Risk and Regulation Autumn 2003

Risk&RegulationMagazine of the ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation No.6 Autumn 2003

Seeds of discontentPublic perceptions of GM

alsoInsurance at risk

Catastrophes and pharmaceutical regulation

The strange death of self-regulation

Planning in the US Air Force

Risk&Regulation: CARR ReviewNo 6 Autumn 2003

Editor: Joan O’MahonyAssistant Editor: Sabrina Antâo

Enquiries should be addressed to: Centre ManagerESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation

The London School of Economics and Political ScienceHoughton Street, London WC2A 2AE

United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 6577 Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 6578Website: www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr/

Email: [email protected]

Published by theESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation

The London School of Economics and Political ScienceHoughton Street, London WC2A 2AE

Copyright in editorial matter and this collection as a whole:London School of Economics © 2003

Copyright in individual articles:p4 © Alan Punter, 2003

p10 © Jürgen Feick, 2003p12 © Charles Baden-Fuller, 2003

Alan Punter, Jürgen Feick and Charles Baden-Fuller haveasserted their moral rights.

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3 Editorial: Regulatory ReflectionsEducational institutions are increasingly subject to 'academic risk'. CARR Co-Directors, Bridget Hutter and Michael Power reflect on the difficulties universities face in responding to government policy.

4 Recognising and Managing Insurance Industry RiskIn our guest column, Alan Punter examines the causes and consequencesof recent instabilities in the non-life insurance industry.

5 CARR NewsAll the latest news plus expert contributions from CARR members.

6 Seeds of DiscontentAgricultural biotechnology continues to trouble the Government. GeorgeGaskell examines the risks of ignoring and of consulting the public.

7 Professionals, Politicians and the Strange Death of Self-RegulationRobert Kaye argues that under pressure from both government and thepublic, professional bodies are having to abandon genteel self-regulation in favour of rigorous regulatory control over their members.

8 Competing for the Future: Managing Risks in the US Air ForceHow are normative arguments about strategic risk management translatedinto organisational practice? Michael Barzelay examines planning in the US air force.

9 Challenging InsurabilityIncreased flood risks in Europe prove to be extremely costly for insurance.Raising the general issue of flood insurability Michael Huber investigates somenational differences in insurability and looks at the regulatory consequences.

10 Catastrophes, regulation and interest accommodation:market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals in the EUJürgen Feick examines market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals withinthe EU and concludes that it still fails to satisfy the Single Market goal.

12 Strategic Decision Making in Large Complex OrganisationsIn our new series on the interface between academic theory and businesspractice, Charles Baden-Fuller examines the efforts of British Petroleum plc (BP) to stay ahead in a hyper-competitive environment.

14 CARR Conferences CARR sponsors risk and regulation conferences throughout the UK.

15 CARR NetworkCARR’s outreach activities across the UK and worldwide.

16 CARR SeminarsReports from CARR’s regular seminar series.

17 CARR BooksAn extensive range of risk and regulation books by CARR members.

18 CARR in PrintNew books and papers by CARR members.

19 CARR PeopleCARR staff and their expertise.

www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr/

Contents

Social scientists need look no further than their ownorganisations for evidence of the rapid growth of riskand regulation issues in modern societies. For at leastthe last ten years, UK universities have been subject tocontinuous change in their regulatory environments,

most recently as the management of ‘academic risk’ has come tothe fore and risk committees have been formed. Indeed, thebiggest risk facing many universities is their helplessness in the faceof shifting government policy. Despite this, academics sometimesimagine that they are separate from the organisational worlds theystudy, as if their local world really is somehow ‘outside’ that of theirintellectual endeavours. This may involve a splitting of theirprofessional and personal selves, with a corresponding loss of whatsome sociologists call reflexivity. And so we have the sometimescurious phenomena of democratic theorists ruling departments withan iron hand, of researchers on health and safety regulationinhabiting offices that constitute a fire hazard, and so on.

The institutionalised difference between academic observing andnon-academic doing, either as a mental or as a social division oflabour, is also sometimes responsible for an aloofness fromresearch subjects. The tendency for academics to emphasiseobserving over doing can lead to wildly unrealistic expectationsof what organisations can deliver. Members of CARR recentlyhad two reminders about the local institutional context in whichour research efforts operate, one relating to the educationalregulatory environment and the other to a more generalregulatory environment. First, we were treated to an informal talkby an LSE assistant registrar on the recent history of regulatoryinitiatives in higher education, encompassing the story of thequal ity assurance evolution in higher education and itsassociated institutional changes. This account provided us with arich insight into the world of the individual manager who mustfind organisational solutions to often bizarre and changingexternal demands, with limited resources and with limited time.

Like all employees, universities and their staff are also subject to,and protected by, a plethora of general employment, health andsafety, fire and financial regulations. This was brought homewhen CARR held its staff training day in July. LSE HumanResources Division led a discussion on the LSE’s ‘DiversityToolkit’, an initiative created in response to a changing legislativeenvironment. The toolkit is essentially an information booklet witha related self-test device intended to raise awareness of diversity

issues within the university. From CARR’s point of view, the toolkitis a specific organisational coping device in the tradition of softregulation. It involves walking a tightrope: satisfying regulatorycompliance pressures while working with a sometimes highlyresistant culture. The very existence of the toolkit itselfconstitutes a form of legal compliance, and its voluntary nature atthe local level seeks a persuasive rather than a mandatory base.Like many regulatory efforts the toolkit endeavours to beinclusive, reaching out to all parts of the School, reminding allstaff of their responsibilities.

The ‘social scientific’ discussion of the toolkit focused on possibleside effects, not least that it might contribute to a compensationculture and increase risk aversion in an organisation that,overburdened with external pressures, is already excessively riskaverse. But the pragmatic modesty of the LSE initiative also showshow organisational agents try to do thingsthat work, and try to appeal to many differentconstituencies at once. We may bemoan theconstant management of appearances inwhich all organisations are engaged, but weshould also recognise the necessaryingenuity of organisational participants increating those appearances.

These two events suggest that academicsneed not look far to see the need for greaterrespect for the compromises of practice, thecomplexities of compliance and theambivalence of organisational agents whotake decisions under less than perfectconditions. This is not to say we shouldabandon the critical detachment which is ourcomparative advantage, but rather that thereis no merit in raising this beyond amethodological principle. These two casesalso suggest a new direction for some of CARR’s energy: ‘inreach’for want of a better term. Having positioned ourselves as apractice-facing unit, which engages with risk and regulationpractitioners, we can also nurture this principle in our own organisation.

Bridget Hutter and Michael PowerCARR Co-Directors

I Autumn 2003 I Risk&Regulation I 3 I

CARREDITORIAL

Regulatory reflections

I 4 I Risk&Regulation I Autumn 2003 I

GUESTCOLUMN

Recognising andmanaging insuranceindustry risk

For some decades, the non-life insurance industry hasdemonstrated highly cyclicalbehaviour and an increasinglyvolatile performance. This is

particularly problematic for an industrywhose core competence is risk. Instead ofdelivering stability to policyholders (andinvestors), the industry has lurched throughperiods of varying availability of cover, andeven greater variability of pricing.

At times, so-called ‘hard’ marketconditions prevail: the capacity to writepolicyholders’ risk becomes harder to find,and, more visibly, premium rates increase.At other times, the market ‘softens’ ascapacity increases and premium rates fall.Previous hard markets in the (a) mid 1970s,(b) mid 1980s and (c) early to mid 1990swere caused by abnormally high lossesthat resulted from, respectively, (a) USproduct liability and medical malpracticeclaims, (b) US commercial liability claims,and (c) the property losses from hurricaneAndrew and the Northridge earthquake.

Unfortunately for insurers and theirshareholders, the soft markets usually lastmuch longer than the hard markets. Forinstance, towards the end of the last softmarket, premium rates were so low thatmost insurance and reinsurance companieswere losing money on their core business ofunderwriting property and casualty risk. Oneindicator of an insurance operation’sprofitability is its combined ratio, which is thecombination of costs (incurred losses plusoperating expenses) as a percentage ofpremiums. An insurance or reinsurance witha combined ratio of over 100 per cent is, ata simple level, losing money because lossesand expenses are exceeding premiums.The combined ratio of the US property andcasualty industry in 2000 was over 110 percent, and then rose above 115 per cent in2001 (in part due to the World Trade Centrelosses). Combined ratios in 2001 forreinsurers were even worse: for USreinsurers it was 142 per cent, for Lloyd’s140 per cent, and for European reinsurers

129 per cent. Clearly such combined ratiosare not sustainable, since under suchconditions reinsurers pay out between $1.29and $1.42 in losses and expenses for each$1 they receive in premium.

The insurance industry has survivedcombined ratios of above 100 per cent formany years, due to one reason alone –investment income. Insurance is one of thefew industries where revenues are receivedbefore most of the associated costs are incurred, so most insurance andreinsurance companies should have apositive cash flow. Significant investmentincome is earned from outstanding lossreserves on old business and from thefavourable timing difference betweenpremiums and losses on current business.Investment income has for many yearsturned negative underwriting results intooverall operating profits, particularly duringthe bull stockmarket of the late 1990s.

The current hard market conditions haddifferent causes from the previous hardmarkets of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.It was caused primarily, not by insurancelosses, but by the 2001 stockmarketcol lapse which took away al l theinvestment income that had hithertosupported unprofitable underwriting. Thecontinued bear stockmarket, exacerbatedby abnormal insurance losses such as theWorld Trade Centre event and by growingprofessional liability losses, have togetherextended the hard market through most of 2003 – an unusually long period for ahard market.

The net amount of capital lost to the globalinsurance industry is summarised below:

The lesson to be learnt here is thatinsurance and reinsurance companies havebeen running risks on both sides of theirbalance sheets, but did not adequatelyrecognise the asset risk that some wererunning with significant proportions of theirinvestments in equities. The lesson waslearnt in the US following the stockmarketcrash in October 1987 and US insurancecompanies have since maintained a muchlower exposure to equities than otherinsurance companies, particularly in Europe.

One consequence of recent events isthat – despite more than two years of hardmarket conditions and the continuingunderwriting profits of most insurance andreinsurance companies – many have hadtheir credit ratings cut by several notchesover the past year or so, mainly because ofthe loss of capital from investment write-downs, and continuing uncertainty overpast liabilities.

However, we must not forget that thecredit rating agencies are not the regulators,although it sometimes seems de facto thatthey are, given their power to destroy thecommercial viability of an insurancecompany by lowering its rating below an ‘A’level. Historically, the insurance regulatoryregime has been based primarily onpremium volume, not on underwritingexposure, nor on investment exposure.Recent experience only adds grist to the millfor a more risk-based approach toinsurance company solvency regulation, onethat can recognise and take into account allthe risks that are inherent in an insuranceoperation: underwriting risk, reserve risk,investment risk, and operational risk.

Alan Punter

Alan Punter is ChiefExecutive Officer ofAon Capital Markets,Aon Limited’sinvestment bankingunit. After 12 yearslecturing onstatistics, Dr Punterentered insurancebroking, where he now has 18 years'experiencespecialising in theanalytical andalternative riskfinancing aspects of insurance andreinsurance.

US$

Global capital at 1/1/2000 882 bn

less WTC 45less Investment losses 2000/01/02 115less Withdrawals of capacity 20less Underfunding of liabilities 102plus New capital raised 35

Global capital at 31/12/2002 635 bn

Source: HSBC Global Insurance Q3 2003

Innovation, Social Risk and Political ResponsibilityPiero Bassetti, a distinguished academic politician andresearcher, delivered a public lecture and discussion seminar inMay on the social and policy implications of innovation in science,technology and business. Mr Bassetti began by examining theconcept of innovation, namely ‘the realisation of the improbable’,and looked at a number of issues that complicate innovativepolitical or business decisions. Special attention was paid to thefact that risk and uncertainty give rise to different difficulties indecision-making processes. Two examples were explored: thedecisions taken by the Allianz insurance company after the attackon the World Trade Centre, and the impact that the introductionof genetically modified foods has had on policy-making andgovernance in northern Italy. Subsequent discussions focused onthe relationship between scientists, technologists, and businesspeople, and the responsibilities they face in implementingsignificant innovations. Reflecting the interdisciplinary content of the subject, the academic events were co-sponsored byCARR, the LSE’s Department of Information Systems and theLSE Cities Programme.


Consultations with CARRVarious national and international agencies have consulted with CARR over recentmonths, including the Financial Services Authority’s Regulatory Strategy and RiskDivision, and DEMOS, the independent think-tank that promotes better publiceducation in politics, economics, the environment, and public policy. From abroad,Statskonsult, the Norwegian Directorate for Communication and Public Managementmet with CARR members to discuss regulatory policies and the organisation ofregulatory agencies.

The Judiciary on TrialIn October, Tim Besley appeared as a ‘witness’ on the Radio 4 programme TheCommission which debated how the judiciary should be selected. The evidence whichTim Besley presented on the programme is drawn from a paper of his which may beviewed at http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/tbesley/papers/courts.pdf.

Civil Service Competency Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge were invited by Rieti,the research organisation of the METI, the Japanese economicsministry, to a conference on civil service competency. Theypresented their research on civil service competency based onthe British Department of Trade and Industry and the GermanEconomics ministry. Hood and Lodge’s approach to thisresearch has been adopted in similar work on the Japaneseministry, conducted by Professor Hideaki Shiroyama of theUniversity of Tokyo. During their stay, Christopher Hood alsogave a seminar on ‘Policy Review and Evaluation in the UK’,and two further seminars on risk and regulation.

CARR ‘Away Day’CARR’s annual staff training day was held at Devonport House in Greenwich in July. A practitioner’s perspective on regulation was provided by Clive Briault (Director,Prudential Standards Division, Financial Services Authority), and Ian Darker(Employee Relations Manager, LSE) and Chris Connelly (Staff Development Unit,LSE) led discussions on diversity and staff development.

Staff NewsWe welcome Amy Eldon who joins CARR as Administrative Assistant and LouiseNewton-Clare who returns as Centre Manager (Finance and Special Projects). Louise will be working alongside Anna Pili who stays with CARR as Centre Manager(Administration, Events and Communications). Welcome also to Javier Lezaun who joinsus as ESRC Research Officer, and Clive Jones who will be a research assistant. We alsocongratulate Yuval Millo on his appointment as ESRC Research Officer and on winningthe K William Kapp Prize, awarded annually for the best article on a theme broadly inaccord with the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPA)Theoretical Perspectives.

We say goodbye to Filippa Corneliussen who has taken up a one-year visitingfellowship at the Centre for the Study of Law and Society, University of California,Berkeley, before joining LSE’s newly established BIOS centre. Goodbye also toStephen Tully who returns to the Law Department, LSE.

We extend our gratitude and appreciation to Henry Rothstein for his hard work on

Risk&Regulation over the last two years. The magazine and readership has flourished

under his editorship. We welcome the new editor, Joan O’Mahony.

Have you moved or changed jobs recently?Please keep us informed of any changes in your contact details so you can continuereceiving Risk&Regulation.Email: [email protected] or Tel: 020 7955 6577

CARRNEWS

Agricultural biotechnology continues totrouble the Government. Confrontedby the continued moratorium on thecommercialisation of geneticallymodified (GM) crops, threats by the

US to take Europe to the World Trade Organisation,an EU directive that recommended publicconsultation, and disagreement in the Cabinet, theUK Government set up a series of independentreviews of GM agriculture. Perhaps it was a moveto buy time, but for the supporters of GM thedetailed reviews of the economics, science, andfield trials were something of a curate’s egg – goodin parts. A fourth review, GM Nation? was intendedto ascertain what the public think about GM. Whileit identified various currents of public opinion, itcould not determine what percentage of the publicholds them because the 37,000 participants were avolunteer and not a representative sample of thepopulation. A celebrated debacle of volunteerpolling occurred during the 1936 US presidentialelection. From a poll of 2.4 million readers, theLiterary Digest wrongly predicted a win for Landon,while Gallop, using a systematic sample, got it right;Roosevelt won by a landslide.

The design of GM Nation? precludes any reliablegeneralisations about public opinion in Britain. Bycomparison with other research, it attracted peoplewho were more informed and more negative to GM.Regardless of these methodological issues, TheGuardian headlined the report as ‘5 to 1 AgainstGM Crops In Biggest Ever Public Survey’, and thisis now the received wisdom. Those (politicians) whoopen the Pandora’s box of public consultation runthe risk of uncomfortable outcomes!

It is interesting how much the GM Nation? reportechoes past debates. From the outset,biotechnology has been controversial. The scientificcommunity implemented a moratorium on researchin 1974, pending clarification of potential health andsafety issues. It was short-lived, and soon thetechnology’s potential economic benefits moved tocentre stage. However, a European survey in 1978showed that the public was troubled by the veryidea of gene technology. In 1994, at a Consensus

Conference on Plant Biotechnology, labelled the‘gene jury’ by The Economist, 16 lay members ofthe public set their own agenda, quizzed expertsand prepared a report. For the jury, the issues to beclarified included the potential benefits and risks,ethical and environmental implications, patenting,the Third World, regulation and product labelling. In1996, survey research showed, once again, thatthe public was troubled by GM agriculture. But thepromoters of biotechnology were in overdrive withtechno-hype. The new life sciences and theirapplications in health and agriculture were progresswrit large; only Luddite anti-technologists couldthink otherwise. Ignoring the public was to cost theindustry dearly.

The ‘watershed years’ of agricultural biotechnologystarted in 1996 with a shipment of GM soya fromthe US and culminated in 1999 in the de factoEuropean moratorium on the commercialisation ofGM crops. With the BSE/CJD crisis and otherhealth and food scares around Europe, theemerging crisis was reinforced by critical scientists,non-governmental organisations, and anincreasingly sceptical press.

As biotechnology diversified into the bio-medicaland agri-food applications, public perceptionsincreasingly diverged. Where the public perceivedclear benefits, as in the case of most medicalbiotechnologies, they discounted the risks.However, in the case of GM crops and foods,which even by the admission of industry offered nodirect benefits to consumers, opposition mounted.

1999 witnessed a definite political response: theintroduction of the de facto moratorium on GMcrops in Europe, a new era of open governance in

Britain, and a revised, more stringent, EuropeanDirective on GM crops. These measures were anacknowledgement that in science and technologypolicy the public cannot be ignored.

A recent Eurobarometer survey in 2002 shows theUK public to have become more optimistic aboutbiotechnology and less opposed to GM crops andfoods. Perhaps this marks a genuine shift inopinion, but it is l ikely that the moratoriumcombined with stringent new regulations on GMsimply took the heat out of the controversy.

In the end though, perhaps the issue is not somuch about the science, but rather about the typeof society that new developments in science andtechnology make possible. Few would argue thatif something is technically feasible it should goahead regardless. Some applications ofbiotechnology, for example cloning humans, arealmost universally ruled out of court. On otherapplications there is less certainty. And here theconflicts that emerge are about the fundamentalquestions: what sort of society (agriculture, food,and environment) is desirable and how can newtechnology help to achieve such goals? These arequestions about social values; science alonecannot answer them. Hence, any platform ofpublic debate is to be applauded and in time nodoubt, appropriate procedures will be developed.Of course, the risk for the promoters of some newtechnologies is that the hurdle of public opinionmay be too high. But if they wish to avoid the riskof reliving the troubled and costly history of GMcrops and foods, is there any other option?

George Gaskell is a CARR Research Associate andDirector of the Methodology Institute, LSE.


CARRRESEARCH

Seeds of discontentAgricultural biotechnologycontinues to trouble theGovernment. George Gaskellexamines the risks of ignoringand of consulting the public.

Self-regulation has long been seen asone of the defining characteristics of aprofession. For the vast majority ofprofessional people, this has meant littlemore than undertaking an accredited

course of qualification, paying an annual retentionfee, and hoping to avoid investigation formisconduct. Now, however, professional regulation,is undergoing a revolutionary transformation, withpractitioners required to account for themselvesregularly in order to retain their registered status.

This expansion in professional regulation has beenmost keenly felt by healthcare professionals,particularly following the Bristol Royal Infirmaryscandal and Harold Shipman’s crimes. Stateregulation of healthcare continues to increasedramatically, with the creation of a unifiedCommission for Healthcare Audit and Improvement,and the introduction of statutory appraisal for doctorsin the NHS. Allied to this, is the General MedicalCouncil’s own introduction of five-yearly revalidation,requiring all doctors to justify their clinical practiceperiodically in order to retain their licence to practice.

A similar audit phenomenon is evident in the riseof Continuing Professional Development (CPD),which over the next eighteen months will becomecompulsory for all solicitors, barristers, doctors, anddentists. This, combined with the increasingrecourse by clients to complaints systems (four percent of doctors are the subject of a complaint to theGMC every year) means that professional regulationis swiftly becoming a routine, pervasive, ongoingelement of professional life.

As professional regulation becomes ever morepervasive, the extent of professional autonomydiminishes. While the rhetoric of self-regulation

continues to be employed, it masks a fundamentaldiminution in the role played by members of theprofessions in regulating themselves. Ostensiblyself-regulating bodies now include ever-growingnumbers of lay members. The new GeneralTeaching Council for England (GTC), for instance,describes itself as a self- regulatory body, eventhough one-third of its council are layrepresentatives. (As a possible indication of futuredevelopments, the GTC has avoided the ‘great andthe good’ approach of similar bodies in favour of aformal stakeholder model, with appointeesrepresenting organisations from Universities UK andthe CBI to the Equal Opportunities Commissionand the Church of England.)

Under prompting from the Government, theGeneral Medical Council has moved to a similarblend of lay and practitioner members, withGovernment reticence about professional self-regulation clearly evident in its language: ‘Self-regulation’, it argues, ‘has been a cornerstone of theNHS since its inception. The Government remainscommitted to professionally led regulation.’ Yet,despite the impression of continuity, the statementexposes a subtle sleight of hand, a shift from self-regulation to professionally led regulation.

In addition, the traditional professional bodieshave been downgraded by the insertion of a newmezzanine tier of sectoral state regulatory bodies, toregulate the regulators. The Bristol scandalprompted the creation of a new Council for theRegulation of Health Care Professionals, to whichthe twelve professional organisations involved inhealthcare are now subject. The AccountancyFoundation – another stakeholder-based body – hasbeen slotted above the industry’s six main

professional bodies, although its powers are nowbeing transferred to the Financial Reporting Council.Meanwhile, poor performance by the Law Society’sOffice for the Supervision of Solicitors led theincoming Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, toupgrade the Legal Services Ombudsman to a LegalServices Commissioner, with new powers to setrequirements and targets for the professionalassociations – a move, perhaps, from ‘enforced self-regulation’ to actively enforced self-regulation.

Yet if politicians and the public alike have shown alack of faith in professional self-regulation, theydiverge on the question of how, and by whom, thepolitical profession itself should be regulated. Despitea series of high-profile failures and the collapse ofpublic trust in politicians, political faith in self-regulation inside Westminster and Whitehall remainsundiminished. MPs and Ministers have struggledhard to maintain control over their own affairs.

Last year the Wicks Committee on Standards inPublic Life recommended a series of measuresdesigned to strengthen the role of the ParliamentaryCommissioner for Standards, after a well publicisedbreakdown in relations between MPs and theprevious Commissioner. In effect, Wicks sought tobypass the self-regulatory components in seriouscases. Rejecting these recommendations, however,the House of Commons’ Committee on Standardsand Privileges insisted instead on retaining its right tooverturn its Commissioner’s findings. Wicksfollowed this up earlier this year with arecommendation that the Prime Minister appoint apanel of ‘three wise men’ who could be called uponto investigate allegations of misconduct againstministers. This in turn was rejected by the PM, whoargued that he needs the flexibility to respond tocircumstances, even when this leads to a situation –as occurred during last year’s ‘Cheriegate’ – whereDowning Street announces with a straight face thatthe Prime Minister, after a thorough examination, hascleared himself of all allegations made against him.

Therein lies the biggest contradiction. Professionssuch as medicine and teaching consistently topleague tables in public trust, yet they are notnecessarily trusted to regulate themselves.Politicians, by contrast, consistently rank withjournalists and estate agents at the bottom end ofsuch tables. It is therefore highly unlikely that thepublic would trust the capacity of politicians to self-regulate better than the more trustworthyprofessions. In response, perhaps politicians shouldsubmit themselves to the same sort of independentscrutiny that they expect of others.

Robert Kaye is ESRC Research Officer at CARR.

CARRRESEARCH

Professionals, politicians and the strange death of self-regulation


Robert Kaye argues that under pressure from both governmentand the public, professional bodies are having to abandongenteel self-regulation in favour of rigorous regulatory control over their members.

Influential tracts on strategic managementimplore executives to ‘compete for the future.’Executives are told to visualise slowly-arisinghazards and to mitigate them through short-runefforts, such as cultivating corporate capabilities.

In short, the advice is to manage strategic risks. The argument in favour of managing strategic

risks is essentially a normative one: it does notdescribe what most executives actually do. Forthis normative idea to serve in practice,organisational leaders need insights into therealities of strategic risk management. Thoserealities can be revealed by sensitively applyingorganisational decision making theories toexperiences where leadership groups haveaccepted the responsibility of managing long-term, strategic risks. One such experience lies inthe United States Air Force in the post-Cold Warperiod. This experience is the basis of therecently published book entitled, Preparing for theFuture: Strategic Planning in the US Air Force.

During the Cold War, long-range planning inthe Air Force focused on designing hypothetical(and unaffordable) military force structures thatwould effectively resist a Soviet invasion ofWestern Europe and a North Korean invasion ofSouth Korea. With the end of the Cold War,attention focused on reducing force structure,placing less emphasis on the nuclear mission,and becoming an expeditionary rather thanforward-based garrison force. Having turned thiscorner, the Air Force’s leadership began to thinkabout its future contribution to the achievementof national security goals on a time-scale of 25-30 years. Senior leaders collectively tackled thisquestion during the 1996-97 period by devisingand operating a novel process of strategicvisioning and long-range planning. The immediateproduct included a strategic vision prefiguring atransition to the nation’s Space and Air Force anddelineating a half-dozen core competences, suchas precision engagement and information

superiority. This effort set the Air Force on a long-term path of innovating its managerial practicesfor strategy development and implementation,which has in turn enabled changes in spendingpriorit ies, technological directions, andorganisational culture. Indeed, the content of thevision itself has changed, after periodic efforts toreassess and revisit it.

The Air Force has developed, in effect, adistinctive approach to managing strategic risks,one facet of which relates specifically to strategicvisioning. Under the Air Force’s approach,strategic visioning efforts were guided by threeprinciples: ‘backcasting from the future’,‘collective buy-in’, and policy management. Thebackcasting principle was meant to undercutplanning routines that concentrated on predictingthe long-term ramifications of medium-termplans. Instead, planning efforts were directed atreducing the risk of a future mismatch betweenthe Air Force’s capabi l i t ies and the pol icyenvironment. The collective buy-in principle wasintended to invest the strategic vision and long-range plan with the collective authority of thesenior leadership cadre. Collective buy-in wasequally intended to ensure that the processproduced understanding and commitment on thepart of the service’s future top leaders, all ofwhom were already playing important roles. Thepolitical management principle was geared to thefact that the Air Force’s long-run future dependedhugely on the policy-making community’s beliefsand attitudes on national security and defenceissues. The Air Force sought to convey acompelling story about its contribution to nationalsecurity over the long-run. As can be seen, theguiding ideas of strategic visioning touched onorganisational and political dynamics, as well ason the framing of analytical tasks appropriate tostrategic risk management.

The Air Force has applied these principlesskilfully in designing and operating its strategic

visioning practices, beginning with the processled by Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman in 1996-97. To illustrate, the Fogleman-led process wastimed to feed directly into an anticipated strategicdefence review, mandated by Congress andconducted by the Department of Defense. Theprocess included a year long preparatory effort bya long-range planning Board of Directors whichhas three star generals in key line and staffpositions, was chaired by the vice chief, andsupported by an ad hoc staff group attached tothe chief’s office. Preparation efforts becameintensive as the culminating event of the processdrew near. This was an unprecedented five-daysenior leadership conference, devoted toresolving 16 major long-range planning issuesand agreeing on the big issue of whether theinstitution was going to acknowledge and expandits role beyond the atmosphere, ie, in the domainof ‘military space.’

The study provides an explanation of howFogleman’s general principles of strategicvisioning were designed and improvised into aworkable method for interactive thinking andnegotiation among busy, high status individualswithin the organisation. This explanation – whichis highly sensitive to context factors – providesinsights into the practicalities of translatingnormative arguments about strategic r iskmanagement into innovative organisationalpractices that are potentially effective. In this way,the book pursues CARR’s research agenda onorganisations and risk, with specific application topublic management.

Michael Barzelay is a CARR Research Associateand Reader in Public Management. Preparing for the Future: Strategic Planning in the US AirForce. By Michael Barzelay and Colin Campbell,Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,2003. To order a copy: www.brookings.edu/press/books/preparingforthefuture.htm


CARRRESEARCH

Competing for the future: managingrisks in the US Air Force

How are normative arguments about strategic riskmanagement translated into organisational practice?Michael Barzelay examines planning in the US air force.

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CARRRESEARCH

Why is the insuranceindustry willing to insuresome risks and unwillingto insure others? Why, forexample, did the industry

insure only fractions of nuclear technology,and more recently refuse to insuregenetically modified (GM) crops, while itaccommodates the costlier and moreharmful risks of storms, floods, andearthquakes? Behind the insuring ofhazards there is a complex and sometimesunpredictable process of identifying thoseevents the industry can deal with and thosewhere an insurance approach is bound tofail. Some of this may be explained byeconomic factors. The insurance sector isunder severe pressure: in particular, firmshave suffered greatly from the downturn instock markets. Political and public anxietiesover ‘new risks’, such as terrorism,biotechnology, or climate change, all placeadditional pressure on the industry. Butdecisions about what to insure and what notto insure are not solely based on economicfactors, but also on political considerationsand public pressure.

Insurance of risks associated with climaticchange is a good example of thevulnerabilities of the state and the insuranceindustry. The high price of interventionimpedes any immediate action, yet thehazards will not just go away. As the risks ofclimate change increase in size andintensity, the willingness to act, or react,decreases in the same degree. In 1990, thecost of damages caused by a hurricane inthe USA were estimated to be below $1billion; ten years later, estimates of $100billion seem too cautious. Only if the costsof impacts clearly outweigh the costs ofinterventions – together with the costs togovernment of making insurance firmsmove – can the inactivity in this policy fieldbe overcome.

The pressures of dramatically increasingcosts and uncertainties about new forms ofrisk have had a decisive impact on current

insurance activities. Ulrich Beck claims in hisWorld Risk Society that these new forms areincreasingly difficult to predict and to control;we thus live in a world of more and moredangers, and fewer and fewer insurablerisks. This observation assumes, however,no change in the norms and institutionalarrangements of risk-assessment in theinsurance industry. An alternative claim isequally plausible; that insurance adapts tothe new situation, modifying the conditionsof insurability and ensuring continuity.

In any event, the continued willingness toinsure general risks seems to contradictBeck’s analysis. For example, there areproblems with measuring weather-relatedrisks such as storms and floods: datarelevant to insurance is often missing, and itis difficult to determine with any precisionthe frequency and scale of such events.Improving the technical basis is welcomeand necessary, but the safest response tosuch risks involves using the state as insurerof last resort. Currently, this politicalinvolvement takes the form of regulation:defining and clarifying the responsibilitiesand limitations of insurance.

While some may be happy with the state’sshifting of responsibility to the insuranceindustry, others would argue that the stateshould take a more active role in thecoverage against hazards. This role wouldinvolve not only shared financialresponsibility, but also negotiations aboutthe fundamental conditions of insurability. InGermany and Austria, for example, state-run flood administration is currently beingtransformed into a public-privatepartnership. But even if such partnershipsare a promising solution to insurabilityconstraints, they are not without problems.For example, the English flood insuranceregime is one of the few private insuranceregimes in the world; traditionally theindustry is fully responsible forcompensation, while the state’s role isconfined to flood prevention. But chronicand destructive flooding, particularly the

floods of 1998 and2000 challenged all this.Increasingly dissatisfied with state regulatoryefforts, the industry threatened tosubstantially reduce its coverage of floodrisk. And more radically, it introduced newbuilding codes and development guidelinesas a means of pressuring the state to investmore in flood protection, thus altering thetraditional division of responsibilitiesbetween state and industry. Now, state andindustry actively compete with each otherfor some regulatory tasks.

As with floods, the need for a politicalresponse goes beyond national borders.The challenges of insurability might bemet to some extent by the growth ininternational government, by theinternationalisation of financial activities,by regulatory competition, and by public-private partnerships. Yet, how exactlythese different aspects contribute, orcould contribute, to stabilising risks is stillunclear. Moreover, attempts to establishthe adequacy of these ‘solutions’ remaininhibited by difficulties of establishing acommon understanding of insurability.Certainly, a broader social scienceperspective on the insurance system andon the role of insurance firms is needed tocontribute to a better understanding of the sector, its main actors and its future development.

Michael Huber is AON Senior ResearchFellow at CARR.


Increased flood risks in Europe prove to be extremely costly for insurance. Michael Huber investigates somenational differences in flood insurability and looks at theregulatory consequences.

Challenging insurability

I 10 I Risk&Regulation I Autumn 2003 II 10 I Risk&Regulation I Autumn 2003 I

From industrial self-regulation toaccident-induced governmental regulationThe pharmaceutical industry was first subjected tomore or less stringent pre-marketing controls in the20th century. Around the turn of the centuryindustrial mass production of pharmaceuticalspecialties had largely overtaken the tradition ofindividual preparations by local pharmacists. Thisdevelopment, along with the growth of internationaltrade, dramatically increased and spread the risksassociated with the consumption of pharmaceuticalproducts. Governments, however, were reluctant tointervene, despite the early warnings fromphysicians, and the demands of health insurers andpublic health care providers, who disliked spendingtheir members’ money or public budgets forpossibly ineffective or even outright dangerousdrugs. But, except for a few countries like the USA,Sweden, or Norway, national discussions beforeWorld War II were regularly stalled by the argumentthat strict pre-marketing controls would burdencompanies with additional costs and endanger thegrowth and international competitiveness of aninnovative industry. There were strong lobbiesagainst effective governmental intervention in thepharmaceutical industry in all industrialisedcountries. And in these early decades it was not toodifficult to convince politicians that industrial self-regulation would assure product quality mostadequately, most efficiently, and with the leastdisruption to the industry. This position made senseinsofar as it was the pharmaceutical industry itselfwhich possessed the scientific and technological

means to test and control the assurance of productstandards. This informational asymmetry betweengovernmental regulators and pharmaceuticalindustry is still effective today, although to a muchlesser degree.

Motives such as consumer protection against fraud,cost control in health care or rationalisationmeasures in war-time economies may be cited forcompelling governments to introduce systematicpre-marketing controls. But the single mostimportant factor for governmental interventionobliging pharmaceutical manufacturers toobtain approval has been drug accidents,some verging on the catastrophic. Publicoutcries in national and, later on,international arenas have pushedpoliticians to set up regulatory regimeswhose political function is to removethe possibility of blame from politicaldecision-makers through preventivemeasures and the delegation ofcontrol tasks to specialised regulatoryauthorities. The Thalidomide catastrophe,surfacing in 1961, was undoubtedly the mostdramatic, most internationally publicised and mostpolitically consequential drug accident; it had astrong impact on practically the whole industrialisedworld. In the USA, the drug had not been approveddue to an already existing safety control system andto the courageous resistance of Dr Frances Kelseyof the Food and Drug Administration against internaland outside political pressure tolicence the drug. Yet even there,foetuses were damaged andcrippled children were born tomothers who had taken thesedative during pregnancy; theyhad either acquired the drugoutside the USA or receivedthe medicine from theirfamily doctors as part of ates t ing/pre-marke t ingcampaign. An estimated10,000 handicapped children wereborn worldwide, mainly in Europe, except for Francewhich had not yet approved the drug due tobureaucratic delays. This major catastrophe waspublicly understood as proof that industrial self-

regulation had failed; a situation that could not behandled by merely symbolic policies.

National responses and the European CommunityIn the US the Thalidomide catastrophe saved apharmaceutical regulation bill that was close tofailure in the US Congress. The bill ultimatelyintroduced the strictest market entry regulation sofar, based on proofs of pharmaceutical quality,toxicological safety and therapeutical efficacy (theKefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962). It became

the regulatory model for policy formation in theEuropean countries. While American policy-making and implementation profited from thedynamics of the ‘new social regulation’, in

many European countries industry lobbyingfirst tried to preserve as much industry self-

regulation as possible.

The upcoming wave of new national regulationwas a challenge for the still young European

Community. Despite lively communication and‘learning’ between national governmentsconcerning this new regulatory task, differingmeasures in the member states threatened toincrease non-tariff barriers to trade, instead oflowering them as stipulated in the EEC treaty.Therefore, the EC-Commission prepared policydirectives, the first coming into effect in 1965, inorder to harmonise national legislation. Its intentionwas to arrive at functionally equivalent nationalpolicies and implementation practices that wouldencourage mutual recognition of national regulatorydecisions. But this mode of European marketintegration by and large either failed or did not liveup to expectations. European harmonisationbecame increasingly dense and detailed, measures

of information, communication, and cooperationbetween national authorities were

introduced, and semi-formalisedprocedures supported by a Europeanevaluation committee (CPMP) were

supposed to foster regulatory consensus-building between national agencies.

Nonetheless, national regulatory decision-makingdid not converge sufficiently to create a singlemarket for pharmaceuticals.

CARRRESEARCH

Catastrophes, regulation and interest accommodation

Jürgen Feick examinesmarket entry regulation for

pharmaceuticals within the EUand concludes that it still fails tosatisfy the Single Market goal.

Incrementalism and a module of structural changeUnti l the early 1990s, the development ofpharmaceutical regulation within the EC had beenone of incremental institutional evolution. Thesingle incremental steps may be regarded asattempts to correct failures on the road to mutualrecognition. They were largely without success,since final regulatory decisions remained nationaland the European implementation input was non-binding. A fundamental structural change wasintroduced in 1995 with the regulatory module ofthe Centralised Procedure establishing an originalEuropean regulatory infrastructure, with theEuropean Agency for the Evaluation of MedicinalProducts as its focal institution, and a decision-making process within which marketingauthorisations are issued by the EC-Commissionand are valid in all member states. Furthermore, asemi-Europeanised approval procedure came intoforce in 1998, the Decentral ised or MutualRecognition Procedure, containing the very rarelyutilised provision for a binding European arbitrationstage should mutual recognition fail.

A ‘policy-patchwork’ accommodating a variety of interestsThis leaves us with a ‘policy-patchwork’ (Héritier) ofthree different marketing authorisation procedures inthe European Community, all for the same regulatorytask, and all based on a maximally harmonised legalframework. These three procedures discriminatebetween types of medicine, distinguished essentiallyby their degree of innovativeness and the number ofmarkets targeted by the pharmaceuticalentrepreneur. In order of degree of Europeanisationthe three procedures are:

1. the Centralised Procedure, obligatory for all bio-hightech medicines, optional for all otherwiseinnovative medicines, leading to a single EC-widevalid marketing authorisation;

2. the Decentralised or Mutual RecognitionProcedure, based on coordinated national decisionsand applicable whenever a medicinal product shallbe marketed in more than one member state and if(1) is not applied;

3. purely national procedures for marketingapplications, targeted at only one member state’smarket, provided (1) does not apply.

This complex procedural configuration reflects alarge variety of economic, political, administrativeand therapeutic interests. In fact, theiraccommodation within a differentiated regulatorylandscape has been a precondition for theacceptability of the most Europeanisingimplementation framework, the CentralisedProcedure. The latter satisfies the interests of theinnovative, internationally oriented pharmaceuticalindustry by opening up a large market with one,even more efficiently organised, procedure. This partof the industry, as well as national governments andthe Commission, views it as a measure toreestablish and enhance the innovativeness andcompetitiveness of the European pharmaceuticalindustry and Europe as an industrial site. TheCommission gains implementation competences atthe expense of national authorities, but theseauthorities may content themselves with extensiveparticipation rights in the procedure. The two otherprocedures are in the interest of pharmaceuticalcompanies whose product range, regulatorycapabilities, or territorial marketing approach aretuned to national or regional markets and totraditional regulatory liaisons. National governmentsappreciate the contribution of these firms to GDP

and high-qualification jobs, andnational authorities’ regulatory

capacity and autonomy isguaranteed by the continuationof these nationally based

procedures. The diversity of

procedures leading to the output of a variety ofmedicines, some with a rather national focus, alsoserves the heterogeneous therapeutical interests ofdoctors and patients. One is tempted to speak of an‘institutional isomorphy’ (DiMaggio/Powell) betweeninterest and regulatory structure. But the originalEuropean goal, that of creating a single market forpharmaceuticals, is only achieved for the mostinnovative medicines. As long as the mutualrecognition of national regulatory decisions is notautomatic, and as long as the Centralised Procedureis not obligatory for all applications, there will be noEC-wide access to all medicines available within theEC (see table 1).

The limits of ‘private interest government’and the quest for transparency

This overall analysis does not mean that all interestsare served equally well. Since the strengthening ofmarket entry control for pharmaceuticals in thesecond half of the twentieth century, an unresolveddispute has been underway between those whoclaim that tight regulation might impede medicalinnovation and economic growth and those whomake the criticism that patients might be less wellprotected than commercial interests. Critics wouldalso argue that even though these new regulationshave not been established on behalf of large parts ofindustry, and even against their resistance, theirfurther development and, especially, theirimplementation have become increasingly biasedtowards industrial interests; this is mainly due tochanges in administrative orientation and behaviour.Nevertheless, there are clear limits to what has beencalled ‘private interest government’ (Bernstein). Afterthe catastrophe of the 1960s, public awareness istoo great to allow major regulatory problems to passunnoticed. Politicians fear that they might losesupport and votes, and companies that theircommercial image could be damaged and that theymight face liability claims. For this mechanism ofpublic control to function properly, transparency is anecessity. Given the complexity of this highlytechnical product, full transparency of applicationdata and procedures is demanded by external expert‘watchdogs’ and ‘whistle blowers’. There areobjections in the name of commercial secrets and,furthermore, warnings that this would strengthen aninnovation-averse, precautionary attitude, because ofa potentially over-anxious public. If so, all partieswould have to prove their case in public; theargument is that an open society can not toleratesecrecy simply because matters becomecomplicated. Otherwise, the establishment oftechnocratic power structures and the misuse ofappeals to complexity for the protection of partialinterests seem inevitable.

Jürgen Feick was a CARR Visiting Fellow and is aSenior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institutefor the Study of Societies.


CARRRESEARCH

AUT B DK F * GER NL S UKAUT – 59 49 43 81 57 48 54B 72 – 55 52 79 66 52 60DK 81 73 – 60 84 76 73 71F * 74 69 58 – 75 68 58 63GER 68 54 43 42 – 50 42 49NL 80 76 65 56 84 – 61 69S 79 71 74 59 83 72 – 70UK 68 62 55 60 73 62 53 –

Selected countries; active ingredients categorized according to ATC-Code.Source: EURO-Medicines Database; Folino-Gallo, P. et al., 2001, Availability of medicines in theEuropean Union, in: European Journal of Pharmacology, 57: 443* Source: EURO-Medicines Database, www.euromedicines.org (date: 23.11.2001)

COUNTRY 2

CO

UN

TR

Y 1

Table 1: No single market for medicinesMutual availability of active ingredients (Country 1 > Country 2 in %)

Strategic decision makingin large complex organisations

Alively joint meeting was held betweenBritish Petroleum plc (BP) and CARRon 13 May 2003 to discuss strategicdecision making in large complexorganisations. This article explores the

main intellectual themes that were raised at themeeting, and assesses their implications for the riskand regulation agenda.

The theoretical ideas Complex organisations face the ‘Red Queen effect’(a reference to Lewis Carroll’s Alice Through TheLooking Glass): they have to run fast to stand still. Tobecome successful, or to stay successful, they haveto run even faster. Many industries feature this kindof hyper-competition. In hyper-competitiveenvironments, there is a degree of similarity betweenthe players. The experience of Dutch financialservices is that most firms follow each other and thatthey do this to avoid the risk of being left out. Yetdangers still remain because blind copying does noteliminate risk. So what can organisations such asBP do? How do they run faster?

The insights of strategic management suggestthat the process of strategy – the means by whichstrategy is developed – is as important as strategyitself. Good processes are harder to copy thangood strategies; hence good processes may bethe source of advantage. Good processes are alsoan opportunity to avoid risks of failure. The keyprocesses in any large organisation are: co-ordinating, planning and decision making. Theseshould be seen as ‘co-evolutionary’, that is, asdynamic interactions between top-management,middle-management, and the environment.

The conversationsBP recognises the Red Queen effect. In contrast to20-30 years ago, today the oil industry faces hyper-competition. Across the value-chain, theperformance of the three super majors – BP, Shell,and Exxon – have converged in the last decade. Inthis environment, BP undergoes constant change toensure that it is always moving forward. Thedimensions of change are many-fold. They includechanges in structures, in the measurement ofperformance, in systems used to fine tune the

running of the company, and in the people whoparticipate in decision making. The forces forchange at BP are both external and internal: thepressures of stock markets and rivals, andpressures from those who work in the corporationwho desire to do better and to avoid failure.

One particular dimension of change anddifferentiation that is considered highly important isthe arrival and influence of John Browne as the ChiefExecutive Officer (CEO) at BP, and the series ofmergers and acquisitions that have followed. Anotherdimension is the emphasis on environmental issuesand BP’s determination to be progressive. But thereare other factors that create path dependency,stability, and occasionally resistance to change.These include BP’s history, especially that of itsemphasis on oil exploration.

Planning processes in BP are well developed, asa result of the pressures arising from the hyper-competition, and of BP’s experience of facing severefinancial difficulties in the early 1990s. There are bothtop-down processes and bottom-up processes.These planning processes do not just involve thedivisions and the operating units, but they alsoengage with interests such as the board and keyinvestors. The discussion at the CARR/BP meetingsuggested that planning is highly regarded and hasproved to be flexible.

BP’s longer-term strategy process is lessformalised that its planning process. While there areformal strategy reviews with senior executives,many strategic issues are managed on a more adhoc basis, involving both informal and formalprocesses. When challenged, those in theorganisation argue that major ideas and initiativessuch as mergers that appear to be spontaneouscan be traced back to the outcome of planningprocesses. They can (at least retrospectively) berationalised and justified into a common framework.It was also argued that planning and strategyprocesses interacted dynamically.

Performance measurement is a key dimension ofBP’s planning process. Indeed, the observers arguedthat this is, perhaps, the most critical feature of BPthat provides the real glue to the seemingly disparateset of businesses. But, BP shows no sense ofcomplacency; it has changed its measures over the

years, and there is still evolution and lively debate onthe subject. This debate extends to askingmethodological and philosophical questions of whatshould be measured (processes or outcomes) and ofhow measurement is best executed.

BP’s performance measurements are linked topay and reward, thus providing incentives formaintaining results. But to see it only in these termsis to miss the point. BP closely links performancemeasurement to resource allocation processes andplanning. How resources are allocated is based onboth formal prospective systems (plans andproposals) and retrospective systems of assessmentof past performance. Planning, proposing, andassessment occur within the system in a complexand sophisticated manner, linking performancemeasurement to strategising and strategy debates.

Comments and reflectionsAn unsaid feature of the meeting was that a majorityof the people in staff functions at Head Office arethere on temporary secondment from the line. Thisis deliberate. It serves to ensure the secureconnection between the line and the centre. Moreformally, the idea is that the centre will not manageday-to-day operations, but only guide them viaplanning and performance measurements. Tofurther reinforce this separation, the location of HeadOffice has been moved recently to a relatively smallbuilding in the West End of London. There is a senseof this being a think-tank or centre of ideas.

Second, the central concern of the BP executivesis that of communication and coordination. Whereasmanagement and economic theory sometimesassume that hierarchical organisations have systemsthat facilitate communication, in BP the debate isaround the difficulties of doing just this. Manyprofessional planners assume that organisationsdebate intensely about what to do next, but BPseems to be equally concerned with how to do thenext things well. It also believes that this will providea secure way of thinking about the future.

BP has experienced many mergers andacquisitions recently, and some have been quitesignificant. This has required the welding of differingcultures into a single enterprise. Although BP hasinsisted that the acquired companies take on BPsystems, several acquisitions have been undertakento change and sharpen further the BP culture andinstil new ideas. These mergers have createdconstructive tensions. Now, planning andperformance measurement rely on language. In BPmuch time and effort is spent defining ideas,clarifying them, and testing them among the

CARRINPRACTICE


In our new series on the interface between academic theory and business practice, Charles Baden-Fuller examines theefforts of British Petroleum plc (BP) to stay ahead in a hyper-competitive environment.


CARRINPRACTICE

constituencies and stakeholders. Some of thecentrally-driven initiatives are quite small, some aremuch bigger. The perception is that to change

things from above, the language has to be chosencarefully. This organisation may have strong top-management, but it is clearly aware of the

need to communicate and coordinate if it is toremain effective.

DiscussionOne of the roles of CARR is to promote asophisticated attitude to risk. Risk has manydimensions, especially in large complexorganisations. As a result of the meeting, it seemsthat further discussions and research can beundertaken on how complex organisations such asBP deal with risk, on what we can learn from theirexperience, and on what we can suggest to them forthe future. For example, BP is heavily dependent on

coordination at all levels to avoid risks. Do the currentplanning and control systems adequately cope withthese risks? The organisation is also under pressureto engage in constant change. Does this pressure toimprove performance and to innovate result in theorganisation exposing itself, and others, to higherrisks along certain dimensions, while it is, at thesame time, reducing risks along other dimensions?Although the company takes great pains to identifyits many stakeholders (including shareholders,employees, customers, and the environment), themeeting agreed that there appears to be a genuinesearch for new ideas and new techniques that canresolve as yet hidden tensions.

Charles Baden-Fuller was a CARR Visiting Fellow and is Professor of Strategy and Editor of Long Range Planning at Cass BusinessSchool, City University.

NGOs, Democratisation, and the Regulatory StateBridget Hutter, Joan O’Mahony and Stephen Tully

In April and September, CARR hosted a two-stage conference with the European Policy Forum(EPF), the European Economic and SocialCommittee, and the Future GovernanceProgramme of the Economic and SocialResearch Council (ESRC), on the role andregulation of civil society in national and Europeangovernance. The conference began in Londonwith participants responding to a paper by FrankVibert, director of EPF. Vibert cautiouslyrecognised the benefits of the growing public roleof non-governmental organisations (NGOs), butcriticised the conventional notion that theseorganisations are necessarily ‘schools fordemocracy’. He went on to outline proposals fortheir internal regulation and externalaccountability. Most respondents to Vibert’spaper agreed that NGOs may not actually meetdemocratic criteria in their own activities. ThusNGOs become not just a regulatory force in theirown right but also potential regulatory subjects.The debate turned to regulatory tools that mightprotect the potentially beneficial initiatives offormally independent civic groups, and that havethe capacity to preserve the innovative andflexible character of the NGO sector.

The debate continued in Brussels where theEuropean Commission’s current implementation of

new standards for the consultation of civil societyorganisations provided the backdrop to an excitingexchange of views on the nature and conditions ofa European public sphere, and on therepresentation and regulation of NGOs at theEuropean level. Contributions from a number ofcivic groups, including Amnesty, Solidar, and thePermanent Forum of Civil Society provided a moreempirical, and somewhat optimistic, counter-weight to Beate Kohle Koch’s and ClaudioRaedelli’s theoretical work on the limitations ofcurrent European democratic systems. KohleKoch and Raedelli’s concern was with the isolationof European political spaces from a European widepolitical debate and the failure of European citizensto identify themselves as European political actorswith the capacity and will to affect outputs. SomeNGO speakers urged stronger recognition forNGOs in the proposals from the Convention nowbeing considered by the Inter-GovernmentalConference. Yet, the NGOs present spoke inbroadly positive terms of the pattern of exchangebetween the Commission and interest groups.What was also apparent was that NGOs werenow accepting the need to take on board thedebate on governance and were aware that withNGO influence went NGO accountability. Thequestion for them was the framework.

The meetings benefited from a regulator’sperspective provided by Rosie Chapman andNancy North of the UK Charity Commission. Bothspeakers pointed to the voluntary efforts of UKcharities to improve transparency andaccountability, but also argued the need for someinternational standards for NGOs, such as theinternational accountancy standards currentlybeing developed for commercial entities and thepublic sector; as yet, there is no equivalent for thecivic organisation. John Roberts outlined therelevance of the debate on the higher standards ofcorporate governance in the business and itsapplication to debates about higher standards ofNGO governance.

The September meeting closed with acontribution by David O’Sullivan, Secretary-General, General Secretariat, EuropeanCommission. Mr O’Sullivan cautioned against thedangers of funding a Brussels-based system ofNGOs out of kilter with national-based civicgroups, and opposed suggestions for an NGOaccreditation system which he argued theCommission was unable to develop.

Papers are soon to be published. Contact [email protected]


CONFERENCE NEWS

Risk Regulation, Accountability and DevelopmentUniversity of Manchester26-27 June 2003

What regulatory solutions can be found in theregulatory arrangements of developing nations?How can governments in developing countriesstrike a balance between the need to takeaccount of existing institutions and arrangementsand the danger of becoming hidebound byinappropriate or inefficient political structures? A joint workshop organised by CARR, the Centrefor Regulation and Competition (University ofManchester) and Aston Business School,attempted to bring together cross-disciplinaryperspectives on risk regulation – financial, socialand economic – with special reference to thedeveloping world. As part of the ESRC’s SocialScience Week, a public session was held in which panellists from the development studiescommunity responded to the points made inearlier sessions on governance; accounting; and economic and social regulation.

Using examples from Australia, John Braithwaite(Australian National University) highlighted theempirical case for ‘responsive regulation’ or ‘meta-risk management’. Trevor Hopper (University ofManchester) presented research undertaken withShazad Uddin (Queen’s University Belfast) onprivatisation in Bangladesh, and the case ofJamaican telecommunications was highlighted in two papers, by Martin Lodge (CARR/LSE) andLindsay Stirton (UEA), and by the Jamaican CabinetSecretary, Carlton Davis. In other panels, JohnStern (London Business School) argued that the high fixed and level costs involved in utilitiesregulation are regressive for developing countriesand Christopher May (University of the West ofEngland) suggested that intellectual property meantbalancing public access to innovation with theprivate rewards necessary to allow it to flourish.

CARR sponsors risk and regulation conferencesat LSE and at universities throughout the UK

More information on CARR events can be foundon CARR’s website, www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr

CARRCONFERENCES

Risk, Regulation and Good GovernanceQueen’s University Belfast 9-10 September 2003

This joint two-day workshop focused on public andprivate governance, in particular on the nature ofpolitical and corporate ethics as well as on instrumentsand technologies of regulating governance. Theworkshop brought together academics andpractitioners from across the UK. Recurring themeswere the setting of standards and the status they should enjoy. A further theme was the contested nature of the appropriate means and organisation forenforcement. The first day was devoted to themes ofpublic and private governance, ranging from debatesover corporate citizenship to the nature and constitutionof ethical principles in public life. The debate centred on how to establish codes that are substantive enoughto alter behaviour, yet are not overly prescriptive. Thesecond day turned to technologies of regulation, suchas the rise of audit within government and theinformatisation of public services. From an internationalperspective, there was no universal ‘audit explosion’,although audit has been increasingly used within thedevolved regions of the UK. Similarly, informatisation has challenged the capacity of governments to act as‘intelligent customers’. Finally, the discussion turned tostandard-setting in multi-level governance, highlightingissues motivating government action in such contextsacross a variety of domains.

Above: John Dowdall, Auditor General, NorthernIreland. Top left: Professor Neil Collins, UniversityCollege Cork. Bottom left: Professor Bridget Hutter,CARR and Professor Elizabeth Meehan, Queen’sUniversity Belfast


CARRNETWORK

VisitorsThe Visitors Programme continues to enrich CARR’sintellectual life. CARR has recently been privileged to welcome four leading scholars and practitioners.

Astrid Epp is a doctoral fellow at the Institute for Scienceand Technology Studies (IWT) at the Universität Bielefeld.She is currently researching the conflict over the applicationof genetic engineering in food production. More specificallyshe is investigating if, and to what extent, legal regulationshave had an impact on the Genetically Modified Organismconflict. This includes a comparison between Germany – as a typical European country in this field – and the United States.

Herbert Kalthoff currently holds a research position at the European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.His research focus is on financial and banking knowledge,especially on the performativity of technological devicesand the interactive accomplishment of risk management.His empirical work is based on ethnographic fieldwork ininternational banks. He has published several articles andco-edited a book on risk management, risk calculation andthe external growth strategies of banks.

Myriam Senn is Senior Officer at the supervisory authorityof financial markets in Berne, Switzerland. Dr Senn hasdeveloped expertise in financial services, company andpublic law. Her main areas of interest are public andinternational economic law, corporate law and the study of regulatory techniques with emphasis on the role of self-regulation. She has published on topics related to financialservices, public and international law.

Raymund Werle is Principal Research Associate with theMax Planck Institute for the Study of Societies at Cologne,Germany. His research is focused on the interaction ofinstitutional and technological innovations, especially in the information and telecommunications technologyindustry. It includes the development of telecommunicationsand data networks, the Internet in particular, and theirstructural and societal consequences. He has published in the area of science and technology studies, developmentand governance of large technical systems, organisationsand processes of technical standardisation but also in the sociology of law and the legal profession andresearch methodology.

Research Round TablesDuring the summer, CARR hosted various round tablediscussion seminars by visiting scholars and practitioners.Professor Hedeaki Shiroyama (University of Tokyo, Japan)visited to discuss research conducted by the ResearchInstitute of Science and Technology for Society, addressingparticular concerns regarding the interaction of science,technology and society, especially in the light of crises and catastrophes in a number of policy domains. EnriqueRueda-Sabater spent time with us to discuss developmenteffectiveness and the World Bank’s poverty reductionmission. He reported on the Integrated Risk ManagementFramework and its need to be both comprehensive andable to promote deliberate risk-taking, not risk avoidance.Finally, Professor Thomas Bernauer (Swiss Federal Instituteof Technology Zurich) spoke to us about international tradeconflict and biotech food regulation. He explored thedistributional implications of regulatory polarisation,concentrating on export revenues and broader effects oneconomic welfare.

Further details of CARR’s Visiting Fellowship Scheme andOutreach Programme can be found on the CARR website:www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr

CARR continues building networks across the UK and worldwide


Asymmetrical Actors andIntentional RiskProfessor Frank FurediUniversity of Kent at Canterbury6 May 2003

Differential cultural attitudes towards risk-takinghave a crucial bearing on the impact ofasymmetrical threat. It is not simply the case thatasymmetric actors regard risk-taking from thevantage point of an opportunity, the very risk-averse culture of their target society mayencourage them to exploit this difference inattitudes. Officials concerned with reassuring thepublic may well become distracted from the taskof preparing society to deal with asymmetricthreat. In some cases, official reassurance canamplify the public’s sense of insecurity, and inothers, governmental warning can serve tointensify public fears.

Risk regulation and interestaccommodation in Europeanpharmaceuticals’ licensingDr Jürgen FeickMax Planck Institute for the Study of Societies20 May 2003

(see pages 10 – 11)

Misfortune, Insurance, and theLiberal State: the perplexities of fairnessProfessor Eugene BardachUniversity of California, Berkeley27 May 2003

The modern liberal state compensates citizens fora wide variety of misfortunes. These range frombeing the victim of an earthquake to having a newhighway disrupt your neighbourhood. Adopting apolicy designer’s perspective, Professor Bardachapplied this to one particular misfortune: being the victim of a terrorist attack. He explored thedimension of fairness and looked at how itprescribed proportionality to moral deservedness.No proportionality theory can remain perfectlyintact in a world of coalition-formation, pluralisticbargaining and rent-seeking. Thus, when policydesigners decide what is morally fair, they mustalso consider what is sustainable politically andunder realistic conditions of implementation.

Regulation and Human GenomicsDr Oliver JamesUniversity of Exeter10 June 2003

This seminar assessed the framework forproviding UK Government with advice abouthuman genomics, particularly advice aboutregulation. With a range of bodies involved in thisactivity, the seminar focused on one: the HumanGenetics Commission (HGC) which wasestablished as the Government’s advisory body onthe impact of developments in human genomicson people and healthcare. The HGC contains anumber of innovations in response to controversyabout advisory systems, particularly in the light ofcontroversy over food safety. The seminar focusedon these innovations in the HGC’s current workproducing advice about the regulation of humanreproductive genomics.

Containing negative integration?The European politics of‘services publics’Professor Adrienne HéritierEuropean University Institute1 July 2003

Materiality and Performativity of Economic CalculationDr Herbert KalthoffEuropean University Viadrina7 October 2003

Calculation plays a major role within both theassessment of risk and the context of practices of economic self-representation. Two differentlayers of calculation exist: the role of technologicalinstruments (eg, computer networks and software)and the role of representation devices, ie, writing(eg, formulas and models). Economic sociology,therefore, combines the analysis of technologywith the analysis of operative writing. Dr Kalthoffreferred to the later work of Martin Heidegger and his philosophy of technology (the Gestell[enframing]), raising the question of how economicsociology has to conceive the activities of framingwhich constitute calculation and which areperformed by different agencies and practices.

Governance without Governments?The Case of the InternetDr Raymund WerleMax Planck Institute for the Study of Societies28 October 2003

The Internet evolved in a niche in which it waspromoted and only loosely controlled by the (US) government. It has developed into a globalnetwork that challenges the traditional nation-based governance institutions. But the popularnotion that governments have lost control overthe network is misleading. Based on a typologicaldistinction concerning the scope and nature ofcontrol (coordination and regulation) the role ofgovernments is analysed. With the central focuson basic operational and infrastructural functionsit is argued that the un-centralised Internet isgoverned by a patchwork of organisations andinstitutions in which hierarchical, network andmarket modes of control appear to be balanced.This balance can be disturbed by too much, aswell as too little, government intervention.

Full abstracts and details of forthcoming seminars can be found on the CARRwebsite: www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr

CARRSEMINARS

FORTHCOMING LUNCHTIMESEMINARSRegulation of the NHS in EnglandProfessor Gwyn BevanLSE11 November 2003

Beyond National Styles of Regulation –Genetically Modified Food in Germany and in the USAstrid EppBielefeld University25 November 2003

Decentralisation of European EconomicLaw. Two Models: Competition Law andFinancial Services LawDr Myriam SennSwiss Federal Banking Commission 9 December 2003

ALL WELCOMESeminars start at 1pm, Room H615,Connaught House, LSE

CARRBOOKS


CARR Books and Special Journal Editions

On Different Tracks:designing railwayregulation in Britain and GermanyMartin LodgeGreenwood Press 2002

British Rail 1974-97:from integration toprivatisationTerence GourvishOxford University Press 2002

The Labyrinths of Information –Challenging theWisdom of SystemsClaudio Ciborra, Oxford University Press 2002‘a series of highly literate

jewel-like essays that are intellectuallyfascinating but could also change the lifeof any practitioner.’Shoshana Zuboff, Harvard Business School

Environmental Policy inEurope: assessing thecosts of complianceAndrew Gouldson and Evan Williams (Eds)European Environment12 (5) 2002

The Politics of Delegation: non-majoritarianinstitutions in EuropeMark Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet (Eds)West European Politics25 (1) 2002

Biotechnology 1996-2000: the years of controversyGeorge Gaskell and Martin BauerLondon: Science MuseumPress and Michigan State

University Press 2001

From Control to Drift: the dynamics ofcorporate informationinfrastructuresClaudio Ciborra and associatesOxford University Press 2001

Rational Analysis for a Problematic WorldRevisited: problemstructuring methods forcomplexity, uncertaintyand conflict (2nd ed.)

Jonathan Rosenhead and John Mingers (eds.)Wiley 2001

The Government of Risk:understanding riskregulation regimesChristopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert BaldwinOxford University Press 2001

‘...a significant contribution to the existingliterature on risk regulation.’West European Politics

Regulation and Risk:occupational health andsafety on the railwaysBridget HutterOxford University Press 2001‘...a classic and deft piece

of socio-legal scholarship ... sure to havean enduring impact on the debate.’Public Law

Cranston’s Consumersand the Law (3rd ed.)Colin Scott and Julia BlackButterworths 2000

Regulation InsideGovernment:wastewatchers, qualitypolice and sleaze-bustersChristopher Hood, Colin Scott, Oliver James,

George Jones and Tony TraversOxford University Press 1999

Telecoms Regulation:culture, chaos andinterdependence insidethe regulatory processClare Hall, Colin Scott and Christopher HoodRoutledge 1999

The Politics ofTelecommunicationsMark ThatcherOxford University Press 1999‘an excellent comparativestudy, rich in empirical

findings, given analytical focus by anexplicit theoretical framework.’Government and Opposition

The Audit Society: rituals of verificationMichael PowerOxford University Press 1999‘A book like this – so rich inideas, observations and

interpretations – has to be taken seriously.’European Accounting Review

A Reader inEnvironmental LawBridget Hutter (Ed.)Oxford University Press 1999‘a timely and useful bringingtogether of major socio-legalstatements on the law.’

Environmental Law Review

UnderstandingRegulationRobert Baldwin and Martin CaveOxford University Press 1999‘an excellently constructedwork… provides much food

for thought for the times in which we live.’New Law Journal

Rules and RegulatorsJulia BlackOxford University Press 1999‘a refreshing book thataddresses the question of‘self-regulation’ in a new way.’Modern Law Review

New Books by CARR Members

Preparing for the Future: StrategicPlanning in the U.S. Air ForceMichael Barzelay and Colin Campbell

Business and Politics in Europe,1900-1970: essays in honour of Alice TeichovaTerry Gourvish, ed


CARRPRINT

CARR publications and other publications by CARRmembers can be viewed on the CARR website:www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/carr/

Selected RecentPublications

Competency andBureaucracy: Diffusion,Application and AppropriateResponse? Martin Lodge and Christopher HoodWest European Politics 26 (3) 2003:131-152.

Halving Global PovertyTim Besley and Robin BurgessJournal of Economic Perspectives,Fall 2003.

Paradoxes for the Business LeaderBridget HutterEuropean Business Forum, 13, Spring 2003: 9-12.

Risk Management and theResponsible Organization Michael PowerIn R Ericson (ed.) Risk and Morality,Toronto, Toronto University Press 2003.

Administrative Patterns and National PoliticsMartin Lodge In GB Peters and J Pierre (eds.)Handbook of Public Administration,London, Sage 2003.

Centralized versusDecentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: apolitical economy analysisTim Besley and Stephen CoateJournal of Public Economics, 87 (11-12) 2003.

Organizational Variety inRegulatory Governance: an agenda for comparativeinvestigation of the OECDcountries Colin ScottPublic Organization Review, 3, 2003: 301-316.

CARR Discussion Papers

COMING SOON DP19Reforming the UK Flood Insurance Regime.The Breakdown of a Gentlemen’s AgreementMichael Huber

COMING SOON DP18Perceptions of Risk: an experimentalapproach using internet questionnairesFrank A. Cowell and Guillermo Cruces

NEW DP17Mapping the Contours of ContemporaryFinancial Services RegulationJulia Black

NEW DP16The Invention of Operational Risk Michael Power

NEW DP15Precautionary Bans or Sacrificial Lambs?Participative Risk Regulation and theReform of the UK Food Safety Regime Henry Rothstein

NEW DP14Incentives, Choice and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak

NEW DP13Regulating Parliament: the regulatory statewithin WestminsterRobert Kaye

NEW DP12Business History and RiskTerry Gourvish

Business Risk and Antitrust: comparative perspectivesTony Freyer

The Risks of Working and the Risks of Not Working: historical perspectives onemployers, workers, and occupational illnessJoseph Melling

NEW DP11The Open Method of Co-ordination and theEuropean Welfare StateDamian Chalmers and Martin Lodge

DP10Drivers and Drawbacks: regulation andenvironmental risk management systemsMarius Aalders

DP9Conceptualising Insurance: riskmanagement under conditions of solvencyMichael Huber

DP8Social Licence and Environmental Protection:why businesses go beyond complianceNeil Gunningham, Robert Kagan and Dorothy Thornton

DP7Neglected Risk Regulation: the institutionalattenuation phenomenonHenry Rothstein

DP6Mass Media and Political AccountabilityTimothy Besley, Robin Burgess and Andrea Pratt

DP5Embedding Regulatory Autonomy: the reform of Jamaican telecommunicationsregulation 1988-2001Lindsay Stirton and Martin Lodge

DP4Critical Reflections on RegulationJulia Black

DP3The New Politics of Risk Regulation in EuropeDavid Vogel

DP2The EU Commission and NationalGovernments as Partners: EC regulatoryexpansion in telecommunications 1979-2000Mark Thatcher

DP1Regulating Government in a ‘Managerial’Age: towards a cross-national perspectiveChristopher Hood and Colin Scott

DP0Is Regulation Right?Robert Baldwin

Business Risk Management in Government:pitfalls and possibilitiesChristopher Hood and Henry Rothstein

Risk Management and Business RegulationBridget Hutter and Michael Power

Risk&Regulation is also published on CARR’s website and back issues are available free onrequest. Please email [email protected] if you wish to order copies.

Risk&RegulationMagazine of the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation No.2 Autumn 2001

BureaucraticCompetencies: A contradiction in terms?

OrganisationalLearning and Risk Management

Why We Need to UnderstandCorporate Life

The Government of Risk

Risk&Regulation

CARR REVIEW

Magazine of the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation No.1 Spring 2001

Risk&RegulationMagazine of the ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation No.3 Spring 2002

Deirdre Hutton onconsumer-drivenregulation and Michael Spackman on regulatorypopulism

also Navigating the debate on corporate socialresponsibility

Regulating MP’s conduct

Decentralising governanceacross the world

Lessons of Caribbeanregulatory reform fordeveloping countries

Is Japan on the brink of an audit explosion?

customer care?

alsoWhere the Ivory Towers Meetthe Whitehall Village

The Operational Risk Game

Regulatory Fever

Controlling the Campus

On the Railroad to Nowhere?

Risk&RegulationMagazine of the ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation No.5 Spring 2003

CARR research staff

Tim BesleyDirector of Suntory and ToyotaInternational Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)

Professor of Economics

Public economics; Developmenteconomics; Political economy.

Julia BlackReader in Law

Regulatory techniques and processes;Interpretive and discourse basedapproaches to regulation; Rule making;Financial services regulation.

Claudio CiborraPwC Professor of Risk Management

Global information technologyinfrastructures; Business risk strategy in relation to building and managingintegrated infrastructures.

Christopher HoodCARR Programme Director: Regulation of Government and Governance

Gladstone Professor of Government and Fellow of All Souls College, University of Oxford

Regulation of public-sector bodies;International comparative analysis of riskregulation regimes; Institutional factors in shaping regulation; Transparency and‘better regulation’.

Michael HuberAon Senior Research Fellow in Risk Management

Environmental regulation; Risk regulation;Organisation theories and social theory.

Bridget HutterCARR Co-Director

Peacock Professor of Risk Management

Sociology of regulation and riskmanagement; Regulation of economic life; Corporate responses to state and non-state forms of regulation.

Robert KayeESRC Research Officer

Self-regulation and parliamentary self-regulation; Good government; British government and politics.

Javier LezaunESRC Research OfficerImplementation of biotechnology regulations;Traceability and market infrastructures;Science and technology studies.

Martin LodgeCARR Deputy Programme Director:Regulation of Government and Governance

Lecturer in Political Science and Public Policy

Comparative regulation and publicadministration; Government and politics ofthe EU and of Germany; Railway regulationin Britain and Germany; Regulatory reformin Jamaica.

Peter MillerProfessor of Management Accounting

Accounting and advanced manufacturingsystems; Investment appraisal and capitalbudgeting; Accounting and the publicsector; Social and institutional aspects of accounting.

Yuval MilloESRC Research OfficerHistorical sociology of financial derivativesmarkets; Regulatory infrastructure; Financialrisk management; Political sociology.

Joan O’MahonyLeverhulme Special Research Fellow

Business regulation and civil society; Roleof non-state sources in risk management;Political sociology.

Michael PowerCARR Co-Director and Programme Director:Organisations and Risk Management

PD Leake Professor of Accounting

Role of internal and external auditing; Riskreporting and communication; Financialaccounting and auditing regulation.

Henry RothsteinESRC Research Fellow

Comparative analysis of risk regulationregimes; Risk regulation and publicopinion, the media, interest groups andregulatory professionals; Transparency and accountability.

Colin ScottReader in Law

Regulation of government,telecommunications regulation andregulation of consumer markets; Newdimensions of regulation of the publicsector and regulatory innovation.

Mark Thatcher

Senior Lecturer in Public Administrationand Public Policy

Comparative European regulation andpublic policy; Telecommunications andother utilities; Institutional design andindependent regulatory agencies.

CARR research associatesMichael BarzelayReader in Public Management, LSE

George GaskellProfessor of Social Psychology, LSE

Andrew GouldsonLecturer in Environmental Policy, LSE

Terence GourvishDirector, Business History Unit, LSE

Carol HarlowProfessor of Public Law, LSE

Donald MackenzieProfessor of Sociology, University of Edinburgh

Edward PageProfessor of Political Science, LSE

Tony ProsserProfessor of Public Law, Bristol University

Judith ReesDeputy Director, LSE; Professor of Environmental and ResourceManagement, LSE

Lindsay StirtonLecturer in Law, University of East Anglia

Peter Taylor-Gooby Professor of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Science, University of Kent at Canterbury

Brian WynneProfessor of Science Studies, Lancaster University

CARR administrative team

Sabrina AntâoEvents and Publications Administrator

Amy EldonAdministrative Assistant

Louise Newton-ClareCentre Manager (Finance and Special Projects)

Anna PiliCentre Manager (Administration, Events and Communications)

CARRPEOPLE

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ESRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation

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and Political Science

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London WC2A 2AE

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Risk and Regulation Autumn 2003

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Transcript of Risk and Regulation Autumn 2003