Russian Military Industrial Complex

8/3/2019 Russian Military Industrial Complex

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2/11Aleksanteri

Papers

Russian

Military-IndustrialComplex

2/2011

Irina Bystrova


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Russian Military-Industrial Complex

Abstract

During the Cold War, military-industrial complexes (MICs) appeared in most of the coun-tries, involved in it. The MIC was a conuence of such groups, as professional military,defense-industrial, governmental and security bureaucracies, and a scientic and techni-cal elite. In the paper, all these groups are presented in social and personal context.

The structure of Soviet MIC was formed by the mid-1960s. The organ of coordination wasMilitary-industrial commission of Presidium of the Council of Ministries of the USSR.

And, a military-industrial complex of the Warsaw Pact was created.

After the end of the Cold War, the MIC of Russia suffered major cutbacks. Since 1999

defense industry was nanced at higher level, but defense production was oriented on ex-ports. After 2006 a new period of development of the MIC started: the Military-industrialcommission and State order for armaments were restored; defense industry was moreoriented on the supply of Russian Armed Forces. This is the sign of rising priority of de-fense sector, and change in governmental policy, with the use of the Soviet legacy of Statecontrol over the national security. Despite difculties, Russian MIC has inherited scien-tic and technical potential of the Soviet MIC.

Irina Bystrova

Irina Bystrova is a Leading Research Fellow at the Institute of Russian History, RussianAcademy of Sciences; and Professor at the Russian State University for Humanities. Sheholds a Doctoral Degree in Russian History (2002). Irina is a specialist on history of theCold War and World War II, and on military-industrial complexes. She is the author ofThe Cold War 1945-1960. Tokyo-Moscow-Washington (Moscow, 2009), Soviet Mili-tary-Industrial Complex: Problems of Creation and Development (1930s-1980s) (Mos-cow, 2006)


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Contents

Russian Military-Industrial Complex .......................................................................................1

The MIC in Historical Research Literature ..................................................................................................... 4

The Sources on the History of Soviet MIC ............................................................................... 4

Forced Defense Construction in the USSR (1930-1945) ................................................................................. 5

The Military Industry of the USSR in 1941-1945: The Domestic and International Aspects ofDevelopment .................................................................................................................................................... 5

The Military-Industrial Complex and the Cold War ....................................................................................... 6

The MIC of the USSR and the Countries of Peoples Democracy ................................................................ 7

Military-Technical Cooperation of the USSR and the Countries of the Third World ................................. 8

Social and Political Aspects of Development of the Soviet MIC ................................................ 9

The Political-Military Leadership .................................................................................................................... 9

The Nucleus of the Military-Industrial Complex: The Military, Industrialists, and Scientists .................... 10

The Military-Industrial Complex: Contradictions and Unity ........................................................................ 11

Russian Defense-Industrial Complex in the Post-Soviet Period ....................................................................12


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Russian Military-IndustrialComplex

This paper is the result of the rst complex study of the history of the military-industrialcomplex of the USSR from 1930s to 1980s, and its transformation in post-Soviet period of1990s-2000s. A broad range of aspects of the problem is included: economic and techni-cal, social and political, cultural, international.

According to the authors major concept, the military-industrial complex (MIC) is seen

as a conuence between the social and political groups connected with the military devel-opment: professional military, defense-industrial establishment, Communist Party andstate bureaucracies, scientic and technical elite.

The Soviet case of the MIC is studied in the framework of the international history ofthe XXth century. The XXth century was characterized by sharply growing scale of mili-tary conicts. This tendency was expressed in its most extreme form in the appearanceof world wars. These were total wars, which included front and rear. In these condi-tions permanent connections between war and economy were established, too. In themilitarized economies, a specic form of connection between governmental apparatus,

military professionals and those who produced military techniques, appeared (they maybe called military-industrial liaisons). Militarized economy appeared in all countriesinvolved in World War I (classical system of state regulation of economy was created inGermany at that time). But after the war there was sharp reduction of military expendi-tures, which was characteristic for all of these countries.

The situation changed drastically from the end of World War II, when principally newperiod of the Cold War started, which was characterized by high level of defense expen-ditures in peacetime. In conditions of the Cold War, military-industrial complexes ap-peared in most of the countries, involved in it (the USA, Soviet Union and Russia, China,France, Great Britain).

In general, the processes of the MIC formation and development coincided in the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union. These processes were connected with such factors, as totalmilitarization of both societies during World War II, the invention of nuclear weapons atthe end of the war and the escalation of the arms race during the Cold War.

The term military-industrial complex was introduced by the US President Eisenhowerin 1961. After that the concept was developed by American political scientists. In variantsof the concept, the MIC was seen as a power elite, a ruling class, as a bureaucracy (i.e. anarrow powerful group), or as a lobby, which included wide stratums of the American

society, which were interested in the policy of the arms race and the Cold War1. In generalin different Western theories the MIC was seen as a coincidence of military and economic


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interests in pursuing joint goals, to the detriment of society, as a whole2. Therefore theaccent was made on the negative aspect of that phenomenon.

Soviet ofcial propaganda and social sciences considered the MIC to be the part of reac-

tionary and aggressive circles of the Western countries, and denied the existence of suchphenomenon in the USSR. Soviet historiography produced a number of works on the his-tory of the MICs in the USA, Great Britain, France, and other capitalist countries.

In the same years of the Cold War, the Soviet MIC was studied in Western historiography.These research works were based on Western or opened Soviet sources. Among them cap-ital books by D. Holloway, P. Almquist and some others have to be noted. In these books,in parallel with economic and technical sides of the Soviet MIC development, problemsof internal relations between its different groups in the decision-making on the military-industrial issues were enlightened3. There was also a vast literature in the West on theproblems of civil-military relations, including those in the Soviet Union4.

It was only starting from the end of the 1980s that the history of the Soviet MIC startedto be studied in the USSR, and then these studies continued in Russian Federation. It

was the archival revolution of the 1990s (opening of many Russian archives to the public,partial declassication of documents on Soviet military history) which made these studiespossible.

In 1996 the rst specialized book on the history of Soviet MIC, based on the released doc-uments from Russian archives, was published. This was the book of Nikolai S. Simonov5.That author was the rst one to show economic dynamics and structural change of the

complex. From conceptual point of view, this work may be attributed to the traditionaleconomic direction of historiography, which identied the MIC with defense industryonly.

A new characteristic feature of archival opening was that it produced a sort of con-vergence of Western and Soviet historiography. One of the results of that convergencebecame a collective book produced by Russian and foreign representatives of the eco-nomic direction The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev6.They determined subject of their research as defence-industrial complex, which in-cluded defence industry, its productive and research units, its labor force and system of

administration, facilities and leaders. This notion differed from denition of military-industrial complex, for professional military, state and party leadership and some othercomponents of the MIC were not included there.

In the recent two decades both Russian, and foreign historiography started to follow thesame way in studying history of different branches of Soviet defense industry. The mainperiod of research was the 1920s-1930s. This theme was developed in fundamental workson economic history by R. W. Davies, based on the released documents from Russianarchives7. The author became the rst one to publish the real gures showing the sharprise of Soviet defense expenditures, connected with the course for re-armament taken


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in the early 1930s.

Among the most signicant works on the history of Soviet MIC, written on the basis ofRussian archives, a book of Swedish historian L. Samuelson (translated into Russian) has

to be noted8

. The author investigated the problems of military planning and developmentof defense industry in the USSR in the 1920s-1930s, postulated theoretical ideas on thecontents of militarization, on the two ways of development of the Soviet MIC (civil andmilitary) and on the system of dual planning. One of the recent research works on thehistory of Soviet militarization was written by American scholar D. Stone9. The book was

based primarily on the documents of Russian State Military archive, and the core of hisresearch became the course for rearmament of the Red Army in the end of 1920s- early1930s, which a special stress on the role of the military in that process. These works layprimarily in the framework of economic direction in historiography of the Soviet MIC.

In recent years in Russia a number of works were published by M. Yu. Mukhin,10 who hasinvestigated organizational structure of Soviet defense industry in the 1920s-1930s. Forexample, in his last monograph the history of Soviet aviation industry of that period wasinvestigated from different points (evolution of institutions, problem of cadres, relations

between political and economic leadership, comparison of the Soviet and German avia-tion industries).

Considering present historiography on the history of Soviet military industry, the authorof this paper tries to avoid any kind of doubling of this literature. For example, the periodof 1920-1930s in the MIC history had already been studied by many researchers - Rus-sian, American and European. The main task of the author was to study most important,

key moments in the process of Soviet MIC formation and development, the role of theMIC phenomenon in the history of the Soviet Union, in correlation with the internal So-

viet policy and international relations. The core of this research is the period of the ColdWar, when the MIC actually became one of the leading factors of Soviet economy, policyand culture.

According to the authors concept, these key moments were the following: 1) realizationof the course for re-armament and creation of independent Soviet defense industry in theearly 1930s; 2) crash militarization and preparation for war (1938-June 1941); 3) thewar economy in 1941-1945 as the peak of militarization; 4) the main directions of the

arms race between the Soviet and Western blocs in conditions of the Cold War; 5) SovietMIC spread out of the limits of one country, and its role at the international arena; 6) at-tempts of reforming of the Soviet MIC in the second half of the 1980s.

Later, the main lines and stages of transformation of Russian MIC in post-Soviet times,are added.

Economic, or material-technical aspect of the MIC is presented by defense industry, likeaggregate of enterprises and facilities, R&D organizations, administrative organs, in-

volved in production of armaments.


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Socio-political and cultural aspect is presented by social and political groups, connectedwith military production, their role in that process, their specic group mentality and wayof life.

One of the main aspects of research is connected with the history of international rela-tions. The Soviet MIC is considered to be a largest supplier of armaments to the countriesof the third world, and the leader of the military-industrial system of the former Soviet

bloc. Thus Soviet MIC went out of one single country and became a constant factor of theinternational relations.

The book is based on the broadest base of different sources (archival, as well as published like collections of documents, memoirs, etc.). But the major complex of source base ispresented by recently declassied documents from both Russian and American archives.

As for Russian archives, the major collections from State archives (GA RF, RGAE), as wellas the former Party archives (RGASPI, RGANI) concerning military history, were thor-oughly searched and studied by the author of the book for about 13 years, and they laid inthe basis of the book. A comparative study of both Russian and American sources (docu-ments of CIA, military intelligence, etc.) made it possible to give more diversied, full,and objective picture of the implementation of the main Soviet military programs. In the

book, personal role of the main leaders, and representatives of social groups, connectedwith the MIC, has been systemized and shown in practice (among them, such gures asJ.V. Stalin, L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin, N.S. Khruschev, D.F. Ustinov, G.M. Malenkov, B.L.

Vannikov, G.K. Zhukov, V.M. Malyshev, A.P.Zaveniagin, S.P. Korolev, I.V. Kurchatov,A.D. Sakharov, and the others, have to be noted).

The mechanism of decision-making process on the military and defense-industrial mat-ters is shown at all the main levels of the MIC. For example, the lower level is studied onthe example of the activities of the system of admittance of defense-industrial produc-tion by representatives of the Ministry of Defense (voennaia priemka). The basic exam-ple of the internal unity of the MIC is of social commonality of the closed atomic cities.

The MIC in Historical Research Literature

The main directions in Russian and American literature are: 1)economic, or defense-industrial (studied the MIC like a defense sector of national economy), 2) socio-political(studied such problems as civil-military relations, decision-making on the problems ofmilitary security, etc.). The rst direction also had scientic-technical or technocraticgroup (developed the idea of the prevailing role of scientic and technical elite in themilitary-industrial system during the Cold War).

In general analysis of literature had shown that there had not been any complex researchon the history of the Soviet MIC, in different aspects done so far. So research presentedhere is the rst and still unique example of such work.


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The Sources on the History of Soviet

MICIn this part detailed analysis of the main groups of sources, including various kinds ofpublished data, archival sources, has been made. The author nds out and analyses themain types of archival documents, which had been just recently declassied. The roleof each particular group of sources is being investigated. The process of declassicationslowed down in recent years, and large groups of archival documents on the subject stillremain classied. The general idea of the author is that scholar does not have to wait untilall the sources are available. The level of sourced accessible is estimated as sufcient formaking complex generalizing research of the history of the Soviet MIC.

Forced Defense Construction in the USSR (1930-1945)

Considering that the problem has been well-studied in Soviet-Russian and Western his-toriography, the author concentrates on some questions for discussion, and on the mainlines and results of the development of defense industry. This part of research is basedon newly declassied archival sources, including those which had been used be the otherauthors so far (like the Commission of Defense). Despite that the political campaign forre-armament evidently started in the war scare period in 1927, real large investmentsto defense industries, and their practical development started from 1931, and especially

1932. Most of so-called big military programs were so large-scaled (they meant leapforward), that they were not implemented according for the plans, but the basis of newdefense industries was laid. As a result, defense industry was organized as a specic sec-tor of the national economy (Peoples Commissariat of defense industry was created in1936). From the point of view of the military-industrial relations, the 1930s were char-acterized by the prevailing role of professional military in the process of defense indus-trial production.

In the end of the 1930s defense industry became diversied in the main four PeoplesCommissariats. The new mark of the period was well-distinguished preparation for war.

Thus, a new administrative body, organized in 1938 inside the main organ on military-industrial matters the Commission of Defense was so-called Military-Industrial Com-mission. Its main functions were connected with the primarily tasks of mobilization ofindustry for military needs in case of war. This mobilization context was the feature thatdistinguished this Commission from the post-war bodies, which existed by similar names,

but had broader functions of correlation of all the MIC activities. Mobilization plans of1938-1939 were highly escalated, so the Military-Industrial Commission had to cut themdown. Typical features of that period from the point view of the MIC development were:the most sharp rise of military production, the development of the Eastern base for thedefense industry (the Urals, Siberia, etc.) by constructing doubling enterprises there;


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the transfer of enterprises from civilian sector to the military Peoples Commissariats;the development of the system of secrecy around the defense industry.

The Military Industry of the USSR in 1941-1945: TheDomestic and International Aspects of Development

According to the view existing in literature, Soviet military economy showed its best dur-ing the war. Some authors argue that it was more productive and effective than the econo-mies of most of the countries involved in World War II. Labour productivity in the USSR

was higher than in Germany, Great Britain and other countries, except for the USA11.Some of the modern Russian scholars called it Soviet economic miracle12.

The author of this paper also proves the thesis that Soviet economic model was a kind of

extraordinary mobilization model. The large-scale evacuation of defense enterprises tothe Eastern areas of the USSR meant the gigantic shift of military production facilities tothe East, and the making the new industrial base, which continued to develop in a largerscale after the war. From the point of view of the MIC development, the war period ledto sharply growing infrastructure of military production in the USSR. The mobilizationmeant the mass transfer of most of enterprises (and not only industrial, but other civil,including administrative, cultural and the other units) to the military sector. At the sametime, the creation of mass specialized military production (concentrated in a number ofspecial Peoples Commissariats) took place. Thanks to that, in 1943 the large-scale pro-duction of the armaments was achieved; the process of assimilation of the modern mili-tary models, which had been invented before the war, and their following modernization,led to the major breakthrough in the matter of achievement of the decisive advantage overthe enemy in modern armaments, which became one of the main factors of the Victory.

As for the international factor, Lend-lease played a substantial role in the achievement ofthe joint victory of the Allies, too. Considering the discussions in literature on the role ofeconomic aid from Western Allies (the USA and Great Britain) to the USSR, the authorhas arrived to the conclusion that this help was very important in many elds. An effectivemodel of military-economic cooperation between East and West was created, which wasmutually protable for both sides.

The Military-Industrial Complex and the Cold War

In conditions of the Cold War, the Soviet military policy was more and more determinedby the international factor, i.e. the arms race. The period from mid-1940s to mid-1970swas characterized by strategic competition between the U.S.A. and the USSR. The mainSoviet goal was to catch up with the leading USA in the invention of the major strategicnuclear weapons. In most kinds of weapons the United States were ahead of the SovietUnion in 4-5 years (except for intercontinental ballistic missiles), but the USSR managedto catch up in the next 4-5 years. After US Soviet strategic parity achieved, from mid-


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1970s to the late 1980s, Soviet strategic stockpile continued to grow, while the Americanwas frozen. These conditions made it possible for the Soviet MIC to get strong and tocontinue existing as a constant economic structure and political force.

In the rst post-war years Soviet military doctrine was still based on the experience ofthe past war, on Stalins concept of constantly acting factors, and on his thesis, thatnuclear weapons only could not decide the fate of the war. From 1945 to 1953 despitethe crash construction of the rst Soviet atomic bomb, the military doctrine and strategy

was based on the development of conventional armaments. The Stalinist economic policyproclaimed the course for demilitarization but this proved to be a secondary side of eco-nomic development. In fact the end of 1940s saw large-scale development of new militarytechnologies (atomic, jet, radar) of highest priority. A 1951-1955 plan marked a period ofsharp rise of the defense expenditures (the military production had to rise in 2, 5 times,and in some branches, as radar, or tanks in 4, 5 times).

In the mid 1950s Khrushchev started reductions of the Armed Forces and military expen-ditures, which was, however, short-lived (up to 1957-1958). At the same time, in 1953-1959 became the period of mass development of atomic and missile weapons, when nu-clear missiles started to be added to the armament. In 1959 a special branch of the ArmedForces was created The Rocket Forces of Strategic Destination. The political concepts

both in the Soviet Union, and in the United States, also included defensive myths, stra-tegic bluff, exaggerated estimates of military potential of each other, etc.

Organizational structure of the Soviet MIC has been nally formed by 1965 in the systemof 9 ministries (plus 10 defense-related ministries). In the 1980s the Soviet MIC produced

25 % of the national GDP, of all R&D works and the best qualied personnel were con-centrated inside of the MIC, which also produced a lions share of civil machine-buildingproduction. Thus the MIC has become the central and the leading sector of the nationaleconomy. The main coordinating structures of the MIC were the Council of Defense (atthe level of the highest political leadership), the Military-Industrial Commission (revivedin 1957 with a much larger control and coordination functions) in the middle higher lev-el, and the organs of military representatives, R&D facilities, the closed cities in thelower level.

The atomic project set up almost an ideal model of military-economic mobilization in

peacetime (the Cold War). The analysis of the organizational structure and the dynam-ics of development of the Soviet atomic complex is based on recently published docu-ments, and shows that the atomic Ministry of Medium Machine-Building has become asort of state within a state, and was privileged even inside of the Soviet MIC.

In the late 1980s, under M. Gorbachevs perestroika, attempts were made to restructurethe Soviet MIC. The defense expenditures were cut down in 1, 5 - 2 times. The adminis-trative reorganisation was expressed in the including of the retarding branches of civileconomy into the system of much more well-planned and organized MIC (i.e. agriculture,civil machine-building). The other direction of reforms was the partial defense conver-


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sion, which in fact included a limited number of enterprises, and did not give positiveresults. All these attempts of reforming were stopped by the collapse of the Soviet Union.The Soviet MIC was disintegrated, like the USSR itself. Sharp drop of the defense expen-ditures, and as a result the drop of military production, and a break between the Armed

Forces and the defense industry, and the former MIC turning from a powerful super-structure into a kind of lobby struggling for resources all these were typical featuresof the 1990s.

The MIC of the USSR and the Countries of PeoplesDemocracy

The main areas of the Soviet MIC activities in the international arena were as follows: 1)the relations with the leading capitalist countries and blocs (primarily with the USA and

NATO, in the form of the arms race);

2) the creation of the MIC of the Soviet bloc as a unied system with the organs of jointadministration, planning and military command (embodied in the organs of the COM-ECON, like the Constant Commission on Defense, and the military organs of the WarsawPact; making of the unied system of anti-aircraft defense of the Soviet bloc, etc.); 3) themilitary and technical assistance to the countries of the third world.

The main principles of the Soviet export of armaments were based on the general foun-dation of the Soviet policy, which was a state monopoly for external trade. Besides, thespecics of the export of armaments was connected with the total secrecy of that area ofactivities, for the reasons of state security.

Therefore it was a special state mediator in the Soviet administrative system, whichsupervised all the activities in the eld of war trade (at rst it was concentrated in theMinistry of the Foreign Trade, then in the so-called Main Engineer Directorate, then inthe State Committee (Ministry) for External Economic Connections), which supervisedprimarily the economic military assistance to the foreign countries.

The other channel of the external military relations went through the Ministry of De-fense. A special 10th Chief Main Directorate supervised mostly military cooperation (the

command over the activities of the Chief military councillors in different countries, theelevation of military personnel, the transfer of military literature, topography maps, mili-tary lms, etc.).

From the mid-1950s on, a unied system of the armaments and a unied planning of de-velopment of the defense industries started to be created inside the Soviet bloc. Differentcountries of peoples democracy were specialized in the production of different arma-ments, according for a joint plan, created in Moscow.


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Military-Technical Cooperation of the USSR and theCountries of the Third World

The value of the Soviet military-technical assistance to the countries of the third worldwas growing. In 1955-1968 the Soviet Union provided armaments and military-technicalequipment to these countries in the sum of 4, 5 billion dollars, in 1966-1975 9, 2 billion,in 1978-1982 34, 4 billion.

The military-technical cooperation was more like assistance, than like any kind of prot-able war trade. The main principles of cooperation: the political assistance (the strug-gle for independence, the development of Communist parties in the world) was free ofcharge; the military-technical cooperation developed in the form of Soviet credit to theother country for 10 years, with 2% payment per year. In fact, most of these countries

have accumulated a huge debt, which they never paid back to the Soviet Union-Russia.

In conditions of the Cold War, the area of the military-technical cooperation became oneon the main spheres of rivalry between the USSR and the USA. The leaders of the third

world countries widely speculated on that factor. The enormous military aid becameone of the main factors of the collapse of Soviet economy in the end of the 1980s.

Social and Political Aspects of

Development of the Soviet MICThis part shows the human side of the Soviet MIC, including the role of its groups andleaders, relations, contradictions and the formation of the MIC like social and politicalunity, with specic mentality and interests.

The Political-Military Leadership

In the Soviet political system, the leading role of Communist Party and its leaders in allthe areas was more than evident. It was expressed in the strongest way in the military andmilitary-industrial matters, which were most strictly controlled. In the period of Stalin-ism it was the Soviet dictator Josef I.Stalin who supervised directly the most importantdefense projects (for example, the atomic program, the development of jet and missiletechniques, radar, etc.). Besides of him, the most important gures were Lavrentii P. Be-ria (who leaded the atomic project) and Nikolai A. Bulganin (who supervised the ArmedForces and a number of programs like missiles and radar from the part of the Communisthighest organ of power the Politburo). In this system, a specic gure of so-called po-litical-military leader has appeared. After Stalin, the system continued acting as a rule.

All the main Soviet political leaders (Nikita S. Khrushchev, Leonid I. Brezhnev) were in


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general following the line of strict personal control over the defense matters.

The main Party organs, responsible for defense matters, were the Department of admin-istrative organs of the Central Committee (which supervised the Armed Forces), and the

Department of Machine-building (after 1953 the Department of defense industry). Be-sides the economic management, the Central Committee decided the crucially importantquestion of selecting personnel for the leading posts in the defense industry and the mili-tary command.

On the lower level, however, the local party organs were not allowed to interfere into theresearch and production activities of the closed citied, subdued to the administrativeorgans of the atomic complex.

As for the security organs, NKVD-MVD (the organs supervising the internal matters)played a great role in creating of Soviet defense industry from 1930s to mid 1950s, whenthe system of forced labour was liquidated. MGB and KGB (the organs of state security)supervised mostly intelligence and counter-intelligence works in the military and de-fense-industrial enclaves, guarded the objects of special importance, the nuclear de-

vices during their transportation, etc. The leading personalities from the security organs,responsible for defense matters, were like A.P. Zaveniagin, P.A. Sudoplatov, P.Ja. Meshik,

A.N. Komarovskii, I.A. Serov.

It is needless to mention, that the professional military and some defense industrial man-agers working for the Soviet MIC, often had conicts with the representatives of securityorgans, which interfered in their practical activities.

The Nucleus of the Military-Industrial Complex: TheMilitary, Industrialists, and Scientists

The military branch was the cornerstone of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Theuppermost echelon was composed of marshals and generals of the professional militaryelite. It was this part of the military as a social stratum of Soviet society which becamemost involved in politics. This particular group will be the topic of discussion here.

The Soviet military were traditionally subdued to the political leadership. After the GreatPatriotic war the role of the military in society inevitably grew. That was one of the mainreasons for the massive purges against them in the late 1940s early 1950s. A num-

ber of processes took part against different groups of the military (the aviation affairof 1946, the accusations against one of the most famous military leaders of World WarII Georgii K.Zhukov, process against Admiral Nikolai G.Kuznetsov and the other Navychiefs in 1948, the affair against the artillerists of 1952).

Some of the military commanders played a substantial role in the development of newarmaments (for example, Marshals Nikolai D. Iakovlev and Mitrofan I. Nedelin in the


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progress in missile techniques). Despite the accusations against him as a supporter ofobsolete conventional armaments, Marshal Zhukov himself contributed to the creationof nuclear missiles and their adding to the armament.

In the rst post-war period Soviet institutions were greatly militarized (i.e. a greatnumber of professional military worked in civilian institutions). 1000 generals and of-cers were sent right after the war to the Ministry of Armaments. As an example of suchmilitary-industrial representative, the biography of Vladimir M. Riabikov is presented,as a typical gure from the part of the military admittance (voennaia priemka) - the

biography of Alexei S. Kalashnikov.

The evolution of the Soviet military elite from 1930 to the post-war period consisted ofslowing down of theoretical level, depth and independence of the military thought, thegrowing role of staff commanders, which had never taken part in a real war. That wasnatural in the conditions of the long-standing Cold War period, and led to the growingdependence of the professional military from the political leadership.

The most inuential group of the Soviet MIC in the conditions of the Cold War becamein fact the defense-industrial managers. Its social structure was formed together with thedefense industry itself in the 1930s. A new group of industrial leaders was promoted onthe wave of purges in the end of the 1930s. It was the group of young and technicallyeducated industrial managers (like Dmitrii F.Ustinov, Viacheslav A. Malyshev, Mikhail V.Khrunichev, etc.), which came to lead the new defense industry at the face of approaching

war. Most of these people were personally devoted to Stalin, for he was the one to pro-mote them.

The main lines and the specics of this core group of the Soviet MIC is shown in detailsat the example of the biographies of one of the bright representatives of the generationof marshals of industry Malyshev, and of the most powerful grey cardinal of thedefense industry Ustinov.

In the post-war period the scientic and technical achievements were laid in the founda-tions of the world policies and economies. Therefore the role of technical and scienticelite inside the military-industrial systems was growing all the time. As for the Sovietcase, scientists, engineers and researchers were among the most noticeable groups of the

military-industrial complex.

By 1960 there was a strong military-industrial lobby in the Academy of Sciences, con-centrated inside the departments of technical sciences and physical sciences. In May 1962this lobby supported the election of the new President of the Academy of Sciences Msti-slav V. Keldysh, who was connected with military works. The next President of the Acad-emy of Sciences in 1975 became one of the leading Soviet atomic physicists Anatolii P.

Aleksandrov. The best scientic and technical personnel, and most of the achievements inthe science and technology in the Soviet Union, appeared to be connected with the MIC.


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The role of the scientic and technical elite in the Soviet system was restricted to the levelof technical expertise. A scientist could only give the policy-makers advice on the techni-cal aspects of a given weapons system, but never on any substantial changes of the politi-cal course. The leading engineers like Sergei P.Korolev gained monopoly control over the

R&D and production facilities. However, the strict Party control limited the domain ofchef constructors to their scientic and production units (nauchno-proizvodstvennyeobedineniia). The high ranking engineers of the military techniques were perhaps themost top secret group within Soviet society. Personal biographies of such leaders ofmilitary science and technology, as Iulii B. Khariton, Igor B. Kurchatov, Sergei P. Korolev.

Andrei D. Sakharov, Mikhail K. Iangel and the others are presented.

The composition of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), which was the main ad-ministrative organ of the Soviet MIC from the late 1950s to 1880s, showed the relativerole of different groups inside the MIC. 50 % of the VPK apparatus came from the min-isterial leaders, 10 % - from the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), 6 % - from theMinistry of Defense, 34 % - from the research and development institutes, the construc-tion bureaus and enterprises. Thus, the most numerous were the leaders of the defenseindustry and the scientic and technical elite, the military professionals consisted muchsmaller per cent.

The Military-Industrial Complex: Contradictions andUnity

A specic social unity of all the groups connected with the MIC was formed in the frame-work of so called closed cities, which existed in the system of the Soviet atomic industry.The specics of life under the double iron curtain, together with social and materialprivileges, have formed a sort of collective mentality on the lower level of the MIC.

There were several levels of secrecy around the military-industrial objects in the USSR.The close cities were at the highest level of secrecy. However, some partly closed enterpris-es, which were situated in the midst of non-secret infrastructure of the ordinary, openedcities, constructed a specic form of relations between secret and not secret zones.

The system of the Soviet MIC in general could not avoid contradictions between different

interest-groups. In the second paragraph, the following types of conicts are shown: 1)The inter-group contradictions, which took place between the leaders of various institu-tions of the MIC chief constructors, administrative personnel, party organs, militaryrepresentatives, scientists. In these conicts, the discussions on the questions of principleclosely interweaved with personal rivalries, ambitions, etc.

2) The contradictions between different departments inside the related branches of theMIC. Inside the MIC, a dualism between a customer (the military) and a producer (thedefense industry) inevitably took place. This sort of dualism is shown on the example ofthe discussions between the Air Force command and the Ministry of Aviation industry


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leaders. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force K.A.Vershinin wrote to Stalin that the AirForce was subdued to the interest of Ministry of aviation industry and its construction

bureaus (KBs), the Ministry hold monopoly prices for military production, which werein 1,5-2,5 times lower than those calculated by the Air Force. He asked to create a single

coordinating centre for aviation (on the pattern of the American NASA).

3) The contradictions between the different branches of the MIC. The most classical ex-perience was the struggle for control over nuclear weapons between the military and in-dustrial leaders. At rst nuclear charges were put under the supervision of the First MainDirectorate (then the atomic Ministry of Medium Machine-Building), then they were re-moved to the authority of the Ministry of Defense, to its 12th Chief Main Administrationfor nuclear armaments (the same transformation happened in the USA)

However, by the time of Brezhnevs rule most of these contradictions were more andmore overpassed by the unity of interests between all the groups, which worked togetherin the system of the Soviet MIC. The general scheme of the decision-making on militaryand defense-industrial matters was elaborated.

The Soviet MIC became the core structure of the Soviet economic and social infrastruc-ture. All the Party- state political leaders (before Mikhail S. Gorbachev) conducted theSoviet policy primarily in the interests of the MIC development, which corresponded withthe interests and prestige of the Soviet state at the international arena.

Russian Defense-Industrial Complex in the Post-

Soviet PeriodAfter the collapse of the Soviet Union the MIC entered the period of deep crisis. It has lostthe leading qualities in the economy and become a sort of lobby group struggling for theinterests of the military and defense industrial sector. The reforms in military-industrialsector had to correlate the scale of the MIC with the real economic potential and interestsof security of Russia. These tasks had to be decided in conditions of sharp deteriorationof the economic situation. Russia has inherited 85 % of military potential, but just 60 %of GNP of the former USSR. By 1997, when the military reform in fact started, RussianFederation had only 25 % of the Soviet GNP, while the country still kept 35-40 % of the

Soviet Army and Navy. By 1997 sharp reduction of defense spending led to the cut of de-fense industrial production for almost 90 % as compare to 1991.

Defense conversion course produced a number of programs, which appeared to be un-successful in general (two State programs of conversion of the defense industry for 1993-1995 and 1995-1997, Federal program for a special purpose of restructuring and conver-sion of defense industry for 1998-2000 (plus 2001), Federal programs of development ofdefense-industrial complex for 2002-2006 and 2006-2010).

In these hard conditions, a sort of a break between military organization and defense


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industry of Russia appeared. As a result of privatization, forms of ownership in defenseindustry of Russia had radically changed. By 1997 about 800 defense-industrial enter-prises were in joint-stock and private property; the State organs supervised around 2 000enterprises, 400 among them were in full State property, in 500 State had golden share,

in 500 control share.

Since 1996-1998 the State policy shifted towards restructuring of the MIC, and the crea-tion of diversied integrated structures. At the same time, the reform of the Armed Forcesof Russian Federation took place, rst of all in the direction of cutting down the numberof personnel. In 1992-1997 the Armed Forces were cut down to 2, 8 billion (in the end ofthe 1980s the numbers were 4,2 billion), by 2000 to the level of 1,2 billion. The systemof civilian control over the military started to develop. The rst civilian (non-military)Minister of Defense was Sergei Ivanov, since 2007 it is Anatoly Serdiukov.

Cutting down the military potential, Russian Federation changed its military doctrine,choosing nuclear deterrence as one of the main mechanisms of its national security afterthe end of the Cold War. The State program of armament for 2001-2010 was aimed at thepreservation of military potential on the main directions of technical progress, mobiliza-tion facilities, with the high level of nancing of R &D.

Since 1999 defense industry was nanced at higher level, as compare to the previous pe-riod, but defense production was oriented more on exports, rather than on the supply ofthe Armed Forces of Russia. The volume of Russian exports of armaments was growingsharply: in 1998 2 billion dollars, in 1999 3, 5 billion, in 2000 4 billion, in 2002 4,8 billion, in 2009 8, 8 billion USD. By 2010 it reached 10 billion USD.

At present the share of Russia in world supplies of armaments grew to 13-15 % in differentkinds of armaments. The number of partner countries of Russia in the arms trade grewup to 60.

Since 2006 a principally new period of development of Russian MIC started. The Stateorder for armaments was restored (thus defense industry was more oriented on the sup-ply of Russian Armed Forces), the central organ of coordination of the military-industrialcomplex - the Military-industrial commission - was reinstated, and gained great powersagain. The functions of the Commission are like the following: setting up prices for de-

fense production; implementing State defense order; control over quality of armamentsproduced; making contracts for the production of armaments and military techniques;elaboration of State program of armaments (for 2011-2020)13.

Nowadays the State takes more and more control over the large defense companies, espe-cially in the key branches like the atomic, missile, electronics, naval construction branch-es. This is the sign of the rising priority of the defense sector, and substantial change ingovernmental policy, with the use of the Soviet legacy of planning and control of the Stateover the sphere of the national security.


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In 2010 a new stage of the administrative military reform started in Russia. The maindirections of the reform are:

Creation of 4 military districts (instead of 6) = 4 United Strategic Com-

mands

Western military district includes the former Moscow and Leningrad mil-itary districts (Headquarters in St-Petersburg), Northern Fleet and BalticFleet, the 1st Command of Air Forces and Air Defense (VVS and PVO)

Central Military District includes the former Volga-Urals and partly Si-berian military districts, 2nd Command of VVS and PVO, 6th TerritorialCommand of Railway troops (Headquarters in Ekaterinburg)

Eastern Military District includes part of the former Siberian military dis-trict and Far East military district, 3rd Command of VVS and PVO (Head-quarters in Khabarovsk), Pacic Fleet

Southern military district includes North Caucasus military district, 4thCommand of VVS and PVO, Railway troops (Headquarters in Rostov-on-Don), Black Sea Fleet, Caspian Fleet.

One of the aims of this reform is increasing the role of the Southern Dis-trict, which is close to the areas of military and terrorist threats (in 2011,there will be 214 military trainings in the North Caucasus - 7 times more

than in previous year).

The main reasons for military reform were, rst of all, due to the lack of coordination:

Previously 6 military districts existed separately, Commander of militarydistrict had the authority over the Land Forces only;

There were no organs of unied command over land, air and naval forces,and no commanders qualied for such operations;

In order to make joint operations involving the other forces some tem-porary Commands had to be created, with the low level of authority andpreparedness;

4 Armies of the Air Forces and Anti-aircraft defense (VVS and PVO),which existed previously, were not correlated with the military districts:territorial borders of military districts did not correspond the borders ofresponsibility for the air defense.

The advantages of the new system of 4 military districts are said to be as follows:


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The new United Strategic Commands (USCs) unify all the military forcesin their military district;

The Commander of military district commands all the troops and is per-

sonally responsible for regional security;

The USC can quickly react to any threats and challenges, implementingjoint land, sea and air operations;

Inter-group groups of forces can be prepared in peacetime without anyadditional reconstruction;

The new principles of dislocation of troops are introduced: they are nearlarge cities, closer to the main means of communication and test ranges;

According to the new rules of combat readiness, all the levels of the newmilitary districts reach combat readiness in 6 hours;

The raising mobility of forces14.

The new line of military reform for 2010-2011 was introduced in Russian President Dmi-trii Medvedevs address to the Federal Assembly in December 2010:

Strengthening air and space defense of the country, by unifying the exist-ing systems of anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic missile defenses, the systems

of warning on missile attack and control over space; subdued to a uniedstrategic command {planned to be done by 1 December, 2011};

Modern Russia needs modern Army and Navy, compact and mobiletroops, armed by the most advanced armaments and high-class special-ists. It is necessary to pay all the obligations to the military people, rst ofall, to decide housing problem;

The Army should get rid of all non-prole functions, which have to bepassed to civil organizations {auto-sourcing the form of civil military

cooperation= transfer of side functions like housing, food supply, repairof military techniques, etc., to civil specialized companies};

Development of international cooperation in the sphere of security, name-ly dialog between Russia and NATO on the construction of European ABMsystem; Russias set up the initiatives on the European security Treaty;

Development of economic diplomacy: creation of joint ventures, inuxof foreign goods to Russia, creation of new jobs, and simplication of the

visa regime;


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According to these plans, from 2010 to 2020 Russia will spend 2,8 percent of GDP for the national defense annually;

Reforms on the social sphere, concerning the military: from 1212 on, the

basic salary of those at military service has to increase in 3 times;

The rise of prestige of military service by contract15.

As regards of the position of defense industry in the 2000s, it was characterized by theupward tendency. One of the main features of that period was the growing role of State inadministration and support of defense-industrial sector. The important fact was restora-tion, at least partial, of unied system of State order for armaments, military and specialtechniques, in the form of a special Federal agency. In 2005-2009 the volume of Stateorder for armaments grew in 2, 5 times.

In 2009 state support for defense was totally 93 billion rubles.

The forms of such support were the advancement of works implemented according to theState order for armaments in the sum of 80 per cent of total sum of contract; subsidizingdefense enterprises in their credit payments, etc.

In general, the total volume of industrial production of defense-industrial complex in2009 (as compare to 2008) grew in 4, 1 per cent, and military production grew in 13 percent.

One of the most important new tendencies in Russian military-industrial policy is gradualtransition from so-called repair system to purchase of new armaments (in 2009 only 13per cent of state expenditures went to repair previously it was 40 per cent).

Some of the new principles were expressed in the State program of armaments for 2010-2020:1) 20 trillion rubles to be spend for re-armament; 2) Preserving combat readiness of Stra-tegic nuclear forces; 3) Creation of perspective system of guidance on the basis of modernsystems of information and telecommunication; 4) Guaranteed access to space, full-scaledevelopment of space techniques, and means of air and space defense; 5) Purchasing themeans providing strategic mobility of troops; 6) Development of armaments and military

techniques of general destination16

.

The largest integrated structures of Russian defense industry are state companies, sothe President of Russian Federation gave the order to Commission on modernization toelaborate the program of innovative development of these structures.

In terms of actual modernization of armaments, according to State program of arma-ments-2015, some new complexes were already created:

Missile complex of strategic destination Yars (the rst regiment armed


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with these missiles, was put on duty in Teikovo missile unit (Ivanovskaiaoblast) on 5 March, 2011)17.

Nuclear powered submarines of Iuriii Dolgorukii type

Su-34 ghters

Antiballistic missile systems C-400

Missile complexes Iskander-M

Plans of modernization in the military-industrial sphere for 2010-2020 were also ex-pressed by Chairman of Government of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin during his

visit to the center of naval military construction in Severodvinsk, that took place also inDecember 2010. According to his words, the main lines of development of defense indus-try included:

The increase of share of modern items of armament up to 30 per cent - by 2015, and upto 70-100 per cent by 2020;

New armament will be procured not in single items, but in complexes;

According to the State program, 79 per cent of all nance will go for purchase of new high-technological armaments18.

The nal variant of the State program for armaments was conrmed by President Med-vedevs Ukaz of 31 December, 2011. According to the program, the rst priority is still thedevelopment of Strategic nuclear forces of Russia. 10 per cent of expenditures go for Stra-tegic Nuclear Forces (modernization of land forces - Strategic Rocket Forces, construc-tion of 8 nuclear submarines, modernization of strategic aviation group).

Second priority would be so-called strategic defensive forces (unied radar system,S-400 antiballistic missile complexes, defensive systems, based in space).

The third main area would be the development of highly accurate weapons (Iskander-M

missile complexes and other systems)19

.

As compare to the Soviet MIC, modern Russian complex evidently suffers a number ofsystem problems. In 2010 about 30 per cent of State order for armaments was not ac-complished. According to Minister of Defense of Russia Anatolyi Serdukovs report to thePresident in the early March of 2011, among the undelivered items were some types ofships, submarines, training aircraft and armored techniques. One of the largest Russianunied industrial corporations - Roskosmos - did not accomplish State order on spacetechniques for 2010, and was criticized for that by Chairman of Military-industrial com-mission Sergei Ivanov20.


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The reasons for that are quite numerous: low effectiveness and productiveness of Russiandefense-industrial enterprises (70 per cent of equipment is obsolete), the growing debtof the Ministry of defense, etc. Some analysts also complain of the lack of coordinationfrom the part of the Military-industrial commission, the authority of which is substan-

tially lower as compare to the Soviet time.

In recent years Russia simultaneously used the policy of purchase of some types of arma-ments abroad. One of the largest recent deals is Russian-French agreement on the con-struction of military ship Mistral (signed in January 2011). Mistral helicopter-carriersare destined to deliver military personnel, military techniques to combat areas, to providetheir landing with the use of landing vessels and helicopters, and to coordinate operationusing powerful means of reconnaissance and combat commandment.

Cases like that let some Western analytical sources argue that Russia would be attempt-ing to skip a generation in research and development (R & D) terms by making acquisi-tions of high-tech military hardware from abroad21.

In any way, despite of many difculties, typical for Russian economic and social systemin transition, nowadays the military-industrial complex of Russian Federation experi-ences the period of relative revival and upward development.

1 Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex / Ed. by S.Rosen. Lexington, 1973; The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment / Ed. by S.Sarkessian. Beverly Hills, etc., 1972.

2 The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev / Ed. by J.Barber and M.Harrison.Houndmills, 2000. P. 24 (Henceforth: The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex).

3 Holloway D. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. New Haven and L., 1983; Almquist P. Red Forge:Soviet Military Industry Since 1965. N.Y., 1990.

4 Ericson J. The Soviet High Command. A Military-Political History, 1918-1941. L., 1962; Civil-MilitaryRelations in Communist Systems. Boulder, 1978; Soviet Decision-Making For National Security / Ed. byJ.Valenta and W.Potter. L., 1984; Johnes E. Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military.Boston, 1985; Soviet Military Policy / Ed. by S.M.Lynn-Johnes, S.E.Miller, S. van Evera. Cambridge,1989.

5 Simonov N.S.. The Military-Industrial Complex of the USSR in the 1920 1950s: the tempo of eco-nomic growth, structure, organization of production and administration. oscow, ROSSPEN, 1996.

6 The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev / Ed. by J.Barber and M.Harrison.Houndmills, 2000.

7 Davies R.W. Crisis and Progress in the Soviet Economy, 1931-1933. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hamp-shire and London, 1996.

8 Samuelson L. The Red Colossus. The Formation of military-industrial complex of the USSR. 1921-1941.oscow, 2001.

9 Stone D. Hammer and Rie. The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933. Univ. Press of Kansas,2000.

10 Mukhin M.Iu. The evolution of the system of administration of Soviet defense industry in 1921-1941 and


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change of priorities of oboronka // techestvennaja istorija.. 2000. 3. . 3-15; Mukhin M.Yu. Theaviation industry in the USSR in the 1921-1941. oscow, Nauka, 2006.

11 Harrison M. Wartime mobilization: a German comparison // The Soviet Defense Industry Complexfrom Stalin to Khrushchev/ Ed. By J.Barber and M.Harrison. Houndmills, 2000. P. 99-117.

12 Hanin G. Soviet economic miracle: myth and reality // Svobodnaia Mysl. 2003. # 7-9.

13 Putilin V. The Military-industrial commission: stages of historical development // Vlast: Dela i litsa. (0) 2007.

14 Krasnaia Zvezva (Red Star). 15 December 2010.

15 Krasnaia Zvezva (Red Star). 2 December 2010.

16 Krasnaia Zvezva. 30 December 2010.

17 Krasnaia Zvezda. 5 March 2011.

18 Krasnaia Zvezda. 22 December 2010.

19 Krasnaia Zvezva. 25 February 2011.

20 Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie. 2 March 2011.

21 An Oxford Analytica In-depth Analysis. January 12, 2011


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