Russian foreign policy in the East - Internet Archive

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LIBERTY Pt IVLISUING COMPANY

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICYIN THE EAST

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

Omladina u Sadashnyosti.

Veshtina Pisanya.

Govorne Figure u Pesmama.

(A prize essay).

Prevodi u Srpskim Zabavnicima.

(A prize essay).

Tolstoy's Theory of Social Reform.

(A Master's thesis).

Russian Foreign Policy in the East.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICYIN THE EAST

BY

MILIVOY S. STANOYEVICH, ML.

(University of California)

OAKLAND AND SAN FRANCISCO

LIBERTY PUBLISHING COMPANY1916

, 1916

BY LIBERTY PUBLISHING CO.

OAKLAND, CAL.

PREFACE.

Whoever has carefully considered the past and present

of historical phenomena might certainly judge and conclude

of the future political issues. To comprehend general Euro-

pean politics, one should study the history of Eastern

Europe, to wit, the history of Russia; and to undestand

the Russian European history one must be intimate with

Russian diplomatic activities in Asia, particularly in Far

Asia. The aim of this condensed essay is to sketch Russian

foreign policy in the East, from about the begining of the

nineteenth century to the present time. The student of

political questions who wish to grasp in extenso Russian and

European politics, which, in recent tragic days is written,

not by pen but by blood of our brothers and fathers, can

not find sufficient data for his perusal in the following pa-

ges. If such a student want to be informed of Russian

internal and external policy from original sources and

books more detailed and authoritative, he is advised to

consult the documents and general works which are listed

in the bibliography at the end of this monograph.

I desire to acknowledge the invaluable aid for facts and

ideas received from the writings of M. N. Pokrovskago.His illuminating book, Russkaya Istoriya s DrevnieyshihVremen (Russian History from the oldest Times), and his

brilliant articles in Istoriya Rossiyi v XI X Viekie (Histo-

ry of Russia in the Nineteenth Century), offer mines of infor-

mation, as well as a sympathetic interpretation of con-

structive Russian politics. More particular gratitude has

been richly merited by Dr. D. P. Barrows, Professor of

Political Science in the University of California, and

333456

VI PREFACE

Dr. Payson J. Treat, Professor of History in Stanford Uni-

versity, for their acute observations and suggestions offered

to me. Acknowledgments and sincere thanks are also due

to Mr. Lewis Anderson, B.A., Miss Margaret Hodgen, B.L.,

and Dr. Frank F. Nalder, of the University of California,

for their kind assistance efficiently rendered in the reading

and revising of proof.

M. S. S.

Berkeley, California.

February 14, 1916.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

Russia in the Near East.

Three phases of Russia's expansion in the East Decadence of Tur-

key Tsarigrad [Constantinople] the metropolis of the Orthodox

Church Russian policy in the Near East from 1806 to 1812 TheAlliance between Russia, France, and Great Britain for liberation

of Greece under the Turkish domination, 1827 The Crimean

War The Epoch of the Great Reforms The Russo-Turkish Warof 1877 Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria An-

nexation of these two provinces Rivalry between Slavonic and

Germanic powers in the Balkan Peninsula The Balkan Alliance

of 1912 Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro declare war on

Turkey The second Balkan War The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913

Russia's failure in the Balkans Her gain in Asia. pp. 1-9.

CHAPTER II

Russia in the Middle East.

Expansion of Russia toward the Arabian Sea Annexation of Khiva,

Bokhara and Caucasus Russia's influence in Persia and Afghanistan

Collision with Great Britain in the Middle East Germany's Drangnach Osten The Bagdad Railroad Russian and British spheres

of interest in Persia Entente cordiole between the two powers in

Afghanistan Criticism of the Anglo-Russian agreement in the Middle

Orient Renunciation of Russia from the Persian Gulf Russia and

England prior to the Convention of 1907 Their policy after the

Convention of 1907 Persia and Afghanistan at the beginning of the

European War of 1914 Their neutrality. _ pp. 10-16.

CHAPTER III

Russia in the Far East.

Relation of Russia to the Far East Muraviev-Amurski, governorof Eastern Siberia, 1847 Annexation of the Amur and Maritime

Province Russian steamships in communication with Japan and

U. S. of America Russian trade in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan

Formation of the Russo-Chinese Bank Concessions in Manchuria

Russian policy and the Boxer rising in China The Tsar protects

"the Son of Heaven" A secret agreement between Russia and

VIII CONTENTS

China Japan and Russia in Manchuria Russia and Japan in

Korea War between Russia and Japan. pp. 17-22.

CHAPTER IV

Russian Policy after the Japanese War.

A parallel between the Japanese and Russians in fight Why did

Japan succed? The treaty of peace Did Russia's policy fail in the

Far East? General characteristic of her foreign politics Relation

with Mongolia in the beginning of the twentieth century Russia the

protector of the Mongolian peoples Her protection of the Slavonic

peoples Turning from the Far to the Near East Liberation of the

subjugated peoples from the Turkish yoke Why is Russia in war

with the Huns and Teutons? pp. 22-27.

APPENDIX

Bibliography _ pp. 29-38.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY INTHE EAST.

CHAPTER I

RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century up to the

present time, the foreign policy of Russia in the East has

passed through three important stages. These three stages

or phases of expansion may be focused respectively on

the Aegean Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Yellow Sea, or in

other words, on the Near East, the Middle East, and the Far

East. To secure the first outlet, Russian diplomats knewthat the route lay through Constantinople and the Darda-

nelles; to attain the second outlet, the way lead throughPersia and Afghanistan; and to reach the third point, the

route passed through Mongolia and Manchuria. Thesouthward expansion toward the Mediterranean hadsometimes a religious and idealistic aspect. Transcaucasian

expansion had a commercial significance, and the eastward

expansion a political aspect. Let us first consider the Russian

foreign policy in the Near East.

Since Russian expansion towards'the north was made

impossible by the icy solitudes of Lapland, and westward

by the frontiers of firmly established states such as the

German and Austrian Empires, the only way open to Russia

was in the direction of the south. The decadence of Turkeyseemed to offer her a splendid opportunity for such purposes.

2 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST

Diplomats from|the Neva dreamed of the Black Sea, Marmo-

ra Sea, and Aegean Sea, becoming Russian lakes. And since

Russia as the chief political representative of the Greek

Church feels that there exists an historic connection bet-

ween her and the former Eastern Roman Empire, she has

always coveted the restoration of Constantinople as the

metropolis of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and as the

capital of her great empire. She longed for centuries to free

that city, Tsarigrad (Tsar's City) from the yoke of the

infidel, and to replace the crescent by the cross on the

dome of St. Sophia. But, as the facts show, it was in this

direction that her diplomacy, after some brilliant successes,

found itself most completely deceived.

During the Russo-Turkish War in 1804 under Tsar

Alexander I, Russian armies were victorious, and after the

war they occupied the Turkish Danubian principalities .of

Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria. Occupation of these

provinces lasted from 1806 to 1812. The rupture with

Napoleon compelled the Tsar to sign the Peace of Bucharest

by which of all his conquests he retained only a bit of

Rumanian territory, Bessarabia, and two Danubian towns,

Ismail and Kilia on the mouths of the Danube. The Ru-manians and Bulgarians fell again under the Turkish yoke,

and Serbia, which won her independence with her own forces

(18041812), was left to herself. Such a state of affairs in

the Near East remained throughout the Napoleonic wars

in Europe. (St. Stanoyevich, Istoriya Srpskoga Naroda.)

The second intervention of Russia in the Near East oecur-

ed on the occasion of the Greek Revolution. In July 1827,

Russia, France, and Great Britain, entered into concerted

action by the Treaty of London. The united fleets of the

three powers totally annihilated the Turkish and Egyp-tian fleets October 20, 1827, at Navarino, under Admiral

Codrington. This decisive naval battle precipitated the

Russo-Turkish War of 18281829, and weakened the

resistance of Turkey against Russia. At that time the

RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST 3

French army continued to operate in the Morea to insure

Greek independence, while the Russian Tsar Nicholas I

took it upon himself to settle the rest of the Near Eastern

Question. His European army again conquered the Danu-

bian principalities, invaded Thrace, and entered Adrianople.

In Asia his forces occupied Turkish Caucasia. By the

Treaty of Adrianople, concluded in 1829, the autonomyof Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, was guaranteed,

but Russia did not secure any territory in Europe, except

the isles of the Danubian delta. She also reserved for

herself freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and an open

way through the straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

In Asia she secured a real territorial compensation by the

acquisition of the northern part of Caucasia.

The result of the Peace of Adrianople was to make Russia

supreme at Constantinople. Later, in 1833, a new treaty

was concluded between the ultan and the Tsar, the Treatyof Unkiar-Iskelessi, which constituted a defensive and

offensive alliance between the two powers, and established

virtually a Russian protectorate over Turkey. Friendly

relations between the two emperors lasted until 1852. In

this year Russian prestige at the Porte began to decrease

and the influence of England, France, and Austria to

increase. Nicholas I sent his minister, Alexander Sergievich

Menshikov, on a special mission to Constantinople, to

obtain reparation in the form of a treaty which should

guarantee the rights of the Orthodox Church in Palestine,

and confirm the protectorate of Russia over all Ottoman

Christians, established by the treaties of Bucharest and

Adrianople. The Sultan opposed, and his resistance, supported

by England and France, led Russia to the third intervention

in the Near East, i.e., to the Crimean War. This war was

terminated by the taking of Sevastopol (1855) and the Trea-

ty of Paris (1856). By that important document Russia

reluctantly consented to a strict limitation of her arma-

ments in the Black Sea, to withdrawal from the mouths of


the Danube, by the retrocession of Bessarabia, and finally

to a renunciation of all special rights of intervention between

the Sultan and his Christian subjects. Tsar Nicholas did

not live to experience this humiliation, as he died of grief

before this treaty. His successor was Alexander II.

The first decade of Alexander's reign is commonlyknown as the Epoka Velikih Reform, and may be described

as a violent reaction against the political and intellectual

stagnation of the preceding period. In respect of external

policy, the reign of Alexander II differed widely from that

of Nicholas I. The Eastern Colossus no longer inspired ad-

miration and fear in Europe. Until the country had

completely recovered from the exhaustion of the Crimean

War the government remained in the background of

European politics; the Russian minister of foreign

affairs, Prince Gorchakov, graphically described its at-

titude in the famous declaration: "La Russie ne boude pas,

elle se recueille." ( Russia is not sulking, she is collecting

herself ) . However, during this recovery Russia suc-

ceded in 1871 to secure the suppression of article two of the

Treaty of Paris, which limited her military power in the

Black Sea. Had the Tsar been satisfied with this success,

which enabled him to rebuild Sevastopol and construct a

Black Sea fleet, his reign might have been a peaceful and

prosperous one. But he tried to recover the remainder of

what had been lost by the Crimean War, the province of

Bessarabia, and the predominant influence in Turkey. Toeffect this, he embarked on the Turkish War of 1877

,and

so began the fourth intervention of Russia in the Near East.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877, ended in severe dis-

appointment for Russia. Though the campaign enabled

her to recover Bessarabia, it did not increase her prestige in

the Balkans. Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Bulgaria,

were increased territorially by this war, and completely

liberated, but Russia took, so to speak, nothing for herself

in Europe, because Austria-Hungary, Germany, and


England, modified her preliminary Treaty of San Stefano,

at the Congress of Berlin, in favor of Turkey. Tsar Alexan-

der II was especially irritated by the fact that the two

powers that were thus depriving him of the fruits of his

victories found means to slice off a share for themselves.

Under the pretext of administering their affairs, Austria

occupied Bosnia - Herzegovina, and by a separate treaty

England secured the island of Cyprus, as well as a controlling

situation in Anatolia.

After thirty years of occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

the annexation of these two provinces by Austria-Hungaryfollowed in 1908. Serbia and Montenegro protested to sig-

natory powers. Sir Edward Grey declared that annexation

violated and nullified the Treaty of Berlin. He arrangedfor a new European congress or conference to be held for

the revision of the treaty. Baron Aehrenthal, Austrian

foreign minister, refused the proposition, and consented to

pay Turkey an indemnity of 65,000,000 francs. These

negotiations took place in January and February 1909, and

the protocol embodying the above terms between the two

countries was signed on February 26. It was approved by

Turkey on April 5, after a debate of nine hours in the

Turkish chamber.

Russia, weakened by the Japanese War and absorbed byconstitutional reforms, was not at this time able to encourageSerbian and Montenegrin warlike agitations against Austria.

She urged them to moderate their aspirations and to

prepare for better times. The aggressive foreign policy of

Austria now opened the eyes not only of the Balkan states,

but also of Russia. Armaments and preparations for war

began immediately after the annexation. In the work of

restoring its military power the government was supported

by the Duma. In this manner Russia counterbalanced the

Austrian and German militarism which had been enormous-

ly strengthened after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.


Rivalry between Slavonic and Germanic powers for

political preponderance in the Balkans, especially between

Russia and Austria, was not new in European history. It

existed even before the reign of Catherine II, and Joseph II

of Austria. Russia strove to force her way to the great

midland sea and obtain a footing in the world markets to

which that commercial route leads. This egress from the

dreary region of frost and ice to the lands of sunshine and

fertility was ever felt as a prime necessity of national life. It

is clear that for political and economic reasons, and notably

for racial motives, Russia could never allow Constantinople

to fall into the hands of any European power, nor could

she allow the Balkans to fall under the ascendancy of

Austria-Hungary or Germany. Austria-Hungary for her-

self spoke in very much the same strain. In a leading Vien-

na paper, one which usually reflects with fair accuracy

the opinions of Ballplatz diplomacy, appeared on No-

vember 5, 1908, an article which stated Austrian policy

avowedly and frankly:

"The thing is urgent, and we must be resolute. Wecannot halt in the path marked out for us without

incurring the most serious peril. We cannot return thesword to the scabbard until we have established on asecure basis our absolute supremacy in the Balkans, andcrushed in those lands the influence of every other power.To accomplish this is essential. But we can only achievethis on condition that we border on Turkey, on the longestpossible front. Especially must we establish ourselves onthe border of Macedonia. The sine qua non for this is

disappearance of Serbia and Montenegro; a conflict

must be forced, and that speedily, on these countries.

Ruthless selfishness is the only course that pays in

politics. Ethical considerations should not affect theattainment of a political aim; to reach our aim no meansmust be despised." (Quoted by H. J. Darnton-Fraser in

The Westminster Review, February, 1909.)

It was obvious that Austria desired either to take Con-

stantinople, or to prevent Russia from doing so. Theacute tension in diplomatic relations between these two

Dower

RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST

powers continued for several years. In 1912 Russia succeded

in forming a Balkan League against Turkey. She favored

a union of the Balkan Slavs with Greece, which would

give her access to the southeastern ports in Aegean Sea.

Austria opposed such a policy and desired to preserve the

status quo, by which she hoped eventually to gain more

Slavonic territory and to be united with her own Slavic

dominions in a Trialism. This was a dream of Archduke

Franz Ferdinand and his militaristic party. Russian policy

in accord with the Triple Entente triumphed in the Balkan

War. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, increased

territorially. Serbia captured Drach (Durazzo) on the Ad-

riatic Sea, and insisted on retaining this seaport with a

small strip of the adjacent coast,in order to have an outlet,

"a little window," on the Adriatic. Russia and other powersof the Triple Entente actively sympathized with the Serbian

claims; Austria and the Triple Alliance again opposed,

especially Austria which had economic and political interests

in Albania and did not desire to encounter Serbian compe-tition there. She insisted that new Albania, since, it

manifestly could not remain Turkish, should be formed

into an autonomous principality under her political

-protectorate. The state of European alliances caused

Germany to champion the policy of Austria-Hungary, and

brought France and Great Britain to the support of Russia.

Only the earnest endeavors of all the foreign chancellories

of Europe succeded in effecting a compromise of these

conflicting purposes and thus temporarily preventing a

general war.

In 1913 there came the conflict between Bulgaria and

her former allies, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro, in

consequence of the partition of territory gained in European

Turkey. Austria without hesitation encouraged Bulga-ria in her demands, while the Russian Tsar telegraphed to

the rulers of Southern Slavs to find some method to avoid

a fratricidal war, reminding them of his position as arbitra-


tor under the Balkan Treaty of 1912, and warned them

that he would hold that state responsible which appealed

to force. "The state which begins war will be responsible

to the Slavonic cause"-- he said. In Vienna it was looked

upon as an indirect assertion of moral guardianship of

Russia over the Balkan states. The Austrian and German

press insisted again that Balkan Slavs were of age and

could take care of themselves; if not, it was for Europe, not

for Oriental Russia, to control them. (Cf. Die Gegenwart,

Berlin, March 8, 1913. )

The well-meant action of Russia in intervening in Balkan

affairs had an effect opposite to that hoped for. The political

horizon grew darker and darker, not only in the Balkans,

but in all Europe. The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, at the

close of the second Balkan War, was concluded without

much regard .to the nationalities of the people in the dis-

tributed territories, and still less regard for the political

and economic interests of the individual states. By Aus-

trian intervention Skadar (Skutari) was taken from Mon-

tenegro and ceded to Albania, a state which Austria had

just created. Serbia in particular, cut off for many years

from the Adriatic and Aegean Sea, felt now that she had

a wonderful opportunity to secure Drach, or some other

seaport which would give her territorial and commercial

access to the Mediterranean. But her desires were frus-

trated and her political, economic, and national aspirations

brought to naught.

When we glance generally over Russia's foreign policy

for a hundred years, from Alexander I in 1815, to Ni-

cholas II in 1915, it is easy to see that all interventions,

all the wars undertaken in the Near East, have ended in

very meagre results. Four great wars against Turkey have

brought Russia only a strip of Rumanian territory between

the Dniester and the Pruth, and another Rumanian bit

of land in the delta of the Danube. Even this last morsel,

acquired in 1829 and restored in 1856, was won back in 1878


at the cost of 200,000 men lost in a terrible war. Russia,

whose fleets have twice at Navarino in 1827, and at

Sevastopol in 1854 annihilated the naval power of Tur-

key, did not secure even an island in the Aegean Sea.

In regard to satisfaction of a moral character, the

Russian soldiers have never been able to enter Stambul,

nor to pray in St. Sophia. As to gratitude upon the part of

the liberated Balkan peoples, Matushka ( Dear-Mother )

was always rewarded with a series of disillusionments, which

rewards mostly came from Bulgaria.

The real gain for Russia in the Near East, as has been

said, was slight as far as expansion was concerned. For

a hundred years this powerful Northern Empire did not

obtain one foot of territory in the Balkan Peninsula. But in

the direction of the Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, Tur-

kestan, Siberia, Mongolia, Manchuria, and China she

made a real gain. Russia secured there an enormous increase

of territory, and an aggrandizement of influence greater

than what one might deem that she ever will have in the

Balkans when a new day dawns after the present European

Walpurgis night of slaughter.

CHAPTER II

RUSSIA^IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

For a few parcels of territory in the West, conquered with

tremendous difficulty, what bloody wars has Russia not

endured? Her efforts to obtain access to the sea have been

but half successful. The White Sea, blocked with ice; the

Baltic, closed by the Sound and the Belts; the Black Sea

closed by the Dardanelles; and the Mediterranean itself,

with Gibraltar and Suez Canal,-- are not available, and

not sufficient for the needs of the expansion of a mightycontinental empire. In Asia, on the contrary, by way of

Persia, the Tigris, and the Persian Gulf, Russia is able to

open her way to the Arabian Sea. Bismarck once spoke in.

disdain of the mission of Russia in Asia. But when young

Emperor Nicholas II ascended the throne, he and his minis-

ters took matters more seriously. In 1893 a Russian publi-

cist, Prince Ukhtomski, issued a book ( Puteshestvie na Vostok

Naslednika Tsesarevichd), in which he stated with pride that

the time had come for the Russians to have some definite

idea regarding the heritage that the Genghis Khans and the

Tamerlanes have left them. "Asia! we have been part of it at

all times," he said; "we have lived its life and shared its in-

terests; our geographical position irrevocably destines us to

be the head of the rudimentary powers of the Orient".

The opinion of Prince Ukhtomski revealed a new element

in Russian foreign policy. Gradually, step by step, town bytown, and district by district, Russia won her influence

in numerous khanates, amirates, satrapies, and other Asiatic

provinces. She annexed Khiva in 1872, Bokhara in 1873,

RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 11

and Caucasus in 1878. She won political and commercial

influence in Turkey, Afghanistan, and Persia.

By these Russian successes in Asia, England was greaty

alarmed. At every forward movement of the Muscovites,

the Britons protested, or endeavored to secure guarantees

against a new advance, or tried to gain for themselves some

new strategic point that would strengthen their position. In

1885 the belief was general that a war was about to ensue

between "the Whale and the Elephant". But three years

later, Great Britain agreed to the Russian occupation of

Merv, Penjdeh, and Kushk. The Russians now were within

one hundred miles of Herat "the Key of the Indies".

The question of the settlement of the boundaries was

scarcely disposed of, when another problem arose concerning

the settlement of the boundaries of the Pamirs, a moun-

tainous region of Central Asia lying on the northwest border

of India. With the Bam-Dunya ("the Roof of the World")the platau of Pamirs commands both Afghanistan and Cash-

mere, those two ramparts of India and Chinese Turkestan.

The region was broken up into petty khanates over which

the khan of Bokhara, the vassal of the Russians, and the

amir of Afghanistan, the client of the English, laid claim to

sovereignty. Non of them had recognized until then the

value of the territory. In the summer of 1891 a Russian

scientific mission accompanied by six hundred soldiers,

made its appearance in Pamir, and aroused, by its presence

there, protests of the English. At the approach of winter,

the Russians withdrew; but the following summer they

again appeared there, under the command of Colonel Ya-

nov. They contended that they had been insulted by the Af-

ghans, for which they inflicted upon them the bloody defeat

of Somatash, after which they fell back and took up their

position at Kalabar on the Oxus. This clash of arms was

succeded by a diplomatic controversy. It was not until 1895,

after a keen discussion between the two great powers, each

contending for its own client, that they reached an ag-

12 R USSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EAST

reement. The disputed region was divided between Bokhara

and Afghanistan, the former receiving the little khanates of

Shugnan and Rushan, and the latter the khanate of Wakhan,a narrow strip of territory, about twenty miles wide, which

now forms" a buffer state" between Russia and Bri-

tish India.

In 1899 England occupied in Arabia the island of Perim

in order to control the outlet of the Red Sea and establish

a coaling station in her maritime route. Russia, in the same

year, endeavored to obtain from the imam the grant of a

coaling station on his coast. From this arose new com-

plaints and strenuous opposition on the part of England,

especially when Russia established herself on the coast, and

at the very capital of the emperor of Abyssinia.

The English began staidly to alternate between doubtingand believing that these expansions of Russia by way of the

Caucasus, by way of Turkestan, and by way of the Pa-

mirs, were all directed towards one goal, to possess "the ri-

ches of the Indies." Some English jingoists declared that

the conquest of all the Levant was worthless for Russia, if

it would not open the road to India. Russian diplomacydenied such innuendos. "We do not desire India, but must

get down to the Persian Gulf"-- contended Novoe Vremya

(April 28, 1901), a leading conservative Russian paper. In

truth, what Russia desired was not a road to India, but

a road to the Arabian Sea, and to reach that point the route

lay through the Persian Gulf. She accepted the theory that

in Asia there is room enough for two powers," if they find

a modus operandi to move there in parallel lines without

colliding.

The modus operandi between the two rivals was not found

until Germany compelled them to find it. The German planfor the Bagdad railroad was regarded for many years as an

impracticable enterprise. But when a part of it was openedbetween Constantinople and P>egli in Central Turkey, andwhen Germany was preparing to continue the railway con-


struction with a terminus at Persian Gulf, England realised

that the German Drang nach Osten was not illusion but fact*

The basis for Anglo-Russian agreement in the Middle East

was now found. Russia, not being at the zenith of her milita-

ry and political effectiveness, condescended to an arrange-

ment by which the situation in Persia and Afghanistan was

cleared up. By this arrangement Great Britain consented to

seek no political or commercial concessions north of a line

connecting Kasrishirin, Ispahan, Yezd, Tabbas, and Khaf,with the junction of the Russian, Persian, and Afghan fron-

tiers. Russia gave to Great Britain a like understanding in

respect of the territory south of a line extending from the

Afghan frontier to Birjand, Kirman, and Bander Abbas-

The region between these two lines was to be regarded as a

neutral zone in which either country might obtain conces-

sions. It is of interest to note how Russia admitted the Bri-

tish sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf, renouncing her

claims in that part of Persia which she had coveted for so

many decades.

In Afghanistan the British and Russians reached an

entente cordiale by which England was to exercise her

influence in that amirate only in a pacific sense, viz., never

to permit Afghanistan to take any measures threatening

Russia. England also engaged neither to occupy nor to

annex, in contravention of that treaty, any portion of Afgha-

nistan, nor to interfere in the internal administration of the

country. The statesmen of Russia, on their part, declared

that they recognized Afghanistan as outside the sphereof Russian influence, and they agreed to conduct all

their political relations with Afghanistan only throughthe intermediary of the British Government. In commercial

relations the two governments affirmed their adherence to

the principle of equal opportunity, and they agreed that anyfacilities which might have been, or should hereafter be,

obtained for British and British-Indian trade, should be

equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders,


This agreement, which was confessedly drawn up for the

sake of a solid and lasting peace between the two em-

pires concerned, evoked a mixture of sullen criticisms in

the English and Russian press. It was said that certain

stipulations of this convention did more harm than goodto the British interests in the Middle Orient. Some English

politicians objected that Russia obtained in Persia, for

her sphere of influence, about two-thirds of the country,

with its richest and largest towns, including Teheran the

capital; that she had become indisputable master of the

centres of trade, of the oldest and best routes in Persia; that

in Afghanistan she had a free hand to let her officers confer

with Afghan officers in"non-political" matters; and finally,

that her appointed commercial agents in the amir's countrywould not promote or safeguard English interests in

the matter of trrade.

In Russia the compact was criticized only by warm-water

publicists of the forward policy, who alleged that the Eng-lish had no sincere intention in concluding such an agreement.It was England, they asserted, that had blocked the way of

Russian efforts to reach the ocean; it was England that

thwarted Russia's aim in the Crimean War to go to the

Mediterranean. TheA! averred it was Lord G. Curzon's

firm Persian policy that arrested Russia's outflow to-

wards a seaport on the Persian Gulf, which necessarily and

properly was her right. The first Anglo-Japanese Treaty of

1902, according to these contestants, was the death blow to

the Russian Pacific open-water projects. Said convention

does not grant Russia any outlook towards the Persian

Gulf, the summum desiderium of her foreign policy in the

Middle East, because she conceded to give up of her rail-

road proposed from Meshed to Bander Abbas.

There are other similar arguments pro and con this con-

vention, but whatever they may be, the fact remains that

the two signatory powers were not compelled either bythreatening diplomatic complications to appeal to a peace


arbitration tribunal or by force of arms to sign a treaty of

peace. They voluntarily and with earnest solicitude

on both sides entered into the compact, to remove certain

prejudice, mistrust, and resentment for injuries inflicted

on each other in previous times. The Russian public in

general, regarded England prior to this time as perfide

Albion with whom it was not worthy to make any alliance

or treaty. In the eyes of the English, Russia was considered

as a semi-civilized nation ruled by autocrats and aristo-

crats, which was known in Weltpolitik by her quick forget-

fulness of given promises, and which is wholly built uponwarfare and conquest. Such misunderstandings between the

two powers had really existed for many decades, and these

were removed by that agreement.

To Persia, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 wasmore benevolent than some critics supposed. If the rivalry

between England and Russia had remained as acute as it

was in earlier times, Persia, with her constant troubles andher inefficiency for self-government, would have been

plunged into civil war and finally become dismemberedlike an Asiatic Poland.

At the beginning of the European War in 1914, and lat-

terly in 1915, both Persia and Afghanistan were advised byTurks and Germans to take arms and overthrow the

Russian and British protectorate. German and Austrian

agents, taking advantage of their diplomatic immunity,

attempted to convince Persia and Afghanistan that if theywished to preserve their national existence when the Euro-

pean gigantic strife of nations ends, they must not remain

neutral. "If England and Russia issue victorious in this

war, then Persia and Afghanistan will be wiped off the map,and their national existence finished for ever" - wrote the

Turkish paper Tanine of Constantinople. The British andRussian representatives complained that these Austro-

German and Turkish agitations clashed with the rights of

Russia and England as protecting powers of Persia and Af-


ghanistan. Precautionary measures against foreign in-

trigues were taken immediately. Russia and Great Britain

warned the Persian shah (" the King of Kings") and the

Afghan amir that any act of hostility towards the British or

Russian Empire might mean the end of independence of

their respective countries. Fortunately for the shah and his

people, all these foreign instigations failed of success, and

Persia declined in 1914 and 1915 to join officially either

belligerent party.

CHAPTER III

RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST.

In relation to the Far East, the contact of the Rus-

sians with the Asiatic peoples has existed more than two

hundred years, especially with China. From the annexation

of the Kamchatka Peninsula, the position of Russia in

the Far East continually grew stronger. In 1847 the Russian

Government appointed for governor-general of Eastern

Siberia, Count Nicholas Muraviev, who later was named, in

reward for his services, Muraviev-Amurski. When Muraviev

took this position he set himself to develop and strengthen

the eastern colonies. He knew that his new province would

have no future if it was not secured by the chief river and

the richest region, that is, the Amur and Manchuria.

In 1848 Russia sent an expedition of exploration to the Far

East, but all this expedition perished without the escape of

a single man to tell the story.

Two years afterwards Captain Nevelski with his explo-

rers discovered the island Sakhalin, occupied the mouth of

the Amur, and gave a proclamation to the native Chinese

mandarins that all this region belonged to "the White Tsar"

at Petersburg. They protested and demanded that nego-

tiations should be entered upon with their emperor. Gover-

nor Muraviev declined the proposition because "Peking was

two far away, and Chinese diplomacy too slow." Hecontinued to act as if the country was already a Russian

province, and strengthened his position by building along

the river the forts Aleksandrovsk, Khabarovsk, and Ni-

kolaevsk.


During the Crimean War the Anglo-French fleet blockaded

the Russian Pacific coast, and destroyed a part of the

military establishments there. This blockade, by threate-

ning to starve out the colony, only hastened a decision

on the part of Muraviev, who had need of Manchuria to

furnish food for his colonists. In 1857 Admiral Putiatin

dropped anchor in the Pechili Gulf, and proposed to the

emperor of China, in consideration of Russia's armed inter-

vention in the Taiping insurrection, the cession of Manchu-ria. China's only reply was a vigorous protest against this

Russian encroachment. War seemed imminent between the

two empires. Happily for the Russian eagle, just at

that time came the Anglo-French expedition and the march

of the allies upon Peking. The Russians profited by this

event to complete the annexation of the coveted province.

The Tsar sent a fleet into the Chinese waters, and the

Celestials did not relish having a third European power to

deal with. By the treaties of Aigun and Tientsin of 1858,

they granted to Russia the entire left bank of the Amur,and all the territory between this river and the Pacific

Ocean. In the southern part the Russians built a fort-

ress and a city with a prophetic name Vladivostok (Do-minator of the East). The acquired lands formed two

provinces, Amurskaya Oblast (the Amur Province) west of

the Amur, and Primorskaya Oblast (the Maritime Province)

east of that river. By the Treaty of Peking in 1860, China

ceded to Russia the region adjacent to the lakes Balkhash

and Issik-kul. The boundary line between Manchuria and

Siberia was readjusted, and the Russians were granted the

right to trade in all parts of the empire. Fifteen years after-

wards Russia obtained from Japan the abandonment of the

latter's rights over Sakhalin, in exchange for the North

Kurile Islands.

For nearly thirty years the boundary between China and

Russia remained as agreed upon in the treaties of 1858

and 1860; but already the commercial and political activity

of the Russians was overstepping it. They had established

RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST 19

themselves in large numbers in towns of Chinese Manchuria,in Kiakhta, Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar. The navigation

of the Ussuri and Sungari rivers fell wholty into their hands.

The steamships of the Amur Company put Russia in rapid

communication with Japan and San Francisco. Scientific

missions traversed China in all directions. At Peking the

Russian colony acquired a continually greater importance;

the ambassador of the Tsar wielded more influence at court

than the representatives of any other European power. His

open-handed liberality won him the favor of the courtiers,

mandarins, and the generals. In all the sea and rivers* ports

the colonies of Russian merchants multiplied, and these

seemed to live on better terms with the native population

than the traders of other foreign nations.

In 1881 Russia secured great economic concessions and

privileges in the provinces bordering on Siberia and Tur-

kestan. By the Hi Treaty Russia and China agreed that no

tariff was to be imposed by either of them, unless trade

attains "such development as to necessitate its establish-

ment." Free trade, according to this treaty, was to be main-

tained between all Chinese and Russian subjects in the

principal towns and trading areas of Mongolia and Chinese

Turkestan. Also, the treaty confirmed that Russian subjects

had the right to settle and to acquire houses, for the pur-

pose of carrying on trade in all trading places on either side

of the Tianshan ranges and in the country outside the

great Chinese Wail.

By the convention of June, 1895, China contracted with

Russia, through the intermediary of the Russo - Chinese

Bank at Petersburg, and under the direction of Count

Ukhtomski, a loan of four hundred million francs at four

per cent., payable in thirty-six years. On August 27, 1896

this same bank made another agreement with the Chinese

Government (the Treaty of St. Petersburg). This treaty

gave the Eastern Chinese Railroad Company the right to

carry the Siberian railway through Chinese Manchuria


and the Liaotung Peninsula, with a terminus at Talienwan

and Port Arthur. Another purpose of the loan was to

develop coal, iron, and gold mines in the territory traversed

by the road. The stock of the company was held only byChinese and Russians. A special clause authorized the Tsar

to station in Manchuria both infantry and cavalry for the

protection of the railroad, which at the end of twenty-five

years was to revert to China, in case she desired it after

having fulfilled all her obligations. Having secured the right

to construct this line of railway, Count Cassini had little

difficulty in inducing the Government of Peking to allow

certain deviations of the road so as to bring it into touch

with Tsitsihar, Kharbin, and Vladivostok.

This matter was hardly settled between China and Rus-

sia, before some other differences arose between China and

Germany. On November 1, 1897, two German missionaries

had been murdered by the Chinese ruffians in the province

of Shantung. Such an outrageous act now gave a plausible

pretext for the German Government to occupy the harbor

of Kiaochow. For Russia this was a most unwelcome in-

cident. She had intended Kiaochow for her own purposes,

and had already made an agreement with the authorities in

Peking that the harbor might be used freely by her fleet.

The Cabinet of Petersburg hastened to demand, therefore,

as an offset for the loss of Kiaochow, a lease of Port Arthur

and Talienwan. The Chinese Government granted the

demands, and the Russians now had free hand to use

Port Arthur not merely as railroad station but as a place

d'armes. From the Korean Government they obtained a

lease of the port of Masampo on the southeastern coast of

Korea, and other concessions in this province.

The Russian grandiose scheme in the Far East was very

carefully laid, and for a time it was favored by many cir-

cumstances. In 1900 the Boxer rising in China and the

troubles in the town of Blagovieshchensk, justified Russia

in sending a large force into Manchuria, to protect her own


interests and at the same time the territorial integrity of

the Celestial Empire against the inordinate demands of the

western powers for compensations and guarantees. Whenthe Boxer riots were silenced General Nicholas Grodekov

telegraphed to his government of"consolidating the great

enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia's

dominions, and making of that river an internal waterwayand not a frontier stream." His proposition was accepted as

it concerned the right bank of the Amur. "The Son of Hea-

ven" was assured that whatever might come to pass in

Manchuria " no part of China should be annexed to Russia".

Moreover, Russian diplomats in Peking made with the

Chinese Government a secret agreement (1900) by which

Russia undertook to protect China from foreign invasion^

and to dismantle all forts and defenses not occupied by the

Russians. Niuchwang and other places, according to that

agreement, were to be restored to the Chinese administraton

when the Russian Government was satisfied that the

pacification of the province was complete.

The existence of such an agreement was denied by Count

Lamsdorf, the Russian foreign minister, to both the British

and Japanese ambassadors at Petersburg. But in spite of

Count Lamsdorf's disavowal, this clandestine agreementwith China on one hand, and the Russian general policy in

Manchuria, on the other, excited suspicion in Japan and

Great Britain. The hostility of the Japanese was stirred upon political grounds, while the English were jealous to see

such a mighty rival as Russia in the Far East. For that

reason, both powers, Japan and England, astonishing the

world, signed in January, 1902, a treaty for maintaining the

status quo and general peace in the extreme Orient. The trea-

ty provided that the integrity of China and Korea must be

respected, and the policy of open door for commerce and in-

dustry in China and Korea should be granted to all nations.

One of the first effects of this Anglo-Japanese Alliance

was to strengthen the hands of the peace party in Russia,


resulting in a new treaty with China (March 26, 1902),

pledging the Russians to withdraw from Manchuria. Theevacuation was begun shortly afterwards and continued

during the winter. But in the spring of 1903, this process

stopped. The Japanese now felt that it was high time to

intervene. Accordingly, in July, 1903, they addressed an

inquiry to Count Lamsdorf, asking whether he was disposedto reopen the negotiations on the Manchurian and Korean

questions. The Russian Government vouchsafed a reply in

which it was stated that Russia was willing to recognize the

preponderating commercial interest of Japan in Korea,as well as her right to advise and assist that country in

civil administration. Japan was further to be at liberty to

send troops for this purpose to "the Hermit Kingdom''after giving notice to Russia. Both powers were to agree not

to use the territory of this kingdom for strategic purposes^and not to erect any fortifications on the coast calculated to

impair the freedom of the straits of Korea. The questionof Manchuria was not brought into this scheme, because the

Russian Government regarded this province to be outside

of the Japanese sphere of interest. The answer did not sa-

tisfy Baron Kamura, the Japanese minister of foreign af-

fairs. After six months of dilatory wranglings, diplomacyhad exhausted itself. The war began on February 8, 1904,

without any formal declaration.

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIAN POLICY AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR.

A great deal of nonsense has been written and accepted as

true concerning the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Through-out the course of this terrific conflict, the Japanese took

the best of care to put their own view of the case before

the world. "The wonderful heroism," "the marvellous

strategical and tactical skill," "the perfect medical and

transport arrangements of the Japanese forces," and other

set phrases received more than a fair share of praise. This

was due to the perspicuous industry of the Japanese publi-

city agencies. Those who believe in such laurea verba forget

that Japan had advantage of Russia in being better preparedfor the war; she was equipped with a full war-chest, a ve-

teran army and navy. In the meantime the Russians fought

under the dispiriting conditions of having a well-trained

enemy in the far front and nearly all the European powersbehind. Austria, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain

intrigued secretely against Russia, especially Austria and

Germany. Furthermore, in internal policy the vast Slavonic

Empire was threatened by a revolutionary movement. The

Russian Government was hampered at every turn by dis-

orders. Nevertheless, in the battlefield the Russians put

up an extraordinary fight, so that before a year and half had

passed their adversaries were completely exhausted. The

Japanese now unofficially suggested to the President of the

United States of America that he intervene as mediator.

President Roosevelt accepted the suggestion, and his

mediation worked successfully. The treaty of peace between

24 RUSSIAN POLI Y AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR

Russia and Japan was concluded September 5, 1905, at

Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Since the close of this unfortunate war the position

of Russia, however, was not doomed either in Asia or in

Europe. Russian policy in the Far East was generally more

successful than in the Near East. The great secret of this

success lay on the method employed in Russian dealings

with the Asiatic peoples. Prof. Reinsch observes in his

suggestive book, World Politics, that the Russians have

an insinuating manner and great tact in diplomatic inter-

course. In their Oriental political system they know how to

use that splendor and concentrated majesty which impress

the Oriental mind far more than do the simple business

methods of the Britons. The Russian diplomats understand

very well how to use the amour-propre of their adversaries.

They know when to use force, and when to soothe up with

gracious audiences, Lucullan banquets, and blandishments.

Withal, the policy of Russia is persistently opportune and

constant. The changes in ministry of foreign affairs are not

so frequent as in France, England, and United States of

America. From 1815 to 1882 Russia had only two ministers

for foreign affairs, Nesselrode and Gorchakov; and since

the latter date there have been only six, De Giers, Lobanov,

Muraviev, Lamsdorf, Izvolsky, and Sazonov. This per-

manency in the foreign office ensures continuity of the same

political views and consistence in realizing them. Russia

secured in Asia lands and influence among Oriental nations

only by her peaceful persistency, not by belicose means.

Russian policy in Far Assia showed that great conquests

can be achieved not only by the land battles and sea fights,

by brag proclamations, and oratorical heroics, but rather

by silence and prudence.

Of like opinion is Prof. James Mavor. In his Economic

History of Russia, the English scholar assumes that Central

Asia and the Far East contain imense possibilities for Rus-

sia. At the present time she has privileges and concessions to


exploit the mining industries and construct the railroads

in Manchuria and all Mongolia. According to Prof. Ma-

vor, the latter has already become in reality her prote-

gee under the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol

of 1912. China now controls solely the external relations

of that province. All internal administration is left to the

local khans, whose chief spiritual ruler is the khutuktu

(saint) ;and this

"saint" is simply a vassal of the Slav Tsar.

Though preocupied with political and civilizing mission in

the Far Orient, Russia did not abandon her liberating

mission in Central and Southeastern Europe. When in

May, 1912, Mr. S. Sazonov made a speech in the Duma,he declared, amongst other statements, in the reverse of

Prince Ukhtomski's opinion, that Russia is not an Asiatic,

but a European power. "Our State was put together

not on the banks of the Black Irtish, but on the Dnieper

and the Moskva" he asserted. This diplomatic usus

loquendi translated into plain language signifies that expan-

sion in Asia should not constitute the one sole aim of the

foreign policy of Russia, for she has to protect, not only

3,000,000 of Mongols from unremittng Chinese raids, but

she has also to protect 50,000,000 of her minor brethren,

the Slavonic peoples under the domination of Austro-

Germans. Situated upon the outskirts of Europe, in

the debatable region between the West and East, she is

the conecting link between Occidental civilization and

Oriental barbarism. The double eagle of Russia is the

symbol that connects the Slavonic fragments in a racial

bond which will spell in future peaceful progress and not

war. The aims of this empire, whether in the Near, Mid-

dle, or Far East, are nowadays mainly cultural. They are

commercial and political only in so far as the geographical

situation of Russia makes it incumbent on her statesmen to

maintain her territorial integrity, and to provide for the

normal expansion of her industrial and agricultural output.

From 1908 onwards, Russian statesmen concentrated

their attention and energies on everything relating to the

26 RUSSIAN POLICY AFTER THE JAPANESE WAR

Slavonic affairs, and gave their diplomatic support to all the

Balkan Slavs. They encouraged the Panslavonic societies in

Moskva and Petrograd to help the Western and Southern

Slavs when these needed such help. The formation of the

Balkan League of 1912 was their deed. And, as it is known,the Balkan League was not created for conquests of new

territories, for subjection of other peoples, for national

or international brigandage and booty. The Balkan Slavs

made this union, with the assistance of their sister country,

Russia, for the defense of their own soil, for liberation of

their kinsmen, the subjugated rayas, who were under the

brutal Asiatic oppressor the red Sultan! For six hundred

years Turkish janissaries plundered, persecuted, and mas-

sacred the Christian population in the Balkan Peninsula.

No European state had raised its voice against these Mu-sulman carnivals of crime. The only state sympathising

with the sufferers was the Empire of the Tsars. Russ shed

his blood on more than one occasion for the rescue of his

underling brother from a galling yoke. And, as already noted

in the first chapter, he secured nothing for himself, but

only fought to assuage the downtrodden and humiliated

peoples; he fought for justice and humanity.

In the Far Orient Russia had many diplomatic adven-

tures; most of them were successful, but a few very dis-

astrous. The debdcle occasioned by the Japanese Warmarked a decisive moment in her contemporary history.

As a prominent Slavic economist, M. A. Finn-Yenotaevski,

remarked in his work, Sovremennoe Khoziaystvo Rossiyi

(The Modern Economy of Russia), for the last eight or ten

years "the eyes of the Muscovite eagle were turned from

the East towards the West, and above all from the Far

East to the Near East." Austria's systematic provocations

in the Balkans, and her insolent attacks on Serbia and

Croatia, together with German commercial competition in

the Levant, forced Russia to recoil from the Far Orient, in


order to prevent further encroachments of the Teutons, andtheir

"Pressing towards the East." If 35,000,000 of the

Western Slavs (the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks), and 15,000,000of Southern Slavs (the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes)enslaved at present time, would be delivered after this

bloody European Armageddon they should be grateful not

merely to the Matushka-Rossiya, but even to their foes.

Their eternal enemies hastened the solution of the old

Eastern Question. By the declaration of war to Serbia and

Russia in 1914, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey,

unconsciously made an ample contribution to the liberation

of the Slavonic Laocoon who has wrestled for centuries

with the Hun and Teuton serpents.

APPENDIX.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Utilized documents and works).

The literature of Russian history and politics is practi-

cally inexhaustible. The following bibliography is limited

to those documents and works which have direct bearingon the subject as outlined in this essay, thereby avoidingthe confusion that results when there is an overhelmingmass of material to be examined. For the spirit of the Rus-

sian politics the student must consult all kinds of politi-

cal literature, the blue, white, green, red, yellow, and

orange books; the Russian year books; diplomatic cores-

pondence; pamphlets; magazine articles, and even the

newspapers. These are, of course, too numerous and too

fluctuating in character to be catalogued. Herewith we list

only the most important sources and treatises.

CHAPTER I

A) Official Documents.

Traite d*armistice entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, signe

Slobosia, le 24 aotit, 1807. ("Recueil de Principaux

Traites," par Geo. Fred, de Martens, pp. 689692,t. VIII. Gottingue, 1835).

Convention d 'armistice entre la Turquie et la Serbie, signe a

Brakni, le 17 ao&t 1808. (Idem, "Nouveau Recueil de

Traites," p. 88, t. I. Gottingue, 1817).

Traite de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane, signe

Bucharest, le 28 mai 1812. (Ibidem, pp. 397405,t. III. Gottingue, 1818).

30 APPENDIX

Treaty for the Settlement of Greece, between Great Britain,

France, and Russia, with an additional and secret

Article. July 6, 1827. French and English text. (Ibidem,

pp. 282-290, t. VI. Gottingue, 1829).

Traite de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane.

signe a Adrianople, le 14 septembre 1829. ( Ibidem,

pp. 143-155, tome VIII. Gottingue, 1831).

Traitt <f Unkiar-Iskelessi entre la Russie et la Porte Otto-

mane. Constantinople, le 8 juillet 1833. (Ibid. pp. 655-661,

tome XI. Gottingue, 1837).

Traite General de Paix, entre 1'Autriche, la France, la

Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse, la Russie, la Sardaigne,et la Porte Ottomane. Paris, le 30 mars 1856. (Ibidem,

"Nouveau Recueil General de Trates," tome XV,pp. 770-781. Gottingue, 1857).

Traite conclu dLondres, le 13 mars 1871, entre FAllemagne,

PAutriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, 1'Italie, la

Russie, et la Turquie, pour la revision des stipulations

du Traite conclu a Paris le 30 mars 1856, relatives a la

navigation de la Mer Noire et du Danube. (Ibidem,

tome VIII, pp. 303-306).

Preliminaries de Paix entre la Russie et la Porte Ottomane.

San Stefano, le 3 mars 1878. (Ibidem, pp. 246-56. 2e serie,

t. III. Gottingue, 1878).

Traitt de Berlin, entre 1'Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie,

France, Grande-Bretagne, Italic, Russie, et Turquie,

signe le 13 juillet 1878. (Ibidem, pp. 449-465).

Protocoles du Congres, reuni a Berlin du 13 juin au 13 juillet

1878. (Ibidem, pp. 276-448).

Protocol between Austria- Hungary and Turkey concerning

Bosnia- Herzegovina, signed February 26, 1909. (See"Supplement to the American Journal of International

Law," pp. 286-289, vol. 3, 1909).

BIBLIOGRAPHY 31

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdomof Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia, signed at Sofia,

February 29, 1912. (Ibidem, pp. 1-11, vol. 8, 1914).

Treaty of Alliance and Defense between Bulgaria and Greece,

signed at Sofia, May 16, 1912. (Ibidem, pp. 81-85).

Treaty of Peace between Turkey and the Balkan Allies, signed

at London, May 30, 1913. (Ibidem, pp. 12-13).

Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Rumania, Greece,

Montenegro, and Serbia, signed at Bucharest, Jul.28, 1913

(Ibidem, pp. 13-27).

B) Principal Works.

Bernhardi, F. Th. Geschichte Russlands und der Euro-

paeischen Politik in den Jahren 1814-1831, v. I-III.

Leipzig, 1863-1877.

Brandes, G. Impressions of Russia. London, 1890.

Cheradame, And. Douze Ans de Propagande en Faveur des

Peuples Balkaniques. Paris, 1913.

Dolgorukov, P. V. La Verite sur la Russie. Paris, 1860.

Dzhanshiev, Gr. Epoha Velikih Reform. Moskva, 1900.

Gershenzon, M. O. Epoha Nikolaya I. Moskva, 1910.

Golovachev, A. A. Desiat Liet Reform, 1861-71. Pet. 1872.

Gourdon, E. Histoire du Congres de Paris. Paris, 1857.

Hamley, E. The War in the Crimea. London, 1891.

Howard-Flanders, W. Balkania, a short History of the

Balkan States. London, 1909.

Immanuel, F. La Guerre des Balkans de 1912, v. I-III.

Paris, 1913.

Istoriya Rossiyi v XIX Viekie, t. I-IX. Izd. T-va Br. A. I.

Granat i Komp. Moskva, 1907-1910.

Kovalevskiy, Maksim M. La Regime Economique de la

Russie. Paris, 1898.

La Russie d la Fin du XIXe Siecle. Paris, 1900.

Krasinski, V. Panslavism and Germanism. London, 1848.

Lacroix, Paul. Histoire de la Vie et du Regne de Nicolas /,

Empereur de Russie, 2e ed. Paris, 1869.

Latimer, El. W. Russia and Turkey in the XIX Century,6 ed. Chicago, 1903.

32 APPENDIX

Leger, L. Russes et Slaves. Paris, 1896.

Lowe, Charles. Alexander III of Russia. London, 1895.

Mallat, Jos. La Serbie Contemporaine, v. I-II. Paris, 1902.

Marx, Karl. The Eastern Question. London, 1897.

Miller, William. The Balkans. London, 1911.

Mijatovics, E. L. The History of Modern Serbia. Lon. 1872.

Morfill, W. R. A History of Russia. London, 1902.

Novikoff, Olga (O. K.) Skobeleff and the Slavonic Cause.

London, 1883.

Pokrovskiy, M. N. Ruskaya Istoriya s Drevnieyshih Vremen,2d ed. v. I-V. Moskva, 1915.

Rain, Pierre. Un Tsar Ideologue, Alexandre I. Paris, 1913.

Rambaud, Alfred. Histoire de Russie. English translation

by L. B. Lang. Boston, 1886.

Ranke, Leopold. A History of Serbia. London, 1847.

Russell, Sir William H. The British Expedition to the Crimea.

London, 1877.

Samson-Himmelstjerna, Herman. Russia under Alexan-der III. Translated from the German. New York, 1893.

Sentupery, Leon. L'Europe Politique, t. III. Paris, 1895.

Skrine, Francis Henry. The Expansion of Russia,1815-1900.

Cambridge, 1903.

Stanoyevich, St. Istoriya Srpskoga Naroda. Beograd, 1910.

Stevenson, F. S. A. History of Montenegro. London, 1913.

Taburno, I. P. Vopros o Raspredieleniy Zavoyevanoy v

Turtsiy Teritoriy mezhdu Bolgariey i Serbiey. Pet. 1913.

Tatishchev, S. S. Vnieshniaya Politika Imperatora Nikola-

ya I. Peterburg, 1887.

Iz Proshlago Ruskoy Diplomatiyi. Peterburg. 1890.

Imperator Aleksandr II. Peterburg, 1912.

Thompson, H. N. Russian Politics. London, 1895.

Tikhomirov, L. A. Russia, Political and Social. Lond. 1892.

Urquhart, David. Progress of Russia in the West, North,and South, 4 ed. London, 1853.

Recent Events in the East. London, 1854.

Vandel, A. Napoleon et Alexandre I, 6e ed. Paris, 1900-1907.

Yakschitch, Gregoire. L'Europe et la Resurrection de la

Serbie. Paris, 1907.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 33

CHAPTER II.


Treaty of Gulistan, signed between Russia and Persia,October 12, 1813. (Appendix in Krausse's " Russia in

Asia." pp. 332-5. London, 1899).

Treaty of Turkomanchai, signed between Russia and Per-

sia, February 21, 1828. (Ibidem, pp. 336-41).

Correspondence settling the Russo-Afghan Frontier of 1872.

(Ibidem, pp. 344-6).

Treaty of Khiva, signed between Russia and Khiva,August 24, 1873. (Ibidem, pp. 347-50).

Treaty of Bokhara, signed between Russia and Bokhara,September 28, 1873. (Ibidem, pp. 351-3).

Akhal- Khorassan Boundary Convention, signed betweenRussia and Persia, Dec. 21, 1881. (Ibid. pp. 360-2).

Russo-Afghan Boundary Convention, agreed at St. Peters-

burg, July 10, 1887. (Ibidem, pp. 363-72).

Convention between Great Britain and Russia, with regard to

the sphere of influence of the two countries in the re-

gion of the Pamirs. March 11, 1895. (Ibid. pp. 373-4).

Convention between Great Britain and Russia, containingarrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan, andTibet, signed on August 31, 1907. (

"Supplement to the

American Journal of International Law/' pp. 398-406,vol. I, 1907).

Agreement between Germany and Russia, relating to Persia,St. Petersburg, Aug. 19, 1911. (Ib. p. 120, v. 6, 1912).

B) Principal Works.

Albrecht, Max. Russisch Central Asien. Hamburg, 1896.

Baddeley, John. The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus.

London, 1908.

Baxter, W. E. England and Russia in Assia. London, 1885.

Bouillane de Lacoste, E. Around Afghanistan, Lond. 1909.

Browne, E. G. The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909.

Cambridge, 1910.

Colquhoun, A. R. Russia against India. London, 1900.

34 APPENDIX

Curzon, G. N. Russia in Central Assia, in 1889, and the

Anglo-Russian Question, 2d ed. London, 1889.

Persia and the Persian Question. London, 1892.).

Hamilton, Angus. Afghanistan. London, 1906.

Heyfelder, O. Transkaspien und seine Eisenbahn. Leip. 1889.

Kostenko, Lev. Turkenstanskiy Kray. Peterburg, 1880.

Krahmer, (Gustav). Russlandin Mittel-Asien. Leipzig, 1898.

Die Beziehungen Russlands zu Persien. Leipz. 1903.

Krausse, Alexis. Russia in Asia. London, 1899.

Marvin, Charles Th. The Russians at the Gates of Herat.

New York, 1885.

Maslov, A. Zavoevanie Akhal-Teke. Peterburg, 1882.

Olufsen, O. The Emir of Bokhara and his Country. Copen-hagen, 1911.

Popowski, J. The Rival Powers in Central Asia. Lond. 1897

Reclus, El. Geographie Universelle, t. V. Paris, 1880.

Rossbach, Paul. Die Russische Weltmacht in Mittel- undWestasien. Leipzig, 1904.

Shuster, W. M. The Strangling of Persia. New York, 1912.

Ukhtomskiy, E. E. Puteshestvie na Vostok NasliednikaTsesarevicha. Peterburg, 1893.

Vambery, Armin. History of Bokhara. London, 1873.

Western Culture in Eastern Lands. London, 1906.

Whigham, H. J. The Persian Problem. New York, 1903.

CHAPTER III


Traite de Commerce entre la Russie et la Chine, signe &

Kouldja, le 25 juillet 1851. ("Nouveau Recueil Gene-ral de Traites," par G. F. de Martens, pp. 176-180,tome XVII, partie 2. Gottingue, 1869).

Traite de Limites entre la Russie et la Chine, signe & Aighoun,le 16 mai 1858. (Ibidem, pp. 1-2. t. XVII, partie 1.

Gottingue, 1861).

BIBLIOGRAPHY 35

Treaty of Peking, between Russia and China, signed No-vember 14, 1860. (Appendix in A. Krausse's "

Russiain Asia," pp. 342-43).

Treaty of Hi, between Russia and China, signed Feb-ruary 12, 1881. (Ibidem, pp. 354-59).

Manchurian Railway Agreement, concluded between theChinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank,August 27, 1896. (Ibidem, pp. 375-83).

Russo-Chinese Convention, respecting Port Arthur andTalienwan, March 27, 1898. (Ibidem, pp. 384-86).

Anglo-Russian Agreement, respecting sphere of influencein China, April 28, 1899. (Ibidem, pp. 387-8).

B) Principal Works.

Anspach, Alfred, La Russie Economique et I'Oeuvre de M.de Witte. Paris, 1904.

Aulagnon, Claudius. La Siberie Economique. Paris, 1901

Bates, Lindon W. The Russian Road to China. Boston, 1910.

Beveridge, A. J. The Russian Advance. New York, 1903.

Chirol, V. Far Eastern Question. London, 1896.

Cotes, E. Signs and Portents in the Far East. London, 1907.

Curzon, G. N. Problems of the Far East. Westminster, 1896.

Douglas, R. K. Europe and the Far East. Cambridge, 1904.

Dyer, Henry. Japan in World Politics. London, 1909.

Golder, F. A. Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850.

Cleveland, 1914.

Hannah, Ian C. Eastern Assia, a History. New York, 1911.

Harrison, E. J. Peace or War, East ofBaikal*? Yokoh. 1910.

Hart, A. B. The Obvious Orient. New York, 1911.

Hishida, Seiji G. The International Position of Japan as aGreat Power. New York, 1905.

Krahmer, (Gustav). Russland in Ost-Asien. Leipzig., 1904.

Sibirien und dieGrosse SibirischeEisenbahn. Lpz. 1900

Das Nordoestliche Kuestengebiet. Leipzig, 1902.

Die Beziehungen Russlands zu Japan. Leipzig, 1904.

Krausse, Alexis. The Far East. New York, 1900.

Lawton, Lancelot. Empires oftheFarEast, v. I-II. Bost.1912.

Leroy-Beaulieu, P. The Awakening of the East. N. Y, 1900.

Litman, S. La Siberie et le Trans-Siberien. Paris, 1903.

36 APPENDIX

Little, Archibald J. The Far East. Oxford, 1905.

Lowell, Percival. The Soul of the Far East. New York, 1911.

Millard, T. F. The New Far East. New York, 1906.

Norman, H. The Peoples and Politics oftheFarEast.LonlQQQ

Price, M. P. Siberia. London, 1912,

Ravenstein, E. G. The Russians on the Amur. London, 1861.

Rawlinson, H. England and Russia in the East. London, 1875.

Reinsch, Paul S. World Politics. New York, 1904.

Vasilliev, V. P. Otkritie Kitaya. Peterburg, 1900.

Vladimir ( John Foreman ?). Russia on the Pacific, andSiberian Railway. London, 1899.

Weale, Putnam B. L. (B. Simpson). Manchu and Musco-vite. London, 1904.

The Re-shaping oftheFarEast, v. I-II. London. 1905.

Wright, G. F. Asiatic Russia. New York, 1902.

CHAPTER IV


Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia, signed at Ports-

mouth, September 5, 1905. (" Supplement to the Ame-rican Journal of International Law," pp. 17-22, v. 1 1907).

Agreement between Russia and China regarding Manchuria.

Peking, March 26, 1906. (Ibid. pp. 704-6, v. 4, 1910).

Russo-Japanese Convention, concerning "open door" in

China. July 30, 1907. (Ibidem, pp. 396-7, v. I, 1907).

Sino-Japanese Peking Treaty, signed December 22, 1905.

(Ibidem, pp. 396-97, v. I, 1907).

Agreement between Russia and Mongolia, with accompanyingProtocol, signed at Urga, Novem. 3, 1912. (Ib. pp. 180-7)

Analysis of the China-Japanese Treaties. Their Bearing onAmerican Interests. By Geo. Bronson Rea. Publisher

of "The Far Eastern Review." (Shanghai, 1915).

China's Official History of the Recent Sino-Japanese Trea-

ties. (Idem ? ).

Sbornik Diplomaticheskih Dokumentov, Kasayushchihsia

Sobitiy na Balkanskom Poluostrovie 1912-1913. Izdanie

Ministerstva Inostrannih Diel. Peterburg, 1914.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 37

B) Principal Works.

Albert, Louis. Paix Japonaise. Paris, 1906.

Alexinsky, Gregor. Modern Russia. Transleted from the

Russian, by Bernard Miall. London, 1913.

Russia and the Great War. Translated from the

Russian, by Bernard Miall. New York, 1915.

Blakeslee, George H. China and the Far East. N. York, 1910.

Drage, Geoffrey. Russian Affairs. London, 1904.

Finn-Yenotaevskiy, M. A. Sovremennoe Khoziaystvo Rossiyi

Peterburg, 1914.

Goodrich, J. K. Russia in Europe and Asia. Chicago, 1912.

Kallash, V. Rossiya otSmuti do Nashego Vremeni. Mos. 1913

Kovalevskiy, M.M. Istoriya Nashego Vremeni. Sovremen-

niya Kultura i eya Problema. Peterburg, 1914.

Martov, L. Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie v Rossiyi v Nachalie

XX Vieka. Peterburg, 1914.

Martin, Rudolf Emil. The Future of Russia. Translated from

the German. London, 1906.

Mavor, James. An Economic History of Russia. N. Y. 1914.

Miazgovskiy, E. A. IstoriyaChernomorskagoFlota 1696-1912.

Peterburg, 1914.

Miliukov, Pavel N. Russia and its Crisis. Chicago, 1905.

Glavniya Techeniya Russkoy Istoricheskoy Misli. Ya-

roslav, 1913.

Ocherki po Istoriyi Russkoy Kulturi. Peterb. 1913.

Ovsianik Kulakovskiy, D. N. Istoriya Ruskoy Intelligen-

tsiyi. Peterburg, 1914.

Ovsianiy, N. R. Blizhniy Vostok i Slavianstvo. Pet. 1913.

Perry-Ascough, H. G. C. With the Russians in Mongo-lia. London, 1913.

Pipin, A. N. Panslavism v Proshlom i Nastoyashchem.

Peterburg, 1913.

3S APPENDIX

Plekhanov, G. V. Istoriya Ruskoy Obshchestvenoy Misli.

Peterburg. 1914.

Seton-Watson, R. W. The Southern Slav Question and the

Habsburg Monarchy. London, 1911.

Tucic, Srgjan PL The Slav Nations. London, 1915.

Weale, Putnam B. L. The Truce in the East and its After-

math. New York, 1907.

The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia. London, 1908.

Wallace, D. Mackenzie. Russia. Revised and enlarged

edition. London, 1912.

Gaylord Bros.

Makers

Syracuse, N. Y.

PAT. JAN. 21 ,1908

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