RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY -...

Template No. 5-0000-0001-T2 Rev. 1 Copyrights EIL All rights reserved

EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN

MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE FROM RGT TO PALANPUR

Document No. A524-17-41-EI-1401

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RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY


EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN

MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE FROM RGT TO PALANPUR


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6.0 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THESTUDY

The principal objective of this study is to identify the potential hazards posed by

incidents occurring at proposed project facilities. The study identifies the possible

failure cases, which might affect the population and property in the vicinity of the

facilities and thereby provides information necessary for developing mitigation

measures for preventing accidents and to formulate the disaster management plan.

Details of the proposed facilities for augmentation of existing crude oil pipeline & gas

pipeline and new gas pipeline are given in Tables 2.4, 2.6 and 2.9 respectively in

chapter-2 of this report. Among these facilities certain representative facilities have

been chosen for risk assessment study based on similarity of layout and operating

parameters and same are listed below in Table 6.1. The Conclusion and

recommendations for the representative stations are equally applicable for all other

stations.

Table 6.1 : Representative facilities for Risk Assessment study

Project component

Proposed facilities Selected facilities

Augmentation of

existing crude oil

pipeline

AGI-9 & 26, Viramgam

terminal

AGI-9, Viramgam terminal,

24” existing buried crude oil

pipeline

Augmentation of

existing gas

pipeline

AGI-6,7,8,11,16,18,20 &

25, Viramgam terminal

AGI-25, Viramgam terminal,

8” existing buried gas

pipeline

New gas pipeline Raageswari despatch

station, SV-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8

& 9, IP station, compressor

station and Palanpur

receiving station

Raageswari despatch

station, SV-3, compressor

station, Palanpur receiving

station, 30” new buried gas

pipeline


EXPANSION OF EXISTING CRUDE OIL CARRYING CAPACITY FROM 200,000 TO 300,000 BOPD & NATURAL GAS CARRYING CAPACITY

FROM 6.3 TO 40 MMSCFD IN MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 280MMSCFD NATURAL GAS PIPELINE

FROM RGT TO PALANPUR


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6.1 DESIGN FEATURES FOR SAFE OPERATION

The existing pipeline is built in accordance with the prudent construction practices as

defined in ASME/ANSI 31.8/31.4, OISD standard 141 and 138 for design, construction,

maintenance and inspection. The storage terminals are designed according to OISD

118 - ”layouts for oil and gas installations” and OISD 117- “Fire protection facilities for

petroleum and Depots and terminals”. Other relevant standards adopted for existing

facilities are given in tables 2.11 to 2.16 of section 2.1.2, Chapter 2 of this report.

Instrumentation and monitoring is done by state-of-the-art equipment that transmits real

time data to the central control centres at Mangala, Viramgam and Bhogat. This data

received in the control centres allows the pipeline operating pressures and flow

volumes to be monitored on a real time basis.

Safety features such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), Leak

Detection System (LDS), Pipeline Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) have been

incorporated in the design of the existing facilities and will be extended to the new

facilities. In addition to the above, the pipeline and associated facilities are periodically

patrolled to ensure that there is no encroachment on the pipeline right of use.

Information captured through in built safety systems and physical patrolling are

communicated directly to the central control room at Mangala, Viramgam and Bhogat

for suitable action.

Pipeline External Corrosion Protection and Monitoring

Pipeline is epoxy coated line with 4” PUF insulation and HDPE top sheath. Periodic

intelligent pigging survey and pipe-to-soil potential surveys shall be conducted for

pipeline health monitoring in accordance with the requirement of codes and best

industry practices. Following are some common design criteria used in insulation

system design for piping application:

Controlling heat loss on hot piping by PUF insulation system

Providing personnel protection

Limiting or retarding surface condensation

Providing process control

Economic optimization or energy conservation

Providing fire protection






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Providing freeze protection

Providing noise control

Sectionalizing Block Valves

Main line block valves are provided as per the requirements of ANSI/ASME B 31.8/B

31.4 and OISD 141 based on population density and land use along the pipeline route.

Provision should be made for safe blow down of gas contained in each section of the

pipeline into the atmosphere.

Valve maintenance should be performed every six months to ensure effective

operability.

Leak Detection System

State-of-the-art Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system supported

by leak detection software module, precision instrument and dedicated communication

system is installed to monitor the integrity of the pipeline. The shut down system of the

pipeline will act to close the sectionalizing valves based on leak detection system and

will alert the pipeline operator about the potential leaks along the pipeline route.

Typically, the time required detecting / confirming a leak, raising alarm and taking

action to isolate the leaking section is around 100-150 seconds. The entire pipeline

system should be monitored continuously from a control station having a SCADA

system. The remote control and monitoring is typically done from a centralized system

on a 24/7 basis. The systems are typically computer based and most have a back-up

computer and other redundant features. The centralized SCADA system typically

communicates with the field and remote devices through a dedicated communication

network such as land telephone lines, satellite system, microwave towers, or directional

radio frequencies with most systems having reluctant communication frequencies. The

measures that should be employed to protect security of SCADA systems include:

Maintain integrity of communication parts through out the system

Verification of transmitted signals on regular basis

Inspection of status of field devices through fixed time schedule

Regular feedback of control signals to check its reliability

Database protection from viruses to avoid system failure

Accessing control to the control center by defined procedure






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Other Safety Aspects

The pipeline will be physically patrolled by walk-through and aerial survey to ensure

there is no encroachment on the pipeline right of way. Moreover, during day to day

operational and maintenance activities, company employees should be aware of all

activities occurring around the pipeline and report such activities to the appropriate

authorities

Pipeline appurtenances like valves and meters should be painted to prevent

atmospheric corrosion

Pipeline marker signs should be placed where the pipeline crosses rivers, highways

and major crossings. Line of sight of markers should be maintained

Nearby population along the pipeline route should be made aware of the safety

precautions, to be taken in the event of any mishap due to pipeline.

6.2 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT

The facility handles various hazardous materials like natural gas and crude oil which

have a potential to cause fire and explosion which may lead to major hazards.

In a pumping or compressor station, the potential sources of a large loss of

containment are not many. There are various modes in which flammable chemicals can

leak into the atmosphere causing adverse affects. These losses could be in the form of

a small hole in the piping, the failure of an instrument tapping, the failure of

pump/compressor seal etc. Large loss of containment can be due to failure of the

pipeline or even catastrophic failure of storage tanks.Various types of fire and

explosions are described below:

FLASH FIRE A flash fire occurs when a cloud of vapours/gas burns without generating any

significant overpressure. The cloud is typically ignited on its edge, remote from- the

leak source. The combustion zone moves through the cloud away from the ignition

point. The duration of the flash fire is relatively short but it may stabilize as a

continuous jet fire from the leak source. For flash fires, an approximate estimate for the

extent of the total effect zone is the area over which the cloud is above the LFL.

JET FIRE Jet fires are burning jets of gas or atomized liquid whose shape is dominated by the

momentum of the release. The jet flame stabilizes on or close to the point of release






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and continues until the release is stopped. Jet fire can be realized, if the leakage is

immediately ignited. The effect of jet flame impingement is severe as it may cut through

equipment, pipeline or structure. The damage effect of thermal radiation is depended

on both the level of thermal radiation and duration of exposure.

POOL FIRE

A cylindrical shape of the pool fire is presumed. Pool-fire calculations are then carried

out as part of an accidental scenario, e.g. in case a hydrocarbon liquid leak from a

vessel leads to the formation of an ignitable liquid pool. First no ignition is assumed,

and pool evaporation and dispersion calculations are being carried out. Subsequently

late pool fires (ignition following spreading of liquid pool) are considered. If the release

is bunded, the diameter is given by the size of the bund. If there is no bund, then the

diameter is that which corresponds with a minimum pool thickness, set by the type of

surface on which the pool is spreading.

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of flammable gas burns sufficiently

quickly to generate high overpressures (i.e. pressures in excess of ambient). The

overpressure resulting from an explosion of hydrocarbon gases is estimated

considering the explosive mass available to be the mass of hydrocarbon vapor

between its lower and upper explosive limits.

BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION (BLEVE) BLEVE occur when pressurized vessels containing volatile liquids, in particular

liquefied gases, are engulfed by external fires causing catastrophic rupture of the

vessel and the formation of a disastrous fireball.

6.2.1 POSSIBLE MODES OF FAILURE Lists of common reasons for failure are as follows:

Material and Construction Defects

Inappropriate material of construction

Improper use of design codes

Weld failures






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Failure of, or inadequate, piping supports

Pre-Operational Activities Failure induced during delivery of materials at site

Failure induced during installation

Effects of Pressure and Temperature Overpressure

Cyclic expansion induced cracking

Low temperature brittle fracture

Fatigue loading induced cracking

Corrosion Internal corrosion

External corrosion

Cathodic protection failure

Operational Errors Failure to inspect regularly and identify defects

Failures due to Third Party Activity Vandalism and theft

External Impact Induced Failures Dropped objects

Vehicle impact

Subsidence of soil

Failure due to Fire External fire impinging on the piping

Rapid vaporisation of cold liquid in contact with hot surfaces






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6.3 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Consequence analysis involves the application of the mathematical, analytical

and computer models for calculation of the effects and damages subsequent to a

hydrocarbon / toxic release accident.

Computer models are used to predict the physical behavior of hazardous

incidents. The model uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of

identified scenarios:

Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in process equipment/pipe work

Modeling of the size & shape of the flammable/toxic gas clouds from releases in

the atmosphere

Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burnt

as jet fire, pool fire, flash fire and fire ball.

Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point

of release

The different consequences (Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire and Explosion effects) of loss

of containment accidents depend on the sequence of events & properties of material

released leading to the either toxic vapor dispersion, fire or explosion or both.

DISCHARGE RATE The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the

equipment, size of the hole and phase of the release (liquid, gas or two-phase). The

release rate decreases with time as the equipment depressurizes. This reduction

depends mainly on the inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak and blow-

down the equipment.

DISPERSION Releases of gas into the open air form clouds whose dispersion is governed by the

wind, by turbulence around the site, the density of the gas and initial momentum of the

release. In case of flammable materials the sizes of these gas clouds above their

Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) are important in determining whether the release will

ignite. In this study, the results of dispersion modelling for flammable materials are

presented LFL quantity.






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6.3.1 SELECTED FAILURE CASES

Listing of failure cases helps eliminate failure cases of small magnitude as well as

cases with a very low probability of occurrence. A list of selected failure cases was

prepared based on process knowledge, engineering judgment, experience, past

incidents associated with such facilities and considering the general mechanisms for

loss of containment. A list of cases has been identified for the consequence analysis

study based on the following.

Cases with high probability of occurrence but having low consequence:

Example of such failure cases includes two-bolt gasket leak for flanges, seal failure for

pumps, sample connection failure, instrument tapping failure, drain/vent failure etc.

Cases with low probability of occurrence but having high consequence

Example includes catastrophic failure of station piping etc.)

Although the list does not give complete failure incidents considering all equipments,

facilities etc., but the consequence of a similar incident considered in the list below

could be used to foresee the consequence of that particular accident. The failure cases

considered for consequence analysis are listed in the Table-6.2 below.

TABLE 6.2 : SELECTED FAILURE CASES

S. No. Unit Equipment Failure Mode Consequence

1. AGI-9 Pump

Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure

Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)

Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure

Drain point leak (50 mm hole ) Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure

2. Viramgam

terminal

Pump / Compressor/ Tank





Tank on Fire Pool Fire

3. AGI-25 Compressor Pin-hole leak (5 mm hole) Flash Fire, Jet Fire,

Overpressure Instrument Tapping Failure (20 mm hole)







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S. No. Unit Equipment Failure Mode Consequence


4. Raageswari

despatch

station Pig Launcher





5. SV-3 Sectionalising Valve





6. Palanpur

receiving

station Pig Receiver





7. Existing Buried

crude oil

Pipeline Pipeline

20% rupture Flash Fire, Jet Fire, Overpressure



8. Existing buried

gas pipeline Pipeline




9. New Gas

Pipeline Pipeline









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6.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS MODELLING 6.4.1 SOFTWARE USED FOR THE STUDY

The software used for this study is PHAST 6.7, developed by DNV. Phast 6.7

estimates the consequences of various failure scenarios.

6.4.2 METEOROLOGY

GENERAL

The actual behaviour of and consequences arising from any release of flammable

material largely depend upon the prevailing weather conditions. For the assessment of

major scenarios involving the release of toxic or flammable materials, the most

important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric dispersion

of the escaping material, namely the wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability

and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of the risk

analysis; however, it may be beneficial by absorbing or washing out released materials.

6.4.2.1 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY

The stability of the atmosphere directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to

disperse pollutants emitted into it. In most dispersion scenarios, the relevant

atmospheric layer is that nearest the ground, varying in thickness from a few meters to

a few thousand meters.

Turbulence induced by buoyant forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the

vertical temperature gradient. The temperature of air decreases with height at a rate

called the Environmental Lapse Rate (ELR), a value that varies with time and place.

The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the ELR being

less than, equal to or greater than the Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR), a constant

value of 0.98°C/100 meters. The Pasquill-Gifford stability parameter is a meteorological

parameter describing the stability of the atmosphere, i.e., the degree of convective

turbulence. Wind speeds, intensity of solar radiation (daytime insulation) and night time

cloud cover have been identified as prime factors defining these stability categories.






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Table: 6.3 : PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES

Surface

Wind

Speed

(m/s)

Day time solar radiation Night time cloud cover

Strong Medium Slight Thin < 3/8 Medium 3/8 Overcast

>4/5

< 2 A A/B B - - D

2 – 3 A/B B C E F D

3 – 5 B B/C C D E D

5 – 6 C C/D D D D D

> 6 C D D D D D

Legend: A = Very unstable, B = Unstable, C = Moderately unstable, D = Neutral, E =

Moderately stable, F = stable

6.4.2.2 SPECIFIC METEOROLOGICAL DATA

Since the stations are located along the Barmer-Bhogat pipeline, it has been

considered advisable to take into account the prevalent weather conditions of the

regions nearest to the stations. The meteorological data of the observatories nearest to

the stations, have been taken from the “Baseline Environmental Status prepared under

this Project”. The Meteriological data that have been used for the study are

summarized below in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 : Meteorological Conditions

Sl. No.

Location of failure

Weather Station Applicable

Temperature (ºC)

Wind Speed (m/s)

Pasquill-Gifford Stability

1 AGI-9 Banaskantha 32.4 (mean) 3 C/D

2 Viramgam

terminal Ahmedabad

32.7 (mean) 3 C/D

3 AGI-25 Wankaner 32 (mean) 3 C/D

4 Raageswari

despatch station Barmer

6.3-48 3 C/D

5 SV-3 Jalore 32.4 (mean) 3 C/D






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Sl. No.

Location of failure

Weather Station Applicable

Temperature (ºC)

Wind Speed (m/s)

Pasquill-Gifford Stability

6 Palanpur

receiving station Banaskantha

32.4 (mean) 3 C/D

7 Buried Existing

crude oil Pipeline

Banaskantha 32.4(mean) 3 C/D

8 Buried Existing

gas Pipeline


9 Buried New

Pipeline


6.4.3 SIZE AND DURATION OF RELEASE

Leak size considered for selected failure cases are listed below:

Leak Size for selected failure scenario is detailed below : Pin-hole leak 5 mm leak

Instrument tapping

failure 20 mm hole size

Large hole 50 mm, complete rupture of 2” drain line

Catastrophic

failure Complete rupture of pressure vessels

The discharge duration is taken as 10 minutes for continuous release scenarios as it is

considered that it would take plant personnel about 10 minutes to detect and isolate the

leak.

Ref [5] AICHE, CCPS, Chemical process Quantitative Risk Analysis






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6.5 DAMAGE CRITERIA

DAMAGE CRITERIA DUE TO VARIOUS SCENARIOS

In order to appreciate the damage effect produced by various scenarios,

physiological/physical effects of the blast wave, thermal radiation or toxic vapour

exposition are discussed.

LFL OR FLASH FIRE

Hydrocarbon vapor released accidentally will spread out in the direction of wind. This

mixture (hydrocarbon and air) finds an ignition source before being dispersed below

lower flammability limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame will travel back

to the source of leak. Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer fatal burn

injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance of LFL value is usually taken

to indicate the area, which may be affected by the flash fire.

Flash fire (LFL) events are considered to cause direct harm to the population present

within the flammability range of the cloud. Fire escalation from flash fire such that

process or storage equipment or building may be affected is considered unlikely.

THERMAL HAZARD DUE TO POOL FIRE, JET FIRE AND FIRE BALL

Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet fire or fire ball may cause various degrees of burn

on human body and process equipment. Following Table 6.5 below tabulates the

damage effect due to thermal radiation intensity.

Table 6.5 : Damage due to incident thermal radiation intensity

Incident radiation intensity (KW/m²)

Type of damage

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

32.0 Maximum flux level for thermally protected tanks containing

flammable liquid

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of

plastic tubing etc.

8.0 Maximum heat flux for un-insulated tanks

4.0 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20

seconds. However blistering of skin (1st degree burns) is likely.






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The hazard distances to the 37.5 kW/m2, 32 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2, 8 kW/m2 and 4 kW/m2

radiation levels, selected based on their effect on population, buildings and equipment

were modelled using PHAST.

VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION:

In the event of explosion taking place within the plant, the resultant blast wave will have

damaging effects on equipment, structures, building and piping falling within the

overpressure distances of the blast. Tanks, buildings, structures etc. can only tolerate

low level of overpressure. Human body, by comparison, can withstand higher

overpressure. But injury or fatality can be inflicted by collapse of building of structures.

Table 6.6 illustrates the damage effect of blast overpressure.

Table 6.6 : Damage Effects of Blast Overpressure

Blast Overpressure (psi) Damage Level

5.0 Major structure damage (assumed fatal to people inside

building or within other structures)

3.0 Oil storage tank failure

2.5 Eardrum rupture

2.0 Repairable damage, pressure vessels remain intact, light

structures collapse

1.0 Window pane breakage possible, causing some injuries

The hazard distances to the 5 psi, 3 psi and 2 psi overpressure levels, selected based

on their effects on equipment, buildings and population were modelled using PHAST.

6.6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

6.6.1 PIN-HOLE LEAK

A Pin-hole leak is assumed to result in a 5 mm hole in the piping. The ensuing release

would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released material’s

encountering a source of ignition. Weather conditions of different weather stations will

be applicable for different pump stations. Following Table 6.7 provides the details of






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the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions:

Table 6.7 : Fire Hazard Distances Due to Pin-Hole Leak

Location Inventory Release (Kg)

Consequence

Thermal Radiation Distances (m) or Overpressure Distances(m) or Flash Fire Envelope (m)

4 kW/ m2 or 2 psi

12.5 kW/ m2 or 3 psi


AGI-9 900

Flash fire 11

Jet fire 25 19 15

Over pressure 28 26 24

Viramgam

terminal

900/78

Flash fire 11/3

Jet fire 25/5 19/NR 15/NR


AGI-25 78

Flash fire 3

Jet fire 5 NR NR

Over pressure NR NR NR

Raageswari

despatch

station

1000 Flash fire 4

Jet fire 8 8 NR


SV-3 1000

Flash fire 14

Jet fire 28 22 18


Palanpur

receiving

station

1000

Flash fire 14

Jet fire 28 28 28


6.6.2 INSTRUMENT TAPPING FAILURE

An instrument tapping failure is assumed to result in a 20 mm hole in the piping. The

ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released

material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather conditions of different weather

stations will be applicable for different pump stations. Following Table 6.8 provides the






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details of the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions:

Table 6.8 : Fire Hazard Distances due to Instrument Tapping Failure

Location Inventory Release (Kg)

Consequence


4 kW/ m2 or 2 psi



AGI-9 14130

Flash fire 74

Jet fire 83 62 49


Viramgam

terminal

14130/

1200

Flash fire 74/11

Jet fire 83/25 62/20 49/16

Over pressure 201/26 194/24 188/23

AGI-25 1200

Flash fire 11

Jet fire 25 20 16


Raageswari

despatch

station

2670

Flash fire 18

Jet fire 37 30 24


SV-3 2670

Flash fire 18

Jet fire 37 30 24


Palanpur

receiving

station

2670

Flash fire 18

Jet fire 37 30 24







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DRAIN POINT RUPTURE A drain point rupture is assumed to result in a 50 mm hole in the piping. The ensuing

release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released

material’s encountering a source of ignition. Following Table 6.9 provides the details of

the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions.

Table 6.9 : Fire Hazard Distances due to Drain Point Rupture

Location Inventory Release (Kg) Consequence


4 kW/ m2 or 2 psi



AGI-9 90000

Flash fire 210

Jet fire 178 133 107


Viramgam

terminal

90000/ 7800

Flash fire 210/37

Jet fire 178/64 133/50 107/39

Over pressure 533/97 514/93 497/90

AGI-25 7800

Flash fire 37

Jet fire 64 50 39


Raageswari

despatch station

16344

Flash fire 61

Jet fire 93 71 55


SV-3 16344

Flash fire 61

Jet fire 93 71 55


Palanpur

receiving station 16344

Flash fire 61

Jet fire 93 71 55







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6.6.3 CRUDE OIL TANK AND TANK MANIFOLD FAILURE

Crude Oil Tank on Fire

The case modelled is the crude oil tank on fire. Crude Oil tank is a fixed roof tank. The

dimension of the tank is 31.5 m in diameter and 20 m in height. The storage capacity of

the tank is 14927 m3. Table 6.10 below depicts the details of same.

Table 6.10 : ‘Crude Tank on Fire’ case Failure Scenario

Weather Pool Fire radiation (kW/m2) Distances in meters

4 8 37.5

3 C/D 22 14 6

The consequence contours show that both any of the above radiations are not getting

incident on the adjacent dyke.

Instrument Tapping Failure in manifold of Crude Tank

The scenario considered for modelling is a large hole in the inlet manifold of crude oil

tank. A representative hole size of 20 mm has been modelled for a release duration of

10 minutes. The pressure considered for release is based on the head in the tank and

temperature is assumed to be ambient. The dimension of the tank is 31.5 m in

diameter and 20 m in height.

Though a jet fire result has been assessed, the possibility of jet fire is not likely due to

the low pressure at the point of release. Table 6.11 below provides the details of this

scenario.

Table 6.11 : Large Hole in manifold of Crude Tank

Wea

ther

Flash Fire Distances in meters

Jet Fire Radiation (kW/m2) Distance in meters

Pool Fire radiation (kW/m2) Distances in meters

Overpressure (psi) Distances in meters

LFL 4 8 32 4 8 32 2 3 5

3 C/D 59 55 40 32 58 33 NR* 104 98 93

* NR- Not Reached






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From the consequence contours it is observed that the hazards of pool fire might reach

the tanks in the adjacent dyke.

6.6.4 EXISTING AND NEW GAS PIPELINE RUPTURE

20 % RUPTURE

The case modelled is 20% rupture of the buried existing gas and new gas pipeline from

Raageswari to Palanpur. The ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and

late explosion upon the released material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather

conditions of different weather stations will be applicable for different locations.

Following Table 6.12 below provides the details of the fire hazards for before-

mentioned weather conditions:

Table 6.12 : 20% Rupture of the Pipeline

Pipeline

Weather




LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5

Existing

Gas

3 C/D 300 467 326 243 593 549 510

New Gas 3 C/D 442 712 493 372 878 813 753

The scenario of 20 % rupture is a most credible scenario for the pipeline with a

relatively high frequency of occurrence. Where the buried pipeline is passing through a

populated area, LFL distances may extend up to those areas. Since there is no control

of ignition sources in these areas therefore general public may get exposed to

hazardous effects of fire in case of such rupture of the pipeline. General Public working

in offices/industries and residing along the pipeline route should be made well aware

about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency Contact numbers shall be displayed

at number of locations so that in any case of leakage from the pipeline, concerned

personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should be regularly monitored by using LEL

meter for any leakage.






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50 % RUPTURE

The case modelled is 50% rupture of the buried existing gas and new gas pipeline from

Raageswari to Palanpur. The ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and

late explosion upon the released material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather

conditions of different weather stations will be applicable for different locations.

Following Table 6.13 provides the details of the fire hazards for before-mentioned

weather conditions:

Table 6.13 : 50% rupture of the Pipeline

Pipeline

Weather




LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5

Existing

Gas

3 C/D 343 559 389 291 675 624 578

New Gas 3 C/D 500 856 592 449 1004 928 860

The scenario of 50 % rupture is a credible scenario for the pipeline with a high

frequency of occurrence. Where the buried pipeline is passing through a populated

area, LFL distances may extend up to those areas. Since there is no control of ignition

sources in these areas therefore general public may get exposed to hazardous effects

of fire in case of such rupture of the pipeline. General Public working in

offices/industries and residing along the pipeline route should be made well aware

about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency Contact numbers shall be displayed

at number of locations so that in any case of leakage from the pipeline, concerned

personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should be regularly monitored by using LEL

meter for any leakage.

100% OR FULL BORE RUPTURE

The case modelled is 100% rupture of the buried existing gas and new gas pipeline

from Raageswari to Palanpur. The ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire

and late explosion upon the released material’s encountering a source of ignition.

Weather conditions of different weather stations will be applicable for different






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locations. Following Table 6.14 provides the details of the fire hazards for before-

mentioned weather conditions:

Table 6.14 : 100% rupture of the Pipeline

Pipeline

Weather




LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5

Existing

Gas

3 C/D 361 599 416 313 720 665 616

New

Gas 3 C/D 523 914 630 480 1044 964 890

The scenario of 100 % rupture is a least credible scenario for the pipeline with a

relatively low frequency of occurrence but with the worst consequences. Where the

buried pipeline is passing through a populated area, LFL distances may extend up to

those areas. Since there is no control of ignition sources in these areas therefore

general public may get exposed to hazardous effects of fire in case of such rupture of

the pipeline. General Public working in offices/industries and residing along the pipeline

route should be made well aware about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency

Contact numbers shall be displayed at number of locations so that in any case of

leakage from the pipeline, concerned personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should

be regularly monitored by using LEL meter for any leakage.

6.6.5 EXISTING CRUDE OIL PIPELINE RUPTURE

The case modelled is 50 mm rupture of the buried existing crude oil pipeline. The

ensuing release would result in a flash fire, jet fire and late explosion upon the released

material’s encountering a source of ignition. Weather conditions of different weather

stations will be applicable for different locations. Following Table 6.15 below provides

the details of the fire hazards for before-mentioned weather conditions:






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Table 6.15 : 50 mm rupture of the Pipeline

Pipeline

Weather




LFL 4 8 32 2 3 5

Existing

Crude

Oil

3 C/D 210 178 133 107 533 514 497

The scenario of 50 mm rupture is a major credible scenario for the pipeline with a

relatively high frequency of occurrence but with the lower consequences. Where the

buried pipeline is passing through a populated area, LFL distances may extend up to

those areas. Since there is no control of ignition sources in these areas therefore

general public may get exposed to hazardous effects of fire in case of such rupture of

the pipeline. General Public working in offices/industries and residing along the pipeline

route should be made well aware about the pipeline rupture scenarios. Emergency

contact numbers shall be displayed at number of locations so that in any case of

leakage from the pipeline, concerned personnel may be contacted. The pipeline should

be regularly monitored by using LEL meter for any leakage.

6.7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While consequence distances have been mentioned under section-6.6, the major

conclusions and recommendations based on the consequence analysis of the identified

representative failure scenarios are summarized below:

6.7.1 AGI-9 PUMPING STATION

From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire and

Overpressure hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be made from the

results:






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1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover the entire station. It is therefore

recommended that blast resistant design be considered for all the manned facilities like

new control room, Guard room etc. with positive pressurization or otherwise this control

room is to be relocated to a safe location outside the overpressure zone, in which case it

shall lie outside the boundary limit of tentative plot demarcated for the same.

2) Pool fire is not envisaged at this station due to the above-mentioned leakage.

3) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may come under its influence.

6.7.2 VIRAMGAM TERMINAL

From the consequence analysis it is observed that the flash fire (LFL), Jet Fire,

Overpressure and Late Pool Fire hazards will be realized. Following analysis can be

made from the results:

1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover around half of the station.

2) Pool fire is envisaged at this station due to the above-mentioned leakage.

3) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may not come under its influence and

therefore personnel may escape easily in case of such instance.

6.7.3 AGI-25 COMPRESSOR STATION



results:

The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover the compressor station only.

1) In case of a flash fire Main entrance may not come under its influence and therefore

personnel may escape easily in case of such instance.

6.7.4 RAAGESWARI DESPATCH STATION



results:






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1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost entire station and hence all manned

buildings like Control room. Guard room etc. need to be built as blast-proof.


6.7.5 SV-3 STATION



results:

1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost entire station and hence all manned



6.7.6 PALANPUR RECEIPT STATION



results:

1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost entire station, hence all manned



6.7.7 CRUDE OIL TANKS

1) Hydrocarbon detectors would be installed as per OISD-116 near the tank manifold.

Hence the early detection of release would enable in quick isolation of the tank contents

through the ROSOV which will be installed as the first isolation valve at tank body flange.

Hence this detection and isolation of tank contents would reduce the amount of inventory

released.

2) The fire at the tank manifold shall be fought with the monitors and hydrants provided

near the tank dyke. To protect the crude oil tanks from the radiation, the water spray

systems shall be started for shell cooling.






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6.7.8 EXISTING AND NEW GAS PIPELINE



results:

1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost 616 and 890 m for existing and new

gas pipeline respectively, hence all habitation in this much periphery of the pipeline

should be generally avoided.

6.7.9 EXISTING CRUDE OIL PIPELINE



results:

1) The blast overpressure of 5 psi would cover almost 500 m, hence all habitation in

this much periphery of the pipeline should be generally avoided.

6.7.10 COMMON RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations applicable to all stations based on the consequence analysis of the

identified representative failure scenarios are summarized below:

1) The owner must take cognisance of the fact that the area bordering the station is

to be kept free of habitation, and means to discourage the growth of such

habitation must be incorporated in the offsite disaster management plan.

2) The vicinity of the station must be rendered free of all sources of ignition. An

additional measure of security may be provided in the form of explosion-proof

fittings.

3) Measures need to be put in place for the evacuation of non-essential employees

from the premises in the event of a fire.

4) The firewater system ought to be of sufficient capacity to cater to all demands

that may be made of it.

In order to reduce the risk involved at the station, the following measures are

suggested:






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a. Preventive Maintenance

Routine inspection and preventive maintenance of equipment and facilities at the

station is advisable, so as to avoid any untoward occurrence.

b. Instruments

All pressure and temperature instruments, alarm switch, safety interlocks and

emergency shutdown systems should be tested for intended operation as per the

preventive maintenance schedule.

6.7.11 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Mitigating measures: Mitigating measures are those measures in place to minimize

the loss of containment event and thereby hazard associated. These include:

Rapid detection of an uncommon event (HC leak, Flame etc) and alarm

arrangements and development of subsequent quick isolation mechanism for major

inventory.

Measures for controlling / minimization of Ignition sources inside the Station.

Active and Passive fire protection for critical equipments and major structures

Effective Emergency Response plans to be in place.

Detection and isolation: In order to ensure rapid detection of a hazardous event the

following is recommended:

Ensure installation of Hydrocarbon detection and fire detectors at strategic location for

early detection and prevention of an uncommon event emanating from the facilities.

Once the flammable gas release has been detected, as the gas or subsequent fire and

escalation risk will be reduced by isolation of the major inventory from the release

location (prevention of loss of containment). Hence, manual / automated mechanism is

required to isolate the major inventory during any uncommon event. It is recommended

that the station piping should be considered to have remote operated valves so that

these valves can be closed from the safe location upon fire or flammable gas detection.

Ignition control: Ignition control will reduce the likelihood of fire events. This is key for

reducing the risk within the station facilities. As part of mitigation measure it is strongly

recommended to consider minimizing the traffic movement within the station area.






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Escape routes: Provide windsocks throughout the site to ensure visibility from all

locations. This will enable people to escape upwind or crosswind from flammable

releases. Sufficient escape routes from the site should be provided to allow

redundancy in escape from all areas.

Others: Closed sampling system may be considered for pressurized services. Failure

scenarios discussed in this report shall be considered in formulating disaster

management plan of the station.

Control Rooms Control room shall be located at a distance at sufficient distance from operating

areas

The building shall be located upwind of the process storage and handling

facilities.

Control Rooms coming under overpressure zones should be blast proof and

shock proof

Critical switches and alarm should be always kept in line

Minimum number of doors shall be provided in the control room while at the

same time the number of doors shall be adequate for safe exit

Smoke detection system shall be provided for control rooms at appropriate

locations

Halon / its proven Equivalent fire extinguisher shall be used for control rooms and

computer rooms

To resist fire spread through ducts, dampers shall be installed in ducts

Power Generating Units Hydrocarbon detectors are recommended in power plant

Surrounding population (including all strata of society) should be made aware of

the safety precautions, to be taken in the event of any mishap in the plant

Critical switches and alarms should always remain online

the equipments should be hydraulically tested to a pressure of at least 1.5 times

the design pressure before putting into operation

The pipeline / equipments / storage loading unloading lines should be monitored

continuously for identifying leakages and have control systems which should be

capable of closing down transmission of oil and gas automatically, if ever required






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Every storage tank, including its roof and all metal connections, should be

electrically continuous and be effectively earthed as per OISD Std. 108

Hydrocarbon detectors may be installed in the tank farms with remote alarms in

control stations as per OISD Std. 108

Fire water requirements should be decided as per guidelines given in OISD Std.

116

Fire proofing materials and systems should be applied as per OISD Std. 164.

6.8 GUIDELINES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING

Disasters are major accidents which cause wide spread disruption of human and

commercial activities. Most natural and man-made disasters have a sudden onset

leaving no possibility of planning then for the occurrence. Industrial disasters cost

human lives, cause injuries and long-term disablement within the facility, while also

affecting the surrounding populace. The loss of revenue and employment, besides the

cost of rebuilding provide severe economic constraints to recovery.

The possibility of disasters needs to be foreseen keeping in mind past experience, so

that means to mitigate the effects can be planned in advance. Human life and the

environment should be given the utmost importance in such planning.

6.8.1 DEFINITION OF AN EMERGENCY

Emergency Planning is integral to loss prevention. Emergencies will be considered

here that have the potential to result in severe consequences, which tend to cause

disruption both on and off-site, and which may require the use of external resources

While „Emergency‟ is a general term that implies a hazardous situation both inside and

outside the factory premises, an „on-site emergency‟ refers to a situation that is

confined to the facility although it may require external help, and an „off-site emergency‟

refers to a situation whose effects spread beyond the facility. An on-site emergency

that is not controlled may turn into an off-site emergency.

6.8.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE PLAN

Emergency preparedness consists of a comprehensive plan to:

1) Respond to a number of emergencies that may be anticipated in the works






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2) Contain the loss of human life and property

3) Provide speedy and effective remedial measures.

The nature of a scenario and its consequences determines the emergency response,

and therefore, the action plan should cover all credible accident scenarios.

Identification of scenarios includes the detection of abnormal conditions, assessment of

the potential consequences and determination of the immediate measures to mitigate

the situation. It also includes emergency response actions, which must be taken to

protect the health and the safety of the staff personnel and the public. Responsibility

for accident assessment normally resides with the managements of individual plants in

the complex, who are best placed to accomplish this function.

The important elements of emergency planning are:

1) Identification of potential disaster scenarios and planning for the same to

mitigate damage to property and life.

2) Disaster Phase Warning and Protective actions like evacuation of personnel.

3) Containment of the disaster by isolating it and fire-fighting

4) Effective and efficient rescue of and provision of relief to people affected in the

works or in the community, based on actual needs and on information collected

locally, both before the disaster and as soon as possible after its occurrence.

5) Efforts to return to normal conditions once the situation has been contained.

The first four points listed above are the most relevant to the management of the

facility. It would be appropriate to classify the hazards posed to the areas around the

facilities by both large and smaller events and provide emergency measures in both

onsite and offsite areas affected.

6.8.3 ALERT

The first, and most important, step in disaster management planning is the

identification and assessment of the principal hazards, which, in facilities handling

Crude Oil are for the most part of the nature of fires. Without the hazards being

identified, planning for an emergency would be an exercise in futility. Operational






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experience and historical evidence concerning past events will help identify the points

of vulnerability and the dangers posed by various scenarios. This information is used in

conjunction with the layout of the facilities and of adjacent communities in preparing the

contingency plans.

Any witness to the beginning of an accident or of any anomalous incident, which could

lead to an accident, is duty bound to give the alert and employ all means available to

him to the best of his ability. These constitute the 1st intervention steps.

An alert is a term used to refer to the information given to ask for assistance or to warn,

in principle, using alarms inside or outside the establishment.

CAIRN will have to ensure, through training or otherwise, that each of its staff can give

a brief and precise warning indicating the place, type and seriousness of the incident,

whenever an abnormal initiating event is witnessed by him. Depending on the nature

and magnitude of the event, and local conditions such as meteorology, geographical

layout, population distribution and accessibility, the important aspect to be considered

is the type or level of an emergency. Emergencies may be broadly categorised into

four levels depending upon the in-plant facilities and the extent of external help that will

be required to meet the emergency. While a Level 1 emergency can be controlled at

the unit in itself and no external help of any nature will be required, in other levels,

external help will be required as outlined below:

Level 1: Operation/Unit level

Level 2: Local/District level

Level 3: State/National level

Level 4: International level

6.8.4 ORGANISATION

Activities during an emergency must be coordinated and this is best achieved by an

organizational approach, with quick response capabilities.






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The ability to respond quickly should not be affected by the time of day or night in

responding to disasters. The coordination of the response to the emergency is critical

in protecting the lives of plant personnel, property and the community. To ensure an

effective response under any circumstances or a combination thereof, a central

authority must be constituted for inter-departmental organization of works. The

functions of the authority should comprise the following:

Establishment of plans and procedures to deal with the disaster, with all

departments and agencies (including the civic authorities).

Creation of a chain of command.

Assignment of responsibilities for each critical function – communication,

gathering of information and revision of records and documentation with fresh

information.

Organisation and execution of training courses and emergency drills.

Establishment and operation of an emergency control centre.

Provision of medical facilities.

Formulation of plans for restoration of normality, partially or fully, depending upon the

destruction caused.

Generation and maintenance of records and documentation.

Certain suggestions concerning the duties of individuals concerned in preparing for an

emergency and during the emergency are outlined below:

i) Works Incident Controller (Chief Incident Controller)

The Works Incident Controller will head the group during an emergency. The Chief of

the Installation or the Deputy General Manager (Operations) may assume the position

of the Works Incident Controller. In his absence, the Sr. Manager (Operations) should

assume this pivotal role until the arrival of the designated Works Incident Controller.

The Works Incident Controller will be responsible for finalizing the emergency plan,

organisation of transportation and establishment of the control centre communication

arrangement, amongst other related duties. The Works Incident Controller will assess






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the situation, declare an emergency and activate the relevant plan. Given a thorough

knowledge of the plant, he should be in a position to decide whether or not the

operation is to be suspended, taking the input necessary from the shift-in-charge/shift

supervisor.

The Works Incident Controller normally operates from the Emergency Control Centre

delegating the shift-in-charge to take charge on-site. He should see that the

procedures laid out for emergency are strictly followed. Mutual aid plans should be

invoked by him, should the requirement for outside assistance arise. The duties of the

Works Incident Controller during an emergency may be summarized as follows:

Announcing an emergency and activating the disaster management plan.

Deciding whether the offsite emergency plan is to be initiated or not, depending on

the level of the emergency.

Arranging for a chronological record of the emergency.

Continuous review and monitoring of the situation and implementation of corrective

action with the help of other senior members/functional coordinators.

Co-ordination with the various internal and external agencies to augment

resources.

Ensuring that key personnel are called in.

Ensuring that the essential emergency services are called in and directed to the

site.

Deciding where to stop an activity.

Issuing directions for the cessation of activities in a safe manner so that the

consequences are minimized.

Ensuring that all personnel in the affected area are accounted for.

Ensuring that casualties receive adequate attention and arranging for additional

medical help, if required, while also ensuring that the casualties’ relatives are

informed.






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Ensuring that the head of CAIRN is kept informed of the status of the situation.

In case of a prolonged emergency, arranging for the replacement of panel

members handling the emergency

Declaring the end of the emergency.

Controlling the rehabilitation of those affected.

Approving press statements to be released by the press coordinator.

Constituting a committee to investigate into the causes of the disaster.

In addition to the co-ordinators mentioned below, chiefs of the electrical, mechanical,

instrument and civil services should also be available with Works Incident Controller for

tendering any help necessary.

ii) Senior Operations Manager

iii) As mentioned earlier, the Senior Operations Manager should take control of the

emergency till the Works Incident Controller arrives and can take charge. After handing

over charge, or, if the Works Incident Controller is already at hand, from the start, he

will work closely with the Maintenance and Operations Engineer and take control at the

emergency site, tackling the situation and co-ordinating the activities of various

agencies. The Senior Operations Manager will have the following important functions

during an emergency.

Arranging for the acknowledgement of the receipt of alerts or alarm signals.

Appraising the situation and maintaining a liaison with the Works Incident

Controller.

Arranging for the containment and isolation of the damaged area

Warning all personnel involved in the operation and evacuating them to a

predetermined place if the need arises.

Commencing and directing fire fighting (if required) till the fire fighting crew arrives.






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Initiating rescue activities and first aid for injured persons pending the arrival of an

ambulance.

Ensuring that only persons with authorized duties enter the affected area.

Controlling spectators to prevent an addition to the confusion.

iv) Fire Co-ordinator

The functions of the Fire Co-ordinator will be:

To work in close association with the Works Incident Controller.

Rendering technical assistance on logistics to fire personnel.

Establishing danger zones and barricading, if necessary.

Making requests for assistance or special services, as may be required.

Arranging for and maintaining necessary appliances and supplies.

Planning and organising evacuation services and training its members.

Accounting for personnel in the affected area.

Arranging mock drills and monthly fire fighting exercises

Inspecting and maintaining an adequate number of fire fighting equipments,

ensuring the functioning of the fire water system and the fixed fire installations, as

well as the corresponding fire alarms

v) Medical Co-ordinator

The important functions of Medical Co-ordinator will be:

Keeping the dispensary of the facility always ready for an emergency on the piping

at Pumping Station.

Assigning doctors, nurses and first-aid personnel specific duties.

Procuring and maintaining medical supplies, drugs and equipment.






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Arranging for ambulances to transport casualties.

Identifying the nature of the accident before sending victims to a hospital so that

action relevant to the injury can be initiated. He should be acquainted with the

chemicals handled and be aware of the specific treatments to be administered.

Imparting knowledge of first-aid to plant personnel

Imparting health education to workers and training them in the methods of dealing

with pool fires and jet fires.

vi) Personnel/Welfare Co-ordinator

The major functions of the Personnel/Welfare Co-ordinator will be:

Arranging for canteen facilities and special food as per medical advice.

Ensuring the availability of adequate provisions and stores for canteen services.

Making arrangements to meet emergency clothing requirements.

Arranging for communication with the families of casualties.

Maintaining public relations and arranging for a media briefing wherever

necessary.

Assisting in evacuation of personnel and neighbouring people, if necessary.

vii) Transport Co-ordinator

The functions of Transport co-ordinator will be:

To keep all vehicles and drivers in readiness and send the vehicles in keeping

with the requirements of different co-ordinators and officials.

To requisition vehicles from outside agencies, if necessary, for which purpose he

should maintain a list of local transport agencies and be in touch with them.

To make all travel and accommodation arrangements for VIPs and company

employees who may have to travel to or from other locations for the

implementation of the emergency control plan.






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To arrange for VHF hand sets to link rescue teams with the Emergency Control

Room.

viii) Security Co-ordinator

The important functions of Security Co-ordinator in an emergency follow:

Instructing all security personnel to help maintain the law and order.

Leading and assisting an evacuation, if necessary.

Closing all visitor's gates, regulating traffic, permitting entrance only of authorized

persons, discharging contract labourers, casual labourers and employees not

involved in emergency operations in consultation with the Chief Incident Controller.

Drawing a cordon around the area of an accident and co-ordinating with external

security personnel, if necessary.

Informing people and vehicles entering the facility, in advance, of restricted entry,

parking, and disaster-struck areas as communicated by the Chief Incident Controller

and the various co-ordinators.

Issuing guidance to external fire-fighting agencies on the premises, as directed by

the Fire Chief.

Co-ordinating with the local police and informing them about additional patrolling, if

required for law enforcement, traffic control and crime protection, in consultation with

the Chief Incident Controller.

Ensuring that systematic efforts are launched and no confusion or panic ensues.

ix) Press and Public Co-ordinator

The important functions of Press and Public Co-ordinator in an emergency are:

Co-ordinating with the press as the official spokesman for the company on the

disaster and its effects.

Keeping the Chairman & Managing Director informed concerning all press releases

and press queries.






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Co-ordinating all legal matters pertaining to the disaster.

Arranging for photo/video coverage for the record and for information.

x) Finance Co-ordinator

The important functions of the Finance Co-ordinator during an emergency follow:

Responsibility for the financial management and accounting of expenses for disaster

control.

Approval of contracts agreed upon with external services by the relevant co-

ordinators, and arranging the finances for the same.

Arranging for the finance to be paid as compensation to the public, upon the advice

of the Chief Incident Controller.

Preparing, forwarding and settlement of all claims with insurance companies.

Co-ordinating with the Central Excise, Income Tax and Sales Tax authorities to

settle all claims.

Arranging for sufficient finance and ensuring that no activity of any functional co-

ordinator is stopped for a paucity of finance.

xi) Emergency Maintenance Co-ordinator

The important functions of the Emergency Maintenance Co-ordinator during an

emergency are:

Ensuring rapid emergency repair and maintenance of all spill-control, fire fighting

and rescue equipment.

Arranging for the maintenance materials required for disaster control in co-ordination

with the Material co-ordinator.

Providing emergency lighting in the area of a disaster and at other locations

identified by the Chief Incident Controller and functional co-ordinators.






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Arranging for medicines, rescue equipment and fire fighting materials as

requirements of the highest priority.

xii) Material Co-ordinator

The important functions of the Material Co-ordinator during an emergency are:

Procuring all materials required for disaster control.

Procuring medicines, rescue equipment and fire fighting materials on priority.

xiii) External Agencies Co-ordinator

The important functions of the External Agencies Co-ordinator during an emergency

are:

Maintenance of correspondence and contacts with external agencies, for complying

with statutory requirements.

Requesting neighbouring organizations for help in controlling emergencies after

consultation with the chief incident controller.

xiv) Stock Co-ordinator

The important functions of the Stock Co-ordinator during an emergency are:

Responsibility for isolation of storage.

Ensuring that an emergency supply of chemicals required for the implementation of

the disaster control plan is always available.

Arranging the evacuation of processing units as instructed by the Senior Manager

Operations.

Activating the in-built safety/fire protection system if the disaster is in his area.

6.8.5 CHAIN OF COMMAND

The Organisational structure should lay stress on the execution and speedy

implementation of response plans. At the same time, it should be flexible enough to






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adapt to a rapidly changing scenario. All actions must be co-ordinated well, so that the

situation on the whole is under control.

The duties and responsibilities of each individual co-ordinator are to be fixed such that

actions can be taken logically. If any changes are necessitated in the procedure, or in

actions, it should be possible for the front-end area co-ordinator to respond logically.

To achieve the above, the chain of command must have a tiered structure, so that the

supervisors can take a few independent decisions to achieve the ultimate objective.

The chain of command should naturally correspond to the organisational structure with

a clear delineation of the nature of duties and the objectives each position entails. It

should also, clearly spell out the duties of each co-ordinator, and his area of control. All

technicians and operators should know who would issue them their instructions in case

of an emergency. The chain of command should also indicate an alternative for each of

the co-ordinators if any of those designated is not available.

All co-ordinators should see that suitably trained men are deployed for each job. Mock

emergency drills conducted on a regular basis would help the co-ordinators understand

their duties and responsibilities well. The command structure can be improved with the

feedback and experience gained from these drills.

Co-ordinators should never leave the command post unattended. If a co-ordinator is

required to leave the command post for any reason whatsoever, he has to appoint a

deputy to attend to his functions, since the activities will be of a crucial nature, and

admitting no delay.

6.8.6 INTERNAL CO-ORDINATION

COMMUNICATION

Communication includes all physical and administrative means by which operators can

rapidly notify the management, off-site emergency response agencies and the public. It

also includes emergency response actions, which must be taken to protect the health

and safety of the personnel and the public. Communication may be by both, software-

and hardware-oriented systems. An emergency planning cannot be successfully

executed without adequate communication.






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During a disaster, communication channels must be kept open to the Emergency

Control Centre (ECC) and outside agencies. The communication system may be

planned as follows:

1) Voice communication Channels:

i) ECC to

Civilian Hospitals.

Civic authorities including police.

Local fire fighting brigade.

Company corporate office or Headquarters.

ii) ECC to

Medical centre (first aid station)

Fire station

Security gate

2) Audio Communication Channels (Alarms)

ECC to

Disaster warning siren

Central warning system (fire)

3) Fire warning

If the fire is noticed at any sector the fire warning is to be given and to alert all the

sections of the complex. If it is a major fire, the ECC is to be immediately activated.

4) Medical alarm/alert

A medical alarm channel is to be created to alert plant personnel trained in first aid.

The channel should include the following tracks:






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From control room to security.

From control room to the Company Medical Officer

From control room to the nearest civil hospital

5) Warning System

The alarm should be raised by a siren audible at a distance.

The siren system should be so devised so that the types of emergencies can be

identified immediately and appropriate action taken at the first instance. For instance,

different signals could be devised for evacuation, assembling the emergency service

personnel at designated points inside & outside plant.

The siren system is to be designed so that it can be activated from the emergency

control room.

6) Power supply for the communication system

All communication systems should have an independent power backup system.

Walkie-talkies are to be given to personnel directly involved in operations and to

those responsible for the area, for additional communication.

MEDICAL RESOURCES

The medical centre must be situated in a zero risk area, while the first aid facility can

be located within an office building. It is most advisable that a full-fledged medical

centre be planned outside the facilities. The medical centre must be equipped to deal

with at least five injured persons simultaneously to treat burn injuries, multiple

fractures, shock etc. and antidotes.

TRANSPORT

Adequate transport vehicles are to be provided for medical treatment, communication,

evacuation and the movement of emergency staff. A general indication of the types of

vehicles that will be required follows:

i) Ambulances, which can accommodate at least two stretcher cases.






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ii) Pick-up vans, preferably with radio communication system (i.e., walkie-talkie).

iii) General-purpose vehicle (Jeeps and cars).

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

This is a common, permanently installed centre of works. The staff can be called at a

certain level of danger and the concerned activities performed by the selected people.

The control centre must be located outside the reasonable area of hazard and suitably

fortified while also being approachable. The centre must be equipped with emergency

power and should have the following provisions:

An adequate number of external telephones, one accepting outgoing calls only in

order to bypass the switchboards during an emergency.

An adequate number of internal telephones.

Layout of the facility.

Technical documentation including P&IDs, process data and equipment data.

Safety data sheets.

Identified hazard zones for the types of scenarios considered.

Maps marked with escape routes.

Evacuation plans in case evacuation is necessitated.

Information regarding the available fire-fighting and medical services.

Medical first aid facilities to handle two or three people at a time.

A muster roll of employees.

A pick-up van with radio communications systems.

A list of key personnel, with addresses, telephone numbers etc.

Refreshments.






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The emergency control centre need not always be manned. During an emergency, the

persons concerned should be shifted there to direct activities.

An expert/specialist support team is to be identified to provide specialist assistance to

the emergency control room staff, for directing and advising special operations. The

experts' team may contain specialists both from the company and from outside (civic

authorities, other industries, medical care, the fire service, and government agencies).

This team's involvement helps in minimizing the errors in making decisions.

The centre must be provided with an emergency air circulation system so that in the

event of a fire in the vicinity, the centre can be pressurized, thereby protecting the

personnel.

6.8.7 CO-ORDINATION WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

Responsibility for warning the population and conveying information on measures that

necessarily need to be taken by them rests with the civic authorities and other

governmental agencies. Intimation or warning of the incident must be given by the

management to these agencies. The decision as to when the population must be

warned will, however, lie with the civic authorities who will base their decision on the

information supplied by the plant management during the crisis, as well as the

information given earlier, on the likely scenarios of accidents.

Depending upon the methodology adopted for the coordination of various aspects of

disaster management, specific responsibilities have to be fixed for civic and

government agencies. The support of outside agencies is required for emergency

responses such as:

For assisting the fire-fighting service and for firewater.

For medical treatment of casualties in isolated areas.

For evacuation of personnel.

For law-enforcement, traffic-control and crime-control.

For communication and transport facilities.






Rev 0 of 46

For rapid procurement of consumables like the foam compounds and fire hoses.

6.9 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions listed below are based on the emergency scenarios generated in the

consequence analysis section.

1) All credible disaster scenarios and their consequences will have to be considered

for the disaster management plan.

2) Disaster Management procedures will have to be made as per the hazard

distances and hazard zones indicated earlier on in this report.

3) Hazardous zones must be identified in keeping with the consequences of various

scenarios already discussed

4) All the staff at the pumping, pigging and compressor stations and engaged in

maintenance and inspection must be informed of the possible consequences of

all incidents and their potential for damage.

5) A proper warning system shall be developed for identifying hazardous situations

so that disaster plan could be implemented.

6) Access roads, escape routes and evacuation plans will be made as per the

hazard distances and hazard zones.

7) The emergency coordinators shall be easily accessible to the operating staff.

8) The company’s fire-fighting resources may be rendered useless in the event of a

major fire at an isolated or distant location. Mutual aid with civil and commercial

organizations in the area must be worked out to augment these facilities. For the

same reason, effective and speedy means of communication with all mutual-aid

centres must be developed.






Rev 0 of 46

6.10 REFERENCES

1. “Classification of Hazardous Locations”, A.W.Cox, F.P.Lees and M.L.Ang,

Published by the Institution of Chemical Engineers, U.K.

2. “The Reference Manual”, Volume-II, Cremer & Warner Ltd. U.K' (Presently

Entec).

3. “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Hazard Identification, Assessment

and Control”, Frank.P.Lees (Vol. I, II and III), 2nd Ed., Butterworth-Heinemann,

U.K.

4. “Risk Criteria For Land-Use Planning In The Vicinity Of Major Industrial

Hazards”, Health & Safety Executive, UK.

5. “Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis”, AICHE, CCPS

6.11 CONTOURS

All the contours plotted for risk assessment study has been attached as Annexure-XII.

Jet fire due to 5 mm pump seal failure of crude oil pump (AGI-9)

Page 1

Overpressure due to 5 mm pump seal failure of crude oil pump (AGI-9)

Page 2

Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude oil pump (AGI-9)

Page 3

Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude oil pump (AGI-9)

Page 4

Jet fire due to 50 mm leak in crude oil pump (AGI-9)

Page 5

Overpressure due to 50 mm leak in crude oil pump (AGI-9)

Page 6

Jet Fire due to 5 mm seal failure of NG compressor (AGI-25)

Page 7

Jet Fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure of NG compressor (AGI-25)

Page 8

Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure of NG compressor (AGI-25)

Page 9

Jet Fire due to 50 mm large hole near NG compressor (AGI-25)

Page 10

Overpressure due to 50 mm large hole near NG compressor (AGI-25)

Page 11

Jet fire due to 5 mm seal leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 12

Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 13

Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 14

Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 15

Overpressure due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 16

Jet Fire due to 5 mm seal leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 17

Jet Fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 18

Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 19

Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 20

Overpressure due to 50 mm leak at compressor station (compressor station)

Page 21

Jet fire due to 5mm seal failure of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 22

Overpressure due to 5mm seal failure of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 23

Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 24

Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 25

Jet fire due to 50 mm leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 26

Overpressure due to 50 mm leak of crude pump (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 27

Pool fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 28

Jet fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 29

Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 30

Late pool fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping failure at Tank manifold (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 31

Late pool fire due to tank on fire (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 32

Jet Fire due to 5 mm seal leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 33

Jet Fire due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 34

Overpressure due to 20 mm instrument tapping leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 35

Jet Fire due to 50 mm leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 36

Overpressure due to 50 mm leak at NG compressor (Viramgam Terminal)

Page 37

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