Safety Climate and Designing Interventions to Improve Safety Performance David M. DeJoy, Todd D....
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Transcript of Safety Climate and Designing Interventions to Improve Safety Performance David M. DeJoy, Todd D....
Safety Climate and Designing Interventions to Improve Safety Performance
David M. DeJoy, Todd D. Smith, Aimee A. DyalWorkplace Health GroupCollege of Public Health
University of Georgia
Status of Safety Climate Research
• Recent meta-analyses (up to 200 studies) show safety climate among the strongest predictors of safety behaviors and related outcomes (e.g., Beus et al. 2010; Christian et al. 2009; Nahrgang et al. 2011)
• Safety climate as a “leading indicator”• Most research cross-sectional; few longitudinal
or intervention studies• Very little empirical research specific to
emergency responders
Safety ClimateCore Concept: Shared perceptions of employees
about (relative) importance of safety within their organization
Intersection between organizational and psychological processes and their relationship to safety (Neal & Griffin, 2004)
Social-cognitive mediator between environmental attributes and outcomes (Zohar & Luria, 2004)
Climate-Behavior-Outcome:Basic Model
SafetyClimate
Behavior Outcomes
Intervention: Antecedents Perspective
SafetyClimate Behavior OutcomesAntecedents
Safety Climate Research
• Most of the attention has been given to defining and measuring safety climate
• Less is known about antecedents and mechanisms linking safety climate and outcomes
• This hampers intervention development
e.g., Clarke, 2006; Zohar, 2010
Business Environment
National Culture
OrganizationalVision/strategy
Organizational Culture
Organizational Structure &
Practices
OrganizationalClimate
Safety CultureSafety Policies
& PracticesSafetyClimate
Antecedents: Broader Organizational Factors
(adapted from Ostroff et al., 2003)
What Qualifies as a Safety Climate Intervention
• Arguably, anything that increases the salience of safety could potentially qualify as a safety climate intervention: – recent accident/injury (e.g., Beus et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2006)– initiation of a new safety approach or program component
(e.g., behavior-based safety)• Safety can be improved without necessarily
improving safety climate, and vice versa (partial mediation, e.g., Clarke, 2009)
• However, actions that improve safety climate will frequently improve safety – through increased knowledge/motivation/extra-role (OCB) behaviors, etc.
Safety Climate Interventions: General Literature
• Enacted safety policies and practices: management commitment/actions >
words• supervisor leadership/support –
transformational/transactional leadership trust - voice - coaching - motivation
Underscores the social-communicative aspects of safety climate (e.g., Rochlin, 1999); collective sense-making (e.g., Weick, 1995)
Firefighting
• Without question, firefighting is high hazard work, but it is unique beyond this.
• In most high hazard work situations, the goal is hazard avoidance. In firefighting, the principal work activity is hazard engagement.
• The hazards associated with this work activity are further worsened by unpredictability and extreme time pressure.
Safety Climate and Firefighting
• We assume that the safety climate construct is relevant to firefighting
• So little research that we don’t know what it looks like compared to other types of work
• Difficult to conceptualize interventions with any degree of specificity
• What have we learned?
Firefighter Fatality Investigations (fishbone diagram)
Kunadharaju, Smith, & DeJoy, 2011(189 fatalities, 2004 to 2009)
Factors on left side assumed to impact those on right.
Firefighter Fatality Investigations
Kunadharaju, Smith, & DeJoy, 2011
Fatality Study: Cultural Paradigm
• Operating with too few resources• Compromising certain roles and functions• Skipping or short-changing operational steps or
safeguards• Relying on extreme individual effortsThese operational tenets accepted and normalized as “the way we do things”. This tolerance of risk internally and externally reinforced.
Safety Climate: Firefighting“proof of concept”
Smith & DeJoy, 2014
SEM Results
Significant first order factors of safety climate
Factor Unstandardized Path Coefficient
SE t p R2
Safety Communication 1.00 0.00 - - .24
Management Commitment
2.46 0.33 13.22 0.00 .60
Supervisor Support 1.47 0.16 9.48 0.00 .44
Safety Programs & Policies
1.42 0.22 6.37 0.00 .62
Smith & DeJoy, 2014
(career firefighters, N=349)
SEM Results
Path Unstandardized Path Coefficient
SE t p R2
Safety Climate → Safety Compliance Behavior
1.09 .13 8.17 0.00 .50
Safety Climate→ Safety Citizenship Behavior
1.396 .21 6.96 0.00 .33
Smith & DeJoy, 2014
Safety climate and safety compliance and participation
Firefighter Focus Groups10 focus groups: Two large metro departments; groups segmented by rank (frontline, company officers, dept. senior leaders); N = 86; 72 to 96 minutes per group.
Groups asked to discuss: individual, workgroup, and organizational factors related to safe performance in emergency response situations.
Focus Group Results
Level Key Emergent ThemesIndividual Competency/professionalism
Physical/mental readinessWorkgroup Cohesion
Supervisor leadership/supportOrganizational Politics/bureaucracy
ResourcesLeadershipHiring/promotion
Focus Groups: individual level“I rely that these guys know the SOPs [standard operating procedures]. The basic SOPs. Yeah, we’re going to find weird scenarios. We’re going to find… there will also be a curveball but those training SOPs, the idea that we are all relying on each other, that we know those basic jobs regardless of morale, regardless of your attitude for the day. The bell goes off and we show up. I am relying on these guys to know their basic job.” (Firefighter, dept. 2)
“For instance, we go into a structure, we have a structure fire. You will have too many members in that one structure when it doesn’t need to be, but nobody wants to be seen on the outside. It’s the macho thing where everybody just floods this house.” (company officer, dept. 1)
We talked about strains and sprains. [But] the one injury that all of us get pretty early on are the invisible emotional injuries where your first day … you go to a shooting, you go to stabbing, you go to a child murder, whatever. It could be real extreme or it could be less than [that] but your system gets a jolt.” (senior leader, dept. 2)
Focus Groups: Workgroup Level “The crew gets a rapport, you all know each other. You learn each other’s tactics and you know what is going on at the home life so you actually start functioning as a team.” (company officer, dept. 2)
“He taught you what to do. He taught you why to do it. We always ate dinner together. Whether we really wanted to or not, we always ate dinner together. He always made sure of that.” (firefighter, dept. 1)
“By design, usually your most up-to-date information is getting put out in those recruit schools. They’re learning techniques and procedures that their officers didn’t learn and haven’t trained on, so when they come to the station, they look up to that officer and that officer says I don’t care what you learned in training. That’s not the way we do it out here.” (senior leader, dept. 1)
Focus Groups: Organizational Level“Fire chiefs positions have become so political that fire chiefs finding themselves creeping their organizations into these mission creep situations to try to not only maintain the department’s relevance in the community, but their relevance within the political structure of the city or county or whatever.” (senior leader, dept. 1)
“When I came on we had some senior chiefs who could run a fireground, who had been there with the experience factor, strong command presence.” (company officer, dept. 1)
“if you go off on a workers’ comp issue, you’re really considered the cheater of the system. Or why did you get hurt? You shouldn’t have gotten hurt, we’re not supposed to get hurt and I understand that we are not supposed to get hurt but this is a difficult dangerous job.”(company officer, dept. 2)
Interventions: Moving Forward(re: firefighting)
Emphasis on supervisor/workgroup factors holds promise due to nature/organization of work activity; potential for org-workgroup disconnects; undoing of best practices
– Transformational leadership– After-action reviews– Supervisor retraining/updating– Trust/collective sense-making– Control/autonomy balance
• Management commitment (senior leader support) also important– Communicating/redefining safety– Building a supportive organization– Involvement/participatory processes– High reliability organizations
The Public (Firefighter Image and Expectations)
Firefighters (Firefighter Heritage and Traditions)
Gov’t FireDept.
FireStation Firefighter Injury/
Death
Firefighting Organizations and Firefighters are Trapped between their Public Image and their own Heritage and Traditions
The image is of heroism and self-sacrifice for the good of others. The tradition is “can do”, “must do”, “make do” , and “right now”
Core Organizational Task
Core Organizational
Task*
Department
Individual Workgroup
Com
mun
ity
* e.g., Reiman & Oedewald, 2007
Thanks!
Dave [email protected]