RMA - A roadmap for the Indian sapper in 2020

7/27/2019 RMA - A roadmap for the Indian sapper in 2020

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Manekshaw PaPer no. 34, 2012

KNOWLEDGE WORLD

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Centre for Land Warfare Studies

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Revolution in Military Affairs

A Roadmap for the Indian Sapper of 2020



Centre for Land Warfare Studies

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Contents

Itodctio 1

T spiit of egiig, sppig d soldiig 1

Chapter 1: Past, Present and Future of Military Engineering

1. T Mtt of Dicio 22. Fom T Oigi to t Pt: Pogio of Mility egiig 2

3. hitoy of sppig 3

4. Mility egiig i t Cotmpoy Idi amy 5

Chapter 2: The Emerging Nature of Warfare and

the Global Revolution in Military Affairs

1. Looig Yod 82. emgc of Mod Mility Cocpt 8

3. Combat Power Redened 9

4. Dtmitio of rlti stgt 9

5. Combid am Optio 10

6. T Cocpt of Itopbility 10

7. T nc of applictio of t Cocpt of ‘simltity’ 11

8. T M of t Pdomit am 11

9. scop of Mobility 11

10. rpid Dploymt d Gdtd rpo 12

11. T rol of Ifomtio wf 13

12. Lo Itity Optio 13

Chapter 3: A Mandate for the Indian Sappers of 2020

1. Mility egiig Oppotiti i t Idi Cotxt 14

2. Igdit of egiig sppot to t Idi amy i

t Comig e 14

3. Ft of sccfl egiig sppot i t Idi amy 18



Chapter 4: Tactical Nuances of Terrain Engineering

1. Dictt of t Ti i appcitio of

Combt egiig sppot 24

2. Ti smplig: C stdy fo t Moti 24

3. Cctitic d effct of Ti 26

4. altitd, Climt d wt 26

5. sfc Commictio 26

6. ai Commictio 26

7. Obtcl 27

8. Tcticl Optio 27

9. Tcticl Momt 2710. ati-Ldig Obtcl 27

11. Defence Works and Field Fortications 28

12. Locl roc 28

13. Camouage, Concealment and Deception 28

14. Tim Fcto 29

15. Cmpigig so 29

16. apct of Ti egiig i t Comig e 30

Chapter 5: Organisation for

Effective Combat Engineering Support

1. Gi of roltio i Combt egiig 32

2. T Fdmtl Cocpt 34

3. Mtod of Foc Ogitio fo t Ft w d Pc 37

4. stdd Foc Compoitio 375. Mission Specic Force Organisation 40

6. sttgic Foc Ogitio 41

7. Ogitio fo Cot-Igcy 42

8. T Co ad 43

acoldgmt 42



1

Ma ne k s ha w P a P e r n O

. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

revOLuTIOn In MILITarY aFFaIrs: a rOaDMaP FOr The InDIan saPPer OF 2020

Revolution in Military Affairs:

A Roadmap for the Indian Sapper of

2020

To engineer is to arrange, contrive, manoeuvre, guide.

Introduction

The Spirit of Engineering, Sapping and Soldiering

Engineering is dened as the art and science of arranging, contriving, manoeuvring

d gidig, il ppig impli tcig to ptt ic pmit

ccfl mo tod t my it t ppo of dmiig

his position. Thus, by denition, the engineer is expected to be a motivator, an

iitito d pim mo of t mility foc ppot. I ti cotxt,

it i lt to coid t ol of gi. It i: “To pply giig

oldg d ill to t ftc of t commd’ pl”. all ot

arms have well demarcated and specically dened roles concisely spelt out

i copl tc; ot o i t c of t pp o i odid to

ccflly ccompli d ll tliti ll c t ic do ot fll

iti t mbit of poibiliti of y ot m o ic. I dditio,

t pp foc to pfom t ol of ifty o d. It i tll

od, d it b o ic t d of mility ogitio.

wit mdt o t d limitd, to dtd tmilitary engineering signies and what is entailed in making it an effective

gi foc. To do ti, to tt t t oot of o xitc,

tody d t i xpctd of i t comig dcd.



3


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


‘D’. similly, b btig xcli giig xpti till

iftym bcm dpt t dlig impl cg, il ot log go, t

t-m lood t t pp to dploy fci to co mll ditc. T

gi dig o t t of mility igllig to t Cop of sigl

d pi d coy to t Cop of elcticl d Mcicl egi

(eMe) om ot xmpl. It old b, tfo, ppopit to if

tt ogitio li, dlop d ti tog ytm of dicdig t

old d dptig to mgig td. jt t ifty gdtd to

undertaking simple eld engineering tasks such as laying small foot bridges

d btig b fom tdoff ditc it tdm d oct,

d mod it gid xpti i coig mio obtcl bytml, gi mt mo o to cqi ig ll of xpti

i t lm of mobility, cot-mobility d ibility, tby opig

p id it d poibiliti fo t mgc of btt fom of

mility tctic d ttgy.

Ti i impti if , t gi, to ti o tt t

pmi ppotig m fo t t sic d colo of tcicl

iotio i t coty.

History of Sapping

I t cit tim d t Middl ag, t m of mtmtic

d cic o tid to b gi i t mploymt of t tt. Li

most ofcials of the court, they too, were involved in the pursuit of warfare,

ic, mog ot poibiliti, ptd tm it oppotiti i

the eld of engineering as well. When the state was not engaged in military

ctio, t gi bilt plc, fot, bidg d cl. To ti dy,

the term ‘engineers’ is specically dedicated to the military engineers, and

t tm ‘ciil gi’ mgd to f to to gi o ot

oldi. T ltt tm old bot 200 y go, t d fo

giig ill mgd i t ciil cto coqc of t Idtil

roltio. Lt, of co, ot dicipli of giig bcd off, to

b fd to ‘mcicl giig’, tc. i pig it t td of

tcologicl dcmt.

a t codd itoy of ami t old o l, t pp

compot of t mility coitd of cif gi, o lo



4


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GauTaM Banerjee

senior eld commander. He was assisted by a few formally trained engineer

staff ofcers and artisans who planned and executed military engineering

t it t lp of toop lbo, o, t tim, tog mt of ciili

o foc. a imil ytm i og dig t hid ll Mlim

l i Idi. ‘egi’ ditict cop of comptily ct

oigi – pobbly t mid-18t cty, t Idi gdlly lippig

d t Biti l. Ml sbti l Pt d vb of Fc,

o of t gt mility gi, dmittd kig’ egi i

1655, gtd litcy i t royl Gd i 1668 il cotiig

t Cif egi; commdd ifty diiio git t egli

from 1691 to 1697, before nally returning to his rst love, that is, fortressgiig, i 1703, i t of ‘Ml of Fc’. Mo Gl Lz

nicol Mgit Cot ot gt gi of i tim, o

oldd t dti of Cif egi i t ‘ami of t ri d t

not’, ll Dfc Miit i pot-roltio Fc, bfo fllig

ot it npolo i 1807. T tditio of gt mility gi tig

o t mtl of optiol ldip t t tiol ll d i tim

of cii – Fild Ml Lod kitc, Fild Ml robt npi dGl Godo of sd, to m oly f – i mc i idc i t

Biti amy too. Biti Idi d by oll of gt mility gi

o pctd d mmbd o by ll Idi to ti dy.

T ft of t cotctio of t Gg Cl by Colol Ctly, gt

iigtio o by Colol si at Cotto d Mo jo Pycic,

cotctio of gt od, ctomt d mtic bildig t Md

by Cpti willim Dixo d sy, t Clctt by Litt Fob

d t Bomby by Litt Fll, to m oly f, clbtd

tody, idd t cotibtio md by Colol sito

jcob i dlopig t Ido-scic tyl of citct. ho, t

olmig cotibtio of t mility gi i t amy, ll

i tio-bildig, i bt i t usa. wt Poit t pioig

itittio of giig dctio i amic d t oll of gt pp

who inuenced the shaping of the nation includes leaders such as Generals

McCl, L d Mcat. T pimcy of t ol of t us Cop of

egi i digig, xctig d cotollig ll mo ciil giig

d tpottio poct i t amic mild b t mot



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cclimd fodtio of tcologicl pioity o t t of t

old, d to ti dy, mi o of t gt tgt of tt tio.

e cotctio o of gt giig ft bod i t

follo of o hid dyti, my of ic – motly fot d tmpl –

i to ti dt, fottly, littl i o of it t gi o t

giig pctic of to tim. rcod pig b o fot’,

d t littl ctlly codd, mt b dtoyd t

t of lig d clt tocd by t id fom Ctl ai.

After the rst millennium, great feats of engineering were accomplished by the

military engineers of our Muslim dynasties, the rst lot of whom had mostly

migtd fom wt ai. T 240-m-log jm-hi Cl cotctddig Foz s Tgl’ l, cotctio of empo ao’ Gd

T rod by s s si d s j’ cotctio of Dli Cl,

t rd Fot t Dli, d t T Ml t ag, t dig of ig-tcology

t pply cm t io fot d ‘Ml’ – fo xmpl, t o t

Md i imply billit – d mo ot o of gd giig

poct td ttimoy to t po of t Idi mility gi of

to dy. Dig t lt lf of t Mgl piod, o, eopgi cm to b mployd mo d mo il idigo giig

practices were gradually forgotten. This unfortunate loss of scientic temper

d ibility to p p it t tcologicl pog pp t t

c of o poblm of tody. It too ot to dd odd y fo

t Idi gi to mg oc gi, tid d t Biti ttlg

d o od t it m’ dtdy. It t city dig

the World Wars, followed by independence, which nally paved the way for

t mgc of tly comptt d idpdt commity of idigo

gi – bot mility d ciil. Tody, Idi gi pogd

to c xtt tt t tcologicl fodtio of t old’ ol

ppo i tid by my of tm.

e t, log y to go bfo o gi blz

t til of idpdt d idigo giig dig ic

ctomid to t Idi coditio d locl qimt. Tt old

b t tim t tio ill cqi it igtfl tt i t mod

old.



6


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GauTaM Banerjee

Military Engineering in the Contemporary Indian Army

a o pt old l, t i itimt coctio bt t tditio

of comptt giig d t tgt of tioood. It lo follo tt

d dcmt i mility giig i impti fo t pt tt

tod moditio of t Idi amy. ufottly, i t oltio of

t pot-idpdc Idi amy, pp i t bcdop of ixpic

i ttgic pcptio d ig dictio of , t Cop of egi

omo got coigd to pipl ol. excpt fo ot dtio

i t lt 1960 d 1970, t qtio bt mility giig

d combt po d com to b cogid d bttil tid i

combt giig md, t pctic of cooptig gi commd-di i tcticl dciio-mig igt fom t icptio tg i ldom,

if , llod to go byod t tiig pmplt. similly, t ytm of

organisational upgrading, resource allocation and scal provisioning seems to

have been conned to pro-rata distribution between the bigger arms rather

t big god by t coidtio of blcd foc-tctig. a

lt, t mantra for successful war-ghting in the contemporary era –

tt o lmt of combt i tid fom fll tcticl xploittio d toidqcy of ppot fom ot – do ot obti i o cotxt. Ti i

a serious deciency due to which the range of possibilities and options borne

out of the limitless capabilities and innite facets of military engineering

i ppot of optio ly lid i o amy. Coqtly,

mility iititi i o amy yt to i to t ll of billic

exemplied by the Napoleonic concept of campaigning astride strategic axes

and logistic exibility, the tradition of exploitation of waterways in the US

amy, t oigility of scliff’ ttgy of otmoig, o Gdi’

iq btog co t o-clld impbl ad fot.

T xcptio of t Bgld Cmpig i 1971 otittdig, o

military planners see the difculties of terrain and vagaries of the weather as

dibl idc t t oppotiti fo dtgo tcticl

mipltio by means of efcient combat engineering.

An unfortunate fallout of this self-inicted denial of military engineering

oppotiti i o amy, tt i, to b bl to miplt t ti

tod ccfl poctio of mility optio, i tt littl pog

b cid to di o o io of tcticl tology o docti.



7


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


Thus, connement of our military options into conformist and stereo-type

pl, doid of dcity, , mo o l, bcom igid bit,

d dpdc o tigtfod bt bloody ttitio to gi fobl

lt t y cot of lif d oc i bcomig comfotig ot

fo mot of o mility commd d tff. I t cotxt of t cgig

pdigm of mility pogio i t cotmpoy , c cocptl

midt old t ot to b dito. It i tim, tfo, tt t pp

ftity loo t it o ol i t cotxt of t ogoig roltio i

Mility affi (rMa) – tilod to idigo coditio – d ticlt

t lc of mility giig optio i tclig tcticl ittio

with more efciency. Efforts to enhance the Army’s combat power, after all,cot b coidd to b t ol bd of ‘glit’, lo.

a poit to clify i tt ti pp i dotd to t mod

pct of combt giig, t cocpt of pogio i t it t

cotmpoy d mi qlly pplicbl to ll m d ic; it i

ot i to ti of pomotig mility giig i ioltio.

But, rst, let us have a look at the emerging trends in the art and science

of ildig mility po ic old dictt t cop of cocpt dpctic of mility giig i t comig y.



8


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GauTaM Banerjee

Chapter 2: The Emerging Nature

of Warfare and the Global

Revolution in Military Affairs

I prefer to learn from the experience of others.

— Otto o Bim

Looking Yonder I t pcdig pt, tt ‘giig’ b t tl

pim mo of m ocity i bot d pc. w lo

o t pogio of mility giig , o t cti, opd

up new vistas in the elds of tactics and strategic opportunities. It is time now

to mo o to t xt tp, tt i, to t old b t cct

of ft f d o ti cct old coditio t cocpt of

giig ppot i t comig dcd.

Emergence of Modern Military Concepts

alog it ig pitio fo pog d city, t old tody i

xpicig ot cycl of pdigm cg i t politicl, coomic

d ttgic io. socil , coomic complio d t

dt of ig tcology of t cotmpoy cittd

f-cig gmt mog t io c of f,

which, in turn, would inuence the concepts and practices of planning

d xctio of mility optio i t ft. T, t t ttgic

levels, we see manifestation of localised conicts; involvement of non-state

militancy, regional conicts generated out of economic and environmental

comptitio, pplictio of diplomtic-militcy potig, coomic

m-titig, tcology dil d gdtd octtio of md

po, gig fom mll-it ittio t t lot d to cl

dtc t t top. T ttgic gol i t ft old b to poct

mility po to pt t t g , d to i it itot

mc f old t b ttlig fil. accodigly, ogitio of t



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mility tct, icldig po, qipmt d logitic, ic

dly dotild ito cl cpbility d itgtd tog xploittio

of ifomtio tcology i dy i mot mod ami. at t

optiol d tcticl ll, illc, dcptio, mobility, pciio

ggmt, imltity d ifomtio optio t copodig

fllot of c diptio.

In the context of the issue under discussion, the most signicant

cocptl cg, bogt bot by t mig of mility itllct it

t mgt p-tcology t old o, it pticl fc to

t pct of mility giig, my b dcibd follo.

Combat Power Redefined

The days of counting soldiers, tanks and guns to dene combat power is

pt. not oly t lmt cotittig t combt po poliftd

co id pctm, io foc lmt old cfot combi

differently under specic conditions to generate unique results. For example,

bttl gop itgtd it t qiit dg of giig ppot

o to b cpbl of moig co migly impbl ti oldproject combat power many times more than another which is conned to

t pdictbl co. a coolly, mility giig oc old

cotitt o of t impott foc-lmt tod cimt of

t mod io of combt pioity. eqippig, oitig d tiig

t md foc tim comig poc. Figtd tp tod

ogitio d moditio of t Cop of egi i cofomity

it it ftitic mdt, tfo, d to b iititd ll i tim, fo it

to b bl to td p to t mgig cllg.

Determination of Relative Strength

I imil i, t fcto of lti tgt old comp mc id

pctm to co t my’ tgt d lbiliti i-à-i tt of

o foc. T lt fcto old b i tm of t tt , t d

t til lmt of t foc, bid t qi-mility cpbiliti c

commictio, tpottio ytm d mility idty. Tfo, i

i of t fct tt t optiol gol old b dicttd by t cpbiliti

of mility forces, their equipment prole and logistic assets as available at the



10


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GauTaM Banerjee

tim d plc of ctio, t Cop of egi too tdio mdt

d fo moditio. It mt poid fotli giig ppot i

t Tcticl Bttl a (TBa), it mt lo ti d to b bl to ct

t cy logitic iftct iti gi timfm ic old

generate tactical and strategic exibility in the time of need. Roads, rail,

ty, i-d, tog fo mility d, t mgmt d

mtil dlig om xmpl of c iftct ic ti

modern war efforts, and enhanced capability in these elds would count

tod bildig p t mod io of lti tgt.

Combined Arms OperationsI t mgig cotxt, ‘combid m’ old imply optimm gopig

of ppotig lmt it t bttl gop, t t t pt

pctic of lloctig t miimm icpbl ppotig m lmt to

compo t i llod to p off ‘ll m-foc’. ud t pt

gmt, typicl bttl gop i t bot cpbl of ggig i

intense dog-ght, applying brute force to impose an adverse ratio of attrition

po t my – m git m d t git t. T, t mci i did t oppotiti to dt dcio mo – i

tm of t toy of idict ppoc – o to dci d pi t

enemy and, thus, ensure his eventual defeat even before the rst attrition is

inicted. Therefore, the modern force-structure would need to be ‘balanced’

to tt t ifty d t mo t btt ppotd it tt

degree of repower, mobility, counter-mobility, communication, aviation and

logitic oc, ic old p t y fo cimt of tcticl

and strategic goals with greater efciency and minimal loss. Adequacy of

cotmpoy giig oc i impti fo cimt of ti

coditio.

The Concept of Interoperability

In the emerging dispensation in the eld of military organisation, an element

of ‘itopbility’ i miftig itlf, it t poibility of t big

ccomplid by mb of ltt m. T, pic of god my b

did it by dploymt of toop, o by m of y olm of pciio

re, or by means of deterrent obstacles, or even by hazardous contamination.



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T fcto of itopbility old, t, dictt t toop-to-t, d

t blcd foc tct. Fomtio old to b gopd it

yig combitio of m, dicttd – bid t cotiol fcto

of ti, my, miio d tctic – by dditiol fcto, tt i, t

mtod of xctio to b doptd. Lg commitmt of combt gi

to bl pg of foc tog xpctd ti o lily dictio

– a foit co of t Gt Cpti – to ccflly tcl pticl

tcticl ittio i xmpl of ti cocpt. Ft, dymic dlopmt

of favourable operational situations by a eld force through a system of exible

po to b fodd po t lmt of ig mobility – ic i t

tditiol bd of combt gi.

The Nuances of Application of the Concept of ‘Simultaneity’

simlto ggmt of mb of clo of my foc i ttc

o dfc old iol itio i tm of optiol timig d

p to oid diiptio of ffot. a t dpt of ggmt pocd

dp ito t my titoy, t dity of itc old l

d t tgt cotd old t oft, il t g t icggmt t plc old xpd. a coolly, t ‘fictio of ti’

(to imply itc impod to fod momt) d t ‘tio of

logitic’ (to imply tdig pll xtd fom lc b) old m

lg popotio optio pog ito dp . Fildig i

foc to tcl t d ct of t my foc d t ligt d ft

lmt to mo d gg t dpt clo, il pcil foc

ld dp iid to ct oc t t lbl ct of gity,

old b t tdd mility pctic i t mod . T cocpt of

imltity, t, cll fo ig dg of mobility, bot i t god

d i, d ti i ot fct of combt giig ic d to b

ppcitd i mtt of tcticl ll logitic plig.

The Measure of the Predominant Arm

In the emerging dispensation in the eld of military operations, predominance

of m o ot old b dicttd by, bid t ti d

t my oppoitio, t mtod of xctio. Fi lt, pg of

ppotdly impbl ti, lctoic ttc d xploittio of cl



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GauTaM Banerjee

ti c i poit, t dg of pdomic my it

tmpoily ift to tilly, gi, igl o cl foc, o my

even remain indeterminate. The matter of predominance is further qualied

by t cocpt of ‘ymmtic po’. Ti cocpt cll fo pplictio of

c ‘tidot’ ic old xploit t my’ poit – i offc

ll i dfc. Fo xmpl, t tcticl ll, ti cocpt cold mift

i t fom of tig dtg of mo’ lbility to ligt ifty t

t by cotiolly foc, il t t optiol ll,

it cold b t xploittio of olmig lctoic pioity by

mod foc, d t t ttgic ll, it my b t impoitio of logitic

itdictio by t tog o co to gill f by t mog t di. T, t mod cocpt of pdomic of o

arm over the other will itself need to be redened in terms of the method

of xctio d t ymmty of po. I it c, li t ot

m, gi to b tctd ccodig to t optiol docti

adopted by the Army. The Viet-Cong strategy of inltrating whole engineer

bttlio ito sigo to dtt t amic mility tct d, t,

big bot ti igloio dofll i good xmpl of gi foc-tctig iti t oll mbit of amy’ ttgic docti.

Scope of Mobility

In the modern dispensation, the concept of mobility of the eld forces has

ldy bo f of it mooig o t god. ai mobility ll

mobility git t fictio of ti – m, t bodi, d, o

d bo god – tody i itiic to t amy’ optiol ll

logitic qimt, d ti fct d to b fomlly cogid. h

gi, gi to g p fo t ol of fcilitto of c mlti-

dimiol mobility by m of ig po cotctio cpbiliti.

Rapid Deployment and Graduated Response

no amy tody c miti itlf i tt of pptl di fo combt;

t cot too poibiti. T co doptd, tfo, by t

mot pofl tio, i to p o pt of t foc i di fo pid

dploymt o to tbili y tcticl ittio d p t y fo t

lg foc to pp d bild p. Optio , t, iititd t t



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appropriate time of own choosing while the time lag is lled up with politicking,

b ttlig d pycologicl f. Ogitio d cpbiliti of combt

ll t li of commictio gi of t ft, pt of t pid

dploymt d t mi foc, lo to ti t complx logitic ytm

of t mod , old b god by ti mgig td.

The Role of Information Warfare

This is a eld which is characterised by the vast extent of the role military

gi to ply i t codct of mod f. no mod

mility pl c b xctd d o mod po o mility d

can be effective without the benets of high grade digital mapping and theGo-sptil Ifomtio sytm (GIs). T ytm d t commitmt

of t bt ill i mility giig o log y to di, fct ot

mc lid iti t ftity.

Low Intensity Operations

A point to appreciate is that all the above listed elds of modernisation

lo pplicbl i fll m i t c of cot-igcy olo itity optio. T bic pmt of illc, itlligc,

communications, mobility, repower, etc. do not change after all, even if a

cti dg of itio i mpi i cy. T ibility to ctit

t impti my b t o tt ti fom of f

bcom mo o l t ol bd of t ifty d xci i

perpetuity. Better success rates can be achieved by exploiting the full benets

of focd itlligc, illc gid, obtcl cpbility d i mobility,

dly bcd p by ciic d politicl dlopmt. T gi ogitio

to b dptd to c of t tt ccodigly, to b bl to t

p it lgd ol i tclig lo itity .

hig, t, xmid t c of cotmpoy ll ftitic

concepts in the eld of war-ghting at the global level, we may now venture

to ly t t ft dmd of , t mility gi of t Idi

amy.



14


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

Chapter 3: A Mandate for the

Indian Sappers of 2020

What is necessary to be accomplished in the heat of action should

constantly be practised in peace.

— Roman General Flavius Vegitus

Military Engineering Opportunities in the Indian Context

wit immly di ti d limitl mility cllg boout of political and social conicts, the conditions in India provide for

bttil cop d oppotiti fo t mility gi to cotibt.

Bid xctio of ti-iti mg-poct fo tio-bildig,

ic i byod t cop of ti pp, t pp c ply y ccil

role in securing the desired end-state of conict termination with the least

xpdit to t tt o dmg to t popl. Ti i to b cid by

ltig t xtt d qlity of giig ppot to t Idi mdfoc.

I 1847, dig t Mxic Cmpig, t amic foc d

the command of General Wineld Scott, found themselves insufciently

equipped to capture Mexico City, which was protected rst by extensive

marshlands, and then a lava eld which was reputed to be impassable by man

o bt. Bid, t cpitl dfdd by Mxic amy t tim

lg. T gi, ld by Cpti L (lt Gl L of t Ciil w

fm), t dlopd ligmt tog t m d tft ct

a passage across the ‘impassable’ lava eld, in seven days at. Through this

ot, t amic mod i to ct off t Mxic, d ti tm o

t id. T dfd bo d i mit.

Lt xplo o ti my b o it .

Ingredients of Engineering Support to the Indian Army in the

Coming Era

I t cotxt of t Idi amy, t cocpt of gi ppot i i

sanctied by the role of the military engineer, which is worthy of a repeat, that



15


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


i, “to pply giig oldg, ill d oc to t ftc

of the commanders’ plan”. This all-encompassing denition takes military

giig – li t ll dlitd ol of ot m d ic

– beyond the bounds of routine connes, and involves undertaking of any

range of unspecied and unique variety of tasks to support a war effort. This

i fdmtl diffc bt t gi d t ot m d

impli tt y ffot , which is not specically covered within the roles

of ot m o ic, i to b t pp’ bd . a t Idi amy

g p fo it impdig ol i t himly moti, t pli, t

dt d ild titoi igd i t y 2020 d byod, t

coidtio old dictt t ft co of gi ogitio dcpbiliti.

a ll o, t til igdit of giig ppot iol

t to fcilitt o mobility, dil of mobility to my foc d to

enable own forces to survive the hostile environs of a battleeld. Activities

associated with these ingredients are: rstly, rendition of engineering advice

to c clo of commd; codly, fod plig, fom icptio

to t clmitig poit; d tidly, timly xctio of t p ticidc. w cid ot to pfctio, good giig ppot ld

to c mility dtg , t cmlti ffct of ic p t y

for achievement of operational and logistic exibility by a force of combined

m d ic, d, t, cotibt bttilly tod t ltimt

cc. Impott igdit of good giig ppot my t b

dcibd follo:

l Emergence of ‘Engineer Options’ to Tactical Problems: T tm,

‘egi Optio’ impli tt pt fom t io tcticl co

ilid by commd, t doo to dditiol d mo dtgo

co are opened to im by i gi di. I ffct, t gi

adviser applies engineering skill and knowledge to nd additional avenues of

ppoc o dictio of ttc i t c of offi ctio, o optiml

tilitio of ll mility oc il dtig dfi optio.

npolo’ xtictio of i amy fom t doomd ittio dig i

tt fom ri i Dcmb 1812 – i ic tppd bt

t ri ni d iftly dcig Coc amy – by cotctig

bidg o xpctd it, i xmpl of giig oltio to



16


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

tcticl poblm. Motgomy’ totlly xpctd fotl ttc follod

by massive mineeld breaching operations which paved the way for the

mo to b ot d ct t Gm dfc ito to dig t

Bttl of al almi i ot xmpl. T p of o giig

igity i fll idc dig t Bgld w too; tt p

m to bcom domt d to my o ic ll

xmi littl il lt.

l Achievement of Operational and Strategic Surprise and

Deception: spig o modifyig t ti to o dtg i

the method by which this mandate is fullled. Surprise is achieved by

doptig lily co of ctio ic i dd poibl by mof giig t ti o to fcilitt o id mobility, t c

my b, il dcptio i t fllot of ‘giig’ fl pcptio

po t my’ ldip. T Popl’ Libtio amy’ (PLa’)

p-ft tc cotctio fom Tg to s L d byod i 1962

and the Indian Army’s ooding of the Valtoha Gap on 8 September 1965

to cot t dc of Pit’ 4 d 5 amod Bigd i t

km scto om good xmpl of ti cocpt. Ptly,o, t itl ilbl to t Cop of egi i tm of

t moig, dmolitio d bidgig cpbility i--i t impti

of the modern battleeld are so outdated as to be matter of concern and

citicl i fo immdit dl.

l Ability to Articulate the Tempo of Operations to Upset the

Enemy’s Design of Battle: T mtod to ci ti i by big

o ccltig t momt of o ll t my’ bttl

fomtio i t it t optiol pl. I ot od, it impli

miplti cotol o mobility d cot-mobility it t lp

of i-bilt bility to gotit tog obtcl o itpo

obtcl. romml’ - mo, it t lp of mi f

d dmolitio dig t not afic Cmpig i 1941-42, i ttc

ll itdl, pcilly t ltt, poid my xmpl of

pplictio of combt giig mtod to cotol t tmpo of bttl

to dtg. T ogitiol tct of o combt gi it,

i tm of bot mpo d qipmt, d to b bld fo c

capabilities in tune with the battleelds of the modern era.



17


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


l Capability of Sustaining Forces in the Battleeld for Periods

Longer than Anticipated by the Enemy: I mot t Idi

amy i obligd to opt, tibility of tog foc-cpbiliti old

b t dcidig fcto tod ccfl tcticl otcom. Coctig

fod pot to t b by m of tc, lipd, i-ldig god

or ropeways, erecting shelters and eld fortications for the troops to live

in, and ght the rough hostile weather or enemy re, and overcoming lack

of t om of t giig cllg to ci ti d. T

Idi amy’ cltd dploymt i Ld i 1986 to fotll Ci

dtim d it pmpti occptio of t sic Glci om

xmpl of ibility dicttig t tcticl otcom. O t ot d,t mot pomit c of t Biti midt i Cim i t

1850 – bid bd glip – cllo idiffc of t Gl

stff tod ctio of dqt fciliti fo t toop to li i, d

ght. Even as we have easy access to the requisite engineering skills, stores

d idigo qipmt to mt ti d, t i d to b f

of our xed ties to the system of ground-based transportation and proceed

to explore the air dimension for efcient execution of engineering tasks inppot of combt toop. I ot od, t i tpottio ytm

d to b pomotd to gi pi d miti optiol ll

logitic pp d. Ctio of xti i tpottio to,

bid t cotiol tibility t i b ll mot

old, t, b ddd poibility po t pp i t comig

y.

l Pivotal Role of Military Mapping and Geo-Spatial Information

System: a igligtd li, ig gd digitl io of mility-

specic terrain mapping and development of an all pervasive Geo-Spatial

Ifomtio sytm (GIs) dly ctomid fo mility , t bic

qimt of ffcti optiol plig d xctio of mility

t i t cotmpoy . Mo ccilly, o mod po o

qipmt c b optd to it fll pottil, icldig t cop fo

pciio tgtig, l t fdmtl dtb i digitl fom

itgtd ito t po o qipmt optig ytm. T gim

of Ifomtio wf (Iw), tfo, mi compltly bit to

t ilbility of g of cct digitl mility mp d dtb. Ti



18


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

i ddd poibility po o mility gi. Oly ti m t

qiit tiig d co comptc – dicio mix of tcticl cm

and technological expertise – to nd pragmatic methods of adjustments

bt t tcticl commd’ dm d t tcologicl poibiliti.

egi, tfo, t bt itd to bild p, it d cccy

and regular updating, the military-specic cartographic databank through

optiml xploittio of blig tcologi. e tog, tditiolly,

the Indian engineers have been pioneers in the eld of military mapping and

c bot of xpti ic i ibl by t tdd of t mot

dcd ami, t Idi amy i yt to idict dg of lcity i

xploitig ti pottil to co t idig gp bt t modpo d qipmt it to cqi – umd ail vicl

(UAV), electronic warfare and signal intelligence gadgetry, re control

ytm fo tt-of-t-t g d t, pciio mitio, d,

miil gidc, tc. to m oly f – d t digitl ctogpic

dtbig to opt t ffctily. It old t y to bild p ti

fdmtl ipt fo t g of ctiiti ic clbbd d t

mbll of Iw ytm; it too t us amy 15 y to gt ti bicGIs goig. I t mtim, my pdo d lf-ifomd mility ll

as civilian agencies are trying their hand at this military engineer-specic

xpti, it lf-dpdtig lt. T bc of y gcy o

by mility icy, dctd ty b tog t ‘ o-

cic’ tm i o cdmi, to dd ti pct d to b lodly

ticltd by t Cop of egi. el, it ill b too lt d too cotly

to big bot t moditio i t Idi amy.

Features of Successful Engineering Support in the Indian Army

egi odid to lt t ti to it t codct of o mility

optio, mdt dd xtmly complx d to t idly

varied conguration of the Indian landmass. Thus, even as the basic features

of giig ppot mi t fo ll typ of ti, t cotxtl

cctitic of god d t, t ffct t optiol pl,

dictt t dg of mpi to b lid o io pct d mtod of

xctio of mility giig t. T mi ft of t qiit

dg of giig ppot i ti cotxt mtd blo:



19


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


l Engineer Intelligence: Mod m of itlligc-gtig pmit

to ocom t limittio of t pt. Moo, ic optiol

d logitic iftct ic of itt to t mility gi

t y to bild p, cotio igil o t of itt old

pay good dividends. There is, therefore, no justication for not having

compi d cct giig ifomtio o of o

coc, o to b bl to coctly pdict t my’ offi

ll dfi cpbiliti. Ti, o, i pptly o of o

t li i giig plig tody, ic d to b ddd

by icopotig ddictd giig tff i t ytm of cqiitio

of mility itlligc. a gi cci i t Mility Itlligct-p dimiid o t y, mo d mo ig odig

politico-mility dico by t ‘glit’ big cd ot i

t m of itlligc ipt, of ic littl i of lc it to t

eld commander to help him conceive tactical options, or to enable the

gi commd to d migfl dic to im. Bid, t

i tog c fo pgdig t itlligc ctio i gi it

to t cotmpoy ll of tcology, icldig l-tim coctiityto t itlligc d illc to i t cto o tt of

optio. Ti i pp o pct o ic t Cop of egi

tml yt to b dqtly itid.

l Engineering Advice: T dictm of dotilig giig dic ito

t cmpig pl fom t y icptio i mo ccil i t

cotmpoy cio. Ti i o bc t qtio mog ti,

availability of axes for progressing operations, battleeld transparency,

ffct of pciio tgtig d t tim-iti of combt

giig t mo big o mobility, cot-mobility d

survivability of forces during the conduct of operations. As exemplied

o mo occio i t pt, icldig t Itli d not afic

Cmpig of wold w II, t Ci ggio of 1962 d

t ct Glf w, igtd optiol tmpo itpd it

cflly cotolld tcticl p d pig of t cmpig old

b obligtoy fo y foc to ci t did d tt ply o

ccot of mility giig coidtio lo. sic optiol

c cot b llod to ottip t pog of tc cotctio,



20


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

t pply, fod pply of fl, tc, itio i tmpo d pig

to b pld i ltio to t icidc of giig t. T

itio to b dotild ito t tcticl ll t oll

ttgic pl o tt t iititi i ot lot il t logitic clo

ctc p. Ti id of tcticl pctic mply dmottd by t

Ci i 1962 d t amic i Iq i 2003. Mo cocd d

flly occpid it t dy-to-dy d ttic, ttitio di optio

t t it o fomtio ll, t mility icy i Idi tody

m to bcom obliio of t dtg of good giig

dic. Ti ditio d to b mod if t to b mod

mility foc.l Organisation of Engineer Force: Mility cmpig ldom

tid by tdig combt gi ogitio; dploymt of

qi-mility o dftd ciili oc ly b mtt

of l. I o cotxt, t BrO, Mes, PwD d oc of t pblic

ll t pit cto dtig ill to b icopotd

to ply bttil ol i t tc of mility optio i t

fod optiol b ll i t commictio zo.Dpdc o ciil lbo old lo b cy, d it ttdt

logitic implictio mt b ctd fo. T, old mg t

optimm combt giig foc-tct digd to tcl clo

ll gl ppot giig t i t bttl zo. at t m

tim, t qi-mility giig gci old to b dftd

ito t ttgic pl to dt t - giig t,

tog ioctio of t poiio of t uio w Boo. Ti id

b i cottio t t px ll fo om tim, lbit ifomlly.

l Modernisation of Engineering Equipment: O dc to

dfi ttgy i t pt d cotid dploymt i lo itity

optiol iomt ttd t dlopmt of combt

giig qipmt, pcilly tt of iti ic digd

to pfom i t Idi bcotitl ti. T t-moig

plt, bltig tool, cotctio plt, pmpig t, tc it

too cmbom o tig i otpt cpcity to it mod bttl

conditions. Therefore, on the one hand, execution of eld engineering

o d to b dd qipmt – t t pol –



21


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


intensive to achieve higher efciency without accretion i mpo,

il, o t ot, t g d xtt of giig o

to b pgdd i t it t dmd of mod o -li

optio. I ot od, mo ffcti combt gi ppot i

t t amy of tomoo of . Fo xmpl, tc cotctio

task forces would have to be based on eld platoons duly integrated

it lg complmt of t moig d cotctio plt d

equipment rather than deploying the entire eld companies with just one

doz o to d i c m tt t oll otpt d pd

of cotctio i icd. similly, t t pply tm mt b

dd cpbl of mtig t ig qimt of t pt-dy amy iti t ccptbl timfm, t t t cotiig

it t oflly otdtd gmt of tbliig t o-clld

‘bigd t poit’. aot pct of qipmt mgmt til

o cogitio of t fct tt difft id of ti qi difft

dig of giig qipmt. Fo xmpl, it i impcticl to xpct

t mi bcig tl to pfom i ll id of ti; it i impti

to hold a mix of trawls, ails and explosive hoses to be able to breachmi d ll coditio. T dpttio of t ltt qipmt to

perform in the environs of the modern battleeld, therefore, calls for

gt di tod pgdig t combt giig cpbiliti i

t Idi amy, ti big pqiit to t amy’ di tod

oll moditio d impti tod coctd ppoc

to solve the emerging challenges of the battleeld. A point to note is

tt mot of t commitmt tod c moditio di cibl idigoly d t y mll cot, i compio it t

ot m.

l Time Required for Execution of Engineering Tasks: exctio

tim , f t mility gi i cocd , i t cmlti

dtio of to-idctio, dploymt, cotctio o dtctio d

maintenance. Depending upon the conguration of terrain, secondary

coidtio c ilbility of x, loctio of tf poit,

ilbility of tpot, lbo d qipmt fo lod dlig, t

d tmpt, tc mift i t fom of dditiol fcto to ft

ffct t tim pl fo xctio i bttil m. Mticlo



22


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

d litic pl to icld tim fo plig, bild-p of to d

t foc d xctio d -li coditio, it i-bilt

cio t c li, tfo, old b mdtoy poibility

to tt t pog of optio, logitic bild-p d xctio

of giig t mtlly comptibl. T tmpo of optio

big dpdt po logitic ppot, old, t, lt to t

incidence of execution of engineering tasks and the nal outcome of the

optio old b coditiod ccodig to c tim-pl. Of lt,

ttitd of xpdicy pp to mgd mog t combt

gi i impcticl xctio timig big qotd it

enthusiasm and the well conceived planning gures questioned withoutd coidtio of t fcto dicd bo o pcticl dpttio to

war-like situations. Claims of impractical levels of efciency in execution

of giig t dcd, t, t combt giig

oc mi it ot o obolct. It i tim tod o

mility giig pgmtim.

l Mobility of Engineering Resources: Mobility of t egi T

Foc i yoymo it t logitic mobility of t ti foc. w ldy tt t logitic of foc-dploymt old b t

y fcto i ticltig t mility pot i t comig y.

a t Idi amy gdt fom mly big cti foc to

pocti iitito of politico-mility m to pomot tiol

itt iti d otid t gio – idiidlly o pt

i mltitiol iititi – it i tim to ti of t itiic mobility

of t egi T Foc. Tody, t poid of tcticl d

ttgic mobility i itlf l mobil compd to t ppotd

m, imply bc t foc i it o o ld foti o t

f ilomt i dpt co t bttl li. I t comig y,

this xation would have to change; successful battles would have to

b fogt o lg dpt d fotg d co c ti

ic my g fom moti to c d dt to ild.

To c d t ti foc co c complx ldm

old citt clig of ig mobility icl to t giig

it, dly pplmtd it i mobil tpottio – d i

om cto, i-cio icl – o to tt t



23


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


igly mobil mility optio of t comig ccodd t

copodig dg of giig ppot.

Fom t fogo lyi, it i cl tt ti mi t mot

impott obct of mility giig, il cmt o cotimt

of t fictio of ti to o dtg i t pimy ol of ti m.

It old, tfo, b ppopit to dl ito t c of ‘ti

giig’.



24


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GauTaM Banerjee

Chapter 4: Tactical Nuances of

Terrain Engineering

God made terrain and permitted only the engineers to alter it.

Dictates of the Terrain in Appreciation of Combat Engineering

Support

w dicd i pig t id t of ti tt t mility

gi to cotd it i i mdt to ‘docto’ t i tit t qimt of codctig ccfl mility optio.

ho, compi ltio of t dictt of ti, i o f

t commitmt of t gi cocd, mi oly mgilly

xplod mogt d to t o ldy igligtd. Tody, t

pim foc i o mio tctic d it ll ctio. I t Idi amy,

ti ittio i ldy o t md fo t btt, d, tfo, t -

dicoy of t pp’ t fom obcity old b cy to tclft cllg.

T i of ti impti i t cotxt of mod f i

t d old qi lg fo fo dicio. ho, it old b

otil to igligt cti co i i od to mpl od-

mp ic cold b t bi fo tig p dtild optiol d ti

specic analyses. The best method of identifying the imperatives of terrain

it ffct t mility gi, i to cy ot ‘c tdy’ to i t

‘mpl ddctio’ t pply to pticl ti, ic my t t

t t fo ll t ot id of ti itio. Tod ti d, lt

dic t moti tt gi dtid to opt i. Ot

typ of ti – pli, dt, ii, gl d ild – cold lo b

bct to ctiy i imil tmplt.

Terrain Sampling: Case Study for the Mountains

Even within the classication of mountains, we have the mid-altitude,

ig-ltitd d glcitd gio; t ig-ltitd gio ft

difftitd ito nott kmi, et Ld, d Ctl d



25


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


nott scto. ec of t iq cctitic, d,

tfo, qi ctomid giig ppot. Fo xmpl:

l T codci to m ibittio, t t d climt

big iti t limit of m tolc. T glly ll popltd

d t to of od d tc i copodigly ll dlopd.

Mility optio i t ill to b dlopd tid t

valleys, with dominating features on anks and shoulders targeted as the

tcticl obcti fo ttc o dfc, il commictio ct d

toip t t b of coomic ctiity my b t t tmil

obcti. spd of dc, dlopmt of ltt d

ttimt of pi tog xpctd xctio timig old b tmi obct of giig ppot i t .

l T t to ic cctid by ply popltd,

mm cltitd d olly g i lly ittd t ltitd

bt 2,500 to 3,000 m d odd by dl xtt of ggd

p 4,000-5,000 m ig, ic b d o-cld fo good

pt of t y. no, dp lly d ggd idg li td to

dgd t pottil of tilly d i ppot, d t poc of ttc o dfc old b xtmly lo, xtig d cotly i tm of

clti. O t ot d, occptio of ft i t dpt to ct

off t my fom i logitic lif-li cold idc im to bdo i

poitio o d. Poiio of logitic iftct fo t

toop xctig c mo i dfc o ttc old b t

mi giig cllg i ti id of ti.

l I 1984, t Ido-P cofottio pilld o to t ot of Poit

nj 9842, t, ldig iq fom of f. T sic Glci

i combitio of y ig-ltitd, xtm cold d dp o –

ti ic d b coidd fo ggmt i f.

ntiol coc d oig pid, o, citt tcticl

occptio of ti glci d, coqtly, pmtly cofottiol

ittio pil. Dploymt ll codct of dfi d offi

optio i c coditio o t y, old ito bc

of mility t d cic. Dploymt o t actl God Poitio Li

(aGPL) i i t fom of lg mb of fod pot, t goig

fcto big t cop fo tcticl domitio d logitic cpbility to



26


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

ti t toop tgt. Optio i ti old biclly iol

tlty ppoc of mll bodi of igly cclimtid toop to dtoy

lctd my pot i clo qt bttl, follod by occptio of

t o to lt t aGPL i o fo. It i tll od, qiig t

xtm i tm of m ffot ll logitic tc, t ltt

big ply dicttd by t mility giig cpbiliti.

Characteristics and Effects of Terrain

Tig tp ft, lt o t cctitic of t motio

gio old dictt t c of giig ppot i t comig

y; t cctitic of ot typ of ti cold lo b ticltdlog imil li.

Altitude, Climate and Weather

T ttibt dictt t logitic of toop dploymt d xctio

time of eld engineering tasks in support of tactical operations. Inter alia,

t ttibt old dictt t pc d tmpo of optio.

Surface Communications

T mot ccil giig t i ti cotxt old b t dlopmt

d cotctio of ll t od tid t lly d fi t

tc p to t domitig ft. Mitc of ily d x,

cotctio of dditiol by-p loop, pig plc, ltt ot,

bidg, d y dty t o to pp dploymt , lod

tf poit d coy god old m ig pioity i od to

ti optio.

Air Communications

T limittio of fc commictio, o t o d, d t d

fo imltity i optio, o t ot, m it impti to xploit

i-dimiol cpbiliti i ft . T old b i t fom of

i-dop, i-ldig o libo optio, d old iol cotctio

of lg mb of doppig zo, ldig god, lipd, d fll-

edged ‘air-heads’ at the terminals of ‘air-bridges’ for conduct of sustained

optio ll co t bttl li.



27


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


Obstacles

T ffct mility optio i io y, follo.

Tactical OperationsFast owing mountain streams, deep ravines and steep slopes would have

to be exploited in defence or attack to achieve surprise. Similarly, articial

obtcl lid i coctio it tl o old it to b ctd

o gotitd, t c my b, by ddictd gopig of gi

do to t b-it ll.

Tactical MovementArticial obstacles in axial form would be devised in the form of road

dil by m of ctig, dmolitio of bidg d tiggig of ld

lid. Mi old dy cc to bottlc, coig plc, bidg

it d lily dploymt . Ddictd giig ffot i tm

of mpo d qipmt old, tfo, d to b dployd i

clo ppot to tt t bttl pl, dfi o offi,

tid.

Anti-Landing Obstacles

Suitable landing areas being limited and well dened, obstacles to prevent air

o li-ldig of foc d i pply old bcom lt. Coly,

intended sites of airelds and helipads would have to be cleared before these

c b ctitd fo .

Defence Works and Field Fortifications

The mountainous terrain affords additional strength to eld defences due

to the combined effects of robust construction, deladed protection, and

limitations on approaches and reduced effects of artillery re. In attack,

tfo, dtctio of dfc old qi dploymt of lt

teams as well as employment of suitable direct ring weapons, such as tandem

d miil d ai Dfc (aD) po i t god ol. wil

gi old b qid to b gopd it lt clo fo t

rst requirement, construction of temporary tracks or helipads would have

to b otd to i t ltt c. I dfc, near-real time cotctio



28


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

of modern eld defences in tune with the tempo of operations and denial of

ppoc to tm old b mo giig t. B coitig

of mmitio dmp d ot ic ic itd tid od

d tc old b oft tgt fo tilly d i bombdmt. Ti

fct ill dictt pptio of cd dploymt fo t follo-p

clo d cotctio of potcti o fo logitic itlltio.

Local Resources

ailbility o oti of t locl oc old to b imiltd

into modern eld engineering designs so to exert higher inuence upon siting

d cotctio of dfi o d logitic itlltio of t mod .wt pply tm old to gdt byod t obolct cocpt of

t ‘bigd t poit’ d lo-tcology pmpig t to mod mltipl-

tg t pply cm to ppot toop o t ig c, d,

thus, provide tactical exibility to the force commander. Similarly, the scope of

electricity supply in the eld would need to modernised either through higher

cpti gtio o xctio of dy-to-itll mico poct.

Camouflage, Concealment and Deception

Battleeld transparency and precision targeting of modern wars, on the one

d, d t d to potct ig cot mility d fom iiltio,

o t ot, cd t impotc of t m. Mod

technology provides for ample opportunities in these elds by way of

suppressing or misleading the target signatures and, thus, inuences the

otcom i mot fobl m. T Cop of egi mt tp

t mgig oppotiti bfo mi t b; it old b complx

mdt i y c: gi t limitd ppcitio of t dtg d t

additional scal commitment that the military leadership has to contend with,

ti old b oly ot-tm bd.

C3I: T ti dictt t cop of xploittio of illc,

lctoic f, commictio d tgt cqiitio dic. effct of

screening due to ground conguration and foliage will be more pronounced on

t ttc o ill b obligd to tbli tmpoy ‘Commd, Cotol,

Commictio, Ifomtio (C3I) nod’ d lp-fog t i tp it

t pog of optio. T ttc’ poblm c b ocom to



29


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


coidbl xtt tog coct itig of t od, fo ic it

pptio d tc cotctio my b cy. I dfc, c od

would be good demolition targets while electronically deladed positions

would have to be devised through a combination of construction, camouage

and articial screens. Ti i cocpt ic d to b dlopd by

t mility gi to cop it t mgig qimt.

Time Factor

Ti impo tim plti o giig o i tm of

momt tim, tf of lod d dmpig of to t it. Tdio

li of commictio fo t pply of giig to i o cotxtcitt mticlo plig d tict dc to tim cdl.

Timig dig iclmt t my yt go compltly off t m,

ldig to t dibl ittio of lt clo big ptd

fom ppotig lmt. Tlcopig io timig d ggmt i

imlto ctiiti to oid c ptio my to b otd

to. Fo xmpl, tc cotctio do ot d to it compltio of

pticl p of t optio, d mlti-poit cotctio my tob doptd tog i idctio.

Campaigning Season

T cocpt of codctig optio t ll tim of t y d t

t coditio it t lp of mod it fo il old to

b togt of i od to ci pi. Coqtly, bttl fomtio

old to b committd fo log piod d mi o dployd

ft t obcti b cd. Fild giig o mt,

tfo, ct fo t cpbility to ti toop o log cmpigig

piod. Coditio ic coidd to b ‘ibitbl’ tofo,

old to b dd omt ‘opitbl’ by m of mod

m of mility giig. sic i xmpl.

Low Intensity Operations: It ill b i clo ctiy tt it

d dpttio fo t pcliiti of ti fom of f, t fdmtl

cocpt d pctic dicd bo mi t i t c of lo

itity d id-to-ciil toity, it i fo cotiol – o

ncl, Biologicl, Cmicl (nBC) – f i t cotmpoy .



30


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GauTaM Banerjee

Aspects of Terrain Engineering in the Coming Era

T fogoig dicio o ti optiol itfc i t

‘motio tmplt’ ld to t folloig ifc ltd to

plig d xctio of giig t i ft optio :

l effcti giig ppot fo codct of mility optio old

b poibl most times of the year . Cpbility to poid ll t logitic

bc-p, icldig tog fciliti, pcil clotig, dcd mdicl

fciliti, libl fc d i commictio, dig lt,

ocig fo t, tc old m t igt impotc.

l a qtm ic i t cotctio of ml tc d cl 3, 5, d

9 fi t tracks will be the most important commitment fo t pp,to b dt o t l of t ltig clo. a bttil

to of cilly tc-o old lo b qid fo tmpoy

siting of direct and indirect ring support weapons, surveillance and

tgt cqiitio dic, lctoic f ct, d commd d

commictio od, d t bqt lp-foggig of t i t

it t pog of optio.

l

Speedy development of axes old iol xtdig t od-d dctio of t ocitd to of byp, ltt ot, tf

poit, cooy , tc by t gi. sbqtly, t cl 9 x

would have to be improved to all weather specications. Except in certain

, t old b o locl oc to dpd po. T t

old, tfo, b tim-citicl fom t logitic gl.

l Construction of air-heads i t fom of dcd ldig god d

lg mb of lipd old b pioity t fo t gi

to lp t foc ti t momtm of simultaneous deep strike

operations.

l Lighter engineer elements ill to gopd it io bttl gop

to ensure efcient conduct of obstacle warfare – mine elds, anti-heli-

landing devices, exploitation of natural streams and areas of difcult going,

to name a few – as well as creation or destruction of eld fortications.

similly, follo-p clo mt b gopd it heavier engineering

resources to tcl t ocitd it dlopmt o dil of x

c bidg, od, tc d dploymt iti t ccptbl

tcticl timfm.



31


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


l The scope for camouage and concealment from the air or from vantage

points would vary according to the terrain. Apart from what is deladed

due to the conguration of broken ground, judicious siting, use of multi-

texture camouage qipmt d cotctio of potcti c

old b cy to ct fo t cd ffct of t dy’

precision re.

l hig cl of to o dploymt , g d

dmiitti fo mod amy old b cy to

tt foc blcd i dipoitio. Siting and construction of defence

works c potctd po mplcmt, mmitio poit,

eld hospitals and execution of survivability tasks for living, water supplyd po bc-p, to ct fo log cmpig piod, old iol

mploymt of dditiol giig toop, tt-of-t-t lt

ll y cotctio plt d mciy i t tid clo.

l Potbl d ig cpcity t pply equipment to ct fo gity

fd ll pmpd t poit ill b qid to ppot io

echelons of the force which would be deployed at difcult and isolated

loctio i dfc o ttc.l T giig ppot pl mt lo ct fo t tedious lines of pply

of to d lo t of xctio of t o ccot of dcd

efciency in man and machine. It should also cater for long periods of the

cmpig.

hig, t, xmid t io pct of t mility giig

itfc i ltio to t codct of optio i tmplt of motio

ti, c imilly if t qimt ic my cofot t

mility gi i t ft i io ot id of ti. It i tim,

tfo, to mo o to t cocldig pt of ti dicio, tt i, to

xmi to t old b t pmt fo ogiig gi

foc tt old ot oly poid ffcti ppot to t Idi amy of t

ft, bt lo ply piotl ol i opig p it fo dlopmt

of idigo tcticl, ttgic d logitic cocpt d pctic.



32


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

Chapter 5: Organisation

for Effective Combat

Engineering Support

Organisations created to fght the last war better

are not going to win the next.

— Gl jm M Gi

Genesis of Revolution in Combat Engineering

ami tody mitid to pt t t g , d old

till b iitbl, to i it it lt pi d ffig. T, t

cocpt of ‘Peace Dividend’ – tt i, t fllot of big militily ppd.

I t pcdig pt of t pp, o t mility icy

i idpdt Idi b dfi i otloo – lgcy of ni

idlim – d complily committd to t ‘ttitio toy’, ttitd odobt impod po d to limitd cc to mility tcology, politicl

restraints and scal connes. We had let the world know that we were

ppy t gdig o bod d tt o o d f o tibtio.

Our Army too, therefore, reected a similar outlook – in organisation as

ll i cocpt – d d to tcticl dtg i micl tm

oly ft mtt d ly go ot of d. Obioly, t Idi Cop

of Engineers was but a reection of the Army it is meant to support. And

o o igbo d t fo gtd; o of tm d b

mboldd og to igo o mility pioity d impo poxy

po it immity.

a Idi b ito t globl big lg, ll ti old to cg;

ktily’ d Mcilli’ cocpt old b dicod by it polity.

a t midt of cotig t mb of pol, t d g i

ocom, t mility pl old popgt tt iti t cilig

limit of t tibl mb of t, g d ot i-tc mility

d – ic cot-iti d impot-dpdt, d, c,

coditiol – id optio of tcticl, optiol d ttgic m



33


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


poibl, if t tgt of o idigo giig llod

to bloom. wit igly comptt d lg b fo cotctio

giig mtil, giig plt, qipmt, giig ill, t

lbo foc d pottil fo logitic itl dy to b tppd, it

old b pfbl to dploy d dploy c foc-lmt fom o

bttl to ot i qic ccio o to mo t oppot

ito opl ittio d, t, ci t ttgic im t lo cot i

terms of death, destruction or scal burden. To illustrate, we can sustain only

xed numbers of tanks, guns or even infantry units within our technological,

industrial and scal capacity, and so derive only a specied level of tactical

pyoff. sold it b poibl fo t amy to xploit t bdc of oit cpbiliti i fc, o i tpottio d idigo bitt

giig idty d ‘gi’ dual-use logistic infrastructure t io

optiol , t m foc ll c b bilt p xpctdly, mod

co ‘ímpbl’ ti, tid t ibitbl loctio, dployd d

dployd i tibly qic tim, d poid to ti it t t

my mot – ptdly d i qic ccio. I ot od, lbot

logitic iftct d li of commictio ctd by mig of t dy idigo giig cpbility i pc-tim d by pgdig

t cop of combt giig ppot dig optio old by itlf

mg ot foc mltipli. aot pct of foc mltiplictio

tog ‘giig’ i by m of bildig p ffcti cpbiliti i tm

of camouage, coclmt d dcptio ; y l body of toop d

pic of l qipmt potctd o flly poctd to cot pciio

ti old dd to t foc ll. a dditiol igligt of c pctic itt it old pomot ti idty d ifoc t locl coomy. Ti

i lo t clicl cocpt of xploitig o’ idigo tgt to po

a situation of asymmetry upon the adversary, thereby, forcing him to ght

o o tm. Ti i t t pocti ami ttmptd to ci

tog t g – t Cpti, G, Fc, Gm, amic,

vitm, t l – d o do t mod ami pl to ci

cy, it t mility gi plyig ppopitly xpi ol

i pc d . O c oly imgi t coc dy old

dlop o tt t pofl bttl-gop of t Idi amy

c b bilt p i qic tim t y loctio of tcticl coic, mi ll



34


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

potctd git cot-ctio, dpict fl bild-p l, xci

tcticl mobility d cot-mobility of ig od iti t bttl

and be sustained in that manner across even very difcult terrain for long

piod.

T Idi amy’ Cop of egi mt, tfo, ot oly pp

fo xtdd mdt i t ft, bt to b t to t pofio, it

mt lo m t mtl of ctlyt, o motito d fcilitto,

i bigig bot t d cg tod cocptl moditio of t

amy i it o y, t t ot m d ic too old. T

dtg of xploitig giig oltio to mility poblm d to

b ticltd by togt d pctic – t t jC-Co-typ potig of “gi t” old ot do ymo.

Pogio d moditio of t Idi amy qi c m o

ic to do ti bit commt to ti ol i t oll cm. Lt

t to t old b o dtitio m of t mod

Idi amy. T ppo i ot to lit ot t old – tt

c b od ot ll if t dtitio i o – bt to idtify ic

dictio old d fo.

The Fundamental Concept

The most important condition for war-ghting in the contemporary era –

that no element of combat is tid d to lc of ppot fom ot

– d d loo i o cotxt. T ogitiol tct tt i

required to enable preparation of the battleeld and application of force in

t coct m d to b t ot of, i od tt t fo pill

of mod f – iz illc, commictio, mobility d logitic

(note that two of these four are engineer-specic) – are adequate to sustain

optimum deployment of our entire ghting force. There is no use having

p ‘tt’ if t ‘’ i d t ‘til’ i too ot to blc t body

poid i ctio. ul t foc tct i ‘blcd i compoitio’,

t ‘tt’ lmt of amy – ifty d mcid foc – old

ff y lg ‘unusability factor’ , i t fll igt of t ‘bit’

cot b bogt to b d to idqt tgt of t ‘’ – t

ppotig m. similly, l t ‘til’ lmt – t logitic cpbility – i

dqtly bilt p, it i ‘blc i dipoitio’ cibl, o c t



35


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


momtm of optio b tid i od to optimlly mploy ll t

deployable ghting echelons as well as the controlling headquarters. As a

coolly, t commd old littl optio of mo d old

o coic bt to b po bt foc to dft t my tog

attrition alone, sacricing infantrymen and tanks to ‘ buy’ pyrrhic victory –

o ic cold t ot to b cotly dft. I fct, i t pt

cotxt, y lo old ot b ccptbl to t tio. a t d

old ppcit, t to b mo cot-ffcti m of bildig

p amy. T moditio old, tfo, lo imply blcig p

the support and logistic capabilities – re support, engineering capability,

Commd, Cotol, Commictio, Compt, Ifomtio, Itlligc(C4I2), tpot it, b fciliti, d o o – iti t oll tct

of t modid amy.

T cod mot impott coidtio i ogitiol tctig

i t d fo gdtio to ig xpti. a t tdd of m

understanding expand and expertise ows downwards, organisations must

dicd t oti d t md, d gdt to ig ll of ill

d complxity of pfomc. If ti i ot d, ogitio oldb doomd to obliio. Fo xmpl, o t y, t tt of xpti

qid fo t pt pctic of mi lyig, bidgig, cotctio

of tc d m-ift lt, optio of gto d pmp fo

rudimentary electrication and water supply – most of the traditional eld

giig t, i fct – o log xcli to t gi lo;

just as with a better level of training and awareness, patrolling, driving, eld

commictio o bic mdictio d t optio o logt xcli p of t tditiol mot m d ic. T toy

of pogio of lty ogitio, tfo, idict tt t mt

b gdl ift to ig ll of xpti, d, t t m tim, opig

up of new vistas for expansion and diversication. The signalmen and the

g li to ti d, o i t BrO d, to om xtt, t Mes.

A similar thrust must be made and pursued vigourously in the eld of combat

giig too. Fo xmpl, t cop old b tiig of tctig

t t dibdig t iq fcility of t egi sto Dpot d

nd new roles for this strategic asset. In the coming years, if the corps keeps

o t igt tc of moditio, mgmt of lg g d olm



36


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

of theatre specic stores and equipment of engineering, operational works,

d impot d td oigi old po io cllg. T bd of

mgig d mitiig t old b byod t ol d pioiti of

t Cop of eMe o t Odc, d t egi sto Dpot

old com i to ply itl ol. T dg of c commitmt old

mltiply Idi gdt to t giol po-qtio d t o

to t globl d t bcdop of mgig politico-ttgic

diptio, i lg it ply di t amic, t Ci,

t un, t eop uio, to m oly f.

Ttig t gim d ic t Cop of egi i t Idi

amy i to fctio, it old b ld tt t omio ig icidict lod ig. To of t fo mod pill of mod f

– mobility d logitic – big gi-ctic, t i littl optio bt

to modi t mility giig ogitio. It i, tfo,

impti fo t cop to ticlt t mgig pict, d fo t

Gl stff to cogi t itig o t ll. O t ot d, t

full burden of nding the means to seek modernisation, and progression

to ig xpti i combt giig t po gi; it i ‘in-house’ issue. As most eld engineering tasks of dated technology and

limitd cop t o by t ppotd m, gdtio to ig

ll of mility giig ill bcom tl coolly fo t

cop, if to ti o tt iti t amy ll i tio-

bildig. By implictio, ti coditio dictt tt qip ol

with more efcient means of executing traditional as well as newly acquired

giig t, b it mi lyig, bidgig, tc cotctio, lcticityand water supply, habitat and survivability tasks, camouage and deception

o digitl mppig of t qid cccy d ctio of ti

dtb of t cy g d dpt. at t tiol ll, t cop

to m t ol of poid of digitl ti dtb, gcy

fo cooditig ttgic poct i t p of ty, cl od,

dit mgmt cm, cotctio i mot , -t

coio, d o o. w ldy t xmpl of t Cop of sigl

that has donned the mantle in the eld of Information Technology (IT) and

the Army Medical Corps which is emerging in the eld of state sponsored

mdicl pogmm.



37


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


Cocptlitio d implmttio of moditio pogmm

qi tim. w d to tt o; l ill bcom oc pdd

fom t c of t Idi amy. a bd of iftym, tm

and gunners would emerge while we would be hard put to nd compatible

bidg, od d GIs to mt ti qimt. Big tppd i c

to ctc p – it t i qid of d t ctlly cpbl of

delivering – is not a desirable situation for an engineer who, by denition, is

dtid to b ly i cotol.

Methods of Force Organisation for the Future War and Peace

T picipl of mility ogitio dd do o t ctidictate that for the optimum efciency in management of war, military

fomtio o it old b lf-cotid fo oti mploymt

(stdd Compoitio) , il dditiol oc ‘gopd’ fo

specic tasks (Task Specic Composition) o qid bi. O

t pt ix dcd, ft wold w II, d to tcicl d tcticl

dlopmt, t b om diltio i obc of ti picipl.

Tody, giig it o log o blcd i compoitio to b cpbl of flly tiig t ppotd fomtio i ll ti

oti optiol o logitic commitmt, l coomicl d

inefcient recourse to ad hoc arrangements are adopted, be it in terms of

repower, mobility, reconnaissance or transportation. On the other hand,

it i it cot-ffcti o cy to bild p c gi it to

ct fo ll tliti gi t dcd tt of commictio d

tpottio tt c b xploitd to ttc o dtc oc i qic

tim, d, t, ci foc-mltiplictio ffct. T i, tfo,

c fo i of t xitig ogitio t tcticl (it, bigd

d diiiol fomtio), optiol (cop) d ttgic (tt

amy) ll to i t t igt mix of itgl ll ctlid

giig oc ic old llo to mt o optiol

commitments more efciently and, at the same time, contribute to the

giig d t t tiol ll dig t log y of pc tt

my pil. accodigly, i-dpt i my to b dt

log t li ticltd blo.



38


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

Standard Force Composition

As stated, while a standard engineer force composition for various eld

fomtio i ldy i plc i o amy, ti d to b d

d cotctd bd o o o cotmpoy ll ftitic

optiol qimt. Ti tp ill to b did ft tig

ito ccot t fcto of ‘imltity’ d ‘itopbility’ lt

i o cotxt, bc t old dictt t blcd compoitio d

equipment proling in the manner discussed above. Articulation of policies

i pct of plcig ddd lic o mcitio t t pol

tgt, co to ffcti t pply, dmolitio, booby tppig,

lm dic d obtcl cm to poid lif to pmtlydployd toop d optimm tilitio of oc by m of btt

tcticl mobility, ttgic tpottio d igl commictio

few examples which would guide us in proling the War Establishment of

t gi it of t ft. T impti, tfo, i to modi

o combt gi it i tp it t oll cm of t amy’

moditio. wt i mo impott i tt t iititi mt mg

fom iti t cop, t t big di by co of icpbldmd fom t ppotd m. a mod t, g, lctoic f

qipmt d ifty po cqid, t copodig giig

bc-p – bidg, od, digitl topogpicl dt, GIs, obtcl ytm,

lm ytm, bitt to d qipmt d gi itlligc –

to b ab initio ticltd by t gi t t plig tg itlf. Ti

would help the Army in two ways: rst, engineering input to overall decision-

mig old b ilbl, t, impoig t qlity of plig, d cod,full tactical exploitation of new acquisitions by the eld formations would not

have to wait till the engineering deciencies are lled up by trial and error

o log piod. acqiitio of mod tilly ytm, motly pilotd

icl, lctoic f cpbiliti, illc ytm, tt-of-t-

t mo, tc. c i poit i t copodig giig

iftct fo fll xploittio of t to com p – bfo t

idctd. T impti, tfo, :

l Compi ffot to modi t w etblimt, w

etblimt Tbl d t ltd scdl d Lit, i tm of

ctgoi, dig ft d modl, d to b md i mo



39


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


itittiolid m. egiig to d qipmt cld to

gi it tody coidd fo pgdtio to t cotmpoy

ll oly t bcom o obolt tt t idty i o log

bl to mfct tm, o t toop gt y of ig tm. O

pmpig t, compo, mci loi d cpt tool

c i poit i ic t cop mi tity y bid t

lo cot, ig-tc d idigoly ilbl plcmt. effot to

mo c omli old b milto tod moditio of

giig ppot.

l Itodctio of mod ft i combt giig ppot by y

of cqiitio of mod giig tool, plt d qipmt i o complio. hig tc cotctio, bidgig, obtcl, t pply,

material handling, camouage, deception, habitat and transportation

cpbility i tm of t extent of ppot ll t timfm i

ic t my b xctd d optiol coditio old ply

ctlytic ol i t dlopmt of t amy’ ftitic docti fo

d pc.

l

Filly, t cmt i combt giig cpbiliti mtcofom to t ct cilig o mpo. Inter alia, it impli tt

t tt of xctio of combt giig t mt ift fom

tgt of pol i it to xctio by mcid m.

Ti old ffct ig i mpo ic cold t b tilid

fo iig git t oid i t gi foc tct.

Fo xmpl, t bic t foc fo optiol tc cotctio

should be revised to a eld platoon with higher mechanised capability

rather than the eld company.

T poit to ot i tt fo ti ffot to ccd, i mot

cases, the engineers have to nd their own answers to the problems of

giig ppot t big tily dpdt po qipmt ic

t ppotd m c ffod to l o dicd – mod icl

c fo bidg ytm, fo itc – o dig t Dfc rc

d Dlopmt Ogitio (DrDO) my tmbl po. My c

, idd, fod, d impoid qipmt dlopd by t

it commd dig t ct Optio Pm; t id d to



40


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

b ft td. T my b c fo tbliig cll to

ogi i-o combt giig dlopmt pogmm, y, t t

Collg of Mility egiig. w ti ffot ccd, oltio i

giig ppot old lt. Tt old b o im.

Mission Specific Force Organisation

sic c optiol d tcticl ittio old iibly b iq, t

would be a need to regroup the forces for each specic operation, so as to

ci blc i compoitio ll i dipoitio. rqimt of

engineer units for execution of specic tasks – over and above their integral

resources – would have to be attached for specic periods and then quicklydployd t t xt poit of citiclity. Ti old b cy fo

cimt of foc-mltiplictio ffct d ‘pi mo’ iti

t fmo of bttl tim d pc. I om c, t qimt

i pdicbl, t cold b fomlid i t fom of foml optiol

orders to foster afliation and cohesion. In other cases, operational balance in

compoitio old citt ttcmt of toop o qipmt o l

of to fom ctlid oc o c-to-c bi. T giigoc ic old fll d ti ctgoy old g fom y t

moig, t pply, bidgig d cotctio plt d qipmt, to p-

fbictd lt d olmio cotctio mtil, ic old b

mitid cto o tt toc. To ci t qiit dg of

exibility in this context, it would be imperative that an integrated system

of coic, commictio d it ll it-tt mobility

i lo pt i plc. Dcidig bot t citct of c ytm old

po mo cllg to t gi ldip; bt it old b ot t

ffot, o t t poibiliti. It i, tfo, mo commitmt o

t pt of t gi to coid t folloig:

l expio of t cop of tt of to, plt d giig

qipmt i t it t ftitic qimt, d bd o t

impti of ti d tcticl ltti.

l eltio of t giig cpbiliti iti t tt to tt ll

ic old cog t mgc of tcticl optio fo t

eld commanders to xploit. hig od cotctio d t pply

cpbiliti om lt xmpl of c iititi; bility to



41


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


dt ciic ctio pogmm i igcy i ot

ppopit xmpl. Tt t iititi lo i cot d ilbl

i bdc idigoly, dd to t dibility.

l Itittio of ig ll of mcitio old lo til gt

dpdcy o i-o o itgl ogitio fo mgmt of

‘gi to d qipmt of gi oigi’, t pctic

dig t w y; it old b impcticl to xpct eMe o Odc

to do o biddig. It i tt t lc of t egi sto

Dpot, itbly ogid, com to t fo.

Strategic Force OrganisationI poidig giig ppot to mod amy o titoil, giol

o globl dploymt, t mgig diptio cll fo itgtd

ytm of giig coic d lbot logitic pltfom

to icld tpottio of mtil, ci of pply d oig of

ig tog of mtil. Ti i o bc giig oc,

itgtd co t ti tt of optio, old bl

o commd d tff to opt fo otodox dploymt, d,t, gg otil foc it lmt of ttgic pi. T

impti to tlt c oppotiti ito mti ctio o

the ground would be the capabilities of mass transportation and efcient

pply of to. w ldy dicd tt i t cotmpoy

ittio, it old b mot dtgo to bod logitic optio

to dploy, ti d dploy t foc lmt. I ot od,

t logitic of tpottio d pply ll plcd, itcig

d tiig of foc i dd fibl d, t, t optiol

cpbiliti of mll foc mltiplid. T Ci dc to t

footill i t ott dig 1962, o ticl lopmt to t

t fll of D i 1971 d fotllig Pit i sic i 1984

bt f xmpl of ti mility dictm, i ic mll foc,

bcd p it lbot logitic ppot, cid xtodiy lt.

I o cotxt, poitd ot li, ctio of lbot logitic

iftct i ll iti t idigo cpbiliti, il m

mfct of i-tc mility qipmt i yt f y. It, tfo,

m to xploit o it giig tgt d bild p



42


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

GauTaM Banerjee

o ttgic logitic cpbiliti d o b bl to dploy o limitd

‘tt’ foc – mo, tilly, illc d coic (.g.

umd ail vicl—uav), lctoic, d, to om xtt,

t ifty lmt – d to ift t fom o tt li to

ot to ffctily tcl cci tgt i qic tim. I to b

cod it i ti cotxt cold b follo:

l riig of ‘amy egi rgimt’, itbly qippd it y

cotctio plt d mciy to dt lg cl cotctio

of logitic b d tpottio ci i t commictio zo

cold b coidd. Ti cold it b ogid by cotig

d ogiig t Bod rod T Foc o by m of iigTitoil amy it. T it my t b itbly mployd i

pc-tim o gigtic tiol pogmm c t i liig

d igy cotctio poct, lo to lp Mes cl t y

bclog of dfc cotctio cm.

l Icopotio of t moig, tpottio d cotctio t

ld by t pblic ll t pit cto ito t dfc pl.

Ptly, ti pct i dpdt po locl gmt d mtldtdig, d d to b itittiolid t t px ll.

l Itittio of ll ogid gi lmt compot of

t cl foc, to icld cpbiliti i tm of cl-dd

shelters, camouage and deception schemes, nuclear demolitions and

dit mgmt.

l e itlligc i coidd to b pt of Gl stff fctio,

o t y, t occd md oid i t qlity of

gi itlligc. I mod ll ftitic combt, t ygy

of ccfl optio old dpd po comptt gi

itlligc, icldig xti topogpic dt d GIs. Ogitio

of ffcti ytm of itlligc collctio, colltio, ifcig d

dimitio i - tim old, tfo, b o of t mo

cllg fo t Cop of egi i t comig y. nxt, t

poc of gltig t olm of itlligc ipt i t it t

city d dibility t io ll of t foc, ll t

bility of imiltio d ctio t t ll, old lo d to b

od ot i gt dtil. Ftmo, t ltt ytm old



43


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2


to b dotild ito t tomtd dt pocig d commictio

gid. T pct mt, tfo, fom itiic pt of t ttgic

foc tct of t mility gi i t comig y.

Organisation for Counter-Insurgency

I t comig y, ‘lo itity ’ – cot-igcy d cot-

toim – old cytlli ito itgl compot of tiol city.

It is time, therefore, that this kind of operation is recognised as a bona de

mdt fo t amy, d ti commitmt i dditio to t

fmily of o tditiol ‘optio of ’. To tt xtt, t fogoig

ly mt co t giig commitmt i ltio to t loitity optio, o tt t gi foc tct mi ‘blcd’

even under the conditions of these deployments, and the benets of good

engineer support transcends beyond the connes of external and overt

conicts. For these conditions to be met, it is an imperative that the process

of gi foc tctig t ti ol ito ccot. Coty to

t ppio gdig t ibility of co-ltig t ‘cotiol’ d

t ‘littl ’, it i icigly ppt t old o tody tt c coctiity i fibl, idd, oidbl. a mgil xpio i t

scope of engineering support – conned to additional or customised design

ft i mility giig d d bod obcti i tiig

– would sufce to take care of this additional role. The basic features of

combt giig – iz ldip d igo ill i t bcdop of

t id of ‘st’ – old, d mt, mi ffcti i y c. T,

t cop old b bl to pfom i cofomity to t xpcttio of t

amy.

The Course Ahead

D to t coidtio igligtd i t pp, it old b mot

ppopit to ly ot itittiolid li of tiig tod dlopmt

of blcd foc tct i t Idi amy, cofomig to it ttgic

ll tcticl mdt, i ic t it ddci, o

cotit. T gi compot of c blcd foc cold b

ticltd i t fom of t of gidli o cocptl fmo

ic ill bl t policy-m d pl to ogi giig



44


. 3 4 , 2 0 1 2

units, update the equipment prole, assimilate new technical capabilities and

digt t giig t i mtl coct. wit moditio

ldy o t amy’ gd, fomlitio of c gidli my ldy

b t d; dditiol mpi o ti ccot old b mot lt.

Ft, i od to d t gidli migfl, ty cold b bd

o lily optiol ittio i o cotxt d lidtd tog -

gaming at corps and eld Army levels. Following such in-depth examination,

t bod pmt fo tig d compoitio of gi foc t

standard, mission specic and strategic levels would get crystallised. These

ifc my t fom t bi fo moditio of mility giig

ogitio ll dlopmt of poibiliti d optio, tcticlas well as strategic, for a modern version of efcient all-arms operations in

t Idi amy.

Acknowledgements1. eic att, Military Capacity and Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran (sIPrI, Oxfod

uiity P, 1997).

2. v Gol (d), Introduction to International Relations and India’s Foreign Policy (1996).3. adlpi Pp, no 299.

4. jt sig, National Security (n Dli: Lc Pblictio, 1997).5. Indian Defence Review , Fby 1995.

6. Parameters, spig 1998.7. s kodplli, China’s Military: PLA In Transition (n Dli: IDsa, 1999).

8. Asian Military Review , 2001.9. Coli s Gy, Exploitations in Strategy (wtpot: Good P, 1996).

10. Tom Clcy d Gl Fd F j, Into the Storm: A Study in Command (n Yo: GP Ptm d so, 1997).

11. “Fdmtl, Docti d Cocpt – Idi amy”, hQ arTraC, 1998.

12. “Pptio fo w i t 21t Cty”, Parameters, atm, 1997.13. robt r Lod, The Art of Manoeuvre: Manoeuvre Warfare Theory (Dd: T

egli Boo Dpot, 1998).

14. B h Liddl ht, The Remaking of Modern Armies (Boto: Littl Bo, 1928).15. ali h Bti, Mti Libici d Fdic w kg, “hig Tc: Ft Fc of w?”,

Parameters, vol XXvII, no 4, 1998-99.

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