Safety Measure Presentation

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Marine Safety

Environmental

Management

Presented by Group

Adrian Novel 421 Mohammad Hafidh R 421

Alika Hidayanti 421

Faizal Satya P 421

Fahmy Faizal N 421

Safety Measures

Faculty of Marine Technology

Department of Marine Engineering

Double Degree Marine Engineering

2014


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Outlines

Introduction

Basic Theory

Safety Performance Indicators

Study Cases

Conslusion

Marine Safety & Environmental Management Courses Safety Measures


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Introduction Every year more than 1000 marine incidents are reported.

Youcan't manage it, if you can't measure it,

It can be applied also to safety management. Man

sometimes need to base their decisions on intuition, which heto make the required decisions quickly.

Measurement is an absolute prerequisite for control, whet

the control of production quality, accidents, or any other com

an industrial system[Rouhiainen, 1990]

Safety management will probably reach its goals more easi

safety performance indicators (SPIs) are available and proper

control and guidance.



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Introduction

Safety cannot genuinely be improved only by looking to the past and taking precaut

accidents that have happened [Hollnagel, 2008].

The dynamics and pressures in the system cause changes, which may result in

unfavorable change in the risks. Such a surprising change to an increase in the num

accidents (worldwide) has been reported recently e.g. by [DNV, 2008].



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Introduction

This regulatory system, which is supported by the Safety Management Systems o

companies, is very complicated due to the many players (and stakeholders) involved,

Objective:

To prevent maritime accidents and make zero accident working on the ship

To improve safety, including safety working for the personel on the ship



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Safety Theory - General Risk is defined as a measure of the probability of a hazards related in

occurring, and the severity of harm or damage that could result. This

directed to persons (crew/passengers/others), environment (nature)

property (ships/port facilities/other). In some cases the harm may evereputation. [Manuele, 1997]



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Safety Theory - General Safety measures are activities and precautions taken to improve safety, i

risk related to human health. Common safety measures include:

General safety measures:

Ensure there is safe access

Minimise the movement and handling of materials.

Personal protective equipment should only be used after all collective and technica

been exhausted



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Safety TheoryAccidents ModelDomino theory:

One of the earliest accident models of modern times was the Domi

presented by Heinrich already in the 1930s [Heinrich, 1950].

This chain of multiple events ends up to the 16 accident and finally i

consequence, e.g. an injury. The early Domino theory has been cr

because it does not account for multiple causality [Kjellen, 2000].

Fault tree model

Fault tree models were started to be developed in the 1960s. The fau

model can be often utilized even for a quantitative risk analysis of the

probability a complicated technical system if the probabilities of the events are known.

It has been criticized for being difficult to use, see e.g. [Harms-Ringd

It may not be a suitable model for the analysis of man-machine inter

the analysis of the organization [Harms-Ringdahl, 1993].


S f


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Safety TheoryAccidents Model Event tree model

A fault tree can often be supplemented by an event tree, which can b

as being the opposite of a fault tree. An introduction to event trees is

[Suokas et Rouhiainen, 1993].

An event tree, starts from the initiating event and then describes all th

outcomes of this. It offers possibilities to for carrying out probabilisti

of the consequences [Harms Ringdahl, 1990].


S f t Th Ri k M d l


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Safety TheoryRisks Model Risks can be modeled using accident models as a basis, but a sufficient r

usually much more comprehensive than a pure accident model. The risk

be either descriptive, qualitative or quantitative models. It is important th

model includes at least the most important parameters and contributing


S f t Th F l S f t A


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Safety TheoryFormal Safety Assesm Formal Safety Assessment is a risk-based, systematic and sturdy approac

management. It is a rather new methodology for rule-making, which app

scientific approach of thinking. If correctly applied, FSA applications are

transparent, traceable and repeatable.

FSA acts in a pro-active way: it should put emphasis not only on risks wh

lead to accidents, but also on risks which may have severe consequences

An ideal FSA has been characterized with the following attributes [Skjon

Well structured, systematic, comprehensive

Objective, rational

Auditable, repeatable, well documented

Defensible, reliable, robust




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Safety Theory

Formal Safety Assesm




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Safety Theory

Formal Safety Assesm When applied by this way, the process of carrying out a quantitative risk

and the results of it may produce very useful safety performance indicato

The reliability of these SPIs depends on the validity of the risk models a

validity data, input parameters and constant values.

It can be stated that those parameters that have the biggest effect on the o

are probably the most important safety (performance) indicators. The m

important indicators can be found by the use of sensitivity analysis. Any

these parameters will have either a favorable or unfavorable effect on the

safety (unless there is no effect at all). Thus, if there are not any changes would necessitate a change of the risk model, the most important input p

of valid risk models should be used as the safety performance indicators


S f t P f I di t


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Safety Performance Indicators Leading and Lagging ndicators

indicators are based on a sufficient number of instances to be able to identify change over t

[Hopkins, 2008b] defines an indicator as a slope of a trend in time.A partition of leading an

indicators as before and after accident indicators, illustrated to Reasons Swiss-cheese mod

is one of the approaches to simplify and fasilitate understanding of differentials between lead

indicators.


S f t P f I di t


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Safety Performance IndicatorsRisk contributing factors included in the marine accident database DAMA are

presented in the following table 1. Multiple/frequent/concurrent occurrences of these factors in relat

indicate an increased risk related to its operation.

Table 1 Contributing factors to maritime accidents (adopted from DAMA)

Marine Safety & Environmental Management Courses

Safety Measures



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Safety Measures

Study Case Maritime Transport (PSC


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Study Case

Maritime Transport (PSCParis MoU have introduced deficiency codes, see table 5, which have been

less followed by other regimes, with the exception PSC of US Coast Guard

2006].

This coding system facilitates in finding of critical and repeating lacks, thus

system can be used as a source of performance indicators.


Safety Measures


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Study Case

Maritime Transport (PSC According to [Knapp, 2006] 4.9% of PSC eligible vessels that have been inspected with in last 6 m

accident. From this, two observations can be made:

enforcement of corrective actions need to be improved

correct implementation of safety management should be assured

One of the concerns pointed out by [Knapp, 2006] is that approximately 32% of PSC relevant caaccident first event in engine related areas and in the same time only 9% (Paris MoU, others the

detentions are made because of engine related areas. This concern may indicate that the efficienc

might call for some development in this area. One problem here is that the inspections are norm

only when the ships are moored or anchored.


Safety Measures



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Study Case

Maritime Transport (PSC


Safety Measures

Study Case Offshore Industry


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Study Case

Offshore IndustryCurrently all three elements behind safety development (e.g. IMO, Governmental agencies and class

societys) are encouraging the offshore industry towards risk based decision making. HSE Tolerabilit

approach (Figure 17) has been adopted by most of the offshore operators [HSE, 2001].

TOR approach does not how ever force in the use of some particular risk reduction or assessment m

2001] presents a wide but non comprehensive list of methods for risk assessment.


Safety Measures



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Study Case

Offshore Industry Oil and Gas Procedures in its worksh

shows that their Lost Time Injury Fr

Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRI

(Figure 18.) during the 10 year period

also conclude that even though their

performance data shows improvemen

and small accidents it does not neces

reduction of major incident risk has b


Safety Measures



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Study Case

Offshore IndustryIn the same workshop report Statoil presented their own list of performance standards (Table 6.) tha

for producing limited number of high level performance indicators. [OGP, 2008]

Table 6 Statoil, technical performance standards, adopted from [OGP 2008]


Safety Measures



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Study Case

Offshore IndustryIn the same workshop report Statoil presented their own list of performance standards (Table 6.) tha

for producing limited number of high level performance indicators. [OGP, 2008]

Table 6 Statoil, technical performance standards, adopted from [OGP 2008]


Safety Measures

Conclusions and Recommendation


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Conclusions and Recommendation In the maritime sector the most widely used safety performance indicators seem to be lagging

indicators are most often related to the number of accidents, accident frequencies and the co

measured by the loss of life, persons injured, total losses, material damage in terms of costs an

environmental damage.

The problem with lagging safety performance indicators is the fact that the approach is reactiv

something bad must first happen to make a change in the indicator.

The problem with accidental losses might be avoided if an efficient information system based

development and use of risk models with significant leading and lagging indicators would be a

Therefore, the development of such a proactive system for the maritime sector should be star

An ideal safety information system would facilitate analysis and synthesis of data taking into a

investigation reports, accident statistics, incident reports, developments in science and trends

technology and traffic on several levels:

Global level (internationally)

Sea area (Baltic Sea)

Fleet (of a shipping company)

Ship type

Stakeholder


Safety Measures

References


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References SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR MARITIME SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Literature review TKK-AM-9

Risto Jalonen, Kim Salmi

Helsinki University of Technology. Faculty of Engineering and Architecture.

Department of Applied Mechanics. Series AM

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safety)

(https://osha.europa.eu/en/sector/construction/general_safety)


Safety Measures
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safetyhttps://osha.europa.eu/en/sector/construction/general_safetyhttps://osha.europa.eu/en/sector/construction/general_safetyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safety

Safety Measure Presentation

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