Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports - isolation or ... · Iranian crude oil exports and production...
Transcript of Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports - isolation or ... · Iranian crude oil exports and production...
Shabnam Mirsaeedi-Gloßner, MPhil, MPA Berlin Centre for Caspian Region Studies Freie Universität Berlin [email protected] www.fu-berlin.de/bccare
Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports - isolation or diversification?-
18th REFORM Group Meeting
Salzburg, August 30th 2013
Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports: isolation or diversification?
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The international sanctions: context and targets
Crude oil exports
Natural gas exports
Electricity exports
„A drop of water always finds its way“: the impact of sanctions on Iranian
energy exports
Recent data on Iranian energy exports poses the following question: have the sanctions had the desired impact on Iranian energy exports?
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The first set of recent crude oil related sanctions from the United States were imposed on December 31 2011 and the European Union adopted a similar embargo in January 2012, which took effect in July 1 2012
The U.S. sanctions also determined punitive measures against all those countries which do not “significantly reduce” their crude oil imports from Iran
The newest set of U.S. waivers was passed in June 2013 for China, India and South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Taiwan. Waivers for Japan and 10 European countries were approved earlier in 2013
Newest data indicates two things: a ) stabilization of crude oil exports and b) efforts of energy export diversification in the last few years
Question: Have the sanctions had the desired impact on Iranian energy exports?
Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports: isolation or diversification?
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The international sanctions: context and targets
Crude oil exports
Natural gas exports
Electricity exports
„A drop of water always finds its way“: the impact of sanctions on Iranian
energy exports
Iranian crude oil exports, 2006-2012
In million barrels per day
Iranian crude oil exports and production
In million barrels per day
The Iranian Budget of 2013/2014 projects a 40% decline in oil revenues – recent data indicates some level of stabilization
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Source: OPEC 2012, U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013; Reuters, Oil and Gas; Arab News ; OPEC 2013
1.3
April 2013
1.1
March 2013
0.8
February 2013
1.1
January 2013
1.1
December 2012
1.4
2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
2.7
June 2013e
0.9
May 2013
-40%
2012
1.5
2011
2.5
2010
2.6
2009
2.4
2008
2.6
2007
2.6
2006
2.6
crude oil exports Iran crude oil output
Largest importer remains China, followed by India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey – shares have stabilized in recent months
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Iranian crude oil exports, 2013 by month and importing country In thousand barrels per day
67
67
67
379 (47%)
117 (14%)
148 (18%)
60 (7%)
107 (13%)
February 2013
1,078
354 (33%)
279 (26%)
184 (17%)
143 (13%)
118 (11%)
1,169
312 (27%)
286 (24%)
239 (20%)
190 (16%)
January 2013
390 (40%)
968
June 2013e
March 2013
811
142 (12%)
141 (15%)
129 (13%)
136 (14%)
105 (11%)
May 2013e
1,334
555 (42%)
213 (16%)
222 (17%)
119 (9%)
158 (12%)
April 2013e
1,084
415 (38%)
123 (11%)
179 (17%)
190 (18%)
110 (10%)
Taiwan Turkey South Korea Japan China India
Source: Reuters; ArabNews; Press TV
Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports: isolation or diversification?
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The international sanctions: context and targets
Crude oil exports
Natural gas exports
Electricity exports
„A drop of water always finds its way“: the impact of sanctions on Iranian
energy exports
Iranian export pipeline infrastructure
Three existing export pipeline:
Iran-Turkey: reached an estimated 7.5 bcm in
2012
Iran-Armenia: capacity of 2.3 bcm annually;
but in reality closer to 1.1 bcm annually
Iran-Nakhchivan: 0.25 bcm annually
Planned export routes to increase natural gas
exports to 35 bcm annually by 2016:
Iran-Iraq-Syria: capacity to Iraq of 9.13 bcm
and expand to 10.95 bcm annually including
Syria (operational to Iraq by the end of
2013/beginning of 2014)
Iran-Pakistan: capacity of 9.13 bcm annually
(operational by mid-2014)
Iran-Turkey-Europe: 3 bcm annually (2 bcm to
Turkey, 1 bcm towards Europe)
Current natural gas export infrastructure is limited, however, plans have been set to triple export volumes by 2016 through three routes
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Iranian natural gas infrastructure
Iranian natural gas exports & imports, 1999-2012
In bcm
In 2012 Iran still imported more natural gas than its exports – 90% of Iranian natural gas exports are destined to Turkey
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Source: OPEC 2012, BP Statistical Review 2013; Eurasia Review; Global Business;
5.8
2008
4.1 7.1
2007
6.2 7.3
2006
5.7 5.8
2005
4.3 5.8
2004
3.6 5.2
2003
3.5 4.9
2002
0.7
4.9
2001
0.1
4.2
2000
2.7
1999
2.0
8.3 7.1
2009
5.7
+317%
2016 goal
35.0
2012
8.4 9.4
2011
9.1 10.6
2010
exports imports
Tabriz-Ankara Pipeline exports, 2001-2012
In bcm
-22% -17%
2012
10.0 7.5
2011
10.0 8.4
2010
10.0 7.8
2009
5.3
2008
5.8
2007
10.0
6.1
2006
5.7
2005
4.3
2004
-25%
2003
3.5
2002
4.0
0.7
4.3
10.0 10.0
-39%
-83%
2001
0.1
actual use operational capacity
Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports: isolation or diversification?
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The international sanctions: context and targets
Crude oil exports
Natural gas exports
Electricity exports
„A drop of water always finds its way“: the impact of sanctions on Iranian
energy exports
Iran is preparing itself to increase its electricity exports in geo- politically critical areas – these include investment and management in the grid
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Iran’s strategic electricity export choice In GWh
5,500.0
6,500.0
6,000.0
2,500.0
5,000.0
4,500.0
4,000.0
3,500.0
3,000.0
2,000.0
7,000.0
1,500.0
1,000.0
500.0
2,100 2,060
6,150
3,015
6,707
2,068
6,152
1,684
3,875
1,842
2,520 2,541 2,775
2,084
2,759
2,074
2,761
2011 2010 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2000 1999 1998 1997
6,600
4,500
2012 (based on calculation from first 9 months)
Source: Mirsaeedi-Glossner (Science & Diplomacy, 2013); Iranian Energy Balance Sheet, 2012; Press TV
Export Import
4,090
3,692
Four areas have been of particular interest in its electricity export Strategy – all areas of geopolitical interest to the United States
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Turkey April 2012: Turkey imported 190 MW per hour from Iran
July 2013: Turkey imported 400 MW per hour from Iran
Future plans: 1,200 MW per hour from Iran; joint power plant constructions
Afghanistan-Tajikistan
January 2012 -2013: – 10 MW to 24 MW for Nimroz; 90 MW to 140 MW for Herat; 50 MW to 100 MW in Farah Province
per hour Plans for a joint power line from Iran through Afghanistan and Tajikistan
Pakistan Purchases 3 million USD worth of electricity a month currently, pays elecrticity debts with
wheat exports to Iran
First phase of project 1,000 MW annually, second phase 10,000 MW
Iraq-Syria-Lebanon
Wasit province (Iraq): up to 1,300 MW annually from Iran; compared to 450 MW in mid-2011
Iran has sold 40 USD worth of equipment for electricity transfer stations and high voltage
transformers; contracts are being negotiation for the purchase of electricity from Iran
Since April 2012 Lebanon has purchased electricity from Iran; first consignment of 25 MW to
be increased to 100 MW per year
Persian Gulf states A 3.8 million USD agreement to develop a power plant with natural gas from the Forouz B gas
field in the Gulf that will generate electricity to the UAE, Oman, Qatar (approximately 3 GW)
Sanctions and Iranian Energy Exports: isolation or diversification?
13
The international sanctions: context and targets
Crude oil exports
Natural gas exports
Electricity exports
„A drop of water always finds its way“: the impact of sanctions on Iranian
energy exports
„A drop of water always finds its way“ –
the impact of sanctions on Iranian energy exports
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Sanctions have the greatest impact in the initial phase, then adjustments in dependencies can mitigate the impact
Iran cannot replace its crude oil sales losses with natural gas and electricity exports, but its is building itself as an indispensable regional player
Iran‘s energy export diversification increases the complexities and minimized leverage that the U.S. has to face if it wants to isolate Iran
While the winner of this policy game has not been announced yet, every day that passes increases the odds for Iran
Thank you very much for your attention!
Shabnam Mirsaeedi-Gloßner, Mphil, MPA
Research Fellow
Berlin Centre for Caspian Region Studies (BC CARE)
Freie Universität Berlin
Ihnestr. 22
D-14195 Berlin
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