Risk 0910 Tullett

8/2/2019 Risk 0910 Tullett

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RISK MANAGEMENT l DERIVATIVES l REGULATION

REPRINTED FROM

RiskInterdealerrankings 2010A game-changing year

www.tullettpreon.com

SEPTEMbER 201


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like it could be game-changing for the derivatives industry.New legislation was signed into law in the US on July 21,

which will require a huge lump of the over-the-counter derivatives market to be clearedthrough central counterparties (CCPs). Limits will a lso be placed on US bank ownershipof hedge funds and proprietary trading desks, while deposit-taking banks will essentiallybe forced to carve out certa in parts of their derivatives business into separate aliates.

In any ordinary year, regulatory changes of this magnitude would be the only story

worth telling. But dealers have also had to cope with severe market ructions in 2010. Adebt crisis in Greece rapidly escalated to other peripheral European countries andbriey appeared to threaten the future of the eurozone. Stock markets fell, creditspreads on certain sovereigns soared and the euro sank to a four-year low. Equityvolatility spiked to 13-month highs, while skew the dierence in implied volatilitybetween out-of-the-money put options and out-of-the-money calls reached unprec-edented highs, causing signicant losses for some equity derivatives desks.

Tese dicult conditions, combined with increased competition among dealers andtighter bid-oer spreads compared to 2009, took their toll on bank results. BarclaysCapital reported top-line income for its xed income, currency and commoditiesdivision of 4.95 billion in the rst half of the year a decline of 40% compared withthe rst six months of 2009. JP Morgan reported a 26.5% drop in xed-income marketrevenue, from $4.9 billion in the second quarter of 2009 to $3.6 billion over the sameperiod this year, while Deutsche Bank disclosed net revenues in sales and trading (debtand other products) of 2.1 billion in the second quarter, a decline of 8%.

Whenever a market suddenly becomes much more volatile, it is more dicult tomanage from a risk perspective. ypically, as a liquidity provider to the market, you canbe on the wrong side of those trades, so you need to think much more than you didpre-crisis about the composition of your positions, liquidity and how you exit risk, says

Wayne Felson, head of complex risk for global rates and equities at Deutsche Bank inLondon. Tis year has been more challenging, but weve been able to manage thiscrisis well, which has had a positive impact on our derivatives books.

Deutsche Bank nished top in this years survey with 10.2% of the overall vote just0.3 percentage points ahead of arch rival JP Morgan (see table, left). Deutsche per-formed strongly across most asset classes, winning the overall interest rate swap andexotic interest rate product categories, and coming second in cross-currency swaps andvanilla currency options.

For many participants, the dening event of the year has been the Europeansovereign debt crisis. Concerns about a possible default on Greek debt quickly spread to

other peripheral European countries, causing a rapid increase in sovereign credit defaultswap (CDS) spreads. Te cost of ve-year protection on Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greeceand Spain was at 114.46 basis points, 119.09bp, 92.58bp, 280.66bp and 96.94bp,respectively, on March 8 this year. By May 6, these spreads had jumped to 461.32bp,272.38bp, 231.68bp, 940.69bp and 274.58bp. Attention quickly focused on the healthof European banks and their exposures to sovereign debt concerns that led to someSpanish banks apparently being frozen out of the repo markets for a short period inMay (RiskJune 2010, page 121).

Market sentiment has largely recovered, buoyed partly by a 750 billion supportpackage announced by the European Union and International Monetary Fund on May 9and approved by the German parliament on May 21. But the volatility in government

1 Reprinted from RiskSeptember 2010

Dealers experienced a bumpy second quarter following the eurozone debt crisis and a spike in

volatility. In this tumultuous environment, Deutsche Bank took rst place in the Riskinterdealer

rankings for the second year, with JP Morgan close behind. ByChristopher Whittall

This year looks

2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 Deutsche Bank 10.2

2 2 JP Morgan 9.9

3 3 Barclays Capital 8.9

4 5 Socit Gnrale 7.3

5 9 Royal Bank of Scotland 7.0

6 7 UBS 6.6

7 8 Credit Suisse 6.5

8 6 BNP Paribas 5.9

9 4 Goldman Sachs 5.7

10 12 Morgan Stanley 5.1

11 10 Citi 4.6

12 15 Nomura 4.1

13 11 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 3.9

14 13 HSBC 3.8

15 14 Mitsubishi UFJ Securities 3.5

16 17 Mizuho 1.3

17 16 Commerzbank 1.2

18 20 Crdit Agricole 0.9

19 18 Santander 0.8

20 Royal Bank of Canada 0.6

To 20 DEALERS RAkg

A game-changing year

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bond markets would have hurt somedealers particularly those that re-enteredthe sector in the rst quarter of this year.

Some dealers had been pursuing marketshare on a purely price-driven basis in the

rst quarter, expanding their balance sheetand risks. When the market reverted to amuch more crisis-like environment in thesecond quarter, it is likely these players

would have found it quite painful. Onbalance, 2010 has been tough for somepeople and a fairly good year for others,says Chris Willcox, global head of ratestrading at JP Morgan in London.

JP Morgan prospered in the interestrate derivatives segments, taking rstplaces in interest rate caps and oors,interest rate swaptions, forward rateagreements and overnight indexed swaps,as well as topping the US dollar interest

rate categories overall. Elsewhere, thedealer retained its crown in CDSs andstructured credit, and raised its prole inequity derivatives, coming third in equityindex options and exotic equity products.

Currency markets also experiencedincreased volatility in May and June as theeuro sank to $1.1952 on June 7 a four-year low. Shorting the euro became apopular strategy with those looking for amacro hedge against contagion in theeurozone. Tis strategy quickly becameexpensive, though the premium on a six-month euro put/dollar call increased from3.12% on January 14 to 4.5% on June 8,according to Royal Bank of Scotland.

Markets became very ill iquid across theboard in all currencies in spot, options,short-dated tenors and long-dated tenors.Bid-oer spreads blew out from a fewtenths of a volatility point in one-monthGroup of 10 currency options to anywhereupwards of 1 or 2 volatility points. Teability of options desks to manage thatilliquidity became the main focus, says

Anthony Hall, Zurich-based global head offorex derivatives at UBS. Te Swiss bankcame top in cross-currency swaps, exoticcurrency options and currency forwards.

It is in equity derivatives, however, thatmost of the damage was done. TeChicago Board Options Exchanges Vixindex, which measures volatility as impliedby 30-day S&P 500 option prices, leapt64% in the space of two days to 40.95points on May 7, before hitting a 13-month high of 48.2 points during intra-day trading on May 20. Meanwhile, three-month 90110% implied volatility skewon the Dow Jones Eurostoxx 50 indexreached 15% on May 20, compared with a

high of 12.8% in 2008, according toDeutsche Bank.

Some equity derivatives desks had to grittheir teeth and take some hefty hits. SocitGnrale Corporate and Investment

Banking (SG CIB) saw a 65.4% decline inrevenues for its equities business in thesecond quarter and it wasnt the onlycasualty. Deutsche Bank reported sales andtrading (equity) revenues dropped 31% inthe second quarter compared with the sameperiod last year, Nomura reported a drop of50% in its quarterly results, BNP Paribassaw a 62% drop in revenues and GoldmanSachs saw equity trading revenues plunge89% in the second quarter.

Despite its losses, SG CIB continued itsstrong performance in the equity deriva-tives categories, notching up rst places in

OC single-stock options, equity indexoptions and exotic equity products.

Te second quarter was a complicatedtime for any market participant. Whenclients buy protection, theyre generallybuying downside puts, which put us asmarket-makers in short smile and shortvolatility positions on the downside. Tatis the nature of the ow activity, and since

were here to quote for clients, the secondquarter was a challenging one for our owindex books, says Dan Fields, globalhead of trading at SG CIB in Paris.

In many respects, the industry haslearnt lessons from 2008 and was betterprepared for dicult markets. However,

what surprised the industry was theviolence of the movements we observed inskew and in some extreme risk premiums,and the fact that it happened with relativelylittle liquidity. Indeed, liquidity has been

worse than it was in 2008 on some shortextreme risk parameters, notably ondownside skew. says Fields.

Fields attributes the record high levels ofskew to the market pricing in black swanevents to a greater extent than in the past.You end up pricing downside puts atlevels that previously were not considered

justiable, which is why hedging downsidebooks is so expensive today, he says.

Not all banks were caught out,however. JP Morgan reported a 41.2%rise in equity market revenues in thesecond quarter, from $708 million in thesame period last year to $1 billion. im

Trosby, global head of equity derivativesin London, attributes the success to anexpansion of the equity ow business andan aggressive approach to recycling risk.

A lot of the ows we saw in the rst halfof the year we believed to be relatively uni-directional, and we decided that if we

wanted to continue to participate, weshould recycle relatively aggressively. Ourimpression is that we were marginally lessexposed than some of our major competi-tors and we had a quality of team and thebalance sheet capability that gave us thelatitude to continue to participatethroughout those conditions, he says.

Trosby believes some of the extrememoves in May were fuelled by dealers orend-users deciding to stop-out ofpositions and take risk o the table. Ifyou owned a short volatility position but

were forced to cut some of the positionduring the volatility of May, there was no

way you could recover that cost. It wouldappear from market liquidity that some

players were less active, and the extrememarket moves would point to somesizeable positions being cut, he says.

Meanwhile, the sovereign debt crisisbrought credit derivatives under theregulatory microscope, with somepoliticians blaming speculative activity insovereign CDSs for exacerbating thecrisis. At the same time, credit spreads

widened and volatility jumped higher,causing problems for some participants.

Some people may have positioned for a

www.tullettpreon.com 2

On balance, 2010 has been tough for some people and a fairly

good year for others Chris Willcox, JP Morgan


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continuation of the strong risk appetitewe saw in the rst quarter and werecaught oside by the stronger thanexpected volatility. People were question-ing the fundamentals of sovereign risk,

which led to quite a lot of re-assessment ofpeoples positions. I think that led to thekind of volatility and illiquidity we haveseen, says Guy America, global head ofcredit trading at JP Morgan. Te US banktopped both the CDS and structuredcredit categories in the poll.

As fears around the eurozone crisiseased in late June, the attention of dealersturned towards regulation. In the US, theDodd-Frank Wall Street Reform andConsumer Protection Act was signed intolaw on July 21 ground-breakinglegislation that will force a substantialportion of the OC derivatives market to

clear through clearing houses.Te derivatives industry has already

taken signicant strides towards centralclearing, with a large proportion of interestrate swaps traded in the interdealer marketalready clearing through SwapClear, runby London-based clearing house LCH.Clearnet. Several CDS clearing platformshave also launched in the past 18 months,encouraged by regulatory pressure to clearthe majority of credit derivatives trades.Te act is likely to require a wider varietyof products to be cleared, and so encouragenew CCPs to set up shop.

Some participants have claimed theexistence of multiple CCPs will increasecosts, as clearing members will have tocontribute to numerous default funds andpost initial and variation margin withoutthe benets of any netting. However,dealers say they will sign up to multiple

clearing houses if clients desire.Were agnostic when it comes to CCPs

wherever our clients want to clear, wewill assess that platform accordingly. Weexpect there to be many CCPs to start

with, with dierent product ranges, capitalrequirements and settlement features, andsome of those will suit some clients morethan others. Tere is a potential for anincreased cost in the early days of clearingas a result of using multiple clearers, but astime goes on, we think we there will bemore netting and more interoperabilitybetween the dierent CCPs, says HarryHarrison, New York-based global head ofrates trading at Barclays Capital.

Client preference

Respondents to the Risksurvey weredivided on the proportion of additional

costs that will be passed on to clients:42% said 020% of new costs will bepassed on, while 21% felt customers

would end up bearing 81100%.Dealers interviewed for this article

declined to speculate on the proportion ofadditional costs that will be borne byclients. However, Deutsches Felsonquestions whether central c learing willactually lead to higher costs for clearingmembers. Its not necessarily truecentralised clearing would imposeadditional costs. Tere may be some set-up costs, but operational costs could godown in a centralised clearing format asopposed to having a series of separatecollateral agreements that need to bemaintained, he says.

Not all banks intend to sign up asclearing members, though. A sizeable77% of respondents who are not currently

clearing members say they do not intendto sign up in future. With the Group of20 countries committed to introducecentral clearing by 2012, banks of allshapes and sizes will have to decide

whether to pay clearing membership fees and also be willing to participate in thedefault management process in the case ofanother member defaulting or use clientclearing services oered by banks that arealready clearing members. A turf waramong the major dealers for this type ofbusiness seems likely.

It may not make sense operationallyfor some of the smaller banks to becomeclearing members, so they may becomeclients of the larger dealers providing aclient clearing product. Tat has hap-pened in the futures markets, and therates market may well move that way as

well, says Felson.Other regulation might not provide such

lucrative opportunities for banks. Te mostcontroversial aspect of the Dodd-Frank Actis Section 716, which will essentiallyrequire dealers to transfer certain parts oftheir derivatives business to separatealiates (RiskAugust 2010, pages 19-232).It may be too early to condently predictthe impact for certain banks, but JPMorgan is certain it wil l not prevent clientsfrom trading derivatives. We willobviously need to do the right amount of

work to deliver the regulatory structuresthat are nally implemented, and its fairto say we expect some incremental workin technology and entity structure willneed to be done. However, we think we

will be able to deliver at least equal levelsof service to our clients, says Trosby. n


Riskreceived 1,807 valid responses from dealers and brokers to this years in-

terdealer survey. The responses were divided between Europe (54.4%), North

America (25.1%), Asia (20%) and other (1.5%).

The sur vey covere d 115 derivative s categor ies across interest r ates, foreign

exchange, credit and equity derivatives. Participants were asked to vote for

their top three derivatives dealers in order of preference in derivatives catego-

ries that they had traded in over the course of the year.

It is important to note this poll is not designed to reect volumes traded in

any particular market and is therefore not necessarily a direct reection of

market share voters could base their decisions on a variety of criteria, includ-

ing pricing, liquidity provision, counterparty risk, speed of execution and reli-

ability. In that sense, this poll should be considered a reection of how market

professionals view their peers in terms of overall quality of service.

When aggregating the results, we look to strip out what we consider to be

invalid votes. These include people voting for their own rm, multiple votes

from the same person or IP address, votes from people using Hotmail or Gmail

accounts, votes by people who choose the same rm indiscriminately through-

out the poll, votes by people who clearly do not trade the product, and block

votes from groups of people on the same desk at the same institution voting for

the same rm. For instance, we do not allow block votes from 20 people on the

same desk, in the same location, all voting in exactly the same way, within hours

and in some cases minutes of each other. We see this as a clear attempt to un-

fairly manipulate the poll. This is a process we t ake very ser iously.

The votes were we ighted, w ith three points for a rst place, t wo points for

second and one for third. No weighting system was used for brokers, as re-

spondents only submitted one vote. Only categories with a sucient number

of votes are included in the nal poll.

The top banks are listed in teams of overall percentage of votes, as well as

number of rst-place wins. To decide the winner, Riskuses the overall percent-

age of votes for each bank. The survey also includes a series of overall product

leaderboards, calculated by aggregating the total number of votes across in-

dividual categories. These overall results are naturally weighted, as there are

more votes in the large categories (for example, US dollar and euro swaps)

than the smaller, less liquid categories.

How the poll was conducted

2www.risk.net/1725925


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industry will be watching very closely to see how US regulatorsdecipher some of the broad principles outlined in the Dodd-

Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law on July 21.Some things are certain a greater proportion of the over-the-counter derivatives

market will be traded through central counterparties. Other issues are murkier whowill be designated a major swap participant and so be required to clear?

At rst glance, the changes might be thought to pose a threat to the business modelof interdealer brokers. With regulators determined to push as many contracts aspossible through transparent, multi-contributor trading venues, some think the age ofvoice broking may be coming to an end, limited to the universe of more complex tradesnot suitable for clearing. Brokers see it dierently. Many reckon a clause in the Dodd-Frank Act that requires any swap subject to the clearing requirement to trade on a swapexecution facility or an exchange opens the door to juicy new business opportunities.

Te major brokers believe they will qualify as swap execution facilities once the USCommodity Futures rading Commission and Securities and Exchange Commissiondraw up the criteria. Many rms have also continued their push to adapt to the new

world of clearing, valuations, post-trade reporting and portfolio reconciliation. Over thepast 12 months, Icap has completed its takeover of Stockholm-based riOptima, whichprovides portfolio compression and reconciliation services, as well as an interest rate

This years survey results belie some major changes in the broker market as a result of

regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market. Many rms continue to expand into

new areas of valuation, portfolio reconciliation and post-trade processing, but qualication

as a swap execution facility under US regulation will prove crucial. ByAlexander Campbell

The derivatives

States of ux


FRST oSToS

TEREST RATESBroker Short-dated Swaps Swaps Interestrate Interestrate Exoticinterest Inflation Overnight Repurchase Forward Total swaps 210years 10+years caps/floors swaptions rateproducts indexedswaps agreements rateagreement

Icap 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 21

Tullett Preon 2 2 1 2 4 1 3 2 17

bGC 4 2 1 7

Tradition 1 1 1 1 1 1 6

Gottex 1 1 1 1 1 1 6

CuRRECESBroker Cross-currencyswaps Vanillacurrencyoptions Exoticcurrencyoptions Currencyforwards Total

Tullett Preon 4 1 5 10

bGC 2 1 2 5

Tradition-Icap 4 1 5

GFI 1 1 2

Icap 1 1

EquTy DERvATvESBrokers OTCsingle-stockequityoptions Equityindexoptions Exoticequityproducts Total

Sunrise 3 8 5 16

GFI 1 1 2

Tradition 2 2

Exane 1 1

CREDT DERvATvESBrokers Creditdefaultswaps Structuredcredit Total

GFI 4 6 10

Tullett Preon 3 1 4

Icap 1 1


6/27

trade reporting repository. It also went livein January with a post-trade aggregationservice for participants in the OCforeign exchange market through a jointventure between raiana, one of its

subsidiaries, and CLS Group, andlaunched Icap Fix, a market data serviceproviding real-time, end-of-day andhistorical market data, in November 2009.

In March, ullett Prebon acquiredVancouver-based OC Valuations, whichspecialises in independent derivativesvaluations of illiquid, hard-to-value OCsecurities and exotic structured products,

while BGC launched a post-tradeprocessing service for foreign exchangeoptions through Tomson Reuters.

All in a ll, brokers see a number ofpositive outcomes from the regulatorychanges although they acknowledge the

requirement to post initial and variationmargin on cleared trades will, on balance,increase costs for derivatives users.

Te increased costs associated withmargin requirements do increase thepotential for higher transaction costs. Inaddition, there will be continued focuson the timely reporting and conrmingof trades, which will no doubt increasethe technology spend required to becompliant, says Steph Duckworth,

chief operat ing o cer at ullett Prebonin London. But any negative eects thiscould have on the volumes transacted byour customers could be oset to agreater degree by the benets derivedfrom mitigating counterparty riskthrough the increased use of clearingfacilities.

ullett Prebon performed strongly ininterest rates in this years Risksurvey,taking 17 rst places, just behind Icap on21. It also led the currency segment with10 top spots, with the majority of its winsin cross-currency swaps and forwards.

Te change in regulation is not all goodnews, however. Dierent countries arelargely pursuing their own regulatoryagendas, with the US likely to go furtherthan Europe, which in turn is likely to bemore aggressive than Asia and Australia.

Derivatives market participants tendto arbitrage regional regulatory environ-ments given that markets are nowglobalised. raders will always look forless or dierently regulated markets,

complicating the tasks of regulators. Tebroad regulatory ideals agreed at thesummits of nations can often yieldextreme divergences when translated intospecic legislation in dierent jurisdic-tions, says Claude Amar, London-basedchief executive at Sunrise, which domi-nated the equity derivatives categories

with 16 rst places.Te current period of uncertainty has

also been a challenge, as regulators in theUS esh out the details of the Dodd-Frank Act and the European Commissionputs the nal touches on its own regula-tions. In particular, some clients are

choosing to sit on the sidelines until therules are nalised. Tis has been espe-cially noticeable in the credit derivativesmarket, says Colin Heron, president ofGFI Group in New York.

Volumes are not falling as dramati-cally this year I think weve hit a baselevel. But theres going to be no realimprovement until we get more clarity onregulation. Its very hard for customers toget involved if they dont know what the

margin requirements are going to be, hesays. GFI topped the credit derivativescategories this year with 10 rst places.

Beyond new regulation, marketparticipants have had to cope with somesignicant market shocks. In the secondquarter of this year, fears that a debt crisisin Greece would spread to other, weak

eurozone countries caused the euro toslump, sovereign credit spreads to surgewider and volatility to leap.

Te equity markets were particularlyhard hit, with several dealers takingsignicant losses on short volatilitypositions, largely accumulated throughclient positions. Tis had knock-on eectson volumes traded in the equity deriva-tives market, says Robert Finegold, chiefoperating o cer at Sunrise in London.

Te European sovereign debt crisis

created a signicant shock across all assetclasses. Investor condence was slightlyrestored from the second half of 2009, butquickly evaporated. Since then, the equitymarket hasnt seen any consistent cash

inow from the large institutionalinvestors or hedge funds, he says.

Other markets saw a spike in activity asinvestors rushed to unwind trades or takeadvantage of market volatility during theeurozone crisis, but this has now dieddown, says Duckworth. It is hard topredict market activity the normalcycles have not yet returned after the vola-tility in the rst half of 2009, so it is veryhard to talk about anything like naturalgrowth anymore.

In fact, the major brokers have seentheir revenues fall on the back ofshrinking volumes over the past year.

Icap noted a 6% drop in underlyingrevenue in the rst quarter of 2010,although group revenue picked up againin the quarter to June, rising 8%compared with the corresponding periodlast year. However, this reected high-frequency traders proting from theshort-term xed-income volatilitysurrounding the eurozone debt crisis,

with volumes fa lling back again in June,the broker noted. ullett Prebonhighlighted the same trend for the yearto June: revenue fell 8% from theprevious year, and activity in June and

July was relatively subdued.Meanwhile, sta retention and

poaching of employees continues to dogthe broker market, with a number ofhigh-prole disputes over the past year.Defections have hurt several rms, withullett Prebon blaming an alleged raid ofbroker sta by BGC in North Americafor causing a 7% decline in revenue in therst half of the year. Growth in the USalso aected GFI: the broker notedincreased competition a s re-capitaliseddealers in the US rebuilt their sales teamsin the xed-income market, which wasalso seeing heightened competition for

brokerage personnel.However, the introduction of newregulation could help reduce poaching,believes Heron at GFI. High start-upcosts will make it more di cult for newentrants to get established, creating lessdemand for broking sta, he believes.Retention is starting to get easier now,and it will get better as people realise thatthere will be fewer and fewer start-upshops, because they wont have the capitaland the technology to compete. n


Volumes are not falling as dramatically this year I

think weve hit a base level. But theres going to be

no real improvement until we get more clarity on

regulation Colin Heffron, GFI Group


7/27


TEREST RATES ovERALL

CuRRECy ovERALL

Short-dated interest rate swaps2010 2009 Dealer %


2 2 JP Morgan 11.93 3 Barclays Capital 10.4

4 UBS 9.1


Interest rate swaps 2-10 years2010 2009 Dealer %


2 2 JP Morgan 12.7



5 UBS 8.8

Interest rate swaps 10+ years2010 2009 Dealer %


2 2 JP Morgan 12.8


4 UBS 9.4

5 Royal Bank of Scotland 8.5

Interest rate caps/floors2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 JP Morgan 15.2




5 UBS 9.2

Interest rate swaptions2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 JP Morgan 14.9




5 5 UBS 10.1

Exotic interest rate products2010 2009 Dealer %


2 4 Barclays Capital 11.63 2 Goldman Sachs 10.6

4 3 JP Morgan 10.2

5 Credit Suisse 9.6

Inflation2010 2009 Dealer %




4 Citi 11.2

5 5 BNP Paribas 9.6

Overnight indexed swaps2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 JP Morgan 11.7



4 Credit Suisse 10.0

5 4 UBS 9.8

Repurchase agreements2010 2009 Dealer %




4 Socit Gnrale 9.8


Forward rate agreements2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 JP Morgan 14.8


3 5 UBS 10.2

4 Credit Suisse 9.9


Cross-currency swaps2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 UBS 13.1


3 4 JP Morgan 10.8



Vanilla currency options2010 2009 Dealer %

1 4= Royal Bank of Scotland 13.0


3 1 UBS 12.4

4 Barclays Capital 9.5

5 3 JP Morgan 8.3

Exotic currency options2010 2009 Dealer %

1 2 UBS 15.8



4 Deutsche Bank 11.0

5 4 BNP Paribas 10.0

Currency forwards2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 UBS 15.1



4 Socit Gnrale 10.4



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EquTy ovERALL

TEREST RATES ovERALL: bREAkDow by CuRRECy

CREDT ovERALL

OTC single-stock equity options2010 2009 Dealer %


2 2 BNP Paribas 14.93 Morgan Stanley 13.1

4 4 JP Morgan 11.2


Equity index options2010 2009 Dealer %



3 JP Morgan 11.5



Exotic equity products2010 2009 Dealer %


2 2 BNP Paribas 14.93 JP Morgan 11.5



Credit default swaps2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 JP Morgan 17.1





Structured credit2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 JP Morgan 15.8



4 BNP Paribas 9.9

5 UBS 9.4

US dollar2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 JP Morgan 12.0



4= 5 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 9.6

4= Credit Suisse 9.6

Euro2010 2009 Dealer %



3 Socit Gnrale 11.5


5 2 JP Morgan 9.0

Yen

2010 2009 Dealer %


2 1 JP Morgan 11.5

3 UBS 11.4

4 Nomura 9.9


Sterling2010 2009 Dealer %





5 Socit Gnrale 8.3

Swiss franc2010 2009 Dealer %

1 2 UBS 17.5



4 3 JP Morgan 11.8

5 Zrcher Kantonalbank 7.0


9/27


CuRRECy ovERALL: bREAkDow by CuRRECy

US dollar2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 JP Morgan 15.5 1 1 Icap

2 4 Barclays Capital 13.4 2 3 BGC

3 2 Deutsche Bank 12.3 3 2 Tullett Prebon


5 Credit Suisse 8.0

Euro

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Deutsche Bank 18.4 1 1 Icap

2 2 JP Morgan 11.7 2 3 BGC

3 3 Barclays Capital 10.6 3 2 Tullett Prebon



Yen2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 5 UBS 16.4 2 1 Tradition

3 Nomura 13.7 3 3 Icap

4 2 JP Morgan 11.9

5 Mitsubishi UFJ Securities 10.9

Sterling2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 18.0 1= 1 Icap

2 1 Barclays Capital 17.3 1= 2 Tullett Prebon

3 3 Deutsche Bank 12.5 3 3 Tradition

4= 5 HSBC 10.3

4= 4 JP Morgan 10.3

ShoRT-DATED TEREST RATE SwAS

US dollar/euro2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 UBS 12.1

2 3 JP Morgan 11.33 2 Deutsche Bank 10.5



US dollar/yen2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 UBS 17.2



4 Nomura 10.1

5 Citi 9.8

US dollar/sterling2010 2009 Dealer %




4 2 UBS 9.1

5 4 JP Morgan 7.9

US dollar/Swiss franc2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 UBS 15.3

2 2 Credit Suisse 14.33 5 Socit Gnrale 10.8



Euro/sterling2010 2009 Dealer %



3 2 UBS 11.7

4 Socit Gnrale 9.3


Euro/yen2010 2009 Dealer %

1 1 UBS 15.4

2 Socit Gnrale 11.9


4 Nomura 9.5



10/27


Swiss franc2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 UBS 18.6 1 1 Gottex

2 1 Credit Suisse 18.0 2 2 Tullett Prebon3 3 JP Morgan 14.9 3 Icap


5 Socit Gnrale 12.7






5 Credit Suisse 8.7

Euro2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 2 JP Morgan 12.0 3 3 Tullett Prebon

4 Socit Gnrale 11.2







5 Credit Suisse 9.4


1 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 18.1 1 2 Tullett Prebon

2 1 Barclays Capital 17.0 2 1 Icap

3 JP Morgan 13.8 3 BGC




1 2 UBS 21.3 1 1 Gottex

2 1 Credit Suisse 20.7 2 BGC

3 3 Goldman Sachs 14.9 3 Tullett Prebon



TEREST RATE SwAS 210 yEARS

ShoRT-DATED TEREST RATE SwAS CONTINUED


11/27





3 2 Deutsche Bank 11.8 3 Tullett Prebon





2 4 Royal Bank of Scotland 12.6 2 3 BGC



5 Socit Gnrale 10.4

TEREST RATE CAS/FLooRS



2 1 Deutsche Bank 12.1 2 3 BGC3 5 Barclays Capital 11.9 3 Tradition







4 Socit Gnrale 10.7




2 UBS 13.7 2 3 Tullett Prebon


4 2 JP Morgan 13.1



1 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 17.6 1 1 Icap


3 3 Deutsche Bank 12.9 3 BGC

4 JP Morgan 10.4

5 5 HSBC 9.6


1 2 UBS 21.4 1 1 Gottex

2 1 Credit Suisse 19.8 2 Tullett Prebon




TEREST RATE SwAS 10+ yEARS


12/27




2 1 JP Morgan 15.0 2 2 Tullett Prebon3 UBS 13.8 3 3 BGC






3 1 Barclays Capital 16.8 3 2 Tradition




1 2 UBS 20.4 1 3 Tullett Prebon

2 1 Credit Suisse 18.6 2 2 Gottex

3 4 JP Morgan 14.3 3 Icap





2 3 Barclays Capital 13.4 2 Tullett Prebon

3 2 Deutsche Bank 10.5 3 3 BGC

4 5 Citi 10.3


Euro

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 2 Barclays Capital 13.2 3= Tradition

4 5 Socit Gnrale 12.2 3= 3 Tullett Prebon




2 1 JP Morgan 14.5 2= 3 Icap

3 UBS 13.2 2= 2 Tullett Prebon





2 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 18.1 2 Tullett Prebon

3 4 JP Morgan 14.8 3 1 Tradition



TEREST RATE SwAToS

TEREST RATE CAS/FLooRS CONTINUED


13/27



1 2 UBS 20.9 1 1 Gottex

2 1 Credit Suisse 19.4 2 3 Tullett Prebon3 5 Royal Bank of Scotland 13.9 3 2 Tradition

4 4 JP Morgan 12.8


TEREST RATE SwAToS CONTINUED

binary/digital2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 Goldman Sachs 16.0 1 1 Icap

2 4 JP Morgan 15.4 2 BGC

3 Credit Suisse 13.5 3 Tullett Prebon



barrier US dollar2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 3 Deutsche Bank 15.1 2 Tradition

3 Citi 12.3 3 3 BGC



barrier euro2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 3 Socit Gnrale 14.6 2 1 Tullett Prebon

3 Royal Bank of Scotland 13.8 3 2 Icap


5 5 Citi 9.7

barrier yen

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 1 Goldman Sachs 16.4 2 2 Tradition

3 3= JP Morgan 13.8 3 3 Icap

4 UBS 13.5

5 3= Bank of America Merrill Lynch 11.2

barrier sterling2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 2= Royal Bank of Scotland 18.3 2 2 Tullett Prebon

3 2= Deutsche Bank 14.0 3 Tradition


5 Socit Gnrale 11.3

bermudan/American US dollar2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker






ExoTC TEREST RATE RoDuCTS


14/27


bermudan/American euro2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 5 Socit Gnrale 14.1 2 Icap3 2 Barclays Capital 12.7 3 2 Tullett Prebon

4 4 JP Morgan 11.2


bermudan/American yen2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Goldman Sachs 18.1 1 3 Tullett Prebon


3 UBS 12.8 3 1 Icap

4 3= JP Morgan 11.8


bermudan/American sterling2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Barclays Capital 22.5 1 Tradition





Quantos2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 4 Credit Suisse 17.3 1 BGC

2 1 Deutsche Bank 15.2 2= 1 Icap

3 3 JP Morgan 13.8 2= Tradition

4 5 Citi 12.7

5 Socit Gnrale 10.1

US dollar

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 3 Deutsche Bank 14.9 3 Icap

4 Citi 12.4

5 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 10.7



2 3 Royal Bank of Scotland 16.1 2 BGC



5 Socit Gnrale 10.1




3 4 HSBC 14.1 3 Icap


5 BNP Paribas 10.4

FLATo SwAS

ExoTC TEREST RATE RoDuCTS CONTINUED


15/27



1 na Barclays Capital 18.5 1 na BGC

2 Royal Bank of Scotland 17.6 2 Tullett Prebon3 Deutsche Bank 14.8 3 Icap

4 Citi 11.7



1 na Royal Bank of Scotland 18.0 1 na Tullett Prebon

2 Barclays Capital 16.6 2 BGC

3 Citi 15.3 3 Icap

4 Socit Gnrale 12.7

5 Deutsche Bank 9.6


1 na Royal Bank of Scotland 19.8 1 na Tullett Prebon

2 Barclays Capital 19.4 2 BGC

3 Citi 13.9 3 Tradition


5 BNP Paribas 12.5



2 Barclays Capital 15.9 2= 3 BGC

3 3 Credit Suisse 11.1 2= 1 Tullett Prebon



Euro

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker




4 4= Socit Gnrale 11.8

5 Credit Suisse 9.2




3 5 JP Morgan 13.7 3 1 Tradition


5 Nomura 10.7




3 Credit Suisse 12.8 3 2 Icap


5 JP Morgan 11.7

ovERghT DExED SwAS

FLATo oToS


16/27



1 2 UBS 20.8 1 1 Gottex

2 1 Credit Suisse 18.4 2 2 BGC3 3 JP Morgan 16.3 3 Tullett Prebon




1 2 Credit Suisse 16.4 1 1 Icap


3 JP Morgan 12.0 3 BGC

4 Citi 11.8









1 3 Nomura 18.3 1 1 Tradition

2 1 Mizuho 15.3 2 2 Tullett Prebon


4 4 JP Morgan 11.7





3 Credit Suisse 13.0 3 1 Icap

4 Socit Gnrale 12.9

5 5 HSBC 10.5



2 3 UBS 20.4 2 BGC



5 Socit Gnrale 11.5

REuRChASE AgREEmETS

ovERghT DExED SwAS CONTINUED


17/27




2 3 Deutsche Bank 14.9 2 =1 Icap3 4 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 14.2 3 =1 Tullett Prebon




1 4 Socit Gnrale 18.2 1 1 Icap


3 1 JP Morgan 13.7 3 BGC


5 UBS 9.6





4 Nomura 11.7

5 Citi 10.7



2 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 17.6 2 3 Tradition

3 Socit Gnrale 12.8 3 RP Martin


5 5 HSBC 10.2


1 1 UBS 20.4 1 1 Gottex





FoRwARD RATE AgREEmETS

CRoSS-CuRRECy SwAS

US dollar/euro2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 3 UBS 12.7 3 3 BGC


5 5 Citi 10.7

US dollar/yen2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 UBS 14.7 1 3 BGC


3 3 Goldman Sachs 13.7 3 Tullett Prebon


5 4 JP Morgan 11.3


18/27


US dollar/sterling2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Barclays Capital 17.6 1 BGC

2 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 16.0 2 1 Icap3 4 Deutsche Bank 13.7 3 3 Tullett Prebon

4 3 UBS 12.9

5 5 JP Morgan 11.5

US dollar/Swiss franc2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 3 Socit Gnrale 14.3 3 3 BGC



Euro/sterling2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 2 UBS 14.7 3 2 Icap


5 Socit Gnrale 12.0

Euro/yen2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 2 UBS 14.9 2 2 BGC


4 Socit Gnrale 12.1


US dollar/euro

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 1 UBS 13.8 2 1 Tradition-Icap

3 5 Royal Bank of Scotland 12.9 3 3 GFI

4 3= Barclays Capital 11.5

5 3= JP Morgan 10.9


1 3 Royal Bank of Scotland 15.7 1 1 Tradition-Icap

2 1 UBS 15.6 2 2 BGC

3 4 Deutsche Bank 13.2 3 3 GFI

4 2 Citi 12.4

5 Nomura 11.0



2 Deutsche Bank 17.6 2 2 BGC

3 4 Barclays Capital 14.3 3 GFI

4 1 JP Morgan 12.5

5 3 UBS 11.4

vALLA CuRRECy oToS

CRoSS-CuRRECy SwAS CONTINUED


19/27


US dollar/Swiss franc2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 2 Credit Suisse 18.2 2 2 BGC3 Deutsche Bank 15.3 3 GFI

4 Socit Gnrale 12.8



1 3 Barclays Capital 18.5 1 1 Tradition-Icap

2 4 Royal Bank of Scotland 17.4 2 3 BGC

3 1= UBS 16.9 3 2 GFI

4 Socit Gnrale 14.4



1 3 UBS 15.4 1 1 GFI



4 Nomur a 11.7

5 Socit Gnrale 11.2

ExoTC CuRRECy oToS

barrier US dollar/euro2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 Royal Bank of Scotland 13.9 2 2 BGC


4 3 JP Morgan 12.4


barrier US dollar/yen

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1= 3 Royal Bank of Scotland 13.8 1 1 Tullett Prebon

1= 2 UBS 13.8 2 2 Tradition-Icap

3 5 BNP Paribas 12.5 3 3 BGC

4 Nomura 11.6

5 1 Citi 11.5

barrier US dollar/sterling2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 5 Royal Bank of Scotland 17.1 2 1 GFI

3 1 Citi 15.5 3 3 Tradition-Icap


5 3 UBS 13.5

barrier euro/yen2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 UBS 15.1 1 2 BGC

2 3 BNP Paribas 14.6 2 3 Tullett Prebon

3 1 Citi 13.6 3 GFI

4 Socit Gnrale 12.9

5 Nomur a 11.4

vALLA CuRRECy oToS CONTINUED


20/27


CuRRECy FoRwARDS

Long-dated2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 5 Royal Bank of Scotland 15.6 2 1 Tradition-Icap3 3 Goldman Sachs 13.9 3 3 BGC

4 Socit Gnrale 13.7

5 BNP Paribas 13.3

US dollar/euro2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 1 UBS 12.8 3 BGC

4 2 JP Morgan 11.7






4 Nomura 10.8

5 4 Citi 10.7




3 2 UBS 16.5 3 RP Martin


5 5 HSBC 12.0

US dollar/Swiss franc

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 Credit Suisse 20.9 1 1 Tullett Prebon

2 1 UBS 20.8 2 BGC

3 4= Socit Gnrale 16.0 3 RP Martin






3 4= UBS 15.1 3 RP Martin


5 4= Deutsche Bank 13.1



2 1 UBS 14.4 2 2 Icap

3 Royal Bank of Scotland 13.8 3 3 Tradition


5 Nomura 11.0

ExoTC CuRRECy oToS CONTINUED


21/27


US2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 4 Morgan Stanley 19.6 1 1 Sunrise

2 2 Socit Gnrale 13.4 2 3 Icap3 3 JP Morgan 10.9 3 2 GFI


5 5 BNP Paribas 8.9

Europe2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 Socit Gnrale 18.6 1 2 Sunrise

2 1 BNP Paribas 18.0 2 1 GFI

3 JP Morgan 11.4 3 Tullett Prebon



Asia2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 1 BNP Paribas 17.8 2 Tradition


4 Morgan Stanley 10.5


DJ Eurostoxx 502010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 JP Morgan 14.6 2 1 GFI




Nasdaq 100

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 Goldman Sachs 15.9 2 Icap

3 2 Morgan Stanley 13.9 3 2 Tradition

4 4= JP Morgan 11.0


DJ Gloal Titans2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Socit Gnrale 19.2 1 GFI

2 Deutsche Bank 18.8 2 2 Sunrise




S&P 5002010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 4 JP Morgan 18.1 1 1 Sunrise

2 1 Socit Gnrale 16.1 2 2 Tradition




EquTy DEx oToS

oTC SgLE-SToCk EquTy oToS


22/27


EquTy DEx oToS CONTINUED

FTSE 1002010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 2= BNP Paribas 16.5 2 3 Tullett Prebon3 2= Credit Suisse 14.3 3 GFI



Nikkei 2252010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 3 BNP Paribas 15.9 2 2 Icap

3 Nomura 15.1 3 3 Tradition

4 4 JP Morgan 13.2


SMI2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 UBS 14.1 3 Vantage


5 JP Morgan 10.8

Dax 302010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Deutsche Bank 22.4 1 1 Sunrise

2 3 Socit Gnrale 14.8 2 3 Icap


4 Commerzbank 12.9


Cac 402010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Socit Gnrale 21.4 1 1 Exane

2 2 BNP Paribas 18.3 2 2 Sunrise

3 JP Morgan 17.1 3 3 Icap

4 Crdit Agricole 15.2


Hang Seng2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 Royal Bank of Scotland 17.1 2 Tradition


4 4 JP Morgan 12.7



23/27


Cliquet2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1= Socit Gnrale 17.3 1 1 Sunrise

2 1= BNP Paribas 14.1 2 2 Tradition3 3 Credit Suisse 11.2 3 3 GFI

4 JP Morgan 11.1


Daily put crash protection2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 3 BNP Paribas 14.1 2 1 Tradition

3 5 JP Morgan 13.9 3 3 AFS Brokers



Quanto forwards2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Socit Gnrale 20.1 1 3 GFI


3 Deutsche Bank 15.1 3 1 Tradition

4= 4 Credit Suisse 13.6

4= 3 JP Morgan 13.6

Volatility/variance swaps2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 JP Morgan 13.9 3 3 Icap


5 Goldman Sachs 11.4

Dividend swaps2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 1 Barclays Capital 14.2 3 Tradition

4 5 JP Morgan 11.0

5 Goldman Sachs 10.3

Worst-of options2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 3 Credit Suisse 16.1 3 Icap

4 JP Morgan 12.7


OTC asket options (index askets)2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 Deutsche Bank 18.3 1 1 Sunrise

2 2= Socit Gnrale 18.2 2 2 Tradition

3 2= BNP Paribas 16.2 3 3 GFI

4 5 JP Morgan 13.5

5 Nomura 11.1

ExoTC EquTy RoDuCTS


24/27


OTC asket options (stock askets)2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 3 BNP Paribas 14.8 2 3 Tradition3 2 Deutsche Bank 14.2 3 2 GFI

4 JP Morgan 11.7

5 Nomura 11.3

ExoTC EquTy RoDuCTS CONTINUED

Investment grade Americas2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 2 Goldman Sachs 16.1 2 1 GFI




Investment grade Europe2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 2 JP Morgan 18.2 1 Tullett Prebon

2 Barclays Capital 15.5 2 1 GFI

3 3 Deutsche Bank 12.5 3 Sunrise



Investment grade Asia2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 1 JP Morgan 19.4 1 1 GFI

2 2 Deutsche Bank 17.9 2 Sunrise

3= 4 BNP Paribas 13.8 3 Tullett Prebon

3= 3 Goldman Sachs 13.8


Investment grade sovereigns

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 Goldman Sachs 17.4 1 Tullett Prebon


3 Deutsche Bank 15.8 3 3 BGC



Emerging market sovereigns2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 Barclays Capital 18.4 1 Tullett Prebon


3 4 Goldman Sachs 13.2 3 1 GFI

4= 2 Deutsche Bank 11.0

4= UBS 11.0

High yield Americas2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 3 Morgan Stanley 19.0 1 1 GFI





CREDT DEFAuLT SwAS


25/27


Markit iTraxx Europe index2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 3 Deutsche Bank 17.2 2 Tullett Prebon



5 UBS 8.9

Markit iTraxx Asia/Australia/Japan index2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 3 Morgan Stanley 16.0 3 Tullett Prebon


5 UBS 11.6

Markit CDX index

2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker



3 3= Deutsche Bank 16.4 3 Icap

4 3= Goldman Sachs 14.1

5 UBS 11.0

Markit iTraxx Europe tranches2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker


2 1 Morgan Stanley 18.2 2 3 Sunrise

3 BNP Paribas 13.2 3 2 Creditex



Markit iTraxx Asia/Australia/Japan tranches2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 UBS 18.4 1 1 GFI


3 1 JP Morgan 16.8 3 Sunrise



High yield Europe2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 3 Barclays Capital 18.2 1 1 GFI

2 1 Deutsche Bank 15.8 2 Tullett Prebon3 2 JP Morgan 12.3 3 3 Icap



High yield Asia2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 Goldman Sachs 18.6 1 1 GFI


3 UBS 13.5 3 3 BGC

4 3= Deutsche Bank 12.7

5 Nomura 10.1

CREDT DEFAuLT SwAS CONTINUED

STRuCTuRED CREDT


26/27


Markit CDX tranches2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 BNP Paribas 16.3 1 1 GFI

2= Citi 15.8 2 Sunrise2= 2 Deutsche Bank 15.8 3 3 Icap

4 1 JP Morgan 15.1


Other structured credit and correlation products (incl. espoke CDO tranches, first-to-default askets, credit options, off-the-run tranches)2010 2009 Dealer % 2010 2009 broker

1 na JP Morgan 19.2 1 na Tullett Prebon

2 UBS 15.1 2 GFI

3 BNP Paribas 12.8 3 Sunrise



STRuCTuRED CREDT CONTINUED

42%

13%

16%

8%

21%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%

0-20%

21-40%

41-60%

61-80%

81-100%

Regulatory change will impose extra costs on derivatives markets what proportion of these costs will be passed on to clients?

67%

33%

Libor

OIS

What rate do you use to discount the present value ofcollateralised trades?

41%

59%

Are you already a clearing memberwith one or more OTC derivatives CCPs?

Yes

No

23%

77%

If not, are you planning to become a clearing member?

Yes

No

45%

55%

No

Yes

Will the Dodd-Frank reforms recently passed in the UShave a direct eect on your part of the derivatives business?

Following implementation, what will be the aggregate impact

of the various strands of regulatory reform on derivatives volumes?

34%

41%

13%

4%

8%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

A drop of up to 10%

A drop of between11 and 30%

A drop of between31 and 50%

A drop of morethan 50%

Volumes will

increase

from their

current levels

ADDToAL quESToS


27/27

The worlds leading IDBTullett Prebon is delighted to have been voted

overall number one broker in Riskmagazines

inter-dealer rankings 2010.

We would like to thank all our clients for their valued

support, and for taking the time to vote for us in this

and all associated Risk surveys this year.

For further information:

Europe+44 (0)20 7200 7000

Americas+1 201 557 5000

Asia+65 6535 0777

Tullett Prebon Electronic Broking+44 (0)20 7200 7300

Tullett Prebon Information+44 (0)20 7200 7600

www.tullettprebon.com

Voted overall

number one brokerin Nordic Riskmagazines

2010 rankings

Voted overall

number one brokerin Creditmagazines

2010 rankings

Voted overall number one

broker in currencies (FX)in Riskmagazines

2010 rankings

Risk 0910 Tullett

Documents

Transcript of Risk 0910 Tullett