Rogers Scepticism

8/10/2019 Rogers Scepticism

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rogers-scepticism 1/16

hilosophical Review

ScepticismAuthor(s): A. K. RogersSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Nov., 1904), pp. 627-641Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2176306 .

Accessed: 29/11/2014 16:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access to The Philosophical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 109.151.255.37 on Sat, 29 Nov 2014 16:47:05 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=philreview

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2176306?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp





http://www.jstor.org/stable/2176306?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=philreview

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke



SCEPTICISM.

J

the

present rticle

shall

have n mind chiefly,

s the

objec-

tivepoint,

he questionofthepossibility f

a final nd satisfac-

tory hilosophy. And by

scepticism shall

mean here hat

ome-

what

unsystematicttitude

whose ground s tobe found

primarily

in

an appeal to

the factof error,nd a

challenge to point out

the

marksby whichwe might

recognize truth if

we once were

to

stumble on it. I am quitewilling, hesceptic may say, to

renounce he

task of provingdogmatically

hat we cannot

know

reality s it is. I only reserve

he right o

ask: If we can

know

truth, ray

where is it ? Produce a

specimen of truth

that

s

certain, dmitted, ndubitable.

Until this can

be done, you

can

hardlycomplain

f exercise

the privilege f withholding

udg-

ment. And

now what

likelihood s therethatyou will be

suc-

cessful in such a task ? Let me point out first hat there s

indubitably he thingwhich

we are

accustomed to call error.

Men

have

proved to be mistakenn theirmost

cherished

eliefs;

or, better, hese beliefs have

come to be

rejected, nd

rejected

almost

universally. In the

life of the

individual thinker the

same

thing is

true. That man

is rare ndeed, f he exists at

all,

who

has not

been compelled to

discardbeliefs

whichonce seemed

to him fullywarranted. Indeed, the more we examine into it,

the

more we

recognize

n

how

thoroughgoing way human

ex-

perience

s

infectedwiththe

disease of

uncertainty.

Essentially

everybelief

s

fluctuating,ubject to dispute

nd

contradiction,

transitory

n the

sway

which

t

holds over men's minds.

Even

the

testimony

f

the senses is

constantly

eading

us

astray;

judged, indeed,

by the standard

of science, tnever ven approxi-

mates thetruth. And in the realm of opinion, s opposed to

judgments

of

sense perception,

n

even

greater

onfusion xists.

It

is

worst

f

all in

philosophy.

Perhaps there

neverwas

a time

when

men

were

more dividedthan at the

present, nd that,

oo,

not

upondetails

merely, ut on

the great

essentials. One

man

says

mind s real

and not

matter; anothermatter, nd

not mind.

627







628

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL.

XIII.

One saysthat

they

have

equal reality,

nd one

that

neither

ep-

resents he

truth. And none of these

philosophers,withall

his

arguments, an convince he others, lthough all are sincere nd

honest

men,who love the

truth, nd have their

mindsopen

to

admit it.

And

if the most of

them are

certainlywrong,

why

may not this be true of all

? Rather,must not

this be so,

since

otherwise omeone

surely

would be able

to

give

reasons forhis

belief

hat

should

carry

conviction

What,now,

seem

to be

the essential factsof

the

case,

in

view

of thisscepticalcomplaint And first fall, it is to be noticed

thatto

be

a consistent

ceptic,

man

should be

ready to

commit

himself o the

definite osition

hat he has

no reason to

accept

any

one

thing

s true above

any

other

thing.

But,

as a

matter

of

fact,

n

any

reasonable

being

this

can

only

be the veriest

pre-

tence; one

who makes

such

an

assertion

may

without

hesitation

be

set

down

as,

consciously

or

not,

posing

for

effect.

We

are,

as Montaigne ays,naturalbelievers. A man can no morehelp

believing

omething,

f he

is still a

thinking

nimal,

than

he

can

help

breathing,

nd still remain

live. Whetheror not

he can

justify

his

belief o

others,whether

or

not

he

can

point

out

any

standard to which belief

must

conform,

e still

inevitably

will

find

himself

elieving.

He

may

realize

that there s the

abstract

possibility

that

every

one

of his

beliefs

will

sometime n

the

futurebe overturned. But thepresenttruth still seems to him

to

be

true;

he

still

asserts

it

to the exclusion of

its

opposite.

At the

very

east

he

asserts,

.

e.,

he

believes

n,

the truth

hat

he

is

sceptical

of

all

truth.

Otherwise

he

would be

trying o

adopt

the

impossible ttitude

f

asserting

nd

denying

he same

thing

at

the same

time.

The

first

oint s, then,

hat

all men

do believe

something,

nd

that no possible difficultiesbout the theoryof belief will ever

stop

their

doing this,

so

long

as

they

choose to

think

at

all.

Of

course a man

may

stop thinking.

But then he is no

longer

a

sceptic;

he is

intellectually nonentity.

In

other

words,

a

man

cannotthink,

nd at

the

same time

really

nd

fundamentally

doubt the

power

of

thought

o

attain to

some

degree

of

truth.

I

may

doubt

a

former esult of

thought,

ut

only by

accepting







No. 6.]

SCEPTICISM.

629

forthe

timebeing the validity

f the process

by which

doubt

it. For

the doubt

itself presupposes the

very thing

that is

doubted. Doubt is notmereabsence of belief. In doubting,

am

also

thinking.

I am using

thought to overthrow

hought.

I

am

using

premises,

hat s, whichmy conclusion

ays

are false,

in order

to reach this

very conclusion.

Any particular

ruth

may perhaps

doubt,except the

truth hat

n the thinking

rocess

truth s implied.

And now

the second

point is this: that

if we do

necessarily

believe something,we have no right n thebasis of thesceptic's

argument

merely o

stop at any

particularpoint, nd

say that

beyond

this beliefcannot go.

All I am

justified n

saying is,

that I cannot at

present come

to any

conclusion about the

matter;

not that some one else

may not have

valid reasons

for

belief,

r

that myselfmay not

in

the

future

ee

my

way

clearer.

The fact

hat

am not as yet

convinced,

urnishes

no ground

whatever orthe conclusionthatthe truthwill never be known.

It may,

ndeed, nduce

me to give up the

search as

hopeless.

But this

s

just

the

theoretical

weakness

of scepticism.

Scepti-

cism,

in

other

words, stands

primarily

s a

disinclination

o

prosecute

he search

further. It is a personal

confession

hat,

n

the

face

of

a certain

roblem

or

group

of

problems,

feel

myself

baffled

nd

ready

to

quit.

And it

is

significant

hat

commonly

it is the attitudeof the amateur, f the one who approaches a

subject

withonly

a subsidiarynterest

n

it,

and

who

has not

the

time

or the

will

to

push

through

o

theend.

No

man

s

a

sceptic

in

every

direction.

Few men are

sceptics

in the

special

field

which

they

have

made their own.

We have had in our

own

day

a

striking

llustration

f

this

n the case

of

Professor uxley.

Professor

Huxley

is a

sceptic

n

ultimate

uestions

of

philosophy.

He has

thought

ar

enough

to see the difficultiesf theproblem,

and

his

interest

s not

sufficiento

carry

him

through

these

difficulties

hich

oom

up

before

him.

In

precisely

he same

way,

and

for

he

same

reason,

he is a

sceptic

n

another

ield

lso.

He

has

an

interest

n

a

certain

omplicated

iterary roblem,

the

relationship

f the

first

hree

Gospels,

and

he

has followed

he

discussions

far

enough

to

be

aware of the differences

f

the







630

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL. XIII.

result,

nd the great complexity

f the

data. And the conse-

quence is that here

too he

is satisfied

o stop the inquiry

n

despairofany final ettlement. The problem,he says, is in all

probability

ncapable

of being solved.

And yet there

really

s

no

ground

for uch

an attitude.

To the one who

has made

a

business

of it, to the

expert in that particular

ield,

here seems

every

reason to believe that

the solution

is not

very far way.

The differences

re

on the

surface; but underneath

here is

a

solid basis of secure

result,whichgives

everypromise

f success.

And the significanthing bout it is this,that ProfessorHuxley

was himself he very

opposite

of a sceptic

n other directions,

n

which scepticism eems

at least

equally justified.

Nothing

can

be finer han his robust

faith

n the future f science,

and in

the

possibility

of

an

answer to the

most intricate uestions,

which

science

has as yet scarcely

proposed

to herself.

Professor

Huxley would have been the

first o decry

a despair

of science

as weak and wholly baseless. And yet here, surely,we have

difficulties

uite

as great as

in the synopticproblem,

t least.

The

difference

s

simply differencef

interest.

One problem

he

approaches

as

an avocation,the other

as a business.

He

is

ready o

give up thefirst ecause

he does

not care for

tsufficiently

to

carry it to its

issue. The

other he

is determined

o solve,

and so he

thinks

t solvable.

The point s, then, hat scepticismmeansa personaldefeat nd

loss

of interest.

There may

be nothing

that

can

compel

the

sceptic

to believe

that a solution

s possible.

But,

on the

other

hand,

his

attitude

ontains bsolutelyno

reason

whythe problem

should be given up, or why

another

man

should

feel the least

hesitation bout grappling

with it, f

he

wants

to

do

so.

It

is

wholly

a matter

whether r not the desire

for

he

solution

xists.

If it does

exist,

a mere

appeal

to past

failureswill

only

act as a

spur

to endeavor.

And this s

just

as

true of

an

ultimate

philo-

sophical

inquiry, s

it

is of

any

minorproblem

of

knowledge.

The line

cannot

be

drawn at any particular

oint.

Now

the fact

is that the

philosophical

or the

metaphysical

mpulse

does

exist.

It shows,

ndeed,

no

sign

of diminution.

And this s

a

sufficient

reason,

notonlywhy metaphysics

will

continue,

ut

why

it

has







No.

6.]

SCEPTICISM.

63I

a

right

to continue.

The

sceptic

has no more business

to uni-

versalize

his own

attitude,

han a child would have to

demand

thateverybody hould stop playing because he himself s tired.

And

yet

to

stop

here would be

doing

an

injustice

o

the

real

significance

o which

scepticism undoubtedly may lay claim.

And, first,

ts

practical ignificance.

Taken

merely

s one

aspect

of the

thought process, scepticism

has

an

important

unction o

perform.

It stands for criticism

f all

positiveresults,

nd the

demand

that we should not

stop

with too

easy

a

conviction

f

truth. The thinker as always need to be on the alert lest he

acquiesce

too

hastily

n a

particular olution,

nd allow

the

plastic

spirit

f

thought

o

harden

nto ome

narrow

mould.

Scepticism

is the

crystallization

f

the attitude f a distrust f

finality. It

calls

for ontinued

riticism,

or onstant

penness

of mind

to

new

evidence.

Looked

at

in this

way, scepticism

will

always be a

necessary

moment

of

thought. Ideally, every

man

his

own

scepticmightrepresenthehighestpointofefficiencyn thought.

But since it

is

a hard

matter

or

he

philosopher

o

play

the

scep-

tic

towards his own attained

results,

t

perhaps

s

well,

n

addition

to the criticism hat

comes

from ival

theories,

o

have

the

atti-

tude of

scepticism

omewhat

pecialized,

nd

put

in

the hands

of

a fewwhose movements re

as little s

possible hampered

by a

committal o

positive

results.

But at the same

time,

he

need

is

relative, ot absolute. Far from enying hevalidity fthought,

it rather

presupposes

it.

In

other

words,

the

verypossibility f

doubt

rests

upon

the

assumption

f

truth.

It

presupposes

not

only

that truth

s

attainable,

ut also

that

in

some

degree it

has

already

been

attained. No

general

doubt

of

the

senses, e.

g.,

becomes

possible, except

as a

new

standard of

truth has

been

erected,by

reference o which we are able to

condemn

he senses

as fallacious. Anyreal doubtis based upon reasons; and reasons

imply

that

lready

we

take

ourselvesto be in

possession

of

ome-

thing

n

the

nature

of truth.

But

there

s also another and theoretical

spect

of

scepticism,

which

has

not received

ustice

n

what

has

hitherto

een

said.

For

there

s,

after

ll,

a

real

problem

which

scepticism roposes. I

will

grant

o

you, thescepticmight

e

supposedtosay, all

that







632

THE

PHILOSOPRICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL.

XIII.

you have claimed.

I will allow that certaingeneral assumptions

about the existence nd nature ftruth re

involved n the attempt

to think at all. I will allow that we always do, as a matter f

fact,findourselvesbelieving many things.

But that does

not

touch

the main point at issue. What I am chiefly oncerned

about, is

not

to

know that there is such a thing

as

truth,

ut to

discoverwhat particular oncrete beliefs

re

true,

nd what

are

not true. And just

this s what I claim

we have no groundsfor

determining. At

a given time,no doubt,

believe that

a certain

thing s true. But I also in thepast have had theexperienceof

believing things ust

as

strongly,which

I afterwards ame

to

doubt.

What

confidence an

I have

that

history

will not

repeat

itself? This

is in a sense an abstractpossibility, o doubt.

But

does

not the bare

possibility

hrow

wavering

nd

uncertain

ight

over all our supposed knowledge? And

must not any reason-

able

man

admit

the

possibilityhat n anyparticular

ase

he

may

be mistaken? He does not believe that he is mistaken. But

would

not the denial of the

bare possibility

hat he may be,

mark

him

at

once as a dogmatist? For, again, how is he to single

out

these beliefs of his which

by no possibility

an change?

He

surely does

not

consider hat all his present

beliefs re eternally

and

unalterably

ixed. If

past experiencebe any guide,

some

of

them

are

sure to

change

in

the future. How

is he to be certain

thatany particular elief s notamongthealtogether ndetermi-

nate number f these

convictions hat

are

destined

o alter?

Has

he

any guarantee

beyond

the

degree

of assurance which

he feels,

the clearnesswithwhich the

truth omes

home to him

?

But is

not this also a clear truth f

experience,

hat,

s a

criterion,

lear-

ness and

warmth

of conviction

may be

misleading? Such

an

assurance

may

fail

us

again,

as it has

often ailed

us

in

the

past.

And still ess does itgive us any rationalgroundfor oming

to

a decision between he beliefs f differenten.

I

have certain

beliefswhich

seem

to

me

true;

and I have

confidence,

herefore,

that when these

beliefs

are

denied by

some

other man, t

is he

who

is

mistaken,

nd

not

myself.

But what

right

have

I to

this

confidence?

Surely

I am not

ready

to set myself up as

the

standard

of

truth,

nd maintain hat whoeverdiffers rom me is







No.

6.]

SCEPTICISM.

633

thereby roved to be wrong. Every man will no doubt

decide

that his

own final onviction s justified. But this

rationally

s

not satisfying. Must we not, n short,fall back upon thestate-

mentthat we believe a thing implybecause we feel sure

that it

is

true; and is not this practically dmitting he sceptic's

conten-

tion

There is no criterionwhich will enable us to give a

dem-

onstration orour certaintyhat any particular oncrete

udgment

about the world s unalterably rue.

There is much in this position withwhich I find myself n

agreement. In the first lace, I cannot but think here s a sense

in which, n the last analysis,we have to depend upon our own

private assurance, or feeling of conviction. For

himself,

ach

man

is necessarily he court of last resort. In spite of his

dis-

agreementwithother men, n spite of his own past

changes of

opinion,he believes a certain hing; and, while he may be able to

give good reasonsfor his

belief,

fter ll the main point s, n

the

case ofhis reasons as well as of the opinionwhich hese support,

that he

finds himselfbelieving. There is something n him

to

which

the belief ppeals. He finds atisfactionn it.

His whole

nature seems to flow harmoniouslyn this direction. There is

no

sense of conflict. In a word, he is assured of ts truth.

The

second point s closely related o the first. I

think hat t

needs also to be admittedthat logical certainty elongs

only

to

theabstract tatement f the conditions fbelief, nd not to any

single concretebelief bout the actual natureof things.

We are

justified,f we think t all, in saying that true thoughtmust be

consistent, hat t must not contradict tself. But what

the

con-

crete

nature s of the real existencewhich is absolute

and self-

consistent,we are not justified n asserting, except

with the

proviso, n each particular ase, that we may possiblybe

mistaken

in

our judgment. Of course I do not mean thatwe may not

believe withverygreat confidence hat

we are

in

possession

of

a

final

nd essentially nchangeable ruth.

It is

only

the

ustifica-

tion of

the

impossibility

f the

contrary

hat is

lacking.

The

only thing hatwe can restupon

is

the abstract

aw of

contradic-

tion.

If we are

going

to

think,

we

are bound to think

n a

way

which

does

not involve

both

the assertion nd

the denial

of

the







634

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL.

XIII.

same

thing

at the

same

time.

No

man can consciously

and

intentionally

o this,

ny

morethan

he

can

move backward

and

forwardt the same time,or lifthis hand at the same timethat

he leaves

it

at

rest. Indeed,

the

law of

contradiction,

ut

in

psycho-physical

erms,

would

seem

to

involve

precisely

this

physical

mpossibility;

he

motor

spects

ofassertion

nd of

nega-

tion

are

contrary,

nd

mutually

inhibit

each other.

But

any

concrete

belief

whatsoever,

ntended

to

refer o the

real

world,

may

conceivably

be outgrown.

Such

a concrete

belief

is

in

every case an hypothesismerely,held subject to correction y

further

nowledge.

If

our

belief rulyrepresents

he

facts,

hen

the

contraryannot

possibly

be true.

Valid knowledge

must

be

consistent.

But

are we

ever

justified

n saying,

bsolutelyand

beyond

the

possibility

f

question:

In this

particular

concrete

judgment

about

reality,

have

reached

the bed rock

of

truth,

and

it is

inconceivable

hat

either

now

or

in

the future

ewlight

should be thrownupon it, or that it should get a different

interpretation

'

Again,

this does

not deny

the practical

fact

of

assurance.

It only

is

meant to point

out

that,

however strong

our conviction,

t

never

warrants

s

in

shutting

ut the

possibility

of what

maybe

a

truer

nterpretation,

n

interpretation

hich

may

conceivably

nvolve

a

modification

n

our

present

belief.

But now

ifwe

grant

this,

does

the

sceptical

conclusion

follow,

that thereforewe have no ground forpreferringne beliefto

another

Does

it make

the mere

factthat

we feelassurance

the

sole

guarantee

or criterion

f truth,

nd

so

take

away

all

possi-

bility

f deciding

n

case

of

conflict

It

seems

clear that

this

s

not

necessarily

consequence

at all.

Let

me

attempt

once more

to state

the

problem.

There

is

a

sense

in

which

t

seems

to

be true

that

the final

guarantee

of our

belief s thefact hatwe believe. The thing s felt o be trueand

self-consistent,

nd

that s the

end of

the matter.

On

the other

hand, the

test

has frequently

ailed.

It

has

not

prevented

our

convictions

from

hanging;

and

it has

not

prevented

men

from

1

I emphasize

the

word concrete.'

In

abstract

hought

e

may

indeed

be sure

that

nothing

ill come

n

to

change

ur

onclusion,

ecause

we

have

arbitrarily

imited

thefield

y

choosing

o confine

ur

meaning

o

certain

articular

ata. This

furnishes

a

specialproblem,

ut do

not think

t nterferes

ith

mypresent

ontention.







No.

6.]

SCEPTICISM.

635

holding

opposite

beliefs

bout the same

thing.

Why,

then, f

ts

claim

has

been

discredited

once,

shouldwe trust

ust

the

same

claimagain? Orhow, ftwosuch claimscome nconflict,hould

we judge

between

them?

If

the

test is

sufficient

n one case,

it

is

sufficient

n

all,.

and

all beliefs

are

justified.

If

it is

not

sufficient

n every

case,

it

is

sufficient

n

none.

Now practically,

n

spite

of

everything

hat maybe said,

we

do

consider

ourselves

to be

in

possession

of some criterion

e-

yondthe

bare

feeling

of

clearness

or certainty.

How

is it that

this actually works? And I may take the case where two

opposite opinions

about

a

given

matter

are

held

by

different

men.

Now,

in such

a

case,

each

man must be

for himself he

final

udge.

But does

this

mean,

practically,

hat

a

man has no

guarantee

of

the superiority

f

his own belief,

eyond

themere

factthat

t

is

his?

Each

man

will

say

for

himself:

My

conclu-

sion seems

to me to

be

the

truer;

for

otherwise t

could notbe

mine. But it is quitepossiblethathe should see a logical justi-

fication lso

for his partiality

owards

himself,

o that his

recog-

nition

f

the otherman's

equal

confidence

would

have,

and

ought

to have,

no

tendency

o

disturb

his own

opinion.

There are two

ways

in

which beliefs ctually

are

held,

both

of

them

quiteapart

from

the unthinking

ppeal

to

mere blind

personal prejudice,

Some

beliefs

we hold as

probable,

nd

yet

when

we come

up

againsta strongdifferencef opinion, t shakes our confidence

little.

We

find

ourselves

hesitating

nd

wavering,

nd if at

last

we

come to

a

decision

and reassert

our

belief,

we still

feel that

we have

no

way

of

showing

decisively,

ither

to

ourselves or

others,

hat

our

opponent

may

not

possibly

be

right.

It remains

to

some

extent

ust

a conflict

f

authority,

nd we decide

forour

own

side

simply

ecause

we are

ourselves,

nd

no man

can in

the

last resortgo back of whatseemstrueto him. Most of our be-

liefs

nto which

we

grow

without ny

careful

xamination f their

foundations,

re

likely

to

meet with

such

an

experience

s this.

But there

lso are

cases where

none

of

this

hesitation

s

felt.

The

fact that some

one disagrees

with

us

does

not n the least affect

our

confidence.

Indeed,

it

may

even

strengthen

ur

conviction.

We

feel

that

our final

decision

s

dictated,

not

by

the

factthat

t







636

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL.

XIII.

is

to us

as

individuals

that the

casting

vote

falls,

but by some-

thing n the situation

which

gives

us

a

logical precedence

which

it denies to our adversary, nd enables us to play the part of

abstract nd impartial

eason.

The practical

ground

for this

distinction t is of course

not

difficult

o discover. Generally speaking,

we have a

logical

right,

s opposed

to

a psychological

disposition,

o prefer ur

own assurance

to that of another,

only

when we are able to

recognize

the relative

ruth

of all forwhich our

opponent

con-

tends, see it fromhis point of view, and understandfully he

reasons

which appeal

to him,and

still can find

hat we are able

to hold

to our

own standpoint

s moreadequate and inclusive,

as accounting

for all

the

facts hat

he

recognizes,

nd others

be-

side.

No one is

in

a position

definitely

nd

finally o reject n

opposing

opinion,

ntilhe can

put

himself

ympathetically

n the

place

of the one who

holds it, and

understand

why t seems to

him true. Justso long as we are simply nthe polemicalatti-

tude,

and

find

the view

that

we are

opposing

wholly

rrational

and absurd and false,

o

long

as there is

anything

n it which

strikes

us

as

entirelywithoutground

and

motive,

we may take

this as

equally

a reflection

pon ourselves, nd

suspect

that the

grounds

of

our own udgment

re

still

ncomplete

nd in

need

of

partial

reconstruction. When,

however,

t is

possible

for us to

say: I also should hold to my opponent'sopinion,f werelim-

ited to

his data;

but these new facts,

r new

aspects of

the old

facts,which

he has

failed

to

recognize,

ompel

a

different

nswer,

-

when one can

say this,

ne

feels

oneself

n safe

ground.

The

new facts

need not

be

part

of the immediate ubject

matter

f

the

problem

in hand. They may

be

obscure

presuppositions

hat

exist in the

background

of

our

opponent's

consciousness,

nd

create prejudiceswhich affecthis attitudetowardconcretemat-

ters

of

opinion.

Then we

give

what we

call

in

a

special

sense a

psychological

xplanation

of

his

belief,

nd

show

how it

springs

naturally

from

these limitations

f his mental

outlook,

which

make

it

impossible

for

him

to

approach

the evidence

n

a

way

to

see what

it

actually

contains.

But in either

case the

general

method

is

the same.

We

feel ourselves

logically justified

n







No.

6.]

SCEPTICISM.

637

overriding nother's

opinion,

because

we think

that we

have a

point

of view which

includes

all

that our opponent

sees, and

enables us to admit ts relative ustification,utwhichalso goes

beyond

this, nd presents

more

nclusive

ystem

of facts.

It is clear that the

criterion

which

this suggests

goes

back

to

the

conception

f the logical nature

of thought s a unified

ys-

tem of related

facts. Without

amplifying his

conception

any

further,

shall try

merely o sum

up the

bearing

which it has

upon

the

claims of

scepticism.

In the firstplace, it furnishes workingcriterion f belief.

We

no

longer have

to hold that

any

and every

beliefhas

an

equal justification,

r

lack

of justification.

The

merefeeling

f

conviction,

when

nterpreted

s the

feeling

f

consistency,

an

be

supplemented

by the

logical

and rational

test which

consistency

itself mplies. The

idea

of a

consistent

ystem,

ven

thoughit

comes

home

to us

ultimately

n

feeling,

arrieswith

t the

means

ofcomparison etween eliefs, n thebasis of the degree nwhich

the belief

s

inclusive

f the

facts.

Of

course

thiswould

not

work

apart

from

he

presupposition

f

commondata of

experience.

If

beliefs

were

based

uponwholly

different

ets of

facts,

here

would

be

no

way

of

udging

between

hem.

Practically

hisoften

s

the

case.

There are

men

who,

ust

for this

reason,

never

can

by

any

possibility

ome

to a rational mnodus

ivendi,

who live in

differenthought worlds, and have no common ground of

argument.

But

fortunately

his

is

not the

universal

rule.

There

is a

general

fund

of

experience

on

which

we

all are ac-

customed

to draw.

On

the

whole,

there

is

as

much

agreement

as there

is

disagreement,

t

least

in

the

general

data on

the

basis

of which

our

interpretation

f

the world

rests.

And

wher-

ever

this

is

true,

herethe criterion

ill

work,

at

any

rate in

a

rough way.

And

now,

n

the

second

place,

it

may

be

seen,

I

think,

how

it

is

still

possible

to

say

that

our

confidence

ests in

the last resort

upon

itself, pon

the

factthat we do

actually give

assent

to the

truth

f

hings,

nd

yet

do

not

find

t

necessary

o

allow

our

changes

in

belief to

affect

his

confidence

eriously.

In

two

ways

belief

goes back,

in

the

final

nalysis,

not

to

anything

we

can demon-







638

THE PHILOSOPHICAL

REVIEW.

[VOL.

XIII.

strate, ut to

an assumption,

nd even a personal

assumption.

The

content

f

our belief,

he

data out of which

the

system

of

belief s formed,re, as I believe, postulatedon the basis of cer-

tain

existing

demands

of

our

nature,

nd have no further

ar-

rant.

And so also the consistency

nto which

we tryby think-

ing to bring his

content,

s evidenced ultimately y

the sense of

intellectual

atisfaction,

hose attainment

s the goal

which,

we

set forourselves

when we

aim to be consistent,

nd

in

termsof

which

we have

practically

o

be

content to describe

this

goal.

Now it is truethatwe never can have logical groundfor hecer-

tainty

that

any

particular

state

of

mind

characterized

by

this

sense

of

consistencywill be final.

And

yet

this

does notpre-

vent the

feeling

rom

being

a valid

test.

There

is

even

a

sense

in which t might

be

maintained

hat the feeling,

n so far s

it

has a

logical

value,

is never mistaken.

For all that it really

claims

s

this:

If

the

facts s I now see them

are a

complete

and

adequate expressionof the real facts, hen myunderstandingf

them

s

the

only

consistent

understanding,

nd is the

truth.

If

an

opinion

eems

consistent

o

any man,

t

is

actually

consistent

on the basis merely

of

the

data which enter

consciously

nto

the

forming f

that

opinion;

and

it

ustly

claims the

universality

f

any udgment.

Any

man

whatsoever, eeing

no more

and

no

differentacts,

would arrive t the

same conclusion.

Moreover,

so far as it goes, thebasis on which the judgment is formed

represents

reality.

Nothing

whatever

that is ever taken for

fact

is

wholly

unreal.

The

interpretation

ay

be

wrong. But

some

modicum

of

reality

does underlie

it,

which a

complete

knowledge

would have to take into account. Every

conviction

of

truth, hen,

rests

upon

reality,

nd would be

justified

were

there

no other

factswhich t leaves

out of

account.

The reason,accordingly,whywe cannot set downany partic-

ular

interpretation

f

things

as

fully

nd

irrevocably

dequate,

is

evidently

his: that

we never can be sure

that

we have

ex-

hausted

the relevant data.

So

long

as

there

is

any

outlying

fact,

r

aspect

of a

fact,

which we have

not

recognized,

o

long

there

s the

possibility,

ased

upon

our

experience

of

previous

changes

of

conviction,

hat

we

should,

were we

in

possession

of







No. 6.]

SCEPTICISM.

639

it, alter

our

presentpoint

of

view.' The sense of consistency

s

the

only

rational

test.

For

practical

purposes

it

is

ultimate.

Any concretepresent udgmenthas to be formed n the basis of

the data

whichwe

possess. On

such a

basis,

we feel that our

sense of convictionustifies

tself,

nd

is for

us, for the

moment,

final.

If

we judge

at

all, we must

do

it

with the material

at

hand.

We cannot

udge

on

the basis of

that which

we

may pos-

sibly know

in

the future,

ut which

by hypothesis

is

to

us

at

present nothing at all. So,

again, the criterion nables us to

compare presentwithpast beliefs, nd say definitelyhat one is

at least truer than the other.

And, finally,

n

the

case even of

the

udgments any possible

udgment

we

imagine

ourselves

passing

in

the future,we

may, although

we

cannot forecast ts

concreteform,

till

recognize

hat the same criterionwill

have to

attend

t,

f

it

is

rationallyustified.

But what

the

possibilities

are

in

the way

of

new facts

f

experience,

we never

by any

chance

can say; and thereforet is thatany beliefmustbe held by us

as

conceivablycapable

of

being

modified

y

further

xperience.

It will always

remain a

logical impossibility, herefore, o

demonstrate he

necessity

f

any particular

view of

the

world.

But,

on the other

hand,

t

needs once more

to

be

pointed out

that this does not

deny

the

possibility

of

practical assurance.

The root

of

assurance

ies

back

of

ogical necessity,

n the

depths

of our activeand practicalnature. No amountofreasoning an

ever

leave

us

absolutely

without

belief, imply

because

we are

more than

reasoningbeings,

nd we never

an

possibly get away

from

urselves.

And

in

the realm

of

logic itself,

we

must dis-

tinguish

between

an

abstract

possibility

nd

a

real

possibility.

That

I

have

a

right

o

believe,

s the one

thing cepticism

annot

touch.

It must

presuppose

the

right

n order

to

be

scepticism.

1

n

making

his

statement

niversal,

have reference

o

beliefswhich

deal

with

the

nterpretation

f

facts,

nd

their

place

in

reality.

I do not

mean

to

maintain

thatwe

may

not

know

with

ertaintyresent

acts f

personal xperience.

I

should

hold that

we

cannotbe

mistaken

n

the

belief

that

some

fact f

experience xists.

Nor

do

I

see

how

we

could

well

go

wrong

n

our

knowledge

f

the

nature

f

at

least

some

of

the

simpler hases

of our

experience,

o

long

as

they

re

regarded imply s

facts

of our

own

immediate

xperiencing

r

meaning.

Even

here,however, ne

needs

of course o

exercise

great aution,

y

reason

of

the well

known

dangers hat

attend

ntrospection

nd

memory.







640 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

[Voi,.

XIII.

What

in

particular am,

or am

not,

ustified n believing,

epends

upon concrete

onditions.

In

order to shake my confidence n

my own assurance, t is not enough, practically, o make me

recognize he possibility

hat

my udgment

may be mistaken. I

must have some solid

and

positive

reason,

n

terms

f concrete

experience,

or

believing

hat t

is mistaken. Now evidently

ll

the concretegrounds

for

my judgment

are the

outcomeof past

experience.

New

experiences

may

alter

my opinion

when

they

come.

But until

heycome,

or until

have

some definite eason

to look forthem, hey may rightly e disregarded. Ifmy pres-

ent

point

of view seems

to

me

sufficient,

f

apparentlyt harmo-

nizes

all the facts,

nd

if,

s time

goes

on,

it continues

ermanently

to approve

tselfto

me as

essentially dequate,

afterbeing sub-

jected

to the

testing process

of

added

experience,

hen I

should

be

foolish

f I were not

practically

o

acquiesce

in

it,

and

take it

as

forme an

assured

result,

o be

accepted

as

governing

my life,

withouttheabiding sense of uncertainty,r a continual ooking

to see

it overthrown. Indeed,

cannot

help taking

this

attitude,

so

long

as

the

system

of

belief

s the outcome of

my practical

needs. Apart

from

articular grounds

for

disbelief,

here

s,

to

be

sure,

this

general

ground

once

more,

that

many

beliefs n

the

past

have

changed.

This

is,

of

course,

o

far

s

it

goes,

a

positive

reason, and,

as

I

have

argued,

t

ought

to

teach us

caution.

But

to make it an absolutelygeneralreason forhesitation,s,I think,

only possible

if

we

exaggerate

enormously

he

facts about

the

actual

fluidity

f

belief.

If

a man's intellectual

experience

has

been

entirely

iscontinuous

nd

chaotic,

there

is

indeed

for

him

good

reason

to

distrust

is

newest

opinion.

But this s

the case

at

most

only

very rarely. If,

as

a matter

f

fact,

ur

ntellectual

growth

s more

or less

continuous,

fthe relation o

earlierbeliefs

is normallyone of absorption, ather than of destruction nd

entire

eversal,

hen the

weight

of the

considerationwill not

be

the

same for

all cases

of

belief,

but

will

differ

ccording

to

the

concrete

circumstances;

nd sometimes t

may rightly

be

very

small indeed.

If

the

new

experience

ever does

occur

which

throws

doubt

upon mypast generalization,

hen,ndeed,

should

not

allow

any

attained

resultto lead

me

to

refuse t

welcome. I







No. 6.] SCEPTICISM. 64I

should be ready to revise my belief as occasion requires. But

until his comes about, am justified n trusting o what I know.

And the more my experience attains certainweight and com-

prehensiveness,he more confident may feel, nd rightlyfeel,

that no new

fact

is likely to overthrow o assured

an

edifice

f

belief, r do more thanalter t

in

itsminorfeatures.

A.

K. ROGERS.

BUTLER COLLEGE.

Rogers Scepticism

Documents

Transcript of Rogers Scepticism