G.R.No. 124062.January 21,1999]COMETA vs CAFACTS:Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc. (SITI),formerly State InvestmentHouse,Inc. (SIHI),is aninvestment house engaged in quasi-banking activities.PetitionerReynaldoCometaisitspresident. Privaterespondent HoneycombBuilders, Inc.(HBI),ontheother hand, is a corporation engaged in the businessofdeveloping, constructing,andsellingtownhousesand condominium units. Private respondent ReynaldoGuevara is president of HBI and chairman ofthe boardofdirectors ofGueventIndustrialDevelopmentCorp.(GIDC).Aninformationfor FalsificationofPublicDocumentwas thus filed against private respondent Guevara intheRegionalTrialCourtofMakati.Aftertheprosecution presented its evidence, Guevara filed ademurrer to evidence which thetrial court granted.Following the dismissal of the criminal case againsthim, private respondents Reynaldo S. Guevara andHBI filed a complaint for malicious prosecution againstpetitionersCometaandSITIintheRegionalTrialCourt of Quezon City.Petitioners SITI andCometafiled theirrespective answers.After the pre-trial of the case, they filed a joint motion todismiss with alternative motion to drop respondent HBI asa party plaintiff, upon thefollowing grounds: The complaintstatesnocauseofaction;SecretaryDrilon,Undersecretary Bello and the prosecutor, not impleadedherein, are the real parties in-interest-defendants, whichagain makes the complaint lack a cause of action.At theleast, the above public officialare indispensableparties,andtheirnon-inclusionrendersthiscourtwithoutjurisdiction over the case; The action seeks to impose apenaltyontherighttolitigateandforthatreasonisunconstitutional and against settled public policy.Trialcourtafterathoroughperusalofthecontentsembodied in said pleadings, in the exercise of its soundjudicial discretion finds that there are sufficient allegationsof cause of action in the Complaint. The defense of lack ofcauseofaction,and thatdefendantsare notthe realparties in interest, in the considered opinion of this Court,are matters of defense, which will be considered, after thecontending parties thrucounselshall haverestedtheircases, and the case submitted for Decision.Petitioners,inseparatemotions,askedforareconsiderationbuttheirmotionsweredenied.CArendered its decision denying the petition forcertiorariandprohibitionofpetitioners.Petitionersfiledamotionforreconsideration but the appellate court deniedtheir motion.Hence, this petition. The principal question for decision iswhether the complaint filed by private respondents againstpetitioners in the Regional Trial Court states a cause ofaction.First,petitionersmaintainitdoesnot astheallegationsinthecomplaintareinsufficientandindispensablepartieswerenotimpleadedinthecase.Secondly, they contend that private respondent HBI shouldhave been dropped as a party plaintiff upon petitionersmotion therefor. Both contentions are without merit.First. A complaint for malicious prosecution states acauseof action if it alleges:1.that the defendant was himself the prosecutor orthat at least he instigated the prosecution;2.thatthe prosecution finallyterminatedintheplaintiffs acquittal;3.that in bringing the action the prosecutor actedwithout probable cause; and4.that the prosecutor was actuatedby malice, i.e., byimproper and sinister motives.Whether the facts pleaded and the substantive law entitleplaintiff to a judgment. Otherwise stated, can a judgmentbe rendered upon the facts alleged and deemed admitted,in accordancewiththe prayer inthe complaint?Toresolve this, the allegations of the complaint must beexamined.Themereallegationinacomplaintformaliciousprosecutionthataninformationwasfiledafterpreliminary investigation and that a warrant of arrestwasthereafterissueddoesnotbyitselfnegateallegations in the same complaint that the prosecutionwasmalicious.Allcriminalprosecutionsarebydirectionandcontrolofthepublicprosecutor.Tosustainpetitionersstandthatanallegationinacomplaintformaliciousprosecutionthattheinformationinthecriminalcasewasfiledafterappropriatepreliminaryinvestigationnegatesacontraryallegationthatthefilingofthe casewasmalicious would result in the dismissal of every actionfor malicious prosecution.In contrast, the decision of the criminal court in thepresent case indicates that there was not evenprimafacie evidencetoprovetheallegedguiltoftheaccused.Consequently,atrialwasinfactunnecessary and the criminal court dismissed the caseagainst private respondent Guevara onthe basis ofademurrer to evidence.Second.Petitioners contend that the Secretary andthe Undersecretary of the Department of Justice andthe Assistant Provincial Prosecutor should have beenincluded in the casefor malicious prosecution becauseit was they who found probable cause against privaterespondentsandunderthelawtheprosecutionofcriminal actions isvestedin thepublicprosecutor.Accordingtopetitioners,theydidnotconductthepreliminaryinvestigationororderthefilingofaninformationandtheirparticipationwaslimitedtoinitiating the investigation in the NBI andtestifying.There is no merit in this contention. The issue in thosecases was not whether the complaint stated a cause ofaction against defendants who were complainants inthecriminal cases which led to the filing of civil casesfordamagesbutwhethertheywereliabletotheplaintiffs. The Court merely ruled in those cases thatthe complainant in the criminal case is not necessarilyliablesimplybecauseheinitiated thecriminal casewhich eventuallywas dismissed.It is noteworthy that,in the case at bar, private respondents do not onlyallege that petitioners initiated the filing of the criminalcase against them but that because of the evidencethey (petitioners) presented, the Department ofJusticecouldhavebeeninducedtoorderthefilingofacriminal case in court.Third. It is contended that HBI is not a real-party-in-interest, whatever interest it may have being purelyspeculative. On this point, we think the Court of Appealscorrectly ruled.It is true that a criminal case can only be filed against theofficers of a corporation and not against the corporationitself.It doesnot followfromthis, however, that thecorporationcannotbeareal-party-in-interestforthepurpose of bringing acivil action for malicious prosecution.

Reynaldo Cometa is the president of State Investment Trust, Inc. (SITI), a lending firm. Reynaldo Guevara is the president of Honeycomb Builders, Inc. (HBI), a real estate developer. Guevara is also the chairman of the board of Guevent Industrial Development Corp., (GIDC).GIDC took out a loan from SITI and secured the loan by mortgaging some of its properties to SITI. GIDC defaulted in paying and so SITI foreclosed the mortgaged assets. GIDC later sued SITI as it alleged that the foreclosure was irregular. While the case was pending, the parties entered into a compromise agreement where GIDC accepted HBIs offer to purchase the mortgaged assets. But SITI did not approve of said proposal.GIDC then filed a request for clarification with the trial court and the latter directed SITI to accept the proposal. Meanwhile, HBI filed a request with the HLURB asking the latter to grant them the right to develop the mortgaged assets. HBI submitted an affidavit allegedly signed by Cometa. The affidavit purported that Cometa and SITI is not opposing HBIs petition with the HLURB.Cometa assailed the affidavit as it was apparently forged as proven by an NBI investigation. Subsequently, Cometa filed a criminal action for falsification of public document against Guevara. The prosecutor initially did not file the information as he finds no cause of action but the then DOJ Secretary (Drilon) directed the fiscal to file an information against Guevara.The case was dismissed. In turn, Guevara filed a civil case for malicious prosecution against Cometa. Guevara, in his complaint, included HBI as a co-plaintiff.ISSUE:Whether or not HBI is appropriately added as a co-plaintiff.HELD:Yes. It is true that a criminal case can only be filed against the officers of a corporation and not against the corporation itself. But it does not follow that the corporation cannot be a real-party-in-interest for the purpose of bringing a civil action for malicious prosecution. As pointed out by the trial judge, and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the allegation by Cometa that Guevara has no cause of action with HBI not being a real party in interest is a matter of defense which can only be decisively determined in a full blown trial.

Urban bank vs penaIn 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI). The land was sold forP240 million. As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCIs lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea had to negotiate with them for them to relocate. But the said occupants, knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Pea. ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize Pea to negotiate with the tenants. Pea had to barricade himself inside the property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so that the local cops are now sympathetic to them. Pea then had a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Pea explained to him the situation. In said conversation, Pea asked authorization from Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Pea also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price or (P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that Pea should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Pea also asked that said authorization be put into writing.The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written authorization released by UBI). Pea was able to settle and relocate the tenants. After everything was settled and the property is now formally under the possession of UBI, Pea began sending demands to UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for the relocation of the tenants and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3 million. But UBI refused to make payment hence Pea filed a complaint for recovery against UBI.The trial court ruled in favor of Pea as it found there indeed was a contract of agency created between and UBI and that Pea is entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded himP28 million.The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Pea is entitled to payment but applying the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, Pea should only be paidP3 million.ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28 million.HELD:No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Pea is entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment andquantum meruit. In the first place, other than the self-serving testimony of Pea, there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Pea should be paid.Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be applied. In this case, Pea is entitled to receive what he merit for his services, or as much as he has earned. In dealing with the tenants, Pea didnt have to perform any extraordinary acts or legal maneuvering. Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services. He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in securing the property, to wit, P1.5 million for the security guards he had to hire and another P1.5 million for settling and relocating the 23 tenants. Total of P4.5 million.The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

G.R. No. 169135 June 18, 2010JOSE DELOS REYES,Petitioner,vs.JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI,Respondent.D E C I S I O NDEL CASTILLO,J.:A judgment debt is enforced by the levy and sale of the debtors property.1The issuance of the final certificate of sale to the purchaser at the execution sale is a mere formality upon the debtors failure to redeem the property within the redemption period.This Petition for Review onCertiorariseeks to reverse and set aside the May 13, 2005 Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87972, which affirmed the August 19, 20043and November 10, 20044Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 159 in Civil Case No. 24858. Also assailed is the August 3, 2005 Resolution5denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.Factual AntecedentsOn October 11, 1977, the trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 24858 in favor of respondent Josephine Anne B. Ramnani. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. On June 6, 1978, then Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 480537 (subject property) during which respondent was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate of sale was executed in her favor on even date. On November 17, 1978, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court. On March 8, 1990, the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. 480537. Thereafter, the taxes due on the sale of the subject property were paid on September 26, 2001.1avvphi1On February 17, 2004, respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the trial courts October 11, 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription.Ruling of the Regional Trial CourtIn its August 19, 2004 Order, the trial court granted the motion:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion is hereby GRANTED; and this Court hereby directs the Branch Sheriff of this Court to issue the corresponding Final Certificate of Sale in the above-entitled case in accordance with the rules immediately upon receipt hereof.SO ORDERED.6The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case. Less than a year from the October 11, 1977 Decision, respondent exercised her right to enforce the same through the levy and sale of the subject property on June 6, 1978. Although the certificate of sale was annotated on TCT No. 480537 only on March 8, 1990, petitioner did not exercise his right to redeem the subject property within one year from said registration. Thus, what remains to be done is the issuance of the final certificate of sale which was, however, not promptly accomplished at that time due to the demise of the trial courts sheriff. The issuance of the final certificate of sale is a ministerial duty of the sheriff in order to complete the already enforced judgment.Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in its November 10, 2004 Order. Petitioner thereafter sought review viacertioraribefore the CA.Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe CA denied the petition in its assailed May 13, 2005 Decision:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is herebyDENIED. The orders dated August 19, 2004 and November 10, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 159, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 24858 are herebyAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.7In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the CA noted that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion, hence, the three-day notice rule does not apply. Further, it agreed with the trial court that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by prescription, laches or estoppel because the October 11, 1977 Decision was already executed through the levy and sale of the subject property on June 6, 1978. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right because petitioner failed to redeem the subject property.Issues1. Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion and the subsequent issuance of the Orders dated August 19, 2004 and November 10, 2004;2. Whether respondent is barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.8Petitioners ArgumentsPetitioner contends that the motion dated February 16, 2004 filed by respondent to compel the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does not contain a notice of hearing. He further claims that the subject motion seeks to enforce the trial courts October 11, 1977 Decision which can no longer be done because 27 years have elapsed from the finality of said Decision.Respondents ArgumentsRespondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion and that petitioner was not denied due process because he was given an opportunity to be heard by the trial court. She also points out that said motion is not barred by prescription, laches and estoppel considering that the levy and sale of the subject property was conducted on June 6, 1978 and petitioner failed to redeem the same.Our RulingThe petition lacks merit.Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right.Petitioner, in essence, argues that the October 11, 1977 Decision was not timely executed because of respondents failure to secure the final certificate of sale within 10 years from the entry of said judgment. This is erroneous. It is not disputed that shortly after the trial court rendered the aforesaid judgment, respondent moved for execution which was granted by the trial court. On June 6, 1978, the subject property was sold on execution sale. Respondent emerged as the highest bidder, thus, a certificate of sale was executed by the sheriff in her favor on the same day. As correctly held by the trial court, the October 11, 1977 Decision was already enforced when the subject property was levied and sold on June 6, 1978 which is within the five-year period for the execution of a judgment by motion under Section 6,9Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.It is, likewise, not disputed that petitioner failed to redeem the subject property within one year from the annotation of the certificate of sale on TCT No. 480537. The expiration of the one-year redemption period foreclosed petitioners right to redeem the subject property and the sale thereby became absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final certificate of sale is a mere formality and confirmation of the title that is already vested in respondent.10Thus, the trial court properly granted the motion for issuance of the final certificate of sale.As to petitioners claim that the subject motion is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, the CA correctly ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4,11Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party.12As already discussed, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same.13Hence, the subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a Comment/ Opposition14on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot, therefore, validly claim that he was denied his day in court.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The May 13, 2005 Decision and August 3, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87972 areAFFIRMED.G.R. No. 161647 June 22, 2006LEONCIO S. SOLIDUM,Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS (Fifteenth division) AND INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO,J.:Petitioner Leoncio S. Solidum appealsviapetition for review on certiorari the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 29, 2003 and January 12, 2004, respectively, which gave due course to the petition for certiorari of private respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (Insular). Petitioner avers that there are other plain, adequate and speedy remedies available to Insular under the ordinary course of law. Hence, respondent court should have dismissed the petition. He further contends that being a mere garnishee, Insular is not a party to the case and cannot avail of the writ of certiorari.The instant case originated from a complaint for collection for a sum of money which petitioner filed against Unified Capital Management Corporation (UNICAP) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Branch 135. Petitioner obtained favorable judgment on May 20, 1999 but was not able to get full payment from UNICAP. Thus, he went after UNICAPs debtors. It appears that one of the debtors, Susan Yee Soon, executed on September 17, 1997 two (2) Deeds of Relative Assignment1to UNICAP. The Deeds assigned to UNICAP "all moneys that may be payable to [Susan Yee Soon] and [her] beneficiary/ies from the basic proceeds" of life insurance policies No. A001122766 and No. A001122777 issued by Insular.On July 9, 1999, Sheriff Artemio Cruz served upon Insular the first Notice of Garnishment2which ordered Insular not to dispose of "all sums of money, credits, shares, interest, accounts receivables and collectibles" arising from the aforementioned policies. A second Notice of Garnishment3dated August 23, 1999 reiterated the first Notice.In a letter4dated August 30, 1999, Atty. Renato S. de Jesus from the Legal Affairs of Insular gave the assurance that it "shall hold the release of any sums(sic)of money, credits, shares, interest, account receivables and collectibles of the subject policies."On April 17, 2000, the sheriff wrote Insular requesting for the release of the garnished credits but this time, Insular refused.5In a letter6of the same date, Insular averred that the "basic policy proceeds" may only be paid upon the occurrence of the risk subject of the insurance i.e.,the death of Susan Yee Soon, and further, depending on any lien, charge or indebtedness that Insular may have on the policies.Petitioner filed a Motion in the trial court to direct Insular to comply with its Orders and Notices of Garnishment. On July 18, 2000, the trial court ordered Insular to release to petitioner "the annual dividend xxx due and payable on 17 September 1999 and the subsequent dividends payable every anniversary date of the policy xxx and such all money, credits, shares, interest, account receivables and collectibles of xxx Susan Yee Soon under [the policies]."7In a letter8dated August 7, 2000, Insular again hedged in complying with the Order. It argued that what was assigned in the Deeds of Relative Assignment was limited to the total face value of the policies. It did not include dividends arising from the policies.Petitioner then filed a Manifestation and Motion9dated December 7, 2000 praying that the trial court issue an Order directing Insular to comply with the Order of July 18, 2000. The Manifestation and Motion was granted on January 4, 2001.10Insular filed an Omnibus Motion11dated January 24, 2001 requesting for a clarification of the issues and a reconsideration of the Order dated July 18, 2000. After comment by the petitioner,12the trial court, in an Order13dated February 19, 2001, denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of merit.Still, Insular refused to release the garnished amounts. On June 1, 2001, petitioner moved for the issuance of an Order directing the sheriff to collect the proceeds of the policies.14Insular opposed.15Acting on the motion, the court issued its questioned Order16on August 7, 2001 directing the sheriff "to xxx collect xxx from the garnishee Insular xxx the proceeds of [P]olicy Nos. A001122766 and A001122777 xxx in the total sum of PhP1,616,900.64." Again, Insular filed a Motion for Reconsideration17on August 21, 2001 which petitioner opposed.18On September 18, 2001, the trial court conducted a summary hearing to resolve the motion for reconsideration. Insular presented the sole testimony of its Customer Servicing Department Head, Mr. Jose A. Padilla. He testified that Susan Yee Soon obtained aP550,000.00 loan from each of the subject policies from UNICAP. As security for the loans, she assigned to UNICAP her policies taken from Insular.19He presented photocopies of the Policy Loan Agreement for Policy No. A001122777,20the Deeds of Relative Assignment of the subject policies,21and the Statement of Loan Transaction for Policy No. A001122766.22Insularformally offered its evidence on November 16, 2001 and all the documentary evidence was admitted by the trial court. However, upon Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner that the Policy Loan Agreement for Policy No. A001122777 was inadmissible for lack of proof of due execution and authenticity, the court excluded the questioned document. In its Order dated June 7, 2002, it denied Insulars Motion for Reconsideration,viz.:On the Motion for Reconsideration, the issues raised therein are mere rehash of the arguments previously considered and resolved by the Court. Moreover, the exclusion of Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F" leaves the movant with no evidence of the loan agreement between the policyholder Susan Yee Soon and the movant. There being no such evidence, the movant has no basis to withhold the proceeds of the policy. Thus, the Court hereby orders the reiteration of the Order dated 07 August 2001.23Insular filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It alleged that the judge gravely abused his discretion when he issued the questioned Order despite its adverse claim on the garnished amounts.The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition. It then annulled and set aside the August 7, 2001 and June 7, 2002 Orders of the trial court.24Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 12, 2004. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue:WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND/OR COMMITTTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT GARNISHEE INSULAR DESPITE OF THE FACT THAT SAID GARNISHEE IS NOT A PARTY IN THE CASE, BUT A THIRD[-]PARTY CLAIMANT.25We grant the petition.Garnishment is a species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to a judgment debtor which may be found owing to such debtor by a third person. It cites some stranger to the litigation who is debtor to one of the parties to the action. Such debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor, and the court, having acquired jurisdiction over his person by means of citation, requires him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor in the main litigation. It is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of one creditor for another.26Garnishment involves at least three (3) persons: the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor, and the garnishee, or the person cited who in turn is supposed to be indebted to the judgment creditor.27In case the garnishee asserts his own rights over the garnished property, Section 16 of Rule 39 provides the remedies,viz.:Section 16.Proceedings where property claimed by third person.- If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.In the case at bar, it is plain that private respondent Insular, as garnishee, did not avail any of the remedies provided by the rules. After it was impleaded as garnishee, it wrote letters to the trial court, initially not contesting petitioners right to the basic proceeds of Susan Yee Soons insurance policies. Later on, however, it changed its stance and resisted payment by filing an Omnibus Motion and Motions for Reconsideration of the orders of the trial court. It even appealed to respondent courtviaa petition for certiorari.Trite to state, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is filed when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.28We have held that neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial of a third-party claim.29In the case ofNorthern Motors, Inc. v. Coquia,30the petitioner filed, among others, a third-party claim which was denied by the respondent judge in the disputed resolution. Northern Motors, Inc. thereafter filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the resolution and order of the respondent judge. In resolving whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's third-party claim, the Court held:Pursuant to [Section 17,31Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court], a third-party claimant hastwo remedies, such as, anaction for damagesagainst the sheriff to be brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond, and aseparate and independent actionto vindicate his claim to the property. In the case at bar, petitioner's and intervenor's remedy against the bond proved to be unavailing because of the disputed order of the respondent Judge cancelling the indemnity bond. Such an order as well as the order denying a motion to reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the third-party claims. What then would the remedy be of the third-party claimants?In the recent case of Serra vs. Rodriguez, xxx this Court (First Division), thru Mr. Justice Makasiar, ruled:From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused to be levied by a creditor,neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. The remedy of petitioner would be to file a separate and independent action to determine the ownership of the attached property or to file a complaint for damages chargeable against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the provincial sheriff.In Lara vs. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Concepcion, later Chief Justice, in denying the petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the lower court quashing the third-party claim of a chattel mortgagee, held:Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained therein shall prevent petitioner "from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action." Neither does the order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by appropriate proceedings.In short, he has another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," and, hence is not entitled either to a writ of certiorari or to a writ of prohibition.32(Emphases supplied.)The Court further held that since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the action, he could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order denying its claim, but should file a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or a complaint for damages against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.33The rights of a third-party claimant should be decided in a separate action to be instituted by the third person. In fine, the appeal that should be interposed, if the term "appeal" may be properly employed, is a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.34IN VIEW WHEREOF,the petition isGRANTED.The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72637 dated September 29, 2003 and January 12, 2004, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.REYNATO S. PUNODE MESA V. ACEROG.R. No. 185064, [January 16, 2012]DOCTRINE:Rules onconstitution offamily homes, for purposes ofexemptionfrom execution:First, familyresidencesconstructed before theeffectivity ofthe FamilyCode or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted asa familyhome either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;Second, familyresidencesconstructed after the effectivity ofthe FamilyCode on August 3, 1988 areautomaticallydeemed to be family homes and thusexempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;Third, familyresidenceswhich were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted asa familyhome prior to the effectivity ofthe FamilyCode, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes byoperationof law and are prospectively entitled to thebenefitsaccorded toa familyhome underthe FamilyCode.The settled rule is thatthe righttoexemptionor forced sale under Article 153 ofthe FamilyCode is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not bythe sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claimingexemptionmerely alleges that such property isa familyhome. This claim forexemptionmust be set up and proved tothe Sheriff.FACTS:Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. Awrit of executionwas issued to levy on the said property.Thehouse and lotwas sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Aceros complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudios name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made bythe Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Aceros Torrens title that was resultantly issued.Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property isa familyhome, which is exempt from execution underthe FamilyCode and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying thewrit of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTCs decision.ISSUE:Whether or not the subject property, asa familyhome, may be subject to execution in this case.HELD:YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general,the familyhome is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.RATIO:Forthe familyhome to be exempt from execution,distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.The foregoing rules onconstitution offamily homes, for purposes ofexemptionfrom execution, could be summarized as follows:First, familyresidencesconstructed before the effectivity ofthe FamilyCode or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted asa familyhome either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;Second, familyresidencesconstructed after the effectivity ofthe FamilyCode on August 3, 1988 areautomaticallydeemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;Third, familyresidenceswhich were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted asa familyhome prior to the effectivity ofthe FamilyCode, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes byoperationof law and are prospectively entitled to thebenefitsaccorded toa familyhome underthe FamilyCode.Here, the subject property becamea familyresidence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted asa familyhome in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, whenthe FamilyCode took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property becamea familyhome byoperationof law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property wasa familyhome.Despite the fact that the subject property isa familyhome and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property beinga familyhome and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming theexemptionof the property from executionSPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA, et al. v. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR., et al. G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J.)It is incumbent upon the debtor to invoke and prove that the subject property is his family home within the prescribed period, otherwise laches will set in.FACTS:Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa). The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor.In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. However, the RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs Decision.ISSUE:Whether or not the family home is exempted from executionHELD:Petition DENIED.Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

Golden Sun Finance Corporation v. Albano [A.M. P-11-2888. July 27,2011]03OCTGOLDEN SUN FINANCE CORPORATION represented by Rachelle L. Marmito,complainant,vs.RICARDO R. ALBANO, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City,respondent.[A.M. P-11-2888. July 27, 2011]FACTS:Respondent was charged of negligence and grave misconduct for levying a Honda Civic Sedan by virtue of a writ of execution. The complainant averred that the levy and sale of the motor vehicle by the respondent was illegal.It claimed that the respondent was negligent when he levied upon the motor vehicle and proceeded with the auction sale without looking into the cars Certificate of Registration to determine whether it was encumbered or not. The encumbrance on the motor vehicle having been made prior to the suit filed by the Royal Makati Credit Resource, the complainant posited that its claim should have priority over the formers claims. Required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to comment on the charges against him, the respondent contended that he had no knowledge that the car was encumbered because the Certificate of Registration was never shown to him.He also had no knowledge that the car was the subject of a writ of replevin in another Civil Case. Thus, the respondent asked for the dismissal of the complaint, stressing that he had acted within the scope of his duty as sheriff when he enforced the writ of execution. The OCA recommended that the respondent be charged administratively.ISSUES:Remedial Law(1) Whether or not the recommendation of the OCA is proper on the ground of negligence on the part of the respondent.RULINGS:Remedial Law(1) No. The Court failed to find sufficient basis to declare the respondent administratively liable for simple neglect of duty. Section 9(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states the manner by which judgments for money may be satisfied by levy. It is to emphasize that a sheriffs duty to execute a writ is simply ministerial,and he is bound to perform only those tasks stated under the Rules of Court and no more.Any interest a third party may have on the property levied upon by the sheriff to enforce a judgment is the third partys responsibility to protect through the remedies provided under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.Thus, [the Court] cannot hold the respondent liable on the ground that the complainant cites. If at all, the respondent should have required, as a matter of sound established practice, the production of the certificate of registration, but this is an altogether different matter that [the Court] do not here pass upon.GERMAN CAYTON and the HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE CECILIA CAYTON,Petitioners,- versus -ZEONNIX TRADING CORPORATION; SPOUSES VICENTE MAOSCA andLOURDESMAOSCA; MAXIMO CONTRERAS, Ex-Officio Sheriff; and PABLO L. SY, Senior Sheriff forMakati, MetroManila,Respondents.G.R. No. 169541Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,CARPIO MORALES,*VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:October 9, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA,J.:Before the Court is a petition for review oncertiorariassailing the Decision[1]dated September 27, 2004 and the Resolution[2]dated September 5, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71294.At the heart of the controversy is a three hundred fifty-seven (357) square meter residential house and lot located in BF Homes, Phase III, Sucat, Paraaque, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-90836 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of Vicente Maosca, married to Lourdes Maosca (Maoscas).[3]On May 24, 1980, the Maoscas executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the house and lot as security for the loan of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) that they obtained from Family Savings Bank (FSB). On June 2, 1980, the real estate mortgage was annotated on TCT No. S-90836.[4]On July 21, 1981, a levy on attachment was annotated on TCT No. S-90836 in favor of Zeonnix Trading Corporation (Zeonnix) pursuant to a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the Court of First Instance of Pasay City in Civil Case No. 9225-P, a case for recovery of a sum of money, entitled Zeonnix Trading Corporation v. Vicente D. Maosca, doing business under the name and style of Vic D. Maosca Brokerage. The case was re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakatiand re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2173, due to the judicial reorganization in 1983.[5]On September 1, 1981, a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage[6]was executed between the Maoscas and the spouses German G. Cayton and Cecilia R. Cayton (Caytons) over the subject house and lot for the amount of one hundred sixty thousand pesos (P160,000.00). As part of the consideration, the Caytons assumed payment to FSB of the real estate mortgage amortizations on the property. The Caytons also paid the real estate taxes on the property beginning in 1982.[7]The Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage contained the following stipulations:2.That the Vendee shall pay Vendors the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS, the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS and SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P118,563.16) of which have been paid by the former unto the latter and the balance of FORTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SIX PESOS and EIGHTY FOUR CENTAVOS (P41,436.84) to be paid by the Vendee unto the Vendors within six (6) months in six equal monthly installments commencing December 7, 1981 and every 7thof the month thereafter until fully paid, said installments shall be covered by postdated checks of the Vendee.3.That as part of the consideration of this sale, the Vendee agrees to assume as [he] hereby assumes, all the duties and obligations of the Vendors imposed upon the latter on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by the Vendors in favor of Family Savings Bank denominated as Doc. 388; Page No. 79; Book No. V; Series of 1980 of the Notarial Registry of Notary Public Fe Tengco Becina; that Vendees assumption of the mortgage obligation shall be limited only to the amortization that will fall due [in] September 1981 and that all arrears in the amortizations, penalties and charges that have accrued before said date shall be borne and paid by the Vendors.x x x x7.That Vendors hereby warrant that save to the restrictions annotated in the Transfer of Title, the said property is free from any lien and encumbrance and that Vendors undertake to defend title to the same from whatever claim.[8]The Caytons failed to register the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage because the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. S-90836 was in the possession of FSB in view of the loan of the Maoscas wherein the property was used as security.[9]Meanwhile, on February 3, 1984, a Decision[10]was rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 2173, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant Vicente D. Maosca, doing business under the name and style Vic D. Maosca Brokerage to pay plaintiff [Zeonnix] the amount ofP167,037.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from May 12, 1981, until fully paid.Defendant is likewise ordered to pay plaintiff the amount ofP20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.[11]Subsequently, the Caytons defaulted in the payment to FSB of the monthly amortizations, and the property was extrajudicially foreclosed. On April 23, 1984, the property was sold at public auction. The Caytons were declared as the highest bidder, in the amount of ninety-five thousand pesos (P95,000.00). A Certificate of Sale[12]was issued by the Ex-Officio Sheriff, and the same was annotated on TCT No. S-90836 on April 25, 1984.[13]On April 15, 1985, the Caytons filed before the RTC of Makati a civil case for quieting of title and/or removal/prevention of cloud on title against Zeonnix. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10316.[14]The Caytons claimed that, with the execution of the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage, all the rights, interests and participation over the property had been transferred to them by the Maoscas, including the right of redemption. Thus, Zeonnix had no more right of redemption to speak of.[15]On April 17, 1985, the Caytons filed an amended complaint, in which they impleaded the Maoscas and the then Clerk of Court and the Senior Deputy Sheriff ofMakatiCity, as additional defendants.[16]On April 18, 1985, Zeonnix, as judgment creditor of the Maoscas in Civil Case No. 2173, offered to redeem the property by tendering to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati one hundred six thousand four hundred pesos (P106,400.00) through Managers Check No. DV008913 dated April 15, 1985. The amount tendered represented the purchase price of the property and interest that had accrued thereon.[17]On May 7, 1985, the Caytons filed a supplemental complaint in which they alleged that assuming that Zeonnix had the right of redemption, still the amount it tendered was insufficient to effect a valid redemption because it failed to include the amount of real estate taxes paid by them, amounting to two thousand one hundred seventy-five pesos (P2,175.00).[18]On June 4, 1985, Zeonnix tendered to the Clerk of Court of Makati the additional amount ofP2,175.00 to cover the real estate taxes paid by the Caytons. The latter, however, maintained that the tender of the deficiency amount representing the real estate taxes did not cure the defect because the payment was done beyond the period of redemption, which lapsed on April 26, 1985.[19]On March 20, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 10316, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs [Caytons] and against the defendant [Zeonnix], holding that:1)defendant Zeonnix Trading Corporation has no right of redemption over the property in question as against the plaintiffs [Caytons];2)plaintiffs [Caytons] are the legitimate owners of the property in question.SO ORDERED.[20]Zeonnix filed an appeal with the CA, assigning the following errors of the trial court: (1) the RTC erred in considering the Caytons as owner-bidders in the foreclosure sale of the property and not as ordinary bidders or buyers; (2) the RTC erred in ruling that Zeonnix was not entitled to redeem the property, which was foreclosed by FSB; (3) the RTC erred in not finding that Zeonnix had a superior or better right, by virtue of the prior attachment/lien on the subject property, than the Caytons who were negligent in buying it despite the recorded or existing attachment lien thereon by Zeonnix; (4) the RTC erred in ruling that the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was not spurious or fictitious in character; and (5) the RTC erred in not ruling that Zeonnix was entitled to damages and attorneys fees.[21]On September 27, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision,[22]thefalloof which reads:WHEREFORE, the appeal [is]GRANTEDand the appealed Decision isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint, and ordering the ex-officio Sheriff of Makati to accept and receipt for the redemption price paid and to issue the corresponding certificate and other papers of redemption to Zeonnix.SO ORDERED.[23]

In reversing the decision of the trial court, the CA ratiocinated that:The levy on attachment was duly annotated and registered in the title of the property on July 21, 1981[,] while the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was executed on September 1, 1981. The registration of the levy created a constructive notice to the whole world and served to protect the interest of Zeonnix. The Caytons therefore could not raise their mere childlike reliance on the real estate agent to justify their ignorance of the recorded levy for they should have checked the title with the Register of Deeds (tsn Oct. 3, 1986, p. 28). The Caytons did not even cause the registration of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Notable too are the payments of the monthly amortizations by the Caytons with FSB wherein the bank in its receipts simply acknowledged payments in the following manner: Paid by Cecilia Cayton for the account of Vicente Maosca x x x. This means that the bank while it received payments from the Caytons, however it did not fully recognize them as the new owners.[24]The Caytons filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA denied the same in a Resolution[25]dated September 5, 2005.Hence, this petition.The Caytons submitted the following grounds in support of the petition:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER GERMAN CAYTON AND DECEASED SPOUSE ARE NOT SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST WHO HAVE PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY THAN A REDEMPTIONER WHOSE RIGHT TO CLAIM AROSE FROM A MONEY JUDGMENT.IITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PAYMENT OF THE INSUFFICIENT REDEMPTION PRICE BY ZEONNIX AS REDEMPTIONER DID NOT RESULT IN ITS FAILURE TO PERFECT ITS RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.[26]The petition is without merit and must be denied.ISection 27, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold.Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property;(b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the lien under which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.Right of redemption is the prerogative to reacquire a mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale. It exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure unless the mortgagee is a bank.[27]An attaching creditor acquires the right to redeem the debtors attached property subsequently foreclosed extra-judicially by a third party.The successor-in-interest of a judgment debtor includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of redemption; one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption; one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law; one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the property sold; or his spouse or heirs.[28]A redemptioner, on the other hand, is a creditor with a lien subsequent to the judgment which was the basis of the execution sale. If the lien of the creditor is prior to the judgment under which the property was sold, he is not a redemptioner and, therefore, cannot redeem because his interests in his lien are fully protected, since any purchase at public auction of said property takes the same subject to such prior lien which he has to satisfy. Unlike the judgment debtor, a redemptioner must prove his right to redeem by producing the documents called for by Section 30, Rule 39[29]of the Rules of Court.[30]In the instant case, the Caytons aver that as successor-in-interest of the Maoscas by virtue of the deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage, they have a better right than Zeonnix to redeem the property. This stance deserves scant consideration.Indeed, they are successors in interest of the Maoscas.However, their supposed title or right over the property is unregistered and, as such, the same cannot affect third persons. This is because it is registration that is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned. A deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect conveyance involving registered land, shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority of the Register of Deeds to make registration.[31]The unregistered sale of the house and lot to the Caytons by the Maoscas cannot prejudice the right of redemption granted by law in favor of Zeonnix. The levy on attachment of Zeonnix on the subject property was duly recorded on TCT No. S-90836. Thus, the levy on attachment created a constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registration.[32]The record is notice to the entire world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses.[33]When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrefutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption may not be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption may not be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains, any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts that the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.[34]Zeonnix has acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the foreclosed properties. By virtue of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 2173, it had the right to redeem the property. This is pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135,[35]as amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:SECTION 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.The writ of attachment entitled the attaching creditor to exercise the right to redeem the foreclosed properties. A writ of attachment that has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution.[36]

IISection 28, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the manner of payment in redemption:Section 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed.The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such lien, with interest.Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registry of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.Accordingly, to constitute valid redemption, the amount tendered must comply with the following requirements: (1) it should constitute the full amount paid by the purchaser; (2) with one percent per month interest on the purchase price in addition, up to the time of redemption; (3) together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase; (4) interest on the taxes paid by the purchaser at the rate of one percent per month, up to the time of the redemption; and (5)if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest.In exercising the right of redemption, the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the purchase price. Otherwise, to allow payment by installments would be to allow the indefinite extension of the redemption period.[37]The amount tendered by Zeonnix may be considered sufficient for purposes of redemption, although it failed to include the amount of taxes paid by the Caytons. The payment of the full amount of the purchase price and interest thereon should be deemed as substantial compliance, considering that Zeonnix immediately paid the amount of taxes when apprised of the deficiency.InEstanislao, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[38]the Court relaxed its rules on the redemptioners failure to pay the taxes paid by the purchaser. The Court ruled in this wise,viz.:There are additional amounts to be made in order to effect a valid redemption required by law, but, as respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. failed to comply with certain requirements, petitioners' failure to pay these additional amounts may be considered excused. As provided in Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the redemptioner must also pay the assessment or taxes paid by the purchaser. However, the latter must give notice to the officer who conducted the sale of the assessments or taxes paid by him and file the same with the Registry of Deeds. x x x.x x x xPetitioners were not furnished by respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. such statement of account. Neither was such statement filed with the Registry of Deeds. Respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. claimed that a statement of account (Exh. 8-C and Exh. 8-D) was furnished the office of Atty. Basco, the notary public who had conducted the sale, as received by Elizabeth Roque, an employee therein. However, Atty. Basco denied having received the statement. Petitioners were therefore justified in not paying any assessments or taxes which respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. may have paid.[39]Likewise, inRosales v. Yboa,[40]the Court ruled that the failure to pay the delinquent real estate taxes on the property will not render the redemption void. This is in consonance with the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:In fine, We hold that the failure of the mortgagor Pedro Oliverio to tender the amount ofP745.47 representing the delinquent real estate taxes of the subject property, the registration fee ofP3.00 and the interest thereon ofP0.04, the Sheriff's Commission in the sum ofP99.82, and the deficiency interest on the purchase price of the subject property, will not render the redemption in question null and void, it having been established that he has substantially complied with the requirements of the law to effect a valid redemption, with his tender of payment of the purchase price and the interest thereon within twelve (12) months from the date of the registration of the sale. This ruling is in obedience of the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption.WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision dated September 27, 2004 and the Resolution dated September 5, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71294 are herebyAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED

Spouses yap vs spouses dy[G.R. No. 171868, July 27, 2011]

SPOUSES FRANCISCO D. YAP AND WHELMA S. YAP, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES ZOSIMO DY, SR. AND NATIVIDAD CHIU DY, SPOUSES MARCELINO MAXINO AND REMEDIOS L. MAXINO, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS ORIENTAL AND DUMAGUETE RURAL BANK, INC., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: The subject parcels of land designated as lot 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 as well as lot 846 are originally owned by spouses Tirambulos. They executed a REM over Lots 1,4, 5,6, and 8 in favour of the Rural Bank of Dumaguete, predecessor of Dumaguete Rural Bank Inc. (DRBI). Later, Lots 3 and 8446 were also mortaged in favour of the same bank.

Subsequently, the Tirambulos sold all & mortgaged lots to spouse Dy without consent and knowledge of DRBI. Tirambulos failed to pay their loans so DRBI foreclosed lots 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8 and sold at public auction. DRBI was the highest bidder.

Later, DRBI sold lots 1, 3, and 6 to spouses Yap.

ISSUE:

Is Lot 3 among the foreclosed properties? May persons to whom several mortgaged lands were transferred without the knowledge and consent of the creditor redeem only several parcels if all the lands were sold together for a single price at the foreclosure sale?

RULING: We cannot subscribe to the Yaps' argument on the indivisibility of the mortgage. As held in the case of Philippine National Bank v. De los Reyes,[44] the doctrine of indivisibility of mortgage does not apply once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof as in the instant case. The Court held:The parties were accordingly embroiled in a hermeneutic disparity on their aforesaid contending positions. Yet, the rule on the indivisibility of mortgage finds no application to the case at bar. The particular provision of the Civil Code referred to provides:Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or of the creditor.

Therefore, the debtor's heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied.

Neither can the creditor's heir who received his share of the debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who have not been paid.

From these provisions is excepted the case in which, there being several things given in mortgage or pledge, each one of these guarantees only a determinate portion of the credit.

The debtor, in this case, shall have a right to the extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as the portion of the debt for which each thing is specially answerable is satisfied.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that what the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the property or a number of the several properties mortgaged corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation. This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release of any portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan thus, secured has been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied.

That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within the purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious since the aggregate number of the lots which comprise the collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is no partial payment nor partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. The aforesaid doctrine, which is actually intended for the protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of the indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the mortgage is existing. Once the mortgage is extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with the full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to secure.[45] (Emphasis supplied.)