Saint-Simon and the Origins of Scientism and HistoricismAuthor(s): Peyton V. LyonSource: The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienned'Economique et de Science politique, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb., 1961), pp. 55-63Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Canadian Economics AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/139396Accessed: 28/05/2010 13:09

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SAINT-SIMON AND THE ORIGINS OF SCIENTISM AND HISTORICISM'

PEYTON V. LYON University of Western Ontario

CLAUDE-HENRI DE ROuv.ROY, comte de Saint-Simon, was born in 1760; his writings date from 1802 until his death in 1825. He is widely regarded as perhaps the most enthusiastic of all scientistic writers, and one of the most influential, but the nature and motivation of his scientism have been frequently misunderstood. Scientism I understand to be the belief that all, or virtually all, moral and political problems can be solved by methods similar to those used in the natural sciences. Historicism, a form which scientism very often takes, I would define as the revealing of laws of history by which, it is claimed, the future of man can be predicted. Exponents of scientism appear to have one or more of three different but related objectives: one, the pursuit of truth about man and society; the second, the acquisition of techniques to cure social ailments; the third, the re-establishment of ideological uniformity.

Saint-Simon had no interest in the first objective; truth for its own sake, indeed, was a notion of which he strongly disapproved. He thought more of the second, the therapeutic function of science. Having narrowly survived the French Revolution, he was obsessed with the need to re-establish social order on a new basis which would prevent the recurrence of such catastrophic upheavals. He believed that unrest would last until ideological uniformity had been reimposed and control over society transferred to new 6lites which, had they but the wit to recognize it, already possessed the elements of power.

The method chosen by Saint-Simon to promote social health was historicism. By professing to have discovered scientific laws of history, he attempted to show society where it was inexorably heading, and to inspire the coming 6lite to rise to its destiny by assuming control of society. Karl Marx has made familiar so much of Saint-Simon's historicism, without proper acknowledgment, that it would be tedious to do much more than catalogue the similarities and differences between the two exploitations of history. Saint-Simon's basic position was stated in the following declaration:

The law of human progress guides and dominates all. Men are only its instruments. Although this force derives from us, we can no more submit its movement to our influence ... than change at our whim the primitive force which impels our planet about the sun.... All we can do is consciously obey this law . . . ascertaining the course which it marks out for us, instead of being blindly pushed by it.'

Saint-Simon did not, however, wish to promote a passive fatalism. Instead he stated that secondarv effects are under human control,2 and that this enables

*This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in Kingston, June 10, 1959.

ICEuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin (hereafter cited as CEuvres), ed. Laurent de l'Ardeche, Fournel et al. (Paris, 1865-78), XX, 119.

2Ibid.

55

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56 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science

man either to accelerate or retard the march of history. His historicism revealed the broad lines of the future, thus permitting man to plan in order to speed and smooth the transition to the new social system. He reasoned that only the unforeseen is ever calamitous, and that crises could now be avoided or rendered painless.:

Society, he thought, had evolved by a progressive spiral of harmonious, organic eras alternating with questioning, revolutionary periods. He much preferred the first, but contended that neither could be skipped: ". . . each improvement . .. has been the result of a great crisis."4 "Each epoch has its limits which are impossible to cross, and to seek to pass beyond them means retarding rather than accelerating the progress of civilization.... Every organic period is characterized by a dominant class whose talents and ideology make its members the ideal rulers for society at that particular stage of its intellectual and technological development. "There is nothing good, nothing bad, absolutely speaking. Everything is relative-that is the only absolute; everything is relative, above all to the time, in so far as social institutions are concerned."6 "Nature inspires ... at each epoch the most suitable form of govern- ment."7 Earlier writers had emphasized the need for rule by an elite; Saint- Simon's contribution was to insist that the elite had to possess talents and an outlook appropriate to the needs of society at the particular stage of its development.

Since ruling 6lites tend to ossify, it had been necessary for progressive ideas and techniques to be developed by new classes which originated and grew up within the framework of the established order. Elements in the ruling elite unwittingly assisted the creation of the class which would later displace them. During its growth, the rising class unconsciously perfected the organization and ideology appropriate to the next organic era. But it could not take over without a prolonged struggle, or until the foundations of the new order had been completed. Most of Saint-Simon's history dealt with mass phenomena; it was very largely the story of class struggle since in it the mechanism of progress was the displacement of one ruling class by a new one. He created the myth of the unique virtue and infallibility of the rising class and appointed himself the philosopher, historian, teacher and advocate of the progressive class of his day.

This he called the "industrial" class. He was the more fervent in promoting its interests because he believed it would usher in the definitive, classless order which would not be subject to social upheavals. The industrial interest, there- fore, was the interest of all mankind. Indeed, the industrial class included the large majority of society because it comprised all the productive elements. It was pacific and orderly by nature, and could exist without armies or police; Ccommand" and "government," said Saint-Simon, would yield to "demonstra- tion" and "administration."8 Man's inclination to dominate would be diverted to the exploitation of nature in the interest of the good life for the masses.

31bid., XIX, 26. 4Ibid., XX, 32. 5L'Industrie, III, republished in Revue occidentale (Paris, 1884), II, 169. 3Ibid., in Revue occidentale (Paris, 1884), I, 331. 7CEuvres, XXXIX, 189-90. 8Ibid., XX, 126-7 n.

Saint-Simon 57

Saint-Simon believed there is an intimate and necessary link between all aspects of social existence-the economic, ideological, moral, religious, artistic, legal, and political. A significant change in one requires corresponding changes in the others. He regarded political forms and theories as very secondary, often needing to be brought into line with the more basic and dynamic factors to restore sound social structure. The science of man, he believed, has to be very largely the study of institutions, and these cannot be adequately understood if considered to be consciously contrived means of accomplishing definite pur- poses. Saint-Simon achieved this great advance over the mechanistic thinking characteristic of earlier centuries at about the same time as Hegel; but neither knew of the other, and Saint-Simon expressed the point in clearer, less mystical terms.

Marx was introduced to Saint-Simonism well before his infatuation for Hegel,9 and, in his German Ideology,'0 he displayed a detailed familiarity with Saint-Simon's writings. He adopted a great deal from this source, perhaps more than from any other, but camouflaged his debt by paying homage to Saint- Simon as a typical "utopian socialist." Marx claimed that his own contribution to socialism lay solely in rendering it "scientific." However, many of the dis- tinguishing features of "scientific socialism," by Marx's own criteria, were vital elements in the Saint-Simonian system.1"

The most striking difference between Marx and Saint-Simon lay in the com- position of the rising class. Saint-Simon extolled the "producers" and attacked the "bourgeoisie"; all of society, he wrote, was dividing into these two hostile groupings. But the bourgeoisie for him consisted solely of army officers who did not belong to the nobility, idle property owners, and, above all, lawyers and men he called "metaphysicians";"12 it was a rootless class, useful only in a revo- lutionary transitional phase. The "industrial" class included all the workers but -and it is a considerable "but"-the workers led by their "natural leaders," the bankers and entrepreneurs.

A second difference is that Saint-Simon abhorred violence as much as Marx, sitting in his British Museum sanctuary, gloried in it; he also had more con- fidence in the persuasiveness of his laws of history, which he hoped would convince the obsolete ruling class that it should yield without further struggle.

Thirdly, although Saint-Simon appeared as an economic determinist in some

9F. A. von Hayek, "The Counter-Revolution of Science," Economica (N.S.); VIII, 1941, 290.

l0German Ideology, ed. R. Pascal (London, 1939), 129-44. "lMarx complained that the "utopian" socialists ignored history, were excessively

rationalistic, held aloof from the class struggle, advocated peripheral experiments, and eschewed violence. These may be reasonable criticisms of Fourier and Owen, the other members of the trio who, according to Marx, were the outstanding "utopians." Saint-Simon, however, referred constantly to historical trends, advocated and almost always maintained a relativistic approach, threw himself ardently into the class struggle, ignored the periphery and aimed straight for the heart of social power. He mistrusted war and mob action, of wvhich he had had more experience than Marx, but was not above violence to the truth or crude exploitation of financial power. Engels, always more fair than Marx, wrote of Saint- Simon that "almost all the ideas of later Socialists that are not strictly economic are found in him in embryo." Marx and Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in Selected Works (Moscow, 1949), II, 113.

12CEuvres, XXXVII, 129.

58 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science

of his works, in most he treated the accumulation of knowledge, and its increas- ing sophistication, as the dynamic factor in social change. In his most complete account of history, to be found in volume XX of the CEuvres, revolutionary changes in the methods of production and in science were shown to have started together, and the new economic and scientific elites seemed equal partners during their ascent. He often attributed considerable effect to a single idea, but generally stressed that its influence was due to the fact that the material conditions had been ripe. An idea before its time, he argued, was wasted. His interest in ideas was almost exclusively confined to their capacity to influence social conduct. He had no use for the mystical, Hegelian sort of idealism, and treated knowledge, along with art, wealth, the means of produc- tion, and religion, as so many different types of social power. It has been con- tended that he believed there was one fundamental factor determining his- torical change: technology, the combination of science and the means of production. Although something can be said for this view, nevertheless Saint- Simon's "fundamentalism" cannot be compared in consistency or precision with that of Marx. It may be the more plausible because of that!

Marx seems to have believed that his predictions really were based on a scientific reading of history. With Saint-Simon, one is not so sure. Suspicions are aroused by the very facility with which he could always produce a his- torical trend, parallel or cycle to prove that whatever he happened to be advo- cating was precisely what was coming in any case. He contended that, for their own good, most of the people have to be deceived all of the time; at least on occasion, he seemed aware that he was distorting history to improve his brief for social reform. He certainly appreciated the persuasiveness of historicist reasoning. He wrote, for example, that the most convincing argument in favour of a political reform is to show that it is coming in any case, because, he believed, "one does not resist the march of civilization.'3 Again: "It is sweet to swim with the current. . . . Once the idea is well established that the industrial system must predominate, all able men will stop working to prolong the debris of the feudality.'4 He even listed history among the tools available to spread new ideas!'5 He constantly implied that the one serious crime is to resist history, for history is progress; to resist is also foolhardy for resistance will be crushed. Saint-Simon used history to promote what is now known as a band-wagon effect, and also to bully those who failed to be attracted by his vision of the new world.

Whether or not he believed in the authenticity of his historical laws, he gave the first demonstration of the full potential of historicism as an armoury of arguments to support a programme of political reform. The Greeks, Machia- velli, and Vico had described historical cycles, but these tended to be circular. Plato thought that human society was in decline, but implied that the right constitution could arrest this trend. Condorcet had suggested the possibility of revealing the future by means of a law of historical progress; he made the fulfilment of such a law, however, depend upon the initiative of free men, and

13lbid., XX, 62-3. 14Ibid., XXXVII, 57. 151bid., XXXIX, 210.

Saint-Simon 59

his lack of relativism, illustrated by his condemnation of the Middle Ages, gave his historical series a much less scientific aroma than those of Saint-Simon. Condorcet, in short, invoked history to inspire or warn, and not, as did Saint- Simon, to coerce.

Karl Popper obviously erred when he described Hegel as the "source of all contemporary historicism";16 according to Popper's own definition, the histori- cist employs history to make predictions.17 Hegel used it to justify the present, but did not make predictions, and condemned those who did. Saint-Simon was the first to claim absolute "scientific' certainty for his forecasts of the future of man. To him must be accorded the honour, if such it is, of having invented historicism in its modern form.

His interpretation of history was careless, tendentious, and contradictory in detail. Yet he was comparatively free of prejudice and was shrewd in sifting the significant from the superficial. The trends which he identified enabled him to become one of the most prophetic thinkers of modern times.18 Had Saint- Simon been content to speak of likelihoods, something could be said for his scientific pretensions. However, the step he took from the conditional, or probable, to the certain, was the step from science and common sense into the realm of mysticism or deceit. I question whether Saint-Simon was as naive as his bolder claims indicate. But, had he conceded the possibility that man might avoid any of the fundamental developments which he forecast, then the political utility of his historicism would have suffered. He sacrificed much of his right to be judged a great social scientist to his ambition to restore social harmony. This sacrifice was not necessarily conscious, at least in its entirety; but, even if it had been, even if Saint-Simon had recognized the conflict between his reforming and his scientific ambitions, he would not have hesi- tated. He would have agreed with the youthful Marx who wrote that the important thing is not to interpret the world, but to change it.

II

Of the three scientistic objectives, the one which most interested Saint- Simon was the third, the re-establishment of ideological uniformity. He believed that scientific activity had a serious bearing upon moral, religious and political beliefs. Like Plato, he was convinced that ideological uniformity was a prime requisite of social health. Neighbours with different ideologies, he said, were inevitably in conflict."' Further, religious, moral and political beliefs must all be derived from, or at least be in harmony with, the cosmology accepted by the leading intellectuals of the period. He often contended that

l6The Open Society and Its Enemies (London, 1945), II, 25. 17The Poverty of Historicism (Boston, 1957), 3. 18Among other developments, Saint-Simon anticipated the rise of a managerial Alite;

the concentration of control over industry; the modern role of central banking and the national budget; the welfare state, especially full-employment policies; the ideological system characteristic of communist countries; a reunited Western Europe established largely on the basis of joint industrial projects; the use of art to promote social objectives such as peace and the exploitation of natural resources; the establishment of sociology.

19CEuvres, XL, 158.

60 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science

all knowledge and rules of conduct must be shown to be deduced from a single principle, such as that of a divine creator, or Newton's law of gravity. He also argued that the new moral code must be based on a scientific study of human behaviour; the "science of man" must be made "positive" as all the other branches of science already were.

Did Saint-Simon really believe that all knowledge and morality could be derived from a single principle? The answer would seem to be negative. He was much less concerned with truth than with plausibility, and the likelihood of general acceptance. The sole cause of the terrible crisis of his time, he wrote, was the incoherence in the prevailing "general ideas." Speed was of the essence since the crisis would last until a new ideology was ready. He told the scientists that their task was easier than they thought, and that they must not be frightened by apparent difficulty or possessed by too lively a desire for perfection.20 At different times he suggested a variety of principles which he thought could be presented as the new unifying concept. He was confident that if all those with claims to intellectual distinction agreed to give the public the same account of the world, it would matter little that their system had imperfections or that the scientists themselves had private reservations. At least society would again have the coherent and plausible Weltanschauung which it so urgently needed.

Saint-Simon's lyrical praise of science must be assessed in the light of his distinction between analysis and synthesis. By "analytic" science he meant empirical science, and he believed that it was predominant during critical, revolutionary eras. It was necessary in order to progress, but nevertheless destructive of social order. He even attacked Newton for the "anarchical" tendency of his science!21

"Synthetic" science, on the other hand, was entirely "constructive," and was imperatively needed by a society, such as his own, which was suffering from ideological incoherence. Saint-Simon called it "Platonic science," in contrast to the "Aristotelian" variety, and said it depended on imagination, as opposed to observation and reason. The synthetic science demanded by Saint-Simon obviously has more to do with religion than science, as these terms are ordinarily understood.

In his last work, he in fact gave his doctrine a religious presentation which he called the "New Christianity." This should not have occasioned great sur- prise. During two-thirds of his career, he had advocated a revised religion; during the remaining years he anticipated that science would be more or less a direct substitute for religion. Generally he thought that religious beliefs were the scientific theories of the intellectual elite expressed in terms made comprehensible to the masses. Religion was the means by which the intelligent ruled the ignorant, and it filled a vital social need. Ideally, religion should be directly derived from the accepted scientific principles; at least, it must appear to be in harmony with them.

Saint-Simon's objection to the Christian doctrine was simply that it was no longer believed; it was out of step with the "march of knowledge" and could

201bid., XL, 304. 2lIbid., XV, 84.

Saint-Simon 61

no longer be taken seriously.22 He agreed with the Catholic reactionaries, De Maistre and De Bonald, that undisciplined science and philosophy had brought about the French Revolution by destroying the ideological uniformity on which social harmony had depended. He considered ridiculous, however, their con- clusion that the old beliefs must be revived. A lost faith could not be recovered. Saint-Simon's cure was a new religion ostensibly in harmony with "positive" science, and ostentatiously supported in public by the leading scientists. His partial reversion to Christianity in his old age was a change only in tactics. He himself remained an atheist but conceded that he had under- estimated the vitality remaining in the Christian doctrine. And he was by then inclined to rate art more highly than science as a social force. He still insisted that religion be revised so as not to be in opposition to the findings of con- temporary science; indeed, he did little more than usurp the lips of Jesus and of God to express once again his familiar proposals for social reform. He was prepared to try almost any device to win a sympathetic hearing.

Many of Saint-Simon's contemporaries praised the Christian doctrine but condemned the institutions and worldliness of the church. He, on the con- trary, criticized the doctrine but had fulsome praise for the institutions. He even admired the frauds by which, he said, the church had achieved prestige and power.23 Again like Plato, he believed that the social doctrine must be in the care of a well-organized intellectual elite, supported, if need be, by myth. This "clergy" should be-or appear to be-the repository of answers to all problems, factual and moral. Saint-Simon contended that the intellectual 6lite always had one set of beliefs for itself and another for presentation to the masses.24 However, there could not be a stable social order if illustrious intel- lectuals were to argue in public about the nature of truth or to question t-he validity of the prevailing ideology. The one great error of the church had been its failure to maintain its monopoly over higher learning, research and teach- ing; a new class of scholars had been allowed to make discoveries and gain prestige; when some of them attacked the dogma of the church, ideological harmony was destroyed and society on its way to disintegration.

Even more than he admired its successes, Saint-Simon feared the disruptive consequences of scientific activity. His first aim was to tame rather than promote science. From his earliest pamphlet, he urged men of wealth to honour the scientists, and pay them well, lest they again become disaffected and upset the moral beliefs of the masses, which, he said, provided the only pro- tection for property.2 5He stipulated that all financial support be made con- ditional upon the scientists' being useful and loyal to the ideological structure.26

Chambers of scientists, similar to the existing French academies, appeared in each of Saint-Simon's dozen-odd draft constitutions. However, the scientists designated to sit in them were not predominantly students of social problems, and their legislative role was secondary to that of the business men and, at times, the artists. The proposed presence in parliament of the leading scientists

221bid., XX, 173. 23Ibid., XXXIX, 74-5. 24cEuVres choisies de C.-H. de Saint-Simon, ed. C. Lemonnier (Brussels, 1859), I, 219. 25UEuvres, XVIII, 221. 26Ibid., XXXIX, 26.

62 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science

may therefore have had little to do with their supposed ability to solve social problems scientifically; rather it seems to have been a device to harness to the constitution the prestige of science, which he valued more than its discoveries.

In many of his writings, Saint-Simon demanded that the scientists organize themselves along the lines of the Catholic clergy, formulate a new moral code, and direct the education of the masses.27 He even suggested they elect a scientific pope, employ excommunication for crimes against the ideology, and institute a "Newtonian" form of baptism.28 The serious, consistent thought was that the new clergy, the authorities in matters of morals, must be composed of the men in whom society already reposed its confidence in matters of fact. Indeed, Saint-Simon wanted all moral and political questions to be treated as if they were factual. He aimed, he said, to put an end to idle talk about politics,29 and to reduce the number of those entitled to voice opinions on political questions.30

Most scientistic enthusiasts appeal to the conceit of the scientists; you have solved the mysteries of the universe, they say, now apply your techniques to the study of man and social problems. Saint-Simon appealed rather to their conscience. For the sake of social peace, he urged the scientists to accept the discipline of a church, or similar body, to agree quickly on a new public doctrine to restore ideological uniformity, and to do nothing to cast doubt on that doctrine. This might well be regarded as a conspiracy against the scientific spirit, but he believed it a small price to pay for social harmony.

Saint-Simon was by no means original in promoting a science of politics. Nor was he alone, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, in wishing to re- establish ideological uniformity. His contribution lay in combining the two currents of opinion to produce a radically new formula for the return to the closed society. The belief in science would provide the faith, the scientists would form the clergy. If change could not be arrested, at least it could be controlled. With science subjected to discipline, there could be an end to ideological incoherence and social upheaval.

Other brands of scientism have also shown a close affinity to religion. Auguste Comte, who became Saint-Simon's secretary at the age of nineteen, and was once proud to be known as his disciple, explained that he broke away when, in his last years, the master turned to religion. However Comte, often regarded as the founder of sociology, completed his own career by establishing the "Religion of Humanity." He resented being reminded of his debt to Saint- Simon, but could break free from neither Saint-Simon's ideas nor the pattern of his life.

Marx considered his own doctrine to be respectably scientific. It has suc- ceeded, however, very largely because it serves as religion for millions who have lost their traditional faiths. Communist China and Russia, indeed, come much closer to being the organic society advocated by Saint-Simon then the equalitarian, liberal democracy of which Marx dreamed.

27Ibid., XL, 311-13. 28Ibid., XV, 51-5. 29Ibid., XXI, 17. 3OIbid., XL, 288.

Saint-Simon 63

Professor Harold Lasswell appeared close to the Saint-Simonian position when he wrote: ". . . the consensus on which order is based is necessarily nonrational . . . if we pose the problem of unifying the world we must seek for the process by which a nonrational consensus can be most expeditiously achieved."3' In the same work he said of the social scientists:

It is indisputable that the world could be unified if enough people were impressed by this (or any other) 6lite. The hope of the professors of social science, if not of the world, lies in the competitive strength of an 6lite based on vocabulary, footnotes, questionnaires, and conditioned responses, against an elite based on vocabulary, poison gas, property and family prestige. For our encouragement, I may cite the 6lite which so long and so successfully maintained its position at the apex of the pyramid of the Roman Catholic Church....32

In a chapter in which he praised Lasswell, Professor Catlin has written: what we require is not 'no ideology' but a better ideology and one very care- fully considered-at least as much as Marxism, . . . We need a political logical positivism, a new political scholasticism for a new world."33

Scientistic advocates generally appear to be motivated, at least in part, by a longing for ideological coherence and conformity. I do not question the sincerity, in most cases, of their faith that scientific methods can yield obvious and logically imperative solutions to all social problems, and lead to a scientifically valid social order. Uniformity of belief might then be established, but only because scientific procedures had demonstrated the one true answer to every question.

With Saint-Simon, and some of the other more sophisticated promoters of scientism, the situation is different. Indeed, it is doubtful if Saint-Simon can be called scientistic if one accepts the definition of the term I have offered. He displayed little confidence, and less interest, in science as a means to truth about man and society. His therapeutic science-historicism-was hardly an adaptation of the methods of any respectable science; it seems that to him it was little more than a propaganda device, useful in the re-establishment of social stability. Scientism assuredly had a vital role in fostering the ideological uniformity he considered essential to social health. But here it was only the prestige of science that counted, and his proposals would go far to stifle scientific activity in the interests of the closed society. Saint-Simon thus believed in the usefulness, rather than the validity, of scientism and historicism, the two doctrines which he did more than anyone else to formulate and pro- mote. The study of Saint-Simon suggests it is no accident that scientism, which assumes a progressive guise, turns out to be one of the most reactionary creeds of our times.

38World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York, 1935), 237. 321bid., 20. 33In Morroe Berger et al., eds., Freedom and Control in Modern Society (New York,

1954), 282.