The Life and Death of an Aircraft:A Netuork Analysis of TechnicalChangeJohn Law and Michel Callon

Imagine a technological project that lasts for a number of years, in-volves the mobil ization of tens or hundreds of thousands of workers,designers, managcrs, and a ple thora of heteroscneous bits and piecesincluding designs, parts, machine tools, and all the rcst. Imagine thatthis project is developed in a constantly changing cnvironmentthat requirements, interests, and even the actors themselves changeduring the course of its l i fetime. Imagine that not hundreds buthundreds of thousands of decisions are made . And imagine that inthe end it is cancelled amid a welter of acrimony. How can wedescribe such a project in a way that is more than "simple" history?How can we describe it in a way relevant for the analysis of otherprojects and technological innovations? How can we explain thedecision to close the project? How can we explain its failure? Andhow can we do this in a way that lets us avoid taking sides?

Despite the recent growth in interest in the social analysis oftechnology, few tools currently available are really useful. Our prob-lem is that it is too simple (though it contains an element of truth)to say that context influences, and is simultaneously influenced by,content. What we require is a tool that makes it possible to describeand explain the coevolution o[ what are usually distinguished associotechnical context and sociotechnical content. In recent work wehave used a network mctaphor to try to understand this kind ofprocess (Callon and Law l9B9). We have considered the way inwhich an actor attempts to mobil ize and stabil ize what we call aglobal networ,t in order to obtain resources with which to build aproject. In our languaee, then, a global network is a set of relationsbctween an actor and its neighbors on the one hand, and betweenthose neighbors on the other. It is a network that is built up, deliber-ately or otherwise, and that generates a space , a period of t ime, anda se t of resources in which innovation may take place. Within thisspace-we call i t a negotiation space-the process of building a project

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( l l t r .s t i ( )n ( , l s( . ( l l l ' i tu- { s t r l l ic icnt resources l rom neighbor ing actors. In()tl l( 'r (. irs(.s it w:rs a question of securing their neutrality for anappropriate period. In both cases it was a question of coming toappropriate arrangements-ofdefining the relationship between theproject and its neighbors.r

The origin of this process can be traced to a General OperationalRequirement (GOR 339) developed by the Operational Require-ments Branch and to a policy for the rationalization of the aircraftindustry implemcnted by the procurement branch of the Brit ishsov(:rnmctrt, the Ministry of Supply' So far as the RAF in generalw:ls c()nccrncd, it was necessary that the end product be an aircraft.All othcr transactions were predicated on this assumption. That a('()rnl)irt aircraft was needed was not, in fact, that clear in the latel95r0s. ' l 'he defense policy of the United Kingdom as spelled out inthc 1957 Defence White Paper was that of nuclear deterrence basedon ball istic missile retaliation. So far as the Ministry of Defence wasconcerned, it was important that the end product not be a strategicbomber-this alternative having been ruled out by the white Paper.l 'his suggested that the project should be a combat aircraft, andgiven Brit ish defense commitments as conceived by the Ministry, itwas appropriate that it should be a tactical strike and reconnaissanceaircraf t (TSR).

So lar as the Treasury was concerned, it was important that theend product be cheap. Given this perspective, which was based onits perceived need for economies in defense spending, the Treasurytended to doubt the need for any aircraft at all. At most supportcould be found for a single combat aircraft. This meant that theaircraft would have to fulfill all the possible combat aircraft require-ments of the RAF. Accordingly, there was pressure for a versati leaircraft-a requirement fulf i l led by the TSR definit ion-and alsoone that might be sold overseas' thereby cutting its unit cost.

So f;ar as the Navy was concerned' it was also necessary to over-come a high degree of hosti l i ty. The Navy was purchasing a smalltactical strike aircraft called the Buccaneer, and was anxious topersuade the RAF to buy this same aircraft because this would cutunit costs for the Navy and relieve Pressure on the arms procure-ment budget overall. The response of the Operational RequirementsBranch was to proPose a large, supersonic, precision-strike, long-range aircraft that was quite different from the Buccaneer. Althoughthis response was not what was sought by the Navy, it was intendedto neutralize the (Treasury-assisted) attempts by the latter to imposethe Buccaneer.

t t r ; ty l rc t r t ' i r t t ' t l l rs t l r t . r . l i r l ror . : r l ior r t i l ' t lo t t t l r t t , l t t ,or / t l r : r r is , t l r r .developrnent < l l 'an array < l l ' thc hr . t t : r .g( : ' ( ' ( )us scr , l ' l l i rs : t r r< l 1 l i< . t .<.sthat is necessary to the successful production of any worki.s clcvi<.c.we have suggested, that is, that the notions of context and contc'tthat are used as common analytical devices in the sociology of scienceand technology may be transcended ifprojects are treatà as balanc_ing acts in which heterogeneous elements from both ,. inside', a.d"outside" the project are juxtaposed.

In this chapter we push our analysis a stage further by consideringthe dynamics of a large Brit ish aerospace project. we consider theway in which the managers of that project sought to position theirproject in a global network in order to obtain the i ime and theresources needed to build and maintain a local network. And wediscuss the way in which the shape of that project was influencednot only by the efforts of those managers, but also by events andstrategies that influenced the shape of the global network. Thus wetrace the strategies and contingencies that led to the creation of bothlocal and global networks, the fortunes or the managers as theysought to shape both networks and control the relatiàns berweenthem, and the eve'tual collapse of the project when the relationshipbetween thcm finally got completely out of hand.

At onc lcvel , thcn, our s tory is banal . I t is the descr ipt ion of a largemi l i tary tcch 'o logy pr . jcct that went wrons. But a l though th is pro-.icct h:rs c.'si<lcr.blc irtcrcst lor the ]ristory orB.it irh aero-space, here.ur . inr is ' ' t primarily to adcr t. the catalog of accounts of -i l i tu.yw.stc. Rather i t is analyt icar . L ike many others in th is volume, we^re corccrned to develop a vocabulary o{-analysis that wil l allow usto dcscribe and cxplai ' ail attempts to build durable institutions.A.alytically, rhe lacr of the fàilurc in the present project is best seenas a methodological convenience: controversy surrounding failuretends to reveal processes that are more easily hidden in thË case ofsuccessful projects and institutions.

A Project and lts Neighbors

The TSR.2 project was dreamed up in the Operational Require_ments Branch of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the late I950s. (TSRstands for Tactical Strike and Reconnaisance; the meaning of the 2is a mystery.) The structure of the project and its airciaft wereconceived in the course of a set of negotiations with neighboringactors. 'rhus, those who advanced the project sought to esr;blish forit a shape that would allow it to survive. In some cases it was a

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These transactions shaped and helped to define the projcct. Lct usnote a number of important characteristics of this process.

The TSR.2 project displayed what we may call variable geometry:it represented different things to different actors. In other words, itpossessed a high degree of "interpretive flexibil i ty." For the Ministryof Defence and the RAF, it was not a strategic bomber but a tacticalstrike and reconnaissance aircraft. For the Treasury it was relatively(though insufficiently) cheap. For the Navy it was a successful com-petitor to the Buccaneer, and for the Ministry of Supply it was aninstrument of industrial policy.

At the same time, however, it was also a relatively simple object toeach of those other actors. Though our account is, of course, sche-matic, most o{'thc complexities of the aircraft and its project werealso invisiblc to these outside actors. But the simplif ication involvedin bringing this project into being was reciprocal: the outside actorswere, in turn, simplif ied from the standpoint of the project. Thusthe 'freasury was (and is) a highly complex bureaucracy with awide range of policy concerns and procedures. From the standpointol the project most of these were irrelevant. The Treasury was a"punctualizsd" 2s1e1-an actor that was reduced to a single func-tion, that of the provision of funds.

This process of reciprocal simplif ication has several consequences.One is that from the standpoint of both its neighbors and an outsideobserver, the project can be treated as a series of transactions. Someof these took the form of economic exchanges: in return for theprovision of funds the project would provide accounts, progress re-ports, and, ult imately, a working aircraft. Some were polit ical incharacter: in return for a demonstrated need for a large and complexaircraft, the objections of the Navy to the project would be overruled.Yet others were defined technically (the General Operational Re-quirement, and the more specific Operational Requirement thatfollowed it) or industrially (the provision of contracts in exchange fora rationalization of the aircraft industry). In an earlier paper (Callonand Law l9B9) we referred to what is passed between an actor and

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It is ir lso irrrl lortant to note that transactions leading to reciprocal. l r r r r l r l i l ic i r t ion shapr:d not only the pro ject i tse l f but a lso the actorstlr:rt crrtcrt 'd into transactions with it. Again, this shaping operatedrlrr.orrglr a variety of mechanisms: often the formulated interesk ofcsisting irctors were redefined. In 1957 the Ministry of Defence didrrrr "know" that it needed a TSR aircraft. It simply knew that it didn()t n('ed a strategic bomber to replace the existing V bomber forcelrr.r 'rrtrst'ball istic missiles would fulf i l l this role. In the process ofirrtcractins with the Operational Requirements Branch, the ministryrr.rrs persuaded or became aware of its interest in a TSR aircraft. Asirnilar process overtook the RAF. At the beginning of the process itkrrcw only that it wanted a new combat aircraft, and that there wereinrportant obstacles to this ambition. By the end it perceived itsirrterests in terms of the TSR.2. A similar but even more dramatic

l)rocess overtook the airframe manufacturers. They started out withit general interest in obtaining contracts to produce new aircraft, andt'nded up finding that it was in their interest to merge with manuflac-turers that had previously been rivals to design and manufacture a'f SR aircraft. So profound was the process in this case that they werenot simply reshaped they were turned into new actors in their ownright.

However, the actors shaped by the project were not, in all cases,influenced by operating on their perceived interests. Thus the ex-pressed interests of the Navy with respect to the project remainedunchanged in the following years: it was hostile and wished to see itcancelled. However, because of the definition of the aircraft de-scribed above and a series of bureaucratic political ploys that will notbe detailed here, the project and those whose support it enlisted(notably the RAF itself) boxed in the Navy. The latter was hosti le,but it was also unable to press its hosti l i ty home. In this case powerplays and bureaucratic strategems acted to shape the Navy. Theneutrality of the Treasury was secured in part by similar me ans.

We are emphasizing this process of mutual shaping because it isimportant to understand that actors are not simply shaped by thenetworks in which they are located (although this is certainly true),but they also influence the actors with which they interact. In one

\ \ . r \ l l l r s i s o l r v i o r r s , l o r t l r r ' l . r t t r . r r l . r , r , , o l . r r l o r \ . r r r . l l r r . r n s r . l r r . r l o r . r l r . r li r r i r r r t l s l r i r p t ' r l l r y i r g l , l l r l n ( . r r r ' ( ) 1 . k . l l , u , r ' r . r . r ' , t l r r . p , i r r t i s r n . , r . t l rrnaki r rs cx l l l ic i t ly l r t ' t ' ; rust ' i t l ln ' i rks < lowrr i r r r i r l rs t r : rc t r l is r i l r t . t io l rcommon in socia l analys is between (dctcrrn incc l ) a< ' tor : rnr l (dt . t t . r -min ing) s t ructure, or between content and contcxt . Ncighlxrrs ckrindeed shape new actors as they enter into transactions with them,but they are in turn reshaped by their new circumstances.z

Finally, we should note that f inancial resources, a set of specifica_tions, the tolerance of certain neighbors, and the neutralization ofothers offered the project managers the resources to go about fulfill-ing their side of the explicit and implicit bargains that they hadentered into. In short, l ike many of the other cases described in thisvolume, the project had created for itself a time and a space withinwhich it might deploy the resources it had borrowed from outside . Ithad, accordingly, achieved a degree of autonom!, a ,,negotiationspace'" we wil l now consider some of the transactions that tookplace within this negotiation space.

Designing a Local Netuork

By the autumn of 1957 the nesotiation space for the project man-agers was quite l imited. In seneral they were obliged to adopt astep-by-step approach: for instance, no funds would be forthcomingunless they produced intermediaries in the form of clearer ideasabout the design of the aircraft, its l ikely manufacturers, the costsinvolved, and the probable delivery date. The first stage in thisprocess was to specify the design features of the aircraft more fully.Thus GOR 339 was quite general, specifying the kind of perfor_mance required rather than detail ing the design of an aircraft. Thelatter would be necessary if such skeptics as the Treasury were to beconvinced that a consortium of manufacturers was indeed capable ofproducing the proposed aircraft within budget. Accordingly, theprocess of giving shape to the project continued. Now, however, thefocus of the project managers turned inward: they started to try toelaborate a network of design teams, design features, schedules, andcontractors. They started to create and mobil ize actors in what wewill call a local network.3

The first step in this process was to ask the Brit ish aircraft industryto submit outl ine designs in the autumn of 1957. This posed noparticular problem, for the firms in question were hungry for workand readily mobil ized. In all there were nine submissions (Gardnerl98l, 25), though here we wil l mention only the three most relevant

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r ' , u r \ t o r r , \ \ ' r l l r . r r r r r , ( l t cgo t r , . t t r r l S i t t t pso t r l ' l l t r l ) t . \ ' i c kc rs o l l c r t ' < lt r r r , po rs i l r r l r t i c s . ( ) t r c r r : r s l i r l ; r s r r r : r l l s i r r g l r ' - r ' l r g i r r r ' : t i t ' r ' r ; t l i t l t : t t w i t sr r l , r t r r r ' l v l l r r ' ; r p l r r t t r l i v c t uc t l t ' o t t s i< l t ' r l r b l y l i r r n r ( i ( )R 1139 . ' I ' hc

. t l r r ' r r r ' ; rs l i r t l r t t t t tc l t l i r tgct r r i r t ' r : t l i th : r t t :o t r l r l rmcd c losely to GORI i t ) . l l1 1111 Prolxrs i t ls i t< l r 'o t ' i t t t 'd : t "wt :apons systems" approach to, l r ' r i r .1r r rv i t l r l r t r in tcgrat t '< l approach to a i r f rame, engines, equipment ,. r r r r l r l r ' ; rporrs (Wrxxl l -975, 156) . Al though th is represented a depar-r r r r r ' l ior r r t r : rc l i t ional mcthods of mi l i tary a i rcraf t procurement in*lriclr ;t irf iarnes wt--rc designed, built, and tested first, and weapons.rrr<l t 'r l tr ipmcnt were added afterward, the approach was well re-, r ' ivtt l in Whitehall, in part because of an extensive sell ing exerciselrr Vit 'kcrs and in part because it accorded with Ministry of Supplyt l r i r rk ing and recent Amer ican exper ience.

Nt'vt 'rtheless, although the general philosophy of the submissionu rrs t ' lcar, well articulated, and closely argued, Vickers were not ableto tlo all the necessary design work and saw themselves going intoprrrtnership with another firm, English Electric, which had designedrrrr<l manufactured the successful Canberra l ight bomber and thel,ightning supersonic fighter. However, English Electric had madeits own submission, code-named the Pl7A, which was a detailedirt 'rodynamic and airframe design lor a 60,000 to 70,000 lb. delta-rvirrged Mach 2 strike bomber with twin engines and two seats

çHast ings 1966,30; Wi l l iams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969, lB; and\Vood 1975, 155) . Though the PlTA met many of the speci f icat ionsol'GOR 339, it lacked an all-weather capabil ity and a vertical orshort takeoffcapacity (Will iams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969, l8).English Electric countered the latter deficiency by arguing that shorttakeoff was not the most urgent requirement (which was, in theirview, the replacement of the Canberra), but suggested that thiscould be provided at a later date by a platform that would l ift,launch, and recover the PlTA in the air. This platform was to bedesigned and built by Short Brothe rs, which submitted a preliminarydesign (Hastings 1966, 29; Will iams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969,lB ; Wood 1975 , 155 ) .

With the airframe manuf,acturers mobil ized and a set of submis-sions in place , the second stage in the elaboration of the local networkstarted-consideration of what design or combination of designswould best fulf i l l the various requirements negotiated with neigh-boring actors. Though the small Vickers design was favored by theTreasury because it was l ikely to be relatively cheap, the largesubmission was particularly attractive to the Air Staff, the RAF, andsections of the Ministry of Defence. This was because it strengthened

t l r c r o r r r t r r r l r n ( ' n l n l t l r r ' , \ r r S t . l l l l r o l l r l n . r r l r l t l - l . r l c o l l . r r r r r . r l l( w l r i r l r u o r r l t l l r : r v c l r , l r r ' l ; r r ( t ' l r c t . r r r s l i t r r o r r l r l r r c c r l l r r ' , r p o u c t l i t l( ' r ) t { i ncs ) a r ) ( l t ( ) i r w ( ' i r l ) ( ) n sys t ( ' l ns i r l l l l r o : r r ' l r . ' l ' l r c s t i r l l , t l r r ' l \ l i r r i s t r ' 1o[Delèncc, and t ] re Min is t ry o l 'Supply wt ' r t 'a lso i rnpr t 'sscr l l ry t l r r 'integrated design philosophy advocated by thc comprury and wcr('persuaded that Vickers had the management capacity to control :rndintegrate a complex pro ject (Wood 1975, l58; Gardner l98l , 33) .However, they were also impressed by the English Electric sub-mission, which was generally conceded to be "a first class design"(Wood 1975, 155), was the product of wide experience with super-sonic aircraft, and also had the advantage that it could use existingavionics equipment in the short run. In addition, though contactbetween the two firms had been limited (with English Electric con-tractually t ied to Short Brothers), Vickers had indicated its wish tohave English Electric as its partner. Accordingly, the Air Staffcameto the conclusion that a combination of the large Vickers-type 571and the English Electric Pl TA would be both appropriate and capa-ble of being used to mobil ize actors in the global network.a

Accordingly, with a putative design and potential contractors inhand, the Air Staff returned to the global network in June 1958.Specifically, they went to the Defence Research Policy Committee(Gardner l98l ,32) . This group was responsib le for the overal l con-trol of defense procurement and as part of its role assessed and al-located priority to the projects put to it by user services and theappropriate supply departments (Will iams, Gregory, and Simpsonl98l,32). Cabinet-level approval was ultimately obtained, and GOR339 was replaced in early 1959 by a tighter, more technical and defi-nit ive requirement, Operational Requirement (OR) 343 (Gardnerl98l ,33; Wood 1975, l58) , and an associated Min is t ry of Supplyspeci f icat ion, RB 192 (Gunston 197+,41) . t At t was now in p lace: apreliminary ne twork of local actors had been mobil ized and had con-tributed to creating the intermediaries needed to satisfy the globalactors or turn their objections aside. The design for a local networkof f irms, technical components, management procedures, and therest had been approvcd. Intermediaries would start to flow fromthe global nctwork in order to mobil ize a more permanent localnetwork.

The Creation of a Local Netanork

Vickers and English Electric did not wait for contracts to be awardedformally. In late l95B they set about the diff icult task of building a

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r l t r t r o l o l l r l o t q t r i t c s t ' p t t r l t t t ' i t l < l t r s t r i a l r l r S a n i z a t i o n s a n d d e s i g n S '

\ r . r r . r ; r l 1 , r . . ,1 ,1 . ' r r rs I l r r l to l r t .< lv t ' r t ' omc in th is p rocess o f des ign ing and

, , , , , l , i l i z i r ru : r lo r . t r l 1 t ' twr l rk . l ' i r s t , the des igners who had prev ious ly

r r , , rk r . r l i r r tw ' t ( ' ^ rns somc 200 mi les apar t had ra ther d i f fe ren t

, r1 ,1 , r ' , l l r r ' l t t ' s t r l < lcs ign . ' l ' hus the V ickers team, wh ich was based in

\ i , ' r l , r i t lgc i ' Surrey and near Winchester in Hampshire ' had con-

r cr r t r ' : r t t '< l o t t c lcct ronic systems, on a i rborne systems in general , on

l r rsc l r rqt 'c lcs isn and on shor t takeof fand landing (Wi l l iams, Gregory '

, r r r t l S i rnpson 1969,29) . The Engl ish Electr ic team was based on

\\ ':rr.to. in Lancashire and had concentrated on supersonic aspects

,,l r lrc dcsign, the implications of low-level f l ight' and had, as we have

rrot<'<1, submitted the more detailed airframe design' The process ofqcrting to know one another and settl ing down to collaborative work

,r irs cliff icult but generally successful in the end (Beamont 1968, 137;

l lcarnont I980, I34; Wi l l iams, Gregory, and Simpson I969, 47) ,and

rr . ioint team of f ifty designers undertook a detailed study of the

t, ', lhnical and design problems raised by GOR 339 by the early

nronths of 1959. Following this a division of labor evolved that

1.flected the relative skil ls of the two teams: the Weybridge group

worked on systems including cost-effectiveness and weapons' while

the Warton team worked on aerodynamics (Wood 1975' 164)'

But the local network was not composed of people alone' For

instance, the problems posed by the differences between the two

clesigns *".. ut f irst considerable. The most fundamental of thcsc

arose out of the different requirements suggested by supersonic fl ight

and a short takeoff capabil ity' High-speed fl ight suggested a small

wing with low aspect ratio, a low thickness-to-chord ratio and a high

leading edge sweep-all features of the Pl7A. A short-takeoff capa-

bil ity suggested the need lor a low wing loading, which -in turn

l-pii.a Inlt tn. wing should be large, and it also suggested a high

thickness-to-chord ratio and a low leading edge and trail ing edge

sweep. Sir George Edwards, head of Vickers and later of the merged

Briti ih Aircraft Corporation, is reported to have said at one stage',.The Vickers STOL study and the English Electric machine with a

t iny low level wing . . . seemed i r reconci lable" (Gunston 1974,44) .

The team wrestled with these different requirements and eventually

resolved them in a single solution by: a' providing very Iarge flaps

that increased both th1 thickness-to-chord ratio and the angle of

. r t t . l ( [ , l r . l o r r t r r g l r r x l r - l r r ( ' \ \ u r ( ' . l r r o \ ( . r t l r r . l l . r l r r r r r o l r l r . r l r , r n r l n ( ] \ ( .l i l i r r t l o w s p c r ' < l s l r y l l r c v c r r t i n g t l r ( ' l r l r . r r k r r p o l i r i l l l , u . o v r . r ' r l r r . l o l rsu r l : r ce o l ' t hc w i r rg ; a r r< l t ' . i r r c r t . i r s i r r g t l r . t l r r t r s t - t o -w r . i g l r t r i r t i oby speci fy ing two cxt remcly powcr lu l c 'g i ' t .s ( ( iur rs t , ' l l )74, 4( i ;W i l l i ams , Grego ry , and S impson 1969 ,25 ,39 ; Wood 1975 , 165 ) .

Although this was the most fundamental design decision l irrgiven the operational Requirement, many other decisions atroutengines, moving surf;aces, undercarriage, and integral fuel tanks wereseen by the team to be foreclosed-other and somewhat separabledesign diff iculties also arose. one of these concerned the location ofthe engine. The necessity for thin, unclurtered wings suggested thatthese should be located within the fuselage, as in rhe English Electricdesign. Vickers were skeptical about this, worrying about coolingproblems and the risk fire. However, in the end the Engrish Electricview carried the day (Wood 1975, lG3). Another concerned theshort-takeoff capabil ity o[ the aircraft. In 1959 the Air Sraff werehoping for this, but the designers quickly concluded that the pro-posed aircralt was too heavy, and they sought-and were qiven-permission to build an aircrafr that would take offinstead from halfrunways and rough st r ips (Gunston 1974, 4 l ) .

In March 1960 the wing position was moved by three inches as aresult of these and similar deliberations (Hastings 1966, 40; Gardnerl98l , 105) , but af rer th is the design was changed l i t t le in concepr,and a brochure and drawings were issued to the workshops in 1962(Wood 1975, 165).6 A putative local nerwork of technical compo-nents had been specified. All that remained was to turn these frompaper into metal.

Integrating their designs and their design teams were not the onlyproblems of integration and control conlronted by the two firms.There was also a question about how the production work should beallocated. Although the conrract lrom the Ministry of Supply statedthat the two firms were to share the work equally, it was also madeclear that Vickers was the prime contractor and would exerciseoverall mangement conrrol (Hastings 1966, 35; Will iams, Gregory,and Simpson 1969, 22). ' I 'his led to some il l feeling in English Elec-tric, which felt that it should have received its own contract directlyfrom the ministry. The problem was exacerbated by the commit-ment to a development batch approach. The prototypes and devel-opment aircraft would be built on the production l ine for the mainseries rather than being built by hand, separately. The location ofthe production l ine had, therefore, to be determined early on, andnegotiations were diff icult (Gardner lgBl, 32).

Rololittst he|woon Globel cnd l.ocel Nolworkt

\ \ J r r l c t l r c r l r ' r i g r r : t t t < l r ' t t ' : t l i o t t o l l t k r t : t l t t t ' two rk w t ' t t t i t l t t ' : t <1 , t l t t ' r t 'r r r . r r . r ' o t r t i r r r r i r r g r l i l l i t r r l t i c s i r r t l r c i r r t t ' r i t c t i o l t l l c tw t : c t r t hc l oca l ne t -r r , , r k ; r r r r l t l r c L {k r l l l t l t r c lwo rk t ha t had l l r ough t i t i n to be ing . As welr . rvr ' : r l r t ' r r r ly i r r< l i t ' r t t t '<1, in pr in t : ip le the Min is t ry of Supply was, , , rnrr r i l r r '< l t ( ) : r w( 'a l )ons systcms approach to procurement- then l rok ' r r rachint ' in t : lud ine a l l i ts av ionics, armaments, and othersrr l rsvst t ' rns should be conceived as a whole. In the v iew of the Min is-r r r , th is approach had impl icat ions for management:

Srrrt c thc fàilure of only one link could make a weapons system ineffective,rlrr. i<k'al would be that complete responsibil i ty for co-ordinating the various(()rnl)on('nts of the system should rest with one individual, the designer oftlrr ' :r ircr:rl i . (SuPPU oJ Militarl Aircraft 1955' 9)

' l ' lrc approach thus implied centralized control. It suggested that asirrgle locus should shape and mobil ize the local network and that tbislot'us should have control over all transactions between the local andulrrbal networks. It should, in short, become an obligatory point of

ftassage between the two networks.As we have indicated, Vickers was indeed appointed prime con-

tractor and was responsible in principle for controll ing the entireproject (Hastings 1966, 35; Will iams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969,22). In practice, however, the Ministry of Supply (later Aviation)did not vest all responsibil i ty for control in Vickers. Rather, theproject was controlled by a complex series of committees on which arange of different agencies were represented, and no single agencywas in a position to control all aspects of the project. The failure ofthe management of the newly formed British Aircraft Corporation toimpose itself as an obligatory point of passage led to a number ofcomplaints by the latter about outside interference. These fell intotwo groups:

l. Actors in the global network were able to make (or veto)decisions that affected the structure of the local network:

a. Many of the most important contracts were awarded directly bythe Ministry; the contract for the engines provides a case in point.The design team took the unanimous view that this should beawarded to Rolls Royce. This recommendation was based on thebelief that a reheat version of the RB l42R offered the thrust-toweight ratio necessary for the aircraft, was lighter, and had morepotential than an alternative enhanced Olympus engine made by

l l r r . t , , l S r r l r l c l c r , l l . r \ t l n r , l \ l t l t r l r , I l , \ \ , , , , r 1 l t ) i l r , l t r . l , . l l o \ r ( ' \ ( ' t , t l l ( 'l \ l i r r i s t r r o l ' S r r p p l l ' l r ; r r l o t l r c r r i c n ' s , : r p p : r l c r r t l v r l c l i v i r r g l i o r n r t s( ' ( ) n ( ' ( ' r n t ( ) l ) u r su ( ' : r l r i r r t l r r s t l i ; r l po l i t ' y ' o l r r r c l gc r ' , i l n ( l ( l ( ' s l ) i t ( ' t l l i srccommendat ion awarded thc ( 'ontr i l ( ' t to Br is to l S i<k lc l t 'y ( ( l l : r rkc1965 ,77 ; Gardne r l 98 l , 29 ; Guns ton 197+ ,41 ; W i l l i ams , ( i r cgo ry ,and Simpson 1969,21) . In fact , overa l l , the BAC contro l lec l onlyabout 30 pe rcent of the project expenditure itse lf (Gunston 197 4, 67 ;Hast ings 1966,40) .b. The Air Staff tended to make decisions without reference to theBAC. The problem here was that the RAF continued to develop itsideas about the idcal performance and capabil it ies of the TSR.2.This tendency to upgrade specifications was encouraged by the factthat contractors would often talk directly to the Air Staffand the AirMinistry. Sometimes such discussions would lead to changes in thespecification of equipment whose specifications had already (or sothe BAC thought) been fixed. One result was that, at least in theview of the BAC, progress toward lreezing the design of the aircraftwas impeded (Hast ings 1966, 144; Gardner l9Bl , l0 l ; Wi l l iams,Gregory, and Simpson 1969, 49) .

2. Given the number of global actors that had a right to expressthei r v iews in the commit tee st ructure, arr iv ing at a c lear decis ionwas sometimes diff icult.a. It was often impossible to get a quick decision from the varioussovernment agencies. Hastings (1966, 160) describes the case of thenavisational computer that was thc responsibil i ty of a firm calledEll iott Brothers. The specification lor this computer was very de-manding, and Ell iott concluded that the only way in which thiscould be met within the time allowed was by buying the basiccomputer from North American Autonctics. The Ministry resistedthis because it had sponsored basic research on airborne digitalcomputers in 1956 57. The Min is t ry u l t imate ly accepted El l io t t 'sview, but the equipment re<luircd was complex and the price washigh. This brought into play ' l 'rcasury representatives, who insistedthat the decis ion be rcv icwc<l : r l ic r ayear. The whole argument de-layed the devclopment ol 'thc computer and (or so Hastings argues)added f750,000 to thc cost .b. On a numbcr ol-occitsions the Trcasury used its position to try tocancel the pr<rjcct, or at least reduce its cost, and there seems litt ledoubt that an init ial dclay in issuing contracts was in part a functionof Treasury reluctancc. When the committee structure was furtherelaborated in 1963, the opportunities for discussion about costs be-

r . r 1 t t . ! : r r . , r t r . r r 1 l l . t r r r l r . r . r l , l l r l l ' r | ) 1 r ' r t s l t l r t l r r ( l , r t t t t t t i t t l r " u ' l r i r l t

r i l , l t r r l r . r l I r r . , r r r r t \ t t t t ' t t t l r t ' t s l r i P , l r ; r r l t l ( ) t ( ' l ) t ( ' s ( ' t l t : t t i v c s l i ' r l l t t i r r r l t t s -

r r \ l l , r r r i r r qs l l x r ( r . l l l t ; \ \ ' i l l i ; r r r r s , ( l r cqo | y , i t r r< l S i r t tPson l l x i { ) , t } 2 ) .

, l l r r . t r . t . l r r r i r . ; r l r . r , r r r r i l i t t t . t .s o l i t ' r r t l ta t l t ' t lc t : is i t tns wi th re lat ive ly

l r t r l r . f l r , r rg l r l .1 . 's t , wl t t ' r t ' i ts l l t .s t : t : 'mtn i t tecs cOncerned wi th CoSts

l r , r r l l i t rk ' i t r l i r r r t r l t t io t t : t l lout , or abi l i ty to determine' the technical

r r , ' , r 'ss i ty ' o l ' t l tc tasks thcy werc examining (Hast ings 1966' 35;

\ \ ' i l l i r r r r rs , ( i rcgory, and Simpson 1969,22) ' Cer ta in ly i t appears that

rlr, ' l{Al" sought optimum petfotmattce in a way that was relatively

, , ,s t - i r rs t ' t rs i t ivc. (Hast ings 1966,59 60) ' The Air Staf f tendency to

,1,' lrrv wlrs strcr.rgthened Èy the weaPons systems philosophy.a-nd the

,1.'r ' ,: l ,,pme.t batch approach to procurement, both of which rein-

l,,r.t.r.rl in" Ref' desire to b. ,,rr. that the design was absolutely right

lrclir lc it was frozen, because it was so diff icult to introduce modifi-

r:rriols once this had occurred (Will iams, Gregory' and Simpson

| 1X ; { ) , 53 ) .

Dfficulties in Mobilizing a Local Netuotk

\Vc have described the reaction of the British Aircraft Corporation

to the fact that outside actors refused to let it serve as an obligatory

point of passage between the project's global and the local networks'

However, the growth of mistrust between the Ministry and the BAC

was two-way. tft. Ministry came to believe that the prime contrac-

tor was fail ing to exercise adequate management control (Hastings

1966, 157;Wi l l iams, Gregory, and Simpson 1969' 54) ' In par t icu lar '

it was suggested that theie was no single "iron man" at the BAC to

dircct thË'project (Wood 1975, 172), and at one point the ministry

lelt obliged to represent this view very strongly to the firm' Thus'

althougt the Ministry's point of view has not been as well docu-

-.nt.à as that of the BAC, it is pretty clear that for much of the

period after 1959 neither acted as an obligatory point of passage be-

,r".a., local and global networks, and there was continual "seepage"

as local actors lobbied their global counterparts' which influenced

and in some cases impeded the smooth running of the project'

Indeed, the constiuction of the local network presented many

p rob lems .Pe rhaps themos tSe r i ouso f theseconce rned theeng ines .I t i s c l ea r i n re t rospec t tha tne i t he r theMin i s t r yno rB r i s to lS idde leyknew what they were letting themselves in for when the contract was

awarded. The Ministry specified the engines in very general terms'

and it was at first thoughi that their development would be a fairly

s t r . u r l l r t - l ( , 1 \ r ' . r r ( l r n . l l t c r . , l r r l r g r . r r l r r r g . r r r . . \ r \ t r u l { t t . 1 r r . , t l r r . ( ) l r r r r P r r s( \ \ ' i f l i i r r r r s , ( i r r . go ry , i u r t l S i r r r l r so r r I tX i t f , , ) 7 , 52 ) . l t t r r r . l r r . r l o r r t t l r i r tt l r is was r l ( ) t t l l ( ' t 'as< ' . ' l ' l t t ' c t tg i r rc t l r i r t w:rs r l r .vr .kr1 l r .< l l r i r r l i r r r r r r r . l rgreater thrust than i ts prcdeccssor anr l opcratcc l at rnuch l r i .q l rcrtemperatures and pressures. when it was first proved o. thc tcst lrr.rl,i t turned out that its cast turbine blades were too britt le, ancl it w^snecessary to replace them with forged blades at considerablc cost inboth t ime and money (Hast ings 1966, 42; Gardner lgBl , 104) .

This was not the only diff iculty experienced by Bristol Siddeley.serious problems arose with the reheat system, it proved impossibleto install the completed engine in the frrelug., a.,à there *u, ulro uweakness in the joint between the main engine and the jet pipe.However' the most serious problem appeared only late in the processof development. After proving the engine for over 400 hours on thetest bed (Hast ings 1966,43) , i t was insta l led beneath a vulcan in la te1962. on December 3 this aircraft was taxiing during ground restsat the BSE works at Filton in Bristol when the engine blew up,"deposi t ing," as Wood (1975, 174) repor ts i t , . ,a large por t ion ofsmouldering remains outside the windows of the company pressoffice." The aircraft was reduced to burning wreckage, and althoughthe crew was saved, a fire engine that approached the flames withoutdue caut ion was caught up in the in ferno (Gunston 1g74, 56) .

within forty-eight hours ir was clear that the failure had beencaused by primary failure of the low-pressure compressor shaft.what was not clear, however, was what had causeà this f;ailure.Bristol siddeley hypothesized that it might be due to srress andordered that the thickness of the shaft be doubled. At the same timeit ordered an exhaustive series of tests .-a further, elaborately mobi-l ized network 'f actors -to investigate the reasons for the f;ailure.These led to further unpredictable and unexplained explosions.Finally, in the summer of l9G4 rhe cause of the problem was diag-nosed. In the orisinal u.modified engine, the low-pressure shaft hadturned on three bearings. However, the design team had become con-cerned that the middle of these three bearings might catch fire at thehigh operating temperatures; this bearing had therefore been removedand then, to provide the shaft with sufficient rigidity, the diameterof this shaft had been increased (Beamont 1968, 139; Hastings 1966,43; wood 1975, 174) . under cer ta in unusual c i rcumstances, the a i rbetween this shaft and its high-pressure neighbor started to vibrateat a frequency that corresponded to the natural frequency of reso_nance of the low-pressure shaft. when this happened, disintegration

I b I r l t r s , l l l t t l | u l t a l r t , t t l l | \ r l r r " r l l a t l s ' t ' " l I t ' h n r ' t l t h ' n q '

, 1 r r , l l t l , , l l , , r r c r l l l , , r r r r ' r ' t , r ' r ' r ' t t r r t t l t . t r l t . t t l t t , r s i s : r t l t : t t r r l , l t s o l t t l i o t t\ r , r \ ! ' ' r n B l o t c r l t t i t r ' l t t t i l t t ' t t i t t t r ' ; r t t r l l l t ( ) t l ( ' \ ' . 7

\ , r t . r l l o l t l r r . l r x : r l r r r . l u ,o rk l r r o l l l c t r r s ( ' ( ) t l ( ' ( ' l ' l l ( ' ( l t l r t ' c r rg incs . I t, r l r o l r r , , r c r l yc r ' \ ' t l i l l i r r r l t t o t ' l t t l t ' o l t l r t ' su l l t ' 1 ; t t t r ac to rs . As we haver r r , l r r . r t c r l , s ;u r t c s t t l r t ' o r l l r i t ( ' l ( ) r s appca l t ' d < l vc r t he head o f t he BACto r l r r . r r r i r r i s t r l , i r r 6 r t l t ' r t 9 < l I t a i t t | àvo rab le dec i s i ons abou t cos t sl l . r r t i r r qs I lX i ( i , l l ( i ; ( i a r c l nc r l 98 l , l 0 l ) . O the rs co l l uded w i th t he

,r r r s t ; r l l to s l tc t ' i ly t ' r lu i l tment that was unduly sophist icated ' Again,l r , r r r 11)51) r tnd tnore so l rom 1962, when the pol i t ica l c l imatel,r 'r i.rrr to rrrr<lcrtnine the project many subcontractors doubtedrr l rc l l r t ' r ' rhc: r i r t ' ra l i would actual ly f ly . This feel ing was a funct ion, ,1 , r r rot l r t ' r 'k ind o l 'seepage between the local and g lobal networks-.1,r't i l icit l ly the knowledge that the project had powerful opponentsIrr rt()\ '( 'rnment.' l 'he subcontractors thus sought to protect themselves,rrrrl rc<'over their costs in full within each contract) by charging

lriqlr priccs, and they also tended to give the work low priorityl i 'urnont 1968, 143; Gardner l98l , 102; Wi l l iams, Gregory, and

Sir r rpson 1969,28) . In addi t ion there was a tendency to charge arr i r l t ' range of development work to the TSR.2 because i t was the,rrly advanced military aircraft project in Britain (Gunston 1974,i r l l ; ( iardner l98l , 102) . In any case, much of the work was notr r r r rcnable to prec ise cost ing in advance (Gunston 1914,60; Wi l l iams,( i rcgory, and Smith 1969, 27 ,5 I ) . Although the aim of the ministryirncl the BAC was to issue fixed price contracts as this became possi-blc, this goal was not achieved for many of the most importantrrreas of work because unanticipated technical problems arose or thespecification of the equipment was altered.

The Global Netuork ReshaPed

The consequences of the failure to build a satisf;actory local networkmade themselves felt in a number of ways. The RAF had beenpromised rhat rhe TSR.2 would be available for squadron service by1965, but it was clear, wirh the engines sti l l unproved in the middleof 1964, that this deadline had substantially slipped. The Ministry ofDefence had likewise been promised a vital weapon with which tofight a war in Europe or the Commonwealth by 1965. This was noteoing to be available . The Treasury had been promised a cheap andversatile aircraft. Though it is true that some of the blame for the costoverrun can be laid at the door of the Treasury itself, by 1963 theestimated cost of the aircraft had nearly doubled' The Navy, whichhad been hostile from the outset, saw the project swallowing up more

' , , , ' , : , r , ' , ; ; ; : " : , , , , ' r r ( ' . r r , ' ( r H r . r . r r r r ! r r r l , r r r r . r r , . r p r r r r . r r . r t . r . ; r r r ri l ( ' l ( ) l ' s i l r t l r c 1 I l o l r i r l t l ( ' l w ( ) r ' k , n l r c t l r c r s v r r r l r i r t l r r . t i r . l o t l r r . l ) r . ( ) l ( ' ( . 1 ( , r .n ( ) t ' s : rw i t as bc ing i r r dc r ' 11 t r ou l r k ' . I t * , , , , s i r r r p l y l i r i l i r r s i , , . 1 , . 1 i r , , . .the in termediar ies to the g lobal .c tw.rk that i t hacl Pr 'nr isc<l wh, , .it had been given the go-ahead. Thus, arthough thc crata i. tabrc I . Iare calculated on a variety of bases and are not in ail cases stri.trycomparable with one another, they sufficiently i l lustrate this scneraltrend.

However, although these diff iculties were serious, they did notnecessarily mean that the project was doomed. If the necessaryintermediaries could be obtained from the global network, it wouldbe able to continue: funds from the Treasury, expertise and sup-port from the RAF, polit ical support from the Ministry of Defence,and specialist services fiom such departments as the Royal AircraftEstablishment-these would allow it to continue. The RAF andthe Minister, though not necessarily the whole of the Ministry or'Defence, remained strong supporters of the project. With the gov_ernment committed, it was not possible for the Treasury, the Navy,or indeed, the hosti le sections of the Ministry of Defence, to stop theproject. Accordinely, the lunds continued to flow. However. armed

Table l.lEst imatcd costs and dcl ive ry datcs of ' l 'SR.2

Datc of est imateDevclopmcnt Productionestimate estimate 'Iotal

January 1959December 1959

October 1960

March 1962

January 1963November 1963

January 1964February 1964

January 1965

d2s-s0mdBO-90m(for 9 aircraft)

d90m

dl37mdl75-200m

d24O 26Om

up to d200m

c. d237m(for l58 aircraft)

up to d250m

c. d330m

d400m (overall,Ministry of Aviation)

d500m (overall,Ministry of Defence)d604m (overall,Ministry of Aviation)d670m (overall,contractors) (R&Dand production ofI 50 aircraft)

I L , l , l , , t 6 , 1 l t , , r t h " l t r l r t , t , r l l | \ . t , , . ' l l n t l l t , , ' l l , , h n r , , t i t h , r n r , i ,

r r r t l r t l r r L t r , , r r l c r l g c l l r . r t t , t t t t c l t o t t t t l r c i t p : r l t i c i p ; r t i o t t i t t t l t c c l t t ' s, r , r r l l l o l q o r ( ' r l r n ( ' n l : r t r r l i r r r l r r s t l l r ' o t r r t n i t t c c s , t l t t ' s k r ' l r t i c s w c r t ' i l t, r \ t r r ) n { pos i t i o t r t o r r t r r l c t ' t t t i t r c t l r r ' l l r r r i c c t l r y i nc l i r cc t û r cans . ' I ' h i sr r r r , , l r c r l t : r k i r r 1 1 t l r r ' l i g l r t i r r l o i r w i r l t ' r i t r c n a .

I l r t ' pro jcr t l r i r< l l r< ' t 'n conccivr :d and shaped wi th in the context of. r l r r r r i tcr l r r t r r r r lx ' r o1 'g lo l ta l actors. Government departments, the,r rnrct l scrv i t ' r 's , thc acrospace industry these were the re levant. r ( l ( ) rs t l r i r t l r : r< l g ivcn l i lè and shape to the pro ject . Though sect ions, ,1 t l rc spccia l is t prcss had some knowledge of the pro ject , publ ic\ r , r r ( 'nr ( 'n ts by nr in is ters had been very l imi ted, and unt i l 1963 i t hadlr,rrl rr vcry low profi le. Gradually, however, this started to change asn('\\ ' :r( ' t()rs Iirst learned about the project and then indicated their, r ppos i t i on t o i t .

' l ' lrt ' rnost important of these was the Labour Party, which had,lt 'r ' l :rrcd its opposition to "prestige projects" such as Concorde andl SR.2 and had promised to review them if it was returned to powerin tlrc next General Election. Labour views about the TSR.2 hadlrt ' t 'rr unimportant in the early days of the project, and indeed wererrrrl irrmed. However, by 1963 this was beginning to change. Thel.ubour Party was riding high in the opinion polls, and a Generall ' l lcction was due by October of 1964 at the latest. Whispering inr.lovcrnment and by other insiders and a series of admissions from theNlinistries of Aviation and Defence about delays and escalating costslcd the TSR.2 to became an object of polit ical controversy from 1963onward. This process was reinlorced by a highly controversial set-l>ack to the project-the failure to persuade the Australian govern-rnent to purchase the TSR.2 for the Royal Australian Air Force. Ina blaze of publicity, the Australians opted for the rival Fll l , anaircraft built to a similar specification by the American firm, GeneralDynamics.

Thus, although supervision of the project remained in Whitehall,the number of actors, including crit ics, involved in its surveil lancemultiplied in 1963. The cost of the project was officially given asd400m. in November 1963. However, the Labour Party Oppositionargued that this was a gross underestimate and put the figure closerto d1,000m., an estimate that was fiercely disputed by the Govern-ment (The Times, Nov. 12, 1963, p. 5). Furthermore, the Oppositionargued that cost was one of the major reasons for the f;ailure toprocure the Australian order, a charge angrily rejected by the Gov-ernment, which claimed that the constant carping of crit ics in theUnited Kingdom had led the Australians to doubt whether theaircraft would ever be produced (The Times, Dec. 4, 1963, p. 7).

l "hn I ' ru , tn, l l l r ,h! ( t ! ! , ,n

( ) t l r c r < ' r i t i t ' s s l t l { g ( ' s t ( ' ( l t l r : r l t l r r ' ; r i r c r i r l i l u r r l l r r . r ' o r r r r . t oo r . xp r . r r s i y r .lbr its r. lc and to. expc'siv(' t() lx' r iskt'cl in t."rbiri, ' l lu ' l inu.tsuggest ing that at d l0m. per machi 'e , i t was " the m.st cxpr .ns iv t 'way yet devised of b lowing up br idges" (Sept . 28, l964 p. l0) .

Further polit ical disagreements centered around the rore 'f ' tht.aircraft. The cancellation of the Brit ish ball istic missile Blue streakin 1960, followed by the 1962 cancellation of the American Skybolt,which had replaced Blue streak, had led certain commentators tospeculate that it might be possible to use the TSR.2 in a strategicnuclear role. This suggestion (which had always been seen as apossibil i ty within government) was picked up by the lg63 Defencewhite Paper (omnd. 1936) and attracted crit icism both from thosewho felt that the aircraft was neither fish nor fowl, such as The Timesand The Economisl, and the left wing of the Labour party, which wascommitted to a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. yet othersincluding Denis Healey, the Labour defense spokesmen, concludedthat this "strategic bonus" did not so much represent a change in thespecification of the aircraft as an attempt by the government topersuade its backbenchers of the soundness of its nuclear defensepolicy (The Times, March 5, 1963 p. l4). Controversy also sur-rounded the continued delays in the first rest f l ight. Healey high-lighted the symbolic importance of the maiden fl ight when heclaimed in Parliamenr at rhe beginning of 1964 that the BAC had"been given an order that it must get the TSR.2 off the groundbefiore the election, and that (this) was a priority, ' (The Times, Jan.17,1964, p. l4) .However, though he was much too professional apolit ician to let the conservarive governmenr off l ightly for its al-leged incompetence, he was also much too agile to loreclose his ownoptions by promising to cancel the project it the Labour party wereto win the General Election.

Endgatne

By the autum'of 1964 the project was at a crucial stage. The localnetwork was practically in place: the TSR.2 was almost ready for itsmaiden fl ight, albeit very much behind schedule and over budget.But the structure of the global network had altered. Disagreementwas no longer confined to the Treasury and the Navy and the RAF,the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Aviation. (Indeed, someof these agencies were starting to alter their views of the project.)The dispute was now public, and the conservative Government hadcommitted itself f irmly and publicly to the TSR.2, while the Labour

( l ppo r r t i o r r , t l l , r r g l r r r . sc t v i t t g i t s pos i t i o t r , r r ' : t s g t ' t t t ' r l t l l l l r i g l r l l ' t ' r i t i -, . r l r , l t l r c cos l : t t t t l r r t i l i r v o l t l r t ' l l r o j c t ' t .

' l ' l t t ' l i r t t r r t ' r t l ' t l r t ' p r< l i ec t t hus, l , .1 , r . r r r l r . r l ( )n l$ ' ( ) l i rc tors. l . ' i rs t , i t was i tn l lor t : rnt to dcmonstrate therr . r l r t r i t . t r l ( . ( ) rn lx . t ( .n( ' ( .o l ' t l r t ' l t r t l jc t : t , and the best way to do th is wasl, rr it tr I lurvt. lr srrcct:sslul f irst f l ight. ' Ihis would reinforce the position,,1 rlrosr. wlro wishccl tcl see the project through. At the same time, theout( ( ) ln( .o l ' thc ( lcncra l Elect ion was a lso v i ta l . Conservat ive successuorrkl pr.[afiy assure the future of the project. Labour victoryr ro r r k l t ' a l l i t i n to ques t i on .

' l ' lrt ' rrraide p fl ight took place just eighteen days before the GeneralI.,k.t.t ion. Roland Beamont, the test pilot, describes the rather sub-tlrrr '<l gr<;up of engineers, technicians' managers, and RAF personnelrvlro :rssembled at Boscombe Down before the fl ight. Most knew' asrlrc large crowd beyond the perimeter wire did not, of the poten-ri ir l ly lethal nature of the engine problem, and they knew that al-t lrgugh its cause had been diagnosed, it had not yet been cured. Inlirct the fl ight was highly successful, the aircraft handled well, andthcre was no hint of the destructive resonance that had plagued thet'nsines. Deep in the election battle the Prime Minister, Sir AlecDouglas Home, described it as "a splendid achievement" (Beamont1968, l5l). The aircraft was then grounded for several months inorder to modify the engines and tackle minor problems with theundercarriage.

The General Election took place on october 15. The result wasclose, and it was not unti l the following day that it became clear thatthe Labour Party had been returned to power with a tiny majorityof f ive. The new administration started work in an atmosphere ofcrisis as a result of a large balance of payments deficit, and it decidedto cap defence expenditure at d2,000 mill ion. It also ordered adetailed scrutiny of the various military aircraft projects and starteda review of the proper future shape and size of the aircraft industry(Campbell 1983, 79). In February the new Prime Minister, HaroldWilson, made it clear that the future of the TSR.2 would depend onfour factors: first, a technical assessment of the aircraft and its alter-natives; second, the f;act that although the overseas purchase of analternative aircraft would save d250 mill ion, this would also involveconsiderable dollar expenditure; third, the future shape of the air-craft industry, and the possible unemployment that would resultfrom carcelling the program; and fourth, the nature of the terms thatcould be negotiated with the BAC.8

At the beginning of April spokespersons for the principal actorsin the newly reconstructed global network the Cabinet Ministers

, , . , , , : , ' ; ; ; i ; : : ' , , : : : , , , , * ( l \ ( , , , , r , ( , , , , , ( . , , ( , , ; rkr . ; r , r , . , ,sr , r r' l ' l r cV t ' o r t s i t l t ' r t ' t l t l t r t ' t ' ; x r ss i l r l r ' ( ' ( ) u l s ( ' s r l ; r c l i r r r : l . r ' r l r l i r r r r r . * . i t l r t l r r .' l ' SR '2 ; t o t : i t t t t ' t ' l i t i t n t l l r u t no t l r i nu i r r i r s l l l l r r . c ; r r n< l t o r . l r r r r . r . l i t : r r r< l

r cp lace i t w i t h t he s im i l a r F l l l ( c rossma ' rg75 , l ! ) l ; w i r s r ' l { ) 7 r ,90) ' The Treasury remained host i re to the ' rsR.2 a 'd acc.rcr i 'urysought cancellation. Although it was concerned that a lar.qc pur_chase of an alternative American aircraft such as the Fll l wourcrimpose severe dollar costs, it was prepared to accept that an option Iôrthe purchase of this aircraft should Ëe taken o.rt ân the undcrstand-ing that this did not imply a firm commitment. The Ministry ol.Defence was also in favor of canceilation on cost grounds, and it wasjoined by those, such as the Navy, that f;avored ihe claims of'orherservices and projects (Hastings 1966, 68, 70). The Minister of De-fence was in favor of an Fl l l purchase, but there was same uncer-tainty whether Britain really needed this type of aircraft in viewof the country's diminishing world role (Will iams, Gregory, andSimpson l969, 3l) H,. was rhus huppy to rake out an op,i l., on rheAmerican aircraft rather than placing a firm order.

The position of the Minister of Defence probably in part reflecreda shift in the view of the Air staff. The comtinatio., of deray and cosroverrun' together with the much tougher policy of economies intro-duced by the new Minister of Defence, had convinced the Air staffthat it was mosr unlikely that there would be a full run of 150TSR.2s, and this had red to doubt about whether it would be possi-ble to risk such a small number of expensive aircraft in conventionalwarfare' For some officers this pointeà to the desirabil ity of acquiringlarser numbers of cheaper aircraft that might be mo.e flexiËty de-ployed. In addition, though the technical problems of the T.SR.2appeared to be soluble, its delivery date was sti l l at least three yearsaway' Because the Fl l l was designed to essentially the same specifi-cation and was already in procruction, the RAF found this quite anat t ract ive ahernat ive (Reed and Wi l l iams 1971. lB l ) .

lre Ministry of Aviation was concerned that a decision to scrapthe TSR'2 would seriously reduce the future capacity of the Brit ishairc,raft industry ro mount advanced military p.oj.cis, and tendedto f,avor cancellatio', combined with th.

-p.,.. iuse of a lower-

perlormance Brit ish substitute. However, most ministers, includingthe Minister of Aviation, berieved that the industry *a, -r.h toolarge for a medium-sized nation. The rear problem was that therewas not yet in place a policy about its future shape and size. Even so,the TSR.2 was cosring abour dl milrion a week, and further deray incancellation did not, on balance, seem justif ied.

l h l t l t n , l l l t r l h " l r n l t t , t r l t | \ r r , , , , ' l l n r l t , r , , ' t l , , h r r , , r l I h , r t r r l l

I r r l i . n , t , r l , t l r r ' 1 1 , \ r ' t n r n ( ' r t l \ \ . 1 \ ( r ) n ( r ' t t t r ' < l l l t ; t t r ; t t t r c l l . t t i o t t r v o t t l t ll , , r , l t , , u r r r r r l r l , , \ r r r c n t . \ \ ' i t l r : r t i r r r l . ; t l r o t t t r r r i r . j o l i t y i t t I ) i t t ' l i : t t t t t ' t t t ,r l r r \ 1 . ' r \ \ \ ( ' r ( ' : u l x l ( ) u s n ( ) t l ( ) ( ( ) t t r t u l t t l ( ' ( ( ' ( ' s s i t r y u r t l l < l l l u l a r i t y .\ l i . r r r r r t t l r i s , l r owcvc t ' , I t t i t t i s t c t ' s f i ' l t t l r a t t hc r csu l t an t unemp loy -r r r . r r t r r ou l r l r nos t l y l r c t cn t l l o r i t r y : t h : r t many o l ' t hose work ing onr l r , lS l t .2 rvorr l t l <1tr i t 'k ly bc absorbcd by other pro jects or f i rms.

\ r ' r t ' r ' t l rc lcss, t l rc dcc is i r )n was by no means c lear-cut : there was no, , r l r . r l l ( l r r l r i r r t ' t rna. ior i ty lbr any of the three opt ions (Wi lson 1971,' t { | . , \ r r r r r r r l rcr o l 'min is ters main ly , i t seems, those who were notr l r rcr ' t lv involved wantcd to postpone cancel la t ion unt i l a long-r . r r r r < lc f i 'ncc pol icy was in p lace (Crossman 1975, 190) . Overal l ,Ir,,r lr ' \ 'r 'r, those who wanted to maintain the project were outnum-l rc lcr l l ry those in favor of cancel la t ion wi th, or wi thout , the Fl l l,ption, and the vagueness of the latter commitment ult imately madert possible for these two groups to sink their differences.

' l 'hc cancellation was announced by the Chancellor of the Exche-rqrrcr ,James Cal laghan, in h is Budget Day speech on Apr i l 6 , 1965.' l 'hc result was polit ical uproar as the Conservatives sought to voicetlrt ' ir anger and frustration at what they regarded as a foolish andshortsighted decision. A censure motion was debated on April 13.r\rnid charge and countercharge, Minister of Aviation RoyJenkinst oncluded the debate for the government by agreeing that the'l 'SR.2 was a fine technical achievement:

But, to be a success, aircraft projects must be more than this. They musthave controllable costs; they must fulf i l l the country's needs at a price thatthe country can afford; they must be broadly price competit ive with comPa-rable aircraft produced in other countries, and they must have the prospectof an overseas market commensurate with the resources tied up in theirdevelopment. On all these four grounds I regret to say that the TSR.2 wasnot a prize project but a prize albatross. (Hansard, April 13, 1965' c. 1283)

The result of the censure debate was a resounding victory for theGovernment: it secured a majority of twenty-six, and any residualOpposition hopes that the the project might, somehow, be savedwere dashed when members of the small Liberal Party voted withthe Government.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have shown that the success and shape of a pro-ject, the TSR.2, depended crucially on the creation of two networksand on the exchange of intermediaries between these networks. From

l ! lohn I t t r tu l , l l t rhr t ( ,dtut

t l rc g lo l ra l nctw()rk c i lmc a rangc ( ) l rcs()urccs ( inancc, pol i t ica lsupport, technical specifications and, in some cases at least, a hosti leneutrality. These resources were made available to the project andgenerated what we have called a negotiation space. This was a spaceand a time within which a local network might be built that wouldin turn generate a range of intermediaries-but most obviously aworking aircraft-that might be passed back to the actors in theglobal network in return for their support. We have also noted,however, that there were continual seepages between the global andthe local networks in the case of the TSR.2 project. Actors in theglobal network were able to interfere with the structure and shape ofthe local network, while those in the local network were able to gobehind the back of the project management, and consult directlywith actors in the global network. The result was that project man-agement was unable to impose itself as an obligatory point of passagebetween the two networks, and the troubles that we have detailedfollowed.e

The history we have described offers further evidence for sev-eral important f indings of the new sociology of technology. First, iti l lustrates the interpretive flexibil i ty of objects the way in whichthey mean different things to different social uroups. Second, as isobvious, it represents a further example of the social shaping oftechnology namely the way in which objccts are shaped by thei rorsanizat ional c i rcurnstances (Pinch and Bi jker l9B7; MacKenzieand Wajcman l9B5;Cal lon l986; Law l9B7; MacKenzie l9B7; Mac-Kenzie and Spinardi l9BB; Akr ich, th is volume; Bi jker , th is volume;Latour , th is volumt ' ) . ' l 'hr rs wc have sketchcd out the way in whichthc f 'SR.2 a i rcra l i charrscd in shape both l i tera l ly and metaphor i -ca l ly dur inq the coursc o l ' i ts development , and the re lat ionshipbetween thcst'r:harrr-Tcs ancl the compromises that grew up for a timebetween thc rc lcvarr t human and nonhuman actors compromisesthat achievcd, as wc h:rvc seen, no final solidity but that were, inturn, reworkcd as a l irnction of new circumstances in the local andglobal networks.

Thus back irr 1957 what we might call aircraft number one d,id nothave a physit:al slrapc at all in the minds of the Air Staff or theMinis t ry of Supply (sr :c table 1.2) . I t was rather the per formancespecification a rolt ' to be played and some of the circumstancesin which it should be built. And this role reflecred their view of wharwould pass muster with other relevant actors. Thus, the RAF wanteda flying combat aircrafi, but the Ministry of Defence had a view ofthe future that left room for neither a strategic bomber nor a fighter.

Table 1.2'l'hree aircraft

Aircraft shapeInterestcd actors( * del in i t ion ofai rcraf t )

Host i le actors( + def in i t ion ofai rcraf t ) Neutral actors

l oa

a

a

a

l oa

a

a

a

a

3 . op t ion on F l I Ir ' I 'SR.2 canccl lcd

long rangesupersonrclow al t i tudeSf'OLal l weatherlarge

wing shape, del ta, th intwo powerful cngincsblown f lapsengines in fusclagctwrn cngrnesintceral luel tanks

RAF :. combat a i rcral t. in and out ofEurope. d ispcrsable. precis ion bombing/reconnaissanccDcfcncc:not st ratcgic bomber

RAI ' :o largc, twin-cneine, sophist icatcd. ' l 'SR aircraf t. S ' I 'OL. long rangcDefcncc:. 'I 'SR aircraftBAC:. S'I'OL difficult. V' l 'OL impossible

BAC:. b u y 1 4 0Conscrvativc party:. ' l 'SR.2 csscntialUnions:o maintain work

Navy:o BuccanccrTreasury:r chcap, vcrsat i le Buccaneer?

Navy :o ( b l ockcd )Treasurt :. ( b l ockcd )

RAF :o buy chc:rPcr, rnore certa in a i rcraf lDefcncc:r buy t'hc:rpt'r :rircraft' l ' rcasu rv:. ca l ) c x l ) cnd i t u re. l imi t ( )v( ' rs( :as spendingNavv :. adoPt }JuccancerAviat ion:. bu,v thcpaer U.K. a i rcraf tLabour party ' :. cancel

Labour party. ln lgnorancc

{sf

Ir

F\

\

?E

\

!s

-S

l l l , ' h n I r r r ' t n , l l l r , h r l ( , t l l , ' n

A t l r t ' t i t t t l l r o t t t l l t ' r : l t r ( l l ' ( ' ( ' ( ) n l r i r i s s i u l ( ' ( ' r r i r c r ' : r l i w i l s l l r ( . ( ) n l y r l . n l i l i n -inu possib i l i ty an a i r ( : ra l i that w<lu ld p l : ry out sPct ' i l i t . , n( )ns(r . i r t ( 'g i ( .ro les in Europe and Br i t ish depcndencies ovcrseas. By r :ontrast , thcTreasury was quite uninterested in the delence of the westcr' All i-ance. Much more important was the defence of the public pursc inthe face of ever more costly military technologies. Accordingly, itwanted no aircraft, or (second best) an existing aircraft, or if this wasnot possible (third, fallback, option), then no more than ,ne type ofnew aircrafr. The RAF judged it could force the Treasury to itsfallback position, so it responded by specifying a single versati leaircraft. The Navy had strong views about defence needs, but it sawthese in its own, quite different, carrier-based way. Accordingly, itwanted the RAF to procure a version of its small, subsonic Buc-caneer. In a more negative sense, this was a strong incentive forthe RAF to argue the need for a large, supersonic aircraft thatwas qualitatively different from its naval rival. And the Ministry ofSupply wanted an aircraft that would he built by a consortium offirms rather than one alone.

Though it was rouch and go, rhe Air Staffjudged things rightlyand the global ne twork required by this shadow aircraft number onewas stabil ized. The result was aircraft number ftry0-this time one thathad, albeit on paper, a physical shape. This shape was parrly afunction of the global network of institutional actors mentionedabove. But many other actors, considerations, and negotiationshelped to structure the design. 'I 'hus the shape of the wings rep-resented a compromise between thc dcmandine specification re-quircd by the RAF on the one ha.d, and dcsign skil ls, knowledge ofaer.dynamics and materials strc'Eths, and the practice of wind-tunrc l tcst ing on the other . How on ear th was shor t takeof f andl.ndins to bc reconcilcd with high-altitude Mach 2.5 fl ight andl .w-al t i tudt ' , l 'w-sust rcsp 'nsc? The wing was the physical answerto this rlucsti... It rt 'prcsc'tcd a compromise between these differ-ent considcrat ions. But i t a lso represented a compromise betweenthe Engl ish Elcct r ic .nd Vickers design teams- in which Engl ishElectric had tlrc upPcr hand. Similar reasoning-again in f;avor ofEnglish Elcctrir: led t 'a decision about the location of the engines.These, it was decided, would l ie within the fuselage to clear wingsurfaces and avoid undue differential propulsive force in case ofsingle engine failure-and this despite the potential f ire hazard thatso concerned the vickers team. And it is possible to travel throughthe aircraft explaining the shape of each system as a physical com-promise between the specification, the design teams, and a range of

I h , t t l , , r n , l t t t ' t t h , ' l , r n l r t ' t ' t l l | \ r l t r , , t A l n , t l t , r ' , ' 1 I r , h n t , r l I h , t n y l ' ,

n r l l u l \ l r o n r , r ( ' r ( x l \ r r ; r r r r i r s t o t l r c v i c u ' s o l ( ' x l x ' t ' l s r r t t l r c R o y : r l A i r -r r . r l t l ' , s t : r l r l i s l r t r r c t r t .

I t t : r r r l x ' : r r g r r c r l t l r i r t i r i r c ra l i r t u rn l l c r two g rew ou t o f a i r c ra l tr r r r r r r l r< ' r orr r ' . ( lcr t i r i r r ly rnarry of the constra ints and resources that\ r ( ' l r t t ( ) s l r i rp t 'nurn lx : r ( )nc hc lped to shape number two. But thel ) r { ) ( ( 'ss is r rot onc o{ 'uni l inear development . Ai rcraf t number two\ \ rs n() l s i r r rp ly thc "unpacking" of a set of impl icat ions that werel r r r i l t in to a i rcraf t number one. Ai rcraf t number one posed a set ofpr oll lcms to which there were many possible solutions. Aircra[t num-lrcr two represented a particular set of solutions to those problems-tt,nrpromises negotiated by further numerous actors. Or, in some( as('s at least, it represented refusal to accept the problems posed by(;()R 339, as is most obvious in the case of the short takeoff andlirnding requirement where the available rules of aeroloil behavioroverruled the wishes of the Air Staff. In this instance, then, we see (ifanything) the obverse of the social shaping of technology: it was thetcchnical around which the social was being bent.

But if aircraft number two represents a translation rather than asimple development of aircraft number one, a translation shaped bya set of compromises between a somewhat different set of actors, thenthe metamorphosis of the project is yet more obvious for aircraflnumber three.This, which is more usually known as the Fl I l , gradu-ally took shape after the General Election. Thus we have traced thechanges that took place among many of the most important actorsafter October 1964. The Treasury imposed rigorous economies andexpressed extreme concern about the ever-increasing costs of theTSR.2 project, its short run, and its lack of export prospects. TheMinistry of Aviation sought to shape a smaller and better-adaptedaircraft industry. The Ministry of Delence was involved not only incost cutting but also in a Defence Review that might lead to theabandonment of many Brit ish overseas responsibil i t ies and with it,part of the rationale lor the TSR.2. The Air Staffwere increasinglyconcerned that they would not obtain the full 140 TSR.2s. For theirdifferent reasons a// of these were prepared, with greater or lesserenthusiasm, to abandon the TSR.2 and take out an option on theFll l. Accordingly, the project f ior a tactical strike and reconnais-sance aircraft had been reshaped yet again by the relations betweenthe actors involved, and with that reshaping the object that lay at itsfocal point had undergone metamorphosis yet again. This reshapingis summarized in table 1.2.

So much for the shaping and reshaping of TSR.2.10 But howshould we describe such a "translation trajectory?"rr This, then, is

l t ' l , ' h n L n r , t n , ! l ! t , h r l ( t l l , , t

( ) u r t l t i r ' ( l ( ' on ( . ( . r l l . l l ' t r . t . l r r r o l os i t . s i r r . r . i r r t t . r .P r . t . t i v r . l y l k . x i l l l r . , i l t l r r . y ,arc shapcd by thc i r .o ' tcxts but thcy : r rs , s i rapc tht , rat t t . r , th<.r r , . i r 'we say nothing general about the continsent and iterativc })r(x.(:ss(.sthat generate them? our answer, as we hinted in the introduction, isto deploy a network vocabulary and, specifically, to make use ol.theconcepts of global network, local network, and, obligatorlt point qf passage.our proposal is that the shape and fate of techrioroli.ut p.Jj..t, r, ufunction of three interrelated factors.

The frst is the capacity of the project to build and mainrain aglobal network that wil l for a time p.ouid. resources of various kindsin the expectation of an ultimate return. Note that the successrirlconstruction of a globar network has a specific and important conse-quence: it offers a degree of privacy for project builders to make theirmistakes in private, and without interference_it offers a negotia_tion space (see callon and Law lg'g). In the ideal case the projectbuilder thus obtains a degree of autonomy in its attempts to gJ.reratea return. It also-again in the ideal case_achieves toth ciompletecontrol over and responsibil i ty for those arrempts.

The secondis the abil ity of the project to build a local ne rwork usingthe resources provided by the global network to ultimately offer amaterial, economic, cultural, or symboric return to actors lodged inthe global network. Put less formaily, it is the abirity to experrment,to try things out' and to put them tosether successfully. It is arso theabil ity to control whatever has been produced and feed it back intoand so satisfy the understandings that have been entered into withother actors in the global network.

The third lactor' which is entaired in thc first two, is the capacityof the project to impose itself as an obligatory point of passagebetween the tw'nctw' rks. Unress i t is abie to do ro, i t has t . nocontrol over thc use .l 'slobal resources that may, as a result, bemisused or withdrawn, :rnd 2. it is unable to claim responsibil i ty inthe global netw.rk firr a.y successes that are actually achieved in thelocal network. It is' in short, in no position to profit from the localne twork.

Note' now, that the objects and actors in both globar and localnetworks are hetcrogeneous. Thus in the case of the TSR.2 wem,entioned a ranse of important institutional actors in the form ofwhitehall ministries. Bur we also rouched upon geopolit icar factors(the presumed interests of a range of nation states) and technologicalchanges (the advance of missile and anti-aircraftiechnologies). Andwe might equally well have considered the role of such"naturallyoccurring features as prevail ing winds (they were vital in the calcura-

I h t I t l t ' t u ' l l l r ' t t h , ' l ' t t l r r ' r r t l l | \ r r t t " r A l n t l t ' r , , ' l I / t h t u t t t l ( h t t n r t l i

t r o r r n l l r t t t t ; u r q ( ' s ) , : r t r r l l c t r ; t i t t r t ' o s s - s c r l i o n s ( w l r i t l r w c t t t i r t t o t l t t 'r , r l r r r l . r t i o r r o l t l r c r i sks i r r vo l v t ' t l i l r l ow- l cvc l l l y i ng ) , r l r , I i r r t ha tn r . r t t ( ' r . s r r t l r l r r r n r i r r r ucou r i t p l r i t : a l bu t g l c l ba l cons ide ra t i ons as t he. r r , r i l ; r l r l i l i t v a r r< l < l i s t r i bu t i on o f a i r s t r i ps o f d i f f e ren t l eng ths .

l i r r t i l 'skr l la l nctworks are heterogeneous, then so too are localn( ' t \1 ' ( ) rks. ' l ' l r t " l 'SR.2 pro ject mobi l ized inst i tu t ional actors in thelorru of ' ( ' ( )nt ractors, subcontractors, and specia l is t agencies such asr l rc l r rs t i tu te fbr Aviat ion Medic ine. I t mobi l ized tens of thousands,,1 <lr ir l isnrcn, designers, market personnel, and fitters. It involved therrsr' ol 'a grcat body of high-status knowledge in the form of scientif ic:rrr<l tcchnical expertise and a large amount of equally importantslrop-floor knowledge and skil ls. And it involved numberless ma-r Irinc tools, j igs, motor vehicles, chaser aircraft, and test ries, not torncntion an awesome quantity of paperwork in the form of drawings,irrstructions, management charts, brochures, sales pamphlets, maps,rund publicity handouts.

If the elements that make up global and Iocal networks are hetero-seneous, then the extent upon which they can be depended is alsoproblematic: the degree to which they may be mobil ized is variable,reversible, and in the last instance can only be determined empiri-cally. In other words, the extent to which it is possible for a projectto control its two networks and the way in which they relate isproblematic, and it is the degree and form of mobil ization of the twonetworks and the way in which they are connected that determinesboth the trajectory and success ofa project (f igure l. l).

Concentrating on the two networks, it is possible to plot anyproject in a two-dimensional graph, where the r axis measures thedegree of mobil ization of local actors (control over local network)and they axis measures the extent to which external actors are l inked(control over global network). Furthermore, it is possible to describethe translation trajectory of any project (f igure 1.2).

Thus, in the case of the TSR.2, the project started in the center ofthe diagram and climbed up thc vertical axis as it sought to distin-guish its product from the Buccaneer (A) . Then, as the managementstructures were elaborated, it sought to move along the r axis to theright (B), and this tende ncy was strengthened as a design was agreedbetween the two former design teams, which in turn f;acil i tated theformation of a single, unified design te am (C). However, this positionwas not maintained. Litt le by l itt le, as the subcontractors failed tofall into l ine, and in some cases interacted directly with the RAF, thedegree to which the project management monopolized the internalnetwork declined (D). This process reached a nadir when the low-

l "hn I ' r , , , tn, l . l l t ,hr l ( r l l , ,u

Loca l ne lwork G l o b o l r r e t w o r k

Strong external at tachmentStrong internal mobi l izat ionstrong obl igatory point of passage

Weak external at tachmentWeak internal mobi l izat ionWeak obl igatory point of passage

Figure l.lStrongly and wcakly mobi l izcd networks.

I h , I t l , , m ' t l l r ' t t h " l ' n l t t , t , t l t | \ r t t t u L l n ' t l 1 , t r " l l . t h n t t t l I h i i l U

I I ' r l l r

D r : q r r : r : o l a t l a c h f n e n t o la c t o r s I n g l o b a l n e t w o r k

Sol id, indispensable project

H i gh

Degree of mobi l izat ion oflocal network actors

Weak, d isaggregat ing pro jec t

Figure 1.2Mobilization of local and slobal networks.

pressure shaft of the engine disintegrated and the latter blew up (E),and the Australians opted to purchase the Fl I I (F). However, aftermuch remedial work the successful maiden fl ight took place and adegree of control over the local network was reasserted (G). Accord-ingly, the project moved back into quadrant l, but with changingpolit ical circumstances and the availabil ity otthe Fl I l , i t reenteredthis quadrant lower down they axis. Finally, with the election of aLabour government, the Fl I I came to be seen as a realistic alterna-tive, and the project slipped down into quadrant 4 (H), and withcancellation it concluded by losing complete control of the localnetwork, so ending up at the lowest point in quadrant 3 (I) (seefigure 1.3). The major turning points in the trajectory of the projectacross this diagram can be depicted as a table ofchoices and conse-quences (see table 1.3) .

We conclude, then, with the thought that the trajectories of tech-nological projects are contingent and iterative. Sometimes, to besure, a project or a technology may move forward in a manner that

Low

' t l ) . fohn l .uu,rn l , l l t rhel ( ;n lhnt

H r g h

Degree o f a t tachment o fac tors In g loba l ne twork

Degree of mobi l izal ion otlocal network actors

LowFigure 1.3'I 'he trajectory of ' l 'SR.2.

I h t I t l r , n l l ) t ' i l h , ' l t n l r r r r r l l | \ t t t r , ' r A

' l ' rblc 1.3( l l r o i r c r , u r t l r o t r s c t l t t c t t t t ' s

. l n i l t , t , t l I r r h n t r t l ( h r n p

l ' , r ' r ' r r t s / r l t r i s i o t t s l ,ot 'a l < <lnsr '<1 uct t< 'es ()lobal consequcnccs

l l

' l i , l r r r i k l : r r r t 'w: r i r t r : r l i

, , \ p l x r i r r t r r r cn t o l 'l ) r r n l ( ' ( ( ) n t r a ( ' t o r

I ) t ' r is ion aboutt l t ' s i gn

Sul lport pr imc( ( )ntractor 'sr l ro i< cs

I)cstruct ion ofcngrnes

Austra l ianpu rchasingdccisionMaiden flight

Labour party winsclection

Cancellation

Ar t i cu la tc dcs ign

Art iculatc weapons

Develop productionfaci l i t iesUndermine primecontractor

Delay, mobil izat ionof new teams andlacilitiesIncreasing skepticismby subcontractors

Technical conndencein aircraft and contractorIncreases doubts amongsubcontractorsDissolution of project

Navy and 'I'reasury

blockedMinimize outsideinterventionSecure funding

Permit direct RAFintervention

Expense and increasedskepticism

Increased politicizationo[ project

Strengthcns supportersof projectStrengthens opponentsof projectOption to purchaseF l i l

( :

l )

I

( ;

t l

side, between backstage and front stage. The methods and mate-rials for building such backstage negotiation spaces and relatingthem to the front stage are varied, and as the case of the TSR.2shows, they are certainly not a function of strategy alone. We makeuse of a ne twork metaphor because we need a neutral way of talk-ing about the barriers that shape, for a time, the seamless web ofsociotechnology.

Notes

John Law gratefully acknowledgcs thc award by the Nuffield Foundation of a SocialScience Research Fellowship, which made possible the empirical research on whichthis paper is based.l . Here we adopt the mcthodological adage of Latour (1987) and "fol low theactors."2. In an earlier paper (Callon and Law l9B9) in which we developed this argumentin greater detail, we referred to these neighbors as "preforming networks."

3. Ful ler detai ls ofthis process ofdesign are reported in Law 1987.

4. Little is known about the actual process by which decisions were reached. Thebest information available to us amounts to little more than hints. It does appear,

.52 |John Inu and lltuhcl (,hllon

howcvcr, that thc ' l ' reasury and thc Ministry ol ' l )el 'encc wcrc l i rught ol l 'agairr inFebruary I95B (Wood 1975, 158). ' l 'he' l ' reasury was st i l l conccrned alrout the costo[ the whole project, and the Ministry of Defence, noting the smallcr of thc twosubmissions lrom Vickers, toyed with the idea of specifying an aircraft that wouldfulfill some GOR 339 requirements and also be capable of carrier-borne operations(Wood 1975, 156). However, the RAF's need for a large aircraft of the TSR typcwas pressed both formally and informally, and GOR 339 emerged unscathed.5. This specified that the TSR.2, as it was coming to be known, should be capableof high-altitude supersonic flight and a 1,000-nautical-mile radius of operations ina mixed sub- and supersonic sortie. It should also be capable of low-altitude treetop-level flight, have a terrain-following radar, display a low gust response, and have ashort takeoffcapacity, which in turn entailed a high thrust-to-weight ratio. It shouldhave precision, self-contained navigational aids, be capable ofdelivering both nu-clear and high-explosive bombs, have advanced photographic and linescan cap-abilities, and be reliable in order to minimize losses and permit operation frompoorly equipped forward bases. Finally, it should have a ferry range of 3,000nautical miles and be capable of inflight refueling.6. In its definitive fiorm the proposed aircraft had l. a cruising speed Mach 0.9- l.lat sea level and Mach 2.05 at high altitude; 2. a sortie radius of 1,000 nautical miles,3. a takeoffcapability of 3,000 4,500 feet on rough surfaces; 4. a climbing rate of50,000 feet per minute at sea level; 5. a takeoff weight of 95,000 pounds lor a1,000-nautical-mile mission; 6. a high-wing delta configuration with large blownflaps but no control surfaces; 7. a large tailplane with all-moving vertical andhorizontal surfaces; B. two internal ly mounted Olympus 22R engines;9. an internalweapons bay; and 10. an intcrnal fucl capacity ot5,588 gal lons.7. The developmcnt of thc cnginc and the detectivc work involved in diagnosingthe cause of i ts fai lurc is discusscd in dctai l in Law 1992.B. In January the governmcnt considcrcd an ofler lrom the BAC to manufacturell0 aircraft at a price of d575 million, with the firm picking up the 6rst {9 millionofany cost overrun (F' l ight International 87,2928, Apri l 22,1965, p. 622). I t did notaccept this offer primarily because it was not prepared to carry all additional losses.9. The limits to organizational powcr arc useflully discussed in Clegg 1989.10. Although it is outside this story, thc aircraft went through a further reshapingin 1967 when the Fl l l was cancclcd. At that point aircraft number 4-a furtherversion ofthe Buccaneer entered thc scene.I l. The notion of "translation trajectory" is, of course, ironic. Translations are theproduct of continual negotiation. They are precisely not the result of momentumimparted at their point of origin. We use the term to indicate the way in which ourconcerns overlap those oftrajectory theorists see, fior instance, Sahal l98l, Dosi1982, and Nelson and Winter l9B2 but offer an analysis of technical change thatis quite different in kind.