Vincenzo Ruggiero 131

Drug Economics:A Fordist Model ofCriminal Capital?

The description of 'crime as work' needs not sound tooprovocative. Many of those who engage in crime on a regularbasis regard theirs as an occupational role. Concepts such asspecialisation, professionalism, apprenticeship and jobsatisfaction may help understand the dynamics of illegalbehaviour (Letkenman 1973). The work perspective takes intoaccount the skills required in different criminal activities and mayoffer important elements to identify the organisation of theseactivities.

In a pioneering study of this type, for example, the relationshipbetween criminal organisation and the wider social organisationis analysed against the backgtound ofa pivotal variable: criminaltechnology (Mclntosh 1975). In this study an important varietyof urban crime is described as project crime, a definition whichrefers to large scale thefts and frauds. These activities are said tobe more complicated and technically advanced, and less routinised.'Each of these crimes, or short series of crimes, is z project m itself,involving separate advance planning and organisation' (ibid: 42).

In adopting this line of analysis, I would like to start bydefining 'project crimes' as artisan work, where skills are slowlylearned through apprenticeship, and are often transmitted withinthe family or the social group to which one belongs. I would alsolike to stretch the parallel further. It is widely known that skilled

The author suggeststhat there has been areorganisation ofthestructure of criminalbusiness. Thisfeatures a greaterconcentration ofpower to those whoact as wholesalersand importers fromthose who distributedrugs. This divisionof lahour is genderedand racially struc-tured reflecting thelegal job market.

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industrial work inherited many characteristics of craftsmanship,namely the knowledge of the work process in its entirety and adegree of pride related to it.

In 1914, with the installation ofthe first assembly line at Ford,a different type of labour became necessary. Briefly, the Fordistmodel of work implied the segmentation of tasks, the displace-ment of knowledge from labour to management, repetitive andalienating tasks, and consequendy a high degree of job disaffection(Braverman 1974).

This simplified definition came to my mind when conductinga recent research project on drug use in London (Ruggiero 1993c).I was faced with assembly-line 'delinquents' who were devoid oftraining, specific skills, and a detailed knowledge ofthe economywhich employed them. This knowledge belonged to the'machinery' of which they formed a part, namely the system ofproduction and distribution of drugs. Many of those I contactedwere interchangeable and flexible workers, and almost all lackedthe work ethic which distinguishes professional labour. A longterm user said of his colleagues: 'They don't plan what they do,they don't calculate the effects. The principle used to be: if youcan't do the time, don't do the crime. Now they can't do either'.Are we witnessing a tendential de-skilling of the 'criminal workforce', and the establishment ofa Fordist model of illegal labour?

In the following pages an attempt is made to assess the validityof this hypothesis. The analysis will focus on criminal organisationsoperating in Italy and England in the field of drug distribution andon drug related crime. While in the Italian context a number ofdifferent towns will be examined, the examination ofthe Englishcontext will be mainly centred on London. Insight in the respectivedrugs economies was achieved through a series of research projectsstarting back in 1985 and spanning to current times (Ruggieroand South 1994). These, which were mainly focused on theheroin market, were funded, among others, by Bologna Universityin Italy and the Home Office in England.

Bureaucracy and enterprise

The spread of illicit drug consumption over the last two decadesaltered significantly the profile of criminal business in mostEuropean countries. New characteristics emerged within thecriminal economies which developed varying forms and degrees

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of organisation. Let us concentrate on one particular aspect ofwhat is defined as organised crime.

There are recurrent features in the definition of organisedcrime, among which is the notion that its members are endowedwith criminal skills acquired by means of long-term apprentice-ship. The well known polemic between Donald Cressey andJoseph Albini hides the fact that the above mentioned notionbelongs to both authors and many others after them. Cressey'sdescription of organised crime is based on a so-called bureaucraticmodel, whereby different groups or families are said to coordinateand direct, within a Commission formed by representatives of allgroups, all activities carried out on the national territory (Cressey1969). Albini suggests instead that organised crime is not to beviewed as a nationwide conspiracy, but should be described as aseries of local, relatively independent entities which are looselystructured and only informally coordinated (Albini 1971). Now,these interpretations describe networks and relationships which,if diffetendy structured, nevertheless involve similar actors, namelyprofessional criminals or 'men of honour'. These actors are givena central location in many definitions of organised crime, thusconveying the idea that activities are only performed by criminalswho are extremely skilled, have undertaken an exclusive career,and are often related either by familial or ethnic bonds. Otherdefinitions, which do not only focus on professionalism, can helpdevelop a more fruitful perspective when organised crime isanalysed vis-i-vis the drug economy.

According to Haller (1992), families constituting organisedcrime are not to be regarded as centrally controlled businessenterprises. Rather, members independently conduct their activity:'A family, then, is a group which is separate from a member'seconomic ventures and to which members belong roughly in thesame way that legal businessmen might join a Rotary Club'(ibid: 2). The author also argues that many members are notinvolved in permanent structures nor engaged in long-termpartnerships. They may undertake one-off operations, maketemporary alliances with legal or illegal entrepreneurs, and oftenrecruit part-timers. We will see how these characteristics aptlydescribe the drug economies in the two countries considered.Employees of criminal organisations pose a serious threat to theiremployers. 'The entrepreneur aims then to structure his relation-ship with employees so as to reduce the amount of informationavailable to them concerning his own participation and to ensure

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that they have minimal incentive to inform against him' (Reuter1983: 115). This threat can be reduced if employees are recruitedamong family members and close associates who guarantee adegree of loyalty. However, this is not possible for all illegalbusinesses, especially those presenting with large and ramifieddistribution structures. The drugs economy, for instance, does notlend itself to centralised control by entrepreneurs, whose capacityto monitor the suitability and skills of dealers is very limited. Thefact that many dealers are also users, the precariousness of their'job', and the high turnover in the economy in which they partici-pate are an indication of this. In other words, the involvementof organised groups in the drug economy may lead to their relative'disorganisation'. It may also entail a shift in the way in whichprofits are made and the occupational characteristics of those whocontribute to its creation. Individuals devoid of a previouscriminal career may constitute the majority of employees in thedrug economy, but paradoxically their 'non-professional' anddisorganised illegal acts end up benefitting their professional andorganised employers. Moreover, it is often the case that drugselling is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, legitimateemployment, which explains the rudimentary skills of many usersand small distributors (Reuter et al 1990). Surely, the notion thatorganised crime is a monolithic structure formed exclusively byprofessional affiliates looses pertinence when its involvement inthe drug economy is observed. Here, organised groups are forcedto renounce the traditional regulatory function commonlyattributed to them. Petty, disorganised and opportunistic offencescan no longer be controlled or regulated, as they become animportant component of organised crime itself

This seems to have occurred both in Italy and Britain, whosespecific drug economies I will now briefly describe.

Italian narco-entrepreneurs

The involvement of Italian organised crime in the drug economydates back to the 1950s. One ofthe first large seizures occurredin 1952, when 6 kg of heroin were found in the area betweenPalermo and Trapani (Santino and La Fiura 1993). Among thosearrested were distributors residing both in Sicily and the USA.Other traffickers and wholesale distributors operated in the Northof Italy, where some industrialists managed to divert quantities of

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heroin from the legal to the illegal market. According to the Anti-Mafia Commission set up by the Italian parliament, for a periodLucky Luciano obtained drugs from these 'licit' dealers ofpharmaceuticals (Commissione Antimafia 1976; Pantaleone1976). When a laboratory for the processing of heroin wasdiscovered near Milan, it was clear that Italian criminal groups alsopurchased the substance in the producing countries and, afterrefining it in Italy, exported it to the USA. This pattern of activitywas destined to remain unaltered until a proper heroin marketdeveloped in Italy around the early 1970s.

It is during the course ofthe 1970s and the 1980s that theparticipation of organised crime in the drug economy assumednew characteristics. Judge Falcone's investigation proved thatdecisions regarding the involvement in illegal drugs were nevertaken centrally, but were the result of personal initiative (Falcone1991). In other words, the drug business gave the old mafiafamilies the opportunity to claim independence from so-calledconsortia, commissions or domes (the organ where members ofthe different traditional mafia families allegedly plan and co-ordinate their exploits). All supergrasses ofthe mafia confirmedthat finances invested into drugs did neither come from thecommon assets of the organisation nor from the collectiveproceeds accumulated by members of a specific family. Themoney invested was part of individually owned finance. Memberswho resolved to enter the drug business, therefore, had theopportunity to build partnerships with other investors who werenot part of their family or, for that matter, members ofthe mafia(Arlacchi 1992; Gambetta 1992). The informant AntoninoCalderone tells ofthe way in which some men of honour couldsometimes become independent from their very family if theirattempt to build up a remunerative drug business was successful.Among these was Pippo Bono, who 'never took side with anyprecise group within the organisation, and would always be absentin critical moments' (Arlacchi, op. eit: 136). Pippo Bono wasperhaps the first example ofa member ofthe mafia being able toabstain from the war between families, while becoming a partnerwith other legal or illegal entrepreneurs.

In some cases the members of traditional organised crime inItaly performed the role of mediators, as they invested somebodyelse's money in the drug economy. In other cases, both importeddrugs and drugs refined in Italian laboratories were sold towholesale distributors who did not belong to traditional groups

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or families. In other words, due to the typical hierarchicalstructure which distinguishes drug distribution, 'men of honour'were forced to deal with 'ordinary men'. Among middle-rangedistributors individuals emerged who had acquired skills and fijndsin previous criminal activities on the one hand, and entrepreneurswho were without those skills but only owned funds on the other.In turn, small-scale distribution was also taken on by individualswho had never been associated with organised crime (Ruggiero1993a). In sum, the involvement in the drug economy started aprocess whereby traditional organised crime such as the mafiaslowly lost its characteristic traits while becoming similar to otherorganised groups. None of the prevailing groups managed toestablish a monopoly in the distribution of illegal drugs. Rather,they shared an oligopoly with regard to both the national territoryand the specific local market which they supplied. It is theircommon characteristics which render them comparable within thenational and the international context (Ruggiero and South 1994).A look at the distribution structure in a number of major Italiancities will help identify these characteristics.

The spread of the heroin and cocaine businesses in Naples, forinstance, was possible because of certain factors which typify thehistory of the town. Among these are: firstly, the existence ofprevious illegal markets and smuggling networks by which avariety of both legal and illegal goods circulate. Secondly,organised criminal groups exist which are already well rooted inthe local economy and in the regional political structure (Lamberti1989; Sales 1989). Thirdly, tbere are available a large labour forceand a reserve of casual labour, recruited both in the hiddeneconomy and in the adjacent illegal economy. These factors areconnected, directly or otherwise, to the evolution ofthe Camorra the Neapolitan organised crime syndicate whose history isin many ways almost inseparable from the economic history ofthetown (Ruggiero 1993b). First by smuggling agricultural products,then by dealing with the illicit trade in foreign cigarettes, and laterby buying and selling untaxed commodities, the Camorra achieveda substantive form of'primitive' accumulation of finance. Theexplosion of the drug phenomenon in Naples encouraged localcriminal groups to invest capital which was previously earmarkedfor smuggling. At the top of the distribution chain, theentrepreneurial efficiency of these groups was transferred into thedrug economy. Here some 'legal' entrepreneurs also took achance, in particular those who were insolvent debtors to

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organised criminal groups from which they had previouslyborrowed money. Other entrepreneurs started participating inthe drug economy after accepting a deal: they would be exemptedfrom the payment of protection money if they offered a loan tobe invested in business whose nature they officially ignored orpretended to do so. Those involved in street distribution wererecruited from street sellers who were previously dealing withother smuggled commodities, but also from the semi-officiallabour market which characterises the economic structure ofthetown. It has been shown that among user-distributors, in fact,many do not have a previous criminal apprenticeship and cannotbe identified with a distinct criminal subculture (Feo 1989).

A similar pattern can be observed in Rome. Here, both heroinand cocaine are distributed by a coalition of Neapolitan or Siciliangroups and local groups of professional criminals. The former,in a sense, are forced to set up alliances with the latter because theywould otherwise be unable to access the local distributionnetwork. 'Monthly consignments would be shipped to Italy andpassed on to elements ofthe Roman underworld for distributionat intermediate level within the domestic market' (Lewis1989: 40). Some independent distributors also operate who arenot connected with larger criminal groups. They do not rely onsophisticated chains of distribution, but service the marketimmediately after importation. Many neophytes are found bothwithin these groups and among the street sellers and user-distributors who are 'employed' by local professional criminals.

In Milan, which presents with broadly similar cbaracteristics,groups previously engaged in armed robberies shifted to bothtrafficking and wholesale distribution. As elsewhere, contacts weremade with members of traditional organised crime which initiallyprovided the consignments and, often, ended up engaging injoint-ventures with them. Drugs reduced the entity of othercriminal activities and partially coopted those who were involvedin them. But this process does not seem to have taken place ina mechanistic or smooth manner, especially at low distributionlevel. An illuminating piece of research conducted a few yearsback in the area of Milan, for example, recorded the opinions ofa number of petty property offenders (Bianchi 1986). Many ofthose interviewed rejected a regular job but also refused theprospect of being employed by organised criminal groups on aregular basis. They likened organised crime to ordinary systemsof employment, both being regarded as 'brutal exploiters'. Like

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self employed artisans, some showed a sense of pride in their illegalprofessionalism and independence, and claimed to be unpreparedto relinquish both in exchange for a 'secure' job. Drugdistribution, in their view a secure job, was regarded by many ashighly dishonourable. That the responses of these propertyoffenders were sincere was partly proved by later criminal statisticsregarding the same city. Very few street distributors arrested inMilan between 1987 and 1991 had a record of property offences(ISTAT 1992).

In Verona, as judicial evidence shows, the drugs economy isnot sustained by a typical marginalised underworld or promotedby long-term criminal entrepreneurs. An important role in thedevelopment of the drugs economy here is played by thedissemination of pure entrepreneurial spirit and by a 'stronglymarket oriented mentality in every section ofthe local economyand in large parts of the population' (Arlacchi and Lewis1989: 152). In Verona drug use and distribution have spreaddespite the absence of organised groups previously involved inother illicit markets. Indeed, one could argue that the drugeconomy pro.pered because no traditional mafia-type episodes ofviolent competition occurred which would attract the attentionof institutional agencies. Transactions in the illicit drugs markettake place according to the shared rules of fair bargaining, anddisputes are rarely settled with violence. Research conducted inthe late 1970s proved that the drug users of Verona were so youngthat few had acquired skills and competence in criminal activities.Devoid of previous apprenticeship, they were mostly arrested 'inthe act', the charges brought against them being 'attempted theft','attempted robbery', etc. (Picotti 1979). More recent studies showthat users and small distributors are initiated in drugs via thecommon channels of socialisation, and not through learningprocesses associated with marginalisation or crime (Avico 1983;Arlacchi and Lewis, op. eit.). Many are employed and becomeunemployed only after developing a drug use career (70 per cent);others start using and dealing while active in the licit economy,and eventually continue to hold a position in it.

Finally, in Turin the first purchases of large quantities of drugswere undertaken by 'adventurous' entrepreneurs who ran small licitbusinesses. They did so after forming joint-ventures with ex-cigarette smugglers, or other professional criminals who shiftedto the drug business such as bank robbers and bosses of illegalgambling houses (Ruggiero 1992). My own informants in Turin

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claim that large-scale operations gathered momentum when thesmall groups of users gave up self-supply, which they hadpreviously practised by means of independent trips to Amsterdam.In the mid-1970s, the newly constituted groups of'professionals'could buy larger quantities for each operation at a cheaper price.They were both less 'visible' when crossing borders and morereliable in the eyes of the larger distributors operating inAmsterdam. Only eventually did traditional organised groupssuch as the mafia enter the drug market of Turin. However, whenthey managed to do so, they never achieved a monopolisticposition in it, and had to be contented with sbaring an oligopolywith other groups. As for the user-distributors, official statisticsshow that very few are able to develop a real career in theeconomy of drugs, as they are intermittently arrested either aft:ercommitting the same type of offence or while possessing the samequantity of drug (ISTAT 1992). In other words, their career is'blocked', for they prove incapable of ascending the distributionhierarchy and acquiring the professionalism needed to do so.

The drug business in Italy both remodelled traditionalorganised crime and shaped new organised groups which occupy,along with the former, the leading positions in it. The materialI have provided so far suggests tbat the drug business fosters aprocess whereby the creation of a number of 'expendablelabourers' servicing the market runs parallel with a drive towardsmore structured and professionalised operations. These develop-ments are not oppositional. On the contrary, it is theemployment of one which allows for the promotion ofthe other.

England: Indigenous entrepreneurs and their partners

The existence ofa heroin market in England can be traced backto the mid-1960s. Until 1968 this market offered 100 per centpure heroin, which was legally bought with a medical prescriptionbut pardy ended up feeding a grey market. Legislation introducedbetween the late 1960s and the early 1970s is said to havemodified this situation and indirectly caused the development ofa black market, where illegally imported heroin became available(Whynes and Bean 1991). This legislation limited the doctors'power to prescribe and marked tbe slow decline of themaintenance model, a model allegedly abused by over-generouspractitioners.

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In England, many commentators indicate the early 1980s asa turning point for drug distribution. Supply, which was locallycentred and poorly structured, became increasingly organised andregularised (Stimson 1987). The explosion of the heroinphenomenon is said to have favoured this shift, which iscommonly also described in relation to the variety of thesubstances available on the market and the respective producingcountries. Chinese, Iranian and Pakistani illicit drugs successivelypredominated in the markets of English cities, a circumstancewhich leads many observers to investigate the trafficking routesand the criminal enterprises connected to these producingcountries.

Two crucial features are usually regarded as necessary for anefficient trafficking network. The first is impermeablity withregard to police enquiries; the second is honesty in transactionsand compliance with verbal agreements. 'There are a couple ofinstitutions that measure up excellendy to such requirements.One is the blood family, the other is the expatriate ethniccommunity. Both have done well out of drugs trading' (Tyler1986: 249). Due to their ancient custom of reciprocity and theirsystem of payment entirely based on trust, the Chinese illicit firmsare said to have carried out business undisturbed for years.Allegedly, their sophisticated money laundering system allowedfor operations to be virtually undetected. Heroin, which wasbought in the Golden Triangle and routed through Hong Kong,would reach England concealed among other products destinedfor the Chinese immigrant community. Underground bankingwould then guarantee the invisibility of profits (Nove 1991).

While charting the development of drug trafficking inEngland, one may become entangled in the vexed questionssurrounding the relationship between race and crime. Inparticular, there is a danger that the notion of drugs as an alienconspiracy is unwittingly endorsed. This notion has beenadequately de-mythologised on a number of occasions (amongrecent examples see: Kohn 1987; Arnao 1990; McCoy 1991;Labrousse 1991; Ehrenberg and Mignon 1992; Pearce andWoodiwiss 1993). However, it is important to add a number ofobservations which are frequently lacking in the already existingliterature on this issue. The drug economy seems to mirror thelicit economies also with respect of its division of labour. Incountries with large ethnic minorities, the disadvantages basedon race, which are usually found within the official labour

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market, are in a sense reproduced within the criminal labourmarket. Often, the most remunerative positions within criminaleconomies are occupied by indigenous groups, whereas the mostpoorly paid and dangerous tasks are entrusted to minorities(Trimble, Boiek and Niemcryk 1992; Padilla 1992). In England,for example, some groups or individuals engaged in theimportation of drugs may well belong to ethnic minorities, butthe 'added value' involved in their task may be much lower thanthat involved in wholesale distribution. In turn, wholesale andmiddle-range distribution are frequently controlled by indigenousgroups who have easier access to the market and to smallerdistributors who service it. In South London I came acrossexamples of this race-related division of labour. A street dealerexplained that black people find it difficult to climb the criminalcareer echelon, due to their visibility and the lack of trust withwhich they are regarded. In other words, in the criminaleconomy they find the same obstacles they meet in the officialone (Ruggiero 1993c). These aspects should be borne in mindwhile looking at the drug business in England.

Iranian groups are singled out as the major heroin importersduring the period 1982-84. It is presumed that drugs constituteda currency for middle-class migrants who escaped the Ayatollahregime and brought their assets to London, where they foundrefuge (Burr 1984). The new settlers continued to feed limitedsectors ofthe market for about two years after the collapse oftheold Iranian regime. They would avail themselves of wellestablished connections with wholesale distributors in theircountry of origin. The fact that they never developed a highlyremunerative economy is perhaps due to their lack of contactswith locally established figures. White English drug distributors,in fact, did business with other importers and dealt with higherquality drugs that the Iranian 'brown' variety.

Their successors are purported to be Pakistani illegal entre-preneurs, who managed to reach a virtual monopoly on theLondon market around the mid-1980s. These entrepreneurs aresaid to be still in operation and to rely on partners who reside inthe producing country and act as mediators with local growers (diGennaro 1991; Labrousse 1991). From reports of major seizuresit appears that importers do not only include professional criminalfirms, but also 'clean' business people who may either indulge inone-off operations or engage permanently in drug trading as asideline of their licit business.

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Another import route is believed to run overland throughTurkey and the Balkans. Importers are said to be working inkilograms of drugs, which reach England either directly or throughother less 'suspect' countries (Royal College of Psychiatrists 1987).

Nigeria is deemed one ofthe most important staging posts fordrugs entering England (McCarthy and Kirby 1990). Heroinfollowing this route is often seized at British airports, and Nigeriandrug importers form the largest single group of foreign prisonersin British institutions (ILPS 1990). Research conducted by Green(1991) revealed that 72 per cent of persons imprisoned for illegalimportation of drugs were foreign nationals. 'Africans combinedaccount for 35 per cent of this population, with the largestnational category being Nigerian (30 per cent of the total)'(ibid. 5). On June 1990, 26 per cent of women under sentencewere known to have been convicted of drug offences, comparedwith 8 per cent of men on the same date. Almost 26 per cent ofwomen in prison were of minority ethnic origin, which compareswith 17 per cent on 30th June 1985. This unprecedented increaseis attributed to the growing drug-related offences committed bywomen. 'Many of the women are drug couriers From othercountries, who will be deported after serving a prison sentence'(Nacro 1991:2).

As already noted import operations and distribution are notlikely to be undertaken by the same groups. We have seen thata large majority of apprehended importers and couriers are foreignnationals. These are in no position to master the distributionnetwork in their host country. Therefore, they are forced to sellconsignments to local established figures with whom they end upestablishing business on a permanent basis. These local figures actas wholesalers and, after buying from importers, pass overquantities of drugs to a number of locally based middle-rangedistributors. Some wholesalers are reported to have beenpreviously engaged in armed robberies. Presumably, they nevermanaged to invest the proceeds of their raids in legitimatebusiness, and their shift towards drugs was encouraged by theincreasing use of fire arms on the part ofthe police (Taylor 1984).Drugs were welcomed as a long overdue chance to put guns awayJournalistic accounts also suggest that, after an initial resistanceto drug dealing, some professional criminals 'soon realised thathere was a new way of making money that required no getawaycar and ran less risk of informers. It had the added advantage thatthere was no victim running to the police' (Campbell 1990: 5).

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Among this type of wholesale distributors, defined by Dornand South (1990) as 'criminal diversifier', groups are found whichwere or are still active in the distribution of stolen goods. It isassumed that a number of criminal diversifiers were formerlyowners of scrap metal businesses, a traditional activity amongorganised gangs in London. Illegal entrepreneurs who shifted towholesale drug distribution capitalised on their knowledge of salenetworks and their awareness regarding the quantity and qualityof customers' demand. This knowledge and awareness mainlybelongs to traditional indigenous gangs, hence their crucial rolein drug supply (Dorn, Murji and South 1992).

Hobbs (1988) has studied the semi-legal entrepreneurialculture prevailing in East London, whose peculiar economicstructure 'required generation upon generation of individuals toacquire and internalise the essential characteristics ofthe businessentrepreneur' (ibid. 117). Here, an elite seems to be operatingwhich, after accumulating finance in traditional semi-legal trade,performed an economic conversion to include the drug trade.This shift may not have been traumatic, as 'the East Endentrepreneur deals and trades in commodities and services withinthe parameters of a localised version of legitimate business practice(ibid: 118).

Middle-range distributors are in contact with specificcommunities where street dealers operate. Research suggests thatat this level of drug distribution individuals and groups are foundwho are already involved in a variety of activities in the so-calledirregular economy. This economy provides those who inhabit itwith a 'facilitating subculture', but also with precise skills,structures and roles. 'The irregular economy provides multipleconduits for the distribution and exchange of drugs, and for avariety of other goods and services, prostitution, the disposal ofstolen goods, and so on' (Auld et al 1986: 172). It also providesa position within its structure which is modelled upon a more orless strict division of labour. It is my contention that theconversion of part of this irregular economy to the drug businessmade its internal division of labour increasingly rigid. Research,including my own, seem to prove that those who benefit from thisconversion are mainly individuals who already held anentrepreneurial or managerial position in the irregular economy,whereas those whose role was confined to the provision of 'purecriminal labour' experience, with the shift to drugs, anexacerbation of their economic dependence.

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Many users experiment with drugs while inhabiting theirregular economy, where drugs add to other illicit goods alreadycirculating. Those who develop habitual use, and in particularthose who resort to property crime as a result of this, becomeincreasingly dependent on that economy which provides themwith both the doses and the market where their stolen goods arecirculated. Often, they are forced to give up their 'wage', astransactions take on a non-monetary nature. The exchangetherefore may not entail the trinomial 'good-money-drug', butsimply the binomial 'good-drug'.

The illegal activities conducted by this type of user imply animmutable pattern of tasks within a career which is virtuallystagnant. Users who have been followed up in their career showhow tbeir frenetic activities do not translate into upward mobility(Ruggiero 1993c). A revolving-door situation prevents them fromimproving their skills. This also applies to users who were not'working' in the irregular economy prior to their drug using career:their lack of apprenticeship keeps them at the bottom of the drughierarchy. Jarvis and Parker (1989) attempted an economicevaluation of the illicit activities carried out by users, who werefound to receive only a small fraction of the value of thecommodities handled. While moving considerable wealth fromone place to another and from one person to another, the wealthretained by them consisted primarily of drug doses. Moreover'despite the glamour of the setting and the considerable sums ofmoney involved, many subjects described repetitive life-styles ofdull uniformity' (ibid: 182).

The number of seizures of drugs such as heroin decreasedbetween 1986 and 1990 from 323 to 272. At the same time, thequantities of the same drug seized leaped from 179kg to 575kg(Home Office 1992). Of course, statistics should be taken withprecaution. Nevertheless, I believe that these figures indicatechanges in the structure of drug supply whicb can be tentativelysummarised as follows. Wholesale operations are increasinglyconducted by well organised groups who have access to largequantities ofdrugs and are in a position to invest large quantitiesof money. In order to minimise risk, but also thanks to theincreasing finance at their disposal, these groups undertake areduced number of operations involving larger amounts ofdrugs.Wholesalers, in other words, experienced a selective processwhereby only those endowed with effectiveness, professionalismand larger funds were left in operation. On the other hand, the

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number of people stopped and searched for drugs by tbe policerose from 32,500 to 97,800 (ibid). Tbis tripling in drug seizureopportunities at street level did not result in more drugs beingfound. Street dealers and user-distributors, in other words, didnot show an increased level of participation in the drug economyover a period of five years. The age composition of drug offendersmay also yield interesting information. In 1990 well over half thedrug ofiisnders were aged 17-24, and very few had a criminalrecord prior to involvement in drug use and petty distribution.Young and clumsy, many did not bave the time to accomplishcriminal skills, a circumstance which exposed them to bigh hazardin their day-to-day activity.

Also in England, we therefore witness the creation of aninexperienced 'army' of users and small dealers who service tbedrug market. This, on the other hand, shows a drive towardsmore structured and professional operations at tbe top of thedistribution hierarchy.

Conclusion

The drug business modelled tbe organisation of crime to the pointthat patterns of illegal activity in diverse contexts are becomingincreasingly uniform. Drug-related activities are assuming aFordist-type model, whereby the skills required to perform tasksare visibly declining. Skills, one might say, are concentrated at tbemanagerial level of the drug economy, and are engrained in theorganisation oflabour, which is independent of tbose who playa part in it. In this organisation, criminal labour becomesincreasingly 'abstract', as it is fragmented in a number of repetitiveoperations whose purpose is lost. Gramsci's formulation ofFordism comes here very useful (Gramsci 1951). This model ofwork, be explains, includes both technical and social aspects,therefore 'colonising' both the productive and the reproductivesphere of labour. Many wbo work in tbe drug economy aresimilarly trapped in a highly productive system, of which theynever share the profits, and in a social self reproduction alsodictated by that system.

As we have seen, in Italy the involvement in tbe drug businessof traditional organised crime led to its partial 'disorganisation'.'Men of honour' were forced to form alliances and set uppartnerships with ordinary men, sometimes even witb neopbytes.

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On the other hand, an atmy of unskilled criminal labour wasmobilised whose lack of apprenticeship makes it all the motevulnerable. Similarly, in England the development of the dtugeconomy was accompanied by the partial decline of independentgroups and their subjection to mote organised structures.Simultaneously, a mass of'delinquent-wotkets' without criminalexpertise was recruited. What is striking in both contexts is thedegree of conformity rather than of deviancy displayed by therespective drug economies. Traits that one would associate withthe official society are paradoxically reproduced in the non-officialone. Like many licit industries, the drug industry entails a verticalstructure, a low degree of co-opetation among its members, orrather an abstract, 'Fotdist' kind of co-operation among them.Planning and execution are strictly separated. Moreover, like inlicit industries and society at large, the division of roles and tasksis frequently based on race and gender. See for example therecruitment of Arab immigrants in the lower echelon ofthe heroineconomy in Italy, and the consequent upward mobility of Italian-born drug dealers. Sec also the distribution of tasks in many partsof the drug market in London. Here, impoverished areas are notonly prevented from establishing licit businesses, but they also failto set up prosperous illegal ones. Constant police control hampersthe development of a wealthy illegal economy. An example of thiswas provided by a number of dealers I interviewed in the Londonborough of Lambeth. Their prevailing feeling was that littlemoney is accumulated in the area through drug selling. Therelative poverty of the drug economy, vis-h-vis the number ofestimated users, was interpreted as a sign that profits go to othercity areas where police control is not as strict. In other words,investors and large distributors were said to reside elsewhere. Ifthey operated in Lambeth, this would result in more moneycirculation being visible there. This would also be apparent inmore licit businesses being set up with the proceeds of drug selling.

Examples of a gender-based division of labour in the drugeconomy are also numerous. 'Some partners exploit the women'sability to earn money through prostitution, giving up their ownearning efforts to live off those of their female partner' (Taylor1993: 156). Others take advantage of women's skills and relativeinconspicuousness in shoplifting. We have seen the role of femalecouriers in England, where the worst paid and most dangeroustask of importing is left to women. Research also suggests thatwhen women involved in the drug economy do acquire skills and

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status, they are met with a higher degree of stigmatisation thantheir male counterparts (Rosenbaum and Murphy 1990; Connor1990; Taylor 1993). Theit involvement in drugs is penalised alsobecause it signals the abandonment of their domestic role. Whenthey deal drugs, they are looked down upon not because they aredealers, but because they are female dealers.

A fmal consideration should be given to the type of Fordismoperating in the drug economy. When Ford applied the firstassembly line to his car factory, a substantial incentive was givento the work force in terms of salary. This pay rise was definedwith hindsight as the best cost-cutting measure ever applied bythe car industry (Btavcrman, op. cit.). The Fordist model in thelicit economy established itself within the sphere of what is termed'monopoly sector' (O'Connor 1973). Here, a relative workstability made up for the brutal rhythm of work and exploitation.Those employed in the monopoly sector could at least temporarilyavoid the fear of unemployment, as production seemed assuredfor ever. Conversely, the drug economy seems to adopt a Fordistmodel of labour within the sphere of the 'competitive sector',where markets are irregular and unstable, and work is oftenseasonal. 'Working conditions in competitive industries tend tobe poor and unemployment and underemployment high.Normally, workers do not earn enough to save for times ofunemployment, indebtedness, sickness, or death. Weak andcorrupt labour organisations do not secure adequate company-paid health, retirement, and other fringe benefits' (ibid: 15). Butthis further aspect ofthe drug economy remains to be thoroughlystudied in future research.

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