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Salience and silence: representation ofthe Zimbabwean crisis in the local pressTendai Chari aa Department of Media Studies , University of Venda , Private BagX5050, Thohoyandou, South AfricaPublished online: 20 May 2010.

To cite this article: Tendai Chari (2010) Salience and silence: representation of the Zimbabweancrisis in the local press, African Identities, 8:2, 131-150, DOI: 10.1080/14725841003629591

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Salience and silence: representation of the Zimbabwean crisis in thelocal press

Tendai Chari*

Department of Media Studies, University of Venda, Private Bag X5050, Thohoyandou, South Africa

(Received 5 November 2009; final version received 30 December 2009)

The power of the press to shape public opinion is well documented. News readers take acue from the press on how much salience to attach to an issue. The press are primarysources of ‘the pictures in our heads’ and furnish us with interpretative frameworks forunderstanding public affairs. This article examines representation of the Zimbabweancrisis by the local press between 2000 and 2008. It is argued that representation of theZimbabwean crisis mirrors the contours chalked by the polarized media environment.

Keywords: salience; silence; crisis; representation; agenda-setting; Zimbabwe

Introduction

Over the past decade Zimbabwe has attracted unprecedented attention in informal

discussions, academic debates and the media. As a consequence there are presumably

more ‘experts’ on the Zimbabwe ‘issue’ than there are stars in any autumn night. Lush and

Kupe (2005, p. 5) contend that the words ‘crisis’ and ‘Zimbabwe’ are rarely found apart

these days with Zimbabwe becoming an epitome of ‘crisis’. Chuma (2005, p. 2) argues

that there is a ‘crisis’ of perspective regarding Zimbabwe’s crisis and the terrain of debate

about the Zimbabwean crisis is ‘bifurcated’. Raftopoulos (2005, p. 1) notes that:

In the journalistic world the Zimbabwean crisis since 2000 has been constructed through thedichotomy of either a radical nationalist redistributive project carried out as historical redressin the face of neoliberal orthodoxy, or a breakdown of the norms of liberal governancethrough the machinations of an authoritarian figure.

Stone (2007) asserts that Zimbabwe does not suffer from any single problem but ‘complex

interlinked’ problems which result from multiple causes. In spite of the convergence of

views regarding the fact that Zimbabwe is facing a crisis, there is no consensus either on

the causes or the genesis of the crisis. Conventional wisdom has it that Zimbabwe’s

situation conforms to, in the words of Willems (2005, p. 100), ‘the same old story of a

promising African leader that had still gone corrupt, despite high hopes with some at

independence in 1980’. Akpabio (2008, p. 1) concurs noting that Zimbabwe’s situation is

not a new phenomenon in Africa as others have walked that road before. He argues that the

situation in Zimbabwe has been virtually experienced in all the African countries with

ISSN 1472-5843 print/ISSN 1472-5851 online

q 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14725841003629591

http://www.informaworld.com

*Email: tendai.chari@yahoo.com; tendai.chari@univen.ac.za

African Identities

Vol. 8, No. 2, May 2010, 131–150

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Ghana being the first ‘shining’ example before going to the ‘dogs’ followed by Nigeria

after experiencing acute economic and political problems. The concoction of causes of

these socio-economic maladies is aptly captured by Akpabio (2008, p. 1) thus:

Each sad case of dreams turning into nightmares has its underlying reasons. In some instancesit is the colonial masters sowing the wild oats of failure by handpicking and installingmediocrity – successors who have nothing to offer – or subtly pulling the strings from acrossthe seas and even instigating destabilization if their interests and investments are threatened.This is not to shield the corrupt politicians and military adventures that have pillaged thecontinent’s resources in an unprecedented, immoral and primitive looting spree that madethem richer than their countries. If it is not primitive acquisition then it might be completeintolerance of criticism so much so that opponents and critics are harangued, jailed ontrumped-up charges or simply disappear.

The multiple layers of crisis present serious challenges to the media resulting in the ‘crisis

of framing’ and Zimbabwe is by no means an exception.

The manner in which the media frame events is very crucial because people both at

home and abroad depend on secondary reality to understand public affairs. This is because

people do not only acquire information from the media but also learn how much

importance to attach to an issue based on the level of emphasis it is accorded.

Newspapers offer readers numerous cues on how to understand and interpret certain

issues that are given prominence in the media and ultimately become prominent in

people’s minds. McCombs (n.d., p. 2) contends:

What we know about the world is largely based on what the media tell us. More specifically,the result of this mediated view of the world is that the priorities of the media stronglyinfluence the priorities of the public. Elements prominent on the media agenda becomeprominent in the public mind.

Based on textual analysis and informed by Maxwell McCombs’ agenda-setting theory, the

objective of this article is to examine how the state and privately-owned press have

represented the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ between 2000 and 2008. In particular the article

analyses how these press have represented three elements of the crisis, namely the land

issue, the economy and the country’s foreign relations. News articles were selected on the

basis of accessibility and potential to furnish relevant data.

Key research questions identified are:

. How have the press in Zimbabwe represented the identified elements of the crisis?

. What aspects of the crisis have been accorded salience or downplayed?

. How did the newspapers attempt to manufacture public opinion about the crisis?

The article does not in any way assume that the land issue, the economy and the country’s

international relations are the only elements of the crisis which have received media

attention; neither is it assumed that the Zimbabwean crisis started in the year 2000.

Economic aspects are intertwined with social and political and even international relations

such that coming up with a clinically pure ‘economic’ crisis is a daunting task. The land

issue is a political as much as it is an economic issue and has both international and local

dimensions. At the same time, these issues have been in the media well before the year

2000, some of them dating back to the colonial period. The demarcation of the period of

study and classification of ‘elements of the crisis’ have been necessitated by space

constraints as well as access of data. Besides, there is a general assumption that the

Zimbabwean crisis gained unprecedented media attention after the constitutional

referendum in 2000.

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The next section gives an overview of the post-independence media scenario in

Zimbabwe.

The post-independence media context

The media in Zimbabwe traces its history to the colonial period beginning with the

formation of The Herald in 1892 and The Chronicle in 1894 by the South African-

based Argus Printing and Publishing Company (Gale 1962). Argus would remain the

dominant media player in the country until independence in 1980, after which the

company was acquired by the ZANU-PF government and renamed the Zimbabwe

Newspapers Pvt. Ltd (1980). At independence the country inherited a fairly diversified

media landscape characterized by a blossoming private press which reflected the

dominance of white colonial capital in the economy. Although the ZANU-PF

government espoused socialism, the economy largely remained in the hands of the

white minority (Saunders 1991).

The second decade of independence could be remembered as the ‘golden decade’

of the press in Zimbabwe as it witnessed phenomenal growth of the private press. A

more tolerant political climate and reduced economic control induced by the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment

Programme (ESAP) encouraged new investments in the press (Saunders 1999). A

coterie of privately-owned publications was started including The Daily Gazette

(1991), The Sunday Gazette (1992)1, The Zimbabwe Independent (1997) and The

Zimbabwe Mirror (1997).

It is, however, the formation of the Daily News by a consortium of foreign and local

businessmen in 1999 which completely changed the face of the media landscape. The

Daily News readership shot to 100,000 compared to that of the state-owned The Herald at

90,000 (Waldahl 2004, p. 37). The formation of the Daily News coincided with the

formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a strong opposition party with

roots in the labour movement and backed by white commercial farmers, industrialists and

civil society organizations. The Daily News became a strategic conduit for ventilating

political discontent occasioned by economic hardships resulting from the negative effects

of ESAP.

In an attempt to tame the adversarial and militant media, the government, whose

hegemony was being denuded, promulgated tough media laws – among them, the

Broadcasting Services Act (2001) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy

Act (2002).

The Daily News and its sister publication The Daily News on Sunday refused to register

with the state-appointed Media and Information Commission, resulting in its closure in

September 2003. Even before the closure of the Daily News the government had the lion’s

share of the media space, owning a vast empire of newspapers under the Zimpapers stable

including the flagship and daily The Herald, The Chronicle (also daily), The Manica Post,

The Sunday News, and the indigenous-language Kwayedza and Umuthunywa. In addition

the government owned the sole broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation with

four radio stations2 and one television station.

In terms of reporting, the media became more polarized after the formation of the

Daily News and the opposition, often holding entrenched positions on social, economic

and political issues. The state-owned newspapers rallied behind the ZANU-PF

government while the Daily News vigorously and unapologetically backed the MDC,

resulting in a ZANU-PF minister commenting thus: ‘I wonder why the MDC has

Learnmore Jongwe as their spokesperson when they have the Daily News doing their job’.3

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Newspapers trod a very fine line between press freedom and advocacy reporting,

prompting one newspaper columnist to comment thus:

The polarization in our society today is best depicted in the press. Basically the press is eitherpro-government or anti-government. Sometimes objectivity is sacrificed in order to be true totheir chosen position . . . if you buy newspapers from one divide you will get half the story.(MMPZ 2002, p. 87).

It is against this backdrop that the fast-track land reform, which the government embarked

on after losing a crucial referendum in February 2000, was followed by an economic

meltdown which received unprecedented media attention locally and internationally.

Agenda-setting

The agenda-setting theory propounded by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972)

posits that the mass media have the capacity to influence what people think about and how

they think about certain issues because of their ability to identify, select, prioritize, include

and exclude issues. The media also supply contexts, backdrops and interpretative

frameworks for understanding issues (Onyebadi 2007). In its expanded form the theory

encompasses a range of media techniques such as salience (the importance attached to an

issue), framing (the selection of an aspect of perceived reality and presenting it in a way

that compels attention to it) and priming, (drawing attention to certain issues even in a

neutral manner) (Garson 2006). By drawing attention to some issues while playing down

others the media influence the way in which people and issues are evaluated by the public

(McCombs, n.d., p. 2).

The sheer volume and exposure accorded to an issue, the tone used to describe it and

the manner in which it is projected all have great potential to influence public behaviour

and attitudes. The agenda-setting role of the media brings to the fore the problematique

resulting from our dependence for knowledge and information on mediated reality. Our

attitudes and perceptions of the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ – including the choice of the word

‘crisis’ – are not innocent but pregnant values emanating from secondary sources.

The next section interrogates representation of the land issue, the economic crisis and

Zimbabwe’s international relations by the state-owned and privately-owned media.

Representation of the land issue

The land issue has indisputably been viewed as the epicentre of the Zimbabwean crisis

particularly after the introduction of the ‘fast-track’ land reform programme also known as

the Third Chimurenga4 (or Jambanja5).

Political gimmick or correction of historical injustices?

Media representations of land reform reflected deep-seated and irreconcilable ideological

differences between the state and the privately-owned media, with the state media

advocating land reform on grounds of correcting ‘historical injustices’ while the private

press opposed it as a political gimmick by the ZANU-PF government.

For example, an opinion article in the newspaper by David Mills argued that land was

being used as a diversionary tactic or political gimmick. Mills opined thus:

We are being drawn into debates on the land issue and the rule of anarchy, when the mostserious and pressing problem that we should be debating and concentrating on is the rapidlydeclining state of the economy, and how will the economy be restored to a more viable level.(Mills 2000)

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Another opinion piece in the Daily News argued that the crisis was about ‘good

governance and not the land issue’, a sentiment which appeared to echo the opposition

MDC’s position and attitude towards the situation in the country (Guma 2002, p. 2).

Guma wrote:

To say land issue is the issue in Zimbabwe is a paralysis of analysis. Land is a smokescreenand Mugabe knew he could exploit the mistrust and differences in the global village tocobble up an excuse for lawlessness, the dictator’s haven. That it took 20 years for Mugabe toact on the land question seems lost to the solidarity bloc who feels he is righting colonialwrongs. (ibid.)

In order to show that they did not support redistribution of land, the private press

characterized the programme as ‘violent seizure of farms’, ‘land grab’, ‘barbaric’, or

‘illegal farm occupations’. War veterans and peasants who occupied farms were labelled

‘thugs, squatters’, ‘goons’, ‘hoodlums’, ‘Mugabe cronies’, etc. One would be forgiven for

thinking that the ‘reluctance’ or inability of newly-resettled farmers to farm was a result of

genetic causes.

In contrast the public press referred to the land redistribution exercise as meant to

‘correct historical imbalances’ while land occupiers were constructed as ‘peaceful

demonstrators’, thus downplaying violence on the farms. In order to show that the land

issue was not a political gimmick but an unfinished item on the country’s decolonization

agenda, the public press made attempts to historicize the issue. Numerous opinion pieces

were published in order to put the issue ‘into perspective’. Examples are former Zambian

president Kenneth Kaunda’s piece headlined ‘Western countries wrong’ (The Herald, 6

June 2007), Neil Thomas, ‘Zim suffering externally driven’ (TheHerald, 14 January 2007),

Baffour Ankomah, ‘West’s policy on Africa odious’ (The Saturday Herald, 15 February

2000), and ‘Anglo-Saxon racism with Zim over land (The Sunday Mail, 20 April 2008).

An opinion piece in The Chronicle (31 May 2000) gave a blow-by-blow account of the

land issue starting with the signing of the Rudd Concession in 1888, up to events leading to

the Lancaster House Conference in 1979, and then up to the fall-out between Zimbabwe and

Britain in 1997. Meanwhile, Ankomah’s piece had chronicled events leading to the final

showdown between Zimbabwe and Britain demonstrating how the letter of former British

Minister for International Development, Clare Short,6 to the government in 1997 became

the last straw that broke the camel’s back when the British formally denied responsibility

for funding land reform (Ankomah 2000). Thus, Britain is blamed for reneging on

promises to fund the land reform in Zimbabwe. Historicizing the land issue helped construct

ZANU-PF as a mass party committed to seeing to it that the final phase of the liberation is

achieved. Heightened international condemnation of the land issue forced the public media

to resort to news that portrayed land reform in a positive light. Voices that were perceived as

‘neutral’ or outsiders who endorsed the land reform were particularly found useful.

The following headlines are testimony of the public media’s propensity for ‘feel-good

news’: ‘German delegation implores the state to intensify the land reform process’ (The

Herald, 10 March 2000); ‘Over 50pc South Africans support ex-combatants’ occupation

of farms’ (The Herald, 4 May 2000); ‘Anglican church backs land reform programme’

(The Herald, 13 April 2000);‘We support Zanu PF on land issue: former ZIPRA members’

(The Herald, 25 April 2000); ‘Methodist church welcomes land talks’ (The Herald, 2 May

2000);‘ZCTU calls for speedy land redistribution’ (The Herald, 2 May 2000);‘Communal

farmers support farm invasions’ (The Herald, 9 June 2000); ‘SA demonstrations support

Zim war veterans’ (The Herald, 27 May 2000); and ‘Zambia backs land reform

programme’ (The Herald, 9 June 2000).

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Voices opposed to land reform were marginalized, resulting in a narrower debate than

it could possibly have been. The public press therefore fell short in terms of giving a

holistic picture of the land issue. Therefore the relationship between the state and

privately-owned newspapers vis-a-vis the land issue became a struggle over meaning and

the ability to win the hearts and minds of people. The social responsibility role of the press

was thus shunted to the margins with the consequence that discourse on land reform

became selective, simplistic and self-serving.

Hyperbole and ‘feel-good journalism’

Contrary to the public press’s positive portrayal of land reform, the private press tried as

much as possible to delegitimize it. The private press accentuated violence while

downplaying the desire for land resulting from historical injustices, a point acknowledged

even by the most strident critics of land reform. In order to delegitimize land reform the

private press employed hyperbole and apocalyptic prophecies particularly with regard to

the food security situation in the country. In the post-fast-track land reform period,

numerous articles were published to prove that land reform was the ‘midwife’ of the

country’s economic misery. Such views are reflected in headlines such as: ‘100,000 may

die’(The Daily News, 9 July 2003); ‘Malnutrition on the rise’ (The Standard, 16 January

2005); ‘Sugar production hits low levels’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 5 November

2004); ‘Maize meal runs out’ (The Standard, 9 January 2005); and ‘Wheat shortfall looms’

(The Zimbabwe Independent, 30 May 2003).

An opinion piece in The Daily News (12 December 2003) headlined ‘Only 12 days left

to save Zimbabwe from famine’ graphically illustrates the use of hyperbole to delegitimize

land reform. It rehashed the ‘prophecies’ made at the onset of land reform that the process

would result in unprecedented famine. The author warned that: ‘There are only twelve

days left before Christmas . . . All of us know that by Christmas it is too late to plant maize.

Even the shortest season do not do well if they are planted too late in the season’ (Buckle

2003). Instructive to note is that the author had been prompted to write after an earlier

edition of the Daily News had published an aerial photograph showing ‘thousands’ of

hectares of uncultivated arable farmland leading to the conclusion that famine was

‘looming’.

Blame was laid on ‘lazy’ beneficiaries of the land reform programme thereby evoking

racial undertones where white commercial farmers are constructed as ‘messiahs’.

Simplification and radicalization of the land issue imposes limitations on the media’s

ability to unpack the land issue since it amounts to stereotyping.

It has been noted that communal farmers have been producing over 70% of

Zimbabwe’s staple maize (Ndlela 2005, p. 84). Ndlela observes that:

White farmers are portrayed as benevolent, hard workers, and the source of food and foreigncurrency for Zimbabwe . . . These assertions are only partially true. It cannot be deniedthat white farmers contributed immensely towards the economy through the production ofcash crops, such as tobacco, but the role of the black communal farmer should not beundervalued . . . (ibid.)

If the private press is guilty of cynicism which prevented it from acknowledging ‘positive’

aspects of land reform, the public press should be faulted for viewing the land issue

through rose-tinted lenses and for constructing it through the narrow prism of government.

The public press also ignored the dislocation (though it could be temporary) that could

result from the land reform. The public media also ignored or gave token attention to

violence on the farms, sometimes euphemistically referring to land occupations as

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‘peaceful demonstrations’ or ‘spontaneous demonstrations by land-hungry peasants’

when the reality on the ground was violence. Violence in the farms was sanitized

through silence, often treating the death of white farmers as ‘unfortunate isolated

incidents’. An example is where President Mugabe is quoted in The Herald (17 April

2000) saying:

To us what the war veterans have done is a clear demonstration that the government has

delayed in redistributing land. This is a clear peaceful demonstration and there is no problem

with that . . . We warned the farm owners not to resist, fight or take up arms. And should they

do that, we shall not be responsible for the consequences. Those who have tried to fight have

created problems for themselves. It is difficult for us to protect them should they trigger

violence . . . What this must be seen as is a revolution: a struggle that cannot be corrected by

the trespass law, but by the equitable and just land redistribution . . . When Ian Smith declared

Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the British ruled out the use of force to take him out

of power. Yet the same people would want us to use force on war veterans on a peaceful

demonstration . . . They forget that yesterday, they were the oppressors. Where was their

democracy, human rights and the rule of law when we were being oppressed, dying and being

tortured in detention camps and being killed for pursuing the liberation struggle.

The public press failed to acknowledge that as much as there was land hunger among

peasants and war veterans, it was with the tacit endorsement (if not encouragement) of the

state.

Against this background white farmers were constructed as villains rather than victims.

The public press instead accentuated violence visited upon blacks by commercial farmers.

An example is the death of Phibian Mapenzauswa, a prospective new farmer in Odzi7 who

was allegedly run over and killed by commercial farmer Phillip Bezuidenhout. The Herald

(16 July 2000) reported that Bezuidenhout said he wanted to kill 15 settlers to celebrate the

passing of the US Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Bill which provided for sanctions

on Zimbabwe. It was also reported that earlier some youths had attacked settlers using

machetes. Mapenzauswa’s death was given prominence in the public press and

government sources were invited to comment on the incident; among them was the then

Minister of Information and Publicity Professor Jonathan Moyo who said: ‘This is a

callous, premeditated, cold bloodied murder which smacks of the Ku Klux Klan-type of

murders done in the United States and South Africa’ (The Herald, 16 July 2001) An

opinion piece in The Herald (23 July 2000) described the killing of Mapenzauswa as an

‘evil and wicked perpetrated with the sole aim of appeasing the devil’ (Matonga 2000).

In contrast to the public press, the privately-owned press blamed war veterans for the

‘orgy of violence’ while downplaying the killing, with the Zimbabwe Independent (20 July

2000) focusing on violence that followed after the death of Mapenzauswa. In a story

headlined ‘Zimbabwe militants run amok’ the paper reported that: ‘Angry war veterans

have gone on an orgy of looting on the three farms owned by the family of

Philip Bezuidenhout, who drove over and killed a land invader on one of his farms on

Monday’ (ibid.).

On the other hand the Daily News (17 July 2000) led with a story headlined ‘War vets

on the warpath in Odzi’ and, like The Zimbabwe Independent, emphasized the subsequent

violence rather than Phibian’s death. Bezuidenhout (the perpetrator of the killing) was the

only one interviewed in the story complaining about the alleged ‘ransacking’ of his house

by ex-combatants. This shows that press reporting and meaning construction around the

land issue was a battle for hegemony between the two media camps. Their ability to report

truthfully and professionally was thoroughly compromised.

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Humanism and ‘worthy victims’

In this polarized context it was not possible for readers to have full knowledge of what

exactly was happening, since each side of the press became hostage to political forces. In

the process, the truth became the first casualty. White commercial farmers were constructed

as the aggressors rather than the victims. For instance, violence was attributed to

commercial farmers who provoked newly-resettled farmers and deaths were attributed to

‘unknown gunmen’ or ‘assailants’. With the exception of Martin Olds, a Nyamandlovu

farmer who was reported by The Herald (19 April 2000) to have been ‘shot dead by war

veterans’, and Macheke farmer David Stevens (allegedly shot dead by war veterans

[The Herald, 17 April 2000], agency for the violence was always attributed to ‘unknown

people’. An example is the death of Beatrice farmer Stewart Dun, who was reported by The

Herald (9 May 2000) to have been murdered by ‘a gang of six men at his Maasplem Farm’.

On the other hand, the privately-owned press downplayed violence on commercial

farm workers and newly resettled farmers creating a simplistic dichotomy of ‘Angels’ and

‘Devils’. Examples of headlines that illustrate this are: ‘Ex-fighters hold farmer hostage

for three days’ (The Daily News, 9 July 2001); ‘Another white farmer killed’ (The Daily

News, 19 April 2000); and ‘Abducted farmer escapes death’ (The Daily News, 12

December 2000).

The press reports on violence on white farmers were saturated with what Jo Harvey

(2000, p. 5) calls ‘humanist rhetoric’, whereby white commercial farmers were depicted as

‘tremendously good’ people in order to wring sympathy from the audience. According to

Harvey, humanist rhetoric employs too much detailed information about a victim whereby

we get to know about the ‘victim’s name, name of family members (including pets), his

lifestyle and other mundane details’. An example of this is found in a front-page story

published by The Standard (11 July 2004) and headlined ‘Commercial farmer under siege

at farm’. This was a story about a commercial farmer in Chiredzi whose farm had allegedly

been invaded by ZANU-PF ‘militias’ who laid siege to his house. Part of the story read:

Yesterday, at one point, Harrison (64) and his son Russell (32) had to hide in their lockedhouse with all the curtains closed as the militia surrounded the property threatening todeal with them. Interviewed by The Standard while holed in the house, Harrison said hefeared anything could happen to them and had already requested friends to come to theirassistance . . . ‘We are in a difficult position. We have no arms. We can’t defend ourselves.They seem to be everywhere outside’ said Harrison sounding distressed.

The emotive language used makes it impossible for the reporter to be objective. Other than

the victim no other source is quoted.

Chomsky and Herman (cited by Harvey 2000) note that the media tend to choose

‘worthy victims’ who are featured prominently and dramatically. These victims are then

‘humanized’ and their victimization will receive detail and context that will generate

sympathetic emotion (Harvey 2000, p. 9). The private press treats white commercial

farmers as ‘worthy victims’ thus masking other issues about the land issue. The use of

humanistic rhetoric interferes with the media’s role to give a broader perspective of the

land issue.

Representation of the economy

There could be no better way of understanding the Zimbabwean crisis than examining its

economic manifestations. The private and public press gave contrasting images of the

economic crisis. In the private press headlines focused largely on symptoms of economic

decay as typified by sensational headlines such as: ‘Zimbabwe crisis assumes deadening

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proportions’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 26 October 2007); ‘Enough madness’ (The

Daily News, 29 July 2003); ‘Meat crisis deepens as CSC disrupts Zim’s eating habits’ (The

Zimbabwe Independent, 10–16 August 2007); ‘Boarding school closes as food crisis

worsens’ (The Standard, 9 September 2007); ‘Paralysed’ (The Daily News, 19 March

2003); ‘Zimbabwe sliding back into troubled waters’ (The Sunday Mirror, 1 May

2005);‘Hunger ravages Masvingo’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 4 November 2003); and

‘Crumbling NRZ coaches’ (The Standard, 24 November 2002).

Through these sensational headlines, the private press sought to attract readers’

attention to humanitarian aspects of the economic crisis. They also possibly sought to

nudge citizens to take a more active role in the politics of the country. The private press

largely blamed President Mugabe and his government, corruption, land reform and the

Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, for the economic crisis. In an editorial headlined

‘The choice is clear’, published a month before the 2002 presidential elections, The

Standard (10 February 2002) urged voters to reject President Mugabe charging that he

authored the country’s economic crisis, stating:

Some of the unpopular and costly decisions the 77 year old leader has made include theawarding of the unbudgeted gratuities to war veterans which sucked an unbudgeted $4 billionfrom the fiscus in 1997. This irresponsible move saw the country’s currency dramaticallyplunge overnight and also marked the beginning of the current economic crisis. Mugabeshould also be held accountable for the infamous DRC misadventure which has costZimbabwe billions of dollars as well as substantial toll in human life while our health systemcollapsed. But 2000 is arguably the year the mercurial Mugabe revealed his true colours.

This sentiment is echoed in The Financial Gazette, which is widely believed to be owned

by Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, which wrote thus:

the land reform initiative has been a miserable failure, giving credence to the widely heldbelief that the rushed agrarian reforms are a seal of death on the once vibrant sector. Thus itmight therefore seem impolitic to draw too much attention to this. But that is a fact and there isno gainsaying it.

While this is partially true, it is something of an oversimplification of the Zimbabwean

crisis. The private press gave selective accounts of the problem in order to suit their

ideological positions. They deny that Zimbabwe is suffering from debilitating effects of

economic sanctions resulting from the US Zimbabwe Democracy Recovery Act of 2001 as

noted by several scholars (Moyo and Yeros 2007, Mamdani 2008, Gowans 2008, Stone

2007, Mkenda 2009). We are not told about the impact of the collapse of various bilateral

funding arrangements, the failure of ESAP and various acts of economic sabotage including

stay-aways8 on the economy. Moyo and Yeros (2007) contend that the Zimbabwean

economy has been subject to economic sanctions since 1998 when Britain imposed an

embargo on the sale of military equipment, the suppression of aid by IMF and the World

Bank, and the freezing of development assistance which contracted from US$562 million in

1994 to US$190 million by the year 2000.

Gowans (2008, p. 5) asserts that:

the US Zimbabwe Democracy Act (ZDERA) reduces Zimbabwe’s access to foreign currencyit needs to import necessities from abroad, including chemicals to treat drinking water, asignificant point in the recent cholera outbreak. Development aid from the World Bank is alsocut off denying the country access to funds to build and repair the infrastructure needed to runa modern economy. Rather than banning the export of goods to Zimbabwe (popularunderstanding of sanctions) the US has made importing goods a challenge.

The Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ), a non-governmental

organization critical of ZANU-PF, notes that the private press failed to make an informed

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analysis of ZDERA which had the effect of ‘freezing international assistance’ to

Zimbabwe. The Financial Times, a British newspaper, also acknowledges the negative

effect of sanctions reporting that: ‘Mr Mugabe and his regime have been remarkably

resilient. The country is enduring de facto sanctions; the IMF and World Bank have frozen

loans, aid is limited to humanitarian needs and foreign investment has dried up’ (cited in

Ahmed 2002, p. 5).

Most recently the Finance Minister in the Zimbabwe coalition government, Tendai

Biti, told SW Radio, a pirate station based in Britain, that ZDERA was a major obstacle to

the country’s economic recovery stating that:

if you consider for instance, the World Bank right now has billions and billions of dollars that

we have to access but we can’t access unless we have dealt with and normalized our relationswith IMF . . . We cannot normalize our relations with IMF because of the voting power. It’s a

veto power of America and people who represent America on that board (who) cannot vote

differently because of ZDERA, so it is critical.

An online publication later remarked that:

Biti’s admission that US sanctions on Zimbabwe have an economic impact shatters a long

advanced argument by western nations and supporters of the MDC, the former opposition

party now in coalition with President Robert Mugabe’s Zanu PF, that these sanctions are

‘targeted’ at senior government officials accused of human rights violations. (New Zimbabwe,

7 May 2009)

The selective omission of facts and the failure of the private press to scrutinize the causes

of the Zimbabwean crisis, and in particular the issue of sanctions, in a holistic and

balanced manner is a serious indictment of the private press which often acts in a

watchdog role on the media in contemporary Zimbabwe.

The public press is equally culpable. Apart from shying away from the word ‘crisis’,

particularly during its formative stages (preferring the word ‘challenges’), the public press

demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the truth. The public press was largely silent about

inflation figures and other negative economic indicators. Stories on the rising cost of living

would be tucked inside the pages while at the same time government programmes such as

the National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP) were lavishly and

uncritically lauded on the front pages of the public press. MMPZ notes that The Herald

(8 June 2003) buried its announcement on the rise of the monthly cost of living and the

increase in the rate of inflation in its business section. The newspaper quoted an official of

the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe urging ‘all Zimbabweans to rally behind the National

Economic Development Priority Programme for the betterment of the economic situation’.

The tendency to portray an overly optimistic outlook of the economy is also demonstrated

in a Sunday Mail (3 June 2003) news report that said:

although the rise in inflation was expected . . . there is a positive trend in the statistics

announced on Friday . . . because food inflation has started going down . . . as more food

makes its way to the market from the last season’s harvest the impact will be felt more.

(MMPZ 2003)

Unlike the privately-owned press which saw doom and gloom, the public press depicted a

picture of ‘the best possible worlds’, often insinuating that there is ‘light at the end of the

tunnel’ – except that there was no cogent reason to believe that it was so. When the

government introduced bearer cheques9 the public press greeted this event with

excitement with The Herald (19 September 2003) quoting the then Minister of Finance,

Herbert Murerwa, saying: ‘This measure, which will go a long way in increasing the

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availability of cash and facilitating queues that have greatly inconvenienced the public and

business, has been carried out after extensive consultations with various stakeholders . . . ’

Amid the avalanche of criticism and blame directed at the ZANU-PF government, the

public press resembled a public relations arm of the government stridently deflecting

blame from it. A case in point is a story in The Herald (13 August 2003) headlined

‘Government move on bank notes laudable’, where it was reported that: ‘The decision by

the government to phase out notes and replace them with a new one, while introducing a

$1000 note seems to be the tonic that the country needs to bring back sanity to the bank

note shortage’. The newspaper failed to understand that replacing old notes with new ones

would not address the root causes of the economic crisis. It was lost on it that the problems

bedevilling the economy ran deeper than they portrayed. Another example of this ‘best of

all possible worlds’ scenario depicted in the public press was demonstrated in a story

published in The Chronicle (6 June 2000) headlined ‘Shortage of fuel set to ease’, where it

was claimed that the fuel situation in the country was set to improve after fuel companies

received deliveries. Such headlines were so common in the public press that members of

the public often sarcastically remarked that ‘fuel is only available in the newspapers’,

indicating a loss of confidence in the press.

A poignant example of this kind of ‘feel-good’ journalism is also evidenced in a

Sunday Mail story (15–21 July 2007) headlined ‘Shopping madness order of the day as

prices go down; Christmas in Harare’, where it was reported that members were doing

shopping like it was Christmas time after the government had forced retailers to reduce

their prices in a clampdown. The newspapers described the clampdown as a welcome

move which gave long-suffering consumers a reprieve. The newspaper failed to anticipate

the backlash which would follow, resulting in a shortage of basic commodities and empty

shelves which became a source of a propaganda campaign in the international media.

Because of the overly optimistic view of the public press on the country’s economic

problems it is possible that some of its readers could have developed cognitive dissonance

given the fact that what they read was at odds with their lived reality.

Monetary policy, budget and cynicism

The optimistic view of the public press is worlds apart from the private press’s representation

of issues such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. In the private press the budget was often

cynically constructed as a non-‘event’ or simply a ‘damp squib’. An example is an opinion

piece published in The Standard (3 November 2003) headlined ‘Trillion dollar charade’,

where the writer dismissed the 2004 budget presented by Minister Herbert Murerwa as a

‘trillion dollar charade’. In the Zimbabwean Independent, 7 September 2007), a story

headlined ‘Budget deception at its worst’ quotes ‘analysts’ who say the budget had nothing

to offer. One ‘analyst’ says: ‘It seems the minister is very generous in allocating what he

does not have. It is obvious he cannot deliver what he has provided’.

Monetary policy, which had become synonymous with Reserve Bank Governor

Gideon Gono, is equally represented in a cynical way. An example of such a headline in

the privately-owned press is: ‘Wrong doc to cure Zim’s economic ills’ (The Zimbabwe

Independent, 16–22 February 2007). In the article Gono is blamed for downgrading the

economy from being ‘an outpatient to one confined to the intensive care unit’. There is a

great deal of personalization of the crisis around Gono, demonstrated in headlines such

as: ‘Failure is the only option for Gono’ (The Standard, 28 August 2005); ‘Gono stutters’

(The Standard, 20–26 May 2005); ‘Sun sets for Gono’; and ‘Gono admits failure’

(The Zimbabwe Independent, 20 May 2005).

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It is, however, instructive to note that Gono is hardly criticized in his personal capacity

in The Financial Gazette, a newspaper he is believed to own. Instead he has been ‘ring-

fenced’ from criticism. In fact when he appeared to make headway in his war against

inflation in 2004 he was feted by and was once described as an ‘anti-inflation hawk’ –

whereas it has become almost taboo for the private press to portray anyone with ZANU-PF

links in glowing terms. It is customary for The Financial Gazette to criticize government

collectively while treating Gono and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe with velvet gloves.

An example is a commentary in the The Financial Gazette (6–12 October 2005). The

Governor is spared the ‘rod’ while government’s knuckles are rapped after Gono gently

criticized renewed farm occupations which had resurfaced around the country. The paper

commented:

Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor, Gideon Gono’s exasperated undertones over thecontinued agrarian reforms – ironically meant to unlock the economy’s undoubted immensegrowth potential – is understandable. The governor pulled no punches last week when hecalled those invading farms criminals. And deservedly so . . . Gono was never to be at loss forwords, which are both opprobrious and apt in expressing his distaste and frustration.

The impression created by the article was that Gono was the voice of reason whistling in

the wilderness. While other privately-owned newspapers personally blamed Gono for the

country’s economic problems, The Financial Gazette sought to represent him as a

hardworking and sincere person who was being let down. The dynamics of ownership and

control are playing themselves out here demonstrating the fragility of the private–public

dichotomy in Zimbabwe.

Protests and stay-aways by the opposition and civic groups were constructed as

legitimate struggles which would deliver a political solution to the country’s problems. An

example is the Daily News (19 March 2003) coverage of MDC’s protests in 2003.

The newspaper reported in a celebratory tone that ‘business had been brought to a virtual

stand-still by protesters in Harare’. The newspaper concentrated on how business

people had heeded the call to close shops. Its tabloid-like lead story headlined ‘Paralysed’

overtly endorsed the violent protests. Its commentary in the same edition, headlined

‘Better planning needed’, rang like a manual on how to conduct street protests. The paper

asserted that:

It is vital that word about the mass stay-away should be communicated from top to the bottomnationwide. There must be an understanding of what should be done next after such anexercise because there is a high expectation of immediate change among the people. Whensuch change fails to take place they might conclude that it was a futile exercise.

The Zimbabwe Independent (6 June 2003) was equally enthusiastic after the MDC staged a

Ukrainian-style mass action in Harare, dubbed ‘The Final Push’. The writer said:

Meanwhile the MDC will have to regard this week’s events as a test run. In other countrieswhere mass action has succeeded it has progressed by steps. There is no initial big bang. Just aseries of increasingly louder eruptions. The three-day stay-away, shorter and sharper maybemore effective than five.

Such reporting is typical of advocacy reporting where the media openly lobby on behalf of

a special interest and all pretence of objectivity and balance is cast to the wind. By

supporting business closures, the paper appreciates the cumulative effect of stay-aways on

the already ailing economy.

In sharp contrast to the privately-owned press, stay-aways and protests were projected

by the public press as the work of economic saboteurs – agents of ‘regime change’. In an

opinion piece in The Sunday Mail (1–7 April 2007) by the then Minister of Labour,

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Nicholas Goche, it was alleged that the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)

stay-away was meant to please the ‘Western world’. As a consequence, blame for the

economic malaise was apportioned to stay-aways and work stoppages. For example, in

the same opinion piece a link was made between the opposition MDC violent protests

and the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries. The article argued that

sanctions were meant to make the ‘economy scream’ as much as the opposition-

orchestrated demonstrations were meant to make the economy haemorrhage. Over-

emphasizing external causes made it impossible for the public press to consider internal

causes of the economic crisis such as corruption and bad business practices.

Representation of international relations

Zimbabwe’s international relations, particularly the relations with its former colonial

master Britain, have been a staple subject in the media, not least in the local press. Souring

relations have been a key catalyst for keeping the country in the spotlight. The private

press has moved from a position of encouraging the country to remain engaged in the

‘international community’ (a code-word for Britain and the United States of America) to

one where it has tacitly and overtly supported isolation of the country and its leadership.

When President Robert Mugabe threatened to pull out of the Commonwealth in 2003

The Standard (30 November 2003) warned that the country’s economic problems would

worsen, pointing out the benefits of staying engaged in the ‘community of nations’. The

newspaper commented:

Britain is the second largest bilateral donor fighting hunger in Zimbabwe and is contributing26 million pounds over five years to help tackle the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Apart from that it issupporting community based projects across Zimbabwe which benefit poor people and is amajor trading partner.

The paper sought to construct Zimbabwe’s pulling out as ill-advised and irresponsible.

On the other hand the public press tended to emphasize sovereignty of the nation,

arguing that the Commonwealth symbolized the perpetuation of a colonial relationship

between African countries and their former colonial masters. The private press argued that

in the absence of tangible economic benefits sovereignty was ‘nothing more than a

nebulous concept’.

In the subsequent fall-out between Zimbabwe and Britain, the private press

constructed the event as the result of ‘obstinate Mugabe’ and being a consequence of

violation of human rights and rule of law. As a result the private press overtly supported

isolation of the country and its leadership. Examples of headlines which testify this are:

‘US warns Mugabe’ (Daily News, 29 May 2003); ‘Zim’s readmission tragedy for Africa’

(Zimbabwe Independent, 21 February 2003); ‘Mugabe increasingly isolated’ (The

Zimbabwean, 22–28 March 2007); and ‘Zim in the dock’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 8

February 2002). In the story headlined ‘US warns Mugabe’ (Daily News, 29 May 2003)

the newspaper reported that US president G.W. Bush had warned Mugabe for clamping

down on street protesters. The paper reported thus: ‘The US, fresh from militarily toppling

Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein with the support of Britain, did not say in its statement how

it would react to any violent suppression of demonstrations’. By evoking the US/UK

invasion of Iraq, an impression was created that the newspaper also supported military

intervention in Zimbabwe, something that would not be in the national interest. Thus

Britain and its European allies, and the United States to some extent, were viewed as

holding the key to Zimbabwe’s problems since they had the power to ‘discipline Mugabe’.

It was on the basis of this assumption that we have headlines like: ‘EU swoops on Mugabe’

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(The Standard, 7–13 October 2001); ‘Belgium, France, SA have a duty to disown killers’

(The Zimbabwe Independent, 6 March 2001); ‘Bush presses Mbeki to act on Zimbabwe’

(The Daily News, 10 July 2003); ‘Tsvangirai welcomes US commitment to end crisis’ (The

Daily News, 10 July 2003); and ‘Blair, Howard tighten screws on Zimbabwe’ (The

Zimbabwe Independent, 9 April 2003). To a large measure, these headlines show that the

private press viewed the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis as hinging on external

intervention, including military intervention.

While the private press maintained that the fall-out between Zimbabwe and Britain

was a result of the former’s violation of human rights, the public press constructed frozen

relations between the two countries as a bilateral misunderstanding over the land issue.

Britain was blamed for reneging on its earlier promises to fund land reform, funding the

opposition and for mobilizing the international community to isolate Zimbabwe. The

dispute was also framed in racial terms whereby Britain was accused of protecting its ‘kith

and kin’ while ignoring the plight of landless blacks. This sentiment was aptly captured in

an opinion column in The Herald (27 February 2007) thus:

All European nations – Britain included – know fully well that the tiff between Zimbabweand Britain is bilateral; know that in terms of all benchmarks of material democracy,Zimbabwe is as nonesuch on the continent; indeed know that even in the present deeprecession Zimbabwe is well above her peers across all measurements of human welfare . . .

It was consistently argued that the land issue rather than human rights was the main cause

of the fall-out. Thus Britain was constructed as a spiteful and unrelenting demon angling

for regime change in order to subvert a ‘democratically’ elected government. As a

consequence Britain and the US were derisively projected as ‘bully-boys’. A number of

scholars have traced the genesis of Zimbabwe and Britain’s fall-out over the land issue

(Ahmed 2002, Stone 2007, Chigora 2006). Chigora characterizes the conflict between

Zimbabwe and Britain as a ‘conflict of values’. He contends that:

There is need for Western countries especially Britain and the United States to desist fromchampioning human rights, rule of law and governance especially narrowly defining theseterms in terms of their own national interest. This will result in conflict of values betweennations leading to antagonism and consequent decline of relations. (Chigora 2006, p. 67)

SADC, Mbeki and ‘quiet diplomacy’

The role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and in particular

South Africa has featured prominently in the Zimbabwean press. Consistent with its belief

that Zimbabwe’s solution would come from outside rather than from within, SADC is

constructed by the private press as having the ‘muscle’ and leverage to put pressure on

President Mugabe to step down from power. Thus, we have the Zimbabwe Independent

(25–31 August 2006) in a story headlined ‘SADC confirm Zim as a trouble spot’ where it

was reported that Zimbabwe had been discussed in a special SADC session held in

Lesotho, prompting President Mugabe to leave in a huff before the summit officially

closed. The newspaper quoted the prime minister of Lesotho ‘confirming’ that Zimbabwe

and Swaziland had been described as ‘barriers to regional economic integration’.

South Africa, and in particular its former president Thabo Mbeki, is represented as a

‘Big Brother’ with the wherewithal to bring change in Zimbabwe using his country’s

economic muscle and is criticized for his ‘quiet diplomacy’ (a code-word for failing to put

pressure on President Mugabe to step down). Mbeki is regularly criticized for ‘not taking

action against Zimbabwe’. Examples of such headlines are: ‘History will charge Mbeki

harshly over Zimbabwe’ (The Standard, 11 January 2003); and ‘Mbeki stance on Mugabe

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criticized’ (The Standard, 21 December 2000). The Standard (11 January 2003) reported

that Mbeki, as an international statesman, had the leverage to put pressure on Mugabe but

had elected to do nothing about it. The paper wrote:

The South African leader must surely know that he faces the real risk of losing hisinternational stature as one of Africa’s hopes if he clings to the notion that the solution to thiscountry with continuing to accommodate President Mugabe . . . Mbeki has only to slaphimself in the face to realize that he actually holds the trump card to restore Zimbabwe and –thereby the rest of Southern Africa – to the promised path of development and glory . . . Thefunny thing is that he knows that this is the only solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis . . .

In contrast to the privately-owned press’s ‘Big Brother’ image of SADC, the public

press emphasized solidarity with SADC being constructed as true friends and brothers who

had helped repudiate the neo-colonial machinations of the West. President Mugabe’s

warm receptions at regional and international summits were feted and used to show that

the West’s neo-colonial agenda was failing. Examples of headlines which suggest this are:

‘SADC summit an eye opener for the West’ (The Sunday Mail, 1–7 April 2007); ‘In

Tanzania, Zimbabwe is more than a friend’ (The Sunday Mail, 11–17 June 2006); ‘SADC

ministers rap media for demonizing Zimbabwe’ (The Herald, 12 December 2001); ‘SADC

leaders back Zim land stance’ (The Sunday Mail, 23 April 2000); ‘Solution to Zim’s woes

lies with Zimbabweans’ (The Herald, 20 May 2003); and ‘SA a true friend’ (The

Chronicle, Comment, 3 June 2000).

A commentary in The Sunday Mail (1–7 April 2007) succinctly shows how the public

press accentuated regional and continental solidarity towards Zimbabwe while

suppressing dissenting voices from individual SADC members such as Botswana’s Ian

Khama and Zambia’s Levy Mwanawasa, who is reported to have described Zimbabwe as a

‘sinking Titan’ (Nkonde 2007):

The just-ended one-day SADC extraordinary summit in Dar es Salaam, attended by 10 headsof state and government, has once again offered Britain, the US and some of their reluctantWestern allies an opportunity to realize their misguided perception about the thinking ofliberated Africa. For the Western media, CNN and BBC in particular, had given the wholeworld the false impression that Zimbabwean Government, and President Mugabe inparticular, was going to be rapped on the knuckles for stopping an attempted MDC violentuprising.

The view that solutions for the country’s problems would come from within (with the help

of friends from the region) rather than from outside was emphasized in public press

reports. Former South African president Thabo Mbeki’s opinion piece expressing a similar

view was reproduced in The Sunday Mail (20 May 2003). Mbeki argued that:

Zimbabwe can only extricate herself from this crisis in conditions of political stability. Shewould be best placed to take the difficult decisions she has to take, if her political leadershipacted together, responding to a common national emergency, in the interest of all the people.

While the public press accentuated the view that the solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis should

be a homegrown one, the private press emphasized external intervention.

The Look East Policy

Another element of Zimbabwe’s foreign relations which featured prominently was

Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy which the country sought to promote after her fall-out with

the West. The private press projected it as unenviable and unfruitful for the people of

Zimbabwe. The country’s relationship with China was particularly projected in a negative

light, with the private press arguing that China had nothing to offer. Chinese products and

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merchandise in the country were disparaged and derisively labelled ‘Zhing-Zhongs’ and

became the butt of numerous jokes. Examples of negative headlines about this policy

include: ‘Gono slams Zhing-Zhongs’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 20 May 2005);

‘Zimbabwe envoy defends ‘Zhing-Zhongs’ (The Standard, 18 December 2005-); ‘No

Chinese reward for Mugabe’s spirited bluster’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 16–22

February 2007); and ‘Mugabe mortgages Zimbabwe’ (The Zimbabwe Independent, 5

October 2001). In a commentary, The Standard (29 June 2003) argued that Zimbabwe did

not have anything in common with Asian countries, economically, socially or culturally

and therefore there was nothing to be gained from the Look East Policy. The paper

asserted thus:

Clearly, we have very little in common with say Malaysia, Chinese or Thais other than that weare all members of the human species and belong to the developing world. It therefore doesnot make sense to seek to realign our economic needs with those countries which althoughmore prosperous than us are themselves in need of continuous development from the West.

The privately-owned press ignored historical affinities that exist between Zimbabwe and

Asian countries which go as far back as the liberation struggle, electing to accentuate the

non-existence of colonial ties.

On the other the public press emphasized Zimbabwe’s historical links with China and

other Asian countries that provided her with material support during the liberation

struggle. It was often suggested that it was fitting for China to help Zimbabwe during its

Third Chimurenga as much as she had rendered support during the Second Chimurenga.

The Look East Policy was often represented as ‘paying dividends’ as evidenced by the

increasing partnerships and joint ventures entered between the two countries. An opinion

piece in The Herald (17 February 2007) sums up the public press’s image of Zimbabwe–

China relations thus:

China is a vector of development on the continent. Even at commercial level Chinaemphasizes joint ventures yielding a win–win outcome. But what is more Chinese leadershipis humble enough to requite Africa’s visit, in the process consolidating the image of equalpeers . . . Resource-hungry China has simply docked here, served in good measure by herhistorical role as a benefactor in our hard fight for freedom. The Russian, it is the same storyunderlining how resources simply mould and melt attitudes, however hardened.

For the public press the Look East Policy provided an outlet to avoid economic suffocation

in the aftermath of frozen relations with the West. The public media’s perspective of

Zimbabwe’s foreign was therefore worlds apart from that of the privately-owned press.

Conclusion

This article has discussed the representation of the Zimbabwean crisis by the local press

focusing on the land issue, the economic situation and the country’s foreign relations. The

two press camps pursued completely different agendas, giving prominence to those

aspects of the crisis which fitted into their political agenda while suppressing those which

did not. The public press approached the land issue from a political economy perspective

and accentuated history and the need to redistribute land in order to correct social

injustices while downplaying the dislocation caused by the land reform on the agricultural

sector. On the other hand, the privately-owned press was informed by a neo-liberal

perspective which puts primacy on the sanctity of property rights, human rights and the

rule of law while ignoring existing social inequalities and the injustices of the past. On the

issue of the economy, the public press had an exaggerated sense of optimism about

prospects of economic recovery while the privately-owned press was cynical in its

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projection of the economic crisis and possible chances of recovery. On international

relations, both press supported the idea of international engagement. However the public

press emphasized the ‘Look East’ policy, while the privately-owned favoured a ‘Look

West’ policy. The two media camps employed different rhetorical devices in order to

manufacture public opinion about different aspects of the crisis. The capacity of the media

to distort and misrepresent reality through selective mechanisms which accentuate events

that suit and conform to certain ideologies and political agendas while suppressing

‘inconvenient’ facts is amply demonstrated in this article. It is a salutary example of how

‘crises’ impose severe technical limits on the media which prevent them from becoming

platforms for informed, open and balanced debates. The private press sought to draw the

public’s attention to the proportion of the crisis and to attribute agency to certain

individuals using hyperbole. On the other hand, the public press sought to depict the

situation in the best possible light and a lot of effort was expended deflecting blame from

those individuals. The entrenched positions of the two press camps made it impossible for

the citizenry to find common ground on the causes, extent and the solutions needed to

resolve the crisis. In the final analysis, it could be argued that the Zimbabwean press has

been part of the problem rather than the solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. In their

intoxicated and blind loyalty to political causes, the press lost an opportunity to analyse the

multiple layers attendant to the Zimbabwean crisis, thus abdicating their social

responsibility to inform and educate the public and to chart a viable way forward.

Notes

1. These newspapers folded in 1994 due to financial viability constraints.2. A fifth radio station, Voice of Zimbabwe which is based in Gweru, was introduced in 2007.

The state broadcaster was also scheduled to introduce a second television channel in December2009 but could not do so because of financial problems.

3. The statement is attributed to Patrick Chinamasa, a ZANU-PF minister of Justice.4. This is a Shona word for war of liberation. Shona is the dominant language spoken in Zimbabwe.5. This is a colloquial term for violence.6. Clare Short’s letter to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs stated categorically the British

government’s position that Britain would not be responsible for funding land reclamation inZimbabwe.

7. Odzi is in Manaicaland province.8. These were work stoppages, business closures and protests organized by the main labour

organization, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the then opposition MDC.9. Temporary currency introduced by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to address the problem of

cash shortage.

Notes on contributor

Tendai Chari is a Media Analyst and a Media Studies Lecturer in the Department of Communication,School of Human and Social Sciences, University of Venda, Republic of South Africa. His researchinterests are media representation, media ethics, media policy, and media and development.

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Newspaper articles

The Daily News, 2000. Another white farmer killed. The Daily News, 19 April.The Daily News, 2001. Ex-fighters hold farmer hostage for three days. The Daily News, 9 July.The Daily News, 2002. Abducted farmer escapes death. The Daily News, 12 December.The Daily News, 2003. War vets accused of extorting money to have farms delisted. The Daily News,

13 April.The Daily News, 2003. Better planning needed. The Daily News, 19 March.The Daily News, 2003. Paralysed. The Daily News, 19 March.The Daily News, 2003. US warns Mugabe. The Daily News, 29 May.The Daily News, 2005. 100 000 may die. The Daily News, 19 July.The Financial Gazette, 2004. Land reform gives away markets. The Financial Gazette, 3 January.The Financial Gazette, 2005. Government to blame. The Financial Gazette, 6–12 October.The Financial Gazette, 2006. Choice and consequence. The Financial Gazette, 24–30 August.The Herald, 2000. German delegation implores state to intensify land reform programme.

The Herald, 10 March.The Herald, 2000. Anglican church backs land reform programme. The Herald, 13 April.The Herald, 2000. White Macheke commercial farmer shot dead. The Herald, 17 April.The Herald, 2000. Nyamandlovu farmer dies in shootout with war veterans. The Herald, 19 April.The Herald, 2000. Methodist church welcomes land talks. The Herald, 2 May.The Herald, 2000. ZCTU calls for speedy land redistribution. The Herald, 2 May.The Herald, 2000. Over 50pc South Africans support ex-combatants’ occupation of farms.

The Herald, 4 May.The Herald, 2000. Beatrice farmer murdered. The Herald, 9 May.The Herald, 2000. We support Zanu PF on land issue Former ZIPRA members. The Herald, 25 May

2000.The Herald, 2000. Communal farmers support farm invasions. The Herald, 9 June.The Herald, 2000. SA demonstrations support Zim war veterans. The Herald, 9 June.The Herald, 2000. Zambia backs land reform programme. The Herald, 9 June.The Herald, 2001. US rights group expresses support for land redistribution. The Herald, 4 May.The Herald, 2001. Odzi farmer kills settler: resettled man ran over, dragged for 20m. The Herald, 16

July.The Herald, 2001. Farmers on war path. The Herald, 8 August.The Herald, 2003. Government move on banks laudable. The Herald, 13 August.The Herald, 2003. RBZ unveils new ‘notes’. The Herald, 17 September.The Standard, 2002. The choice is clear (Comment). The Standard, 10 February.The Standard, 2003. Budgeting for a non event. The Standard, 30 November.The Standard, 2003. Trillion dollar charade. The Standard, 30 November.The Standard, 2004. Commercial farmer under siege at farm. The Standard, 11 July.The Standard, 2005. Maize meal runs out. The Standard, 9 January.

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The Standard, 2005. Malnutrition on the rise. The Standard, 16 January.The Standard, 2005. Failure the only option for Gono. The Standard, 28 August.The Sunday Mail, 2000. House makes historical constitutional amendment. The Sunday Mail, 9

April.The Sunday Mail, 2000. Lest we forget; the other side of land grabbing. The Sunday Mail, 9 April.The Sunday Mail, 2000. Of colonial masters and third world leaders. The Sunday Mail, 9 April.The Sunday Mail, 2000. Farmers organize attacks on war vets; police issue stern warning.

The Sunday Mail, 2 July.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2001. Donors won’t fund illegal land reform – EU. The Zimbabwe

Independent, 4 September.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2001. 350 farms forced to close down. The Zimbabwe Independent, 28

September.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2002. Zim government in the dock. The Zimbabwe Independent, 8

February.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2003. Zim’s re-admission tragedy for Africa. The Zimbabwe

Independent, 21 February.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2004. Mugabe cronies 100 landless 0. The Zimbabwe Independent, 30

June.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2004. Wheat shortfall looms. The Zimbabwe Independent, 2 July.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2004. Sugar cane production hits new laws. The Zimbabwe

Independent, 5 November.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2005. Gono admits failure. The Zimbabwe Independent, 20 May.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2006. Regime to cling to power by force. The Zimbabwe Independent,

6 June.The Zimbabwe Independent, 2007. Wrong doc to cure Zim’s economic ills. The Zimbabwe

Independent, 16–22 February.The Zimbabwean, 2007. Mugabe increasingly isolated. The Zimbabwean, 22–28 March.

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