Roma and the Question of Self-Determination
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Transcript of Roma and the Question of Self-Determination
RO
MA
AN
D TH
E Q
UE
STIO
N
OF S
ELF-D
ETE
RM
INA
TION
: FIC
TION
AN
D R
EA
LITY
Re
po
rt
15 C
hambers S
treet
Princeton, N
ew Jersey 0
8542-3
707, U
SA
Telephone: (609) 6
83-5
666
Fax: (609) 6
83-5
888
E-mail: per@
per-usa.orgW
eb Site: w
ww
.per-usa.org
PR
OJE
CT
ON
ETH
NIC
RE
LA
TION
S
The P
roje
ct on E
thnic Relatio
ns (PER
)was
founded in 1991 in anticipation of the serious
interethnic conflicts that were to erupt follow
-
ing the collapse of Com
munism
in Central
and Eastern Europe and the form
er Soviet
Union. PE
R conducts program
s of high-level
intervention and dialogue and serves as a
neutral mediator in several m
ajor disputes in
the region. PER
also conducts programs of
training, education, and research at interna-
tional, national, and comm
unity levels.
PER is supported by the C
arnegie Corporation
of New
York, with additional funding from
the
Starr Foundation,
the W
illiam
and Flora
Hew
lett Foundation, the Charles Stew
art Mott
Foundation, the Rockefeller B
rothers Fund, the
Ford Foundation, the U.S. D
epartment of State
(Stability Pact for South East Europe), and the
Germ
an Marshall Fund of the U
nited States.
Individuals and institutions wishing to receive
PER
publications should write to:
JADWISIN, POLAND APRIL 15-16, 2002
RO
MA
AN
D TH
E Q
UE
STIO
N
OF S
ELF-D
ETE
RM
INA
TION
: FIC
TION
AN
D R
EA
LITY
JAD
WIS
IN, P
OLA
ND
AP
RIL 1
5-1
6, 2
00
2
©C
opyright 2003 by Project on Ethnic R
elations
TAB
LE
OF
CO
NTE
NTS
Pre
face1
Introdu
ction and B
ackground
4
The Jadw
isin Debate
9
The D
eclaratio
n of the
Rom
a Natio
n: A Q
uestio
n of Le
gitimacy
11
The C
once
pt of S
elf-D
ete
rminatio
n in the V
iew
of the
Rom
ani Elite
s:
Cultu
ral Auto
nom
y16
The O
ption o
f Territo
rial Auto
nom
y21
Rom
a and Natio
nal Self-D
ete
rminatio
n23
The Finnish P
reside
nt’s Initiative and R
om
a Natio
nal Self-D
ete
rminatio
n28
Conclu
sions
31
Appe
ndix A36
Appe
ndix B41
Note
s42
List of P
articipants48
Othe
r PER
Publicatio
ns50
1
PR
EFA
CE
With funding from
the Ford Foundation, on April 15-16, 2002,
PER
, in cooperation with the O
ffice for Dem
ocratic Institutions andH
uman R
ights (OD
IHR
) of the OSC
E and its C
ontact Point onR
oma &
Sinti Issues, organized a regional roundtable on “Rom
a andthe Q
uestion of Self-Determ
ination: Fiction and Reality.” T
he meet-
ing, which took place outside of W
arsaw, in Jadw
isin, Poland, was a
follow-up to the PE
R M
arch 2001 meeting in K
rakow on “R
omani
Representation and L
eadership” (see the PER
report Leadership, Rep-
resentation and the Status of the Rom
a, Princeton 2001).
The Jadw
isin roundtable gathered Rom
ani leaders and activists fromE
urope and the Balkans. B
oth the Jadwisin and K
rakow m
eetingsw
ere internal Rom
ani meetings exploring and debating topics, w
hichfor m
any appeared to be new and challenging. T
he participants were
confronted with the question of w
hether the Rom
ani leadership isseeking national self-determ
ination based on recent developments
resembling a serious drive for it. A
mong the issues discussed w
ere:the International R
omani U
nion declaration of the Rom
a Nation; the
Finnish President’s initiative to establish a pan-European consultative
assembly for R
oma, the C
ouncil of Europe’s Parliam
entary Assem
blyR
ecomm
endation on Rom
a that endorses a so-called European R
oma
Forum, the R
oma N
ational Congress’s E
uropean Charter of R
omani
Rights, and the experience of R
omani self-governm
ent and the “cul-tural autonom
y” of the Rom
a in Hungary.
In recent years both the Rom
ani and non-Rom
ani actors have beenraising the issue of R
omani self-determ
ination. Some R
omani organi-
zations recall this principle and make reference to it directly, w
hereasothers contest it verbally, but confirm
it in the kind of claims they
make. T
he Jadwisin debate proved that for m
any Rom
ani participantsw
hat is taking place now is a R
omani national self-determ
inationm
ovement in the m
aking.
More R
omani leaders are eager to utilize the concept of a R
oma
nation and use it as a basis for a number of specific claim
s, includinga claim
to attain a political status only a little short of that of a state,that is, to have the sam
e rights as other nations do. Along w
ith thisw
ould go the Rom
ani leaders’ request to become a subject of interna-
tional law (as a nation) and to have seats assigned to R
omani repre-
32
Andrzej M
irga, chair of the PER
Rom
ani Advisory C
ouncil and co-chairof the Specialist G
roup on Rom
a/Gypsies of the C
ouncil of Europe, con-ceived the m
eeting and prepared the report. PER
takes full responsibilityfor the report, w
hich has not been reviewed by the participants.
Allen H
. Kassof,President
Livia B
. Plaks,E
xecutive Director
Princeton, New
JerseyD
ecember 2002
sentatives in international organizations. Are these claim
s baseless andbelonging to the realm
of fiction?
For the majority of those gathered in Jadw
isin, such initiatives as pre-sented by the Finnish President or by the recent recom
mendation
[1557 (2002)] of the Parliamentary A
ssembly of the C
ouncil ofE
urope on the “Legal Situation of the R
oma in E
urope,” which vali-
dated these claims and, in fact, m
ade a viable reality out of them.
The R
omani leaders seem
to be strengthened in their assertions thatas a nation they posses the right to self-determ
ination.
While participants recalled dem
ographic, historical and human rights
arguments justifying their self-determ
ination case, the overall debateproved, how
ever, that they operate with a rather narrow
interpretationof this concept. T
he Rom
ani participants view it as concom
itant with
the notion of personal autonomy; that is, being in control of one’s ow
nlife, or as a right to decide (decision-m
aking power) – in instances of
cultural autonomy or m
inority’s self-governance, or as a right to equalparticipation in society’s life. A
ll of these, in fact, can be reached with-
in the framew
ork of minority rights. For the m
ajority of the partici-pants how
ever, the framew
ork of self-determination sounded m
ore fit-ting to the R
oma’s current situation. A
s one of the participants argued,“Is self-determ
ination about whether w
e want oppression, or not?”
The debate at the m
eeting made it clear that R
omani leaders are eager
to embrace the concept of self-determ
ination as an idea guidingR
omani political m
obilization. Whether it is the concept the R
omani
leaders were m
issing up to now or not, rem
ains to be seen. At least
claims for becom
ing equal political subjects, and in control of poli-cies and funds w
ere strongly asserted.
Finally, the seminar in Jadw
isin was exceptional not only because of
the topic discussed there. It is rare when R
omani participants con-
tribute to a seminar w
ith papers on the subject. All together 10
papers were prepared, subm
itted to the organizers, and presentedduring the m
eeting. That is a new
quality of Rom
ani seminars w
or-thy to em
phasize. The Jadw
isin meeting w
as meant to be preparation
for a larger seminar w
ith mainstream
politicians, lawm
akers andexperts on this issue.
Photo of the participants by Livia P
laks.
54
notion of a Rom
ani enlightenment, a R
omani em
anci-pation, and a R
omani integration as an avenue for over-
coming the hum
iliating Rom
ani position in society?
Should it turn toward social and econom
ic rights as astrategy for their ow
n comm
unity? Should the elitesinsist
on im
plementing T
hird W
orld developm
entstrategies for their com
munities, despite the fact that
most of the R
omani people live am
ong some of the
most advanced and developed societies in the w
orld?” 4
The R
omani leadership has struggled w
ith these questions for a longtim
e. Similar concerns w
ere also raised within the E
uropean Rom
aR
ights Center (E
RR
C) at its D
ecember 2000 panel, “T
he Rom
aniM
ovement: W
hat Shape, What D
irection?” In that discussion, addi-tional questions w
ere raised about whether the m
ovement should take
the course of “[a]n open and inclusive civil rights movem
ent [or] anexclusive E
uropean nationalism and a ‘nation-building’ process? W
ill itcontain territorial claim
s?” 5
At a previous PE
R sem
inar in Krakow
(April 2001), the R
omani lead-
ership grappled with these questions and attem
pted some answ
ers.T
hey concluded that the Rom
ani elite is at best divided regarding them
ain Rom
ani interest; at worst, its direction rem
ains “elusive” and dif-ficult to define, m
uch less to agree upon. Am
ong the competing visions
are those that have been articulated by the International Rom
ani Union
(IRU
) and the Rom
a National C
ongress (RN
C). 6
The Finnish President’s initiative w
as not discussed at the Krakow
meet-
ing. Since then, however, it has occupied a central place in recent devel-
opments and has been the subject of intense consultations and debates.
Are the R
omani leaders closer to m
aking some definite choices? D
oesthe Finnish initiative introduce a new
factor in the overall internaldebate? In w
hich overall framew
ork should it be placed?
Am
ong Rom
ani organizations, only the RN
C has m
ade references tothe principle of self-determ
ination. Most recently, in a report com
mis-
sioned by the OSC
E for presentation at the W
arsaw Im
plementation
Meeting of O
ctober, 2000, an RN
C board m
ember stated, “Instead of
taking the demands of independent R
oma N
GO
s seriously, an aiding(sic) industry w
as created that does not care about the Rom
a’s right ofself-determ
ination.” He further concluded,
INTR
OD
UC
TION
AN
D B
AC
KG
RO
UN
D
In recent years both Rom
ani and non-Rom
ani leaders in Europe have
raised the issue, directly and indirectly, of self-determination for the
Rom
a. Three developm
ents have added mom
entum to this quest: the
implem
entation of the Hungarian m
odel of minority self-governm
ent,providing m
inorities and Rom
a with collective rights and cultural
autonomy; 1
the International Rom
ani Union D
eclaration of the Rom
anation; 2
and the
Finnish President’s
initiative to
establish a
pan-E
uropean consultative assembly for the R
oma. 3
These acts have encour-
aged the Rom
ani leadership to explore this issue further.
This report sum
marizes the debates on this subject at a m
eeting that was
organized by the Project on Ethnic R
elations in Jadwisin, Poland on
April 15-16, 2002 and that brought together leaders from
the Rom
anicom
munity. T
he Jadwisin discussions w
ere the latest round in a newand com
plex dialogue within the R
omani com
munity. T
he reportbegins w
ith a detailed exposition of that background and will help the
reader to understand the context in which the discussions took place.
In the conclusion of their 1997 paper, “The R
oma in the Tw
enty-First C
entury: A Policy Paper,” authors A
ndrzej Mirga and N
icolaeG
heorghe noted:
“The R
omani com
munity itself needs new
ideas togovern and m
obilize itself, and it is the Rom
ani elitesw
ho must fashion those ideas. W
hich notion will
embody the w
ill to self-determination and the dem
andfor political recognition of the R
omani People – a
Rom
a nation in diaspora, a Rom
ani transnationality, aR
omani nonterritorial E
uropean minority, or even a
Rom
ani nonterritorial state?
Should the Rom
ani elites support the idea of Rom
aniethnic groups, each developing its ow
n politics andstrategies w
ithin the borders, legal framew
orks, andlim
its of a given state? Should they struggle for specif-ic rights as envisioned in the concept of a charter ofR
omani
rights? Is
the hum
an rights
approach,dem
anding equality and nondiscrimination, the one
idea than can overcome all the problem
s facing theR
oma? O
r should the Rom
ani elites focus on the
76
This draft obviously builds on the IR
U declaration, but by lim
iting itsnotion to the R
omani population of the E
U m
ember states falls short of
the IRU
European or even global perspective. N
evertheless, the demand
to have such a Charter recognized by the E
U is sim
ilar to the demands
of the RN
C and IR
U.
The D
ecember 2000 E
RR
C discussion introduced several additional refer-
ences to the question of Rom
a self-determination. N
on-Rom
ani partici-pants in particular w
ere more forthcom
ing in suggesting models for R
oma
to follow. Jam
es Goldston’s “fantasy vision” included the follow
ing:
“Surely Rom
a, who num
ber anywhere from
8 to 12m
illion, enjoy at least as much entitlem
ent to a full-fledged State as the Palestinians do. (…
) Since 1990,num
erous people – Macedonians, B
osnians, Croats,
and Slovenes – have demanded and secured by vio-
lence, by fiat or by other means their ow
n states. Why
not Rom
a? (…) In this fantasy of the future, R
oma
finally claim their ow
n land!” 11
Claude C
ahn, on the other hand, invited Rom
a to learn from the
Zionist m
ovement that led to the establishm
ent of the State of Israel.A
ccording to him, there are a num
ber of similarities betw
een theZ
ionism of the nineteenth century and the R
omani m
ovement of today:
“(…) It is not only on this strict organizational/m
ech-anistic front that Z
ionism has ideas of potential use for
a Rom
ani movem
ent – the core challenges of Zionism
,such as breaking the prim
ary allegiance of Jews to the
national states of other people and building the Jewish
patriot and the Jewish body politics, w
ere nearly iden-tical to challenges facing R
omani activists today.” 12
The R
omani elite, as w
ell as non-Rom
ani politicians and lawm
akers,have difficulty in determ
ining or defining who the R
oma are. 13
A search
of documents and recom
mendations produced over the last decade by
international organizations provides a rather large spectrum of catego-
rizations of
Rom
ani populations
in E
urope (R
om,
Rom
a/Gypsies,
Rom
a and Sinti, Rom
a/Gypsies/Travelers) and an equally large num
berof definitions: the R
oma as a people, as a nation, as a transnational
minority, as a E
uropean minority, as an ethnic group, or as a truly
European m
inority.
“The current developm
ent in Europe how
ever clearlyshow
s that Rom
a, regardless of their social status, areconfronted w
ith overt, anti-gypsy hostility. Such hos-tility cannot be abolished through w
elfare or develop-m
ent projects. In order for social development pro-
jects to succeed, Rom
a must be granted guarantees for
protection of civil liberties. This m
eans a change in thepolitical status of the R
oma tow
ard political, social andcultural self-determ
ination.” 7
The IR
U, on the other hand, refrains from
referring to the principle ofself-determ
ination in its declaration of a nation without a state. In the
words of the IR
U President: “[W
]e are not in search for a self-determi-
nation of the Rom
a in Europe.” 8
Despite this declaration, how
ever, it isan open question as how
best to interpret the fact that at its lastC
ongress (Prague, July 2000) the IRU
established a new structure that
clearly resembles a state, com
plete with President, Parliam
ent, Court,
and Ministers or C
omm
issioners.
Both the R
NC
and the IRU
appear to operate on the premise that the
Rom
a are a nation, using this as the basis for specific claims for politi-
cal status that fall only slightly short of that accorded to a legitimate
state. Both organizations ask that the R
oma becom
e subjects of inter-national law
, in the case of the RN
C through its legally binding C
harterof R
omani R
ights 9signed by the states, and in the case of the IR
U,
through recognition of the existence of a Rom
a nation. Both organiza-
tions also seek assigned seats for Rom
ani representatives alongside mem
-ber nation-states in international organizations.
The
Rom
ani A
ctivists N
etwork
on L
egal and
Political Issues
(RA
NE
LPI), a
Belgian-based
federation of
Rom
ani organizations,
offered yet another proposal, the so-called “Moral C
harter of the Rom
anation in the E
uropean Union.” C
hapter 6 of this draft proposal says,
“The E
uropean Union acknow
ledges the existence ofthe territory of its M
ember-States of a R
oma nation
without a com
pact territory. The definition of the said
nation is one, which the nation gives itself (…
) the EU
declares the Rom
a nation (…) is one of the constituent
nations of Europe, in full equality (…
) with other
nations (…) irrespective of their relations w
ith Statesand territories.” 10
98
national minority w
ithin its borders. The R
NC
also demands recogni-
tion of the Rom
a both as a national minority in each of the countries in
which they live and as a R
oma nation w
ithin Europe.
How
should one judge the beliefs held by Rom
ani leaders? Which are
realistic and have a basis in political and legal fact, and which are pure
fiction?
THE
JAD
WIS
IN D
EB
ATE
The
organizers chose
self-determination
as the
main
topic of
theJadw
isin meeting. T
hey hoped that providing tools for examining the
Rom
a’s internal discourse or claims w
ould make the R
omani leadership
more fam
iliar with the legal fram
ework of the principle of self-determ
i-nation. T
his in turn would help them
to distinguish between legitim
ategrounds for their claim
s and illusory ones.
To date there had been no debate about these issues among the R
omani
leadership, nor had there been any efforts to review existing R
omani
statements about self-determ
ination. Some proposals or ideas had
assumed the form
of widely accepted slogans, but neither the R
oma nor
their supporters had much know
ledge of their specific content.
With this in m
ind, PER
raised the following questions for discussion at
the seminar:
1.H
ow do R
omani leaders define self-determ
ination? What kind
of self-determination do they seek, and w
hat arguments are
used to justify such claims?
2.D
o existing Rom
ani claims have substantial ground and legiti-
macy, or are they w
ishful thinking?
3.W
hat are the historical antecedents of this principle, and arethere m
odels for Rom
a to follow?
4.D
oes a drive toward self-determ
ination constitute a positive ora negative developm
ent in terms of the challenges the R
omani
comm
unity faces in their respective countries and in Europe in
general?
In her opening remarks, PE
R’s executive director noted the upcom
ingtenth anniversary of the landm
ark meeting held by PE
R in Stupava
(then C
zechoslovakia) that
started the
regional dialogue
between
The m
ost recent (2002) Council of E
urope Parliamentary A
ssembly
Recom
mendation N
o. 1557 on the Legal Situation of the Rom
a inE
urope calls upon mem
ber-states to resolve the legal status of the Rom
aand recognize them
as an ethnic or national minority group in each
state. Usually, international organizations refrain from
referring toR
oma as a nation. H
owever, at the W
arsaw m
eeting preparatory to the2001 W
orld Conference A
gainst Racism
in Durban, the N
GO
s gath-ered there endorsed the idea of recognizing R
oma as a nation. 14
At the
NG
O Forum
in Durban, recom
mendations included a sim
ilar demand
to have Rom
a treated on “equal footing with other nations of the
world.” T
he final Declaration and A
ction Plan from the C
onference didnot, how
ever, include those recomm
endations. 15
A num
ber of scholars, in addition to some R
omani and non-R
omani
activists, also promote the idea of R
oma self-determ
ination. The text of
Cara Feyes’ “Tow
ard a New
Paradigm of the N
ation: the Case of the
Rom
a,” which appears on the Patrin W
eb Journal, states,
“The international com
munity (…
) primarily regards
nations as territorially based, and the consolidation ofa nation w
ithin a specific territory has lent legitimacy
to struggle for self-determination. Yet this lim
ited def-inition (…
) undermines equally legitim
ate claims for
self-determination am
ong non-territorially consolidat-ed groups. A
new definition of the nation w
ould allowgroups such as the R
oma (…
) to be accepted as anation and w
ould lend greater international legitimacy
to their struggle for self-determination (…
) which
[does] not aim for statehood but aim
s rather, at achiev-ing greater control over their ow
n lives.”
Pavel Barsa also offers scholarly support of the notion that the R
omani
migration to the W
est, especially to Germ
any, contributed to a refor-m
ulation of the Rom
ani identity. Am
ong Rom
ani leaders in Europe,
the debate is phrased in terms of w
hether the Rom
a and Sinti are one ofthe “V
olksgruppe,” that is, a Germ
an ethnic minority, or w
hether theyare part of a pan-R
omani and pan-E
uropean nation. 16
For some governm
ents and some R
omani activists, how
ever, there is nocontradiction in holding both positions. T
he Czech governm
ent hasrecognized the existence of a R
oma nation in a signed m
emorandum
with the IR
U w
hile at the same tim
e legally treating the Rom
a as a
1110
assimilation, integration, separation, or em
ancipation? If emancipation,
do they seek emancipation as citizens, as a m
inority, or as a nation? Anum
ber of Rom
ani-initiated political documents offer various propos-
als, ideas, or visions. Other ideas have been put forth by governm
ents,private foundations, organizations, and individual scholars. T
heR
omani
elite needs to analyze and debate these proposals, and then formally
incorporate their preferred outcome into the O
SCE
Action Plan.
While the interest of G
adje (non-Rom
a) frequently drive the policiestow
ard Rom
a, it is a fact that the Rom
ani elite have yet to formulate a
clear answer as to w
hat is in the Rom
a’s genuine interest. At present,
non-Rom
a are more involved than the R
omani leadership in determ
in-ing this. T
he PER
discussion papers for this meeting offer a new
frame-
work for debate and evaluation of various proposals. H
e expressed hopethat, w
ith the help of this framew
ork, Rom
a gathered at Jadwisin w
illbe able to develop their ow
n vision of self-determination.
(Am
ong the discussion papers prepared by PER
, the first was incorporated
into the Introduction19
to this report and the second into Appendix A
. 20
The m
aterial was apparently inspiring and provocative for the R
omani
leadership, as evidenced by the fact that eight participants arrived at them
eeting with statem
ents or articles written in direct response to issues
raised in the discussion papers. While this report incorporates m
uch ofthe content of these statem
ents and articles, the actual texts are availablefrom
the PER
office in Princeton. Appendix B
lists the titles and authorsof all papers. B
y providing legal language and mainstream
perspectiveson issues of national definition and self-determ
ination, the organizersw
ere successful in significantly raising the qualityof R
omani leaders’ par-
ticipation in internal Rom
a meetings.)
THE
DE
CL
AR
ATIO
N O
F TH
E R
OM
A N
ATIO
N:
A Q
UE
STIO
N O
F L
EG
ITIMA
CY
The issue of R
oma as a nation, publicly raised by the IR
U D
eclaration, was
discussed at the April 2001 PE
R m
eeting in Krakow
and served as a start-ing point for the Jadw
isin meeting as w
ell. Since the Krakow
meeting,
however, R
omani leaders had been greatly affected by the intense schedule
of consultations organized by the Finnish authorities in response toPresident H
alonen’s proposal. 21T
he prospect of Rom
ani representation atthe European level, and specifically w
ithin the Council of Europe, led
participants to be much m
ore assertive and forceful in their statements.
Rom
ani leaders and governments. 17
In the eleven years of PER
involve-m
ent in Rom
ani issues, she continued, one of their biggest achieve-m
ents has been the ongoing cooperation with R
omani leaders.
She observed that there has been an accelerated awareness of issues rel-
evant to the Rom
a among E
urope’s governments and even in the U
.S.T
hat is mostly the result of the w
ork of Rom
ani activists, she said, butalso of the E
U enlargem
ent process. The inclusion of R
omani issues in
the political criteria of accession (the EC
’s Agenda 2000) also started the
ball rolling in the development of R
omani initiatives and governm
entalpolicies or program
s regarding Rom
a. With this developm
ent, however,
has also come trem
endous pressure on Rom
ani leaders to take positionson various issues of im
portance to their comm
unity.
A concerted discussion about w
hat the Rom
ani leadership wants for
their comm
unity ten or twenty years dow
n the road must therefore
begin now. A
t stake is the future of Rom
ani comm
unities. If the Rom
aw
ill not debate this important issue for them
selves, society at large will
decide for them, and the outcom
e may not be to their liking.
She called attention to great progress made over the past decade in polit-
ical activity, including consciousness-raising and comm
unity organiza-tion, by the R
omani leadership. T
hey developed challenging ideas orvisions of the political future of R
oma, such as the IR
U D
eclaration andthe R
NC
Charter. A
t the same tim
e, other ideas, such as the FinnishPresident’s initiative, have com
e from governm
ents. Who can and should
determine w
hat is best for the Rom
a? She suggested that the Rom
anileadership itself can best answ
er these questions and choose the right pathfor prom
oting the well-being and developm
ent of the Rom
ani comm
uni-ties across Europe. A
great deal is at stake, she concluded, and the Rom
anileadership m
ust formulate the clearest possible answ
ers.
The A
dviser on Rom
a and Sinti Issues at the OSC
E/O
DIH
R/C
PRSI
(Contact Point for R
oma and Sinti Issues) also stressed the im
portanceof this m
eeting, but cited different reasons. As a follow
-up to Decision
No. 7 of the O
SCE
Ministerial C
ouncil meeting in B
ucharest held inD
ecember 2001, his office has been w
orking on the OSC
E A
ction Planof Targeted A
ctivities for Rom
a and Sinti. 18T
his is a proposal foradopting a new
political document that sets forth O
SCE
objectives foryears to com
e.
He challenged the participants to develop a R
omani political vision for
promotion from
within the O
SCE
framew
ork. Do the R
oma w
ant
1312
several dozen separate minorities and also a R
oma nation? H
e suggest-ed that the IR
U D
eclaration had in fact been intended to supersede the1995 definition of R
oma as a m
inority.
This question w
as further addressed by the Advisor on R
oma and Sinti
Issues at the OSC
E. A
ccording to the IRU
position, Rom
ani minorities
in various countries are national minorities of a R
oma nation for w
hichthe IR
U seeks legal recognition. Individual states, how
ever, follow the
Zentralrat (G
erman Sinti and R
omani organization) perspective – that
a Rom
ani comm
unity is to be recognized as a national minority, of
equal status with other m
inorities, in their country of residence. Fromthis perspective, IR
U and R
NC
efforts to obtain Rom
ani recognition atthe E
uropean level are both misdirected.
The R
oma m
ight choose yet another option in seeking a firm political
status, said the speaker. During the last visit to India (in 2001) of a
small group of R
omani leaders led by the IR
U President, the R
oma w
eregiven the option of official recognition as an Indian m
inority and were
offered the same status given to all Indian ém
igrés as Indian minorities
abroad, including passports. For some in the visiting group, this w
as thefulfillm
ent of a long-lived fantasy. How
ever, the IRU
President rejectedit, arguing that it w
as not appropriate for a small circle to m
ake such am
omentous decision w
ithout consulting with R
omani com
munities
and organizations as well as w
ithin the IRU
Parliament. M
oreover, therew
as concern that this might lead G
adje to expel Rom
a forcefully or atleast ask them
to leave their countries and return to India. Additionally,
once recognized as an Indian minority, the R
oma could hardly then
claim to be a nation of their ow
n. The cause of Indian m
inority statusstill circulates am
ong some leaders, such as an individual from
Kosovo
who lives in Yugoslavia and to this day w
rites in favor of recognizing theR
oma as an Indian D
iaspora. 22
How
realistic is it to expect that the Rom
a will attain firm
legal andpolitical status along w
ith representation in international and intergov-ernm
ental institutions? As another participant pointed out, the Finnish
initiative aims to provide R
oma w
ith representation within the C
ouncilof Europe. B
ut since non-territorial and non-state nations have no legalposition w
ithin intergovernmental and inter-states institutions, granting
Rom
a such a status would m
ean not only breaching international lawbut also setting a precedent for other sim
ilar groups.
Whereas at the K
rakow m
eeting the IRU
Declaration m
et with criticism
from m
any participants and especially the RN
C representatives, at
Jadwisin there w
as no such criticism. O
n the contrary, nearly all par-ticipants affirm
ed the assertion that the Rom
a are a nation. Responding
to the discussion paper (Appendix A
), the Rom
ani participants arguedthat neither “territory” nor “state” are required criteria for defining anation. T
he Rom
a possess all the anthropological, cultural, and lin-guistic characteristics of a nation,they
said, as
well
as a
comm
on history of persecution in E
urope.
The
majority
of the
participantsjudged R
omani claim
s to nationalself-determ
ination as legitimate and
legally valid, despite what m
ight beregarded as evidence to the contraryfrom
international law and other
international documents. H
aving previously agreed that the Rom
a area nation, they easily extended this concept to include the right of self-determ
ination as well.
Currently, m
any experts and politicians equate nations with states, bas-
ing an entire international political architecture upon a foundation ofnation-states. From
this perspective, the fact that the Rom
a do not havea state does not invalidate their claim
to nationhood. As the IR
U rep-
resentative pointed out, there is no need for academic discussion as to
whether R
oma are or are not a nation. T
he IRU
says Rom
a are a nation.It has been said to K
ofi Annan, to the C
zech government, and to oth-
ers, and no one objected. Politicians do not deny it. Many interna-
tional documents not only do not deny it, but actually strengthen the
conviction among the R
oma that they are indeed a nation. O
ld ideasand definitions are not adequate for m
odern times, he continued, and
the Rom
a challenge the tradition with the innovative concept of a
nation without territory.
Another IR
U representative raised a question regarding the C
ouncil ofE
urope’s 1995 Framew
ork Convention for the Protection of N
ationalM
inorities, which established criteria for recognizing R
oma as a national
or ethnic minority w
ithin each state in which R
oma reside. M
any statesadopted these criteria, and thus R
oma are now
recognized as minorities
in several dozen European states. H
ow can the R
oma sim
ultaneously be
Many inte
rnational
docu
ments no
t only do
not
deny it, bu
t actually
strengthe
n the co
nviction
among the
Rom
a that they
are inde
ed a natio
n.
1514
There w
ere objections on the part of a few participants. For one young
student of political science, accepted sociological definitions suggestthat the R
oma are not a nation but rather an ethnic unit characterized
by a comm
on language, culture and/or historical traditions, and holdinga shared identity. For him
, it will take m
ore than group identity to rede-fine R
oma from
a minority to a nation. 25
Similarly, for another R
omani student, the idea of a R
oma nation is
unsubstantiated. While it m
ight be useful for purposes of mobilization
or for providing a symbolic dim
ension to the quest for Rom
ani identi-ty, nevertheless, R
omani leadership m
ust think carefully about the con-sequences before m
aking such a baseless claim at the E
uropean level.
Yet another participant raised the issue of internal solidarity and differ-ences am
ong various groups identified as Rom
a or Rom
ani. According
to her, Rom
ani leadership ignores this aspect since it uncovers a realitythat is at odds w
ith the ideological image of a united nation. T
heTravelers, A
shkaliya, Egyptians, and R
udari/Beyashi all claim
to be sep-arate ethnic groups. Should they therefore be considered part of theR
oma nation? H
ow do R
oma respect the rights of these ethnic groups
to their own self-determ
ination? She further pointed out that her own
experience in carrying out projects in the Balkan region taught her that
Rom
ani activists’ prime identification w
as not with R
oma living across
the borders but rather with their surrounding nations, w
hether Serbs,C
roats, or Bosnians. 26
These facts beg the question, can one R
oma
nation be developed?
In Jadwisin, as w
ell as in Krakow
, two different positions tow
ard a Rom
anation w
ere manifested. O
ne can be called a universalistic (and volun-tarist) position, fully expressed by the R
NC
: The R
oma nation exists.
But since R
oma are diverse and hold different traditions and cultures,
any attempt to forge a unitary nation is fruitless. T
he Rom
a nation isan open structure; every group can join it because w
hat binds themtogether is anti-G
ypsy sentiment.
The other position, inclusive but particularistic or even nationalist, can
be attributed to the IRU
, among others. It focuses on R
omani culture,
seeking to develop its unified form along w
ith a codified language andrenew
ed traditions and values. It supports an inclusive and global defi-nition of R
omani identity that is nonetheless rooted in R
omani culture
and socialization. According to this approach, internal fragm
entation orseparation of som
e groups like Egyptians or A
shkaliya is a dangerous
The A
dvisor on Rom
a and Sinti Issues at the OSC
E responded by
explaining that there are a number of legal provisions that can be used
in support of the Rom
a claim. H
e cited, for example, the E
uropeanC
harter for Regional and M
inority Languages (1992), suggesting thatthe R
oma can either use provisions like this to ask for m
ore or wait until
the legal framew
ork becomes m
ore favorable for non-territorial nations.H
e recalled the example of indigenous people, w
ho for many decades
went unrecognized in international organizations. H
owever, they m
obi-lized them
selves, organizing conferences and working groups, and brought
their issues to the fore. Now
they are legally recognized within the U
N
system. T
he Rom
a can do this as well.
In fact, in seeking extra-territorial rights for their people, Rom
ani lead-ers are prom
oting the idea of a non-territorial Rom
a nation. The notion
of extra-territorial rights functions also in mainstream
politics, thisspeaker continued, citing the so-called H
ungarian “status law.” 23
The
Hungarian governm
ent’s effort to assert extra-territorial rights forH
ungarians abroad parallels the Rom
a’s claim and m
ight make that
government and others supportive of the R
omani quest.
For some R
omani participants, the changes in Europe open yet another
avenue of possibilities. Their hopes had been bound up w
ith the vision ofa future Europe consisting of various nations or cultures rather than exclu-sively of nation-states. T
his was also the basis for the IR
U declaration. B
utR
omani leaders now
have to turn to a new philosophy. T
he integrationprocess currently taking place in Europe m
eans that those Rom
a living inE
U-accessing states w
ill soon enter into the European Union.
But how
will these R
omani com
munities be incorporated – as citizens
of their respective states or as Rom
a? If as Rom
a, they will have to be
recognized and granted a new status. In the vision of a future E
urope asa union of cultures, there are grounds for claim
ing a place for the Rom
aon the basis of their culture and history.
The position of the R
NC
, the umbrella federation of the R
oma civil
rights movem
ent, has long been clear and firm, according to its repre-
sentative. Rom
a are a nation, and they do not require anyone’s permis-
sion to make that claim
, said the speaker. Their goal is for R
oma to
become m
ainstream political actors, and not m
erely the objects of a“G
ypsy industry” controlled and run by Gadje w
ho profit greatly fromit and em
ploy a few R
oma for purposes of legitim
ization. 24
1716
decision-making is nevertheless quite real. A
ccording to this speaker,the unique H
ungarian system, despite its im
perfections, provides Rom
aw
ith the greatest legal chances and opportunities for exercising theirrights in the C
EE
region. 27
Another participant put forth a related view
by which self-determ
ina-tion refers to equal rights to participate in the larger society w
ith free useof one’s ow
n cultural, ethnic, or linguistic characteristics. It means,
therefore, that national governments shall accept and create structures
for Rom
a’s equal participation as in Finland, where the C
onstitutionguarantees the R
oma cultural and linguistic rights. In their delibera-
tions on self-determination, she continued, the R
omani leadership can-
not ignore existing provisions and legal systems. C
laiming constitu-
tional or other rights from existing governm
ents is also a realization ofself-determ
ination.
Keeping this sam
e line of reasoning, yet another participant noted thatm
inorities are subjects of law and protection in every country. In the
post-WW
II era, however, the rights of m
inorities have been understoodas individual and not collective rights. T
his position, which has pre-
vailed in international law, underm
ines minorities’ right to self-determ
i-nation. A
ccording to this speaker, national minorities should have pro-
portional participation in political power. B
ut the unresolved dilemm
aof individual vs. collective m
inority rights makes the future of these
minorities uncertain. She doubted w
hether it is enough, for example,
to have the individual right to preserve one’s national minority identity
and culture.
This participant considers the quest for self-determ
ination to be one ofthe m
ost important for R
oma. In her view
, self-determination can have
territorial and extra-territorial forms, w
ith the latter no less important
than the former.
In multiethnic states, she continued, the basic form
of self-determina-
tion is national cultural autonomy. R
ussian law qualifies this as “the
form of national cultural self-determ
ination representing the publicassociation of citizens of R
ussia who consider them
selves as belonging toa definite ethnic com
munity on the basis of their voluntary self-orga-
nizing with a view
of preservation of their originality, language, culture,education.” T
he Rom
a in Russia, am
ong others, have this right to forman extra-territorial national autonom
y and thereby to promote cultural
and educational rights and even legislative initiatives or political repre-
process. Indeed, adherents of this view often blam
e the internationalorganizations for encouraging fragm
entation through their recognitionof separate ethnic groups. E
ach of these two positions is additionally
associated with a different conclusion as to w
hat should be in the Rom
a’sm
ain interest: fighting against anti-Gypsyism
or working to develop a
unifying culture.
THE
CO
NC
EP
T OF
SE
LF
-DE
TER
MIN
ATIO
N IN
THE
VIE
W O
F TH
E R
OM
AN
I EL
ITES
: C
ULTU
RA
L A
UTO
NO
MY
Rom
ani participants perceive the concept of self-determination in a
number of different w
ays. Some view
it as individual or even human
rights, others as group or minority rights w
ithin a nation-state, and stillothers as the rights of a people and a nation, such as at the E
uropeanlevel. For som
e, the concept itself has been a novelty. Others criticized
the discussion papers for espousing only the UN
-based restrictive defi-nition of the self-determ
ination principle. For the adherents of them
inority-within-a-nation-state perspective, the ultim
ate goal is culturalautonom
y, and perhaps eventual territorial autonomy. For adherents of
the national perspective, the goal is official recognition of the Rom
anation. T
hose who see cultural autonom
y as the objective tend to holdboth view
s simultaneously, that the R
oma can be a national m
inority atthe state level and a nation at the E
uropean level.
While the U
N system
offers only one possible way of interpreting the
self-determination principle, there are other perspectives. T
he Advisor
on Rom
a and Sinti Issues at OSC
E explained that his organization’s
Hum
an Dim
ension Perspective views self-determ
ination as a basichum
an right of every individual and every people. This constitutes a
political and legal basis for Rom
a self-determination claim
s within the
OSC
E process. H
e believes the Rom
ani leadership should explore astrategy that builds on this basis.
For some, “self-determ
ination” refers to an individual and collective orgroup’s right to participate in a w
ider public and political process. Inthis view
, self-determination begins w
hen a person or group (national orethnic) seeks to represent their ow
n interests within official fora. In
Hungary, R
oma self-determ
ination has been implem
ented through thesystem
of minority self-governm
ent. While the arenas are currently lim
-ited to issues of culture and education, the possibility to participate in
1918
sentation. In her assessment, how
ever, this promising and prospective
law is not easy to realize in practice, especially in the case of R
oma, since
it does not establish procedures and financial guarantees. 28
A young R
omani student explained that the concept of self-determ
inationis vaguely defined in international law
as “having control over our lives.”It can be achieved through political participation and autonom
y orthrough secession. T
he first two are legal w
ays; the latter, besides posinga challenge to the international order, also raises m
oral questions.
Autonom
y can be personal, cultural, and territorial. For the majority,
any quest for minority autonom
y might be interpreted as a threat to its
territory. For this speaker, the Rom
ani movem
ent is heading toward
securing greater political participation for Rom
a, but is moving too
slowly tow
ard attaining cultural autonomy. R
oma can claim
territorialautonom
y in only a few lim
ited cases.
He also pointed out a concern about m
ultiethnic societies. In his view,
multiculturalism
tends to turn minority claim
s for autonomy into issues
of minority political participation. Since as a rule the m
ajority tends topatronize m
inorities, this is not a desirable direction to pursue. He fur-
ther contended that the discussion paper puts forth the position thatinternal self-determ
ination refers only to indigenous people. According
to him, how
ever, it refers also to minorities, and therefore R
oma can
claim it as w
ell. (For him this is im
portant because he does not believethat R
oma should be considered a nation.)
The R
NC
representative approached the question of self-determination
in a different and provocative way. Instead of defining w
hat self-deter-m
ination is, he attempted to define its opposite. T
hat has been colo-nialism
, oppression, and discrimination. In this view
, self-determina-
tion is equivalent to power. T
hose without it face oppression. T
hequestion is, therefore, do the R
oma w
ant oppression or are they readyto defend them
selves? According to him
, the answer is sim
ple – allR
oma w
ant self-determination because they do not w
ant oppression.H
e warned that this view
of self-determination is quite com
mon am
ongthe younger generation.
Clarifying w
hat self-determination m
eans for Rom
a, he went on to elu-
cidate what R
oma do not accept and w
hat they do want. Further defin-
ing self-determination as being in control or in a position to m
ake deci-sions on one’s ow
n, he said, Rom
a do not accept non-Rom
ani experts.T
hey do not accept non-Rom
a engaging in projects on behalf of Rom
a,
making decisions about w
hat Rom
ani children should learn or whether
they are a nation or not, sending Rom
a to participate in wars in w
hichthey kill each other, or designating their representatives for them
.
What they do w
ant is to elect their own representatives, to decide w
hattheir children w
ill learn, and to participate in the politics of the coun-tries in w
hich they reside as citizens and not just as Rom
a. They w
ant,he
said, to
participate at
theE
uropean level of politics, havingnot only a voice but the pow
er todeterm
ine for themselves w
hat theirrole at that level shall be.
According to this speaker, the prin-
ciple of self-determination lies at
the foundation of every democratic
and pluralistic state. The absence of
such a basis leads to oppression, manipulation, and dictatorship. R
oma
should demand self-determ
ination as a basic human right.
The m
ajority of participants, however, view
ed self-determination as a
question of Rom
a’s participation in the larger society. There w
as con-sensus am
ong them that attaining cultural autonom
y would assert their
right to equal participation. How
ever, for many the cultural autonom
ygranted to H
ungarian Rom
a since the mid-1990s is a false version of
self-determination.
The R
NC
representative said that the Hungarian m
odel of minority
self-government prom
otes separation rather than offering them real par-
ticipation in society. He cited m
any Gadje policies that establish special
arrangements for R
oma – special R
omani schools, R
omani advisors,
mediators, R
omani departm
ents – as examples of im
posed segregationrather than integration. H
e sees similar developm
ents in other countriesas w
ell.
Criticism
of the case of Hungarian R
oma, expressed m
ainly but notexclusively by representatives of R
NC
, brings to light a major dilem
ma
that the Rom
ani elite must eventually resolve. Should R
oma be inte-
grated into participation in the larger society on an ethnic basis or a civicbasis? It has been apparent throughout the debate that R
oma intend to
attain more control of, com
mand over, and the pow
er of decision in allm
atters related to them. T
hey differ, however, in how
to reach this goal.
Rom
a intend to
attainm
ore
contro
l of, co
mm
andove
r, and pow
er o
f de
cision in all m
atters
relate
d to the
m.
2120
as poverty and prejudice. The m
ajor challenge therefore remains: H
owto em
power R
oma to becom
e political players and have a real impact?
THE
OP
TION
OF
TER
RITO
RIA
L A
UTO
NO
MY
Those arguing for the option of territorial autonom
y elaborated furtheron the validity of the ethnic w
ay. While their objective has been to
attain greater participation in decision-making or even self-adm
inistra-tion in som
e localities, the racial characteristics of the Rom
a make it
impossible for them
simply to m
erge unnoticed into the majority.
Traditionally they are perceived as a foreign element, and this is unlike-
ly to change. Even in countries in which governm
ents have extensivelytried
to elim
inate racial
barriers, the
results are
not convincing.
Segregation is a fact, even in advanced democracies.
It is even more intense in post-com
munist countries, speakers said.
There, despite loudly declared program
s of integration, the reality isquite the opposite – displacem
ent, marginalization, and in its final con-
sequences, segregation in ever-growing R
omani ghettos and slum
s. Inthis new
reality, governmental program
s, which lack public and political
will,
and the
activities of
non-governm
ental organizations, which
lack sufficient funding, are barelyable to slow
down the segregation
and mitigate som
e of its impact. 30
A real effort to change has to com
efrom
the
Rom
a them
selves, said
another participant.
T
hey m
ustshow
enough will and determ
ina-tion to defend their interests, tostop being objects of charity andpaternalistic
care, and
to seek
respect, self-esteem
, and
dignity.W
hat Rom
a demand from
the stateand society are not handouts but rights and justice. In his opinion, thiscan com
e about by granting greater self-administration in local R
omani
residential units. There R
oma can gain a stronger position vis-a-vis the
majority. C
laims for greater autonom
y at the national level, by contrast,seem
untenable at this time. Som
e say that at present the Rom
a appearunable to handle this responsibility, but they m
ust learn. 31
For some R
omani leaders, the focus of all efforts throughout the 1990s
was greater R
omani participation in m
ainstream politics. T
hey lobbiedfor R
omani representatives in state institutions, departm
ents, and advi-sory or experts’ groups. T
he leadership’s negotiations with the authori-
ties resulted in the establishment of special bodies or arrangem
ents forthe R
omani m
inority as a group. They opted, in short, for an ethnic
path. Now
, as one of the speakers pointed out, these structures functionas “buffers” betw
een the Rom
a and the state and make it easier for the
state to avoid its responsibility toward the R
oma as citizens.
Some leaders have called for redress of the state policy tow
ard the Rom
a,hoping to achieve for them
the right “to participate in a country’s poli-tics not as R
oma but as citizens.” H
owever, R
oma are not generally real
or welcom
ed partners in mainstream
politics inasmuch as they lack
strong political, economic, or intellectual potential. M
oreover, Rom
a’scivic involvem
ent remains very low
as evidenced by their minim
al par-ticipation in elections. H
ow, then, can they gain influence if not
through the ethnic way of cultural autonom
y? Ironically, those Rom
aw
ho do move into the structures and institutions that are part of the
“arrangements” for R
oma, thereby gaining som
e position and power to
influence Rom
ani politics from w
ithin, tend to be strongly criticized,usually by those w
ho remain outside of it. 29
What is the perspective of those w
ho are inside? In the opinion of a par-ticipant w
ho holds the position of Rom
ani Plenipotentiary in the SlovakG
overnment, the key w
ord in all discussions is “integration.” Govern-
mental strategies developed for R
oma in m
any countries aim at inte-
grating Rom
a into mainstream
society. From her perspective, it is the
government’s responsibility to set forth conditions for R
oma’s integra-
tion. Her Plenipotentiary O
ffice acts at three different levels: thenational m
inority level, at which they aim
to provide Rom
a with all the
institutional infrastructure and provisions to which they are legally enti-
tled; the social and economic level, at w
hich they try to address andresolve difficult and contentious issues of R
oma; and the interethnic
level, at which they w
ork to improve relations, com
munications, and
mutual understanding betw
een Rom
a and the majority.
She is determined to bring positive changes to R
oma, but she also
expects the Rom
ani leadership and representation to act responsibly. Inher opinion, they are the w
eakest link, too divided to represent Rom
aniinterests and influence politics. She claim
s that this is more problem
aticeven than all the disadvantages experienced by the R
oma in Slovakia such
A re
al effo
rt to change
has to co
me fro
m the
Rom
a them
selve
s. They
must sho
w e
nough w
illand de
term
ination to
defe
nd their inte
rests,
to sto
p being o
bjects o
f charity and pate
rnalisticcare
, and to se
ek re
spect,
self-e
steem
, and dignity.
2322
RO
MA
AN
D N
ATIO
NA
L S
EL
F-D
ETE
RM
INA
TION
For a few participants, the concept of R
omani national self-determ
ina-tion appears quite elusive. For som
e, it means creating R
omani pow
erand clarifying objectives to be realized in years to com
e. For others,developing a new
ideology would glue R
omani com
munities together,
similar to the w
ay in which religion binds Jew
s around the world.
Some participants view
ed Rom
ani national self-determination as an
effort to seek emancipation as a nation, w
hereas for others the goal is tohave the R
oma nation recognized and granted new
status in Europe, as
in the IRU
Declaration. A
s one speaker underlined, the Declaration
marks a new
and historical opening that requires Rom
ani leadership totake steps to begin a political process both inside and outside theR
omani com
munity. In so doing, they w
ill need to pay attention to theprocesses of globalization, E
uropean integration, and democratization.
They w
ill also need to pay attention to disintegration processes that aregoing on w
ithin the Rom
ani comm
unity at this time – catastrophic con-
ditions in some com
munities and fragm
entation and growing m
arginal-ization in others.
The self-determ
ination option is a positive one which can trigger
changes in areas of Rom
ani culture and politics, both within and in rela-
tion with governm
ents and international organizations. According to
this speaker, however, for the process of R
omani self-determ
ination tosucceed, there m
ust be prior unification of culture, empow
erment,
strengthening of national symbols, and im
provement in social and eco-
nomic standing for all R
oma.
Historically, secession and the creation of a separate state has been the
objective of national self-determination for m
ost nations. How
ever,secession is not a viable goal for the R
oma, suggested another partici-
pant. Moreover, neither the IR
U D
eclaration nor the RN
C C
laim is
new, he said, citing precedents that w
ere formulated by R
omani leaders
at the end of the nineteenth century and in the 1930s. 32
Those historical efforts to achieve som
e degree of national self-determi-
nation or self-organization were interrupted by the N
azis. What sur-
vived the Nazis w
as further destroyed by Com
munism
. The R
omani
comm
unity emerged socially, financially, and politically broken and cul-
turally uprooted. Even worse, the anti-G
ypsy stereotypes survived andw
ere reproduced in both Western and E
astern Europe.
What can R
omani leaders do to turn the reality of residential segrega-
tion into an asset? The R
omani A
dvisor to OSC
E answ
ered by explor-ing the possibility of a dem
and for territorial autonomy. H
e describedthe territorial distribution of the R
omani population. T
here are regionsw
ith a high proportion of Rom
a (such as in Bulgaria’s M
ontana region,w
here Rom
a make up nearly 15%
; Varna, w
here they comprise 10-
15%; and E
astern Slovakia, where they are nearly 20%
), and there arelocalities w
here Rom
a make up 100%
of the population. There are big
Rom
ani quarters, “mahalas” or ghettos, in m
any cities in the CC
Eregion. T
hey contain as many as several thousand to sixty thousand
people, such as in the Suto Orizari quarter of Skopje in M
acedonia,w
here the majority is seriously concerned about a steadily grow
ingR
omani population.
Decentralization, regionalization, and local self-governm
ent – these arethe European U
nion’s promoted policies, continued the speaker. H
owcan R
oma use these policies? C
an Rom
ani leaders work out a project
whereby R
oma in regions or m
unicipalities with high densities can attain
administrative-territorial autonom
y? If such an option were to be real-
ized, Rom
a would be in a new
position to resume the quest for self-deter-
mination. Precedents are already in place, including in the Suto O
rizariquarter of Skopje. R
omani self-adm
inistered territorial units must be
established in accordance with state rules and law
s, said the speaker.
Such units can be tied into a network, he continued, and elected
Rom
ani mayors and council m
embers could com
e together once a yearto w
ork on comm
on strategies and policies. In this way, the R
oma
would gradually create a territorial structure that fulfills the right of self-
determination through attainm
ent of cultural autonomy. T
he network
should also include regions or municipalities of W
estern Europe that
have high-density Rom
ani populations.
For other participants, however, this vision is threatening. A
s one speak-er observed, R
omani leaders m
aking territorial claims w
ould be seen ascalling for a revolution. W
hen the question is territories, Gadje are
ready to strike against any such demand. E
ncouraging Rom
a to go inthis direction, another participant w
arned, would be very risky in that
this is a particularly sensitive issue for countries in which their ow
npolitical self-determ
ination is under threat, such as in many new
statesof the B
alkan region.
2524
Similar w
orries but from a different perspective w
ere expressed byanother speaker. R
oma use the R
omani w
ord “nacija,” translated intoE
nglish as “nation.” She questioned whether that is the best choice in
English. H
aving participated in many gatherings in E
urope, she learnedthat for m
ainstream politicians the m
ost terrifying mom
ent comes w
henR
oma start to talk about “nation” and “self-determ
ination.” Rom
a shouldfind a m
ore acceptable way to press this claim
at the highest politicallevel, perhaps turning to the w
ord “people” as a more suitable transla-
tion, also because of its connotation of “indigenous people.”
The A
dvisor on Rom
a and Sinti Issues at OSC
E pointed out that the
debate on Rom
a self-determination started in the PE
R-sponsored K
rakowm
eeting, prompted by the exchange betw
een the IRU
President and some
Rom
ani leaders in attendance. The IR
U President argued that the IR
UD
eclaration was rooted in historical precedent. Som
e leaders objected,claim
ing that there were sufficient grounds for such a declaration in pre-
sent-day international documents, including the U
N C
harter. 35
He w
arned that Rom
a must pay attention to w
hat is in the minds of
mainstream
politicians. Gadje m
ay understand that Rom
a seek a terri-tory or a state since they no longer w
ish to be identified as, say, Czech
Rom
a or Rom
anian Rom
a but merely as “the R
oma.” H
e thereforeintroduced a distinction betw
een a “political” nation and a “cultural”nation, stressing that the R
omani leadership m
ust clarify whether they
intend the former or the latter. A
iming at political nationhood im
plies,according to him
and in line with G
adje reasoning, seeking politicalpow
er in the form of governm
ent, territory, borders, and passports. The
Rom
ani leadership must be very careful to assess the interpretations and
implications of w
hat they claim, especially if w
hat they seek is actually“cultural” self-determ
ination.
For some participants, how
ever, the challenge posed by the IRU
Decla-
ration is in essence a political one. Clearly rejecting territorial statehood,
the IRU
foresaw a chance to establish a non-traditional form
of nation-al existence in the idea of a non-territorial or extra-territorial nation. A
sthe IR
U representative explained it, although today’s situation is obvi-
ously different from the period of the first half of the nineteenth centu-
ry when m
any new territorially-based nations w
ere formed, there is still
inspiration in these analogies.
Now
, as then, the world system
is changing. While ideals of dem
ocracyare gaining ground, today they are m
ore likely to appear in the context
For most leaders, the secession option is m
ore a political tactic than areal objective. In 1991, for exam
ple, a Rom
ani mem
ber of the Mace-
donian Parliament m
ade a statement dem
anding recognition of Rom
aas a nation and w
arning that Rom
a may attem
pt to form their ow
n statew
ithin Macedonia (“R
omanistan”). A
s the RN
C representative rem
em-
bered it, this MP faced harsh criticism
from all sides. Later, A
lbaniansm
ade a similar dem
and for recognition as a second constituent nation,and they succeeded. M
acedonians are now afraid of losing their ow
nstate, he concluded.
At the O
ctober 2000 PER
meeting on R
oma in Skopje, a m
ajor Albanian
leader argued that Rom
a are an ethnographic/historical minority and
should remain focused on culture. H
owever, R
oma dem
ands were
different. Seeking to become political actors, they requested self-deter-
mination. T
he Rom
ani nationality is now recognized in the M
acedonianconstitution, but only on paper and not in reality. H
e concluded thatR
oma either do not see w
hat they should do at this point regarding anyfuture claim
s or are afraid to make such claim
s. They seem
to have afear of defending them
selves and their way of life, but that is essentially
what self-determ
ination is all about.
For some participants, the exam
ples of other nations’ rise to self-deter-m
ination, either in the nineteenth century or today, are instructive. Forothers, how
ever, those examples w
ere irrelevant as models for R
oma.
The m
ain argument here is that other nations’ self-determ
ination was
driven by territorial quests, and that Rom
a neither seek territory nor arelikely to be granted it. Several participants w
arned the Rom
ani leader-ship against going in this direction. 33
As one speaker pointed out, the question of national self-determ
inationis essentially about pow
er. Some R
omani leaders seek pow
er, which
would inevitably lead to conflict w
ith the existing state. He posed a per-
tinent question: Do R
oma really believe that G
adje will share their
power w
ith them? W
hat power-holders have ever shared it w
ith thosew
ho are powerless?
In the last ten years, the Rom
ani issue became a subject of large-scale
politics and attracted the involvement of pow
erful governments. B
utw
hat actually happened in this same period to the R
oma in E
urope?W
hile the Rom
ani leadership was advocating integration policies, on
the ground the Rom
a increasingly faced advancing segregation. While
the Rom
ani leadership discusses national self-determination, the m
ainconcern of R
oma in localities is m
ere survival. 34
27
hide their Rom
a identity or manifest it publicly? D
o they opt for inte-gration and assim
ilation or for cultural autonomy? D
o they want for
their children integrated classrooms or separation in education? In his
view, the present-day reality and the unfavorable overall context of their
lives provide little evidence that Rom
a are making coherent choices.
The
prime task of the elite and R
omani organizations should therefore be to
motivate R
oma to acknow
ledge their Rom
ani identity as the initial stepon the road to R
oma self-determ
ination.
For yet another participant, it is the Rom
ani leadership’s task andrespon-
sibility to clarify what exactly R
oma seek, even though the elite w
ill beheld responsible and w
ill be judged by the masses for w
hatever is asked,declared, or claim
ed in their name.
The A
dvisor on Rom
a and Sinti Issues at the OSC
E pointed out that in
many countries, governm
ental programs or national strategies for R
oma
already exist and are being implem
ented in cooperation with R
oma.
But for m
any Rom
ani leaders, these programs represent m
ore the inter-ests of the state than of the R
oma. H
e now proposes a rew
rite of governm
ental strategies, such as the Rom
anian one, from the point of
view of R
omani self-determ
ination and genuine Rom
ani interest. What
would be the new
scenario and the new m
essage?
Despite all these w
orries and warnings, there w
as consensus among the
participants that Rom
ani national self-determination is a reality. T
hem
ain objective of the Rom
a’s claim has been to obtain R
omani nation-
al existence and to have its voice officially acknowledged, w
ith structuresset up for equal R
omani political participation, nationally and interna-
tionally. The R
oma do not need a territory of their ow
n in order toclaim
this right. Once this recognition is established, there is hope that
the Gadje perspective on R
oma w
ill change along with the law
s. Rom
ahave to m
ake it clear that they want neither territory nor a state, but
participation in Europe’s international institutions.
As m
any speakers stressed, there are also pragmatic reasons for seeking
Rom
ani nationhood. It provides Rom
a with a stronger position, giving
them confidence w
hile also leading to better self-organization. For them
ajority of participants, however, it is the Finnish initiative that repre-
sents the most significant step forw
ard for such recognition.
26
of multicultural societies. T
he decreasing role of the state and the for-m
ation of multinational structures such as the E
uropean Union m
akethe IR
U claim
an increasingly plausible reality, said a participant. 36
Several participants pointed to a gap between the level of discourse on the
part of the Rom
ani elites and that of the Rom
ani masses. T
hey argue thatit is the elite’s task to translate abstract notions such as nation or self-deter-m
ination into a message that can be clearly understood by the m
asses.W
hile the gap may not be elim
inated overnight, it can be greatly reducedby the use of language that is both specific and practical.
As one speaker noted, it m
ay be truethat elites can m
ake nations, andthose gathered at this m
eeting arem
embers of the elite. M
oreover, theprocess
of R
omani
national self-
determination has already begun and
some R
omani leaders are m
ore orless aw
are of that process, and some
Rom
ani comm
unities are in differ-ent stages of it. T
his speaker notedthat throughout the last decade ofR
omani discourse, all the efforts of
this elite have been directed toward
the national governments and inter-
national organizations rather than toward the R
omani com
munity.W
hilethe elite have forw
arded demands and requests for governm
ents andinternational institutions to change their policies tow
ard the Rom
a, theyhave failed to develop a political credo for R
oma and R
omani N
GO
sthat w
ill link elite discourse with the daily activities of R
omani activists.
When this m
eeting is over, she will go back to her projects irregardless
of what has been debated or concluded here, and projects w
ill move
forward in all directions w
ith little coordination. She would greatly
prefer to have consistent guidelines and an agreed-upon platform that
would answ
er practical questions and govern activists’ projects.
Similarly, another participant asked about indicators that w
ould demon-
strate that Rom
a are undergoing a process of self-determination. A
nansw
er to this question should include not only claims to that effect, but
also evidence of the choices the Rom
a make on practical issues: D
o they
The m
ain obje
ctive
of the
Rom
a’s claim has
been to
obtain R
om
aninatio
nal existe
nce and to
have its vo
ice o
fficiallyackno
wle
dged, w
ith stru
cture
s set u
p for
equ
al Rom
ani political
participation, natio
nallyand inte
rnationally.
29
culties, since in Europe there are as m
any as 2,500 Rom
ani organiza-tions, few
of which are w
ell-structured.
The so-called “H
elsinki Agreem
ent” endorsed by the RN
C presents a
different scenario. The building blocks of the future R
omani represen-
tative body would be provided by five categories of R
omani organiza-
tions: 1) international and experts’ organizations active at the nationaland international level, such as the IR
U; 2) international and experts’
organizations active at the grassroots, regional, and international levels,such as the R
NC
; 3) Rom
ani religious organizations like GAT
IEF; 40
4)R
omani political organizations or parties active at national level; and 5)
independent national Rom
ani organizations or umbrellas of such orga-
nizations that are not part of the IRU
, RN
C, or R
omani parties active
in specific areas such as human rights, education, youth, culture, etc. 41
Each category of organizations w
ould choose its own representatives
through elections, with full respect for transparency of the process and
gender balance. The total num
ber of Rom
ani representatives to this bodyhas been set at 150. T
he building blocks are comparable to parliam
entaryparties and the European R
oma Forum
can be compared to a parliam
ent.T
he proposal also includes the establishment of a board or executive com
-m
ittee (up to 9 persons) and an advisory group of experts selected by theboard. T
he entire structure would be served by a sm
all secretariat.
In the view of the R
NC
representative, there has not previously beenlegitim
ate representation of Rom
a in most of the states. W
here suchrepresentation does exist, as in H
ungary, it was established as “top-
down,” or state-sponsored, and not reflective of self-determ
ination. The
RN
C scenario, he said, attem
pts to restructure the new body aw
ay fromdivisions of R
omani com
munities across borders to reflect instead the
transnational and European nature of the R
oma.
The Finnish R
omani preventative presented an alternative view
of thecom
position of the European R
oma Forum
. He cited the differences
among various R
omani com
munities in E
urope regarding their positionin different countries, the levels of dem
ocratization and self-organizationof R
oma in W
estern and Eastern Europe, and how
they experience theirow
n identity. These differences have to be taken into consideration, she
said, and a comprom
ise solution that would satisfy those various com
-m
unities must be reached so that all could choose their ow
n representa-tives to this body. 42
28
THE
FIN
NIS
H P
RE
SID
EN
T’S IN
ITIATIV
E A
ND
RO
MA
NA
TION
AL
SE
LF
-DE
TER
MIN
ATIO
N
The Finnish participant and the R
NC
representative introduced theFinnish initiative. 37
The first speaker em
phasized that Finnish PresidentTarja H
alonen formerly chaired the R
oma A
dvisory Board of Finland
and is therefore well inform
ed on Rom
ani issues. She knows that every-
where R
oma are politically m
arginalized and powerless. H
er idea was to
create a special arrangement that w
ould provide Rom
a with effective
participation in public life at various levels, and not only as NG
Os. H
erinitiative aim
ed at securing for the Rom
a a place within the decision-
making process at the level of international organizations, from
which
they are presently excluded. Thus w
as born her idea to establish a con-sultative assem
bly for Rom
a at the European level.
Such a body would have an official m
andate, work w
ith all internation-al institutions, and provide R
oma w
ith a voice in addressing all issuesrelated to them
. While there are currently plenty of international doc-
uments addressing R
omani concerns, the R
oma have no institutional
instruments at hand to use them
effectively. The R
omani leadership
approved this initiative and agreed to set up an exploratory group to work
out the details at a seminar held in the Finnish Parliam
ent on October 21-
22, 2001. After several m
eetings of this group, 38an initial agreem
ent was
reached on the composition of the future pan-European body in H
elsinki– the so-called H
elsinki Agreem
ent of March 11-12, 2002.
The R
NC
representative presented a non-paper that was w
orked out bythe Finnish side and explained to the R
oma at the M
arch meeting in
Helsinki. 39
The m
ain topic of this document is a proposal on how
toset up this R
omani body. T
his speaker stressed that the proposal reflectsthe state’s view
. From each country there w
ill be elected a certain num-
ber of Rom
ani representatives; countries with a larger R
omani com
mu-
nity would be entitled to m
ore seats. For example, the R
omani com
-m
unity in Rom
ania would have five seats, w
hereas the comm
unity inPoland w
ould have only two.
He called this proposal interesting but not realistic. Since the process of
democratization in R
omani com
munities and organizations is rudim
en-tary or non-existent, there are no conditions for carrying out such elec-tions in a fully dem
ocratic manner. T
herefore, following this request
would only lead to chaos and endless conflict betw
een Rom
a and theirorganizations. Sim
ilarly, organizing conventions would run into diffi-
31
the above-mentioned categories of R
omani representatives to the
meetings of the exploratory group and, on the other hand, encourag-
ing their participation in gatherings of the international Rom
aniorganizations.
As one of the participants noted, history itself altered the R
omani
discourse. What the R
omani leadership had sought in vain for a decade
was suddenly offered to them
by the state, the side usually seen as againstthem
. The R
omani leadership itself should have addressed R
omani self-
determination and representation m
uch earlier. But this is just the begin-
ning of the “success story.” 45
For the majority of the participants, President H
alonen’s initiativem
arks a new beginning, opening the door for R
oma’s inclusion into
European institutions and providing an opportunity to raise R
oma’s
self-determination at the E
uropean level. In the absence of a Rom
aniorganization w
ith a mandate to speak in the nam
e of all Rom
a at theinternational level, the Finnish initiative offers both a representativebody and an official m
andate. This is a realization of the quest for
Rom
ani self-determination. 46
Several speakers praised the Finnish authorities for the idea, which
had been raised for a decade by some R
omani leaders and presented
at the highest European levels. A
s one of the participants emphasized,
such a proposal presented by Rom
ani activists got no attention. But
when it cam
e from the President of a country, it w
as a different storyaltogether. T
he Rom
a should not forget, however, that this initiative
might as w
ell be named “M
iranda’s” (Vuolasranta from
Finland) ini-tiative, since she contributed m
uch to sensitize President Halonen on
Rom
ani issues at the time w
hen Ms. H
alonen chaired Finland’s Rom
aA
dvisory Board.
CO
NC
LU
SIO
NS
The Jadw
isin meeting is the second in a series of PE
R-sponsored round-
tables, along with the K
rakow m
eeting of 2001, called the Rom
aniPolitical R
eflection Forum. Its form
ula – encouraging discussion that isopen and self-reflective, w
ell-focused, and touching upon difficult andchallenging questions – has proven to be successful. T
he fact that many
participants came w
ith written statem
ents or papers provides some m
ea-sure of their involvem
ent in the subject matter.
30
According to this speaker, a “national R
omani representation” already
exists in the form of various consultative or advisory bodies. R
omani
representatives to these bodies, who are officially recognized and cur-
rently cooperate with governm
ents, cannot be ignored or left out of thestructure. She called special attention to the fact that the decision toestablish the E
uropean Rom
a Forum depends on the governm
ents’com
mitm
ent to it, and securing that is also Rom
a’s responsibility.
Similarly, another participant pointed out that E
U policy calls for
Rom
ani national organizations working as partners w
ith governments.
It requires that progress toward dem
ocratization be accompanied by
increasing roles for those organizations at the level of nation-states,rather than a few
international Rom
ani organizations active at theE
uropean level. Unfortunately, in m
any countries these organizationshave no inform
ation on the Finnish initiative and are therefore not partof the process.
Yet a different scenario for this body was elaborated by the A
dvisor onR
oma and Sinti Issues at the O
SCE
. Based on his overview
of Rom
aniorganizations in E
urope, 43he suggested a com
promise solution com
-bining delegations by consensus and election procedures. A
ccording tohim
, the Rom
anian representatives and NG
Os expressed their readiness
to carry out such exercises of both, working out a m
echanism for dele-
gation by consensus and also holding model elections am
ong the Rom
aat m
unicipal or district levels. If successful, they may provide suitable
models for use at the national and international levels in setting up the
European R
oma Forum
. 44
In his view, this debate should be extended to local/national settings.
The question of how
to establish legitimate representation to this body
from a country like R
omania, w
here the Rom
ani comm
unity accountsfor m
ore than a million people, is a serious and challenging question.
He called for extending consultations w
ithin Rom
ani comm
unities,stressing that a voice m
ust be given also to those who are considered by
some leaders to be “bought,” i.e., those w
ho are state appointees or work
in state administrations. For now
, the representatives of the RN
C and
IRU
have successfully influenced the debate, but the participation of theR
omani M
Ps and Rom
ani representatives and/or officers serving atstate and local adm
inistration levels has been rather limited. T
hiscontributes to the m
isreading of the Finnish initiative among the
Rom
ani comm
unities in many states. H
e suggested inviting more of
32
The debate in Jadw
isin revealed the following:
■T
here was further consolidation of the assertion shared by m
ost par-ticipants that R
oma are a nation. R
ealization of the Finnish pro-posal has contributed to this notion in a significant w
ay. The
Halonen initiative em
erged at just the right time, com
ing right afterthe IR
U D
eclaration of Nationhood and during the period w
henthe R
omani leadership attem
pted seriously to debate the issue ofR
omani representation at the international level (K
rakow m
eeting).
■T
he EU
enlargement factor contributed to it as w
ell. The R
omani
leadership had been concerned about how the R
omani population
would be part of the integration processes that are currently under
deliberation in Europe. T
he debate proved that the Rom
a havehopes of realizing a vision of a E
urope consisting of nations orregions, am
ong which the R
oma w
ill be recognized and granted sta-tus sim
ilar to that of other nations.
■O
nly a few participants objected to these strong statem
ents. In theview
of those few, the R
oma are a m
inority and not a nation. Forthem
, assertions of nationhood are utopian and unrealistic.
■Tw
o opposing positions toward a R
oma nation w
ere identified. The
“universalistic and voluntaristic” position perceives the Rom
a nationas diverse and does not seek to forge a unitary nationhood. It m
aybe joined by any group that claim
to be Rom
ani, for they are heldtogether by the com
mon experience of anti-G
ypsy sentiment. T
he“inclusive and particularistic” position focuses on culture and seeksto develop a codified language alongside renew
ed emphasis on
shared traditions
and values.
Favoring
a global
definition of
Rom
ani identity, it is against internal fragmentation and recogni-
tion of separate ethnic groups among R
oma. Proponents of this
view place a higher em
phasis on unifying the culture than on fight-ing anti-G
ypsyism.
■T
he question of the Rom
a as a nation has been central to the debate onR
omani self-determ
ination. Not surprisingly, the m
ajority of the partic-ipants perceived R
oma’s claim
s to self-determination as legitim
ate andvalid, w
hether or not they are based on a foundation of nationhood.
■R
omani participants perceived the concept of self-determ
ination asranging from
an individual or basic human right, through a group
or minority right, to the right of a people or nation. U
ltimately,
despite these different positions, most of them
embraced the con-
cept as relevant to their current efforts and a promising guide to
33
Rom
ani political mobilization in the future.
■T
he main difference em
erged between those w
ho maintain that the
self-determination principle is the right of m
inorities and those who
consider it the right of a people or a nation. For the adherents ofthe form
er position, the ultimate realization of this right is the
achievement of cultural autonom
y within a nation-state. T
hroughit, the prospect of territorial autonom
y or self-governance in munic-
ipal or even regional levels has also been explored. In the case of thelatter position, achieving a new
status as a nation in Europe has been
the ultimate aim
. For the majority of the participants, how
ever, theoption of secession or seeking a state has been deem
ed untenableand unrealistic.
■Irrespective of how
the participants viewed the concept of self-deter-
mination, they all see it as a question of R
omani participation in the
larger society. There is consensus am
ong them that attaining som
eform
of cultural autonomy w
ill assert their right to self-determina-
tion as defined by equal participation. For many participants, the
example of the H
ungarian Rom
a is a distorted version of culturalautonom
y and not a positive model.
■T
he case of the Hungarian R
oma and the criticism
of it are symp-
tomatic of a larger dilem
ma for the R
omani leadership: how
best toseek integration and participation of R
oma in the larger society?
Should Rom
a opt for civic or ethnic ways of participation? For the
time being, the R
omani leadership has no clear position on this and
efforts to provide answers usually fall apart.
■E
xploring the possibility of attaining territorial autonomy, som
eparticipants turned to the E
U policy and prom
oted the concepts ofdecentralization, regionalization, and local self-governance. T
hey seeit as a chance for full em
ancipation and as a way to stop the state-
sponsored treatment of R
oma as objects of charity or paternalism
.O
thers, however, objected to it as too risky an option. A
proposalto design R
omani territorial/adm
inistrative units was m
ade.
■R
omani national self-determ
ination is viewed in one of tw
o ways:
as an effort for emancipation by a nation, or as recognition of a new
political status for a Rom
a nation in Europe. In fact, how
ever, bothm
eanings were intertw
ined. The difference betw
een them lies in the
emphasis som
e participants are prepared to place on emancipation
efforts as opposed to achieving some degree of self-organization or
political representation. For some participants, therefore, the IR
U
35
should also lead to a more accurate understanding of the Finnish
initiative among R
omani com
munities.
■T
hroughout the
meeting,
it w
as evident
that the
so-called“E
uropean” or “transnational” approach to the Rom
ani issue hasfostered claim
s to national self-determination. T
he Rom
ani leader-ship seem
s to interpret the recomm
endations and initiatives of theinternational organizations as validating these claim
s.
■PE
R plans a follow
-up to the Jadwisin roundtable debate in w
hichthese conclusions w
ill be shared and discussed with non-R
omani
politicians, lawm
akers, and experts. Such a meeting w
ill attempt to
clarify the content of Rom
ani claims, their direction, political feasi-
bility and legitimacy, along w
ith those of the international organi-zations and w
ith some governm
ent views on the situation of the
Rom
a in Europe.
34
Declaration of N
ationhood has marked a new
and historical open-ing to em
ancipation. For others, it is the Finnish initiative that bestencourages R
omani efforts at self-organization or the establishm
entof legitim
ate representation.
■T
he historical association of national self-determination w
ith terri-torial claim
s has prompted participants to m
ake use of other con-cepts such as “people” or “indigenous people.” T
hese concepts aredeem
ed more suitable, especially in light of positive exam
ples ofachievem
ents attained by indigenous peoples seeking recognition oftheir rights and status at international and national levels.
■Several participants cited the existing gap betw
een the discourselevel of R
omani elites and that of R
omani m
asses, and urged theelite to express abstract ideas in m
ore concrete terms. A
search forevidence of a desire for self-determ
ination among the m
asses shouldinclude analysis of the everyday choices R
oma m
ake on practicalissues that are related to their identity.
■T
here w
as overall
consensus am
ong participants
that R
omani
national self-determination is a reality. T
he main objective of the
Rom
a’s claim has been national and international acknow
ledgement
of the existence of the Rom
a nation and voice, along with structures
for equal political participation by Rom
a. Territory is not a prereq-uisite.
■W
hile most agreed that the Finnish initiative represents a significant
step toward recognition, the content of the Finnish initiative – com
-position and w
ays of setting up the body representing Rom
a inE
urope – has been most contentious. T
he debate has been illustra-tive of the ongoing pow
er struggle between R
omani “international-
ists,” as represented by two organizations, the R
NC
and IRU
, and“nationals,” activists representing a variety of national/local R
omani
organizations. According to the “nationals,” the “internationalist”
scenario for setting up this body diminishes the role of existing
Rom
ani representation at the country level and privileges the two
international organizations.
■C
alls have been made to launch a large-scale consultation on m
ech-anism
s for delegating and electing representatives to this body. The
input of the RN
C and IR
U representatives needs to be m
atched byparticipation from
the Rom
ani MPs and R
omani representatives
and/or officers serving at state and local administration. T
his
37
as “states” (UN
Charter, C
hapter II, Mem
bership, Articles 3, 4 and 5).
International law presum
es the existence of states, which are already
constituted and recognized. Criteria for statehood, according to the
Convention on the R
ights and Duties of States (1933), are: a) perm
a-nent population; b) defined territory; c) governm
ent; and d) capacity toenter into relations w
ith other states. The “perm
anent population” asused here is identical w
ith the “nation.” Nationality refers therefore to
the country or state of which a person is a citizen. T
he permanent pop-
ulation of the state makes up a “national society.” From
the perspectiveof international law
, it is less relevant how “national society” is com
-posed from
within (dom
inant majority and various m
inorities). 50
The U
N docum
ents make specific references w
ith regard to applying theprinciple of self-determ
ination to the categories of non-self-governing ter-ritories and indigenous people. In the case of the form
er the UN
Charter
envisaged, through the principle of self-determination, that all territories in
subordinate position as mandates, trusteeships, or colonies w
ould eventu-ally becom
e sovereign (states) or part of existing sovereign states on thebasis of internal equality (self-governance) (A
rticles 73 and 74 of the UN
Charter). In the context of de-colonization, the principle of territorial
integrity took primacy over “ethnic” self-determ
ination claims. T
he terri-torial boundaries of political units w
ere identical with pre-independence
administrative boundaries, in conform
ity with the principle of uti posside-
tis juris, and the “people” of non-self-governing territories were considered
to comprise the total population of the territories. 51
The V
ienna Declaration, w
hile endorsing and recognizing “the right ofpeople to take any legitim
ate action, in accordance with the C
harter ofU
nited Nations, to realize their inalienable right of self-determ
ina-tion…
” (Art. 2, Para. 2), did exclude the use of the right to self-deter-
mination as a basis for secession, as stated in A
rticle 2, Para. 3 (‘this shallnot be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action w
hich would
dismem
ber or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or polit-
ical unity of sovereign and independent states…’).
The notion of “indigenous people,” on the other hand, has an ethnic
rather than a territorial connotation. They are som
etimes nam
ed the“First N
ations” or “dependent nations,” and usually are part of existingsovereign and independent states. C
ontroversy over recognizing theirright to self-determ
ination within the U
N system
relates to qualified orunqualified rights under international law
. In the case of the unquali-
36
AP
PE
ND
IX A
The P
rinciple of Self-Determ
ination: The U
N Perspective
Andrzej M
irga
Project on Ethnic R
elations, Princeton, N.J.
This D
iscussion Paper was distributed to the participants prior to the m
eeting.
The U
N C
harter reference to the principle of self-determination
appears in Chapter I, A
rticle 2, which states: “To develop friendly rela-
tions among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate m
ea-sures to strengthen universal peace.”
The
UN
C
harter notion
of self-determ
ination draw
s on
PresidentW
oodrow W
ilson’s Fourteen Points as delivered in his speech on January8, 1918, and in particular on his rem
ark: “It is that the world be m
ade fitand safe to live in; and particularly that it be m
ade safe for every peace-loving nation w
hich, like our own, w
ishes to live its own life, determ
ineits ow
n institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by other peo-ples of the w
orld as against force and selfish aggression. All the people
of the world are in effect partners in this interest…
” And further: “A
nevident principle runs through the w
hole program I have outlined. It is
the principle of justice to all people and nationalities, and their right tolive on equal term
s of liberty and safety with one another, w
hether theybe strong or w
eak.” 47
The principle of self-determ
ination was endorsed in tw
o UN
Covenants
on Hum
an Rights adopted in 1966. 48
Article N
o.1 in both Covenants
states: “All people have the right of self-determ
ination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural developm
ent.” It was later restated in the
Vienna D
eclaration’s Article N
o. 2. 49T
his principle is best understoodin the context of other principles that form
the UN
normative basis of
international law, that is, the principle of territorial integrity of states (it
has primacy), of sovereign equality of states, and of non-intervention in
internal affairs of other states (except ‘humanitarian’ interventions based
on resolutions of the Security Council).
More im
portantly however, the U
N norm
ative system uses the concept
of a “nation” or a “people” that is “political,” “voluntarist,” and “territo-rial” (dem
os), as opposed to culturally defined or “ethnic” (ethnos). The
subjects of international law are “nations” or “peoples,” but understood
39
republics in accordance with the principle of uti possidetisjuris,
that is, the new borders of political units m
ust be those thatpreviously existed as the borders of republics of an union or fed-erative state.
In general, there is little support if any under international law for self-
determination claim
s of separate ethnic, linguistic or religious groups exist-ing w
ithin sovereign and independent states. The right to secession is not
a right under international law, and such claim
s are usually consideredinvalid. T
his is also the case when ethnic groups call them
selves “nations”or “people” or som
ething else and claim the right to self-determ
ination.
Still, as some scholars assert, one m
ajor confusion about the principle ofself-determ
ination is that while it w
as based on the Western concept of
political nationhood, in other parts of the world and in C
entral andE
astern Europe it w
as often interpreted as the right of culturally definednations to have their ow
n states (see the case of Czechoslovakian
Constitutions since 1920 to 1992 and use of the self-determ
inationprinciple). In fact, the U
N docum
ents do not operate with the concept
of “national self-determination” but w
ith the notion of “equal rights andself-determ
ination of people,” whereas those w
ho invoke this principleusually fram
e it as “national self-determination,” i.e., nation-states or
independence movem
ents. 54
Many observers or independent scholars perceive that the principle of
self-determination, prom
oted by the UN
Charter’s A
rticles 55 and 56,obligates the international com
munity to enforce it above other princi-
ples such as the sanctity of existing borders. They are critical of efforts
to bridge the gap between these tw
o principles with com
promise solu-
tions such as “limited autonom
y,” as in the case of Kosovo. Som
e evenconsider the principle of self-determ
ination, if realized as “nationalself-determ
ination,” to be basically anti-democratic and inevitably
leading to military or bureaucratic “ethnic cleansing” of non-nationals
or ethnic minorities. 55
Since the UN
system operates w
ith the concept of “national society” or“nation” as “dem
os” as opposed to “ethnos,” the national society there-fore com
prises the population as a whole, that is, all groups and seg-
ments, including m
inorities. The principle of self-determ
ination in thecase of independent states m
eans popular sovereignty that is essentiallydem
ocracy or democratic governance. In the norm
ative system of the
UN
, no reference is made to the principle of self-determ
ination regard-
38
fied right to self-determination, each indigenous group should be rec-
ognized as a “people” that ultimately can claim
the right to be an inde-pendent state. In essence, w
ithin the UN
system, the indigenous peo-
ple have a right to “internal self-determination,” that is, lim
ited auton-om
y on
ethnic grounds
within
existing sovereign
states (see
theInternational Labor O
rganization Convention N
o. 169,1989 concern-ing Indigenous and Tribal People; draft D
eclaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People; Vienna D
eclaration, Article 20; also the position of
the U.S. on indigenous people). 52
The U
N principle of self-determ
ination, as stated in its documents, has
been often criticized for being poorly defined. 53It has been interpreted
in various ways and used to m
ean different things for different people.T
he claim is often m
ade that it does not adequately address such ques-tions as: W
ho are the people and what do the people have a right to?
It might m
ean popular sovereignty, that is, the right of people to choosetheir governm
ent (internal democracy), freedom
from external inter-
vention, or the right of people to have the state of their own. O
n theother hand, “the people” itself m
ight mean nations or states, ethnic
groups as in the case of indigenous people, the entire population ofspecified territories, etc. W
hile this criticism m
ight be true, UN
prac-tice provides som
e clarification.
Regarding w
ho has the right to self-determination and w
hat this right isabout, U
N practice proves the follow
ing:
A)
Populations as a whole or nations (people) of existing states
have a right to an effective democratic system
of governance inw
hich all parts of population participate; they also have a rightto continue to rem
ain independent (not to be subjected to alienrule);
B)
Populations of non-self-governing or occupied territories havea right to self-determ
ination, that is, to freely determine their
political status. Beneficiary of this right is the population of the
territory as a whole. It gives no right to a separate part of pop-
ulation to break out of the territory, that is, to secede;
C)
Indigenous peoples have a right to internal self-determination
and limited autonom
y within existing sovereign states;
D)
In the case of dissolution of larger union republics or federa-tions, the right of self-determ
ination is applied to mem
ber
41
By virtue of that right, they m
ay negotiate their political status within
the framew
ork of existing nation-states and are free to pursue their eco-nom
ic, social, and cultural development. Indigenous people, in exer-
cising their right of internal self-determination, have the internal right
to autonomy or self-governm
ent in matters relating to their local affairs,
including of mem
bership, culture, language, religion, education, infor-m
ation, media, health, housing, em
ployment, social w
elfare, mainte-
nance of comm
unity safety, family relations, econom
ic activities, landsand resources m
anagement, environm
ent and entry by non-mem
bers, asw
ell as ways and m
eans for financing these autonomous functions.” 56
The concept of self-determ
ination, its meaning and application, has
evolved over time. It is therefore not surprising that new
ideas haveem
erged outside the UN
system. A
number of institutions and organi-
zations are exploring this principle with intent to enlarge its application.
Most of these efforts focus on elaborating international standards to pro-
vide this right also to “unrepresented nations or peoples,” “internalnations,” or even m
inorities. Advocates of those groups struggle for a
“qualified recognition of a right to internal self-determination” that is for
some a form
of self-governance or autonomy w
ithin sovereign states. 57
How
ever, sometim
es autonomy is provided w
ithin the framew
ork ofm
inority rights, without reference to the self-determ
ination principle.
AP
PE
ND
IX B
Authors and titles of papers or statem
ents prepared for theJadw
isin meeting:
Dragoljub A
ckovic, Birth of Roma N
ationN
icoleta Bitu, An Inventory of C
rucial PointsN
adia Dem
eter, Untitled paper
Nicolae G
heorghe, The Stage of the D
ebates on the Proposal for Setting up aRom
a Representative Body at Pan-European Level (the Halonen Initiative)
Ciprian N
ecula, The Legitim
acy of the Roma Representation. T
he Nation and
the Self-Determ
ination of Roma People
Bela Lakatos, U
ntitled paperStanislaw
Stankiewicz, Europako Forum
Romano (Propozycja ke C
E)Ivan V
esely, Contribution to D
iscussion on Roma Em
ancipation
40
ing minorities w
ithin the state. International human rights instrum
entsof the U
N, how
ever, (Universal D
eclaration, Covenant on C
ivil andPolitical R
ights, Declaration on the R
ights of Persons Belonging to
National or E
thnic, Religious or Linguistic M
inorities and others),assert a set of tasks and obligation to the state, and on other hand, a setof rights to m
embers of m
inorities that aim at appropriate accom
moda-
tion of minorities w
ithin the “national society.”
The state is obliged to protect m
inorities within its territory and provide
conditions for
continuation and
development
of their
identities.Providing m
inorities with organizational, legal, and adm
inistrative struc-tures that w
ould guarantee full and equal participation in the social andpolitical life of a national society is a crucial but difficult task. T
he major-
ity feels the threat of the alleged minority’s inclination to secede, and on
the other hand, the minority feels the burden of second-class citizenship.
This m
akes finding a proper balance between the state’s integrity and
social cohesion and the demands of m
inorities even more difficult.
Nor does international law
provide normative solutions to the question
of how to accom
modate m
inorities within sovereign and independent
states. Here one can explore various existing arrangem
ents or goodpractices developed in som
e countries such as a consociational democ-
racy or executive power-sharing and self-adm
inistration for each major
national or ethnic group, or territorial sub-division or various forms of
minority local self-governm
ent. Those form
s can include federalism,
autonomy (territorial), regional and m
unicipal local government and
other (cultural autonomy). M
ost of these forms im
ply decentralizationand devolution of state pow
er.
In the most general sense, the right of self-determ
ination means the pow
erof nations or people to determ
ine their own international status, that is,
to become a state. E
xisting states and nations or peoples hold this right.W
ith the exception of the post-colonial territories and recently of indige-nous people, various sub-state groups do not posses that right but onlyclaim
it. Ultim
ately, however, those groups w
ho claim a legitim
acy (his-torical or otherw
ise) and are determined to secede through m
ilitary or vio-lent m
eans might succeed in establishing new
states.
Within the U
N system
, more states are ready to support so-called
“internal self-determination” in relation to indigenous people. T
heposition of the U
.S. National Security C
ouncil in this regard is as fol-low
s: “Indigenous people have a right of internal self-determination.
43
for comm
ents. Most participants of the Jadw
isin meeting received this docum
entprior to the m
eeting.
19A
. Mirga, Rom
a and the Question of Self-determ
ination: Fiction and Reality, a discussionpaper prepared for the Jadw
isin meeting, A
pril 15-16, 2002, PER
, Princeton, N.J.
20A
. Mirga, T
he Principle of Self-Determ
ination: The U
N Perspective, a discussion
paper prepared for the Jadwisin m
eeting, April 15-16, 2002, PE
R, Princeton, N
.J.
21T
he consultations started with a sem
inar “Rom
a Participation in Europe” organized
by the Finns and held in the Finnish Parliament on O
ctober 22, 2001. Since then,a num
ber of meetings have been organized by the Finnish authorities w
ith the sup-port of the C
ouncil of Europe. T
he consultations will end in Septem
ber of this year.
22B
. Haliti, Exodus of the R
omany from
the Original H
omeland, Establishing Tasks and
Contacts w
ith the Mother C
ountry and Recognition of Rom
any as a Historical,
Linguistic and National M
inority, a 20-page document w
ithout date or other refer-ences.
23O
n the so-called Hungarian status law
, see for example, a paper outlining the posi-
tion of the Hungarian G
overnment in relation to the act on H
ungarians living inneighboring countries, European C
omm
issionFor D
emocracy T
hrough Law(V
eniceC
omm
ission), CD
L(2001)80, Strasbourg 2001.
24M
ore on the position of the RN
C on this subject can be found in the PE
R report,
Leadership,Representation and the Status of the Roma, Princeton, N
.J., 2001, pp. 38-43.
25M
ore in C. N
ecula, The Legitim
acy of the Roma Representation: T
he Nation and the Self-
Determ
ination ofRoma People, a paper prepared for this m
eeting. No other references.
26M
ore on this topic in N. B
itu, An Inventory of C
rucial Points, a paper prepared forthis m
eeting, Rom
ani CR
ISS, Bucharest, A
pril 2002.
27See m
ore in B. Lakatos’ w
ritten statement prepared for this m
eeting. No title or
other references.
28M
ore in N. D
emeter’s statem
ent prepared for this meeting. N
o title or other references.
29V
arious aspects of the Rom
ani leadership legitimacy and roles w
ere extensively dis-cussed at the previous PE
R m
eeting. See Leadership, Representation and the Statusof the R
oma, op.cit., pp. 11-32.
30M
ore in I. Vesely, C
ontribution to the Discussion on R
oma Em
ancipation, a paper pre-pared for this m
eeting. No additional references.
31O
p. cit.
32M
ore on the topic in D. A
ckovic, Birth of R
oma N
ation, a paper prepared for thism
eeting, Belgrade. N
o additional references.
33M
ore on this issue in S. Stankiewicz, Europako Forum
Rom
ano (propozycja ke CE
(European Rom
aForum
Proposal to the Council of Europe), a paper prepared for this
meeting, in R
omanes. N
o additional references.
34For m
ore see I. Vesely, op .cit.
35M
ore on this issue in the PER
report, Leadership, Representation and the Status of theR
oma, op.cit.,pp. 33-41.
36O
p. cit.
42
NO
TES
1For m
ore on this topic see the PER
Report, Self-G
overnment in H
ungary: The
Gypsy/R
omaniE
xperience and Prospects for the Future, Princeton, N.J. 1997.
2T
he IRU
Declaration ‘W
e, the Rom
a Nation, H
ave a Dream
” was extensively dis-
cussed at the PER
Krakow
meeting on M
arch 9-10, 2001; see the PER
report,Leadership, Representation and the Status of the R
oma, Princeton, N
.J. 2001.
3T
his initiative was announced during a speech by the President of the R
epublic ofFinland, Tarja H
alonen, at the Parliamentary A
ssembly of the C
ouncil of Europe in
Strasbourg on January 24, 2001.
4See the PE
R report, T
he Rom
a in the Twenty-First C
entury: A Policy Paper,
Princeton, N.J. 1997.
5“T
he Rom
ani movem
ent: what shape, w
hat direction?” in Rom
a Rights, Q
uarterlyJournal of the
European Rom
a Rights C
enter, No. 4, 2001, p. 18.
6M
ore on this debate in the PER
report, Leadership, Representation and the Status ofthe R
oma, op.cit ., pp. 33-43.
7Report on the C
ondition of Rom
a in the OSC
E Region, OSC
E/OD
IHR
, Warsaw
,O
ctober 2000, File No. 166, pp. 14 and 19. T
he Report w
as comm
issioned by theO
SCE
for preparation by rapporteur Rudko K
awczynski. See also: R
oma in Europe:
Status Regulation through Self-Determ
ination, the RN
C D
ocument prepared for the
OSC
E, N
ovember 1998.
8Statem
ent of the IRU
President to the initiative of Mrs. Tarja H
alonen, President ofFinland, Strasbourg, D
ecember 13-14, 2001.
9T
he idea of the Charter w
as recently presented in the Report on the Condition of the
Rom
a in Europe, op. cit., pp. 20-25.10
Project of a Frame-Statute (M
oral Charter) of the R
omani People in the European
Union, no date or additional references m
ade to this document.
11“T
he Rom
ani movem
ent: what shape, w
hat direction?” in Rom
a Rights, op.cit. pp.
20-21.
12O
p. cit., p. 27.
13T
he 2001 PER
report, Leadership, Representation and the Status of the Rom
a,Princeton, illustrates the dilem
mas faced by the R
oma in defining them
selves.
14“W
orld C
onference against
Racism
, R
acial D
iscrimination,
Xenophobia,
andR
elated Intolerance,” in Rom
a Rights, Q
uarterly Journal of the European Rom
a Rights
Center, N
o. 4, 2000, pp. 67-69.
15See points 39–44 of the A
ction Plan. The w
hole text of the Declaration can be
found at http://ww
w.unhchr.ch/htm
l/racism/D
urban.htm.
16“R
omanies at the C
rossroads. The D
ilemm
a of Contem
porary Rom
any Politics,” inC
islo 1, v. 2, 2000.
17T
he Rom
anies in Central and Eastern Europe: Illusions and Reality, PE
R R
eport,Princeton, N
.J., 1992.
18T
he draft of the OSC
E A
ction Plan of Targeted Activities for R
oma and Sinti has
been w
orked out
by the
Contact
Point For
Rom
a and
Sinti Issues
at the
OSC
E/O
DIH
R office in W
arsaw and distributed am
ong the Rom
ani organizations
45
the European level. T
he non-paper also defined two kinds of R
omani constituen-
cies: Rom
ani comm
unities from w
hich the majority of delegates have to be chosen,
without governm
ent interference; and Rom
ani organizations active at the European
level such as the IRU
and RN
C. T
hese two organizations w
ould have either a rightto perm
anent and extensive observer status or to nominate a certain agreed-upon
number of delegates on their ow
n. In addition, various observer status in this bodyw
ould have international nongovernmental organizations prom
oting the rights ofR
oma, N
GO
s, parliamentary assem
blies of CoE
, OSC
E and E
U and som
e govern-m
ents (acting presidents of international institutions on rotational basis).
As regards the num
ber of delegates from countries, the non-paper distinguished
between those in w
hich the Rom
ani comm
unity is very large (5 seats), large (4), sig-nificant (3) and other (2). O
ut of 43 mem
ber states of the CoE
, 35 have Rom
anipopulations; therefore, the future R
omani body can reach 114 seats plus seats that
would be assigned to the IR
U and R
NC
.
The issue of the representativity of this body and w
ays to ensure it has been a focalpoint of the ‘non-paper’ proposal. T
he procedural issue was also raised in the draft
of the Parliamentary A
ssembly recom
mendation, “Legal Situation of the R
oma in
Europe.” It required having a E
uropean Rom
a Consultative Forum
“democratical-
ly established.” There has been, how
ever, an obvious discrepancy between the
Finnish perspective aiming to provide R
oma w
ith a representative body and theR
ecomm
endation’s formula that seeks to establish a consultative body. T
he Finnishscenario for setting up the body has been contested by the m
ajority of Rom
ani lead-ers and activists. For som
e mem
bers of the exploratory group, the Finnish propos-al exposed the basic dilem
ma of the w
hole initiative – should this body be “consul-tative” or “representative”? A
consultative body does not need to be necessarily rep-resentative. O
n the other hand, a representative body, if established through elec-tion, assum
es much m
ore legitimacy and pow
er to take decisions and act on its own
as a legal body. It would, how
ever, require a legal basis. Establishing such a repre-
sentative body at the level of Europe, that is transnationally, inevitably raises the dif-
ficult question of Rom
a citizenship and state sovereignty. Having this body con-
sultative leaves much room
for various ways of designating m
embership (by elec-
tion, delegation, nomination, com
petition, etc.), whereas a representative body
would have to follow
election procedures. Furthermore, a consultative body does
not undermine the legitim
acy of various existing structures of Rom
ani representa-tion, w
hereas a representative body, if assuming an exclusive role in negotiations and
consultations, might. (For m
ore see A. M
irga, Some Rem
arks on the Ways to Establish
a Pan-European Rom
ani Advisory B
ody, a paper presented at the exploratory groupm
eeting in Helsinki, Finland, M
arch 9-12, 2002.
40G
ATIE
F – Gypsies and Travelers International Evangelical Fellow
ship organization,established in 1994 in France.
41T
he Helsinki A
greement’s building blocks w
ere originally described in detail in N.
Gheorghe, C
hart ofRom
ani Organizations, a docum
ent prepared for the meeting of
the exploratory group for a pan-European R
oma A
dvisory Body, M
arch 11-12,2002, H
elsinki, Finland.
42In a later docum
ent, she developed an alternative proposal. In her view, the core of
this body should consist of Rom
ani representatives selected nationally in givencountries (80-100 representatives), and international R
omani organizations (IR
U,
RN
C, G
ATIE
F) should have 2-4 seats in it. In selecting “national” Rom
ani dele-gates to the E
uropean Rom
a Forum she opted for election, along the lines of the
Finnish model of establishing the R
oma A
dvisory Board. (R
omani organizations
44
37T
he Advisor on R
oma and Sinti Issues distributed also his docum
ent, a compilation
of various
documents
and m
inutes from
debates
that w
ere held
within
theexploratory group:T
he Stages of the Debates on the Proposal for Setting U
p a Rom
aRepresentative B
ody at Pan-EuropeanLevel (H
alonen Initiative),Inform
al briefingdrafted by the O
DIH
R C
PRSI, W
arsaw, A
pril 16, 2002.
38B
y October 2001, the Finnish M
inistry of Foreign Affairs, supported by the Finnish
Parliament and the C
ouncil of Europe’s D
irectorate General of Social C
ohesion,secured enough acceptance am
ong Rom
ani leaders for the initiative to concludew
ith the establishment of an exploratory group for further elaboration. Since then,
the exploratory group held several working sessions, either in H
elsinki or inStrasbourg (in D
ecember 2001 and in February and M
arch 2002). In the mean-
time, the C
omm
ittee on Legal Affairs and H
uman R
ights of the Council of E
urope’sParliam
entary Assem
bly began its work and consultations for adoption of a new
report and recomm
endation on the legal situation of the Rom
a in Europe. In its
drafts, the Com
mittee fully supported setting up a E
uropean consultative forum for
Rom
a. By the M
arch 2002 meeting of the exploratory group, a tentative nam
e forthis body, the “R
oma A
dvisory Forum,” had been adopted. T
his name w
as laterchanged to the “E
uropean Rom
a Forum.” T
hroughout this period, the explorato-ry group debated various aspects of setting up the E
uropean Rom
a Forum: aim
sand objectives, size, com
position and representative nature, functions and working
methods, institutional links and funding.
Elaborating further on the H
alonen initiative, the Finnish side set forth its major
objective – the establishment of a European R
omani representative body that w
ouldbe com
posed of Rom
a, selected by the Rom
a and working for the R
oma. It should
mainly be concerned w
ith articulating views representative of the R
oma. It should not
be mistaken for a R
omani civil society or in com
petition with it, nor should it be seen
as an umbrella for it. T
he representative body should be officially set up under theauspices of an international organization so as to provide official input into decision-m
aking processes. The body m
ust be given powers to m
ake recomm
endations or ini-tiatives and to report to an appropriate international organization, and should be con-sulted on standard-setting and program
matic m
easures on the European level thataffect the R
omani m
inorities. It should not be seen as an alternative or competing
avenue for participation in decision-making at the national or local levels. M
odalitiesthat are neutral and enjoy legitim
acy in the view of the R
oma as w
ell as governments
need to be developed for the selection of Rom
ani representatives. For more on this
topic, see A.M
. Nyroos, Participation in D
ecision-Making: A
Pan-European Represen-tative B
ody for Roma, a paper presented at the Finnish Parliam
ent House sem
inar onR
oma Participation in Europe, H
elsinki, Finland, October 22, 2001.
39T
he subject matter w
as raised in the exploratory group chair’s non-paper at theM
arch meeting of the group (N
on-Paper/5.3.2002). The Finnish M
P envisionedsetting up this body in a w
ay that would be representative and reflect the relative
size of Rom
ani constituencies in different European countries. In his proposal he
refrained from advocating an individual balloting procedure, deem
ing it problem-
atic in the case of ethnic minorities (for exam
ple, ethnic registration is forbidden bylaw
in many countries). Instead, he suggested organized conventions of R
omani
NG
Os in each country for the nom
ination of delegates to this body. The nom
ina-tions of delegates w
ould preferably be accomplished by general agreem
ent between
the NG
Os. In case no agreem
ent can be reached, the convention could resort tovoting. M
odel rules of procedures for doing so would be elaborated in advance at
47
52M
ore in: H. H
annum, A
utonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-D
etermination, R
evisedE
dition, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, C
hapter 5, “Indigenous Rights,”
pp. 74-106.
53See
for exam
ple, A
. R
oberts, “B
eyond the
Flawed
Principle of
National
Self-D
etermination,”
in People,
Nation
and State.
T
he M
eaning of
Ethnicity and
Nationalism
, ed. by E. M
ortimer w
ith R. Fine. I.B
. Tauris Publisher, 1999, pp. 77-106.
54For m
ore on this topic see B. Slattery, T
he Paradoxes of National Self-D
etermination, 1995.
55R
. M. H
ayden, Yugoslavia: “Where Self-D
etermination M
eets Ethnic C
leansing,”in N
ew PerspectivesQ
uarterly, V. 9, (Fall), pp. 41-46.56
U.S. N
ational Security Council, position on Indigenous People (January 18, 2001),
University of M
innesota, Hum
an Rights Library.
57For
more
on this
topic, see
Y.N.
Kly
and D
. K
ly, “T
he R
ight to
Self-D
etermination,” C
ollected Papers and Proceedings of the First International Conference
on the Right to Self-D
etermination and the U
nitedN
ations, Geneva 2000. See also,
among
others, activities
of the
UN
PO
(Unrepresented
Nations
and Peoples
Organization) based in T
he Hague claim
ing nearly 50 mem
bers worldw
ide or theLichtenstein Institute on Self-D
etermination, based in Princeton, N
.J.
46
would choose their candidates from
among their m
embers by internal elections or
decisions of their boards, the ministry responsible for R
omani affairs w
ould work as
facilitator and guarantor of the fairness of the process, and finally those selectedw
ould be officially appointed as representatives by governments.) For m
ore on this,see M
. Vuolasranta, European R
oma Forum
. Proposal/Alternative M
odel of Com
posi-tion, Selection and Size ofER
F,May 22, 2002. N
o additional references.
43N
. Gheorghe, C
hart of Rom
ani Organizations, a docum
ent prepared for the meet-
ing of the exploratory group meeting in H
elsinki, March 11-12, 2002.
44T
he Stage of the Debates on the Proposal for Setting U
p a Rom
a Representative Body at
Pan-EuropeanLevel (the H
alonen Initiative), op. cit .45
In May 2002 at another session of the exploratory group in Strasbourg som
e addi-tional com
promise solutions w
ere worked out: T
he number of seats for the IR
Uand the R
NC
in this body dropped to 15 for each organization. It was agreed that
the Rom
ani political parties which have elected representation at local and nation-
al levels and/or are elected from m
ainstream parties w
ould be entitled to delegateone representative each to the body. A
lso, the Rom
ani ‘national’ representationw
ould consist of two delegates from
each mem
ber state of the CoE
, with the
Rom
ani comm
unity representing Rom
ani national nongovernmental organizations
or umbrella N
GO
s. There w
ill be one more m
eeting to conclude the work of the
exploratory group.
46T
he IRU
position has changed since the so-called “Helsinki A
greement” has been
reached. Clearly, concerns that setting up a new
representative body for Rom
aw
ould inevitably undermine the IR
U claim
to be the political representation of aproclaim
ed Rom
a nation were the cornerstone for its initial reservations about the
Finnish initiative. Responding to that challenge, the IR
U proposed to seek the
good will and resources of the Finnish authorities in helping R
oma organize them
-selves in a different w
ay, by accepting the IRU
framew
ork and helping to elect a“constitutional body of a R
oma nation” as proposed by the IR
U Parliam
entR
esolution adopted at its Skopje session (2002). The IR
U-proposed “constitution-
al body” obviously differs essentially from w
hat the Finnish initiative intends to setup. It is interesting that the IR
U has opted for election as a procedure in establish-
ing Rom
ani representation.
47T
he Fourteen Points, contained in the Address of the President of the U
nited StatesD
elivered at a Joint Session of the Two H
ouses of Congress, January 8, 1918. Papers
Relating to the ForeignRelations of the U
nited States, 1918, Supplement 1, T
he World
War, W
ashington, D.C
. US G
overnment Printing O
ffice, 1933, vol. 1, pp. 12-15.
48International C
ovenant on Economic, Social and C
ultural Rightsand the International
Covenant on C
ivil and Political Rights. B
oth were adopted on D
ecember 16, 1966.
49T
he UN
organized the World C
onference on Hum
an Rights in V
ienna (1993)resulting in the D
eclaration and Programm
e of Action.
50For m
ore on this issue, see A. E
ide, “Territorial Integrity of States, Minority
Protection, and Guarantees for A
utonomy A
rrangements: A
pproaches and Roles of
the United N
ations,” in Local Self-Governm
ent, Territorial Integrity and Protection ofM
inorities, Proceedings of the UniD
em Sem
inar, Lausanne, April 25-27, 1996,
Council of E
urope Collection, Science and technique of dem
ocracy, No. 16, 1996,
pp. 273-303.
51O
p. cit.,pp. 283-287.
49
Livia P
laks, Executive D
irector, Project on Ethnic R
elations, USA
Iulius Rostas,International A
dvocacy Officer, E
uropean Rom
a Rights
Center, H
ungary
Norm
unds Rudevics, M
ember of the Foreign A
ffairs Com
mittee,
Parliament of the R
epublic of Latvia
Stanislaw Stankiew
icz,Prime V
ice President, International Rom
aniU
nion; Rom
a Council, Poland
Ivan Vesely,Head, D
zeno Association; C
omm
issioner for Media,
International Rom
ani Union, C
zech Republic
Miranda Vuolasranta,Secretary G
eneral, Advisory B
oard on Rom
aniA
ffairs, Ministry of Social A
ffairs and Health, Finland
48
LIS
T OF
PA
RTIC
IPA
NTS
Dragoljub A
ckovic, President, Rom
a Congress Party, Yugoslavia
Osm
an Balic,President of the E
xecutive Board, Y
UR
OM
Center;
Mem
ber, International Rom
ani Union; Yugoslavia
Nicoleta B
itu, Rom
ani CR
ISS, Rom
ania
Nadezhda D
emeter, Senior R
esearcher, Institute of Ethnography and
Anthropology, R
ussian Academ
y of Sciences, Russian Federation
Asm
et Elezovski,C
oordinator, Rom
ani Com
munity C
enter DR
OM
,K
umanovo, M
acedonia
Orhan G
aljus, Program M
anager, Open Society Institute,
Netw
ork Media Program
– Rom
a Media Fund, H
ungary
Nicolae G
heorghe, Adviser on R
oma and Sinti Issues, C
ontact Pointfor R
oma and Sinti Issues, O
DIH
R/O
SCE
Ondrej G
ina, President, Fund of Hope and U
nderstanding, C
zech Republic
Erika G
odlova,Interpreter, Slovak Republic
Salome H
irvaskoski, Officer on R
oma and Sinti Issues,
OD
IHR
/OSC
E
Rudko K
awczynski, M
ember of the B
oard of Directors,
Rom
a National C
ongress, Germ
any
Nikolay K
irilov, Director, R
oma-Lom
Foundation, Bulgaria;
Director, Pakiv E
uropean Rom
a Fund, Hungary
Bela L
akatos, Director, Pedagogical R
esource Center, M
inistry of E
ducation, Hungary
Andrzej M
irga, Chair, PE
R R
omani A
dvisory Council; C
o-Chair,
Council of E
urope Specialist Group on R
oma/G
ypsies; Poland
Nezdet M
ustafa,Mayor, M
unicipality of Shuto Orizari, M
acedonia
Ciprian N
ecula, Coordinator, M
edia Project, Rom
ani CR
ISS,R
omania
Klara O
rgovanova, Plenipotentiary for Rom
ani Com
munity,
Governm
ent of the Slovak Republic
51
■Schools, L
anguage, and Interethnic Relations in R
omania: T
he Debate
Continues (1998)
■T
he Rom
a in Bulgaria: C
ollaborative Efforts B
etween L
ocal Authorities
and Nongovernm
ental Organizations (1998)
■B
altic-Russian R
elations in the New
Geopolitical Fram
ework (1998)
■Political Participation and the R
oma in H
ungary and Slovakia (1999)
■B
uilding Rom
anian Dem
ocracy: The Police and Ethnic M
inorities (1999)
■C
atastrophe in the Balkans: Serbia's N
eighbors and the Kosovo C
onflict(1999)
■State Policies Tow
ard Rom
ani Com
munities in C
andidate Countries to
the EU
: Governm
ent and Rom
ani Participation in Policy–Making (1999)
■M
ontenegro on the Brink: Avoiding A
nother Yugoslav War (2000)
■R
oma and the L
aw: D
emythologizing the Stereotype of “G
ypsyC
riminality” (2000)
■Vojvodina: T
he Politics of Interethnic Accom
modation (2000)
■T
he Year 2000 Elections in R
omania: Interethnic R
elations andEuropean Integration (2000)
■T
he Rom
a in Hungary: G
overnment Policies, M
inority Expectations,
and the International Com
munity (2000)
■Tow
ard Com
munity Policing: T
he Police and Ethnic M
inorities inH
ungary (2000)
■A
lbanians and Their N
eighbors: Unfinished B
usiness (2000)
■R
oma and Statistics (2000)
■R
oma and the G
overnment in Slovakia: T
he Debate O
ver M
igration (2000)
■A
lbanians as Majorities and M
inorities: A R
egional Dialogue (2001)
■State Policies Tow
ard the Rom
a in Macedonia (2001)
■Parliam
entary Representation of M
inorities in Hungary: L
egal andPolitical Issues (2001)
■Political W
ill: Rom
ania’s Path to Ethnic A
ccomm
odation (2001)
■Yugoslav R
oma Face the Future (2001)
■L
eadership, Representation and the Status of the R
oma (2001)
■Yugoslavia at the C
rossroads (2002)
■T
he Bulgarian E
thnic Experience (2002)
■Political E
xtremism
and Interethnic Relations in the N
ew M
illennium(2002)
50
OTH
ER
PE
R P
UB
LIC
ATIO
NS
■R
omanian-A
merican Sym
posium on Inter-Ethnic R
elations (1991)
■T
he Rom
anies in Central and E
astern Europe: Illusions and Reality
(1992)
■N
ationality Policy in the Russian Federation (1992)
■Interethnic R
elations in Serbia/Yugoslavia: Alternatives for the Future
(1993)
■T
he Media of E
astern Europe and the Former Soviet U
nion: Reporting on
Interethnic Relations (1994)
■M
anaging Ethnic Conflict: T
he Kona Statem
ent (1994)
■C
ountering Anti-R
oma V
iolence in Eastern Europe: T
he SnagovC
onference and Related E
fforts (1994)
■Ethnonationalism
: Fears, Dangers, and Policies in the Post-C
omm
unistW
orld (1995)
■Slovakia R
oundtable in the United States (1995)
■D
emocratic P
rocesses and Ethnic Relations in Yugoslavia (1995)
■R
ussia and Eastern and C
entral Europe: Old D
ivisions and New
Bridges
(1996)
■Second Slovakia R
oundtable (1996)
■Ethnic R
elations: A Selected B
ibliography (1996)
■R
eporting in a Post-Conflict Environm
ent: Bosnian and C
roat JournalistsM
eet (1996)
■T
he Media and the R
oma in C
ontemporary Europe: Facts and Fictions
(1996)
■T
he Rom
a in the Twenty-First C
entury: A Policy Paper (1997)
■P
revention of Violence and D
iscrimination A
gainst the Rom
a inC
entral and Eastern Europe (1997)
■Enhancing R
egional Security: Russian and C
entral European Perspectives(1997)
■T
he New
York Roundtable: Tow
ard Peaceful Accom
modation in K
osovo(1997)
■Im
ages and Issues: Coverage of the R
oma in T
he Mass M
edia in Rom
ania(1997)
■Self-G
overnment in H
ungary: The G
ypsy/Rom
ani Experience and
Prospects for the Future (1997)
■Political L
eaders on Interethnic Relations and R
egional Security inC
entral Europe: A R
oundtable (1998)
■Interethnic R
elations in the Balkans: N
ew G
eneration, New
Politics(1998)