,youknow,like,talk.

....

A. [T]heyre young, so, you know, theresgonnabe

violenceinit.

....

A. But,Icouldntstopthem.

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Q. Right.So,theytheyImeanbasicallytheonly

reasontheyweregoingovertherewastogetthemoneyback.

A. Probably.

TheStatedoesnotforcefullycontestthatRichardstoldBacodaboutthe

plantoconfrontSanders. InsteaditarguesthatRichardssstatementwasnotofherown

intent,butinsteadtheintentofanunidentifiedthey.Butthetheyinquestionis

notunidentified.Bacodnamedthefourpeopleinvolved,includingRichards.When

DetectiveHuelskoettersummarizedwhatBacodhadtoldhimtheplanwasthat

Travis[Moore]andhisgirlfriendandAshlee[Richards]andandsomeothergirl

namedRaven[Ketzler]weregonnagooverthereandessentiallyjumpthemtogettheir

moneybackBacoddidnotsaythatRichardswasnotpartofthegroupmakingthe

plan. TheStatesargument that only Moore, andnotRichards, intended to beatup

Sandersfailsforsimilarreasons:Bacod,inrecountingherconversationwithRichards,

saidmultipletimesthattheynotjustMooreweregoingtobeatupSanders.

TheStatearguesthatthestatementsregardingSandersstealingmoneyare

inadmissiblehearsaybecausetheyarebeingofferedtoprovethatSandersstolemoney.

But Sanders offered the statements about the theft to show Richardss motive,not

whetherSandersactuallystolemoney.Richardssbeliefthatthetheftwascommitted

bySandersexplainedhermotiveingoingtoSanderssapartment.31

31 TheStatealsoarguesthatRichardssstatementsregardingSandersstheft

ofmoneymaynothavebeenbaseduponherownpersonalknowledgeandthuswouldbeinadmissibleunderAlaskaRuleofEvidence602,whichpermitsawitnesstotestify

onlytomattersaboutwhichshehaspersonalknowledge.Butthestatementswerebeing

offeredtoproveRichardssbelief thatSandersstolethemoneyashermotivetoattack

him. Richards had personal knowledge regarding her own belief, just as she had

personalknowledgeregardingherownplantobeatupSanders.

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TheStatealsocontendsthewordjumpasusedbyBacodmeanttalk,

notassault.TheStatearguesthatBacodexpresslydefinedjumpforherpurposes.

Thisiscontradictedbythestatementitself.Beforeusingthewordjump,Bacodstated

thatthegroupwasplanningtobeat[Sanders]up.Bacodtwiceansweredinthe

affirmativeDetectiveHuelskoettersdirectquestionsverifyingthatMoorewasplanning

togobeatupSanders.

BacodstatedthatRichardsdirectlyexpressedherintenttobeatupSanders

and her motive for doing so. This statement ofRichardss intentand motive was

admissibleunderRule803(3)toshowherfutureaction.32 Becauseweconcludethatthe

superiorcourtsfactualfindingthatBacodmerelyextrapolatedviolencefromRichardss

statementtoherwasclearlyerroneous,wemustreversethecourtofappealsdecision

upholdingthesuperiorcourtsRule803(3)ruling.

B. Richardss Statement To Bacod Was Admissible As Evidence of

MooresFutureActionsUnderAlaskaRuleOfEvidence803(23).

AlthoughRichardssstatementtoBacodwasrelevanttoexplainsomeof

RichardssconductatSandersshome,itsgreaterpotentialrelevancewastoexplain

Moores conduct, which, according to Sanders, included pistol-whipping Sanders

withoutprovocation. However,asChiefJudgeMannheimernotedinhisconcurring

opinionbelow,theCommentarytoEvidenceRule803(3)explainsthatRule803(3)

32 SanderssstatedpurposeinrequestingadmissionofRichardssstatement

ofherownmotiveand intentincludesshowingRichards[s]conductatSanders[s]

homethatshewouldhavebehavedlikeMoorewouldhavebehavedafterSanders

foughthimoffandinparticularthatshechosetofleeSandersshome togettothegetawaycar(insteadoffighting,hiding,stayinginplace,orwithdrawing)anddid

nothingtorescueSandersfromhisassailant. Sandersalsostatesthatevidenceof

Richards[s]robberyplotwouldhaveshow[n]thatRichardssharedMooresescaperoute

Porterfields SUVand that Richards ran because she hadmade the mistakeof

bringingaknifetoattackamanwithagun.

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doesnotallowalitiganttointroduceonepersonsstatementabouttheircurrentmental

state(includingtheircurrentplans)forthepurposeofproving another persons future

actions.33 Thus,ifRichardssstatementtoBacodwasadmissibleonlytodemonstrate

Richardss future actions, and not Moores, its probative value might have been

outweighedbythedangerofunfairprejudice,34 makingitproperforthetrialcourtto

excludeitorsubjectittoalimitinginstruction.35 Butthecircumstancesinthiscase

demonstratethatRichardssstatementwasadmissiblenotonlytoproveRichardssintent

andconduct,butalsoMoores.

TheCommentarytoRule803(3)explainsthat[f]orthestatementsofone

personas tohismentaloremotionalconditiontobeusedagainstanother,[Evidence

Rule803](23)mustbesatisfied.36 Rule803(23)isaresidualhearsayexception. It

permitstheadmissionofastatementthatwouldotherwisebeexcludedashearsayifit

hascircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessthatareequivalenttothelisted

exceptions,andifthecourtdeterminesthat(a)thestatementisofferedasevidenceof

amaterialfact;(b)thestatementismoreprobativeonthepointforwhichitisoffered

thananyotherevidencewhichtheproponentcanprocurethroughreasonableefforts;and

(c)thegeneralpurposesoftheserulesandtheinterestofjusticewillbestbeservedby

admissionofthestatementintoevidence.

33 Sanders, 2013 WL 6229377, at *8 (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring)

(emphasisinoriginal).

34 SeeAlaskaR.Evid.403.

35

Cf. Linton v. State, 880 P.2d123, 130-31 & n.6 (Alaska App. 1994)(affirmingintroductionofmurdervictimshearsaystatements,withlimitinginstruction,

under Rule 803(3) even though the statements concerned the victims fear of the

defendantandthedefendantsallegedthreatstothevictim).

36 CommentaryAlaskaE.R.803(3).

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Inthiscase,thepartyseekingtointroduceastatementundertheresidual

exceptionisacriminaldefendant.Thisfactisimportantintwointerrelatedways.First,

Sanders,likeallcriminaldefendants,enjoysaconstitutionalrighttodueprocessoflaw

beforeheisconvictedofacrime.37Althoughitisnotabsolute,adefendantsrightto

presentadefenseisafundamentalelementofdueprocess.38Evidentiaryrulingscan

soinfringethisrighttopresentadefensethattheyconstituteaviolationoftheguarantee

ofourconstitutionsdueprocessclause,39whichrequiresadmissionevenofevidence

thatthelegislaturehasspecificallybarredifitsexclusionsubstantiallylimitstheright

to present a defense.40 Here, however, as we explain below, it is an incorrect

applicationoftheevidencerulesthatencroachesonthisright.

Sanderspresentedfivedefensetheoriestothejury:justifiedself-defense,

heatofpassion,defenseofpremises,defenseofathirdperson,andreasonablemistake

offact(regardingRichardssidentity). Thecredibilityofeachofthesetheorieswastied

tothejuryswillingnesstobelieveSanderssaccountofMoorestrikinghimwithout

provocation,anaccountthattheStateargueddoesntmakeanysenseduringclosing

argument.TheexclusionofRichardssstatementtoBacodeffectivelyexcludedall

evidenceoftheallegedconspiracytorobSandersandthusexcludedcriticalevidence

relevanttothecredibilityofSanderssaccountoftheeventsthatprecededtheshootings.

Thejurywasleftwithanaccountinwhich,astheStateputitinclosingargument,

Sanderstellsusfornoreason,noreasonwhatsoever,noreasonthatheswillingto

admit,Mr.Moorewhackshimontheheadandcausesthatgash,thatgashabovehiseye,

37 SeeAlaskaConst.art.I,7.

38 Smithart v. State,988P.2d583,586(Alaska1999)(citationomitted).

39 See id.

40 Valentine v. State,215P.3d319,326(Alaska2009).

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fornoreasonwhatsoever. Theexclusionpreventedthejuryfromhearing theonly

availableevidenceofthemissingreasontheStaterhetoricallylamented. 41

ThesecondwaythatSanderssstatusasacriminaldefendantisimportant

isthefactthattheStatelikelycouldhaveusedRichardssstatementagainstMooreifit

hadsoughttoprosecuteMooreforconspiracytocommitrobbery.42AlaskaRuleof

Evidence801(d)(2)(E)providesthatastatementisnothearsayifitisofferedagainst

apartyandis...astatementbyaco-conspiratorofapartyduringthecourseandin

furtheranceoftheconspiracy. RichardstoldBacodaboutanon-goingplan torob

Sanders a plan that Richards shared with Moore and which they had already

attemptedtoputintoaction,onlytoberesistedbySanderssarmedbrother. Bacodwas

apparentlysupposedtojoinherfourfriendswhentheywenttoSandersshouseonthe

nightoftheshootings.Mooresactions,includinggoingtoSandersshomewiththe

otherallegedparticipantsintheconspiracywhilecarryingapistoland,accordingto

Sanderss account, striking Sanders in the face, corroborate his connection to the

conspiracyRichardsdescribed.43

Rule801(d)(2)(E)isnotdirectlyapplicabletothiscasebecauseMooreis

notapartytotheStatesprosecutionofSandersandthusRichardsisnotapartysco-

conspirator. ButRule803(23),whichmustbe satisfied[f]orthestatementsof one

41 Cf. Keith v. State,612P.2d977,982-83(Alaska1980)(Ifthesuperior

courtsrefusaltoadmitthejournaldid,infact,substantiallylimitKeithsopportunities

toprovehisinnocenceaffirmatively,thedueprocessrighttoafairtrialwouldhavebeen

deniedhim.).

42 SeeAS11.31.120(conspiracy);11.41.500(robberyinthefirstdegree).

43 Cf. Stewart v. State,756P.2d900,904-05(AlaskaApp.1988)(discussing

evidence that corroborated a defendants connection to a plan described in a

co-conspiratorsstatement).

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personasto[her]mentaloremotionalconditiontobeusedagainstanother,44allowsfor

theadmissionofstatementsthathavecircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessthat

areequivalenttotheotherexceptionstothebaronhearsay.Statementsmadebyaco-

conspiratorinfurtheranceofaconspiracyweretraditionallydefinedasanexceptionto

thehearsayrule,butundertherevisedAlaskaRulesofEvidencetheyaredefinedas

nonhearsay.45 Theircharacterizaionasnonhearsayislargelypredicatedonexpectations

oftrustworthiness,justliketheexceptionslistedinRule803.46Richardssstatement

establishingMooresparticipationinaconspiracytorobSandersdidnotbecomeless

trustworthybecauseSanders,ratherthantheState,soughttointroduceit.

TheinterestofjusticefactoridentifiedinRule803(23)dovetailsinthis

casewiththerighttopresentadefense. Inlightofthisfactor,Richardssstatementfits

withintheresidualhearsayexceptionevenasitpertainstoMooresfutureactions.Here

theonlyreasonablyavailableevidenceexplainingMooresallegedunprovokedassault

onSanderswashisco-conspiratorsstatementthatshe,Moore,andotherswantedtogo

beat[Sanders]uptogetthemoneyback.RichardssstatementtoBacodwastherefore

admissible.

44 CommentaryAlaskaE.R.803(3).

45 See Hawley v. State,614P.2d1349,1357n.20(Alaska1980);Commentary

AlaskaE.R.801(d)(2)([I]ftheserules[801(d)(2)(C),(D),and(E)]werewritten

onacleanslatewithoutreferencetotheFederalRules,admissionswouldbetreatedas

exceptionstothehearsayruleandplacedunderRule803.).

46 SeeMODELCODEOFEVIDENCE,Rule508cmt.b(1942)([T]hetendency

intheauthoritiesistoreceiveevidenceofalldeclarationsofaconspiratorconcerningthe

conspiracywhenmadeduringitspendency.Thesestatementsarelikelytobetrue,and

areusuallymadewitharealizationthattheyareagainstthedeclarantsinterest.).

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C. Bacods Statement To Detective Huelskoetter Was Admissible As

EvidenceOfRichardssStatementUnderAlaskaRuleOfEvidence

804(b)(5).

1. The superior court and court of appeals excluded Bacods

statement to Detective Huelskoetter based on an overlydemandingtestfordeterminingsufficienttrustworthinessunder

theunavailabledeclarantresidualhearsayexception.

AlaskaRuleofEvidence804(b)(5)is,likeRule803(23),aresidualhearsay

exception.Itpermitstheadmissionofastatementbyanunavailabledeclarantthatwould

otherwisebeexcludedashearsayifithascircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness

thatareequivalenttothelistedexceptions,andifthecourtdeterminesthat(A)the

statementisofferedasevidenceofamaterialfact;(B)thestatementismoreprobative

onthepointforwhichitisofferedthananyotherevidencewhichtheproponentcan

procurethroughreasonableefforts;and(C)thegeneralpurposesoftheserulesandthe

interestsofjusticewillbestbeservedbyadmissionofthestatementintoevidence. 47

The superior court stated that Bacods statement did not fall within

Rule804(b)(5)sresidualexceptionbecauseitwasnotsotrustworthythatadversarial

testingwouldaddlittletoitsreliability.Thecourtofappealsagreed,andquotedthe

samelanguageinsupportofitsconclusionthatthesuperiorcourtdidnotabuseits

discretioninexcludingBacodsstatement.48Thequotedstandardisfromthecourtof

47 AlaskaR.Evid.804(b)(5).

48 See Sanders v. State,Mem.Op.&J.No.5991,2013WL6229377,at*5

(AlaskaApp.Nov.27,2013).

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appealss decision inRyan v. State,49 which in turnwas quoting the UnitedStates

SupremeCourtsdecisioninIdaho v. Wright.50

Both Wright andRyan areConfrontation Clause cases.51Theywere

decided based on the precedent established inOhio v. Roberts, under which even

testimonialhearsaycouldbeadmissibleagainstacriminaldefendantaslongasitfell

within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bore particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.52Bothcasesconsideredresidualhearsayevidenceofferedbythe

governmentagainstacriminaldefendantprotectedbytheConfrontationClause,andboth

erectedademandingstandardforadmission:Thecourtswouldonlyallowacriminal

defendanttobetriedbasedonthewordofa declaranthe couldnotconfront if the

statementwassotrustworthythatadversarialtestingwouldaddlittletoitsreliability. 53

49 899P.2d1371,1375(AlaskaApp.1995).

50 497U.S.805,821(1990).

51 See id.at808(Thiscaserequiresustodecidewhethertheadmissionat

trialofcertainhearsaystatementsmadebyachilddeclaranttoanexaminingpediatrician

violatesadefendantsrightsundertheConfrontationClauseoftheSixthAmendment.);Ryan,899P.2dat1375(Becausethehearsayissueinthiscasearisesinthecontextof

acriminalprosecution,thehearsaymustsatisfynotonlytherequirementsofEvidence

Rule804(b)butalsotherequirementsoftheConfrontationClausesoftheFederaland

Alaska Constitutions (the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

ArticleI,Section11oftheAlaskaConstitution).).

52 448U.S.56,66(1980).

53 Wright,497U.S.at821;see also Ryan,899P.2dat1375.TheUnited

States Supreme Court disapproved the Ohio v. Roberts approach in Crawford v.Washington,541U.S.36(2004),andDavis v. Washington ,547U.S.813(2006),which

establishedthathearsayevidencemayviolateadefendantsrightofconfrontationeven

thoughthatevidencemightbeadmissibleunderthehearsayrules. Clark v. State,199

P.3d1203,1210(AlaskaApp.2009). BydecouplingtheConfrontationClauseandthe

(continued...)

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Incontrast,inthiscaseitwasSanders,ratherthantheState,whosoughtto

admitBacodsstatement.TheStateis,ofcourse,notprotectedbytheConfrontation

ClausesintheAlaskaandUnitedStatesConstitutions.AndtheStatehasnotidentified

any case in which the test the superior court used has been applied to evidence

introduced byacriminal defendant. The superiorcourtthuserred byapplying the

heightened reliability standard that limited the residual hearsay exception in

Rule804(b)(5)toevidencesotrustworthythatadversarialtestingwouldaddlittletoits

reliabilitytoBacodsstatement.Instead,thesuperiorcourtshouldhaveappliedthetest

setoutinEvidenceRule804(b)(5)itself:Astatementbyanunavailabledeclarantis

admissible if (1) the statement is offered asevidenceofamaterial fact, (2) the

statementismoreprobativeonthepointforwhichitisofferedthananyotherevidence

whichtheproponentcanprocurethroughreasonableefforts,(3)thegeneralpurposes

of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the

statement into evidence, and (4) the statement has circumstantial guarantees of

trustworthinessthatareequivalenttotheguaranteesoftrustworthinessthatjustifythe

enumeratedhearsayexceptionswhenadeclarantisunavailable.

Importantly,theenumeratedexceptionstowhichRule804(b)(5)refersare

thosethatapplyonlywhenthedeclarantisunavailable.Thetraditionalexceptionsto

thehearsayruleformtwogeneralclasses:(1)thosestatementswhichareso inherently

reliable that cross-examination is thought unnecessary (Rule 803); and (2) those

statementswhicharesufficiently reliable tobeadmittedinlightoftheirgreatevidentiary

53

(...continued)rulesofevidence,CrawfordandDavisremovedtheneedtoerectademandingresidual

hearsaystandardtoservethepurposesoftheConfrontationClause.Cf. Whorton v.

Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413-14 (2007) (Roberts potentially excluded too much

testimony because it imposed Confrontation Clause restrictions on nontestimonial

hearsaynotgovernedbythatClause.).

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value when the declarant is unavailable (Rule 804).54 The exceptions to which

804(b)(5) refers all have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, such as the

unavailabledeclarantsbeliefofherimpendingdeath55oradmissiontocivilorcriminal

liability,56buttheyarenotnecessarilysotrustworthythatadversarialtestingwouldadd

littleto[their]reliability. Infact,thelimitationoftheseexceptionstocircumstancesin

whichthedeclarantisunavailablesuggeststhatcross-examinationwouldaddtotheir

reliability, andwould be required if it were possible.57 Thus, the superior courts

applicationofthedemandingadversarialtestingwouldaddlittlestandardtoSanderss

effortstoadmitBacodsstatementunderRule804(b)(5)wasalegalerror.

2. Itwaslegalerrorforthesuperiorcourttorefusetoconsider

evidence that corroborated Bacods statement to Detective

Huelskoetter.

Thesuperiorcourtruledthat[t]hetrustworthinessof[Bacods]statement

[toDetectiveHuelskoetter]maynotbeestablishedbycorroboratingevidence. The

54 In re A.S.W.,834P.2d801,804(Alaska1992)(emphasisadded).

55 SeeAlaskaR.Evid.804(b)(2).

56 SeeAlaskaR.Evid.804(b)(3).

57 SeeCommentaryAlaskaE.R.804(b)(Rule803.. .isbaseduponthe

assumption that a hearsay statement falling within one of its exceptions possesses

qualities which justify the conclusion that whether the declarant is available or

unavailableisnotarelevantfactorindeterminingadmissibility.

[Rule804(b)]proceedsuponadifferenttheory:hearsaywhichadmittedlyisnotequalinqualitytotestimony

ofthedeclarantonthestandmayneverthelessbeadmittedifthedeclarantisunavailable

and if his statement meets a specified standard. The rule expresses preferences:

testimonygivenonthestandinpersonispreferredoverhearsay,andhearsay,ifofthe

specifiedquality,ispreferredovercompletelossoftheevidenceofthedeclarant.).

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courtofappealsdidnotspecificallyconsiderthisclaimoferror.58 Thesuperiorcourts

rulingonthispointislegalerrorandisinconsistentwithourcasesinterpretingEvidence

Rule804(b)(5).

ThesuperiorcourtcitedRyan v. State insupportofitsno-corroborating

evidencerule.Asdiscussedabove,Ryan wasaConfrontationClausecase.Likethe

heightened reliability requirement for unavailable declarant hearsay testimony, the

requirementthat[t]herequiredguaranteesoftrustworthinessmaynotbeestablished

byshowingthatthehearsaystatementiscorroboratedbyotherevidencewasbasedon

thecourtofappealsinterpretationofIdaho v. Wright.59ThecourtofappealsinRyan

limitedthisholdingtocasesimplicatingtheConfrontationClause.60Theapplicationof

theprohibitiononcorroboratingevidencetoacriminaldefendantsattempttointroduce

hearsayevidenceiserror,61particularlyinlightofacriminaldefendantsconstitutional

58 See generally Sanders v. State, Mem. Op. & J. No. 5991, 2013 WL

6229377(AlaskaApp.Nov.27,2013).

59 See Ryan v. State,899P.2d1371,1375(AlaskaApp.1995)(citingIdaho

v. Wright,497U.S.805,822-24(1990)).60 See id. (InIdaho v. Wright,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtheldthat,at

least for Confrontation Clause purposes, a hearsay statements guarantees of

trustworthinessmustbeinherentinthestatement.(quotingWright,497U.S.at822)).

61 See Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc.,727F.3d574,578(6thCir.

2013)([Wrights]requirementthatthetruthfulnessofastatementbesoclear[fromonly

thecircumstancessurroundingthestatement]thatthetestofcross-examinationbeof

marginal utility is specific to the Confrontation Clause; thus, the requirement is

inapplicableinthis[civil]case.); United States v. NB,59F.3d771,776n.5(8thCir.1995)(Wright hasnoeffectonhearsayanalysiswhenthereisnoConfrontationClause

issue.);5CHRISTOPHERB.MUELLER&LAIRDC.KIRKPATRICK,FEDERALEVIDENCE

8:141,at286-88(4thed.2013)(ObviouslyWright doesnotaffectuseofthecatchall

[hearsayexception]incivilcases,norlimitdefenseuseofthecatchallincriminalcases,

(continued...)

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righttopresentadefense.

IncasesthatdonotfeaturethespecificprotectionsoftheConfrontation

Clause, extrinsic corroborating evidence often supports the admission of evidence

offeredundertheresidualhearsayexceptionsinEvidenceRules804(b)(5)and803(23).62

Permittingtrialcourtstoconsiderextrinsiccorroborationappearstobethemajorityrule

in jurisdictions which have specifically addressed the issue.63 This

61(...continued)

and in these settings independent corroboration continues to count in assessing

trustworthiness.).

62 See, e.g., Kristen L. v. Benjamin W., Mem. Op. & J. No. 1502, 2014WL2716842,at*3(AlaskaJune11,2014)(corroboratingnotessupportedadmission

of counselors testimony about childrens statements under the catchall hearsay

exception);In re T.P.,838P.2d1236,1241-42(Alaska1992)(approvingoftrialcourts

admissionofminorshearsaystatementunderEvidenceRule804(b)(5)partiallybecause

a reference in the statement to the location of an alleged sexual touching was

corroborated);cf. Matanuska Elec. Assn v. Weissler,723P.2d600,610n.17(Alaska

1986) (approvingof trialcourts ruling that thefact that a hearsaystatement also

corroborates other testimony makes it more appropriate to admit under Evidence

Rules804(b)(5)and803(23)).

63 See United States v. Turner,718F.3d226,233-34(3dCir.2013)([When

determining]whetheradocumentissufficientlytrustworthytobeadmittedunder[the

residual hearsay exception] . . . , the district court may not rely exclusively on

corroborating evidence. (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); United States v.

Redlightning,624F.3d1090,1118(9thCir.2010)(concludingthatahearsaystatement

lackedcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessunderresidualhearsayexception

inpartbecauseitwasuncorroboratedandinpartbecauseextrinsicevidencecontradicted

it); United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 643-44 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding hearsay

statements lacked circumstantialguaranteesof trustworthinessbecausethey wereuncorroborated);United States v. Abreu,342F.3d183,191(2dCir.2003)(finding

hearsaystatementslackedcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessinpartbecause

theywereuncorroborated);United States v. Hall,165F.3d1095,1110-11(7thCir.

1999) (stating relevant factor when determining circumstantial guarantees of

(continued...)

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63(...continued)

trustworthinessiswhetherthedeclarantsstatementwasinsufficientlycorroborated);

United States v. Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d 313, 316-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (listing

corroborationasonefactorindeterminingcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness

andusingextrinsiccorroboration,after Wright);State v. Allen,755P.2d1153,1164

(Ariz.1988)(Wedonotrequirecorroborationundertheresidualhearsayexceptions,

but its existence is nevertheless helpful.);Martin v. State, 57 S.W.3d 136, 142

(Ark.2001)(concludinginthecontextofdeterminingcircumstantialguaranteesof

trustworthiness, that details from the accomplices post-crime hearsay statements,

includingthedetaileddirectionstotheabandonedhouse,thefactthat[thevictims]face

andmouthhadbeenduct-taped,andthefactthatherarmsandlegswerehogtied[,]were

highlyindicativeofthetruthfulnessof[the]statements....);Cabrera v. State,840

A.2d1256,1268(Del.2004)([The]statementsfailtosatisfythe...circumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness[requirementundertheresidualhearsayexception]forthe

samereasonsthattheywerenotadmissibleunder[thestatementagainstpenalinterest

exception]theywerenotsupportedbysufficientcorroboratingevidence.); State v.

Weaver,554N.W.2d240,248(Iowa1996), overruled on other grounds by State v.

Hallum,585N.W.2d249(Iowa1998)(Factorstoconsiderinmakingatrustworthiness

determinationunder[theresidualhearsayexception]include:...corroboration....);

People v. Katt,662N.W.2d12,24n.12(Mich.2003)([C]orroborativeevidencemay

be used to determine the trustworthiness of statements [offered under the residual

hearsayexceptions]...[if]theConfrontationClauseisnotimplicated.(emphasis

omitted)(citationsomitted));State v. Griffin,834N.W.2d688,693(Minn.2013)(listingcorroboratingevidenceasarelevantfactorfordeterminingcircumstantialguarantees

oftrustworthinessunderaresidualhearsayexception);State v. Cottier,755N.W.2d

120,131(S.D.2008)([F]actorsforatrialcourttoconsiderinassessingtrustworthiness

ofhearsayofferedundertheresidualhearsayrule...include:...theexistenceof

corroboratingevidence....);State v. Lopez,843N.W.2d390,437(Wis.2014)(stating

thatfactorstoconsiderindeterminingcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness

under a residual hearsay exception include the existence of other corroborating

evidence);Lafond v. State,89P.3d324,339(Wyo.2004)([C]ircumstantialguarantees

oftrustworthiness...maybeestablished...throughothercorroboratingevidence....(quotingJohnson v. State,930P.2d358,366(Wyo.1996)));2G EORGEE.DIXETAL.,

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 324,at565-66(KennethS.Brouned.,7thed.2013)

([E]venbeforeCrawford v. Washington eliminatedtheprecedentialvalueofWright,

somelowercourtsusedcorroborationasafactorestablishingtrustworthinessofhearsay

(continued...)

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interpretation makes sense, as a court testing a statements admissibility under the

residual hearsay exceptions is concerned with the trustworthiness of the specific

statementatissue,ratherthanthecategoryofstatementstowhichthestatementbelongs.

Thereisnologicalreasonthatextrinsiccorroboratingevidencecannotcontributeto

creatingcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness.64 Indeed,oneoftheunavailable

63(...continued)

admitted under a catchall exception when the confrontation issue was otherwise

eliminated.); 5 FEDERAL EVIDENCE,supra note 61, 8:141, at 286-88; HEARSAY

HANDBOOK47:1-2(4thed.2014);5J ACKB.WEINSTEIN&MARGARETA.BERGER,

WEINSTEINS FEDERAL EVIDENCE 807.03[2][b], at 807-15 to -18 (Joseph M.

McLaughlined.,2ded.2014).

But see United States v. El-Mezain,664F.3d467,498(5thCir.2011)(The

determination of trustworthiness is drawn from the totality of the circumstances

surroundingthemakingofthestatement,butitcannotstemfromothercorroborating

evidence.[United States v.]Ismoila,100F.3d[380,]393[(5thCir.1996)](citingIdaho

v. Wright,497U.S.805,820-22(1990)).);Vasquez v. People,173P.3d1099,1106-07

(Colo. 2007) (relying upon Wright to conclude that extrinsic corroboration is not

appropriate consideration when determining circumstantial guarantees of

trustworthinessunderresidualhearsayexception);State v. Aaron L.,865A.2d1135,

1144n.20(Conn.2005)(Onlyfactorsrelatedtothecircumstances surrounding the

making of the challenged statement maybeconsideredtosupportthereliabilityofthe

hearsay statement at issue. (emphasis in original));Larchick v. Diocese of Great

Falls-Billings,208P.3d836,845(Mont.2009)([Theresidualhearsayexception]looks

to the circumstances surrounding a hearsay statement when it is made the

circumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessthatlendreliabilitytothehearsaystatement

inlieuofcross-examination.(internalquotationmarkomitted));State v. Johnson,557

S.E.2d811,817(W.Va.2001)(Reliabilitymustbeshownfromthecircumstances

surroundingthemakingofthestatement.).

64

The State argues that the word circumstantial in equivalentcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessmeansonlytheimmediate circumstances

of the statement, not any extrinsic corroborating circumstances. But the word

circumstantial could just as easily include any circumstances indicating

trustworthiness,includingextrinsiccorroboration.ThewordingofRule804(b)(5)does

(continued...)

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declarant hearsay exceptions to which evidenceofferedunder the residualhearsay

exceptioniscomparedcontemplatestheuseofextrinsicevidencetosupportthehearsay

65 66statement, andanother,insomecircumstances,requiresit. Wethereforeagreewith

themajority of jurisdictions that extrinsic corroborating evidence may properly be

consideredindeterminingwhetherastatementprofferedunderRule804(b)(5)sresidual

hearsayexceptionexhibitscircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessequivalentto

theotherunavailabledeclaranthearsayexceptions.

64(...continued)

not exclude the consideration of extrinsic evidence, and we will not read such a

prohibitionintotherule.See State v. Robinson,718N.W.2d400,409n.4(Minn.2006)(Nor does the residualexception itself prevent us fromconsidering corroborating

evidence.Therulecontainsnospecificlimitation....).

TheStateadditionallyarguesthatthepresenceofextrinsiccorroboration

precludesthestatementfrombeingmoreprobativeonthepointforwhichitisoffered

thananyotherevidencewhichtheproponentcanprocurethroughreasonableefforts.

Thoughitispossiblethatextrinsiccorroboratingevidencecouldbemoreprobativethan

thehearsaystatementitsupports,thiswillnotalwaysbethecase.

65 SeeAlaskaR.Evid.804(b)(4)(B)(exceptionforstatementofpersonalor

familyhistoryaboutapersonotherthantheunavailabledeclarantifthedeclarantwas

relatedtotheotherbyblood,adoption,ormarriageorwassointimatelyassociatedwith

theothersfamilyastobelikelytohaveaccurateinformationconcerningthematter

declared).

66 See AlaskaR.Evid.804(b)(3)(Althoughstatementsagainstinterestare

generallyadmissible,[a]statementtendingtoexposethedeclaranttocriminalliability

and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating

circumstancesclearlyindicatethetrustworthinessofthestatement.). TheStateargues

thatRule804(b)(3)sexplicitinclusionofcorroboratingevidencemeansthatthedraftersoftherulesintendedtodisallow theuseofcorroboratingevidencefortheotherhearsay

exceptions,includingRule804(b)(5). Buttherequirementofcorroborationinonearea

doesnotnecessarilyentailitsprohibitioninanother. ThedraftersofRule804(b)(5)

could havestatedthat no extrinsic corroborationcould beused to findequivalent

circumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness,buttheydidnot.

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3. Inlightof thecorrecttestofadmissibilityandtheproffered

corroborating evidence, Bacods statement to Detective

Huelskoettershouldhavebeenadmitted.

Asdiscussedabove,astatementbyanunavailabledeclarantisadmissible

if(1)thestatementisofferedasevidenceofamaterialfact,(2)thestatementismore

probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the

proponentcanprocurethroughreasonableefforts,(3)thegeneralpurposesofthese

rulesandtheinterestsofjusticewillbestbeservedbyadmissionofthestatementinto

evidence,and(4)thestatementhascircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthinessthat

areequivalenttotheguaranteesoftrustworthinessthatjustifytheenumeratedhearsay

exceptions when a declarant is unavailable.67

The State contests two of these

requirements:thecircumstantialguaranteesofBacodsstatementstrustworthinessand

whetherthestatementismoreprobativeonthepointforwhichitwasofferedthanother

evidenceSanderscouldhavereasonablyprocured.

a. Bacods statement to Detective Huelskoetter had the

requiredcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness.

Whetheraparticularhearsaystatementofferedundertheresidualhearsay

exceptionatRule804(b)(5)hassufficientcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness

isnecessarilyacase-by-casequestion.Manycourtsfocusuponidiosyncraticaspectsof

the particular proffered statement which suggest trustworthiness.68 Particularly

significantrelevantfactorsreliedonbymultiplejurisdictionsinclude:

whetherthedeclaranthadamotivationtospeaktruthfullyor

otherwise; the spontaneity of the statement, including

whetheritwaselicitedbyleadingquestions,andgenerally

67 AlaskaR.Evid.804(b)(5).TheRulealsorequiresadequatenoticetothe

opposingparty,arequirementnotatissueinthiscase.

68 See MCCORMICKONEVIDENCE,supranote63,324,at561-66.

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the time lapse between event and statement; whether the

statementwasunderoath;whetherthedeclarantwassubject

tocross-examinationatthetimethestatementwasmade;the

relationshipbetweenthedeclarantandthepersontowhom

thestatementwasmade;whetherthedeclaranthasrecanted

or reaffirmed the statement; whether the statement was

recorded and particularly whether it wasvideotaped; and

whether the declarants firsthand knowledge is clearly[ ]demonstrated.69

And,asdiscussedabove,incasesthatdonotimplicatetheConfrontationClauseitis

appropriatetoconsiderextrinsiccorroboratingevidence.

TheStatecorrectlynotesthattheresidualhearsayexceptionsapplyonly

onrareoccasions,70

andarenotinvitationstodiscardthegeneralprohibitiononthe

admissionofhearsay.ButinthiscaseatleastfivefactorsBacodsmotivationto

speaktruthfully,thespontaneityofherstatement,theprofessionalrelationshipbetween

herandDetectiveHuelskoetter,thefactthatherstatementwasrecorded,andtheclear

demonstrationofherfirsthandknowledgeofRichardssplanargueinfavorofthe

statementstrustworthiness,asdoestheextrinsiccorroboratingevidence.Theparticular

guaranteesoftrustworthinessattachedtoBacodsstatementtoDetectiveHuelskoetter

convince us that, given the importance of the statement to Sanderss defense, the

statementshouldhavebeenadmitted. 71

69 Id.

70 In re A.S.W.,834P.2d801,804(Alaska1992).

71 See id. (explainingthat theunavailabledeclaranthearsayexceptions in

Rule804relatetostatementswhicharesufficientlyreliabletobeadmittedinlightof

theirgreatevidentiaryvalue);see also Smithart v. State,988P.2d583,586(Alaska

1999)(recognizingthatexclusionofevidenceprofferedbyacriminaldefendantcan

violatethedefendantsdueprocessrights).

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i. Motivationtospeaktruthfully

Bacods statement provides no reason to believe she was speaking

insincerelyinanefforttohelpSanders.ShetoldDetectiveHuelskoetterthatshehad

knownRichards,whomshedescribedasherbestfriend,sincethethirdgrade,andthat

shehadknown Moore for months. She connected her social life to theirs, telling

Detective Huelskoetter that she was supposed to have been with Richards, Moore,

Ketzler,andPorterfieldonthenightoftheshooting. Incontrast,sheexplainedthatshe

hadnevermetSanders.Despitethisasymmetryofbonds,sherelayedinformationthat,

whethersheknewitornot,wouldhavebeenhelpfultoSanderssdefenseandimplicated

herfriendsinaconspiracytocommitrobbery.ThefactthatSandersdidnotlearnofthe

calluntiltheStatediscloseditsexistencefifteenmonthsafterBacodplaceditfurther

diminishesthechancesthatBacodwassomehowlyingforSanderssbenefit.

ii. Spontaneity

ItisalsorelevantthatBacodinitiatedthecalltoDetectiveHuelskoetter.

ThefactthatshesoughtDetectiveHuelskoetteroutratherthanviceversadiminishesthe

chancesthatshewastellinghimwhatshethoughthewantedtohear.Bacodanswered

DetectiveHuelskoettersopen-endedquestionsandstatedthatshetoldhimeverything

sheknewabouttheevents.Sheinvitedhimtocallherbackifhehadanyfurther

questions,intheprocessgivinghimherfullname,homeaddress,andphonenumber.

Andsheapparentlydidallofthisinthepresenceofhermother.

ThedissentcomplainsthatthemostrelevantportionofBacodsstatement

was obtained through the detectives leading questions.72 But only after Bacod

Dissentat44.

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reportedwhatshehadlearnedabouttheplanfromherconversationwithRichards73did

DetectiveHuelskoetter askthe two follow-upquestionscitedby thedissent. Both

questionswereposedimmediatelyafterBacodstated,Icantthinkrightnow,andthey

are therefore best interpreted not as leading questions but as attempts to elicit

clarificationofBacodspreviousstatements.

iii. Underoath

Bacods statementto DetectiveHuelskoetterwasnot under oath. But

becauseBacodwasspeakingwithapeaceofficeraboutacrime,knowinglyproviding

falseinformationinthiscallcouldhavepossiblysubjectedBacodtocriminalliability.74

Thispossibility,muchlikeanoath,providedastrongincentivetobetruthful.

iv. Cross-examination

Bacodwasnotsubjecttocross-examinationwhenshemadethestatement.

AlthoughDetectiveHuelskoetteraskedsomeclarifyingquestions,thiswasnosubstitute

for cross-examination. This factor does not weigh in favor of her statements

admissibility.

73 [Sanders]stolemoneyfromoneofourfriends,andtheywantedtogobeat

himuptogetthemoneyback.... Bacodthenstated,Ashlee[Richards],...Raven

[Ketzler],...Travis[Moore],andTravissfianceSherrell[Porterfield]...wokeupwith

moneygone,andtheywereguessingitwas[Sanders]....

74 See AS 11.56.800(a)(1)(A) (A person commits the crime of false

informationorreportifthepersonknowinglygivesfalseinformationtoapeaceofficerwiththeintentofimplicatinganotherinanoffense.).TheStatearguesthatBacodcould

nothavefacedchargesforfalseinformationorreportbecauseitwasRichardswho

supposedlysuggestedthatothersintendedtocommitacrime,whileBacodwasmerely

aconduitforthatinformation.Butthissectionappliesasreadilytoconduitsasto

primarysouces,solongastherequisiteknowledgeandintentarepresent.

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v. Relationship

ThefactthatDetectiveHuelskoetterwasthepoliceofficerchargedwith

investigatingtherecentshootingdeathsoftwoofherfriendsstronglyfavorsBacods

statementsadmissibility.Bacodprovidedthedetectivebackgroundinformationabout

whatshebelievedtriggeredittohappen.Theseseriouscircumstancesinvitedcareful

andsomberreflectionandexplanations.Indeed,asdiscussedabove,knowinglylying

toDetectiveHuelskoettercouldhavesubjectedBacodtocriminalliability.

vi. Recantationandreaffirmation

TherecorddoesnotcontainanyevidencethatBacodeverrecantedor

reaffirmedherstatementtoDetectiveHuelskoetter. ThedissentchargesthatBacod

changedheraccountinrealtimeinresponsetowhatshelearnedintheinterviewwith

DetectiveHuelskoetter.75ButBacodinitiallyindicated,withoutanypromptingfromthe

detective,thatMoore,Richards,Ketzler,andPorterfieldwantedtobeat...upSanders.

AndwhileBacodlateraddedthatthefourofthemweregoingtotrytotalk...itout,

thedissentomitsBacodsverynextstatementtothedetective:But...obviously...

theyreyoung,so...theresgonnabeviolenceinit. Andformostofthetimebetween

BacodsstatementandherdeathSanderswasnotawarethatshehadcalledandspoken

withDetectiveHuelskoetter.

vii. Recording

DetectiveHuelskoetterrecordedBacodsstatementwhenshecalledhim.

If the only record of the statement was Detective Huelskoetters recollection and

testimony there would be risks that he misunderstood or misremembered the

conversation.Thefactthatthejurycouldhaveheardthestatementeliminatesthose

Dissentat43.

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risks,althoughitdoesnoteliminatetherisksofBacodsfaultyperceptionormemoryof

herconversationwithRichards.

viii. Cleardemonstrationoffirsthandknowledge

BacodsstatementtoDetectiveHuelskoetterdemonstratedherfirsthand

knowledgeoftheplanandconflictRichardsdescribed.Bacodlistedthenumberofher

friends thatwent to Sanderss house and provided their names. She identified the

relationshipsamongthem. HerclosetieswithRichards,whomBacoddescribedasher

bestfriend,andwhomBacodwassupposedto joinonthenightof theshooting,

providesfurtherreassurancethatBacodhadfirsthandknowledgeof theconversation

withRichards.

ix. Corroboration

Extrinsiccorroboratingevidenceprovidesfurthercircumstantialguarantees

oftrustworthinessinthiscase. Bacodcorrectlyidentifiedthegroupoffourpeoplethat

wenttoSandersshometogetheronthenightoftheshootingswithoutassistancefrom

DetectiveHuelskoetter.Bacodstatedthattheywantedtogobeat[Sanders]uptoget

themoneyback,andthatbecausethefourwereyoungtheresgonnabeviolenceinit.

Onthenightoftheshooting,littlemorethanaweekafterBacodreportedshespokewith

Richards,thosefourpeopletraveledtoSandersshousewithapistol,apushknife,and

amachete.AccordingtoSanders,oneofthemstruckhimwiththepistolwithout

warning,anactionconsistentwiththeplantojumpSandersthatBacoddescribed.

Takentogether,theidiosyncraticfactors76surroundingBacodsstatement

to Detective Huelskoetter convince us that it had the circumstantial guarantees of

trustworthinessthatEvidenceRule804(b)(5)requires.BacodsstatementwasessentialtothedefensetheoriesSandershadaconstitutionalrighttopresent,andit,liketherest

76 MCCORMICKONEVIDENCE,supranote63,324,at561.

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oftheRule804exceptionsforunavailabledeclarants,wassufficientlyreliabletobe

admittedinlightof[its]greatevidentiaryvalue. 77

b. Bacods statement toDetectiveHuelskoetterwasmore

probativeonthepointforwhichitwasofferedthanother

evidenceSanderscouldhavereasonablyprocured.

TheStatealsoarguesthatBacodsstatementtoDetectiveHuelskoetterwas

inadmissiblebecausePorterfieldandKetzlerwereavailabletotestify,andbothwould

havepresumablyknownaboutthepurportedplan. Itfollows,theStateargues,thatthe

statementSanderssoughttointroducewasnotmoreprobativeonthepointforwhich

itisofferedthananyotherevidencewhichtheproponentcanprocurethroughreasonable

efforts,asRule804(b)(5)requires.78

Althoughitisdifficulttopreciselydefinethescopeofthepointforwhich

[evidence]isoffered,itisclearthatBacodwasinauniquepositioninthiscase. She

hadallegedlylearnedaboutanongoingconspiracyfromaclosefriend,butshedidnot

joinintheenterprise.Thisgavehercrucialinsightinto theaimsoftheactingparties

withoutexposinghertothethreatofcriminalliabilitythatwouldnormallysilencea

participant in a criminal scheme. The record contains no hint of another witness

preparedtotestifythatRichardsandMooreplannedtojumpSandersorofanyother

personwhowasawareoftheplanbutnotparticipatinginit.TheStateacknowledges

initsbriefthatPorterfield,oneofthewitnessesitfaultsSandersfornotinterviewing,

deniedknowledgeofanyplanto robandbeatup Sanders. Andthefourthalleged

confederate,Ketzler,similarlydeniedanyrolein,orknowledgeof,aplantorobSanders

77

In re A.S.W.,834P.2d801,804(Alaska1992).

78 TheStatealsoalludestotheavailabilityofSanderssbrother,Joseph,to

testifythatMooreattackedSandersfirst,butBacodsstatementwasprobativeofmore

thanjustMooresphysicalactionsinSanderssbedroomandcamefromasourcemuch

lesslikelytofabricatetestimonyonSanderssbehalf.

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whenquestionedbypolice.Moreover,BacodlearnedabouttheplanfromRichards,one

ofthevictimsandoneofthethreepeoplewhosestatesofmind,intentions,andactions

werecentraltothecase.

Underthesecircumstances,andagaininformedbySanderssconstitutional

righttopresentadefense,wedonotbelievethatSanderscouldhavereasonablyprocured

anyevidencemoreprobativeonthepointsforwhichSandersofferedBacodsstatement

to Detective Huelskoetter. We therefore reject the States argument that Bacods

statementwasinadmissibleforthisreasonand,inconjunctionwithourdetermination

abovethatthestatementhadtherequiredcircumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness,

andtheStateswell-reasonedconcessionthatadmissionofthestatementwouldservethe

interests of justice, hold that it should have been admitted under Evidence

Rule804(b)(5).79

D. TheExclusionOfTheTwoStatementsWasNotHarmless.

AlthoughthesuperiorcourtsexclusionofRichardssstatementtoBacod

andBacodsstatement toDetectiveHuelskoetterwaserroneous,itisnotabasisfor

reversingSanderssconvictioniftheerrorwasharmless. 80Thetrialrecordinthiscase

79 Initsrespondentsbrief,theStateclarifiedthat[t]hestatedoesnotdispute

thepotentialmaterialityofthereportbyBacoditreferstothepurportedstatements

byRichards,whichifadmissible,wouldbe relevant. Nordoesthe statedispute that

admissionofBacodsreportwouldbeconsistentwiththeevidencerulesandtheinterestsofjustice.Thestate,however,disputesthatBacodsreportismoreprobativethanother

reasonablyavailableevidence.

80 See AlaskaR.Crim.P.47(a)(Anyerror,defect,irregularityorvariance

whichdoesnotaffectsubstantialrightsshallbedisregarded.).

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indicatesthattheexclusionwasnotharmlessbecausewecannotfairlysaythattheerror

didnotappreciablyaffectthejurysverdict. 81

TheStatearguesthattheevidencethatRichardsandMoorehadconspired

toattackandrobSanderswouldnothaveappreciablyaffectedthejurysverdictbecause

thefocusoftheStatescasewasontheexcessivenessofSanderssresponse,notwhether

Sanders or Moore was the initial aggressor. The State focuses particularly on the

prosecutors rebuttal argument,during whichhe appeared to implicitly concede that

Moore struck Sanders first. But the strength of the prosecutors concession was

significantlyundercutbyitscontext. Justbeforethosestatements,theprosecutornoted

thathewasarguingbasedonwordsfrom[Sanderss]mouth,buthedidnottellthe

jurytoacceptthemas true. Indeed,muchof theprosecutorsfirstclosingargument

provided the jury with reason not to credit Sanderss account, including Sanderss

explanationofwhathadprovokedtheshootings.Theprosecutorwashardlyconceding

thatSanderswascrediblewhenhetoldthejurythatSanderstellsusfornoreason,no

reasonwhatsoever,noreasonthatheswillingtoadmit,Mr.Moorewhackshimonthe

headandcausesthatgash,thatgashabovehiseye,fornoreasonwhatsoever. The

prosecutor rhetorically askedthe jury,[W]oulditmakeanysenseforMr.Mooreto

whacksomebodyintheheadwithanunloadedgunwhentheotherguysgottwoloaded

81 Love v. State,457P.2d622,634(Alaska1969).Sandersarguesthat,given

theconstitutionalnatureofhisclaimoferror,theStateisrequiredtodemonstratethatthe

errorwasharmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt.See, e.g.,Adams v. State,261P.3d758,

773(Alaska2011)(Aconstitutionalviolationwillalwaysaffectsubstantialrightsand

willbe prejudicialunless theStateprovesthatitwasharmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt.Anerrorthatisnotconstitutionalinnaturewillbeprejudicialifthedefendant

proves that there is a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the

proceeding.). Because we find that the error was not harmless under the less-

demandingstandardfornon-constitutionalerrors,weneednotdeterminewhetherthe

errorwasharmlessbeyondareasonabledoubt.

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gunsrightthereonthebed?Thatmakesnosense.Theprosecutoralsotoldthejury

that[w]eknowintuitivelythatSanderstoldtheotherwitnessestotheeventsthat[t]he

storywillbehehitmefirst.AndtheprosecutortoldthejurythatSandershadamotive

tolietothedetectivestomakehimselflookgoodandtoleaveoutthepartsofthestory

thatmakeitlooklike...theshootingofMr.Moorehadalotmoretodowithpreexisting

animositythanwediscoveredinthiscase.

InlightoftheextensiveargumentagainstSanderssaccountthattheState

presentedduringclosingargument,wecannotfairlyconcludethattheexclusiondidnot

haveanappreciableeffectonthejurysverdict.

V. CONCLUSION

Becausetheexcludedevidenceshouldhavebeenadmittedandbecauseits

exclusionwasnotharmless,weREVERSESanderssconvictionsandREMANDfora

newtrial.

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BOLGER,Justice,withwhomSTOWERS,Justice,joins,dissentinginpart.

I. INTRODUCTION

Iagreewiththegenerallegalframeworkthecourtusestodecidethiscase.

Iamtroubled,however,bythecourtsconclusionthatCarmelaBacodsstatementto

DetectiveHuelskoetterwasso trustworthythat thesuperiorcourtwasrequiredasa

matteroflawtoadmit itunderAlaskaEvidenceRule804(b)(5).1Evenconsidering

corroborating evidence, I would hold that Bacods statement does not evince the

circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission under

Rule 804(b)(5),and I would affirm the superior courtsevidentiary ruling. In the

alternative, Iwouldremand toallow the superiorcourt toexercise its discretionin

makingthisdeterminationunderthiscourtsnewlyannouncedstandard.2

II. DISCUSSION

Thecourt adopts nine [p]articularly significant relevant factors3for

determiningwhetheraprofferedhearsaystatement,despitefailingtomeetanyofthe

enumeratedhearsayexceptions,isneverthelesssufficientlytrustworthytobeadmitted

into evidence.4 The court concludes that at least five of these factors favor the

1 Op.at28,39.

2 See Patterson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co.,347P.3d562,568(Alaska2015)

(We...reviewthesuperiorcourtsapplicationoftheevidencerules...forabuseof

discretion.).

3 SeeOp.at32.

4 Thecourtadoptseightofthesefactorsfrom2GEORGE E.DIXETAL.,

MCCORMICKONEVIDENCE324,at565-66(KennethS.Brouned.,7thed.2013)and

analyzesevidenceofcorroborationasafinal,standalonefactor. See Op.at32-38.

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statementsadmission.5Butforthereasonsdiscussedbelow,Iamnotpersuadedbythe

courtsanalysis,andIwouldconcludethat,ontherecordbeforeus,onlyoneofthese

ninefactorstherecordingofthestatementunambiguouslyfavorsadmission,while

theremainingeighteithercutagainstthestatementstrustworthinessorprovidelittle

insightintothetrustworthinessofthestatement.

A. MotivationToSpeakTruthfully

ThecourtconcludesthatBacodsstatementprovidesnoreasontobelieve

shewasspeakinginsincerelyin an effort to help [Ryan] Sanders.6ButwhileIagree

thatBacodhadnoreasontoliefor Sanders,Bacodsbroadermotivationsforspeaking

withDetectiveHuelskoetterremainunknown.Ifanything,Bacodsstatementsuggests

that Bacod contacted Detective Huelskoetter partly to determine what the police

7knewabouttheshooting, anditisundisputablethatshechangedheraccountinrealtime

inresponsetowhatshelearned.8ThiscastssomedoubtontheideathatBacodcalled

DetectiveHuelskoetterforthecivic-mindedpurposeofprovidingatruthfulstatementto

helpthepolicewiththeirinvestigation.Iwouldthereforeconcludethatthisfactor

weighsneitherfornoragainstfindingBacodsstatementsufficientlytrustworthy.

5 Op.at33.

6 Op.at34(emphasisadded).

7 Specifically,BacodaskedDetectiveHuelskoetter:

[W]ereyouthereatthescene?

Was...itjust[Richards]and[Moore]alone?

[W]asthereotherpeoplewith [Moore]and...[Richards]?...Weretheretwofemalesthere?

8 Bacod initially indicated that Travis Moore, Ashlee Richards, Raven

Ketzler,andSherrellPorterfieldwantedtojumpandbeat...upSanders,butshe

latersaid[t]heywere...gonnatrytotalk...itout.

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B. Spontaneity

Indiscussingspontaneity,thecourtfocusesprimarilyonthefactthatBacod

initiatedthecalltoDetectiveHuelskoetterandstatesthatthedetectivesquestionstoher

wereopen-ended.9

ButthoughitistruethatmuchofBacodsstatementwasmadein

responsetoopen-endedquestions,themostrelevantportionBacodsclaimsabout

Travis Moores intent10 was obtained through the detectives leading questions.

Bacodneverindependentlystated(orevenimplied)thatMoorewastheringleaderofthe

allegedassault.Sheindicatedthisonlybyaffirmativelyansweringtwoveryleading

questions: (1)So...youknowthat[Moore]wantedtobeat[Sanders]upoverthe

money?and(2)[W]hentheyweregoinoverthere[,][it]wasprettymuchtheidea...

that[Moore]wasgonnabeathimup?11IdonotthinkthatBacodsresponsestothe

detectivesleadingquestionsonthiscriticalissuecanbeconsideredspontaneous,and

I would conclude that this factor weighs against the trustworthiness of Bacods

statement.

C. UnderOath

Bacodsstatementwasnotsworntestimony.AccordinglyIwouldconclude

thatthisfactorweighsagainstthestatementstrustworthiness.

D. Cross-examination

Bacods statement was not subjected to thorough cross-examination.

AlthoughDetectiveHuelskoetteraskedseveralleadingquestions,nonewasparticularly

9 Op.at34.

10

MooresintentwasimportantandperhapscriticaltotheadmissibilityofBacodsstatement,asthecourtnotes.Op.at18-19.

11 Moreover,thissecondquestionwouldhavebeenobjectionableifithad

beenaskedattrialbecauseBacodhadnopersonalknowledgeofMooresstateofmind

atthemomentwhen[theallegedconspirators]weregoin[g]toSanderssapartment.

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pointedorintendedtocastdoubtonBacodstruthfulness,astheStatesquestionswould

havebeenhadBacodbeenabletotestifyattrial.Indeed,cross-examinationwouldhave

beenparticularlyhelpful inclarifyingthisparticularstatement,because itmighthave

shedlightonwhetherRichardsactuallytoldBacodthattheallegedconspiratorswere

planningtojumpandbeat...upSandersormerelyindicatedanintenttotalkwith

him.BecausetheStatewasunabletopressBacodonthispoint,Iwouldconcludethat

thisfactorweighsagainstthetrustworthinessofBacodsstatement.

E. Relationship

The court concludes that Bacods decision to talk to a police officer

investigatingthedeathsoftwofriendsstronglyfavorsthetrustworthinessofBacods

statement.12Thecourtalsonotesthatknowinglyprovidingfalseinformationtothe

policecouldhavesubjectedBacodtocriminalliability.13Andelsewhereinitsanalysis,

thecourtsuggeststhatBacodsstatementwasmoretrustworthybecauseshemadeitin

thepresenceofhermother.14Butasageneralmatter,Isuspectpoliceofficersand

parents of teenagers would be skeptical of the courts reasoning, since it is not

uncommonforindividualstolietothepolice,orteenagerstotheirparents.Andasnoted

above,theideathatBacodwashighlymotivatedtotellthetrutheitherbythedeath

ofherfriendsorbythepotentialforcriminalliabilityissomewhatbeliedbythefact

thatshechangedheraccounthalfwaythroughherstatement.

Forthesereasons,IwouldconcludethattherelationshipbetweenBacod

andDetectiveHuelskoetterprovides,atbest,weaksupportfortrustworthiness.Idonot

thinkthereisenoughinformationintherecordaboutBacodsrelationshipwithher

12 Op.at36.

13 Op.at36.

14 Op.at34.

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motherandwithDetectiveHuelskoetter(orpoliceofficersingeneral)tosupportthe

conclusionthattheserelationshipsstronglyfavorherstatementstrustworthiness.

F. RecantationOrReaffirmation

ThereisnoevidencetosuggestBacodrecantedorreaffirmedherstatement

after talking with DetectiveHuelskoetter, and she died before the evidenceofher

statementcametolight. Asalreadynoted,however,Bacodwalkedbackacriticalpart

ofheraccountnamely,thatMoore,Richards,Ketzler,andPorterfieldintendedto

assaultSandersmidwaythroughherstatement.AlthoughitseemslikelythatBacods

reasonforchanginghernarrativewastoprotectKetzlerandPorterfieldonceshelearned

theyhadbeenpresentatSandersshouseduringtheshootings,Bacodsshiftofnarrative

wasindisputablyapartial[]backtrack,15asthecourtputsit,orapartialrecantation,as

Iwouldputit.Forthisreason,Iwouldconcludethatthisfactorweighsagainstfinding

Bacodsstatementtrustworthy.

G. Recording

Bacodsstatementwasrecorded. Asthecourtcorrectlyconcludes,16this

weighsinfavorofthestatementstrustworthiness.

H. FirsthandKnowledge

ThecourtnotesthatBacodhadfirsthandknowledgeofherconversation

withRichards,whichseemsindisputable.17 Nevertheless,Iamnotpersuadedthatthis

factorfavorsadmissibility.Itisdifficulttoimagineprofferedevidenceofhearsaywithin

15 See Op.at16.

16

See Op.at33.

17 See Op.at37.ThecourtalsonotesthatBacodhadclosetieswithRichards

andknewtheidentitiesoftheotherthreeallegedconspirators.Id.Forthereasons

discussed in the next section, however, I am unpersuaded that this corroborating

evidencesupportsthetrustworthinessofBacodsstatement.

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hearsaywheretheout-of-courtdeclarantwillnothavefirsthandknowledgeofthesecond

declarantsstatement,sothisfactorwouldappeartosupporttheadmissionofhearsay

withinhearsayinmostcases.Buteachlevelofhearsaycompoundstheriskthatthe

originalstatementwasmiscommunicatedormisunderstood,andafactorthatusuallyor

alwaysfavorstheadmissionofhearsaywithinhearsayseemsanunreliableindicatorof

whetherthestatementistrustworthy.Therefore,whilefirsthandknowledge(orlack

thereof)seemsaparticularlyrelevantfactorindeterminingwhetheratypicalhearsay

statementshouldbeconsideredreliable, 18Iwouldconcludethatthisfactorhaslittleor

no weight indetermining the trustworthiness of hearsay-within-hearsay statements,

includingBacods.

I. CorroboratingEvidence

Finally, the court concludes that corroborating evidence supports the

trustworthinessofBacodsstatement.ThecourthighlightsBacodsidentificationof

Moore,Richards,Ketzler,andPorterfieldearlyinherstatementwithoutpromptingfrom

DetectiveHuelskotter.19Andthecourtnotesthatthefourfriendshadthreeweaponsin

theirpossessionthenightoftheshootings:(1)Richardsspushknife,(2)themachete

inthecar,and(3)Mooresunloadedpistol. 20

ButthefactthatBacodcouldidentifytheallegedconspiratorsprovides

minimalcorroborationforBacodsstatement,sinceBacodsstatementsuggeststhatthe

friendsregularlyspenttimetogether,andBacoddidnotactuallyknowwhetherKetzler

18 See United States v. Hall,165F.3d1095,1111(7thCir.1999)(holding

third-partysuspectsconfessionunreliablewhereitwasclearthatsuspectknewnothingaboutthespecificsofthecrime).

19 Op.at36.

20 Id.at37.

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and Porterfield visited Sanders the night of the shootings. Moreover, Bacods

identification of her friends does not corroborate the critical portion of Bacods

statement:herexplanationforwhythosefriendsvisitedSanderssapartment.

Likewise,theexistenceofthethreeweaponsaddslittlecorroborativeforce

toBacodsstatement.Thepushknifeandmacheteareconditionallyrelevantonlyifthe

w

Sanders v. State, Alaska (2015)

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