ROADMAPS TO NOWHERE?... · Suri and Naji’s contributions to jihadi strategic thought mark them as...
Transcript of ROADMAPS TO NOWHERE?... · Suri and Naji’s contributions to jihadi strategic thought mark them as...
ROADMAPS TO NOWHERE?
The Uncertain Influence of Jihadi Strategic Thinkers
Upon Insurgencies in Iraq
Submitted by Phillip William Etches, for the degree of Bachelor of International Security Studies (Honours) at The Australian National University
in October, 2018.
1
Unless otherwise acknowledged in
the text, this thesis represents the
original research of the author,
Phillip William Etches.
2
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................. 4
Chapter 2: Analysing al‐Suri and Naji’s Strategic Thought ...................................................... 23
Chapter 3: Comparing al‐Suri and AQI ..................................................................................... 29
Chapter 4: Comparing Naji and IS ............................................................................................ 43
Chapter 5: Accounting for Variance Between the Strategic Thought and Insurgent Practice 56
Chapter 6: Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 67
Appendices ............................................................................................................................... 72
Sourcing ................................................................................................................................... 92
3
Abstract
This paper seeks to determine the extent to which the al‐Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and
Islamic State (IS) insurgencies were influenced by—respectively—Abu Mus’ab al‐
Suri and Abu Bakr Naji’s strategic thought, and why the extent of that influence may
have ultimately been limited. This is relevant for scholars of strategic studies
because these strategic thinkers’ influence upon those insurgencies is an
assumption within some academic and journalistic works which has thus far gone
untested. To address this, the paper takes a comparative historical approach,
measuring al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought—as expressed in their principal
written works—and the AQI and IS insurgencies according to a single analytical
framework of organisational, operational, and lifecycle stage phenomena, and then
using the results to compare strategic thought with insurgent practice. It then
establishes whether externally‐ascertainable issues can account for variance
identified between strategic thought and insurgent practice. This approach yields
two findings. First, AQI and IS’s insurgencies were ultimately conducted in a manner
mostly at variance with al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought, and second, such
variance appeared resultant from insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at
increased scale, the tendency of jihadi insurgent organisations towards inflexibility
and insularity, and the impact which the operational environment can have upon
insurgencies. These findings support a conclusion that the influence of al‐Suri and
Naji’s strategic thought upon AQI and IS’s insurgencies was significantly limited, due
apparently to externally‐recognisable issues affecting jihadi insurgent organisations’
behaviour.
4
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1: Contextual Background and Introduction of Research Question
This paper is concerned with the extent to which certain jihadi “strategic thinkers”
have influenced two jihadi insurgencies in Iraq, and why the extent of that influence
may have been limited. Defined originally by Hegghammer, jihadi strategic thinkers
and “strategic thought” are features of the jihadi movement—a class of persons and
organisations which use violence because, within an eccentric interpretation of
Sunni Islam, doing so is an obligatory “jihad,” or “struggle,” in defence of Islamic
faith, lands, and communities.1 Within that movement, jihadi strategic thinkers,
Hegghammer argues, write “about the best way—from a functional point of view—
to fight the enemy,” focusing less upon “the theological aspects of the struggle.”2
That broad description is constructive: it establishes that jihadi strategic thinkers’
works concern not only strategy—the identification and pursuit of strategic
objectives related to actors’ key priorities—but also the operational level, wherein
actions are coordinated and undertaken in service of strategic objectives; and the
tactical level, wherein tasks are identified and performed in the course of
operational actions.3 Rather than focusing upon jihadis’ ideological or religious
debates, jihadi strategic thinkers articulate jihadi strategic thought—ideas about not
only the strategies, but also the operational and tactical approaches which jihadi
insurgencies should employ. For scholars of strategic studies and professionals
seeking insights into jihadi insurgents’ strategies, operations, and tactics, the extent
of jihadi strategic thinkers’ influence, and that of their strategic thought, is
therefore significant.
1 Shiraz Maher, Salafi‐Jihadism: The History of an Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 31‐33; Christopher Henzel, "The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for US Strategy," Parameters Spring 2005 (2005): 71. 2 Thomas Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism After the Iraq War," The Middle East Journal 60, no. 1 (2006): 16. 3 Dima Adamsky, "Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 1 (2009); Australian Department of Defence Defence, LWD 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power (Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), 19‐20.
5
Two individuals exist among jihadi strategic thinkers, given their contributions to
jihadi strategic thought. One is Abu Mus’ab al‐Suri—a pseudonym of Mustafa
Setmariam Nasar—who penned The Call of Global Islamic Resistance.4 In his book,
al‐Suri advocates an insurgency which adopts a loose organisational structure
centred around small groups or individuals, using terrorism to substitute—and later
complement—conventional military operations. That approach enables a guerrilla
strategy of gradual expansion and escalation, to the point of holding territory and
winning direct confrontations with the government.
Also noteworthy is Abu Bakr Naji. Naji authored The Management of Savagery,5
wherein he advocates an insurgency which uses violence to exhaust the state’s
capacity to provide security and governance, establishes an interim administration,
and achieves victory by defeating the government and developing the interim
administration into a viable state. Superficially, Naji’s thinking resembles al‐Suri’s—
both propose gradual escalation, culminating in overt confrontations with the
government. But where al‐Suri prioritises developing a resilient organisation to
erode the existing order, Naji prioritises usurping government functions. Both
approaches are explained thoroughly in subsequent chapters, but preliminarily, al‐
Suri and Naji’s contributions to jihadi strategic thought mark them as jihadi strategic
thinkers.
Other jihadi strategic thinkers exist, but al‐Suri and Naji—and their principal
works—stand out for two reasons. First, within the relevant literature, al‐Suri and
Naji—and The Call of Global Islamic Resistance and The Management of Savagery—
enjoy elevated esteem from interested parties. The clearest articulation of al‐Suri’s
importance is Stout’s, who describes al‐Suri as “perhaps the leading Salafi jihadist
4 Mustafa bin Abdulqadir Setmariam A.K.A. "Abu Musab al‐Suri" Nasar, The Call of Global Islamic Resistance (Online: Made Available by Archive.org, 2004). 5 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Dangerous Stage Through Which The Ummah Will Pass (McCants's Translation Used for Translation Reference), trans. Will McCants, 2006 ed. (Online: Original Distributed by Aaron Zelin, Translation by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004).
6
strategic thinker,”6 asserting that “no other member of the jihadist intellectual elite
has made an argument as comprehensive” as that in al‐Suri’s work.7 Ryan treats
Naji and The Management of Savagery similarly, lauding Naji’s work as a
“distillation” of jihadist strategic thought,8 claiming that “The breadth of Naji’s
knowledge and his references to other jihadists’ published works and notebooks
support his claim of personal access” to other jihadi notables.9 Lacey suggests that
“it [Naji’s The Management of Savagery] reflects the prevailing views” of al‐
Qa’ida,10 while al‐Suri’s work “is critical to understanding today’s jihadist
movement,”11 and has attained stature rivalling that of Hitler and Lenin’s writings.12
In one work, Lia describes al‐Suri as “one of the most outspoken voices in the jihadi
current,” whose writings “provoked strong responses and debates.”13 Adamsky
argues that al‐Suri “introduced a methodology and established a precedent of
systematic theory‐making in jihadi military affairs…[and] introduced the notion of
operational art into jihadi military theory and demonstrated its practical
applications.”14 Shultz writes that “Naji’s book and contributions…catapulted Naji
into the ranks of important jihadi strategic thinkers,”15 and that “perhaps the
leading jihadi strategic thinker to emerge was Abu Musab al‐Suri.”16 Zackie provides
a more general description of al‐Suri’s importance, characterising him as “al‐Qaida’s
6 Mark Stout, "In Search of Salafi Jihadist Strategic Thought: Mining the Words of the Terrorists," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 10 (2009): 879. 7 Stout, 886. 8 Michael Ryan, Decoding Al‐Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 148. 9 Ryan, 149. 10 Jim Lacey, ed. The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists' Strategy for Defeating America (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 48. 11 Lacey, 162. 12 Lacey, 163. 13 Brynjar Lia, "Jihadis Divided Between Strategists and Doctrinarians," in Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures (Wiltshire: Routledge, 2011), 71. 14 Adamsky, 8. 15 Richard Shultz, Strategic Culture And Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework For Assessing al‐Qaeda And The Global Jihad Movement (Macdill Air Force Base: Joint Special Operations University, 2012), 31. 16 Shultz, 32.
7
leading theoretician and strategic thinker…its post 9/11 principal architect,”17 and
his writings as a “masterwork.”18 While not being responsible for all jihadi strategic
thought, there is a view in the literature that the persons and strategic thought of
al‐Suri and Naji are significant.
A second reason for al‐Suri and Naji’s significance—and the one giving rise to this
paper—is the assumption that their strategic thought has influenced certain jihadi
insurgencies in Iraq. One was the insurgency best‐known as al‐Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI),
which operated following the Ba’athist regime’s fall in 2003,19 and until instability
began in Syria and United States (US) forces largely withdrew from Iraq in 2011.20
The other, often called Islamic State (IS), was a later evolution of AQI which formed
amidst those same events in 2011,21 operating overtly until being forced
underground after losing Mosul in 2017.22 In academic, journalistic, and
professional literature, it is held that al‐Suri and Naji’s persons or thinking
influenced those insurgencies—something expressed by Weiss & Hassan,23
17 M. W. Zackie, "An Analysis of Abu Mus'ab al‐Suri's "Call to Global Islamic Resistance"," Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 1 (2013): 1. 18 Zackie, 1. 19 New York Times, "The Fall of Baghdad," New York Times, 10/04/2003 (2003). 20 Caren Bohan, "Obama: Troops Leaving Iraq with Heads Held High," Reuters, 15/12/2011 (2011); Joe Sterling and Salma Abdelaziz, "As Unrest Spreads, Syrian Government Promises to Respond," CNN, 25/03/2011 (2011). 21 Ahmed Hashim, "The Islamic State: From Al‐Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate," Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014): 73. 22 Isabel Coles and Stephen Kalin, "Iraqi PM Declares Victory Over Islamic State in Mosul," Reuters, 10/07/2017 (2017). 23 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts., 2015), 40‐41.
8
Gerges,24 Smith & Jones,25 Cruickshank & Ali,26 Ignatius,27 Hashim,28 Whiteside,29
and others, and explored further in the literature review. Those claims have some
basis—as stated in the literature review, indications exist that AQI and IS were
acquainted with al‐Suri and Naji’s work, at least. But those indications do not
conclusively establish al‐Suri or Naji’s influence upon those insurgencies, and it can
only be stated confidently that there exists an assumption that al‐Suri and Naji
influenced AQI and IS’s insurgencies.
That assumption begs two research questions. First, from publicly‐available
information, to what extent is it determinable that AQI and IS’s insurgencies
ultimately played out in accordance with al‐Suri or Naji’s strategic thought? Second,
if those insurgencies did not do so entirely, are any issues identifiable which caused
variance between strategic thought and insurgent practice?
1.2: Review of Literature and Establishment of Research Gap
Demonstrating the importance and feasibility of addressing those questions, and
situating the paper within the literature, necessitates establishing the literature’s
current state, and the viability of addressing the gap within it.
The literature concerning jihadi strategic thought and insurgency is divisible into
four categories. A research gap exists across those categories, but is addressable,
given that the underlying concept has been proven viable,30 and the necessary
resources are available.
24 Fawaz Gerges, "The Three Manifestos that Paved the Way for Islamic State," Los Angeles Times, 15/04/2016 (2016). 25 M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones, "The Strategy of Savagery: Explaining the Islamic State," War on The Rocks, 24/02/2015 (2015). 26 Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 1 (2007). 27 David Ignatius, "The Manual that Chillingly Foreshadows the Islamic State," Washington Post, 25/09/2014 (2014). 28 Hashim, 75. 29 Craig Whiteside, "The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare," Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 748. 30 The viability of establishing the research gap is demonstrated in further depth in Appendix #3
9
The first category of works includes books and articles focused upon jihadi strategic
thinkers’ backgrounds and the development of their thinking. Lia provides some of
the best work on Abu Mus’ab al‐Suri, notably a biography and outline of how his
ideas developed.31 Cruickshank & Ali also write about al‐Suri, albeit with greater
brevity and a focus upon al‐Suri’s possible impact.32 Within a larger work, Fishman
describes the development of al‐Suri, his ideas, and limited acceptance by the al‐
Qa’ida movement.33 Cigar provides a biography of ‘Abd al‐‘Aziz al‐Muqrin alongside
a translation, detailing al‐Muqrin’s background and the influences upon his
thinking.34 There is also Stout, who focuses upon the overall development of jihadi
strategic literature.35 The commonality between these works is that they discuss
strategic thinkers’ background, or the development of those thinkers’ ideas, rather
than analysing jihadi strategic thought or showing its application.
The second area of the literature contextualises or analyses jihadi strategic thinkers’
writings. Lia & Hegghammer provide one example, analysing an al‐Qa’ida‐linked
study titled Jihadi Iraq, and describing the intellectual context from which it came.36
Shlapentokh introduces al‐Suri’s strategy and ideas, describing them as “a good
example of the jihadist worldview.”37 Analysing strategic culture’s role in the jihadi
movement, Shultz provides background information and a thematically‐focused
analysis for the works of al‐Suri, Naji, and others.38 Finally, Ryan describes multiple
jihadi ideologues and strategic thinkers’ ideas, including al‐Zawahiri, Faraj, Qurashi,
al‐Muqrin, al‐Suri, Naji, and others. While Ryan avoids linking those thinkers’ works
31 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al‐Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al‐Suri (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2009). 32 Cruickshank and Ali. 33 Brian Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, Al‐Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 166‐67. 34 Norman Cigar, Abd Al‐Aziz Al‐Muqrin, and Julian Lewis, Al‐Qa'ida's Doctrine For Insurgency [A Practical Course For Guerrilla War], First ed. (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc, 2009). 35 Stout. 36 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 5 (2004). 37 Dmitry Shlapentokh, "The Intellectual and Political Exchange Among Jihadists: The Case of Mustafa Setmarian Nasar (Abu Musab al‐Suri)," Journal of Applied Security Research 7, no. 3 (2012): 318. 38 Shultz.
10
and specific insurgencies, he notes al‐Suri and Naji’s pre‐eminence and the quality
of their works.39 In doing so, Ryan demonstrates how this second category of
works—rather than linking al‐Suri, Naji, and others’ writings to specific
insurgencies—focuses on analysing or contextualising the writings themselves.
The third category of works includes case studies of jihadi insurgencies which do not
draw links to jihadi strategic thought and focus upon specific periods or themes.
Long, for example, focuses on both a period and theme, finding Anbari tribes’
political reorientation in 2006 to be resultant from both a “shift in the strategic
calculus of the tribes,”40 and security force efforts.41 Philips focuses on a period,
describing AQI’s decline after 2006, and its ideological inflexibility, violence, and
inability to consider popular political sensitivities as that decline’s cause.42 Ingram
describes the role of propaganda in IS strategy, in the context of IS as both a local
and transnational actor.43 Cancian analyses IS’s tactics, techniques, and procedures,
attempting to trace their development.44 But there are also works which analyse
insurgencies in their entirety. Riedel & Saab’s work on al‐Qa’ida (AQ) in Saudi Arabia
is one example, tracking the development of AQ’s campaign while characterising its
membership as followers of Osama bin Laden rather than a fully‐independent
organisation.45 Pirnie & O’Connell examine AQI within a specific period, between
2003 and 2006, while making superficial mention of AQI’s place within the broader
39 Ryan. 40 Austin Long, "The Anbar Awakening," Survival 50, no. 2 (2008): 78. 41 Long, 78. 42 Andrew Phillips, "How al Qaeda Lost Iraq," Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009). 43 Haroro J Ingram, "The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations," Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 6 (2015). 44 Matthew Cancian, "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of the Islamic State: Lessons for U.S. Forces," Military Review March‐April 2017 (2017). 45 Bruce Riedel and Bilal Saab, "Al Qaeda’s Third Front: Saudi Arabia," The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008).
11
jihadi movement.46 Like the others, they fit amidst works which study the
insurgencies themselves without drawing connections to specific strategies.
Finally, there are academic and journalistic works which assume a connection
between al‐Suri or Naji’s ideas, and jihadi insurgencies, when discussing those
insurgencies or jihadi strategic thought. Several assume a connection between Naji
and IS. Hashim writes one, arguing that IS’s strategy was partly informed by Naji’s
thinking.47 Hassan provides another, describing Naji—alongside another
ideologically‐focused author—as “indispensable” to IS, but also as having affected
former AQI leader Abu Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi’s thinking.48 Friedman suggests that
“[IS’s] methods bear the imprint of…The Management of Savagery.”49 Weiss &
Hassan write that “Al‐Zarqawi’s sinister strategy hewed closely to a text [of Naji’s]
titled…The Management of Savagery.”50 Maher writes that The Management of
Savagery “provides a rationale for how the movement [IS] behaves today, and also
explains…the group’s desire to hold territory and its highly considered use of
extreme violence as an asymmetrical tactic.”51 Gerges describes Naji’s principal
work as IS’s “strategic road map.”52 Gude testifies that Naji’s The Management of
Savagery "outlined many elements of the strategy that ISIS now pursues.”53 Atran
implies a link between The Management of Savagery and IS.54 Finally, Ignatius
writes that IS—its leaders being influenced by The Management of Savagery—was a
46 Bruce Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003‐2006) (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 15. 47 Hashim, 75. 48 Hassan Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context," (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 17. 49 B.A. Friedman, "Mujahideen: The Strategic Tradition of Sunni Jihadism," Small Wars Journal, 28/10/2015 (2015). 50 Weiss and Hassan, 40. 51 Shiraz Maher, "Shiraz Maher on Isis: The Management of Savagery," New Statesman, 12/07/2016 (2016). 52 Gerges. 53 Ken Gude, "Testimony of Ken Gude to the House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security, 10/12/2015," 10/12/2015 (2015). 54 Scott Atran, "Islamic State Has a Plan and That Plan is Working," The Irish Times, 16/11/2015 (2015).
12
“test case” for Naji’s thinking.55 In academic and journalistic sources alike, the
influence of Naji’s ideas upon jihadi insurgencies—particularly IS—is a key
assumption.
A smaller set of works assume a connection between the AQI and IS insurgencies,
and al‐Suri. Whiteside provides one example, stating that AQI’s former leader, Abu
Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi, received an education “mostly from Abu Musab al‐Suri’s work
on the failed Syrian rebellion and Suri’s advocacy of revolutionary warfare.”56 Smith
& Jones write that al‐Suri’s thinking “influences the transnational online strategy of
the Islamic State.”57 Writing broadly about al‐Qa’ida, Cruickshank & Ali suggest that
“His [al‐Suri’s] teachings are likely making an impact on the tactics of the Sunni
insurgency in Iraq.”58 While a link is less often drawn to al‐Suri’s thinking,
particularly as expressed in The Call of Global Islamic Resistance, several works
assume al‐Suri’s influence, just as a larger portion assume a connection between
Naji and IS.
The lack of a clear strategy‐insurgency comparison creates a research gap across the
above four areas, although that gap’s significance should not be overstated. The
first area explains how both strategist and strategic thought developed, but not the
extent of their influence and their relation to jihadi insurgencies. The second
illustrates the strategies’ substance but not their application. The third analyses the
insurgencies themselves either wholly or partly, without establishing the extent to
which jihadi strategic thought influenced them. Finally, the fourth area assumes
jihadi strategic thought’s influence without proving it. Across the literature, a gap is
present, though its nature varies.
This is not to say that the literature is based upon universally‐held
misunderstandings. For one, al‐Suri and Naji’s influence is not consistently assumed.
55 Ignatius. 56 Whiteside, 748. 57 Smith and Jones. 58 Cruickshank and Ali, 9‐10.
13
Berger downplays the influence of al‐Suri’s proposed strategy,59 Watts argues that
al‐Qa’ida’s affiliated networks diverge from their own plans,60 and Fishman
observes that “most al‐Qaeda strategic plans go nowhere,”61 while Naji’s work did
less to influence former AQI leader Abu Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi’s than it did to “codify
and contextualize the lessons of Zarqawi’s early jihad.”62 Further, assumption of al‐
Suri or Naji’s influence are not baseless—jihadis, including within AQI and IS, knew
of both thinkers’ works. Hassan states that some IS members read The
Management of Savagery,63 while IS‐affiliated authors claimed that al‐Zarqawi was
acquainted with al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking but did not embrace it,64 McCants
observes that jihadis beyond Iraq know of al‐Suri and Naji’s writings,65 and al‐Qa’ida
notable Ayman al‐Zawahiri commends al‐Suri and his works, including The Call of
Global Islamic Resistance.66 Such caveats do not diminish the research gap’s
significance—indeed, they add ambiguity by showing that al‐Suri and Naji’s works
were known to AQI and IS without confirming or refuting their influence, while
demonstrating that no scholarly consensus exists about their impact. As such, they
further demonstrate that a significant research gap exists because there has been
no analysis of the extent to which jihadi strategic thought—particularly as
articulated by al‐Suri or Naji—ultimately affected jihadi insurgencies’ behaviour.
1.3: Viability of Addressing Research Gap
Addressing that research gap is feasible because the underlying concept has been
proven viable, and necessary resources are publicly available. The underlying
concept—identifying and explaining the limited extent of strategic thinkers’
influence upon insurgencies to which they are supposedly connected—is feasible. In
59 J.M. Berger, "Can "Lone Wolves" Travel in Packs," Intelwire, 03/05/2011 (2011). 60 Clint Watts, "Do al Qaeda Affiliates Actually Have a Plan," Geopoliticus, 02/12/2013 (2013). 61 Fishman, 37. 62 Fishman, 39. 63 Hassan, 17. 64 Abu 'Abdir‐Rahman al‐Banghali, "The Revival of Jihad in Bengal," Dabiq 12 (2015): 39. 65 Will Mccants, "Abu Mus'ab Suri: Architect of Global Jihad Neglected?," Jihadica, 11/05/2008 (2008); Will Mccants, "Managing Savagery in Saudi Arabia," Jihadica, 26/06/2008 (2008). 66 Ayman Al‐Zawahiri, التبرئة/The Exoneration, (Online: as‐Sahab Media, 2008). 54.
14
the similar literature concerning communist insurgent strategy and strategists—
discussed further in Appendix #3—a debate exists concerning the influence of
strategic thinkers like Mao, Giap, and Guevara. Applying that concept in the context
of jihadi strategic thinkers and jihadi insurgency, by establishing and explaining the
extent to which AQI and IS’s insurgencies accorded with al‐Suri or Naji’s thinking, is
possible with publicly‐available resources. A large volume of media reporting
concerns AQI and IS, due to strong public interest. Academic journal articles also
address al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought, and AQI and IS. Such journals include
Small Wars & Insurgencies, Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, CTC Sentinel, and Perspectives on Terrorism. Simiarly‐focused
publications have also been produced by subject matter experts and institutional
sources including RAND, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Brookings, the Institute for the Study of War, the International Crisis Group, the
Combating Terrorism Center, and the Congressional Research Service. Finally, data
concerning attacks in Iraq are available from the University of Chicago’s Suicide
Attack Database and the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
Because the underlying concept of the paper has been proven feasible in a similar
body of literature, and the necessary resources are publicly available, it follows that
addressing the paper’s research gap is feasible.
1.4: Hypothesis
To establish the extent and potential limitations of the influence of al‐Suri and Naji’s
thinking upon AQI and IS, and that scholars should avoid overstating that influence,
this paper makes two arguments. The first is that publicly‐available information
indicates that AQI and IS’s insurgencies did not ultimately occur in accordance
with—respectively—al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought. This was because mostly,
the organisation, operations, and lifecycle stages of these insurgencies ultimately
appeared to vary from al‐Suri and Naji’s dicta. The second argument is that such
variance appeared at least partly due to externally‐recognisable issues known to
affect insurgencies’ organisation, operations, and development. Among those issues
15
were insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased scale, jihadi insurgent
organisations’ tendency towards inflexibility and insularity, and the influence which
the operational environment can have upon insurgencies. By making these two
claims, the paper will address both research questions.
1.5: Methodology & Analytical Framework
To support those arguments, a comparative historical approach is used which
compares al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought with the events of the AQI and IS
insurgencies, via a suitable methodology. The methodology has two components
which support the arguments with the best analysis which is possible within current
limitations, and dictate the paper’s structure.
The methodology’s first component supports the argument that AQI and IS’s
insurgencies did not ultimately play out in a manner reflecting the influence of—
respectively—al‐Suri or Naji’s strategic thought. It does so by focusing upon the
dependent variable, the presence or absence of certain observable phenomena—
explained in greater depth in Appendix #4—which insurgencies would exhibit if they
accorded with al‐Suri or Naji’s guidance. It involves analysing al‐Suri and Naji’s
thinking according to an analytical framework, and comparing that thinking to
publicly‐available data concerning AQI and IS’s insurgencies which is gathered
according to the same framework. This establishes if how AQI and IS operated,
organised, and developed was accordant or at variance with al‐Suri or Naji’s dicta.
Explaining the framework is necessary, given its role in facilitating the best possible
analyses of al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking, and of AQI and IS’s insurgencies. The
framework focuses upon categories of observable organisational, operational, and
lifecycle stage phenomena developed from the academic and practitioners’
literature on insurgency,67 and observable via publicly available data.
67 The basis for the components of the analytical framework is also provided in greater depth in Appendix #2.
16
Five categories of organisational phenomena facilitate the assessment of the
intended and actual structure, development, and internal relations of the
insurgency, via publicly‐available data. These are developed from the scholarly and
practitioners’ literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency like some works
considered during the literature review. The first is the influence of pre‐conflict
social networks upon the insurgency’s structure and behaviour. These networks are
relevant because they influence the insurgency by shaping its organisational
structure and preferences.68 The second is the strength of the horizontal ties which
ensure coordination between decisionmakers, which is relevant because of the
importance of such ties for coordination and cohesion across organisational and
geospatial gaps.69 The third is whether the organisation grows purposefully. This
category is included because such growth determines whether the insurgency can
escape the early‐stage insecurity common to nascent insurgencies,70 and gain
freedom of action.71 The fourth is related to the presence of auxiliaries, and the
nature of their role. Auxiliaries are considered because they enable insurgencies to
safely conduct activities other than war,72 and increase organisational
survivability.73 The fifth is how the organisation relates to non‐adversary third
parties. This category concerns the extent to which the insurgency competes with
other actors for dominance of the environment, as the counterinsurgency
orthodoxy expects.74 Together, those categories do not facilitate an exhaustive
68 Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Illustrated, Reprint ed. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), 9, 24. Daniel Byman, Understanding Proto‐Insurgencies, RAND Counterinsurgency Study (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 23. 69 Staniland, 21‐22. 70 Australian Department of Defence Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1: Counterinsurgency (Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), 2.09‐2.10. 71 Andrew Molnar, Jerry Tinker, and John LeNoir, DA 550‐104: Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1966), 18‐19. 72 Office of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS, JP 3‐25: Countering Threat Networks, Joint Publications (Online: US DoD, 2016), F5, III.3. 73 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 19, 23. 74 Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," Naval War College Review Winter (1998).
17
analysis—other relevant organisational phenomena exist but cannot be readily
observed in publicly‐available data, including the arrangements by which
insurgencies appear to obtain weapons and supplies,75 and whether relationships of
dependency appear between the insurgency and a third party outside the
immediate area of operations.76 But the above categories do facilitate the best
analysis possible—with sufficient brevity and via publicly‐available data—of the
extent to which AQI and IS’s structure, development, and internal relations
accorded to al‐Suri and Naji’s guidance.
Alongside the categories of observable organisational phenomena, six categories of
operational phenomena relate to insurgencies’ activities. Like the organisational
categories, these are based upon the relevant literature, and facilitate an analysis
via publicly‐available data. The first relates to whether the insurgency’s relationship
with the population is coercive or co‐optive. While it is accepted in the literature
that an insurgency seeks popular support for material and political purposes,77
whether support is achieved through a relationship which is coercive rather than
cooperative is a way in which an insurgency can distinguish itself.78 The second
category relates to whether the insurgency seeks to provoke a government or
popular backlash—a behaviour of some past insurgencies to which the literature
calls attention.79 The third concerns whether the insurgency seeks to disrupt or
usurp normal governmental functions, as some past insurgencies have done.80 The
fourth category relates to whether an insurgency seeks to penetrate or co‐opt the
government or security forces—a threat against which the practitioners’ literature
warns.81 The fifth addresses whether an insurgency exhibits a willingness to seize
75 Central Intelligence Agency CIA, Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, (Online: CIA, 2012). 11; Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 2.3, 2.8. 76 CIA. 15; Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 2.6; Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 30‐31. 77 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 1.3. 78 CIA. 23. 79 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 4D.1; CIA. 2. 80 Byman, 15. 81 CIA. 14; Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 5.17; Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 2.
18
territory as past insurgencies have,82 and hold that seized territory at significant
cost. Finally, the sixth category relates to the modalities of attack which the
insurgency employs, though it is included because it is an identifiable area of
distinction rather than being a question rooted in the literature. Like the categories
of organisational phenomena, there are relevant operational phenomena which are
excluded from the framework—these include the role of nonviolent activism,83
which can complement the insurgency’s military operations;84 and whether the
insurgency clearly favours urban terrorism or rural guerrilla warfare.85 But also like
the categories of organisational phenomena, the included categories of operational
phenomena facilitate the best possible analysis of whether the operations of AQI
and IS accorded to the strategic thought of al‐Suri and Naji, which has sufficient
brevity and is achievable via publicly‐available data.
Alongside the organisational and operational phenomena, a separate indicator
relates to the insurgency’s lifecycle stages. This indicator focuses upon the specific
identifiable stages of the insurgencies’ lifecycles, whether those stages resembled
those envisioned by al‐Suri or Naji,86 and whether those lifecycles reflected the
broader strategic trajectory envisioned by al‐Suri or Naji. It is included because
insurgencies develop over time,87 and behavioural changes can chart that
development.88 While other indicators concern organisational and operational
issues, the lifecycle stage indicator relates to whether insurgencies developed in line
with al‐Suri or Naji’s envisioned lifecycles.
82 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 2.10; United Kingdom Ministry of Defence MoD, British Army Field Manual: Countering Insurgency, vol. 1 (London, UK2009), 1, 1.5; Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 2. 83 C. C. Harmon, "Five Strategies of Terrorism," Small Wars & Insurgencies 12, no. 3 (2001): 46. 84 United States Department of Defense DoD, JP 3‐24: Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.: US DoD, 2009), 2.16. 85 DoD, 2.14‐2.15. 86 Nasar, 1421‐22. Naji, 15. 87 CIA. 5; DoD, xi. 88 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 2.8.
19
The analytical framework described above facilitates the best‐possible analysis—of
the organisation, operations, and lifecycle advocated by al‐Suri and Naji, and seen
within the insurgencies of AQI and IS—which is possible via publicly‐available data.
While it does not ascertain the juncture and purpose of variance between strategic
thought and insurgent practice, the framework makes it possible to address the first
argument—that mostly, al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought was ultimately not
reflected in AQI or IS’s behaviour.
The methodology’s second component addresses the second argument—that
externally‐recognisable issues appeared to contribute to variance identified
between strategic thought and insurgent practice. It does so by focusing upon the
independent variable—issues appearing to play a role in causing those insurgencies
to organise, operate, and develop in a manner ultimately varying with al‐Suri or
Naji’s strategic thought. Those issues included insurgencies’ limited capacity to
operate at increased scale, jihadi insurgent organisations’ tendency towards
inflexibility and insularity, and the operational environment’s influence. To
demonstrate their involvement, the methodology’s second component first
identifies the processes by which those issues can affect insurgencies and the
impacts they can have, then demonstrates that AQI and IS underwent the same
processes and consequently suffered the same impacts—the organisational,
operational, and lifecycle phenomena which were divergent from al‐Suri or Naji’s
strategic thought.
By establishing links between the issues described above and the insurgencies, the
second component serves two purposes. First, the component demonstrates that
specific identifiable issues appeared to contribute to AQI and IS’s failure to
ultimately organise, operate, and develop in complete accordance with al‐Suri or
Naji’s strategic thought. Second, the component reinforces the paper’s validity by
showing that its findings are not necessarily shortcomings in the analysis of
empirical data, or unexplained diversions from the norm. This second component of
20
the methodology, together with the first, is crucial to supporting the argument that
complete accordance between strategic thought and insurgent practice appeared to
be prevented, partly, by issues affecting insurgencies’ organisation, operations and
development.
Aside from the fact that it supports the paper’s arguments, the methodology
described above is suitable because it enables the most extensive analysis feasible
with available data. Theoretically, a more detailed analysis is possible. As stated in
the literature review, AQI and IS personnel were familiar with The Call of Global
Islamic Resistance and The Management of Savagery, but as the analyses of the
third and fourth chapters show, both insurgencies’ organisations, operations, and
development were mostly divergent from al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking. In that context,
a more comprehensive analysis establishes not just that variance was ultimately
evident and that certain externally‐visible factors contributed to it, but also when
and how decisions were made to pursue courses of action at variance with al‐Suri or
Naji’s strategic thought, the internal preferences and processes precipitating those
decisions, and external factors’ role in the insurgencies’ decision‐making processes.
Such an analysis is more comprehensive and resembles those recommended by
defence and intelligence sources, but is not achievable within academic settings
because it relies upon both classified and publicly‐available data.89 The central
impediment is that insurgencies’ internal affairs and preferences are not easily
measured—insurgents avoid scrutiny,90 limiting the amount of publicly‐available
data concerning their internal affairs. With jihadis more specifically, hyperbole
renders a significant amount of disseminated materials unreliable,91 as do
reputation‐management efforts like those undertaken by IS.92 At the same time,
data collected by state agencies which overcomes the paucity of reliable publicly‐
89 CIA; Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 5.1‐5.18. 90 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 2. 91 David Aaron, In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 45. 92 Ingram, 730‐31.
21
available information are available with insufficient regularity.93 In sum, a more
comprehensive analysis is impossible because of limitations upon the availability of
data.
The paper’s methodology facilitates the best possible analysis within those
limitations. The first component focuses upon how AQI and IS’s observable
behaviours ultimately varied from al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought, rather than
when and how their preferences became distinct from al‐Suri or Naji’s dicta.
Because that analysis is concerned with externally‐visible phenomena, it can be
undertaken using only publicly‐available data from media, academic, and
institutional sources, and GTD and the University of Chicago’s Suicide Attack
Database, which directly describe the insurgencies’ organisation and operations, or
events and activities consistent with certain organisational or operational
characteristics. In the second component, the analysis demonstrates that variance
between strategic thought and insurgent practice appeared partly resultant from
certain issues known to affect jihadi and insurgent organisations, the processes and
impacts of which are described in the relevant academic and professional literature.
Because it applies pre‐existing general explanations of insurgencies’ preferences
and decision‐making, the external indications of which are described within existing
literature, the methodology’s second component can be supported with data
concerning AQI and IS’s externally‐visible behaviour which are found in the sources
which support the methodology’s first component, and in academic and
professional sources. The methodology does not completely address the research
gap—it does not identify the points and purposes of departure from al‐Suri or Naji’s
guidance, the internal pressures upon AQI and IS to accord with al‐Suri or Naji’s
strategic thought, or whether accordance was AQI or IS’s original intent. Rather, it
works within certain limitations to show that al‐Suri and Naji’s dicta were not
indicative of how the AQI and IS insurgencies would ultimately play out, while
93 Marc Sageman, "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research," Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 570.
22
certain issues facing jihadi insurgent organisations appeared to play a role in limiting
the influence of al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought.
1.6: Structure
The structure of the paper’s remainder reflects the methodology. The second, third,
and fourth chapters focus upon the methodology’s first component, using the
analytical framework of organisational, operational, and lifecycle stage phenomena
to compare strategic thought to insurgent practice, and show that ultimately,
variance was mostly evident between AQI and al‐Suri, and IS and Naji. Chapter Two
analyses al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought according to the framework,
establishing what observable phenomena would indicate an insurgency which
accorded to that strategic thought. Chapters Three and Four compare—respectively
the results of the analyses of al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking to empirical data concerning
AQI and IS, showing that how those insurgencies ultimately played was at variance
with al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought. The fifth chapter focuses upon the
methodology’s second component, showing that the variance identified between
the insurgencies’ observable organisation, operations, and lifecycle stages, and al‐
Suri and Naji’s strategic thought, appeared at least partly resultant from
insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased scale, jihadi insurgent
organisations’ inflexible and insular tendencies, and the operational environment’s
potential influence upon insurgencies. Being structured this manner, the paper
supports its arguments according to the logic of its methodology.
23
Chapter 2: Analysing al‐Suri and Naji’s Strategic Thought
2.1: Chapter Introduction
To determine the extent to which insurgent practice reflected strategic thought,
unfocused understandings of al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking are inadequate. It is instead
necessary to identify phenomena which insurgencies, according with al‐Suri or
Naji’s thinking, would exhibit. This necessitates analyses of al‐Suri’s The Call of
Islamic Global Resistance and Naji’s The Management of Savagery according to the
analytical framework. Doing so establishes which organisational phenomena,
operational phenomena, and lifecycle stages insurgencies would exhibit if they
accorded with al‐Suri or Naji’s thinking.
2.2: Analysing al‐Suri’s Work
As stated previously, al‐Suri advocated an organisation of small groups and
individuals which employs terrorism as a substitute, and later as a complement, for
conventional operations, while expanding and escalating gradually to the point of
confronting the state and seizing territory. While that description conveys the gist
of al‐Suri’s thinking, it is inadequate for a comparison with AQI, necessitating an
analysis which uses the analytical framework to identify the organisation,
operations, and lifecycle stages which al‐Suri advocated.
That analysis first determines how, in al‐Suri’s view, insurgencies should organise.
For one, it shows that pre‐conflict social networks’ influence is to be limited, with
ideological and political preferences being determined by insurgencies’ elites, not
exogeneous actors. Second, leaders’ horizontal ties should be limited.94 Al‐Suri
argues that unity should come from ideological commonalities rather than
operational coordination, and intergroup communications should be weak or
absent among personnel in operational roles.95 Third, while al‐Suri advocates
operational security and discourages reckless expansion, he endorses safe,
94 Nasar, 54, 1403‐07. 95 Nasar, 1379, 406‐407.
24
purposeful growth.96 He also recommends forming groups which then form other
groups. Fourth, al‐Suri recommends forming auxiliaries for information operations,
which work separately from military personnel.97 Finally, al‐Suri suggests that close
relationships with non‐adversary third parties should be avoided in the insurgency’s
early stages for operational reasons, and that they should be developed later only
to support insurgents’ objectives.98 Together, such observations reflect the
organisational phenomena which insurgencies, according to al‐Suri’s dicta, should
exhibit.
The analysis also establishes how insurgencies should operate, according to al‐Suri.
First, al‐Suri recommends co‐opting populations by leveraging pre‐existing
grievances “sufficient to carry them [the people] to jihad.”99 Second, provocations
are discouraged in early campaign stages, to avoid overwhelming responses,100 but
are acceptable for inspiring popular support,101 or—later—provoking winnable
confrontations with security forces.102 Thirdly, al‐Suri recommends disrupting
government functions, by striking foreign or domestic security forces, political
actors, or government supporters, and persons or entities who support Western
government presence.103 Fourth, al‐Suri recommends co‐opting personnel from
security services when possible, including by avoiding engagements with security
forces in order to encourage defections.104 Fifth, al‐Suri recommends avoiding
consolidating and defending territorial control prior to the insurgency’s final
lifecycle stage.105 Sixth, al‐Suri endorses specific attack modalities. For most groups,
attacks involving small arms, light weapons, and explosive devices are
96 Nasar, 1399‐403. 97 Nasar, 1409, 12. 98 Nasar, 1422‐24. 99 Nasar, 1370. 100 Nasar, 54. 101 Nasar, 1380. 102 Nasar, 1422. 103 Nasar, 1385‐86. 104 Nasar, 54. 105 Nasar, 1422.
25
recommended in the insurgency’s early stages;106 while larger or more‐complex
attacks are advised in the later stages, and the campaign’s apex should see attacks
involving “the remainder of the weapons of the army.”107 Such observations reflect
the phenomena which could be expected from insurgencies operating according to
al‐Suri’s dicta.
The analysis also identifies a three‐stage lifecycle which al‐Suri advocated for
insurgencies. The first sees a balance between progress and organisational survival.
Operating in small groups, the insurgency operates at limited scale and risk,
undertaking assassinations, small guerrilla operations, ambushes, bombings, and
raids to induce security force exhaustion, and political and economic failure. The
second stage sees the insurgency become more ambitious, aggressive, and tolerant
of risk. Insurgents undertake larger operations, compelling security forces into
confrontations of insurgents’ choosing and seizing territory opportunistically. The
third stage is an offensive, resolving the conflict. Insurgents shift to semi‐regular
attacks and regular military operations, consolidate territorial control, and use
terrorism to complement conventional engagements.108 Together, those three
stages constitute a lifecycle whereby the insurgency gradually escalates, becoming
increasingly aggressive and ambitious in its efforts to hold territory and operate
with increasing freedom. Like the organisational and operational phenomena
described above, it is reasonable to expect that insurgencies which accorded with
al‐Suri’s strategic thought would develop similarly.
2.3: Analysing Naji’s Work
Like the analysis of al‐Suri’s thinking, analysing Naji’s strategic thought is necessary
to establish the extent to which IS’s insurgency played out according to Naji’s
thinking. Previously, it was explained that Naji advocated an insurgency using
violence to exhaust government capacity to provide governance and security within
106 Nasar, 1399‐400. 107 Nasar, 1422‐23. 108 Nasar, 1422‐23.
26
a given area, established an interim administration in that area, and resolved the
conflict by defeating the government and turning that interim administration into a
viable state. Like with al‐Suri’s thinking, that broad description is inadequate,
necessitating an analysis which identifies the organisation, operations, and lifecycle
stages which Naji advocated.
As with al‐Suri, observations begin with the insurgency’s organisation. First, Naji
discourages influential pre‐war social networks. He recommends building groups
which operate according to the ideological and operational preferences of the
network in the insurgency’s early stages, while later he recommends building a
state‐like entity based upon a specific politico‐religious program. He also
discourages integrating the populace or pre‐existing networks into the insurgency
because of their undependability, and against planning according to the preferences
of those not principally loyal to the insurgency.109 Second, Naji encourages strong
horizontal ties. Managers should be close and trained in multiple roles, and
reassigned in response to operational priorities during the early stages of the
insurgency, though Naji does advise allowing some independent decision‐making on
their part.110 Third, Naji advocates purposeful growth, to develop certain
capabilities in the insurgent organisation.111 Fourth, he advocates forming an
auxiliary which constitutes the insurgency’s new administrative apparatus, and the
assignment of auxiliary personnel to information operations.112 Finally, Naji
recommends cooperation with politically‐ and religiously‐hygienic non‐adversary
third parties.113 Cooperation can be achieved by ignoring past disputes and
accepting the instrumental character of partnerships, and by concessions or bribes
109 Naji, 17‐21, 35. 110 Naji, 23, 50‐51. 111 Naji, 62‐71. 112 Naji, 11‐12, 21. 113 Naji, 18.
27
to third parties.114 Together, such phenomena could be reasonably expected from
an insurgency which organised according to Naji’s dicta.
Observations can also be made about the expected operational behaviour which
Naji advocated. One is that Naji recommends relations with the population based
on the insurgency’s position as a governing actor.115 This necessitates forming a
state‐like administration which provides political and social order, and basic
services, in the absence of the government’s failure to do so.116 Secondly, Naji
advocates operations which provoke responses or polarise the population. In the
campaign’s early stages, these may be intended to provoke a response, but in later
stages they are intended to force neutral Muslim audiences to align with or against
the insurgency.117 Thirdly, Naji advocates disrupting and usurping the functions of
government. He recommends attacking the “enemy and the regimes collaborating
with them” in the insurgency’s early stages, while in later stages he recommends
assuming the responsibilities of government.118 Fourth, Naji calls for the infiltration
of the government and security forces, and information operations which appeal to
lower‐ and middle‐level personnel from the security forces to defect.119 Fifth, Naji
recommends defending territorial control. This can be by using the quasi‐state
apparatus to develop the population for fighting and repelling attacks,120 and by
responding to security operations with attacks which impose costs upon the
adversary. Lastly, Naji provides little guidance concerning specific attack modalities,
directing readers to “general books on the art of war, especially guerrilla wars” from
jihadi and non‐jihadi sources instead. What guidance he does provide concerning
attacks is broad, and relates to maximising the frequency, geospatial spread, and
114 Naji, 35, 47‐49. 115 Naji, 20‐21. 116 Naji, 17. 117 Naji, 46‐47. 118 Naji, 11‐12, 16. 119 Naji, 21, 51. 120 Naji, 17‐18.
28
range of targets of attacks.121 Together, such phenomena could be expected from
insurgencies operating according to Naji’s guidance.
Finally, identifying Naji’s proposed lifecycle stages is possible. Three stages are
defined. The first is of “the power of vexation and exhaustion,” wherein the
insurgency creates a disordered space wherein it can establish a new order. In this
stage, insurgents weaken the adversary with attacks of high frequency and
geospatial spread, conduct spectacular attention‐drawing attacks, and seize
territory. The second is “the stage of the administration of savagery,” wherein
insurgents establish a new order within the destabilised space. Here, the insurgency
positions itself as a quasi‐state within its new territory, eliminates dissenters, builds
the capacity to repel and respond to attacks, and engages with ideologically‐
acceptable partners. The third stage is of “the power of establishment,” wherein
the insurgency achieves victory by creating a viable state‐like entity.122 As with al‐
Suri’s writings, the direction of Naji’s envisioned lifecycle is escalatory, though it
emphasises more the usurpation of the state’s role and improving the quality of its
efforts, than widening those efforts’ scope. Like with the organisational and
operational phenomena described above, it could be reasonably expected that the
above would reflect the lifecycle of an insurgency which developed according to
Naji’s guidance. As with al‐Suri’s strategic thought, that understanding is essential
because it facilitates an analysis which address the paper’s first research question—
the extent to which AQI and IS’s insurgencies accorded with al‐Suri and Naji’s
strategic thought.
121 Naji, 28‐32. 122 Naji, 15‐18.
29
Chapter 3: Comparing al‐Suri and AQI
3.1: Chapter Introduction
Analysing al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking enables comparisons between strategic thought
and insurgent practice, the first of which is between al‐Suri’s thinking and AQI’s
insurgency. That comparison works by comparing the results of the analysis of al‐
Suri’s thinking to empirical data concerning AQI’s insurgency. Doing so establishes
the extent to which AQI’s exhibited organisational phenomena, operational
phenomena, and lifecycle stages accorded or varied with al‐Suri’s thinking. This
determines that despite indications of AQI members’ familiarity with al‐Suri’s
writings,123 AQI’s insurgency mostly varied with al‐Suri’s thinking—while AQI’s
exhibited organisational phenomena mostly accorded to al‐Suri’s thinking, its
observable operational phenomena and lifecycle stages mostly varied.
That comparison’s results serve two purposes. First, they partially address the
paper’s first research question by showing that ultimately—based upon publicly‐
available information—AQI mostly varied from al‐Suri’s dicta. Second, they specific
the categories of phenomena wherein that variance occurred, facilitating the fifth
chapter’s analysis which addresses the paper’s second question.
3.2: Comparing AQI and al‐Suri’s Thinking
Comparing empirical data concerning AQI’s insurgency to al‐Suri’s thinking shows
that variance appeared between AQI and al‐Suri’s guidance. That comparison is
structured according to the analytical framework, and—while not identifying
precisely when and how AQI diverged from al‐Suri’s guidance—shows that although
AQI’s organisation ultimately reflected al‐Suri’s strategic thought, its operations and
lifecycle mostly varied.
AQI’s organisation mostly accorded with al‐Suri’s dicta, with accordance occurring
across three of five categories of organisational phenomena. The first concerned
123 al‐Banghali, 39.
30
pre‐conflict social networks’ influence, which al‐Suri believed should be limited.
Accordingly, pre‐conflict social networks did not strongly influence AQI. AQI leaders
desired cohesion,124 integrating Iraqis into senior positions and relying upon pre‐
existing social links to recruit them.125 The resulting cohesion inured AQI to other
networks’ conflicting and moderating preferences, including those within the
broader transnational al‐Qa’ida movement.126 External indications reflected this.
For one, AQI’s platform and practices were resilient and persisted amidst leadership
changes—despite reductions in attacks following the death of former leader, al‐
Zarqawi,127 repeated re‐brandings, further leadership changes,128 and pressure from
third parties, the frequency and character of AQI’s attacks did not significantly
change,129 nor did its unwillingness to engage with the political process. AQI’s
alienation of more‐moderate networks was also consistent with an unwillingness to
accommodate pre‐conflict networks’ preferences: in 2005, tribal fighters from Albu
Mahal attacked AQI;130 while in 2007, Ansar al‐Sunnah, the 1920 Brigades, and Iraqi
Hamas formed a separate partnership.131 These external indications, alongside
reports of AQI’s internal workings, show that in keeping with al‐Suri’s thinking, pre‐
conflict social networks’ influence upon AQI was weak.
Second, AQI accorded with al‐Suri’s endorsement of purposeful growth, although
that growth eventually slowed. AQI’s growth began before the conflict, with former
124 Brian Fishman, "After Zarqawi: The dilemmas and future of Al Qaeda in Iraq," The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2006): 22. 125 Chad C. Serena, It Takes More Than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2014), 44; Michael Ware, "Papers Give Peek Inside al Qaeda in iraq," CNN, 11/06/2008 (2008). 126 Ayman Al‐Zawahiri, "Letter From Ayman al‐Zawahiri to Abu Mus'ab al‐Zarqawi, Dated 09/06/2005," (2005), 6; Al‐Qa'ida AQ and Anonymous Author, "AQ‐POAK‐D‐001‐504: A Letter to the Leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq," (Washington D.C.: CRRS, 2007). 127 Associated Press, "Al‐Qaida in Iraq's al‐Zarqawi 'Terminated'," NBC News, 08/06/2006 (2006). 128 Hashim, 72‐73. 129 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, Al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Tawhid & Jihad, and Islamic State of Iraq Attacks, 2001 and 2011," ; M. J. Kirdar, Al Qaeda in Iraq, (Online: CSIS, 2011). 5. 130 Gary Montgomery and Timothy McWilliams, eds., Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004‐2009 (Quantico: MCUP, 2009), 12‐13. 131 Seumas Milne, "Insurgents Form Political Front to Plan for US Pullout," The Guardian, 19/07/2007 (2007).
31
leader al‐Zarqawi bringing core personnel to Iraq and establishing a network there
before US entry in 2003.132 In worsening circumstances following 2003, AQI
continued integrating new members locally, and via foreign fighter flows.133 AQI’s
early behaviour reflected the resultant growth. For one, the organisation operated
in various locales, with data showing concentrated attacks in Baghdad’s
surroundings and elsewhere in Iraq. Further, the frequency and character of AQI
attacks initially reflected a network operating at growing scale: the rate of attacks
increased in AQI’s early years, while human capital‐intensive suicide bombings
increased in greater proportion to other attack modalities.134 Admittedly, such
growth eventually lessened, particularly as security forces became increasingly
capable,135 and AQI never outgrew other insurgent actors in Iraq.136 External
pressures notwithstanding, though, AQI matched al‐Suri’s thinking by growing
purposefully when able.
Thirdly, AQI formed auxiliaries for non‐military functions, as al‐Suri recommended.
AQI contained persons who supported operations by facilitating transfers of
equipment and non‐Iraqi personnel.137 Also present were personnel with
responsibilities including information operations,138 operational security,139
132 Kirdar. 3; Joby Warrick, Black Flags (Toronto, Canada: Doubleday, 2015), 69‐71; Fishman, The Master Plan, 22‐24. 133 Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter, Al‐Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, (West Point: CTC, 2007). 4‐5; Myriam Bernard, "Assessing AQI's Resilience After April's Leadership Decapitation," CTC Sentinel 3, no. 6 (2010): 6‐7; John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2013). 15. 134 Edward Kaplan et al., "What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights From a Terror Stock Model," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 228‐32; UMD‐START. 135 Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline, (West Point: CTC, 2009). Executive Summary; Spencer Ackerman, "How Special Ops Copied Al‐Qaida to Kill It," WIRED, 09/09/2011 (2011); Michael Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas Cantrell, "Employing ISR SOF Best Practices," Joint Force Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2008). 136 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida, (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2007). 3‐5; Pirnie and O'Connell, 25‐30. 137 Cordesman. 2; Anthony Cordesman, Iraq's Insurgency and Civil Violence, (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2007). 19. 138 Bill Roggio, "Letters From al Qaeda Leaders Show Iraqi Effort is in Dissarray," Long War Journal, 11/09/2008 (2008). 139 Serena, 35‐36, 41.
32
assassinations, managing hostages,140 or criminality to fund AQI’s operations.141 As
with pre‐conflict social networks’ limited influence and purposeful growth, those
auxiliaries’ presence indicated that AQI mostly accorded with al‐Suri’s strategic
thought.
The observable organisational phenomena exhibited by AQI were not wholly
accordant with al‐Suri’s thinking, though. Variance occurred in two of five
categories, one of which related to the strength of horizontal ties. While al‐Suri
recommended limiting them and relying upon ideological commonalities for unity,
AQI desired strong horizontal ties. Internally, the organisation was clearly
structured. Commanders knew their role and how to engage with colleagues, with
established roles for information, intelligence, financial, and other officers.
Operational and tactical decision‐making was delegated to local commanders,
facilitating decisions informed by local situational awareness, and pre‐existing
relationships were leveraged when recruiting to ensure mutual trust.142 AQI’s
behaviour reflected this. In late 2005, AQI commanders gathered to consult for a
“three‐month campaign” of coordinated attacks;143 while in 2006, as external
pressure increased, AQI measuredly reduced its operational footprint in certain
areas.144 Moreover, GTD data were at least consistent with an AQI capacity for
coordinated operations. March of 2004 saw near‐simultaneous incidents in
Baghdad and Karbala, 22nd September of 2004 saw multiple bombings in Baghdad
against military targets, and 16th March 2007 saw simultaneous attacks across
multiple locales, for example.145 While AQI’s operations grew increasingly parochial
140 International Crisis Group ICG, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, (Online: ICG, 2006). 8. 141 Rollins and Wyler. 31; Phil Williams, Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq, (Online: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009). 142 Serena, 44; Patrick Johnston et al., Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2016), 71‐82. 143 Ware. 144 Benjamin Bahney et al., An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al‐Qa'ida in Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), 44. 145 UMD‐START.
33
in later years,146 amidst leadership incompetence and security force attacks,147 AQI
displayed an intent to maintain horizontal ties, despite al‐Suri’s guidance.
Second, while al‐Suri discouraged close engagement with non‐adversary third
parties—especially earlier‐on—AQI’s relationships with non‐adversary third parties
were mostly cooperative, though the insurgency only later worked to maintain
them. Initially, AQI coexisted—albeit poorly—with other Sunni groups with whom it
had differences. These included the Mujahideen Army in Iraq, the Islamic Army in
Iraq, Ansar al‐Sunnah or Ansar al‐Islam, the 1920 Revolution Brigades,148 the Islamic
Front of Iraqi Resistance,149 and criminal actors. While common objectives enabled
coexistence between those groups and AQI,150 AQI’s unwillingness to moderate its
ideological platform, and attempts to assert a central role in Iraq’s broader
insurgency,151 eventually alienated third parties, which pivoted from AQI by 2006,
sometimes towards Iraq’s government.152 Resultantly, AQI attempted to improve its
image, rebranding as the Mujahideen Shura Council in 2006, presenting itself as a
more‐conventional part of the al‐Qa’ida‐led jihadi movement,153 and later in that
same year forming the Islamic State of Iraq.154 These changes indicated AQI’s
desire—contrary to al‐Suri’s dicta—to seem a leader among various insurgent
actors,155 and to maintain cooperative relationships with non‐adversary third
parties. This aberrant collegiality, however, did not negate the three areas of
146 Bernard, 7. 147 Roggio; Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline. 19. 148 ICG. 2. 149 Cordesman, Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida. 4‐5. 150 Serena, 33‐34, 45. 151 International Crisis Group ICG, Iraq After the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape, (Online: ICG, 2008). 16‐17. 152 Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 91‐92. 153 Fishman, "After Zarqawi: The dilemmas and future of Al Qaeda in Iraq," 25. 154 Kenneth Katzman, Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links, (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2008). 11. 155 Lydia Khalil, "The Islamic State of Iraq Launches Plan of Nobility," Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 7 (2007).
34
organisational accordance, and ultimately, most observable organisational
phenomena exhibited by AQI accorded with al‐Suri’s guidance.
But while accordance appeared between the organisational phenomena exhibited
by AQI and al‐Suri’s thinking, variance occurred between al‐Suri’s guidance and
AQI’s exhibited operational phenomena—among six categories, variance appeared
in four. The first related to the character of AQI’s relationship with the population.
Although Al‐Suri recommended co‐opting the population by exploiting pre‐existing
grievances, AQI maintained coercive relationships with local populations,
particularly tribes in Iraq’s west.156 The insurgency encroached upon all major areas
of life. AQI sought political control by undermining local leaders’ autonomy,
denouncing the traditional tribal order as un‐Islamic, encouraging younger
members to attack AQI’s opponents,157 and assassinating dissenting tribal
leaders.158 AQI also attempted to dominate social affairs, restricting alcohol, mixed‐
gender interactions, and other matters, while violently enforcing those
restrictions.159 Further, AQI sought to replace the customary law normally governing
tribal life with a religiously‐derived judicial system, enforcing judgments severely.
Finally, AQI forcefully entered economic life, expropriating business revenues,160
while preventing tribal leaders from accessing US‐backed investment.161 Local
actors’ backlashes against AQI further attested to that coercive relationship. In
2005, tribes from the Dulaimi confederation struck AQI, provoking AQI
recriminations; in 2006, the Mahal and Albu Nimr, as well as several tribal networks
156 Bahney et al., 30. 157 Norman Cigar, Al‐Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq's Unstable Triangle, Middle East Studies Occasional Papers (Quantico: MCUP, 2011), 8‐10; Jesmeen Khan, "The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on Counter‐Terrorism," Perspectives on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (2007): 4‐5. 158 Joel Wing, "Anbar Before and After the Awakening Pt. IX: Sheikh Sabah Aziz of the Albu Mahal," Musings on Iraq, 23/01/2014 (2014). 159 Katzman. 10‐11. 160 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey Friedman, and Jacob Shapiro, "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?," International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 20. 161 Cigar, 13‐16.
35
within Anbar Salvation Council, rose against AQI;162 and in 2007, anti‐AQI
mobilisation coalesced as “Sahwa” (Awakening) militias, eliciting reactions from AQI
leaders.163 Similarly, persons living under AQI rule cooperated with security forces—
the Anbar People’s Council began supporting police in 2005,164 while the rate of
civilian tips for insurgent weapons caches increased significantly in 2006‐7.165 Like
the direct indications, this popular backlash illustrated that AQI’s relations with local
populations, contrary to al‐Suri’s guidance, were coercive.
The second area of operational variance related to the use of provocations. While
al‐Suri discouraged provoking reactions prematurely, AQI intended and acted to
provoke reactions from the government and public from its campaign’s early stages.
This is based partly upon AQI’s known intent—in 2004, former leader al‐Zarqawi
expressed a desire for sectarian conflict in Iraq.166 AQI’s actions reflected that
intent. For much of its insurgency, AQI perpetrated strikes likely to provoke
government and public responses. These included the 2003 Jordanian embassy
bombing,167 the 2003 bombing of a hotel used by the United Nations,168 the 2003
killing of a prominent Shi’i figure,169 the 2006 bombing of a notable mosque in
Samarra,170 and a tendency in the late 2000s to target religious minorities and
institutions.171 More broadly, GTD data indicated a pattern of attacks against
security force, government, and diplomatic targets between 2003 and 2005, which
162 Long, 79‐80. 163 CNN, "Iraq: Al‐Qa'ida Calls for the Sacrifice of Members of the Council of The Awakening/ :العراق .Elaph.com, 23/12/2007 (2007) ",القاعدة تدعو إلى التضحية بأعضاء مجالس الصحوة164 Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro, 20. 165 Cordesman, Iraq's Insurgency and Civil Violence. 30. 166 US Department of State, "Text of a Letter From Abu Mus'ab al‐Zarqawi, Obtained by United States Government in Iraq," 167 Askold Krushelnycky, "Iraq: At Least 11 Dead In Jordanian Embassy Bombing In Baghdad," Radio Free Europe, 07/08/2003 (2003). 168 Joel Roberts, "Baghdad Bomb Crude But Deadly," CBS News, 21/08/2003 (2003). 169 Neil Macfarquhar and Richard Oppel, "After the War: Attack at Shrine; Car Bomb in Iraq Kills 95 at Shiite Mosque," New York Times, 30/08/2003 (2003). 170 Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro, 15. 171 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, (Online: US Department of State, 2010). 121.
36
continued—aside from a decline in attacks against diplomatic targets—into the late
2000s.172 For much of its insurgency, AQI intended and acted to provoke a response,
contrary to al‐Suri’s advice.
The third area of operational variance concerned the co‐optation or penetration of
security forces. While al‐Suri encouraged this, AQI did not appear to infiltrate or co‐
opt Iraq’s security forces. Media reporting is not wholly consistent with
collaboration between security forces and AQI, and establishing collaboration
resultant from infiltration or co‐optation is difficult. Some reports indicate security
personnel collaboration with Sunni insurgents, among whom may have been AQI. In
2004, one report indicated an Iraqi National Guard officer providing support to
insurgents near Kirkuk.173 In 2007, Iraqi authorities dismissed a mayor and 1,500
police officers for alleged collaboration with Sunni insurgents.174 In 2011, an Iraqi
soldier was convicted of killing two US personnel, and was allegedly an AQI
member, however the conviction was overturned in 2012.175 Further, GTD data
show that while the rate of attacks against security forces varied, AQI never ceased
attacking security forces in a manner which might encourage defections as al‐Suri
suggested.176 As such, dispositive proof of AQI’s infiltration or co‐optation of the
government or security forces—which would reflect al‐Suri’s influence—was
absent.
The fourth area of variance related to AQI’s willingness to maintain territorial
control. Where al‐Suri discouraged premature territorial seizures, AQI sought to
establish and maintain territorial control, although its resolve to do so gradually
declined. Initially, AQI resisted efforts to end its overt presence in certain areas. In
172 UMD‐START. 173 Borzou Daragahi, "Massacre Feared a Setup / Infiltrators Plague Iraqi Security Forces," SFGate, 26/10/2004 (2004). 174 Stephen Farrell and Hassan al‐Jarrah, "Raids Foil Plot to Kill Shia Pilgrims," The Times, 29/01/2007 2007. 175 US Department of State, US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism: Middle East and North Africa, (Online: US Government, 2013). 9. 176 UMD‐START.
37
2004, several insurgent organisations—including AQI—turned Fallujah into an
environment wherein they could operate relatively freely,177 while AQI attempted
to assert leadership in that city.178 Forcing AQI from Fallujah required two offensives
by security forces,179 which—given AQI and other insurgent organisations’
resistance—caused substantial damage to the city.180 AQI’s willingness to fight for
territorial control declined after Fallujah, however. The insurgency took a more
measured approach in Ramadi in 2006, entrenching itself there after losing
Fallujah,181 but focusing its efforts in specific areas of the city before eventually
being expelled by US, Iraqi government, and local tribal forces.182 In 2007 and 2008,
in Anbar, AQI faced growing pressure from US and local forces,183 and responded by
consolidating its presence in Ninewa rather than attempting to defend its presence
in Anbar.184 By 2009, as US forces began withdrawing and Iraqi forces’ role grew,185
AQI had consolidated itself in Diyala and Ninewa, with networks operating around
Baghdad and in eastern Anbar,186 allowing itself to be forced underground.187 This
change ultimately illustrated the broader point: while its resolve to do so declined,
AQI wished to maintain some measure of territorial control. It was in this regard,
and in the coercive relations with the population, provocative behaviour, and failure
to infiltrate or co‐opt the security forces, that AQI’s operations varied from al‐Suri’s
thinking.
177 The Economist, "The Battle for Fallujah Now‐‐and For Hearts and Minds Later," The Economist 373, no. 8401 (2004); Kirdar. 4. 178 Bahney et al., 19. 179 Albert Palazzo, "Perspective From the Coalface: the Battle for Fallujah," Australian Army Journal 4, no. 2 (2007): 167‐68. 180 Pirnie and O'Connell, 11‐12. 181 Johnston et al., 15‐16. 182 Niel Smith and Sean Macfarland, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," Military Review 88, no. 2 (2008): 49‐50; David Ucko, "Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq," Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 3 (2008): 359. 183 Phillips, 65. 184 Johnston et al., 23‐25; State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. 119‐20. 185 Hashim, 73. 186 State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. 119‐20. 187 Johnston et al., 2‐3.
38
The operational phenomena exhibited by AQI were not entirely divergent from al‐
Suri’s guidance, however—accordance appeared across two categories. For one,
reflecting al‐Suri’s dicta, AQI endeavoured to disrupt government functions with
limited success, but did not meaningfully attempt to usurp them. AQI’s disruption
and usurpation of government were readily observable. After the 2003 fall of the
Ba’ath government, AQI targeted infrastructure, security forces,188 and essential
professionals like doctors, while threatening those who facilitated or encouraged
political engagement,189 or were central to tribal politics.190 This continued into
AQI’s later years, as the insurgency continued targeting government and local
security forces, services, and infrastructure.191 Simultaneously, AQI made token
attempts to usurp government functions through its aforementioned efforts to
impose a social, political, and economic order upon areas it controlled; and seized
control over facilities essential for healthcare, education, and petroleum
production.192 AQI was not successful in its attempts to disrupt the functions of
government, however, and made no meaningful efforts to usurp them. While AQI’s
efforts—and those of other actors—rapidly degraded Iraq’s security environment in
2003 and 2004,193 Iraqi and foreign forces were able to make limited progress in
improving Iraq’s security situation later in the decade.194 While AQI disrupted
essential services by targeting infrastructure and professionals, it did not itself
provide those services.195 Further, AQI’s political obstruction failed, with at least
seventy percent of AQI’s preferred constituency— Sunni Arabs—registering to
188 UMD‐START. 189 ICG, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency. 17‐18. 190 ICG, Iraq After the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape. 6‐7. 191 State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. 120. 192 Montgomery and McWilliams, 21, 46. 193 Anonymous, "Insurgency in Iraq," Strategic Comments 9, no. 8 (2003): 1; Op TELIC SPG, UK Contribution to Iraq: Strategic Intent and Direction, (Online: Government of the United Kingdom, 2003). 1. 194 State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. 119‐20; UK Border Agency UKBA, Iraq: Country of Information (COI) Report, (Online: UK Home Office, 2011). 49‐51. 195 Johnston et al., 101‐02.
39
vote,196 and the 2005 and 2010 elections proceeding with majority participation.197
Alongside other evidence, this reinforced AQI’s intent—but ultimate failure—to
disrupt government functions as al‐Suri encouraged, and its unwillingness to
meaningfully usurp them.
Secondly, AQI favoured an attack modality which al‐Suri endorsed—bombings. GTD
data indicate 297 bombings between 2003 and 2011, exceeding armed assaults,
kidnappings, and assassinations. Periodic increases and decreases in bombings were
also telling. Between 2004 and 2005, bombings increased while other modalities—
notably, armed assault and kidnapping—decreased. More broadly, the rate of
bombings increased until 2010, except in 2006 which saw a general reduction in
attacks.198 This preference for bombings, alongside AQI’s intent to disrupt the
functions of government was accordant with al‐Suri’s operational guidance. Amidst
the areas of operational variance, however, it did not change the fact that AQI’s
exhibited operational phenomena mostly varied from al‐Suri’s thinking.
Like the operational phenomena it exhibited, AQI’s lifecycle also varied from al‐
Suri’s thinking. Variance appeared in that lifecycle’s individual stages, and its
aggregate. In the individual stages, resemblance to al‐Suri’s proposed lifecycle was
inconsistent, with similarities initially appearing: between 2003 and 2004, AQI
operated clandestinely, establishing itself within the post‐Ba’athist landscape, and
attacked diplomatic, security, and politically‐symbolic targets, and private
citizens.199 While developing relationships with other militant actors in this
period,200 AQI operated discreetly—its involvement in the 2003 Jordanian embassy
bombing,201 for example, was not initially apparent.202 This reflected al‐Suri’s
196 Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2009). 2. 197 Kanan Makiya, "The Iraqi Elections of 2010 ‐ and 2005," Middle East Brief 42, no. June (2010): 2. 198 UMD‐START. 199 UMD‐START. 200 Fishman, The Master Plan, 40. 201 Krushelnycky. 202 Warrick, 106‐08.
40
cautious first stage. AQI’s insurgency also resembled al‐Suri’s second stage between
2004 and 2006, as the insurgency became more aggressive. It declared its
association with al‐Qa’ida,203 perpetrating more attacks against more targets,204 and
attempted to establish an overt role for itself by entrenching itself in significant
locales, including Fallujah and Ramadi.205 Initially, AQI’s lifecycle resembled that
proposed by al‐Suri.
But later stages of AQI’s lifecycle differed from al‐Suri’s vision, as did the overall
lifecycle. Between 2006 and 2009, the insurgency’s defensive behaviour did not
resemble any stage al‐Suri described. To prevent attacks by other actors in a time of
relative vulnerability, AQI rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq,206 increasingly
targeting private citizens instead of security forces.207 Responding to pressure from
US, Iraqi, and local tribal forces,208 it reduced its overt presence in Anbar and
dispersed elsewhere, including Diyala and Ninewa.209 Similarly, the counteroffensive
from 2009 to 2011, as US troops—once AQI’s principal adversary—gradually ceded
responsibilities to Iraqi forces,210 only vaguely resembled al‐Suri the first stage
proposed by al‐Suri. Rather than bringing increasing pressure to bear against the
government, AQI had become an underground organisation again,211 maintaining a
strong presence in Diyala and Ninewa, and discreet networks around Baghdad and
eastern Anbar.212 It also avoided major confrontations with security forces,213 which
203 Al Jazeera, "الزرقاوي يعلن والءه لبن الدن ويحيطه بالوضع في العراق/Zarqawi Announces His Loyalty to Bin Laden and His Involvement in the Situation in Iraq," Al Jazeera, 19/10/2004 (2004). 204 UMD‐START. 205 Bahney et al., 19; Ellen Knickmeyer, "Ramadi Insurgents Flaunt Threat," Washington Post, 02/12/2005 (2005). 206 Christopher Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2007). 8. 207 UMD‐START. 208 Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline. 6, 9‐10. 209 Johnston et al., 23‐25; Eric Hamilton, "Expanding Security in Diyala," Iraq Report, May 2008 (2007). 3‐4. 210 International Crisis Group ICG, Loose Ends: Iraq's Security Forces Between U.S. Drawdown and Withdrawal, (Online: ICG, 2010). 4. 211 Johnston et al., 2. 212 State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. 119‐20. 213 Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline. 19.
41
had become more hazardous as more essential AQI personnel were killed in
confrontations.214 Instead AQI increasingly perpetrating firearm and bombing
attacks against police, government, and military targets; and shifted its attention
from the civilians it had targeted in the preceding stage of its campaign—something
at odds with al‐Suri’s objective to induce “exhaustion.”215
AQI’s lifecycle still varied from al‐Suri’s vision when considered in the aggregate.
This was evident in the campaign’s overall direction: while al‐Suri advocated
ongoing escalation and increasingly ambitious efforts to expand the organisation
and its territory, AQI became less ambitious and increasingly focused upon survival
as its campaign progressed. AQI’s insurgency also did not “mature,” with AQI never
operating in a manner resembling al‐Suri’s final lifecycle stage—with terror and
guerrilla tactics complementing conventional operations amidst territorial seizures.
In both its individual stages and entirety, AQI’s lifecycle varied from al‐Suri’s
thinking, just as the exhibited operational phenomena did. Cumulatively, such
findings support a broader conclusion: while AQI exhibited organisational
phenomena mostly accordant with al‐Suri’s guidance, the operational phenomena
and lifecycle AQI exhibited were mostly at variance.
3.3: Summary and Key Findings
Comparing AQI to al‐Suri’s guidance serves two purposes. Firstly, it partly addresses
the paper’s first research question by showing that ultimately, AQI’s insurgency
mostly varied from al‐Suri’s thinking. More narrowly, the comparison identifies
categories of phenomenon apparently at variance with al‐Suri’s guidance. Two
categories were organisational: AQI had strong horizontal ties and engaged with
non‐adversary third parties, contradicting al‐Suri’s recommendation. Four other
categories were operational: AQI maintained coercive relations with the population,
employed provocations earlier than al‐Suri advised, failed to co‐opt security forces,
214 Hashim, 73. 215 UMD‐START, 1422; Nasar.
42
and sought territorial control sooner than al‐Suri advised. Finally, AQI’s lifecycle—as
separate stages or a whole—ultimately differed from al‐Suri’s proposed lifecycle. In
identifying those areas of variance, the results serve a second purpose—facilitating
the fifth chapters’ analysis, which addresses the paper’s second question by
accounting for variance between strategic thought and insurgent practice.
Limitations upon those results exist, however. They do not establish whether AQI
originally intended to follow al‐Suri’s guidance and was forced to diverge, or that no
other areas of potential accordance or variance exist. Indeed, questions remain
because of indications of AQI leaders’ familiarity with al‐Suri’s thinking, the limited
accordance which was identified, and the methodology’s noted limitations.
However, the results do show that AQI’s insurgency ultimately occurred in a manner
mostly varying with al‐Suri’s thinking, with variance occurring in specific areas.
43
Chapter 4: Comparing Naji and IS
4.1: Chapter Introduction
While analysing al‐Suri’s work enables a comparison between al‐Suri’s thinking and
AQI, analysing Naji’s enables a comparison of Naji’s strategic thought and IS. Also
structured according to the analytical framework, that comparison contributes
similarly to answering the paper’s research questions. The comparison works by
comparing the results of the analysis of Naji’s thinking to empirical data concerning
IS’s insurgency, and establishing whether IS’s exhibited organisational phenomena,
operational phenomena, and lifecycle stages accorded or varied with Naji’s
guidance. This shows that despite indications of IS members’ familiarity with Naji’s
writings,216 IS ultimately organised and developed in a manner varying substantially
from Naji’s dicta, and operated only in limited accordance.
Like those from the preceding chapter, that comparison’s results serve two
purposes: demonstrating variance between Naji’s strategic thought and IS, and
enabling the fifth chapter’s analysis which addresses the paper’s second research
question.
4.2: Comparing IS and Naji’s Thinking
Comparing the results of the analysis of Naji’s thinking to data concerning IS shows
that IS’s insurgency occurred at considerable variance with Naji’s dicta, despite IS
members’ familiarity with Naji’s writings. While not establishing the juncture and
cause of divergence from Naji’s thinking, that comparison—structured in line with
the analytical framework—demonstrates that IS’s organisation and development
mostly varied from Naji’s dicta, while its operations were in only limited
accordance.
The comparison first establishes that IS organised in a manner mostly diverging
from Naji’s thinking. Variance occurred in three categories of observable
216 Hassan, 17.
44
organisational phenomena. First, despite Naji’s warning to limit their influence, pre‐
conflict social networks held significant sway over IS’s behaviour. Former officials
from the pre‐war Ba’athist government comprised one network; while not affecting
IS’s ideological programme, they influenced IS’s operational behaviour, increasing
its combat effectiveness.217 IS‐aligned tribes were another, albeit looser, network.
While IS needed them to assert territorial control, ideological and social differences
prevented tribes’ complete integration into IS.218 Consequently, tribal fighters
sometimes operated with separate priorities, enmeshing IS into local conflicts.219
While neither pre‐conflict network altered IS’s ideological platform, they affected its
operational behaviour, thus indicating their influence upon IS, contradicting Naji’s
recommendation.
Second, while Naji advocated strong horizontal ties, IS’s lack of operational
cohesion indicated weak ones. IS commanders maintained strategic cohesion: in
2013 and 2014, groups of IS personnel converged upon locales like Mosul, Ramadi,
and Fallujah,220 operated with broad geospatial spread across central and Northern
Iraq,221 and undertook “campaigns” like the waves of bombings in 2012 and
2013.222 Commanders were not operationally cohesive, however. The
aforementioned bombing campaigns were more consistent with prior centralised
planning than middle‐level collaboration,223 and coordinated attacks were abnormal
217 Ronen Zeidel, "The Dawa’ish: A Collective Profile of IS Commanders," Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 4 (2017): 20‐21; Craig Whiteside, "A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement," Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (2017): 13. 218 Richard Barrett, The Islamic State, (New York: The Soufan Group, 2014). 19‐21. 219 Michael Knights and Alexander Mello, "The Cult of The Offensive: The Islamic State on Defense," CTC Sentinel 8, no. 4 (2015): 2. 220 Paul Kamolnick, The Al‐Qaeda Organization and The Islamic State Organization, (West Point: US Army War College Press, 2017). 194‐95. 221 Chicago Project on Security & Threats CPOST, "Data From CPOST, Islamic State, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and Islamic State of Iraq Attacks, 2011 & 2016," (2018). 222 Jessica Lewis, "Al‐Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I," Middle East Security Report, September 2013 (2013). 13‐16. 223 Lewis. 14.
45
in GTD data.224 IS’s operational commanders also operated independently while IS‐
aligned tribal fighters worked according to separate priorities,225 causing “disjointed
and localized” operational behaviour;226 while IS’s defensive operations relied more
upon preparation than coordination.227 Despite its strategic cohesion, IS’s
operational behaviour belied strong horizontal ties of the sort Naji advocated.
Third, although Naji endorsed constructive engagement with non‐adversary third
parties, IS’s relations with non‐adversary third parties in Iraq were belligerent and
uncompromising. IS’s conduct between 2011 and 2013 reflected this. The
insurgency violently pressured tribal actors in that period, integrating some by
exploiting the Iraqi government’s failure to provide security, and attacking those
which had resisted AQI.228 Even when not hostile, IS was unaccommodating—with
the Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al‐Sunnah, the 1920s Revolution Brigades, and
others, it cultivated relationships via shared interests rather than compromise.229
The alienation of third parties, particularly as incentives to tolerate IS’s behaviour
lessened in and after 2014, also indicated this inflexible attitude towards third
parties. Lacking close bonds to incentivise ongoing relationships, other groups
distanced themselves entirely from IS or maintained only discreet relations, to avoid
being targeted by increasingly‐capable security forces.230 Similarly, tribes turned
224 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017," 225 Daveed Gartenstein‐Ross and Sterling Jensen, "The Role of Iraqi Tribes After the Islamic State's Ascendance," Military Review 95, no. 4 (2015): 108‐09. 226 Thomas Maurer, "ISIS’s Warfare Functions: A Systematized Review of a Proto‐state’s Conventional Conduct of Combat Operations," Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 2 (2018): 232. 227 Michael Knights and Alexander Mello, "Defeat by Annihilation: Mobility and Attrition in the Islamic State's Defense of Mosul," CTC Sentinel 10, no. 4 (2017): 2‐4; Andrea Beccaro, "Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study," Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 2 (2018): 218. 228 Gartenstein‐Ross and Jensen, 102‐03, 05‐06. 229 Fishman, The Master Plan, 183; Aymenn Jawad Al‐Tamimi, "Islamic Army of Iraq Interview," Aymenn Jawad al‐Tamimi's Blog, 04/09/2014 (2014). 230 Sinan Adnan and Aaron Reese, Beyond The Islamic State: Iraq's Second Sunni Insurgency, (Online: ISW, 2014). 15‐16, 18; Al‐Tamimi.
46
against IS,231 or signalled their intent to do so when able.232 That backlash further
evinced the character of IS’s relations with other actors—rather than co‐opting
them and accommodating their interests like Naji recommended, IS’s relations with
non‐adversary third parties were hostile and uncompromising. This, alongside pre‐
conflict social networks’ influence and the weakness of horizontal ties, indicated
variance between IS’s organisation and Naji’s thinking.
Organisational variance was not complete, however. Accordance appeared in two
of five areas. First, IS reflected Naji’s endorsement of purposeful growth—
circumstances permitting—by expanding purposefully in response to operational
requirements. From 2011 to 2013, IS grew cautiously in response to specific
challenges. Prison breaks enabled the recruitment of experienced jihadis, expanding
IS’s initially‐small workforce;233 while engagement with tribes allowed IS to assert
and maintain territorial control.234 This growth hastened in 2014, as IS’s “state”
created greater manpower requirements.235 To satisfy those requirements, IS
courted Iraqi Sunnis by leveraging political anxieties and attacking objectors,236 and
invited foreign personnel to fill military and non‐military roles.237 After late 2014,
however, growth slowed. Military failures hampered recruitment within IS’s
territory and caused unsustainable personnel turnover, while the closure of
smuggling routes reduced the flow of foreign personnel, and IS’s worsening
231 Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazai, Shaping Iraq's Security Forces, (Online: CSIS, 2014). 54‐56. 232 Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel, "A Marriage of Convenience: The Many Faces of Iraq's Sunni Insurgency," Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 12, no. 15 (2014): 4‐5. 233 Al‐Sumaria News, "القاعدة تتبنى الهجوم على سجن تكريت وتعترف بمقتل خمسة من عناصرها/al‐Qa'ida Mounts Attacks Upon Tikrit Prison and Acknowledges the Killing of Five of Its Members," Al‐Sumaria News, 12/10/2012 (2012); US Department of State, Iraq 2013 Human Rights Report, (Online: US Department of State, 2014). 9. 234 Muhammad Al‐'Ubaydi et al., The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, (West Point: CTC, 2014). 25; International Crisis Group ICG, Iraq: Falluja's Faustian Bargain, (Online: ICG, 2014). 7. 235 Fishman, The Master Plan, 203‐05. 236 Gartenstein‐Ross and Jensen, 107‐09; Mohammed Tawfeeq and Chelsea Carter, "Officials: ISIS Recruting on the Rise in Sunni Areas of Iraq," CNN, 11/08/2014 (2014). 237 Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look At The Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail, (West Point: CTC, 2016). 1, 18, 28.
47
circumstances precipitated desertions.238 While IS’s behaviour between 2011 and
late 2014 indicated an initial desire for purposeful growth of the sort advocated by
Naji, changing circumstances ultimately curbed that ambition.
Second, IS accorded with Naji’s endorsement of the formation of auxiliaries. Those
auxiliaries existed within two classes. The first supported military operations and
was continuously present. It conducted information operations,239 supported IS’s
administration and logistics,240 facilitated attacks in the territories of third‐party
adversaries like Belgium and France,241 or generated funds through criminality or
collaboration with criminal networks.242 The second class managed IS’s “state” by
performing law and order, regime security,243 civil service, and public works
functions,244 although it shrunk over time amidst military losses, financial pressures,
and mismanagement, however.245 Shrinkage notwithstanding, they—alongside
personnel supporting military operations—constituted an auxiliary within IS. But
despite IS’s development of auxiliaries and purposeful growth, most organisational
phenomena exhibited by IS varied from Naji’s guidance.
At the same time, IS exhibited operational phenomena which were in only limited
accordance with Naji’s thinking. Across six categories, accordance occurred in three.
First, as Naji advocated coercive relations with the population, IS asserted control
238 Colin Clarke et al., Financial Futures of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 19‐20; Knights and Mello, 4‐5. 239 Daniel Milton, Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts, (West Point: CTC, 2016). 15‐19. 240 Lynn Davis, Jeffrey Martini, and Kim Cragin, "A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat," RAND Perspectives, 2017 (2017). 16. 241 Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Yayla, "The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence Apparatus," Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 11‐13. 242 Vaughan Phillips, "The Islamic State's Strategy: Bureaucratizing the Apocalypse through Strategic Communications," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 9 (2017): 732‐33. 243 Carl Anthony Wege, "The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018): 273‐76. 244 Eric Robinson et al., When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 78‐79; Seth Jones et al., Rolling Back the Islamic State (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 17. 245 Aymenn Jawad Al‐Tamimi, "A Caliphate Under Strain: The Documentary Evidence," CTC Sentinel 9, no. 4 (2016): 2‐4.
48
over political, social, and economic life within its territory. This was evident after IS
seized territory in late 2013 and 2014 and asserted control over significant
dimensions of life. To control political affairs, IS security personnel identified and
punished politically unhygienic materials, statements, or perceived sympathies.246
To regulate social life, the insurgency established guidelines concerning public and
private morality,247 banned “un‐Islamic” practices and products,248 and attacked
undesirable groups.249 IS also regulated economic affairs by imposing taxes,250 and
encroaching upon the cement, gas, oil, and other industries.251 That behaviour did
not necessarily indicate coercion—alone, it also resembled an intent to win support
by providing illiberal governance. Rather, the coercive nature of IS rule was
established by the use of kidnappings,252 executions,253 and corporal punishment to
secure it.254 It was the maintenance of such control via those methods which
indicated a coercive relationship with the population, reflecting Naji’s ideas.
Second, IS’s provocations and their polarising outcomes mirrored Naji’s guidance.
Between 2011 and June 2014, attacks aggravating pre‐existing sectarian tensions
indicated IS’s provocative intent. Following US withdrawal in December 2011, IS
frequently attacked the predominantly‐Shi’a security forces, anti‐AQI Sahwa militia
which Iraqi Sunnis had come to view as the Iraqi state’s partner,255 and Shi’a and
246 Speckhard and Yayla, 8‐9. 247 Rukmini Callimachi, "The ISIS Files," New York Times, 04/04/2018 (2018). 248 Robinson et al., 149. 249 Hassan, 3. 250 Jones et al., 65; Robinson et al., 10‐11. 251 Robinson et al., 12‐13; Phillips. 252 Erin Cunningham, "In Iraq, Islamic State Fighters Seize Sunni Tribesmen for Resisting Rule," Washington Post, 06/11/2014 (2014). 253 Iraq Body Count, "Iraq 2015: A Catastrophic Normal," Iraq Body Count "From the Numbers", 01/01/2016 (2016); Iraq Body Count, "Another Year of Relentless Violence in Iraq," Iraq Body Count "From the Numbers", 2017 (2017). 254 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights UNOCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, (Baghdad, Iraq: United Nations, 2016). 35. 255 Lewis. 10; International Crisis Group ICG, Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State, (Online: ICG, 2013). 11‐12.
49
Shi’a‐affiliated targets.256 Similarly telling was IS’s targeting of Sahwa‐linked tribes,
to signal that cooperation with IS was essential to other tribes’ survival.257 That
provocative intent was further evinced by the responses to such attacks. Iraq’s
government reinforced IS’s narratives of Sunni disenfranchisement by demonising
Sunnis and allowing Shi’a militias’ remobilisation,258 while tribes lost confidence in
the government’s willingness to protect them and increasingly tolerated IS’s
intrusions into their affairs.259 More broadly, sectarian violence intensified as Shi’a
militias and security forces attacked Sunni citizens, gatherings, and properties,260
while locals’ governing concern was the government’s response when IS announced
its presence in Fallujah in December 2013.261 Alongside IS’s provocative attacks
themselves, such reactions further indicated IS’s intent and action to provoke and
polarise, as Naji recommended.
Third, in keeping with Naji’s thinking, IS sought to disrupt and usurp government
functions, although the balance between disruption and usurpation shifted. IS
prioritised disruption between 2011 and 2013, targeting security force personnel
and recruits,262 intimidating former or suspected security personnel,263 and
targeting the government and essential services.264 While such attacks continued
until at least 2016,265 IS began usurping government functions in 2014 by assigning
256 Agencies, "Al‐Qaeda Claims Wave of Deadly Iraq Attacks," Al Jazeera, 22/03/2012 (2012); UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017". 257 Jessica Lewis, "AQI's "Soldier's Harvest" Campaign," ISW Backgrounders, 09/10/2013 (2013). 6. 258 ICG, Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State. i‐ii, 1. 259 Barrett. 41. 260 State, Iraq 2013 Human Rights Report. 2‐3; Michael Knights, "Iraq's Never‐Ending Security Crisis," BBC, 03/10/2013 (2013). 261 ICG, Iraq: Falluja's Faustian Bargain. 7‐8. 262 Rod Nordland, "Iraq Empties Mass Graves in Search for Cadets Killed by ISIS," New York Times, 08/04/2015 (2015). 263 Beccaro, 213; Mustafa Habib, "Why Aren't Anbar's Locals Fighting Extremists?," Niqash, 14/04/2016 (2016). 264 Jessica Lewis, "Al‐Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: Part II," Middle East Security Report, October 2013 (2013). 11; Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis, (Online: CSIS, 2014). 31‐32. 265 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017".
50
personnel to security,266 civil administration, healthcare, education, and other
duties in its territory,267 and inviting foreigners with relevant expertise to that
territory.268 Such efforts were not necessarily effective—IS’s governance was
inept,269 and only of a competitive standard because expectations were low.270 But
success or failure notwithstanding, IS nevertheless exhibited an intent to disrupt
and later usurp government functions in Iraq. As with IS’s coercive treatment of the
population and its use of provocations, that intent was accordant with Naji’s
thinking on how insurgencies should organise.
But despite appearing across three categories of observable operational
phenomena, accordance was absent within three others. Outright variance
occurred twice. First, despite Naji’s endorsement of infiltrating and co‐opting the
government and security forces, IS attempted neither infiltration nor co‐optation,
remaining hostile towards Iraq’s government and favouring disruption over co‐
optation. Partly, this was evident in the number of attacks against the
government—between 2011 and 2016, IS conducted more than 1,700 attacks
against security forces and government targets.271 IS also killed some former or
suspected security or government personnel within its new territories, while
compelling others to resign and renounce government ties.272 Further, security
forces’ service of IS’s interests at specific junctures was not due to IS’s behaviour.
Security personnel deserted Mosul in 2014,273 but because of demoralisation,
266 Speckhard and Yayla, 6. 267 Phillips, 734‐35. 268 Islamic State IS, "Khilafah Declared," Dabiq 1 (2014): 11. 269 Al‐Tamimi, "A Caliphate Under Strain: The Documentary Evidence," 2‐4; Robinson et al., 184‐85. 270 Phillips, 735. 271 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017". 272 Kamal Al‐Ayash, "Iraqi Policemen Who ‘Repented’ To Extremists, Not Allowed To Return Home," Niqash, 25/10/2016 (2016); S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, "Violence‐producing Dynamics of Fragile States: How State Fragility in Iraq Contributed to the Emergence of Islamic State," Terrorism and Political Violence (2018): 16. 273 Tallha Abdulrazaq and Gareth Stansfield, "The Enemy Within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul," The Middle East Journal 70, no. 4 (2016): 539‐40.
51
equipment shortages, and incompetence.274 Similarly, security forces' failure to
thwart IS’s seizure of Fallujah in December 2013 resulted from demoralisation and
locals’ obstructive efforts.275 While occasional, apparent cooperation was consistent
with the co‐optation Naji recommended, a broader body of evidence indicated IS’s
ongoing hostility towards Iraq’s government and security forces, rather than an
intent to infiltrate or co‐opt them.
Second, although Naji recommended preserving territorial control, IS’s conduct
after August 2014 signalled an unwillingness to risk its organisational or
reputational survival to do so. In permissive circumstances,276 IS seized territory
between December 2013 and June 2014,277 and signalled an intent to maintain
control.278 But after the size of its territories peaked and Western intervention
began in late 2014,279 IS prioritised organisational and reputational survival over
territorial control—something reflected in its behaviour. IS attempted to defend
major cities after late 2014 amidst security force encirclement,280 but ultimately
resumed focusing upon guerrilla and terror operations—in the battle for Mosul’s
final weeks, for example, most IS attacks were comparatively small and outside that
city.281 IS’s rhetoric reflected this—it began counselling sympathisers outside Iraq to
operate in their own countries in late 2014,282 its propaganda increasingly
274 Mitch Prothero, "The Iraqi Army's Collapse," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24/07/2014 (2014). 275 ICG, Iraq: Falluja's Faustian Bargain. 6‐7. 276 Anthony Cordesman, Hitting Bottom: The Maliki Scorecard in Iraq, (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2014). 2. 277 George Joffé, "The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq," Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 1 (2016): 10‐11. 278 Islamic State IS, "From Hijrah to Khilafah," Dabiq, June‐July 2014 2014; Islamic State IS, "Remaining and Expanding," Dabiq 5 (2014). 279 Knights and Mello, 1. 280 Zana Gulmohammad, "Unseating the Caliphate: Contrasting the Challenges of Liberating Fallujah and Mosul," CTC Sentinel 9, no. 10 (2016): 17; Associated Press, "ISIS Organizing Bloody Mosul Withdrawal, Preparing for the Next Fight," Haaretz, 14/03/2017 (2017). 281 Hassan Hassan, "Insurgents Again: The Islamic State's Calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria‐Iraq Border Region and Beyond," CTC Sentinel 10, no. 11 (2018): 4‐5; UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017"; CPOST. 282 Barrett. 38‐40.
52
emphasised military operations rather than the “state” in 2015,283 and a senior IS
member asserted that territorial control was unnecessary in 2016.284 While the
hindrance of security forces was superficially consistent with Naji’s call to defend
territory,285 IS’s behaviour and rhetoric, after maintaining territorial control became
costly, indicated a prioritisation of survival.
Alongside that clear organisational variance, IS’s preference for bombings for most
of its campaign neither accorded nor varied with Naji’s dicta. GTD data note 3,388 IS
bombings, as opposed to 481 armed assaults, 103 assassinations, and 436
kidnappings. That preference remained consistent, except in June 2014 when the
number of armed assaults and bombings neared parity and a period of low activity
in 2011 and 2012.286 Unfortunately, Naji neither strongly endorsed or condemned
specific attack modalities, and IS’s preference for bombings thus neither accorded
nor varied with Naji’s thinking. Being numerically equal to areas of accordance, this
and the other areas of non‐accordance meant that at best, only limited accordance
appeared between IS’s operations and Naji’s thinking.
Like the exhibited organisational phenomena, and unlike the exhibited operational
phenomena, variance appeared in IS’s development, as the individual stages and
whole of IS’s lifecycle ultimately differed from Naji’s vision. Accordance was initially
evident in IS’s individual lifecycle stages. In the first, lasting until US withdrawal in
December 2011,287 IS operated defensively and prioritised survival. Aside from
some attacks against mostly‐government targets, IS prioritised establishing itself in
283 Daniel Milton, Down, But Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda, (West Point: CTC, 2018). 22‐23. 284 Cole Bunzel, "The Islamic State of Decline: Anticipating the Paper Caliphate," Jihadica, 15/06/2016 (2016). 285 Robert Postings, "A Guide to The Islamic State's Way of Urban Warfare," Modern War Institute Blog, 09/07/2018 (2018). 286 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017". 287 Bohan.
53
the Syrian conflict more than doing so in Iraq.288 This did not necessarily accord or
vary with Naji’s thinking, but rather was a pre‐conflict period for the insurgency. The
second stage, lasting from December 2011 to December 2013, saw preparations for
an offensive. Operating relatively freely amidst government incapacity,289 IS
prepared for an offensive, working to worsen Iraq’s social polarisation,290 and
undermining potential threats by attacking persons and groups previously
associated with anti‐AQI Sahwa militias.291 This resembled Naji’s first proposed
stage. The third stage, from December 2013 to around August 2014, was an
offensive. Enabled by prior efforts and government failure,292 IS seized Fallujah,
Ramadi, Mosul, Tikirit, and other major centres,293 and signalled an intent to
maintain control.294 IS also announced its “state” and attacked undesirable groups
such as Yazidi and Shi’a Iraqis in this period.295 This resembled Naji’s second
proposed stage, wherein the insurgency was to erect an interim administration and
establish itself as a quasi‐government. In these first three stages, IS’s lifecycle
mostly resembled that envisioned by Naji.
Variance became evident after late 2014, however. For one, the lifecycle stage
between August 2014 and the loss of Mosul in July 2017, wherein IS’s situation
deteriorated,296 was a departure from Naji’s thinking. While slowing the loss of
major centres like Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul, IS increasingly focused upon
288 Brian Fishman, "Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq to Al‐Qa`ida’s Operations," CTC Sentinel 6, no. 11 (2013): 3‐4. 289 Kirk H. Sowell, "Iraq's Second Sunni Insurgency," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 17 (2014): 40‐42. 290 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017"; Cordesman and Khazai, Iraq in Crisis. 18; Cordesman and Khazai, Shaping Iraq's Security Forces. 50. 291 Ezzeldeen Khalil, "AQI's Awakening strategy in Iraq," Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 12/07/2012 (2012). 292 Cordesman, Hitting Bottom: The Maliki Scorecard in Iraq. 2. 293 Joffé, 10‐11. 294 IS, "From Hijrah to Khilafah."; IS, "Remaining and Expanding." 295 Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context," 3. 296 Dan Roberts and Spencer Ackerman, "US Begins Air Strikes Against Isis Targets in Iraq, Pentagon Says," The Guardian, 09/08/2014 (2014).
54
guerrilla and terror operations, perpetrating attacks abroad and dispersing within
and beyond Iraq.297 Rather than defending its “state” and territory, IS prioritised
organisational and reputational survival. The overall direction of IS’s campaign also
came to vary with Naji’s proposed lifecycle. Rather than consistently escalating and
consolidating as Naji recommended, IS ultimately escalated and then withdrew.
While escalation occurred between the Decembers of 2011 and 2013, and between
December 2013 and late 2014, IS stagnated and withdrew after late 2014, returning
to its pre‐conflict reality. Resultantly, the insurgency’s overall course varied from
Naji’s proposed lifecycle. Considered alongside variance between IS’s individual
lifecycle stages and those Naji envisioned, that variance further indicates the
divergence between IS’s lifecycle and Naji’s thinking. This in turn supports the
conclusion that IS’s insurgency ultimately varied from Naji’s guidance of Naji, as its
organisation and development varied considerably with Naji’s thinking, while its
operations were only in limited accordance.
4.3: Summary and Key Findings
Comparing IS and Naji’s strategic thought serves two purposes. For one, it
addresses the paper’s first research question by showing that despite IS members’
evident familiarity with Naji’s writings, IS’s insurgency ultimately varied, mostly,
from Naji’s guidance. More specifically, the comparison identifies categories of
observable phenomena wherein IS varied from Naji’s strategic thought. Three
categories were organisational: while Naji advised limiting pre‐conflict social
networks’ influence, ex‐Ba’athists and tribes exercised significant influence upon
IS’s operational behaviour; rather than engaging constructively with non‐adversary
third parties as Naji proposed, IS was belligerent and uncompromising with such
parties; and while Naji advocated strong horizontal ties, IS’s conduct was consistent
with weak ones. Another two aberrant categories were operational: while Naji
297 Hassan, "Insurgents Again: The Islamic State's Calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria‐Iraq Border Region and Beyond," 3‐5; Anonymous, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2017). 7‐8.
55
endorsed infiltration and co‐optation, IS exhibited overwhelming hostility towards
the government and security forces, and although Naji endorsed maintaining
territorial control, IS was unwilling to assume the risk needed to do so. Lastly, IS’s
lifecycle—in its individual stages and aggregate—varied with Naji’s guidance. By
noting those areas of variance, the chapter’s results also serve a second purpose—
facilitating the fifth chapter’s analysis which addresses the paper’s second question
by accounting for variance between strategic thought and insurgent practice.
Like the comparison between AQI and al‐Suri’s thinking, such results are not
comprehensive—they do not establish whether IS intended to follow Naji’s
guidance and was forced to diverge from it at some point, or whether there remain
other areas of accordance or variance between IS and Naji’s thinking. Rather,
questions persist because of IS members’ known familiarity with Naji’s writings,
limited accordance between IS and Naji’s dicta, and limitations upon the paper’s
methodology. But what the results do establish is that according to an analysis
maximising rigour within certain limitations, IS’s campaign ultimately varied
substantially from Naji’s strategic thought, with variance appearing in specific areas.
56
Chapter 5: Accounting for Variance Between the Strategic
Thought and Insurgent Practice
5.1: Chapter Introduction
The preceding chapters’ analyses identified specific categories of observable
phenomena wherein variance occurred between strategic thought and insurgent
practice. Ignorance of al‐Suri or Naji’s thinking did not cause variance—as noted
previously, personnel from AQI knew of al‐Suri’s writings, as IS personnel did of
Naji’s, and both insurgencies exhibited some accordance with those thinkers’
guidance. Consequently, the paper’s second question is relevant: what issues
appeared to cause variance between strategic thought and insurgent practice?
The fifth chapter addresses that question by establishing that variance appeared at
least partly resultant from issues known to affect jihadi insurgent organisations. For
that, it has two parts. The first identifies issues known to affect jihadi insurgent
organisations and outlines their associated processes and impacts. Those include
insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased scale, jihadis’ tendency
towards inflexibility and insularity, and the operational environment’s potential
influence upon insurgencies. The second stage demonstrates that links can be
drawn between those issues and the exhibited phenomena which varied from al‐
Suri or Naji’s guidance. For this, it shows that these issues’ associated processes
were visible in AQI and IS, and thus appeared to precipitate the identified variance.
The analysis is imperfect, as it focuses only upon externally‐recognisable issues, and
not preferences and processes which are not wholly visible in publicly‐available
data. But within the limitations upon the paper’s methodology, the analysis
addresses the paper’s second question as rigorously as possible by demonstrating
that externally‐recognisable issues—with known processes and impacts—appeared
to at least contribute to AQI and IS’s identified variance from al‐Suri and Naji’s
guidance.
57
5.2: Issues Contributing to Variance
As stated previously, three issues apparently contributed to variance between
strategic thought and insurgent practice. All are based upon general explanations of
insurgent or jihadi behaviour in the relevant scholarly and professional literature,
and work via processes recognisable in publicly‐available data.
The first issue is that insurgencies’ capacity to operate at increased scale is limited
by challenges affecting their organisation and operations. Two such challenges exist.
First, insurgencies balance imperatives of operational capacity and security. They
must operate at greater scale to accomplish more‐ambitious objectives,298 while
expanding cautiously to avoid sacrificing cohesion or becoming vulnerable to
external threats.299 Second, reckless growth can be detrimental. Assimilating
personnel from other social networks without homogenising them weakens
horizontal ties, yields influence to those networks, and undermines operational
coordination.300 The above challenges pose dilemmas for growing insurgencies.
First, rapid expansion empowers pre‐conflict social networks and weakens
horizontal ties, while remaining small limits operational capacity. Second,
manpower‐intensive tasks like high‐cost military operations or close population
management are difficult,301 because insurgencies will be too small to perform
them, or—by expanding rapidly—will risk losing horizontal cohesion needed to
achieve more‐ambitious outcomes.302 By posing such dilemmas, challenges
298 G. H. McCormick and G. Owen, "Security and coordination in a clandestine organization," Mathematical and Computer Modelling 31, no. 6 (2000): 175‐77. 299 Paul Tomkins, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, Second ed., Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (Fort Bragg: US Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 12, 24. 300 Staniland, 41‐42. 301 Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), 141‐42; Derek Jones, Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Cellular Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations (Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 22. 302 Defence, LWD 1, 45.
58
affecting insurgencies’ organisation and operations limit insurgencies’ capacity to
operate at increased scale.
Second, jihadi insurgent organisations are inclined towards inflexibility and
insularity which leads to unpragmatic behaviour. Jihadis are extremists in a broader
movement,303 with disproportionate, nonnegotiable views of the importance of
their identity and objectives, and an intolerance of external ideas and actors. This
can lead jihadis to ignore political and operational realities. At times, jihadis alienate
potential partners or lose popular support by refusing to moderate their ideology or
objectives.304 They can also securitise immorality, attacking perceived deviants,
including those with whom cooperation would be advisable.305 Excess confidence in
their objectives’ importance and feasibility can also lead to overly‐provocative
behaviour and alienate potential sympathisers.306 By causing such behaviours, jihadi
insurgent organisations’ tendency towards inflexibility and insularity can lead to
unpragmatic decisions.
Third, the operational environment can influence insurgencies’ decision‐making.
Insurgencies lack the resources necessary to achieve victory independently and
must instead exploit opportunities.307 Consequently, environmental factors
influence insurgencies’ organisation and operations. The most important factor is
government strength. Weak governments cannot thwart insurgencies, incentivising
opportunistic insurgent behaviour, while strong governments constrain
insurgencies’ behaviour by creating risks and imposing costs.308 A second factor is
303 Henzel, 71. 304 Alexander Thurston, "Algeria’s GIA: The First Major Armed Group to Fully Subordinate Jihadism to Salafism," Islamic Law and Society 24, no. 4 (2017): 426‐27. 305 Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi‐Salafis or Revolutionaries?," in Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement (London, UK: Hurst, 2009), 258‐59. 306 Mohammed Hafez, "Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing Their Civil Wars," Middle EAst Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 86‐88; Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991): 80‐81. 307 DoD, X. 308 Seth Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons From the Vietcong to the Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 27; Erin Marie Simpson, "The Perils of Third‐Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns" (Ph.D., Harvard University, 2010), 46‐47.
59
military support by a state actor, which offsets government weakness and has an
impact resembling that of government strength.309 A third factor is the insurgency’s
popular appeal, relative to the government. Insurgencies seek popular support, and
with it, can accomplish objectives without confronting governments directly.310
However, some measures which separate populations and governments—
terrorism, intimidation, or deprivation—can diminish insurgents’ relative appeal,
constraining their behaviour.311 By precipitating opportunism or constraining
insurgent behaviour, environmental factors influence insurgencies’ decision‐
making. Alongside insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased scale, and
jihadis’ inflexible and insular tendencies, that influence was among the three issues
which apparently contributed to variance between strategic thought and insurgent
practice.
5.3: Apparent Role of Issues in Causing Identified Variance
The aforementioned issues appeared to contribute to the variance evident between
strategic thought and insurgent practice. The analysis establishing this has three
parts, which demonstrate that the processes and outcomes associated with those
issues were recognisable in AQI and IS.
The analysis’s first part concerns the three categories of observable organisational
phenomena wherein variance occurred. These include pre‐conflict social networks’
influence, the strength of horizontal ties, and the character of relations with non‐
adversary third parties.
Insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased scale appeared to contribute
to pre‐conflict social networks’ influence upon IS. Such networks became influential
because of IS’s efforts to quickly build operational capacity. Before its offensive
between December 2013 and June 2014, IS’s admission of ex‐Ba’athists quickly
309 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 91; Jones, 162‐63. 310 Fall. 311 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 1.3, 1.11‐1.12; Jones, 169‐70.
60
addressed leadership and expertise shortcomings,312 while partnerships with tribes
allowed territorial seizures. However, ex‐Ba’athists and tribes were not cautiously
integrated into IS, did not share its preferences and ideology,313 and consequently
influenced IS at the operational level. With ex‐Ba’athists, this was beneficial—it
increased operational efficacy. Tribes’ influence, however, enmeshed IS in local
conflicts which were irrelevant to its operational and strategic priorities.314 In sum,
IS’s efforts to rapidly build capacity without properly integrating and homogenising
new personnel appeared to empower the networks from which those personnel
came, indicating that those networks’ outsized influence upon IS was likely due to
limitations upon the scale at which insurgencies can operate.
That limited capacity to operate at greater scale also appeared to cause IS’s weak
horizontal ties and AQI’s strong ones. Both insurgencies exemplified the
compromises between operational security and cohesion, and operational capacity,
which can limit insurgent organisations’ growth. In IS’s case, prioritising operational
capacity contributed to weak horizontal ties. Seeking the capacity necessary to seize
territory and establish a state, IS expanded quickly between 2011 and December
2013. For this, IS conducted jailbreaks,315 cultivated partnerships with tribes, and
integrated ex‐Ba’athists,316 rather than expanding cautiously. Resultantly, IS’s
horizontal ties were weak and reflected in its operational behaviour, in
contradiction of Naji’s thinking. In contrast, AQI prioritised operational security and
contradicted al‐Suri by avoiding rapid growth. Focusing upon terror and guerrilla
operations,317 AQI’s manpower requirements were modest, and cautious growth—
by leveraging pre‐existing relationships—occurred.318 Relative to other Iraqi militant
312 Zeidel, 20‐21. 313 Barrett. 21. 314 Gartenstein‐Ross and Jensen, 108‐09; Knights and Mello, 2. 315 News; State, Iraq 2013 Human Rights Report. 9. 316 Barrett. 21. 317 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, Al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Tawhid & Jihad, and Islamic State of Iraq Attacks, 2001 and 2011". 318 Serena, 44; Johnston et al., 71‐82.
61
organisations, AQI therefore remained small,319 but operated in a manner reflecting
strong horizontal ties. Both insurgencies faced the same challenges which limit
insurgencies’ capacity to operate at scale, and it appeared that due to those
challenges’ associated processes, IS maintained weak horizontal ties while AQI
maintained strong ones.
While insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased scale seemed to
account for pre‐conflict social networks’ influence and the strength or weakness of
horizontal ties, the operational environment’s influence appeared to cause AQI and
IS’s relationships with non‐adversary third parties to differ from al‐Suri and Naji’s
recommendations. Inflexibility was not the sole reason—both insurgencies were
initially uncompromising with third parties, to the point of those parties’
alienation,320 but AQI eventually attempted to maintain relations with those
parties,321 while IS did not.322 Rather, factors in AQI’s operational environment
affected AQI’s preferences, which were absent in IS’s. For one, AQI emerged when
Iraq’s government was weak,323 but supported by a state actor—the US.324 In such
circumstances, the Iraqi and US governments could impose costs upon an isolated
insurgency, forcing AQI to compromise on its extreme preferences by engaging
pragmatically with some other actors, contrary to al‐Suri’s recommendation.325 In
contrast, IS emerged when security forces were weak,326 the US withheld support
for Iraq’s government,327 and third parties were relatively inferior to IS. Amidst that,
IS would not suffer costs for alienating other actors, and lacked incentive to diverge
319 Cordesman, Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida. 3‐5; Pirnie and O'Connell, 25‐30. 320 Jones and Libicki, 91‐92; Adnan and Reese. 15‐16, 18; Al‐Tamimi, "Islamic Army of Iraq Interview". 321 Fishman, "After Zarqawi: The dilemmas and future of Al Qaeda in Iraq," 25; Katzman, Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links. 11. 322 Robin Wright et al., The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond, (Online: USIP & The Wilson Center, 2017). 7. 323 Toby Dodge, "Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to state collapse," Third World Quarterly 26, no. 4‐5 (2005): 718‐19. 324 Pirnie and O'Connell, xiii‐xiv. 325 Katzman, Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links. 11. 326 Cordesman and Khazai, Shaping Iraq's Security Forces. 3‐4. 327 Bohan.
62
from its inflexible preferences, which varied from Naji’s thinking.328 While jihadi
organisations’ inflexibility and insularity may account for AQI and IS’s preferences
when dealing with non‐adversary third parties, available evidence suggests that the
presence or absence of pressure from the operational environment apparently
caused AQI to defy al‐Suri’s preference for non‐engagement with third parties,
while allowing IS to remain divergent from Naji’s preference for engagement.
The analysis’s second part concerns variance identified across three categories of
operational phenomena. Those included the character of relations with the
population, the use of provocations, and the penetration or co‐optation of the
government or security forces.
A connection was apparent between AQI’s inflexibility and insularity, and its hostile
relationship with the population. Eventually, those relations worsened in the
mostly‐tribal areas where AQI desired a presence. To establish ties with the
population in such areas, AQI could have worked within the existing political, social,
and customary order, as US forces eventually did.329 As former leader al‐Zarqawi
signalled, however, AQI’s ideological platform was extreme,330 and the insurgency
instead violently asserted control over political, social, legal, and economic life. Such
behaviour was consistent with an attempt to win popular support by establishing a
competing system of authoritarian control, separating the population from the
government. The continuation of such behaviour after the subsequent backlash,
however, indicated that AQI’s coercive relations with the population, in
contradiction of al‐Suri’s thinking, appeared resultant more from inflexibility than a
pragmatic attempt to “out‐govern” the state.331
328 Wright et al. 7. 329 Cigar, 2, 33‐34. 330 State, "Text of a Letter From Abu Mus'ab al‐Zarqawi, Obtained by United States Government in Iraq". 331 Phillips, 77‐78.
63
Inflexibility also appeared to precipitate AQI’s use of provocations, contradicting al‐
Suri’s recommendation. In AQI’s radical perception, Shi’a Iraqis were a serious
threat, while Sunni Iraqis not aligned with AQI were ignorant of the importance of
AQI’s ideology and objectives. That perception aligned with a view that instead of
cultivating support in a fight against foreign occupation,332 provoking a sectarian
civil war and forcing Sunnis to side with AQI and against Shi’a Iraqis was
preferable.333 AQI’s actions reflected that view—the insurgency attacked politically‐
sensitive targets, and Shi’a and Shi’a‐linked targets, early in its campaign.334 By
validating a preference for sectarian conflict, inflexibility and insularity thus
appeared to contribute to AQI’s disregard for al‐Suri’s discouragement of
provocations.
AQI and IS’s failure to infiltrate the government or security forces, as both al‐Suri
and Naji advised, also appeared resultant from inflexibility and insularity. Both
insurgencies harboured radical anti‐Shi’a views which had relevance within post‐
Ba’athist Iraq:335 after 2003, Shi’a Arabs dominated the government and security
forces, partly by screening Sunnis and Kurds, the Iraqi civil service expelled or
marginalised Sunni Arabs, and eighty‐five percent of the Iraqi National Police were
Shi’a by 2010.336 The problem was not the security forces’ or government’s
incorruptibility, or AQI and IS’s incapacity for pragmatic engagement with third
parties—Shi’a groups penetrated and co‐opted security forces,337 while AQI and IS
maintained limited relations with other Sunni groups. Rather, AQI and IS’s
inflexibility made pragmatic engagement with mostly‐Shi’a government personnel
unacceptable, and both insurgencies instead attacked government and security
332 Jones, 168‐69. 333 Katzman, Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links. 8‐9; State, "Text of a Letter From Abu Mus'ab al‐Zarqawi, Obtained by United States Government in Iraq". 334 Kirdar. 4. 335 Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context," 3‐5. 336 James L. Jones, Jennifer K. Elsea, and Nina M. Serafino, Security in Iraq (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010), 75‐76, 97‐98. 337 Cordesman, Iraq's Insurgency and Civil Violence. ii, 6‐7.
64
force targets continuously.338 While al‐Suri and Naji advocated infiltrating or co‐
opting the government and security forces, inflexibility appeared to prevent AQI
and IS from doing so.
The analysis’s third part relates to the two remaining identified areas of variance.
Those were AQI and IS’s willingness to maintain territorial control, and the variance
between their lifecycles and those envisioned by al‐Suri and Naji.
The operational environment appeared to influence both insurgencies’ lifecycles
and willingness to maintain territorial control more than al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking.
Initially, permissive circumstances incentivised opportunistic behaviour, though a
causal relationship was not apparent. In their early stages, permissive circumstances
allowed opportunistic territorial seizures and escalation by the insurgencies.
Between 2004 and 2006, AQI—expecting limited US involvement—exploited
government unpopularity among Sunnis to position itself as the ruling actor in
Fallujah and Ramadi,339 while IS seized territory between December 2013 and late
2014 amidst unrest and government weakness.340 As earlier chapters’ analyses
showed, both insurgencies fomented unrest and seized territory opportunistically.
Such behaviour did not contraindicate al‐Suri or Naji’s influence, and was consistent
with adherence to al‐Suri and Naji’s guidance—only AQI’s premature seizure of
territory contradicted al‐Suri’s thinking, after all. What was evident, though, was
that both insurgencies behaved opportunistically in permissive circumstances.
Clearer indications of the operational environment’s influence emerged as
worsening circumstances disrupted both insurgencies’ lifecycles and willingness to
maintain territorial control. After 2006, Iraqi security forces became increasingly
effective while the number of US military personnel increased, and AQI lost popular
338 UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, Al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Tawhid & Jihad, and Islamic State of Iraq Attacks, 2001 and 2011"; UMD‐START, "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017". 339 Bahney et al., 19; Knickmeyer; State, "Text of a Letter From Abu Mus'ab al‐Zarqawi, Obtained by United States Government in Iraq". 340 Joffé, 10‐11.
65
appeal as the Iraqi and US governments courted Sunni tribes.341 In 2014, US support
for Iraq’s government resumed, while that government offset its own weakness by
integrating some militias into the security forces and addressing some grievances
which lent IS relative appeal among Sunnis.342 In environments posing greater risk
and offering fewer opportunities, both insurgencies prioritised survival over
territorial control and escalation. As shown in the analyses of the third and fourth
chapters, AQI’s willingness to defend territory declined after 2006, while IS
prioritised organisational and reputational survival after late 2014. Similarly, the
insurgencies’ divergence from al‐Suri and Naji’s envisioned lifecycles occurred at
comparable junctures. Despite opportunistically seizing territory and escalating in
permissive circumstances, neither insurgency fought meaningfully for territorial
control or continued escalating in adverse circumstances. As other issues appeared
to cause variance across other categories of observable phenomena, it was the
operational environment which seemingly dictated AQI and IS’s lifecycles and
willingness to maintain territorial control, precipitating variance between both
insurgencies and the strategic thought with which their members were known to be
at least passingly familiar.
5.4: Summary and Key Findings
Results from the above analysis address the paper’s second research question.
Broadly, they do so by showing that based upon publicly‐available data, variance
identified in preceding chapters appeared resultant from insurgencies’ limited
capacity to operate at increased scale, jihadi organisations’ tendency towards
inflexibility and insularity, and the operational environment’s potential influence
upon insurgencies. More specifically, the results demonstrate that insurgencies’
limited capacity to operate at increased scale appeared to increase pre‐conflict
social networks’ influence within IS, while weakening IS’s horizontal ties and
341 Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro, 7‐9, 18‐19; United States Government USGov, Initial Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR), (Washington D.C.: US Government, 2007). 18‐19, 21‐22. 342 Cordesman and Khazai, Shaping Iraq's Security Forces. 54‐56; Anonymous, Iraq: Politics and Governance, (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2016). 16‐17, 30‐31.
66
strengthening AQI’s. They also suggest that jihadi insurgent organisations’
inflexibility and insularity precipitated AQI’s coercive relations with the population
and provocations, and could be linked to AQI and IS’s failures to infiltrate or co‐opt
the government and security forces. Finally, the results show that the operational
environment’s influence appeared to account for AQI and IS’s relationships with
non‐adversary third parties which differed from those encouraged by al‐Suri and
Naji, and their willingness to maintain territorial control and their development
across lifecycles differing from those al‐Suri and Naji envisioned.
As acknowledged previously, such findings are not comprehensive. They result from
an analysis focused upon external pressures which prevented accordance between
strategic thought and insurgent practice, and not internal pressures upon AQI and
IS, or the extent to which accordance was AQI or IS’s original intent. But despite not
entirely filling the research gap with which it is concerned, the analysis still takes a
substantial step towards doing so by showing that although personnel from AQI and
IS appeared familiar with al‐Suri or Naji’s thinking, certain externally‐recognisable
issues apparently prevented that thinking from ultimately being reflected in the
totality of AQI and IS’s organisations, operations, or lifecycles.
67
Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1: Summary
The paper has developed across five chapters, with substantive argumentation
beginning at the second. The second analysed al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought
according to a framework of categories of observable phenomena. Doing so
identified organisational, operational, and lifecycle stage phenomena which
insurgencies would exhibit if they accorded with al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought,
facilitating subsequent chapters’ analyses.
The third chapter established the extent of accordance between AQI’s insurgency
and al‐Suri’s thinking. For that, it first compared al‐Suri’s strategic thought to data
relating to AQI’s insurgency, determining that AQI’s insurgency occurred in a
manner mostly varying from al‐Suri’s guidance, while identifying categories of
observable phenomena wherein variance was evident between al‐Suri’s thinking
and AQI’s insurgency.
The fourth chapter established the extent of accordance between IS’s insurgency
and Naji’s thinking. For that, it compared Naji’s strategic thought to data concerning
IS’s insurgency, establishing that IS’s insurgency occurred in a manner mostly
varying from Naji’s thinking, while specifying categories of observable phenomena
wherein variance appeared between Naji’s thinking and IS’s insurgency.
Lastly, the fifth chapter established that variance identified in preceding chapters
appeared resultant from issues known to affect jihadi insurgent organisations. It
first identified those issues: insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased
scale, jihadi insurgent organisation’ tendency towards inflexibility and insularity,
and the operational environment’s potential influence upon insurgencies—and the
processes by which those issues cause impact. It then demonstrated that those
issues appeared to contribute to variance identified between strategic thought and
insurgent practice. Following the second, third, and fourth chapters, the fifth
chapter was the paper’s last.
68
Those four chapters produced two findings, the scope of which should not be
overstated. The first was that ultimately, AQI’s and IS’s insurgencies played out in
ways mostly varying with—respectively—al‐Suri and Naji’s guidance. This was
because across most categories of observable organisational, operational, and
lifecycle stage phenomena, variance appeared between AQI and al‐Suri’s thinking,
and between IS and Naji’s, despite evidence of AQI and IS members’ familiarity with
al‐Suri and Naji’s works. The second finding was that identified variance between
strategic thought and insurgent practice appeared resultant from insurgencies’
limited capacity to operate at increased scale, jihadi insurgent organisations’
tendency towards inflexibility and insularity, and the operational environment’s
potential influence upon insurgencies. Those issues appeared to cause AQI and IS to
ultimately exhibit organisational, operational, and lifecycle phenomena varying
from al‐Suri and Naji’s guidance, because the processes and outcomes associated
with those issues were also identifiable in AQI and IS. Both findings are subject to
certain caveats—the first relates only to AQI and IS ultimate behaviour, not the
junctures of divergence from al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking, while the second accounts
only for externally‐recognisable issues’ apparent role in causing variance.
Limitations notwithstanding, however, both findings are significant and result from
the ideal analysis within certain restrictions.
Those findings support the paper’s two arguments. Firstly, they indicate that based
upon publicly‐available information, AQI and IS behaved in a manner varying from—
respectively—al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought, despite being acquainted with
both thinkers’ works. This was because in most categories of observable
organisational, operational, and lifecycle stage phenomena, variance ultimately
appeared between the insurgencies and al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought. Second,
the paper’s findings indicate that variance identified between strategic thought and
insurgent practice appeared at least partly resultant from certain externally‐
recognisable issues known to affect insurgencies. Those included insurgencies’
limited capacity to operate at increased scale, jihadi insurgent organisations’
69
tendency towards inflexibility and insularity, and the operational environment’s
potential influence upon insurgencies. The findings of the four preceding chapters
support both arguments.
Supporting those arguments addresses the research questions to the greatest
possible extent. The first question was simple: to what extent can it be determined
that the insurgencies of AQI and IS played out in accordance with the strategic
thought of al‐Suri and Naji? The first argument addresses that question by showing
that AQI and IS’s organisations, operations, and development mostly varied from al‐
Suri and Naji’s thinking, despite AQI and IS members’ familiarity with those thinkers’
principal works. The second question was also simple: if AQI and IS did not behave
completely accordantly with—respectively—al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic thought, did
any identifiable issues contribute to variance between strategic thought and
insurgent practice? The second argument addresses that question by showing that
several established issues—insurgencies’ limited capacity to operate at increased
scale, jihadi insurgent organisations’ tendency towards inflexibility and insularity,
and the influence which the operational environment can have upon insurgencies—
appeared to contribute to AQI and IS’ exhibition of organisational, operational, and
lifecycle stage phenomena which mostly varied from al‐Suri and Naji’s strategic
thought.
As anticipated in the introduction, those answers are of limited comprehensiveness,
but still relevant. The first concerns only whether the insurgencies’ behaviours
ultimately varied from al‐Suri or Naji’s thinking, and not precisely when and how
variance occurred or if accordance was the original intent. Similarly, the second
answer only establishes externally‐recognisable issues’ apparent roles in causing
variance, and not internal preferences and processes causing variance, or how
externally‐recognisable issues affected AQI or IS’s decision‐making. Such
shortcomings do not diminish the answers’ value—both result from a methodology
which facilitates the best analysis possible using publicly‐available data, and
70
substantially narrow the research gap. One does so by demonstrating that despite
assumptions about al‐Suri and Naji’s influence and evidence indicating AQI and IS
members’ familiarity with those thinkers’ works, scholars should not necessarily
expect AQI or IS to act according to al‐Suri or Naji’s strategic thought, while the
other does so by establishing that externally‐recognisable issues appeared to inhibit
accordance. Thus, despite their limitations, both answers substantially narrow the
research gap in which the paper exists.
6.2: General Implications & Future Research
Addressing the research questions has two implications. First, the paper’s findings
call into question the link between jihadi strategic thought and jihadi insurgencies.
Partly, they do so by showing that ultimately, a connection between jihadi strategic
thought and jihadi insurgent practice was mostly not reflected in AQI or IS’s
organisation, operations, or lifecycles. This was despite some authors’ assumptions
that AQI and IS were influenced by al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking, and evidence of AQI
and IS members’ familiarity with al‐Suri and Naji’s writings. The findings also cast
doubt upon the assumed link by showing that externally‐recognisable issues
described by the literature—insurgencies limited capacity to operate at increased
scale, jihadis’ tendency towards inflexibility and insularity, and the influence of the
operational environment upon insurgent organisations—appeared to impede
accordance between AQI and IS, and al‐Suri or Naji’s thinking.
The second implication is that the paper’s limitations invite further work. For one,
including jihadi insurgent groups outside Iraq may precipitate general observations,
if not theories, about jihadi insurgencies’ behaviour. Preliminarily, those include
Ansar al‐Sharia in Yemen, al‐Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al‐Shabaab in Somalia,
Islamic State in Syria as well as Iraq, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and the
Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, Barisan Revolusi Nasional in Thailand, and
Boko Haram in Africa.
71
Conceptual expansion is also possible. Establishing the extent to which jihadi
insurgencies resemble communist models of asymmetric warfare—like those
described by Mao, Giap, and Guevara—may yield generic and generalisable insights
about asymmetric warfare.
Finally, the paper’s analysis can be refined. As noted previously, a better analysis
can identify the juncture and purpose of variance between strategic thought and
insurgent practice, identify processes leading to divergence from al‐Suri or Naji’s
thinking, and ascertain the role of internal and external pressures in those
processes. Despite needing more data, this is conceptually sound, given the
evidence supporting the assumption upon which it is based—that AQI and IS were
acquainted with al‐Suri and Naji’s thinking. Moreover, determining the extent to
which accordance resulted from adherence to al‐Suri or Naji’s work can clarify
refutations of the assumed link between strategic thought and insurgent practice.
Expanding the framework to consider the role of nonviolent activism in insurgent
operations, the insurgency’s relationship with a state actor partner, and other
additions can also lend further rigor. Finally, adding a control case would be
constructive—an insurgency detached from the jihadi movement or predating al‐
Suri and Naji’s principal written works, which accords with those thinkers’ guidance,
would suggest that al‐Suri and Naji were more observers than influential strategists.
72
Appendices
Appendix 1: Acronyms & Key Terms
ANU Australian National University
AQI Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq. Other names
included “Jama’at al‐Tawhid wal‐
Jihad,” “The Mujahideen Shura
Council,” and “The Islamic State
of Iraq.”
CIA United States Central Intelligence
Agency.
CPOST Chicago Project on Security &
Threats
CRS United States Congressional
Research Service
CRRS Conflict Records Research Center
CSIS Center for Strategic and
International Studies
CTC Combating Terrorism Center
Defence Australian Department of
Defence
DoD United States Department of
Defense
GTD Global Terrorism Database,
provided by UMD‐START.
ICG International Crisis Group
IS Islamic State. An evolutionary
successor of AQI. Other names
included “The Islamic State of
Iraq and Sham” (ISIS), “The
Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant” (ISIL), and “Da’esh.”
73
ISW Institute for the Study of War
JP Joint Publication
LWD Australian Army Land Warfare
Doctrine
MCUP Marine Corps University Press
NTIS National Technical Information
Service
Sahwa Arabic word which translates to
“Awakening.” In the context of
Iraq between 2003 and at least
2017, Sahwa refers to Iraqi tribal
militias, comprised mostly of
Sunni Arabs, which fought
against al‐Qa’ida in Iraq.
Shi’a Sectarian denomination within
Islam. Constitutes a minority
among the world’s adherents to
Islam, but a majority within Iraq.
Sunni Sectarian denomination within
Islam. Constitutes a majority
among the world’s adherents to
Islam, but a minority within Iraq.
UK United Kingdom
UMD‐START University of Maryland National
Consortium for The Study of
Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism
US United States
USIP United States Institute of Peace
74
Appendix 2: Note on Arabic Transliteration and Translation
The paper contains words transliterated from Arabic and not in common English
use. No standardised transliteration method exists for Arabic, and for that, several
conventions are employed:
The definite article, al, is uncapitalized except when starting a sentence;
The ‘ayn is presented as an apostrophe, and its sound is conveyed by
successive letters, which are capitalised according to English writing conventions;
The qaf is presented as a Q;
No distinction is made between hard and soft s, d, and h letters; and
If person or organisations’ names are used, then common English spellings
of that name are used, regardless of the above rules.
In addition, two vital sources are in Arabic. One, The Management of Savagery, is
available in English. The manuscript refers to that version, although the page
numbers cited in footnotes for correspond to the original Arabic version. The other,
The Call of Global Islamic Resistance, is unavailable in English in its entirety. A
translation of that text is not provided because although a translation would be
helpful, the original work is 1,600 pages, with partial translations available online.
75
Appendix 3: Similarities Between Literature Concerning Jihadi Strategic Thinkers, and
Research Concerning Communist Strategic Thinkers
One of the reasons why it is viable to address the research gap in which the paper
sits is that a similar gap has been filled before, in the literature concerning the
strategy and strategists of communist insurgency.
The literature concerning jihadi strategic thinkers and insurgencies in the Middle
East has parallels to that which surrounded communist strategic thinkers and
insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. In part, this is because
Mao Tse‐Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Che Guevara are presented in the same
exceptional light as al‐Suri and Naji. This is demonstrated best by Bunker, who lauds
Mao’s contribution to communist insurgent doctrine, describing Mao’s Guerrilla
Warfare as a foundational work. He also calls attention to the work of Giap, which
advanced Mao’s thinking further by counselling the insurgent to consider the
international setting in which they acted; and Guevara, whose advice—to aggravate
popular grievances—is still considered meaningful even if his “Foco” strategy was
ultimately unsuccessful.343 Levanger assigns similar importance to Giap, describing
Giap as “one of the foremost practitioners of insurgency and revolutionary war,”344
although it should be noted that since Levanger put forward that argument, Giap’s
assumed importance has been challenged.
It is also because the general shape of the literature pertaining to the persons,
works, associated campaigns, and supposed impact of Mao, Giap, and Guevara
resemble that concerning jihadi strategic thinkers. In the literature review in
chapter one, the literature has been presented as being divided thematically into
four general areas:
343 Robert J. Bunker, "Unconventional warfare philosophers," Small Wars & Insurgencies 10, no. 3 (1999): 140‐41. 344 John Levanger, General Vo Nguyen Giap: The Vietnamese Napoleon? (Carlisle Barracks: NTIS, 1973).
76
1. Studies of the strategic thinkers themselves and the development of their
works;
2. Works which endeavour to contextualise, dissect, and analyse the writings
of those thinkers;
3. Case studies which focus either upon themes or periods of certain jihadi
insurgencies, or those insurgencies in their entirety; and
4. Works which assert the influence of al‐Suri and Naji over jihadi insurgencies.
This runs parallel to the position in which the insurgency literature had been, when
communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Latin America were ostensibly
shaped by the strategic thinking of the most‐notable theorists of communist
guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse‐Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Che Guevara.
For all four areas of the jihadi‐centred literature which were identified in the
literature review, a similar set of works can be found concerning communist
strategic thinkers and insurgencies. For one, there exist biographical works
concerning the strategists of communist guerrilla warfare, as well as the
development of their works. O’Neill is one example of this, providing some
biographical information on Giap, while dismissing his contribution to guerrilla
strategic thought.345 McCormick affords similar treatment to Guevara, providing an
outline of Guevara’s life and works, but also arguing that Guevara’s strategy had
been too reliant upon the conditions of his first revolution—in Cuba—to be viable
elsewhere.346 Griffith, writing an introduction to a translation of Mao’s Guerrilla
Warfare, describes how Mao’s personal development made him amenable to
revolutionary war,347 while contemplation of his experiences leading up to the
345 Robert O'Neill, The Strategy of General Giap Since 1964, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 1969), 1‐4. 346 Gordon H. McCormick, "Che Guevara: The Legacy of a Revolutionary Man," World Policy Journal 14, no. 4 (1997). 347 Mao Tse‐Tung and Samuel Griffith, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12‐18: Mao Tse‐Tung On Guerrilla Warfare, 1 ed. (Quantico: US Department of Defense, 1989), 13.
77
conclusion of the “Long March” served as the inspiration for the development of his
theory of war.”348
There is also a healthy body of works which offer context or analysis of the strategic
thought of Mao, Giap, and Guevara. Condit—writing when the war against
communism was at a similar point to that at which the War on Terrorism appears to
be in 2018—provides an example which situates certain communist insurgencies in
the context of a broader set of communist revolutionary wars, by tracing the
evolution of communist revolutionary warfare across the persons and actions of
Lenin, Mao, Debray, and others.349 Adie offers another, describing the development
of Mao’s guerrilla warfare doctrine during the 1920s, and the maturation of that
doctrine during the war against Japan and Chinese nationalists.350 Majumdar makes
a similar contribution, describing the origins of Maoist guerrilla thought while also
providing more substantial analysis of Mao’s strategy.351 Moreno also provides a
detailed description of Guevara’s Foco strategy.352
Case studies which address communist insurgencies—either in part or as a whole—
are also readily available. Pike, for example, explores the role played by terrorism
within the Viet Cong insurgency,353 while Schultz examines the role of Viet Cong
terrorism in gaining and maintaining control over local populations in the
Vietnamese countryside.354 Writing in 1967, Giap himself describes his
government’s war against the US and South Vietnam, describing the North
Vietnamese government’s people’s war strategy as “superior to all strategies of the
348 Tse‐Tung and Griffith, 18‐19. 349 D.M. Condit, Modern Revolutionary Warfare: An Analytical Overview (Springfield: NTIS, 1973), Chapter 2. 350 W.A.C. Adie, Chinese Strategic Thinking Under Mao, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 1972), 6‐10. 351 B. N. Majumdar, "Mao's Concept of Guerrilla Warfare," China Report 3, no. 1 (1967). 352 Jose A. Moreno, "Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation," Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 2 (1970): 115‐19. 353 Douglas Pike, The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror (Saigon, Vietnam: Unknown Publisher, 1970). 354 Richard Schultz, "The Limits of Terrorism in Insurgency Warfare," Polity 11, no. 1 (1978).
78
U.S. imperialist aggressors,”355 and describing a combination of guerrilla and
conventional approaches.356 Chassin describes the campaign of the Chinese
communists between 1945 and 1949.357
The fourth area differs from its counterpart in the jihadi‐focused space. Rather than
presenting the connection as an assumption, this area of the literature provides
some explanation of the connection between the communist strategic thinkers and
communist insurgencies. Gates argues that guerrilla warfare was in fact used by the
North Vietnamese, albeit as part of a broader strategy which combined political
agitation and military activities.358 Levanger argues that Giap’s influence upon the
North Vietnamese insurgency was limited, as his mastery was more of bureaucratic
politics than insurgency.359 Moreno compares Guevara’s Foco theory to the diaries
he kept during his involvement with the Cuban and Bolivian insurgencies, showing
accordance between Guevara’s theory and action in the process.360 Finally, Adie’s
work—in addition to showing the development of Mao’s thinking—shows how the
conduct of Mao’s wars against the Japanese and nationalist Chinese reflected his
strategic thinking.361 The above works contrast with those which are concerned
with jihadi strategic thought—rather than assuming the thought‐action connection,
the works above go to some length to demonstrate a link, or the absence thereof.
By showing differing views about the impact of communist strategic thinkers upon
insurgencies, the literature concerning communist strategic thought and insurgency
supports the underlying concept of the paper. While there are identifiable
similarities between the literature concerning communist strategic thought and
355 Vo Nguyen Giap, "Article by DRV Defense Minister Giap The Big Victory; The Great Task," Douglas Pike Collection at the Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, 15/10/1967 (1967). 28. 356 Giap. 28‐37. 357 Lionel Chassin, The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War, 1945‐1949, trans. Timothy Osato and Louis Gelas (London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966). 358 John M. Gates, "People's War in Vietnam," The Journal of Military History 54, no. 3 (1990): 328‐29. 359 Levanger, 44‐45. 360 Moreno. 361 Adie.
79
insurgencies, and jihadi strategic thought and insurgencies, the former body of
literature shows that the research gap in the latter—the failure to demonstrate or
contest the influence of jihadi strategic thinkers upon jihadi insurgencies—has
previously been addressed in a similar setting.
80
Appendix 4: Framework of Indicators
Indicator‐Evidence Tables
1: Organisational Indicators
Category of Observable Phenomenon
Preferred Sources Acceptable/Consistent Indicators
1.1: Influence of Pre‐Conflict Social Networks
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Purges, desertions, or defections by members of pre‐conflict networks
Public statements of dissatisfaction by figures from pre‐conflict
Consistency of insurgent political platform over time
Operations in support of pre‐conflict networks’ known goals
1.2: Strength of Horizontal Ties
Academic sources Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data showing large geospatial spread of similar attack methods
Reports concerning leadership relationships
1.3: Growth Patterns—Open or Closed
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Quantitative data showing frequency, scale, or geographic spread of insurgent operations
Stagnation or increase in the frequency, scale, or geographic spread of attacks
Cessation of attacks following counterinsurgency operations
1.4: Presence and Purpose of Support or Service Auxiliary Groups
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Insurgent pre‐emption of security force operations
Post‐conflict arrests of collaborators
Insurgent activities requiring medical, technical, professional, or tradecraft expertise
1.5: Character of Relationships with Non‐Adversary Third Parties‐‐Integration, Elimination, or Coexistence
Academic sources Attacks against neutral non‐adversary parties
Integration or realignment of third parties with the insurgents
Continued insurgent avoidance of attacks against non‐adversary third parties
81
2: Operational Indicators
Category of Observable Phenomenon
Preferred Sources Acceptable/Consistent Evidence
2.1: Character of Relationship with Population‐‐Cooperative or Coercive
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Popular refusal to cooperate with security forces
Expansion of insurgent support beyond areas of direct insurgent control
Insurgent efforts to force compliance within areas of insurgent control
2.2: Use of Provocations to Polarise Population or Provoke Security Response
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Attacks against security force or government targets, after insurgent emergence, but before seizure of territory
Attacks against targets of significance for certain elements of population, after insurgent emergence, but before seizure of territory
2.3: Disruption or Usurpation of Government
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Attacks against government targets
Attempts to dissuade public engagement with government
Insurgent efforts to persuade public of capacity to provide government services
Actual insurgent provision of government services
2.4: Penetration or Co‐optation of Government or Security Forces
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Government statements of concern about penetration
Diversion of government resources to insurgents
Insurgents receiving advance warning of security operations
2.5: Willingness to Maintain Territorial Control
Academic sources
Credible media reporting
Media products conveying insurgent intent to maintain territorial control
Insurgent efforts at entrenchment in captured territory
Quantitative data showing increased attacks during security force efforts to reclaim territory
2.6: Employment of Specific Attack Modalities
Quantitative data drawn from GTD
N/A.
82
3: Lifecycle Stages
Category of Observable Phenomenon
Preferred Sources
3.1: Adherence to Lifecycle Stages, as Described by Strategic Thinkers
Built upon the analysis provided by other indicators, and the historical record of the insurgencies
Explanation of Indicators
The above tables explain the desired and acceptable evidence which can be used to
assess the indicators upon which the analytical framework is based. What follows is
a brief explanation of the substance and relevance of each of those indicators.
1: Organisational
1.1: Influence of Pre‐Conflict Social Networks
The influence of pre‐conflict social networks is relevant because it determines
whether the organisation is willing to tolerate the influence of pre‐conflict social
networks which can influence the insurgency to organise and operate according to
ideas and objectives which are not its own. Staniland notes that when insurgent
organisations are built upon politicised pre‐conflict social networks, the character of
those pre‐conflict networks is reflected in the structure and behaviour of the
insurgent organisation for which they are the basis,362 because “leaders embedded
in [pre‐existing] social bases cannot fluidly reshape their social relations or political
meanings.”363 Byman reinforces this, arguing that “Civil society (social clubs,
religious organizations, unions, sporting groups, and other associations that are
independent of the state) defines an important resource of a group.”364 This begs a
question of whether an insurgent organisation will attempt to marginalise pre‐
conflict networks, in order to minimise their influence upon the organisation, or
362 Staniland, 9. 363 Staniland, 24. 364 Byman, 23.
83
tolerate them, allowing them and their preferences to affect the organisational,
operational, and ideological character of the organisation.
Media and academic sources which explore the influence of pre‐conflict social
networks upon the AQI and IS insurgencies are readily available, such as the point‐
counterpoint which began with a Perspectives on Terrorism article by Whiteside,365
and was continued by Zeidel;366 and Philips’s work which describes the relationship
between al‐Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and tribes.367
There are also observable occurrences which are consistent with the integration or
suppression of pre‐conflict networks. Public statements of discontent by major
figures from once‐integrated groups, as well as defection and/or desertion, are
consistent with a failure to suppress those groups whose interests were always at
odds with those of the insurgency. Conversely, a pattern of operational decisions
(particularly targeting) which was in line with the interests of pre‐conflict groups
and at odds with the stated objectives of the organisation is consistent with an
allowance of pre‐conflict groups’ interests to take precedence over those of the
core insurgent organisation.
1.2: Strength of Horizontal Ties
The strength of horizontal ties among leadership figures is relevant because it
relates to whether the organisation has the leadership cohesion and coordination
required for central control across large geospatial and organisational distance, or if
it is likely to become a collection of disparate groups with parochial interests.368
Two sets of sources can inform a judgment of the strength or weakness of
horizontal ties. The first is based upon academic and media reporting which
discusses the background of the organisation’s leadership, and the relationships
365 Whiteside, "A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement." 366 Zeidel. 367 Phillips, 71‐72. 368 Staniland, 21‐22.
84
between figures within the leadership. The second is based upon quantitative data
from the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which can
indicate whether the organisation is operating in an apparently‐coordinated fashion
across a large geospatial distance.
1.3: Growth Patterns
The presence or absence of purposeful growth has implications for the operational
choices and decisionmaking latitude of insurgent decisionmakers. Organisational
growth is a response to organisational preferences and operational requirements,
determining the organisation’s ability to use certain operational approaches. As the
Australian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 3‐0‐1 notes, insurgent organisations
are initially in a position of inferiority because of their small size, creating an early‐
stage tension between the need to grow a political base and the need to maintain
security.369 This can lead the organisation to be “open” or “closed” in a given
lifecycle stage. An open insurgent organisation will engage in what is dubbed
“purposeful growth” both by Jones,370 and US Joint Publication (JP) 3‐25.371 Open
organisations expand deliberately to meet operational or strategic requirements,
outsourcing tactical‐level decisionmaking to individual cell leaders while still
maintaining operational control, strategic control, and a desired level of security.372
Closed networks will refrain from expanding, either because decisionmakers have
judged that expansion would be unnecessary or bring a disproportionate measure
of risk.373 The presence or absence of growth affects the operational choices of the
organisation because certain operational and strategic courses can only be pursued
by organisations which have expanded to a certain size.374 It is because of this that
369 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 2.09‐2.10. 370 Jones, 41. 371 JCS, F2. 372 Jones, 29‐30, 40‐41. 373 Jones, 41‐42. 374 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 18‐19.
85
growth patterns—and whether they are open or closed—are a useful diagnostic
indicator.
Identifying growth patterns is possible through the use of academic and media
reporting which addresses the internal history of the organisations. CIA’s guidance
also suggests that changes identified in quantitative data, particularly an increase in
the frequency, scale, geospatial distribution, and targets of attacks, are consistent
with growth.375 Stagnation in those same factors can also be indicative of a lack of
growth, as can a reduction in attacks after security operations against the
insurgents.
1.4: Presence or Purpose of Service or Support Auxiliary Groups
The presence and purpose of either support or service auxiliary groups is relevant
because of the importance attached to the role of the auxiliary in the literature.
Auxiliary cells allow the insurgents to conduct activities which are normally
impossible, either because such activities are too complex, or because of
operational circumstances. According to Jones, auxiliary cells provide “logistics,
operational support, and intelligence collection”.376 Similarly, the US Army’s Human
Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies states that auxiliaries are
part‐time personnel who can operate overtly,377 help accommodate and screen new
members into the network,378 and perform “particular tasks or special
assignments.”379 Contemporary US counternetwork literature goes further,
characterising the auxiliary as a key network element that is not only able to
operate covertly amid the normal population, but also to provide professional,
specialised operational, or trade skills,380 which the organisation’s core membership
375 CIA. 14. 376 Jones, 19. 377 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 23. 378 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 2. 379 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 19. 380 JCS, F5.
86
lack.381 For the purposes of this paper, auxiliary groups are therefore understood as
either collaborators in spaces beyond insurgent control (support auxiliary) or
operational specialists who are not part of the organisation’s core groups (service
auxiliary).
For the support auxiliary, the most‐reliable information comes from academic
sources and media reporting which describes persons or entities who are connected
to the insurgency and operating in areas not under the insurgents’ direct control.
Reports of post‐conflict purges of insurgent collaborators in both urban and rural
areas are also consistent with the development of an auxiliary, as are successful
non‐suicide attacks in areas outside insurgent control.
For the service auxiliary, academic sources remain ideal, while media reporting—
including material produced by the insurgents themselves—can also be used, so
long as it indicates the provision of medical, technical, professional, tradecraft, or
other specialised services being provided or utilised by the insurgency.
1.5: Character of Relationships with Non‐Adversary Third Parties—Integration,
Coexistence, or Elimination
Determining the character of relationships between the insurgents and non‐
adversary third parties addresses the question of if and how the organisation aims
to become the dominant political and security actor in the area of conflict. In some
modern works on counterinsurgency, it is stated that insurgents are in competition
with other actors for control over a given population. Fall provides one of the
earliest explanations of this idea, writing that insurgencies aim to “establish a
competitive system of control” and will bring violence to bear both against the state
and against other non‐state persons and entities to do so.382 The question this begs
is how an insurgent organisation will relate to non‐adversary third parties—will it
integrate them, attempt to coexist, or eliminate them?
381 JCS, III.3. 382 Fall.
87
In determining the character of relationships between the insurgents and non‐
adversary third parties, academic sources discussing those relationships are ideal.
Also useful are reports of attacks against non‐adversary third parties, and reports of
possible or actual accord between those parties and the insurgency.
2: Operational
2.1: Character of Relationship with Population—Cooperative or Coercive
Whether the insurgents maintain a cooperative or coercive relationship with the
population is relevant because of the noted centrality of popular support in
insurgent campaigns, and the differing ways in which support can be achieved.
Within the counterinsurgency orthodoxy which is reflected in LWD 3‐0‐1, such
popular support is needed for both material and psychological/moral support.383
One means of obtaining it is by expending time and effort to out‐govern the state or
persuade the population to accede insurgent control for political/ideological
reasons. But the CIA also notes that insurgencies can attempt to coerce the
population,384 albeit at the risk of weakening the insurgents’ political position.385
This begs a question of which approach the insurgency will take in attempting to
win popular loyalty or compliance.
Signs that the organisation may have sought popular support include the refusal of
the population to cooperate with security forces, the provision of early warning of
counterinsurgency operations to the insurgents, and the expansion of the insurgent
organisation’s support base beyond the constituencies with which they were
initially linked. Signs that the organisation is seeking to coerce the population
include individual or collective punishment, efforts to restrict movement, the
aggressive imposition of a political or social program, and any other sort of
383 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 1.3. 384 CIA. 23. 385 Connable and Libicki, 103‐04.
88
deliberate deprivation, as well as popular backlash against the aforementioned
methods.
2.2: Use of Provocations to Polarise Population or Provoke Security Response
The matter of if and how the insurgency carries out attacks, with a view to polarise
the population or provoke a security response, is included in the framework
because of the noted tendency among insurgent organisations to use such
measures as a means of drawing attention and expanding. The CIA notes that
insurgent decisionmakers may wish to “provoke the government into committing
abuses that drive neutral civilians towards the insurgents.”386 LWD 3‐0‐1 states that
insurgents may strike “military targets to induce exhaustion or provoke
overreaction,”387 and JP 3‐24 claims that insurgents have long “sought to provoke
political regimes into overreactions.”388 Similarly, Byman recommends considering
whether early‐stage insurgent organisations are intent upon provoking outrage
from tribal, religious, or ethnic communities.389
Signs that the organisation seeks to provoke a government response include attacks
against government targets, critical infrastructure, or security forces. Signs that the
organisation seeks to polarise the population include mass‐casualty attacks or
attacks against politically, culturally, or religiously‐significant civilian targets.
2.3: Disruption or Usurpation of Government
Whether the insurgent organisation seeks to disrupt or usurp government is
included because of the importance attached to such activities by the literature.
The disruption or usurpation of the functions of government is pursued by some
insurgent organisations,390 who seek to establish themselves as competitors for the
civil obedience of the population.391 Conversely, the need to provide security in the
386 CIA. 2. 387 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 4D.1. 388 DoD, II.4. 389 Byman, 52. 390 Byman, 15. 391 Fall, 1.
89
face of such disruption or usurpation has been recognised as an essential element in
US counterterrorism policy.392
Academic sources and media reporting—including that produced by the
insurgents—which shows or advertises the insurgent organisation’s provision of
security and government services is indicative of a desire to usurp governance.
Attacks against government buildings and/or personnel,393 as well as calls for the
population to refrain from interacting with the state, are indicative of a desire to
disrupt the government.
2.4: Penetration or Co‐optation of Government or Security Forces
Whether insurgents seek to penetrate or co‐opt security forces and government is
relevant because—as with the disruption or usurpation of government function—it
is an activity to which the literature calls attention. The CIA advises analysts to look
for the “penetration of the military, police, and intelligence services.”394
Furthermore, LWD 3‐0‐1 calls attention to the possibility of host nation security
forces being infiltrated by “insurgents or foreign intelligence services,”395 while DA
550‐104 describes the penetration of government institutions as part of an
insurgent organisation’s efforts to shape its operational environment.396 The
concerns had also been raised by the Iraqi government during the effort to
integrate Sunni Arabs into the Iraqi state security forces,397 while Hashim indicates
(without citation) that security force penetration had indeed occurred in Iraq prior
to 2014.398
Academic, media, and professional sources discuss intent to infiltrate or co‐opt the
government and security forces. Reporting of equipment diversion, insurgents
392 United States Department of Defense DoD, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington D.C.: US DoD, 2006), 25. 393 Byman, 8. 394 CIA. 14. 395 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 5.17. 396 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 2. 397 Cigar, 76. 398 Hashim, 79.
90
receiving advanced warning of security operations, or mass security force
defections are also consistent with the penetration or co‐optation of the security
forces.
2.5: Willingness to Maintain Territorial Control
The willingness of the insurgents to maintain territorial control is relevant because
of the noted importance—for insurgencies—of seizing and defending territory. LWD
3‐0‐1 states that “to achieve their political objectives insurgents must ultimately
control the territory in which the target population resides.”399 This is echoed by
British counterinsurgency literature which cites territorial control as one of the
principal objectives of insurgencies,400 and DA 550‐104 which argues that
insurgencies will attempt to seize territory in the later stages of their campaign.401
This begs the question of whether the organisation will attempt to maintain
territorial control, or cede it in the face of pressure.
Relevant sources include academic sources and media reporting, which discuss
insurgents’ intent to maintain control over territory, efforts by insurgents to
entrench themselves in territory they have seized, or insurgent resistance to efforts
by security forces to regain territorial control. Quantitative data showing an
increase in attacks around the time of major security force operations are also
consistent with a desire—on the part of the insurgents—to maintain control over
territory.
2.6: Employment of Specific Attack Modalities
Whether the insurgents employ specific modes of attack is included in the
framework because it has intrinsic value, and because it can be easily tested.
Identifying specific methods of attack is possible through the use of quantitative
data from GTD.
399 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 2.10. 400 MoD, 1, 1.5. 401 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 2.
91
3: Adherence to Lifecycle Stages Described by Strategic Thinkers
Lifecycle stages are used to indicate both the intended and actual development of
the insurgency. The CIA observes that “insurgencies often progress through certain
common stages of development,”402 while DA 550‐104 states that “Guerrilla
strategy usually follows a three‐stage evolution,”403 JP 3‐24 proclaims the existence
of several stages of insurgency,404 and the Australian Army’s LWD 3‐0‐1 identifies
specific insurgent behaviours in certain stages.405
Lifecycle stages are described clearly in the works of al‐Suri and Naji. Determining
whether the insurgencies themselves developed in line with those stages requires
first the identification of campaign inflection points. Second, an analysis of other
indicators, within the time periods between those inflection points, can be done by
examining other indicators. The essential caveat when considering lifecycle stages is
that neither the al‐Qa’ida in Iraq or Islamic State insurgencies ever developed fully.
402 CIA. 5. 403 Molnar, Tinker, and LeNoir, 2. 404 DoD, JP 3‐24, xi. 405 Defence, LWD 3‐0‐1, 2.8.
92
Sourcing
Aaron, David. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad. Santa Monica: RAND, 2008. Abdulrazaq, Tallha, and Gareth Stansfield. "The Enemy Within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul." The
Middle East Journal 70, no. 4 (2016): 525‐42. Ackerman, Spencer. "How Special Ops Copied Al‐Qaida to Kill It." WIRED, 09/09/2011.
https://www.wired.com/2011/09/mcchrystal‐network/. Accessed 22/10/2017. Adamsky, Dima. "Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies." Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 1 (2009/12/31 2009): 1‐19. Adie, W.A.C. Chinese Strategic Thinking Under Mao. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence.
Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 1972. Adnan, Sinan, and Aaron Reese. Beyond The Islamic State: Iraq's Second Sunni Insurgency. Online:
ISW, 2014. Published October 2014. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sunni%20Insurgency%20in%20Iraq.pdf. Accessed 26/06/2018.
Agencies. "Al‐Qaeda Claims Wave of Deadly Iraq Attacks." Al Jazeera, 22/03/2012. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012321145733544106.html. Accessed 27/05/2018.
Al‐'Ubaydi, Muhammad, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton, and Bryan Price. The Group That Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State. West Point: CTC, 2014. Published December 2014. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2014/12/CTC‐The‐Group‐That‐Calls‐Itself‐A‐State‐December20141.pdf. Accessed 20/05/2018.
Al‐Ayash, Kamal. "Iraqi Policemen Who ‘Repented’ To Extremists, Not Allowed To Return Home." Niqash, 25/10/2016. http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5390/Iraqi‐Policemen‐Who‐%E2%80%98Repented%E2%80%99‐To‐Extremists‐Not‐Allowed‐To‐Return‐Home.htm. Accessed 22/06/2018.
al‐Banghali, Abu 'Abdir‐Rahman. "The Revival of Jihad in Bengal." Dabiq 12 (2015): 37‐41. Al‐Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. "A Caliphate Under Strain: The Documentary Evidence." CTC Sentinel 9,
no. 4 (2016): 1‐8. Al‐Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. "Islamic Army of Iraq Interview." Aymenn Jawad al‐Tamimi's Blog,
04/09/2014. http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/09/islamic‐army‐of‐iraq‐interview. Accessed 08/06/2018.
Al‐Zawahiri, Ayman. "Letter From Ayman al‐Zawahiri to Abu Mus'ab al‐Zarqawi, Dated 09/06/2005." 2005.
Al‐Zawahiri, Ayman. التبرئة/The Exoneration. Online: as‐Sahab Media, 2008. Published 16/04/2008. https://ia902603.us.archive.org/2/items/altabr2a001/kitab‐v_1.pdf. Accessed 25/09/2018.
Anonymous. "Insurgency in Iraq." Strategic Comments 9, no. 8 (2003/10/01 2003): 1‐2. Anonymous. Iraq: Politics and Governance. Washington D.C.: CRS, 2016. Published 09/03/2016.
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20160309_RS21968_b49f1c365a907f3d1df0fa87a2446f2bf58032ba.pdf. Accessed 12/06/2018.
Anonymous. The Islamic State and U.S. Policy. Washington D.C.: CRS, 2017. Published 24/05/2017. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170524_R43612_091accd83642edda97cacb78b92b21b0a2d69813.pdf. Accessed 22/05/2018.
AQ, Al‐Qa'ida, and Anonymous Author. "AQ‐POAK‐D‐001‐504: A Letter to the Leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq." Washington D.C.: CRRS, 2007.
93
Atran, Scott. "Islamic State Has a Plan and That Plan is Working." The Irish Times, 16/11/2015. https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/islamic‐state‐has‐a‐plan‐and‐that‐plan‐is‐working‐1.2432231. Accessed 02/01/2018.
Bahney, Benjamin, Howard Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny McPherson, and Barbara Sude. An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al‐Qa'ida in Iraq. Santa Monica: RAND, 2010.
Barrett, Richard. The Islamic State. New York: The Soufan Group, 2014. Published November 2014. http://soufangroup.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/10/TSG‐The‐Islamic‐State‐Nov14.pdf. Accessed 20/05/2018.
Beccaro, Andrea. "Modern Irregular Warfare: The ISIS Case Study." Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 2 (2018/03/04 2018): 207‐28.
Berger, J.M. "Can "Lone Wolves" Travel in Packs." Intelwire, 03/05/2011. http://news.intelwire.com/2011/05/can‐lone‐wolves‐travel‐in‐packs.html. Accessed 03/03/2018.
Bernard, Myriam. "Assessing AQI's Resilience After April's Leadership Decapitation." CTC Sentinel 3, no. 6 (2010): 4‐8.
Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey Friedman, and Jacob Shapiro. "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?". International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 7‐40.
Blanchard, Christopher. Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology. Washington D.C.: CRS, 2007. Published 09/07/2007. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20070709_RL32759_85162d77f8b0e053b0e305ca73dd6a0b95dc24fd.pdf. Accessed 11/12/2017.
Bohan, Caren. "Obama: Troops Leaving Iraq with Heads Held High." Reuters, 15/12/2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/us‐iraq‐usa‐obama/obama‐troops‐leaving‐iraq‐with‐heads‐held‐high‐idUSTRE7BD1ME20111214. Accessed 06/05/2011.
Bunker, Robert J. "Unconventional warfare philosophers." Small Wars & Insurgencies 10, no. 3 (1999/12/01 1999): 136‐49.
Bunzel, Cole. "The Islamic State of Decline: Anticipating the Paper Caliphate." Jihadica, 15/06/2016. http://www.jihadica.com/the‐islamic‐state‐of‐decline/. Accessed 26/06/2018.
Byman, Daniel. Understanding Proto‐Insurgencies. RAND Counterinsurgency Study. Santa Monica: RAND, 2007.
Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.
Callimachi, Rukmini. "The ISIS Files." New York Times, 04/04/2018. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis‐documents‐mosul‐iraq.html. Accessed 08/04/2018.
Cancian, Matthew. "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of the Islamic State: Lessons for U.S. Forces." Military Review March‐April 2017 (2017): 52‐61.
Chassin, Lionel. The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War, 1945‐1949. Translated by Timothy Osato and Louis Gelas. London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966.
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency. Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency. Online: CIA, 2012. Published 2012. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=713599. Accessed 01/11/2017.
Cigar, Norman. Al‐Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq's Unstable Triangle. Middle East Studies Occasional Papers. Quantico: MCUP, 2011. September 2011.
Cigar, Norman, Abd Al‐Aziz Al‐Muqrin, and Julian Lewis. Al‐Qa'ida's Doctrine For Insurgency [in Arabic] [A Practical Course For Guerrilla War]. First ed. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc, 2009.
94
Clarke, Colin, Kimberly Jackson, Patrick Johnston, Eric Robinson, and Howard Shatz. Financial Futures of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Santa Monica: RAND, 2017.
CNN. "Iraq: Al‐Qa'ida Calls for the Sacrifice of Members of the Council of The Awakening/ القاعدة: العراق .Elaph.com, 23/12/2007 ".تدعو إلى التضحية بأعضاء مجالس الصحوةhttp://elaph.com/Web/Politics/2007/12/290288.htm?sectionarchive=Politics. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Coles, Isabel, and Stephen Kalin. "Iraqi PM Declares Victory Over Islamic State in Mosul." Reuters, 10/07/2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us‐mideast‐crisis‐iraq‐mosul/iraqi‐pm‐declares‐victory‐over‐islamic‐state‐in‐mosul‐idUSKBN19V105. Accessed 06/05/2018.
Condit, D.M. Modern Revolutionary Warfare: An Analytical Overview. Springfield: NTIS, 1973. Connable, Ben, and Martin Libicki. How Insurgencies End. Santa Monica: RAND, 2010. Cordesman, Anthony. Hitting Bottom: The Maliki Scorecard in Iraq. Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2014.
Published 01/05/2014. https://csis‐prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs‐public/legacy_files/files/publication/140501_Iraq_Hitting_Bottom_Revised.pdf. Accessed 07/07/2018.
Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq's Insurgency and Civil Violence. Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2007. Published 22/08/2007. https://csis‐prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs‐public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/070822_cordesman_iraq_report.pdf. Accessed 20/04/2018.
Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida. Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2007. Published 16/07/2007. https://csis‐prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs‐public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/070716_sunni_insurgents.pdf. Accessed 20/04/2018.
Cordesman, Anthony, and Sam Khazai. Iraq in Crisis. Online: CSIS, 2014. Published 30/05/2014. https://csis‐prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs‐public/legacy_files/files/publication/140513_Cordesman_IraqInCrisis_Web.pdf. Accessed 25/04/2018.
Cordesman, Anthony, and Sam Khazai. Shaping Iraq's Security Forces. Online: CSIS, 2014. Published 12/07/2014. https://csis‐prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs‐public/legacy_files/files/publication/140612_Shaping_Iraq_Security_Forces.pdf. Accessed 28/05/2018.
Count, Iraq Body. "Another Year of Relentless Violence in Iraq." Iraq Body Count "From the Numbers", 2017. https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2016/. Accessed 25/06/2018.
Count, Iraq Body. "Iraq 2015: A Catastrophic Normal." Iraq Body Count "From the Numbers", 01/01/2016. https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2015/. Accessed 25/06/2018.
CPOST, Chicago Project on Security & Threats. "Data From CPOST, Islamic State, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and Islamic State of Iraq Attacks, 2011 & 2016." 2018.
Crenshaw, Martha. "How Terrorism Declines." Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (1991): 69‐87. Cruickshank, Paul, and Mohannad Hage Ali. "Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda."
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 1 (2007/01/01 2007): 1‐14. Cunningham, Erin. "In Iraq, Islamic State Fighters Seize Sunni Tribesmen for Resisting Rule."
Washington Post, 06/11/2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in‐iraq‐islamic‐state‐fighters‐seize‐sunni‐tribesmen‐for‐resisting‐rule/2014/11/06/74069916‐6382‐11e4‐ab86‐46000e1d0035_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bdbf24a2e88e. Accessed 27/04/2018.
95
Daragahi, Borzou. "Massacre Feared a Setup / Infiltrators Plague Iraqi Security Forces." SFGate, 26/10/2004. https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Massacre‐feared‐a‐setup‐Infiltrators‐plague‐2640625.php. Accessed 24/04/2018.
Davis, Lynn, Jeffrey Martini, and Kim Cragin. "A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat." RAND Perspectives, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html. Accessed 28/05/2018.
Defence, Australian Department of Defence. LWD 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power. Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 2014.
Defence, Australian Department of Defence. LWD 3‐0‐1: Counterinsurgency. Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009.
DoD, United States Department of Defense. JP 3‐24: Counterinsurgency. Washington D.C.: US DoD, 2009.
DoD, United States Department of Defense. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. Washington D.C.: US DoD, 2006.
Dodge, Toby. "Iraqi Transitions: from regime change to state collapse." Third World Quarterly 26, no. 4‐5 (2005/06/01 2005): 705‐21.
Dodwell, Brian, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler. The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look At The Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail. West Point: CTC, 2016. Published 01/04/2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/04/CTC_Caliphates‐Global‐Workforce‐Report.pdf. Accessed 11/05/2018.
Economist, The. "The Battle for Fallujah Now‐‐and For Hearts and Minds Later." The Economist 373, no. 8401 (2004): 49‐50.
Fall, Bernard. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." Naval War College Review Winter (1998): 46‐57.
Farrell, Stephen, and Hassan al‐Jarrah. "Raids Foil Plot to Kill Shia Pilgrims." The Times, 29/01/2007 2007, 28.
Fishman, Brian. "After Zarqawi: The dilemmas and future of Al Qaeda in Iraq." The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2006/09/01 2006): 19‐32.
Fishman, Brian. Dysfunction and Decline. West Point: CTC, 2009. Published 16/03/2009. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/Dysfunction‐and‐Decline.pdf. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Fishman, Brian. The Master Plan: ISIS, Al‐Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
Fishman, Brian. "Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq to Al‐Qa`ida’s Operations." CTC Sentinel 6, no. 11 (2013): 1‐8.
Fishman, Brian, and Joseph Felter. Al‐Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records. West Point: CTC, 2007. Published 02/01/2007. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/aqs‐foreign‐fighters‐in‐iraq.pdf. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Flynn, Michael, Rich Juergens, and Thomas Cantrell. "Employing ISR SOF Best Practices." Joint Force Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2008): 56‐61.
Friedman, B.A. "Mujahideen: The Strategic Tradition of Sunni Jihadism." Small Wars Journal, 28/10/2015. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mujahideen‐the‐strategic‐tradition‐of‐sunni‐jihadism. Accessed 17/02/2018.
Gartenstein‐Ross, Daveed, and Sterling Jensen. "The Role of Iraqi Tribes After the Islamic State's Ascendance." Military Review 95, no. 4 (2015): 102‐10.
Gates, John M. "People's War in Vietnam." The Journal of Military History 54, no. 3 (1990): 325‐44.
96
Gerges, Fawaz. "The Three Manifestos that Paved the Way for Islamic State." Los Angeles Times, 15/04/2016. http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op‐ed/la‐oe‐0417‐gerges‐islamic‐state‐theorists‐20160417‐story.html. Accessed 22/01/2018.
Giap, Vo Nguyen. "Article by DRV Defense Minister Giap The Big Victory; The Great Task." Douglas Pike Collection at the Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University, 15/10/1967. https://vva.vietnam.ttu.edu/repositories/2/digital_objects/142240. Accessed 17/02/2018.
Gude, Ken. "Testimony of Ken Gude to the House Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security, 10/12/2015." 10/12/2015. https://search‐proquest‐com.virtual.anu.edu.au/docview/1748989539?accountid=8330. Accessed 11/02/2018.
Gulmohammad, Zana. "Unseating the Caliphate: Contrasting the Challenges of Liberating Fallujah and Mosul." CTC Sentinel 9, no. 10 (2016): 16‐27.
Habib, Mustafa. "Why Aren't Anbar's Locals Fighting Extremists?" Niqash, 14/04/2016. http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5243/Why‐Aren%E2%80%99t‐Anbar%E2%80%99s‐Locals‐Fighting‐Extremists.htm. Accessed 22/06/2018.
Hafez, Mohammed. "Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing Their Civil Wars." Middle EAst Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 86‐99.
Hamilton, Eric. "Expanding Security in Diyala." Iraq Report, May 2008. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/Security%20Diyala%20‐%20Iraq%20Report%2010.pdf. Accessed 25/04/2018.
Harmon, C. C. "Five Strategies of Terrorism." Small Wars & Insurgencies 12, no. 3 (2001/09/01 2001): 39‐66.
Hashim, Ahmed. "The Islamic State: From Al‐Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate." Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014): 69‐83.
Hassan, Hassan. "Insurgents Again: The Islamic State's Calculated Reversion to Attrition in the Syria‐Iraq Border Region and Beyond." CTC Sentinel 10, no. 11 (2018): 1‐8.
Hassan, Hassan. "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context." Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.
Hegghammer, Thomas. "Global Jihadism After the Iraq War." The Middle East Journal 60, no. 1 (2006): 11‐32.
Hegghammer, Thomas. "Jihadi‐Salafis or Revolutionaries?". Chap. 10 In Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer, 244‐66. London, UK: Hurst, 2009.
Henzel, Christopher. "The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for US Strategy." Parameters Spring 2005 (2005): 69‐80.
Ibrahimi, S. Yaqub. "Violence‐producing Dynamics of Fragile States: How State Fragility in Iraq Contributed to the Emergence of Islamic State." Terrorism and Political Violence (2018): 1‐23.
ICG, International Crisis Group. In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency. Online: ICG, 2006. Published 15/02/2006. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/50‐in‐their‐own‐words‐reading‐the‐iraqi‐insurgency.pdf. Accessed 18/04/2018.
ICG, International Crisis Group. Iraq After the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape. Online: ICG, 2008. Published 30/04/2008. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/74‐iraq‐after‐the‐surge‐i‐the‐new‐sunni‐landscape.pdf. Accessed 19/04/2018.
ICG, International Crisis Group. Iraq: Falluja's Faustian Bargain. Online: ICG, 2014. Published 28/04/2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle‐east‐north‐africa/gulf‐and‐arabian‐peninsula/iraq/iraq‐falluja‐s‐faustian‐bargain. Accessed 26/06/2018.
ICG, International Crisis Group. Loose Ends: Iraq's Security Forces Between U.S. Drawdown and Withdrawal. Online: ICG, 2010. Published 26/10/2010.
97
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/99‐loose‐ends‐iraq‐s‐security‐forces‐between‐u‐s‐drawdown‐and‐withdrawal.pdf. Accessed 19/04/2018.
ICG, International Crisis Group. Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State. Online: ICG, 2013. Published 14/08/2013. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/make‐or‐break‐iraq‐s‐sunnis‐and‐the‐state.pdf. Accessed 26/05/2018.
Ignatius, David. "The Manual that Chillingly Foreshadows the Islamic State." Washington Post, 25/09/2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david‐ignatius‐the‐mein‐kampf‐of‐jihad/2014/09/25/4adbfc1a‐44e8‐11e4‐9a15‐137aa0153527_story.html?utm_term=.dc8d5e8a289e. Accessed 19/01/2018.
Ingram, Haroro J. "The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations." Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 6 (2015): 729‐52.
IS, Islamic State. "From Hijrah to Khilafah." Dabiq, June‐July 2014 2014, 34‐41. IS, Islamic State. "Khilafah Declared." Dabiq 1 (2014): 6‐11. IS, Islamic State. "Remaining and Expanding." Dabiq 5 (2014): 22‐33. Ismaeel, Bashdar Pusho. "A Marriage of Convenience: The Many Faces of Iraq's Sunni Insurgency."
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 12, no. 15 (2014): 4‐6. Jazeera, Al. " العراق في بالوضع ويحيطه الدن لبن والءه يعلن الزرقاوي /Zarqawi Announces His Loyalty to Bin
Laden and His Involvement in the Situation in Iraq." Al Jazeera, 19/10/2004. http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2004/10/19/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A‐%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86‐%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1%D9%87‐%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86‐%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%86‐%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%87‐%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9‐%D9%81%D9%8A‐%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82. Accessed 28/04/2018.
JCS, Office of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 3‐25: Countering Threat Networks. Joint Publications. Online: US DoD, 2016.
Joffé, George. "The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq." Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 1 (2016/01/02 2016): 1‐21.
Johnston, Patrick, Jacob Shapiro, Howard Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle Jung, Patrick Ryan, and Jonathan Wallace. Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010. Santa Monica: RAND, 2016.
Jones, Derek. Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Cellular Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations. Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009.
Jones, James L., Jennifer K. Elsea, and Nina M. Serafino. Security in Iraq. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010.
Jones, Seth. Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons From the Vietcong to the Islamic State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Jones, Seth, James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher Chivvis, Ben Connable, Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson, and Nathan Chandler. Rolling Back the Islamic State. Santa Monica: RAND, 2017.
Jones, Seth, and Martin Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida. Santa Monica: RAND, 2008.
Kamolnick, Paul. The Al‐Qaeda Organization and The Islamic State Organization. West Point: US Army War College Press, 2017. Published February 2017. http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3296.pdf. Accessed 06/06/2018.
98
Kaplan, Edward, Alex Mintz, Shaun Mishal, and Claudio Samban. "What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights From a Terror Stock Model." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 225‐35.
Katzman, Kenneth. Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links. Washington D.C.: CRS, 2008. Published 15/08/2008. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20080815_RL32217_c6aad430c7e11c2eeb3c9f3ca274bf6323735e73.pdf. Accessed 11/01/2018.
Katzman, Kenneth. Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks. Washington D.C.: CRS, 2009. Published 08/12/2009. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B‐6D27‐4E9C‐8CD3‐CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iraq%20CRS_8Dec2009_Iraq_PoliticsElectionsBenchmarks.pdf. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Khalil, Ezzeldeen. "AQI's Awakening strategy in Iraq." Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 12/07/2012. Accessed 25/06/2018.
Khalil, Lydia. "The Islamic State of Iraq Launches Plan of Nobility." Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 7 (2007).
Khan, Jesmeen. "The Iraqi Tribal Structure: Background and Influence on Counter‐Terrorism." Perspectives on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (2007): 3‐11.
Kirdar, M. J. Al Qaeda in Iraq. Online: CSIS, 2011. Published June 2011. https://csis‐prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs‐public/legacy_files/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf. Accessed 08/02/2018.
Knickmeyer, Ellen. "Ramadi Insurgents Flaunt Threat." Washington Post, 02/12/2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2005/12/01/AR2005120100271.html. Accessed 29/04/2018.
Knights, Michael. "Iraq's Never‐Ending Security Crisis." BBC, 03/10/2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world‐middle‐east‐24370037. Accessed 26/06/2018.
Knights, Michael , and Alexander Mello. "The Cult of The Offensive: The Islamic State on Defense." CTC Sentinel 8, no. 4 (2015): 1‐7.
Knights, Michael, and Alexander Mello. "Defeat by Annihilation: Mobility and Attrition in the Islamic State's Defense of Mosul." CTC Sentinel 10, no. 4 (2017): 1‐7.
Krushelnycky, Askold. "Iraq: At Least 11 Dead In Jordanian Embassy Bombing In Baghdad." Radio Free Europe, 07/08/2003. https://www.rferl.org/a/1103998.html. Accessed 08/05/2018.
Lacey, Jim, ed. The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists' Strategy for Defeating America. Edited by Jim Lacey. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008.
Levanger, John. General Vo Nguyen Giap: The Vietnamese Napoleon? Carlisle Barracks: NTIS, 1973. Lewis, Jessica. "Al‐Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: Part II." Middle East Security Report, October 2013.
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JessVBIED_PartII_3Oct.pdf. Accessed 24/04/2018.
Lewis, Jessica. "Al‐Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I." Middle East Security Report, September 2013. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI‐Resurgent‐10Sept_0.pdf. Accessed 24/04/2018.
Lewis, Jessica. "AQI's "Soldier's Harvest" Campaign." ISW Backgrounders, 09/10/2013. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_SoldiersHarvest.pdf. Accessed 25/04/2018.
Lia, Brynjar. Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al‐Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al‐Suri. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2009.
99
Lia, Brynjar. "Jihadis Divided Between Strategists and Doctrinarians." Chap. 3 In Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, edited by Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, 69‐82. Wiltshire: Routledge, 2011.
Lia, Brynjar, and Thomas Hegghammer. "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 5 (2004): 355‐75.
Long, Austin. "The Anbar Awakening." Survival 50, no. 2 (2008/05/01 2008): 67‐94. Macfarquhar, Neil, and Richard Oppel. "After the War: Attack at Shrine; Car Bomb in Iraq Kills 95 at
Shiite Mosque." New York Times, 30/08/2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/30/world/after‐the‐war‐attack‐at‐shrine‐car‐bomb‐in‐iraq‐kills‐95‐at‐shiite‐mosque.html. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Maher, Shiraz. Salafi‐Jihadism: The History of an Idea. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Maher, Shiraz. "Shiraz Maher on Isis: The Management of Savagery." New Statesman, 12/07/2016.
https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2016/07/shiraz‐maher‐isis‐management‐savagery. Accessed 05/01/2018.
Majumdar, B. N. "Mao's Concept of Guerrilla Warfare." China Report 3, no. 1 (1967/01/01 1967): 21‐26.
Makiya, Kanan. "The Iraqi Elections of 2010 ‐ and 2005." Middle East Brief 42, no. June (2010). Maurer, Thomas. "ISIS’s Warfare Functions: A Systematized Review of a Proto‐state’s Conventional
Conduct of Combat Operations." Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 2 (2018/03/04 2018): 229‐44.
Mccants, Will. "Abu Mus'ab Suri: Architect of Global Jihad Neglected?" Jihadica, 11/05/2008. http://www.jihadica.com/abu‐musab‐suri‐architect‐of‐global‐jihad‐neglected/. Accessed 14/06/2018.
Mccants, Will. "Managing Savagery in Saudi Arabia." Jihadica, 26/06/2008. http://www.jihadica.com/managing‐savagery‐in‐saudi‐arabia/. Accessed 22/01/2018.
McCormick, G. H., and G. Owen. "Security and coordination in a clandestine organization." Mathematical and Computer Modelling 31, no. 6 (2000/03/01 2000): 175‐92.
McCormick, Gordon H. "Che Guevara: The Legacy of a Revolutionary Man." [In English]. World Policy Journal 14, no. 4 (Winter 1997/1998
2017‐10‐27 1997): 63. Milne, Seumas. "Insurgents Form Political Front to Plan for US Pullout." The Guardian, 19/07/2007.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/19/topstories3.usa. Accessed 25/04/2018. Milton, Daniel. Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts. West
Point: CTC, 2016. Published 10/10/2016. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf. Accessed 25/07/2018.
Milton, Daniel. Down, But Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda. West Point: CTC, 2018. Published 24/07/2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/07/Down‐But‐Not‐Out.pdf. Accessed 25/07/2018.
MoD, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. British Army Field Manual: Countering Insurgency. Vol. 1, London, UK2009.
Molnar, Andrew, Jerry Tinker, and John LeNoir. DA 550‐104: Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies. Washington D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, 1966.
Montgomery, Gary, and Timothy McWilliams, eds. Iraqi Perspectives: From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004‐2009. Quantico: MCUP, 2009.
Moreno, Jose A. "Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation." Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 2 (1970): 114‐33.
100
Naji, Abu Bakr. The Management of Savagery: The Most Dangerous Stage Through Which The Ummah Will Pass (McCants's Translation Used for Translation Reference). Translated by Will McCants. 2006 ed. Online: Original Distributed by Aaron Zelin, Translation by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004.
Nasar, Mustafa bin Abdulqadir Setmariam A.K.A. "Abu Musab al‐Suri". The Call of Global Islamic Resistance. Online: Made Available by Archive.org, 2004.
News, Al‐Sumaria. " عناصرها من خمسة بمقتل وتعترف تكريت سجن على الهجوم تتبنى القاعدة /al‐Qa'ida Mounts Attacks Upon Tikrit Prison and Acknowledges the Killing of Five of Its Members." Al‐Sumaria News, 12/10/2012. https://www.alsumaria.tv/news/64792/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9‐%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89‐%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85‐%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89‐%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86‐%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AA‐%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81‐%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84‐%D8%AE%D9%85/ar. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Nordland, Rod. "Iraq Empties Mass Graves in Search for Cadets Killed by ISIS." New York Times, 08/04/2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/world/middleeast/iraq‐mass‐graves‐cadets‐islamic‐state‐isis.html. Accessed 11/06/2018.
O'Neill, Robert. The Strategy of General Giap Since 1964. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 1969.
Palazzo, Albert. "Perspective From the Coalface: the Battle for Fallujah." Australian Army Journal 4, no. 2 (2007): 167‐73.
Phillips, Andrew. "How al Qaeda Lost Iraq." Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009/03/01 2009): 64‐84.
Phillips, Vaughan. "The Islamic State's Strategy: Bureaucratizing the Apocalypse through Strategic Communications." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 9 (2017/09/02 2017): 731‐57.
Pike, Douglas. The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror. Saigon, Vietnam: Unknown Publisher, 1970. Pirnie, Bruce, and Edward O'Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003‐2006). Santa Monica: RAND,
2008. Postings, Robert. "A Guide to The Islamic State's Way of Urban Warfare." Modern War Institute
Blog, 09/07/2018. https://mwi.usma.edu/guide‐islamic‐states‐way‐urban‐warfare/. Accessed 10/07/2018.
Press, Associated. "Al‐Qaida in Iraq's al‐Zarqawi 'Terminated'." NBC News, 08/06/2006. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13195017/ns/world_news‐mideast_n_africa/t/al‐qaida‐iraqs‐al‐zarqawi‐terminated/#.WuUtI4iFOUk. Accessed 25/04/2018.
Press, Associated. "ISIS Organizing Bloody Mosul Withdrawal, Preparing for the Next Fight." Haaretz, 14/03/2017. https://www.haaretz.com/middle‐east‐news/isis/what‐s‐next‐for‐isis‐after‐mosul‐defeat‐1.5448676. Accessed 26/05/2018.
Prothero, Mitch. "The Iraqi Army's Collapse." Jane's Defence Weekly, 24/07/2014. Accessed 11/05/2018.
Riedel, Bruce, and Bilal Saab. "Al Qaeda’s Third Front: Saudi Arabia." The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008): 33‐46.
Roberts, Dan, and Spencer Ackerman. "US Begins Air Strikes Against Isis Targets in Iraq, Pentagon Says." The Guardian, 09/08/2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/08/us‐begins‐air‐strikes‐iraq‐isis. Accessed 18/07/2018.
Roberts, Joel. "Baghdad Bomb Crude But Deadly." CBS News, 21/08/2003. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/baghdad‐bomb‐crude‐but‐deadly/. Accessed 07/05/2018.
101
Robinson, Eric, Daniel Egel, Patrick Johnston, Sean Mann, Alexander Rothenberg, and David Stebbins. When the Islamic State Comes to Town: The Economic Impact of Islamic State Governance in Iraq and Syria. Santa Monica: RAND, 2017.
Roggio, Bill. "Letters From al Qaeda Leaders Show Iraqi Effort is in Dissarray." Long War Journal, 11/09/2008. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/letters_from_al_qaed.php. Accessed 25/04/2018.
Rollins, John, and Liana Sun Wyler. Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress. Washington D.C.: CRS, 2013. Published 11/06/2013. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf. Accessed 05/05/2018.
Ryan, Michael. Decoding Al‐Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
Sageman, Marc. "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research." Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 4 (2014): 565‐80.
Schultz, Richard. "The Limits of Terrorism in Insurgency Warfare." Polity 11, no. 1 (1978): 67‐91. Serena, Chad C. It Takes More Than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation.
Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2014. Shlapentokh, Dmitry. "The Intellectual and Political Exchange Among Jihadists: The Case of Mustafa
Setmarian Nasar (Abu Musab al‐Suri)." Journal of Applied Security Research 7, no. 3 (2012/07/01 2012): 301‐19.
Shultz, Richard. Strategic Culture And Strategic Studies: An Alternative Framework For Assessing al‐Qaeda And The Global Jihad Movement. Macdill Air Force Base: Joint Special Operations University, 2012.
Simpson, Erin Marie. "The Perils of Third‐Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns." Ph.D., Harvard University, 2010.
Smith, M.L.R., and David Martin Jones. "The Strategy of Savagery: Explaining the Islamic State." War on The Rocks, 24/02/2015. https://warontherocks.com/2015/02/the‐strategy‐of‐savagery‐explaining‐the‐islamic‐state/. Accessed 10/11/2017.
Smith, Niel, and Sean Macfarland. "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point." Military Review 88, no. 2 (2008): 41‐52.
Sowell, Kirk H. "Iraq's Second Sunni Insurgency." [In English]. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 17 (Aug 2014
2014‐11‐03 2014): 40‐69,176. Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet Yayla. "The ISIS Emni: Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS’s Intelligence
Apparatus." Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2017): 2‐16. SPG, Op TELIC. UK Contribution to Iraq: Strategic Intent and Direction. Online: Government of the
United Kingdom, 2003. Published 09/06/2003. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20171123123505/http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/242976/2003‐06‐10‐minute‐seccos‐to‐pso‐cds‐op‐cos‐paper‐uk‐contribution‐to‐iraq‐strategic‐intent‐and‐direction‐attaching‐paper‐of‐same‐name.pdf. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Staniland, Paul. Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. Illustrated, Reprint ed. New York: Cornell University Press, 2014.
State, US Department of. Country Reports on Terrorism 2009. Online: US Department of State, 2010. Published August 2010. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/146155/Country%20Reports%20on%20Terrorism%202009_141114.pdf. Accessed 29/04/2018.
102
State, US Department of. Iraq 2013 Human Rights Report. Online: US Department of State, 2014. Published 01/04/2014. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220565.pdf. Accessed 27/05/2018.
State, US Department of. "Text of a Letter From Abu Mus'ab al‐Zarqawi, Obtained by United States Government in Iraq." https://2001‐2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm. (Accessed 29/04/2018).
State, US Department of. US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism: Middle East and North Africa. Online: US Government, 2013. Published 30/05/2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209982.htm. Accessed 07/05/2018.
Sterling, Joe, and Salma Abdelaziz. "As Unrest Spreads, Syrian Government Promises to Respond." CNN, 25/03/2011. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/24/syria.unrest/index.html. Accessed 05/05/2018.
Stout, Mark. "In Search of Salafi Jihadist Strategic Thought: Mining the Words of the Terrorists." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 10 (2009/10/02 2009): 876‐92.
Tawfeeq, Mohammed, and Chelsea Carter. "Officials: ISIS Recruting on the Rise in Sunni Areas of Iraq." CNN, 11/08/2014. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/09/world/meast/iraq‐isis‐recruit/index.html. Accessed 25/06/2018.
Thurston, Alexander. "Algeria’s GIA: The First Major Armed Group to Fully Subordinate Jihadism to Salafism." Islamic Law and Society 24, no. 4 (2017): 412‐36.
Times, New York. "The Fall of Baghdad." New York Times, 10/04/2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/10/opinion/the‐fall‐of‐baghdad.html. Accessed 06/05/2018.
Tomkins, Paul. Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies. Second ed. Fort Bragg: US Army Special Operations Command, 2013.
Tse‐Tung, Mao, and Samuel Griffith. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12‐18: Mao Tse‐Tung On Guerrilla Warfare. 1 ed. Quantico: US Department of Defense, 1989.
Ucko, David. "Militias, tribes and insurgents: The challenge of political reintegration in Iraq." Conflict, Security & Development 8, no. 3 (2008/10/01 2008): 341‐73.
UKBA, UK Border Agency. Iraq: Country of Information (COI) Report. Online: UK Home Office, 2011. Published 25/03/2011. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/12/iraq_032511.pdf. Accessed 25/04/2018.
UMD‐START. "Data from GTD, al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq, and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Attacks, Between 2011 and 2017." http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2017&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=95&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20225&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=. (Accessed 24/09/2018).
UMD‐START. "Data from GTD, Al‐Qa'ida in Iraq, Tawhid & Jihad, and Islamic State of Iraq Attacks, 2001 and 2011." http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2001&end_yearonly=2011&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=95&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20225&perpetrator=20426&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=. (Accessed 24/04/2018).
103
UNOCHR, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016. Baghdad, Iraq: United Nations, 2016. Published 30/12/2016. www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&task=download&id=2106_a96b8b398574e30a6b5f17379845067c&lang=en. Accessed 30/05/2018.
USGov, United States Government. Initial Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR). Washington D.C.: US Government, 2007. Published 12/07/2007. https://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/benchmark.rpt.7‐07.pdf. Accessed 22/04/2018.
Ware, Michael. "Papers Give Peek Inside al Qaeda in iraq." CNN, 11/06/2008. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html. Accessed 25/04/2018.
Warrick, Joby. Black Flags. Toronto, Canada: Doubleday, 2015. Watts, Clint. "Do al Qaeda Affiliates Actually Have a Plan." Geopoliticus, 02/12/2013.
https://www.fpri.org/2013/12/do‐al‐qaeda‐affiliates‐actually‐have‐a‐plan/. Accessed 03/03/2018.
Wege, Carl Anthony. "The Changing Islamic State Intelligence Apparatus." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 2 (2018/04/03 2018): 271‐88.
Weiss, Michael, and Hassan Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts., 2015. Whiteside, Craig. "The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare." Small Wars &
Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016/09/02 2016): 743‐76. Whiteside, Craig. "A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State
Movement." Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (2017): 2‐18. Williams, Phil. Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq. Online: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2009. Published June 2009. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub930.pdf. Accessed 01/05/2018.
Wing, Joel. "Anbar Before and After the Awakening Pt. IX: Sheikh Sabah Aziz of the Albu Mahal." Musings on Iraq, 23/01/2014. https://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/anbar‐before‐and‐after‐awakening‐pt‐ix.html. Accessed 25/04/2018.
Wright, Robin, J.M. Berger, William Braniff, Cole Bunzel, Daniel Byman, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, et al. The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond. Online: USIP & The Wilson Center, 2017. Published December 2016/January 2017. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The‐Jihadi‐Threat‐ISIS‐Al‐Qaeda‐and‐Beyond.pdf. Accessed 11/06/2018.
Zackie, M. W. "An Analysis of Abu Mus'ab al‐Suri's "Call to Global Islamic Resistance"." [In English]. Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 1 (2013): 1‐18.
Zeidel, Ronen. "The Dawa’ish: A Collective Profile of IS Commanders." Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 4 (2017): 16‐28.