Richard York, Brett Clark - Marxism, Positivism and Scientific Sociology

The Sociological Quarterly

47

(2006) 425–450 © 2006 Midwest Sociological Society

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The Sociological Quarterly ISSN 0038-0253

Blackwell Publishing Ltd.Oxford, UK and Malden, USATSQThe Sociological Quarterly0038-02532006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.2006473425450MARXISM, POSITIVISM, AND HISTORICISM: AN EXCHANGE

Marxism, Positivism, and Sci-

entific SociologyRichard York and Brett Clark

*Direct all correspondence to Richard York, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR

97403-1291; e-mail: [email protected]

MARXISM, POSITIVISM, AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY: Social Gravity and Historicity

Richard York*

University of Oregon

Brett Clark

University of Oregon

Marxism and positivism are often thought to be incompatible perspectives in sociology. Yet, Marx-

ism has a long history of commitment to scientific inquiry. Here, we juxtapose these two scientific

paradigms—Marxism and positivism—in ways that can enhance both, while highlighting in par-

ticular the power of the former. We argue that many of the key theoretical claims of Marxism can be

explored in terms of analytic concepts congruent with and easily accessible to the contemporary

positivist tradition. Marxist criticisms of the cruder versions of the positivist program are not anti-

science but are rather rational critiques based on scientific principles.

In the discipline of sociology, there is considerable tension between the so-called“positivist” tradition—with its primary focus on quantitative, empirical research—andMarxism. Agger (1998) argues that a definitive feature of critical social theories, includingMarxism, feminism, and postmodernism, is a shared opposition to positivism. Theaspect of positivism that is perhaps most objectionable to Marxists and other critical the-orists is the underlying metatheoretical assumption that the social world is governed byimmutable

laws

that can be identified through empirical observation without the encum-brance of refined theory. Conversely, self-styled positivists often take issue with the per-ceived tendency of Marxists and other critical theorists to evaluate the validity of factualclaims based on ideology rather than empirical evidence.

Our intent is to show that, contrary to widely held perceptions, there are substantialconnections between the Marxist and positivist traditions with regard to scientific analy-sis of the social (and natural) world. In particular, we argue that the materialist approachin the Marxist tradition is consistent with a rigorous scientific method, similar to that ofthe positivist program, and that Marxism offers distinct strengths to scientific analyses.Scientific sociology is not well served by having separate research traditions that operatelargely in isolation, without cross-fertilization. Thus, it is important to recognize connec-tions between prominent research traditions and identify opportunities for dialogue.One key feature that limits serious dialogue between those in the positivist traditionbroadly conceived and those in the Marxist tradition is the lack of a shared intellectual

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Marxism, Positivism, and Scientific Sociology

Richard York and Brett Clark

language. Empirical sociologists with positivist leanings (C. Wright Mills’ “abstractempiricists”) generally have only limited training in grand theoretical traditions, whileMarxists are often poorly trained in quantitative methodology and tend to distrust the“facts” generated by supposedly value-free empirical research.

1

We argue that much of thetension between these two great methodological-theoretical traditions stems from a fail-ure of each to appreciate the central concerns of the other. One corrective to this problemis to express important Marxist critiques of mainstream empirical work in the terminol-ogy of thinkers of a more positivistic persuasion. In so doing, we intend to show thatMarxist methodological concerns and theoretical conceptualization of the social worldare not completely at odds with substantial aspects of the approach to research in sophis-ticated versions of the positivist program, given certain considerations. C. Wright Mills,who was strongly influenced by the Marxist tradition, in his classic work

The SociologicalImagination

(1961), stressed the importance of historical and structural research andnoted that any systematic attempt to understand involves a dialogue between empiricaland theoretical work (p. 74).

The tension between positivism and Marxism is in some respects ironic in that bothtraditions share a foundation in philosophical materialism. Although Western Marxismhas strayed from this materialist focus outside, perhaps, its consideration of economics,there remains a vibrant materialist tradition within Marxism (Sweezy 1953; Kalecki 1968;Gould and Eldredge 1977; Magdoff 1978; Timpanaro 1980; Levins and Lewontin 1985;Braverman 1998; Burkett 1999a; Foster 1999, 2000; Gimenez 2000).

2

Our general argu-ment is that a strictly materialist Marxism and a historically oriented positivism that isnot overly committed to narrow reductionism are not entirely incompatible, and thateach tradition can inform the other. To a large extent, we accept positivist critiques of

nonmaterialist

strains of Marxism and concur with the priority positivists’ give toempirical evidence and realist ontology. However, in the spirit of C. Wright Mills andcontemporary critical realists like Roy Bhaskar (1979), we also recognize the need forsophisticated social theory to direct our inquiries. Here, an important qualification isneeded: Throughout the rest of this article, we are considering only the relationship of

materialist

,

critical-realist

Marxism

3

to the sociological positivist tradition—viewing thelatter in its less epistemologically naïve, more sophisticated form. We make no claims asto the compatibility of crude deterministic positivism and Marxian materialist dialectics;nor do we wish to argue for the compatibility of the more idealist or Hegelian versions ofMarxism or post-Marxism with positivism.

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However, we do contend that the criticalrealist understanding of Marxism is in line with Marx’s own work.

After presenting a discussion of the distinct characteristics of the positivist andMarxist traditions, we develop our argument in three steps by translating key Marxistideas into statistical terms to demonstrate their amenability to evaluation in the broadpositivist program. First, we argue that there are many factors in any historical era that areeffectively constant for long stretches of time—what we label “background conditions”—that may exert a strong influence on social processes (e.g., a variety of factors of interest tothe social scientist, such as crime rates and poverty). However, the influences of thesefactors, because of their ubiquity and constancy (at least over considerable stretches of




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history)—like gravity—are effectively invisible to statistical analyses. In effect, back-ground conditions generate “social gravity”; they influence all aspects of society, but oftengo unnoticed because of their pervasiveness. Second, we argue that background condi-tions likely influence not only many variables of interest, but also interact with other fac-tors, conditioning their effects on social processes. Because of these interaction effects,empirical relationships among factors in any one context cannot be assumed to representinvariant social

laws

, but rather may represent only relationships unique to a specific con-text. Third, we argue that background conditions may change rapidly following longperiods of stasis. Because of the punctuated nature of historical change, time-series anal-yses may not be sufficient to capture the effects of background conditions unless theycover an unusually long span of time.

Following from this analysis, we argue for the central importance of social theory inunderstanding historical processes. We are not arguing that theory should be privilegedover empirical evidence, only that theory gives us insights about the limitations inherentin the data typically available to us as researchers. Furthermore, we argue that Marxism,in relying on theoretical abstractions to make conjectures about future social conditions,does not differ from the natural sciences. Like the natural sciences, Marxism is based ontheory built on observation of a limited subset of phenomena to develop expectationsregarding unobserved phenomena. In its focus on historicity and its understanding ofdepartures from stasis, Marxism transforms the nature of social theory, allowing us toscientifically grapple with a dynamic world.

MARXISM AND POSITIVISM: MATERIALISM AND SOCIAL LAWS

Positivism is a diverse tradition with a complex history, encompassing work fromAuguste Comte to that of the Vienna Circle (Hughes 1958; Fuller 2001; also see Gartrelland Gartrell 2002 for an analysis of positivism in sociological research in the United Statesand Britain). Here, we are concerned with contemporary sociological positivism, whichis characterized by the view that

the social sciences, and sociology in particular, are natural sciences in which abstractlaws of human organization can be formulated to explain the operative dynamics ofthe social universe. The plausibility of these laws are [sic] then to be assessed againstsystematically collected empirical data. (Turner 2001:11827)

Turner (1992) argues that sociological research in the positivist tradition should use “lotsof description and experimental work, ultimately unified by some generally theoreticalprincipals” to identify social laws (p. 60; see also Alexander 1991). Turner (1985) alsoexplains that “[n]aturalistic/positivistic schemes assume that there are timeless andinvariant processes in the social universe, much as there are in the physical and biologicalrealms” (p. 25). Thus, central aspects of the sociological positivist tradition, drawingupon traditions in the natural sciences, include a commitment to ontological realism,advocacy for objective value-free analyses, a focus on identifying spatiotemporally invari-ant (i.e., ahistorical) social laws, a strong preference for direct empirical evidence, and adistaste for overreliance on ungrounded conceptual notions.

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In its cruder forms, positivism has demonstrated weaknesses. The early positivismon which the Vienna Circle based much of its philosophical foundations so stronglyabhorred concepts that where not directly grounded in empirical observation, it led sup-porters to reject some of the most profound scientific advances of the 19th and 20th cen-turies. For example, the renowned physicist Ernst Mach (1838–1916), who was a strictadherent of positivist philosophy, rejected the concept of atoms and Einstein’s theory ofrelativity because of their reliance on theoretical constructs without immediate and directempirical referents (Goldstein 2005:85; Rigden 2005:46–7). It is worth noting that Ein-stein rejected positivism because he perceived that its philosophical prejudice limitedinsight into natural phenomena. Einstein argued that this prejudice “consists in the faiththat facts by themselves can and should yield scientific knowledge without free concep-tual construction” (quoted in Rigden 2005:47).

The Marxist tradition has raised concerns along these lines about the positivist pro-gram. In particular, Marxism eschews ahistorical explanations of social phenomena andtakes an epistemological position that is highly skeptical of the naïve faith that a smatter-ing of factual observations can lead us to a proper understanding of the social world with-out utilizing a refined theoretical framework. Although the materialist Marxism that isour focus here, embodied in the work of social scientists such as Burkett (1999a), Bhaskar(1979, 1986, 1989), and Foster (1999, 2000) and natural scientists such as Levins andLewontin (1985) and Gould (2002), is in full agreement with positivism about the impor-tance of ontological realism and its support for efforts to gain an objective understandingof the world, it is apprehensive about the view that objectivity can be obtained by a singu-lar reliance on supposedly “value-free” empirical research. Materialist Marxism is alsocritical of positivism’s neglect of the importance of conceptually rich theory in directingour empirical inquiries.

The approach we are explicating is one of

historical

materialism, as distinct from otherversions of materialism. While Feuerbach (1881, 1972), a well-known materialist andcontemporary of Marx, rejected Hegel’s speculative philosophy and placed an emphasison naturalism, his materialism tended to be contemplative and ahistorical. It retained astatic conception of nature. The alienation of humans from nature remained an abstractissue to be resolved in the mind. Marx broke from this position to present a practicalmaterialism, which involved human praxis as a force in transforming the world (Marxand Engels 1976a:6–8; Marx and Engels 1976b; Marx 1993; Foster 2000). Thus, Marx’smaterialism is both historical and dialectical. It is characterized by a materialist concep-tion of history and of nature. It views the world as dynamic, governed by forces thatemerge from the interaction of many factors and contingent historical events.

One of Marx’s important insights is that our social position influences our perceptionof the social world, and the views of those in power are often embedded in so-called“value-free” research. Therefore, to achieve a more objective understanding of the world,we need to recognize the imprint of ideology on scientific theories, so as not to be misledby prevailing prejudices (Levins and Lewontin 1985; Levins 1990; Gould 1996). However,unlike some other critical theories, materialist Marxism, like positivism, takes the posi-tion that scientific questions should ultimately be decided based on logic of argument and




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validity of evidence, not ideology. Nonetheless, Marxism points to the importance of the-ory in directing our empirical research and cautions against the naïve assumption that theaccumulation of factual observations alone will lead to an accurate understanding of theworkings of the social and natural worlds. It is not our intention to attempt to reconcilethe differences between Marxism and positivism about the potential for “value-free”research. We broach the issue simply to note that materialist Marxism and positivismshare a support for materialism, ontological realism, and objective analysis, althoughthey take different positions about the extent to which our social context inhibits our abil-ity to be “value-free” in our research and about the necessity of “free conceptual construc-tion” (to use Einstein’s phrase) for developing insights about the empirical world.

Although there are divides between positivism and Marxism that are perhapsunbridgeable, many, perhaps even most, practicing scholars of both positivist andMarxist leanings are more sophisticated and subtle in their thinking than is suggestedby common caricatures of either position. It is to these sophisticated and subtle thinkersin both traditions that we direct our argument. Our concern is to show the potential forengagement between Marxists and positivists on the question about the nature of social“laws.” The materialist Marxist tradition generally is highly skeptical of the claim thatmost observed social phenomena can be explained by spatiotemporally invariant sociallaws, although it does not a priori reject the possibility of such laws. Rather, Marxistspoint to the dramatic changes in social structures and patterns that have occurredthroughout human history and argue that what may appear to be invariant laws to anobserver in any particular period may be in fact transient tendencies unique to a histor-ical era that emerge from the dialectical interaction of a diversity of social and naturalprocesses. In this, Marxists are challenging the reductionism that often leads those of apositivistic bent to assume social patterns occur because of invariant, deterministic,causal forces operating in isolation, rather than because of dynamic interactions of avariety of factors arising through the contingencies of history. As we develop below, ourargument is that the conflicting claims of Marxists and positivists regarding the exist-ence of invariant social laws can be adjudicated in a scientific research program and thatone aspect of scientific sociology, be it positivist or Marxist, should be aimed at estab-lishing the distinction between forces that are historically particular and those that aretruly ahistorical.

It is worth noting that in physics, often seen as the model science among positivists,there are growing questions about whether the “constants” embedded in physical laws areindeed constant, or whether they have changed during cosmic history (Barrow and Webb2005). The question of “inconstant constants” does not serve to undermine scientificinquiry, since empirical evidence can be brought to bear on the matter. However, as withmany key theoretical issues in sociology, there are substantial challenges to gatheringappropriate data and measuring relevant factors with sufficient precision. Furthermore,refined theory is a prerequisite for directing empirical inquiry and alerting theorists to thepossibility that some of the “constants” of nature may not in fact be constant. We point tothis example because it illustrates that the challenges of distinguishing between histori-cally variant and ahistorical forces are not confined to the social sciences.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF PLASTICITY: CONSTANTS AND VARIABLES AS CAUSAL FORCES

Perhaps the most basic requirement for statistical analyses is that the explanatory vari-ables actually vary. In particular, if we wish to explain why some phenomena vary amongcases (e.g., why different people have different incomes), it is necessary that potentialexplanative variables have a diversity of values. For example, we cannot assess the effect ofrace on income in a sample of exclusively white people. Simply stated, a constant cannotexplain variation. However, it is important to recognize that a factor that appears to be aconstant in certain circumstances may not be a constant in all circumstances.

To address this issue, York, Rosa, and Dietz (2002) introduce the concept of

plasticity

,which refers to the potential rate and range of change of a variable. One major problem inassessing the plasticity of a variable is that its

observed

rate and range of change (or lackthereof) may not reflect its

potential

rate and range of change. Consider a hypothetical sit-uation where we have time-series data on three variables for an individual (let us call herJane): monthly income, monthly expenditures, and amount saved each month. If over atwo-year period Jane’s monthly income remains constant at $4,000, while her expendi-ture varies from month to month between $1,000 and $3,000, the amount she saves willvary from month to month. After all, it is plainly obvious that the amount she has to saveeach month (S) is a simple function of monthly income (I) and expenditure (E), so thatS

=

I

−

E. Based on this formula for monthly savings (which could yield a negativenumber, indicating debt or drawdown of accumulated savings), it is clear that incomeplays an important role in determining monthly savings. However, if the time-series datadescribed above were analyzed using typical statistical techniques (e.g., by regressingmonthly savings on income and expenditure in a stochastic linear model), the clear resultwould be that income does not explain any of the variance in monthly savings. This resultmight lead some naïve researchers to conclude (incorrectly) that income does not affectsavings. The reason for this finding is simply that income does not vary among observa-tions, and it, therefore, cannot explain why monthly savings varies (in this case, the vari-ance of monthly savings is entirely explained by the variance of expenditure). Despite thisfinding, it is plainly obvious that income has the

potential

to change (Jane could lose herjob, get a raise, etc.) and any such change could clearly affect the amount of money she hasavailable to save each month.

Lieberson (1985) makes the point that a statistical analysis of the rate of accelerationof a variety of falling objects on Earth will fail to detect the effect of the mass of the Earth(and the gravitational pull stemming from it) precisely because gravity exerts a constantforce on all objects on Earth (because the mass of the Earth is effectively constant). Whilegravity explains why things fall on Earth, it does not explain why different types of objectsfall at different rates—the explanation of why a feather falls more slowly than a rockresides in the field of aerodynamics. To understand the effect of gravity, one must observeconditions in which its strength varies. One cannot do this by observing only objects onEarth, but must observe gravitational effects near other “massive bodies” (e.g., otherplanets). The fact that the force of gravity is a function of mass and distance means that it




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is necessary to make observations where mass and distance vary substantially (e.g.,through astronomical observations) to identify the factors that influence the attraction ofmatter to matter.

What is the lesson to be learned here? Many potential factors may influence socialfacts that are invisible to statistical analyses because such analyses are based on data thatdo not come from a wide range of contexts. Most data sets represent only one moment intime or a short span of time (e.g., a few months, years, or decades), and frequently only alimited regional context (e.g., a single country). Many factors of interest to the social sci-entist may be a virtual constant for all observations within such a limited time span and/or region, but may exhibit substantial change over historical eras or vary among differentregions. Marxism expresses the recognition of this point by characterizing “social laws” astendential laws to be understood only in relation to a specific historical context.

HISTORICITY: BACKGROUND CONDITIONS, SOCIAL GRAVITY, AND INTERACTION EFFECTS

Historicity—the notion that social “laws,” unlike natural laws, vary across different his-torical periods—is one of the most basic concepts of the Marxist tradition.

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Despite thefact that many social “laws” may indeed seem immutable within a given era, history dem-onstrates that the apparently immutable can be radically changed, often in a strikinglyshort span of time. For example, the feudal system in Europe was fully accepted by virtu-ally all people at the time as God-given and unchangeable. Nonetheless, feudalism inEurope is no more. The central point captured by the concept of historicity, then, is thatthe social world is not governed singularly by a set of invariant deterministic laws, such asNewton’s laws of motion, but rather by forces that emerge from a diversity of interactingfactors that change over time. In other words, consideration of the historical context—the organization and structure of society (e.g., division of ownership of the means of pro-duction, technological development, and demographic composition) and the conditionof the natural environment (e.g., the global climate and the availability of naturalresources)—in which events unfold is essential for understanding causation in the socialworld and the potential for social change. The combination of these conditions influencesthe character of the period and the nature of the relationship among social factors.

In any historical period, certain background conditions may exist that, although theyexert a strong influence on the structure of society and the everyday happenings in peo-ple’s lives, remain largely unnoticed because of their pervasiveness. In typical empiricalanalyses of social facts, these “background conditions” are invisible exactly because theyare so pervasive and unchanging (during particular historical eras), just as the effect of themass of the Earth on the strength of gravity is invisible to terrestrially bound peoplebecause it is effectively constant. In effect, historical background conditions generate“social gravity”—influencing all aspects of society while remaining invisible to statisticalanalyses because they are effectively constant during extended periods.

Nonetheless, such background conditions may exhibit substantial plasticity on his-torical time scales, if not on the limited time scales of a human life span. In this sense,

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social gravity is quite different from physical gravity; the specific effects of social gravity

may

change between historical periods. Therefore, the results of statistical analyses for aspecific period or region may not reflect the effects of larger historical factors. This is a sta-tistical reflection of what Marxists call the “principle of historical specificity” (Korsch1963, 1972; also see Mills 1961). In short, then, we introduce and use the term “socialgravity” to refer to emergent structural forces stemming from historical background con-ditions that have ubiquitous and pervasive effects across a broad spectrum of social con-ditions, but that, although effectively constant for long stretches of time, are potentiallymutable.

Roy Bhaskar, in

The Possibility of Naturalism

(1979), presents some of the key insightsunderlying the theoretical concepts of historical background conditions and social grav-ity that we develop here. He explains that we are born into a world with existing, histori-cally determined structures, such as a society operating under the capitalist mode ofproduction. Certain conditions, such as private ownership of the means of production,exist that impose specific relationships and an organization on the world. In this case, themajority of people must sell their labor to those who own the means of production, inorder to pay for the necessities of life. The existence of the political-economic structuresof capitalism creates the conditions that facilitate the reproduction of these relationshipsand the continuance of the economic system (although contradictions are always presentand provide the potential for radical change). Braverman (1998) explained how theexpansion of monopoly capital transformed all of society, as it incorporated each realmof social life into the marketplace. People’s desire and need for food and entertainmentare channeled through the market (pp. 188–96; see also Dawson 2003). These structuralarrangements provide a degree of stability when measured on a limited time scale, such astens or even hundreds of years. The capitalist mode of production acts as a fundamentalbackground condition generating its own social gravity, conditioning relationshipsthroughout the social world. A key insight of materialist Marxism, however, is that,although pervasive and enduring, background conditions, such as those associated withcapitalism, are not immutable.

Despite the challenge that this historical position presents to empirical research, theexistence of statistically invisible background conditions and the social gravity they gen-erate, which may exert a substantial influence on social facts, does not invalidate findingsfrom typical quantitative empirical work. In fact, positivistic empirical researchers mightargue that background conditions present no problems for their substantive findings onthe ground that, because background conditions are constant over most periods ofobservation, ceteris paribus (all else being equal) conditions are met (which is a key goalof multivariate analyses, and one of the central strengths of experimental designs). So, forexample, based on the ceteris paribus argument, researchers might readily acknowledgethat there are potentially other factors (which are part of historical background condi-tions) that they have not taken into consideration in their analyses that may influence akey dependent variable of interest (e.g., crime rate), but argue that their findings regard-ing the effect of a specific independent variable (e.g., unemployment rate) on the depen-dent variable (e.g., crime rate) will hold under other circumstances because the historical




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background conditions are held constant and they have, therefore, determined the

inde-pendent

effect of one variable on another.The key problem with the above argument is that it does not recognize the potential

for interaction effects—a situation where the effect of one independent variable (

X

) on adependent variable (

Y

) depends on the value of another independent variable (

Z

). Ifinteraction effects are present, then ceteris paribus arguments make little sense, becausethe value at which one independent variable is held constant will have a substantial influ-ence on the effect of the other independent variable.

We use a simple hypothetical example of the effect of the education and gender ofindividuals on income (using hypothetical numbers) for illustrative purposes. For exam-ple, in a situation where there is no interaction effect, perhaps each year of education (foreither a man or a woman) corresponds with an additional $1,000 of annual income, andperhaps men make on average $5,000 a year more than women, controlling for the effectsof education. In this situation, we can obtain an unbiased estimate of the annual incomeof an individual based on the simple addition of the effect of his or her education and theeffect of his or her gender (assuming that we have also estimated the

y

-intercept and havecontrolled appropriately for other factors). In this situation, where there is no interactioneffect between education and gender, we can appropriately identify the effect of educationon income ceteris paribus. Note that if there is no interaction effect between educationand gender, then we could assess the effect of education on income by studying onlywomen or only men. Alternatively, we could assess the effect of gender on income bystudying only people with one level of education.

However, if there is an interaction between education and gender, the situationbecomes considerably more complex. Perhaps for men each additional year of educationcorresponds with an additional $1,500 of annual income, whereas for women it corre-sponds with only $500 of annual income. This also indicates, conversely, that the effect ofgender on income will vary with education—in this specific hypothetical example, theincome gap between men and women is higher among those with more education(assuming that the

y

-intercept for women is not higher than it is for men). In this situa-tion, we cannot simply estimate (in an unbiased manner) the income of an individual byadding together the “independent” effects of gender and education, since the effects arenot in fact independent. As a consequence, if we studied only men, we would get a sub-stantially different estimate of the effect of education on income than if we studied onlywomen. Furthermore, if we studied only college graduates, we would get an entirely dif-ferent estimate of the effect of gender on income than if we studied only high school drop-outs. In such a situation, speaking of ceteris paribus conditions makes little sense, becausethere is no “correct” level at which to hold other factors constant and thereby determinethe “true” independent effect of one variable on another.

Note that it is not difficult to estimate interaction effects with typical statistical proce-dures. However, as with all such analyses, variability of all factors in question is a require-ment for estimation. Therefore, in the example given above, estimating the interactioneffect between gender and education on income presents no particular problem, as longas the researcher recognizes the need to look for it. However, in a broader macrohistorical

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context, interactive factors may not show substantial variance among observations if thescope of analysis is restricted.

If, hypothetically, the political economy of a nation interacts with ethnic diversity todetermine crime rates, we cannot legitimately speak of a universalistic effect of ethnicdiversity on crimes rates. In one context (e.g., in a capitalist nation), ethnic diversity mayshow a positive empirical association with crimes rates (i.e., more diversity leads to morecrime). However, in a different context (e.g., in a socialist nation), ethnic diversity mayhave no association with crimes rates, or even a negative association with crime rates (i.e.,more diversity leads to less crime). If there is a substantial interaction between historicalbackground conditions and many key social variables (and there is every reason to sus-pect that there is), then empirical findings derived from analyses of data from one histor-ical period, although certainly not invalid, are clearly context dependent. In such asituation, researchers should be very cautious about assuming that existing empiricalrelationships between factors are an indication of invariant social or natural laws. Forexample, some Marxists have argued that the “law of value” of capitalism did not operatein the Soviet Union because of the lack of effective mechanisms of competition, which inMarx’s political economy enforces the law of motion of capitalism. In an essay entitled“Are There Economic Laws of Motion of Socialism?” Harry Magdoff (1985) answered“No,” even though he insisted that such laws were clearly evident in capitalism. In otherwords, if economic background conditions change radically, which has occurred numer-ous times throughout human history, what appear to be universal laws in a particularcontext may be shown to be invalid in other contexts.

The myopia of ignoring interactions between variables and context dependence isevident in the “unbroken line of science from the criminal anthropology of 1876 to thecriminal cytogenetics” of today (Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984:25). Deterministclaims linking social actions with physical characteristics—such as the Lombrosian sci-ence that declared that inherent criminal intent from birth is evidenced through physicalcharacteristics such as cranial size, or contemporary claims of genetic causes for criminal-ity—assume “social institutions reflect nature” (Gould 1996:166). These claims stemfrom analyses that neglect political contexts and social relations and, therefore, producedubious results. This sleight of hand, which ignores context dependency and interactingvariables, starts from the reasonable position that humans are biological entities and thatwe are greatly influenced by our genetic makeup, just like all other organisms. However,biological determinism reduces physical and social characteristics to codes inscribed ongenes (e.g., Dawkins 1976). However, as Lewontin (2000) argues, an organism does notsimply compute itself from its genes, but rather depends on existing cellular structuresand its environmental context for development. Its ontogeny “is the consequence of aunique interaction between the genes it carries, the temporal sequence of external envi-ronments through which it passes during its life, and random events of molecular inter-actions within individual cells” (pp. 17–18). In fact, Lewontin (2000), a leading geneticistand dialectical biologist, who explicitly acknowledges his connection to Marxism,opposes a determinist position in evolutionary science.

7

He emphasizes the interactionbetween constraints (historical and internal) and external forces:




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All species that exist are the result of a unique historical process from the origins oflife, a process that might have taken many paths other than the one it actually took.Evolution is not an unfolding but a historically contingent wandering pathwaythrough the space of possibilities. Part of the historical contingency arises because thephysical conditions in which life has evolved also have a contingent history, but muchof the uncertainty of evolution arises from the existence of multiple possible pathwayseven when external conditions are fixed. (P. 88)

An organism becomes a site of interaction between the environment (including the ever-changing historical social and natural conditions) and genes.

Thus—disregarding social variables such as rearing, education, and economic ine-qualities—in one context, individuals with certain genes may be more likely to commitcertain crimes compared to others with different genes. However, in a different context,they may be less likely to commit the same crimes than others. The point is that it is mis-leading to argue that crime can be explained by the existence of “criminal genes” and, byextension, that society reflects some sort of “natural order.” In fact, the history of society,like evolution, remains contingent. Chance is always at play. The social gravity actingtoday, persistent as it may seem in terms of our own lives, will be transformed in time.What form it will take, we do not know. As Lewontin (2000) notes, “What we cannot dois to keep things as they are” (p. 68). Change is inevitable and the future remains open.

THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL CHANGE: TIME-SERIES ANALYSES, GALTON’S POLYHEDRON, AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD SYSTEM

The quantitative analysis of time-series data is growing in popularity among social scien-tists. This is for good reason; dynamic effects cannot always be properly assessed withcross-sectional analyses. Nonetheless, can time-series analyses help us overcome theproblems outlined above regarding background conditions that may be constant in anygiven historical era? The answer depends on both the period considered and the nature ofstructural change. If, for example, time-series data for some aggregate phenomenon (e.g.,crime rates) for the period 1950–2000 in the United States were analyzed, certain impor-tant explanative factors may remain effectively constant, even over this relatively longperiod. The most striking example may be the structure of the political economy. Overthe past 50 years, market forces have consistently dominated the U.S. economy and allprominent political leaders (presidents in particular) have been unquestionably procap-italism. Although minor variations may have occurred in some aspects of the capitaliststructure (e.g., government spending, taxation policies), the basic defining structure ofthe political economy has not changed appreciably.

A key argument of Marxists is that historical change is typically not smooth and con-tinuous, but rather, occurs very rapidly following periods of stasis. This position is per-haps best expressed in Eldredge and Gould’s (1972; and Gould and Eldredge 1977)argument that the evolutionary history of organisms is best characterized as “punctuatedequilibria,” long periods of stasis, punctuated with (geologically) brief periods of rapidchange. Social historical change may also follow a pattern of punctuated equilibria. If

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historical background conditions are generally constant, only changing occasionally andrapidly, time-series data will frequently not span the change of state and, therefore, willnot capture the effects of prominent factors (such as the structure of the political econ-omy of a nation) on other social factors.

Francis Galton, a prominent Victorian intellectual,

8

developed a useful metaphor toillustrate the nature of punctuated change, specifically in reference to evolutionarychange in the organic world (Gould 1993, 2002). Galton proposed that organisms are notmetaphorical spheres, like billiard balls, rolling smoothly along an evolutionary path dic-tated by the slightest nudges of external forces (natural selection). Instead, he proposedthat organisms are metaphorical polyhedrons (multisided objects, such as dice). Thepolyhedron, its structure metaphorically representing the constraints on change imposedby the structural integrity of organisms, unlike a billiard ball, stands in place when it isonly slightly nudged (via natural selection). However, when confronted by strong exter-nal forces that can give it a sufficiently hard push, it is forced to move, and thus switchfacets. The polyhedron’s response to external forces is restricted “by its own internalstructure,” the polyhedron’s various sides—that is, it cannot rest in a position betweenfacets, only on a facet (Gould 1993:384). In contrast with a sphere, which may rollsmoothly with a light tap, the polyhedron will resist minor perturbations, but, given suf-ficient force, will switch facets abruptly. This metaphor illustrates the manner in whichstructural factors can lead to the dominance of discontinuous change in history. Inter-connected social structures in a dynamic tension can lead to temporary stability, butwhen sufficiently jostled, a cascading of processes can be set in motion, leading to abruptchange. When this change happens, at a societal level, such as in the mode of production,the historical background conditions will be restructured, changing the nature of thesocial gravity that influences the social world.

Marx and Engels (1976b) stressed that humans are active agents in the creation of his-tory, interacting with nature, both as a source of life (which is transformed in interaction)and as a force influencing social development. Marx’s insistence on a materialist concep-tion of both history and nature provided a dynamic approach for understanding theinteraction of human society with nature (Godelier 1986; Bhaskar 1979; Foster 1999,2000; Dickens 2004). Through this social relationship with nature, the immediate histor-ical context confronted by humanity facilitates and constrains the possibilities of thefuture in creation. As Marx (1987) noted, “Men make their own history, but they do notmake it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves,but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past”(p. 15). The point of central concern for our argument is that when people “make theirown history” (i.e., change historical background conditions), they often do it in a briefhistorical moment of punctuation, which is commonly preceded and followed by stasis orperiods of slow historical change.

Thus, if prominent social background conditions change in the facet switchingmanner of “Galton’s polyhedron,” time-series data will not necessarily be sufficient toobserve variation in key causal factors since change will be concentrated in brief historicalmoments. When this consideration is combined with the recognition that many




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important social variables may interact with background conditions to generate theireffects, it becomes clear that observed empirical relationships among variables in the typ-ical sociological analysis will not necessarily represent invariant laws.

Cross-sectional data on a macroscale may present some hope for observing the effectsof key factors that remain constant over fairly long periods in a specific case (e.g., nation),if they vary across cases. For example, even though within many nations key structuralfactors remain constant for extended periods, such factors may vary substantially at anyone time across nations. Thus, it is not possible to assume that social structures in a par-ticular nation will remain constant throughout time—witness the dramatic changes inRussia in the 1990s and the ones we are seeing in Venezuela in the 2000s.

9

A variety of eco-nomic systems may exist in the world at the same time with various degrees of develop-ment and power. For instance, socialist (or at least semisocialist) nations still exist, despitetheir diminished number. Because of cross-national variation in key structures, then, it ispossible to assess the effects of certain background conditions that remain constantwithin any particular nation over extended periods. The ongoing expansion of globalcapitalism is, of course, reducing the cross-national diversity of many factors, but a hand-ful of noncapitalist models of the nation-state still exist.

Despite the existence of some degree of cross-national diversity, there may be condi-tions that operate on a global level and, therefore, influence all societies in the samemanner that gravity has the same effect on all objects on Earth. In this case, at any onepoint in time, global background conditions will lead to the problems discussed above,where important causal forces remain invisible to statistical analyses. Is it reasonable toassume that such global forces exist? Wallerstein (1974) argues that all nations of theworld are structurally interconnected and form a single world system.

10

In fact, thisworld system has a life of its own, a drive for the ceaseless accumulation of capital, inde-pendent of the individual nation-states that exist within its boundaries (Bergesen 1982).With the emergence of capitalism in the 16th century, precapitalist modes of productionwere eliminated as the new economic system expanded throughout the world. Capital-ism, as the dominant mode of production, consists of an integrated social system com-posed of interacting subsystems held together through conflicting forces and long-termhistorical processes (Wallerstein 1974). The world system is unified economically, but itis politically decentralized, despite the role of the United States as the current hegemon(Mészáros 2001). This arrangement, with divisions between the core and periphery,facilitates the unequal accumulation of capital between spheres within the global econ-omy (Sweezy 1981). The constant drive for accumulation, the concentration of militarystrength in the hands of the dominant capitalist nations, and the division of the worldinto an economic-political hierarchy helps maintain the world system, despite inherentconflicts and shifts in economic-military power throughout the centuries (Magdoff1969, 1978).

11

The world-systems perspective, then, suggests that there are forces that operateworldwide that have been basically constant in some aspects since the 16th century, butmay be, as Wallerstein (2004) himself proposes, on the brink of sudden change.Structural factors of the capitalist world system likely influence social conditions in all

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nations—even noncapitalist nations. If this is the case, causal forces stemming from thestructure of the capitalist world system (social gravity on a global scale) will be invisibleto statistical analyses, even if they examine a broad cross-section of nations and a longperiod (even stretching into centuries).

THEORY, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, AND PREDICTIONS: ANAEROBIC BACTERIA, BLACK HOLES, AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS

Building on the concept of the biosphere introduced by Vladimir Vernadsky in 1926(Vernadsky 1998), J. B. S. Haldane in Britain and A. I. Oparin in the Soviet Union inde-pendently introduced a materialist hypothesis of the origins of life, which argued that theemergence of life from nature radically transformed the conditions that made emergencepossible (Oparin 1965; Bernal 1967). In fact, life—in interaction with the existing envi-ronment—created the atmosphere as we know it. An interrelationship between livingand nonliving materials within the biosphere produces a cycling of chemical elements.Thus, the history of life and the physical and chemical processes of our planet are a storyof coevolution (Levins and Lewontin 1985:46–9).

The unique composition of gases in the atmosphere is the product of biological pro-cesses on earth. Three billion years ago, the Earth’s atmosphere had a dramatically lowerconcentration of oxygen than it does today. Unsurprisingly, anaerobic bacteria (i.e., bac-teria that survive in the absence of oxygen) dominated the Earth. Early bacteria survivedby fermentation, breaking down the sugars and chemicals existing in the surroundingenvironment (Capra 1996:236–42). Fermenting bacteria metabolizing sugars producedmethane and carbon dioxide (key greenhouse gases) as waste products, helping to createthe conditions to hold heat in the biosphere. Some bacteria developed the ability to fixnitrogen. Evolutionary changes led to an early form of photosynthesis, which is quite dif-ferent from the process found in plants today. These photosynthesizing bacteria usedhydrogen sulfide from volcanism (not water) as a source of hydrogen and combined itwith energy from sunlight and carbon dioxide from the air “to form organic compounds”(Capra 1996:237). Oxygen was not released in this process.

Further evolutionary changes in bacteria led to the emergence of a special type ofblue-green bacteria that developed the ability to use sunlight of higher energy to split thestronger bonds of hydrogen and oxygen found in water. The hydrogen was used for build-ing sugars, while the oxygen was released. Over many years, oxygen began to accumulatein the environment, causing toxic reactions with organic matter and the destruction ofessential biochemical compounds. Oxygen pollution killed numerous species, creating apunctuated change in the evolutionary development of the bacterial world. This contin-gent moment in organic history yielded blue-green bacteria that could

both

engage inphotosynthesis, producing oxygen,

and

in respiration, utilizing oxygen from the atmo-sphere (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Thus, blue-green bacteria were able to make use of thewaste (oxygen) produced by their photosynthetic process, which, to some degree, regu-lated the oxygen present in the atmosphere. After several billion years of evolution, life ininteraction with the abiotic environment created a mixture of atmospheric gases that




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provided conditions for the evolution of oxygen-breathing organisms, thus changing thematerial conditions of the world.

An analysis of life on Earth at any one point in time could very easily miss the fact thatthe atmosphere is changing because of the activities of living organisms. In fact, perhapsas a result of the bias that arises from the limited time scale of human affairs compared togeological processes, Western philosophers and scientists traditionally assumed thatnature maintains a sort of foreordained equilibrium (Botkin 1990). This is not the case,however. The actions of organisms at any one point in time contribute to the modifica-tion of the biosphere and lay the foundations for future conditions.

12

In a very real sense,the anaerobic bacteria of Earth’s ancient history were their own gravediggers—they werechanging their environment so that it became uninhabitable to them.

13

We use this example to illustrate the point that current conditions—either in natureor in society—are not necessarily immutable. Furthermore, the key to understandinghow processes operating at present may play out in the future lies in the realm of theory.Turner (1985), arguing in support of theoretical development, states that theorists needto “begin to develop abstract principles and analytical models about invariant and time-less properties of the social universe” in order “to cumulate knowledge about humanaction, interaction, and organization” (p. 30). In contrast, we argue that we need to his-toricize these relationships and properties to determine which extend beyond the back-ground conditions of any particular historical era and which are context dependent,unique to a specific historical era. For example, during a short period, it is unlikely thatdramatic changes in the atmosphere caused by the activity of organisms would beobserved (the present anthropogenic alteration of the atmosphere is perhaps an excep-tion).

14

However, careful observation may lead us to understand processes at work at aparticular time—such as anaerobic bacteria consuming carbon dioxide and emitting freeoxygen—and, through the development of theory, may further allow us to recognize thechanges that such processes may lead to in the full extent of time. In this, we can bettergrapple with the knowledge that change is inevitable and recognize that theory providesa basis for processing the empirical reality of the nature–society relationship (Lieberson1992).

Specifically in reference to Marxist theory, our point is that theoretically derivedexpectations of future changes in society are not necessarily at odds with typical scientificpractice. Just as abrupt change is a topic for natural science and is recognized as a recur-ring phenomenon (Gould and Eldredge 1977; Botkin 1990), so too it must be incorpo-rated into social science. A central aspect of science is the attempt to build nomothetictheory based on a selection of observations. It is obviously not possible to observe all phe-nomena at all periods of time. Science relies on the observation of a subset of given phe-nomena to develop general explanations that can, through deduction, apply to situationsthat have not been observed. In this sense, Marxist theory grounded in materialism is nodifferent from theories in the natural sciences in its realist-empiricist stance.

15

Indeed,Marx was a close observer of the rise of modern science, tracing the impact of Greek mate-rialists, particularly Epicurus, on early modern scientific philosophy as represented byBacon and Gassendi (Foster 2000:21–65; see also Griese and Pawelzig 1995). Using a

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historical materialist (or critical-realist) approach, Marxism embraces the conceptionthat the lives, thoughts, and concepts of humans change in relation to the conditions oftheir material existence (Bhaskar 1979; Burkett 1999a; Foster 2000). This perspectiveprovides the basis for understanding the social relationships in society and with nature.In this dialectical relationship, the present remains an emergent reality tied to previoushistorical, material conditions (Bukharin 1971, 2005). An analysis of inherent contradic-tions (tensions) provides a basis for making conjectures about the machinations of thepolitical economy—much in the same way that an analysis of the oxygen releasing activityof anaerobic bacteria allows for conjectures about the future composition of theatmosphere.

It is important to recognize that Einstein originally developed his theories of specialrelativity and general relativity without direct empirical tests, by logically deriving themfrom existing knowledge with his famous “thought experiments” (Thorne 1994; Rigden2005). In fact, the development of theory about black holes, which Einstein’s physicsimplied, occurred, at least in its initial stages, entirely without observational evidence(Thorne 1994). Crucial to scientific inference as understood since the time of the ancientGreeks (Asmis 1984) is the need to understand how readily apparent physical conditions(observations) are dependent on often invisible processes, requiring that conjecturesregarding the unobserved be based on theoretical constructs. From knowledge of obser-vations, processes (including natural laws), and theoretical insights, scientists makerational inferences about future changes in nature and society.

Marxism embraces this dynamic of the scientific enterprise, analyzing the tensions inthe social-economic world and the evolving contradictions of the political economy. Inhis embrace of the cause of socialism and the main tenets of Marx’s critique of politicaleconomy, Einstein (1949) argued on realist-scientific grounds against the “economicanarchy of capitalist society” in which “production is carried on for profit, not for use”(pp. 12–14). Sweezy (1953) insisted that we understand the present as

history now

, inorder to fully comprehend the processes operating and the contradictions in develop-ment. Whether we look at the economic crises (O’Connor 1973) or the ecological crises(Vitousek, Mooney, and Melilo 1997; Foster 2000, 2002a,b; Buell 2003; Burkett 2003;York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003; Clark and York 2005) produced by capitalism, arguments thatquestion capitalism’s stability are no less scientific than conjectures regarding the futurecomposition of the atmosphere or for a heat death of the universe caused by entropy.

16

Capitalism is an inherently expansionary economic system, requiring access to cheaplabor and natural resources. Through its operations and tendencies, capitalism acts as anorganizing force within global society, while influencing and responding to the specifichistorical contexts of and within nations (Foster and Clark 2003). The ultimate goalswithin this economic system are to maximize profit and to sustain the unfettered devel-opment of the capitalist enterprise (Baran and Sweezy 1971:78–81). Given this back-ground condition, capital becomes a barrier to itself by perpetuating the conflict between“production for profit and production for human needs” (Burkett 1999a:177–80).

17

Inthis situation, nature is freely appropriated, workers are increasingly separated from thedirect means of survival, and social needs are trumped by the demands of capital




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(increasing social inequalities) and the commoditization of everything (Burkett1999a:70, 1999b; Wallerstein 1992:15–19). Given these conditions and processes,Marxism recognizes that the incessant drive to accumulate capital inevitably underminesthe natural conditions of given social formations and/or modes of production (Dowd1989; Foster 2002b; Sweezy 2004; Burkett 2005).

Coupled with human action—such as a global, mass social movement of resistance—the internal dynamics of the political economy make it increasingly difficult for the sys-tem to expand. At the same time, Marxists note, these conditions produce the possibilityof a social revolution that will radically change the historical background conditions ofsocial relations. However, even if revolution fails to end the capitalist system, a worst-casescenario presents itself. Capital will continue to profit despite the degradation of nature,which is inherent in the operations of the political economy and is intensified as the sys-tem develops, only to destroy the ability of nature to sustain human societies, thus endingthe capitalist system (Foster 2002a,b; Burkett 2003; Sweezy 2004). While being influencedby natural conditions, social action, and historical constraints, the future remains contin-gent. The collapse of capitalism, given its inherent operations and contradictions, is arational conjecture regarding the future of society, but the retreat of capitalism to thepages of history only offers the

possibility

of a more sustainable social order.In relying on empirical evidence and rational analysis, Marxist conjectures are not

unscientific, but they are more like midterm weather forecasting than predicting thephases of the moon. Predicting the future is shaky business, particularly when incompleteinformation limits our knowledge of systems, when stochastic processes operate, and/orwhen factors interact with one another in complex ways. Just as the prediction by manyeconomists in the last half of the 1990s that the business cycle was a relic proved wrong,assuming the smooth continuity of current trends can be problematic. We must recog-nize the difference between projection and prediction. Projection merely extends currenttrends into the future, while prediction may involve consideration of forces that are notoperating at present but that theory suggests may operate in emergent contexts. Forexample, over the past 100 years human material quality of life has improved despite envi-ronmental degradation, suggesting that human material well-being does not depend onenvironmental well-being. However, theoretical insights suggest that such a relationshipis context dependent. While resources are plentiful, they can be extracted rapidly withoutmuch notice or concern. However, after a threshold is reached, conditions may deterio-rate appreciably and rapidly (Muradian 2001; Scheffer et al. 2001). That is to say, over thenext 100 years the relationship between human well-being and environmental well-beingmay change dramatically. It is important to recognize that population projections, suchas those generated by United Nations demographers, assume “conditions as usual,” anddo not take into account punctuated changes in background conditions (e.g., rapid cli-mate change, global nuclear contamination), which could lead to dramatically differentoutcomes. Engels (1966) pointed to the possibility that anthropogenic induced climatechange in the form of deforestation and desertification (also involving increased regionaltemperatures) had in some cases dramatically turned the tables on the human relation tonature and might do so again on a larger scale if human production relations were not

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changed (pp. 179–83). As with the effect of anaerobic bacteria on the atmosphere, life cancreate radical transformations in natural and social systems, drastically altering the futureand its possibilities.

CONCLUSION: THE DIALECTIC OF THE PAST AND PRESENT MAKING THE FUTURE

Our central argument is that because of their shared philosophical materialism, nonvul-gar, and historically informed versions of Marxism and positivism are not entirely incom-patible and can inform one another. We make our case by expressing Marxist critiques ofmainstream contemporary empirical research in statistical terms, to show that a positivistprogram can address empirical conjectures based on Marxist theory. Our argumentunfolds in three steps. First, macrostructural background conditions that have substan-tial effects on a variety of social processes—“social gravity” specific to a given historicalera—may be effectively constant for fairly long stretches of history, particularly withinany one society. Because of their constancy during any one period, the effects of suchbackground conditions are invisible to statistical analyses. Second, background condi-tions may not only have a direct effect on variables of interest, but also likely interact withother factors to generate social outcomes. Because of these interaction effects, observedempirical relationships among factors may not represent enduring social or natural laws,but rather, only context dependent relationships. Third, historical background condi-tions that have remained effectively constant for long stretches of time may change rap-idly, such as through revolutions, and thereby alter social conditions and establish a newstate of social gravity. Because of this historical pattern of stasis punctuated by brief peri-ods of rapid change, time-series analyses will frequently miss periods of historic changeand will, therefore, fail to capture the effects of background conditions.

We draw these points together to argue that because of the nature of historical changeand the interaction of background conditions with many social factors, simply projectingshort-term historical trends into the future may be highly misleading. A theoreticalunderstanding of the processes at work is necessary for making informed conjectures. Inthis sense, Marxist conjectures regarding future structural changes in society are notdifferent in principle from the kinds of conjectures made by scientists in the naturalsciences.

A scientific perspective that avoids overly reductionistic, mechanistic, and teleologi-cal positions and incorporates the concepts of plasticity, historicity, social gravity, andcoevolution can provide the foundation for critical research that is not epistemologicallynaïve, while remaining grounded in materialism and realism. In this, the scientific enter-prise, whether Marxist or positivist, can grapple with the dynamic world in which we areimmersed. The historical materialist tradition of Marxism offers a methodologicalapproach for analyzing the historically observed (context dependent), the potentiallyinvisible (in particular contexts), and the contradictions of relationships, in tandem withdeveloping theoretical insights. In this fashion, Marxist theory is not in conflict withthe positivist research agenda, broadly construed. Marxism makes clear, empirically




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assessable conjectures of the social–economic relationships within society and points tothe importance of distinguishing between emergent, historically transient relationshipsand spatiotemporally invariant laws.

Marxist critiques of existing empirical work are not antiscience. Rather, Marxists raiseissues related to positivism’s tendency to be mechanistic and ahistorical. Such critiquesare fully consistent with scientific and statistical considerations. In fact, these critiques—such as Hessen’s (1971)—highlight the historical and social relationships involved in sci-entific work, much like Merton’s (1957, 1970) classic work on the sociology of science.Historical context remains a necessary part of any presentation of the world. Further-more, Marxist arguments regarding the evolution of society, based on the recognition ofinternal contradictions, are not teleological. Contrarily, they are fully consistent with the-ory in the “hard” sciences (e.g., black holes, atmospheric changes, etc.).

Marx (1993) noted, “History itself is a real part of natural history. . . . Natural sciencewill in time incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man willincorporate into itself natural science: there will be one science” (p. 143). Just how this isdone (whether it is sensitive to the concerns we express here) remains to be seen. Nodoubt, this will be an area of contention. The future is influenced by historical and mate-rial constraints, but trend is not destiny. Marxist theory provides an additional tool forunderstanding the world, while grappling with the changes that are taking place. Bothsocial and natural processes remain external forces to turn the polyhedron into thefuture.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank John Bellamy Foster, Philip Mancus, Jason W. Moore, Eugene A. Rosa, and theTSQ editor and anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. The first author’scontribution was supported in part by the New Faculty Award and the Junior ProfessorDevelopment Award from the University of Oregon.

NOTES

1Here, we are only stating a generality. We, of course, recognize that there are some scholars who do

not fit this pattern. The most notable example is Erik Olin Wright (see, e.g., Wright and Perrone

1977; Wright and Cho 1992), who is perhaps the sociologist best known for combining a Marxist

perspective with quantitative empirical methods. Likewise, Marxist approaches to economics

have often been empirically and mathematically rigorous (e.g., Steindl 1952; Kalecki 1968; Shaikh

and Tonak 1994).2“Western Marxism,” labeled as such by Merleau-Ponty (1973) in the 1950s, is a tradition that is

derived from the work of Lukács, Korsch, and Gramsci in the 1930s, which emphasizes the role of

culture, rather than economics, in shaping social relations. Western Marxists embrace dialectics,

emphasizing holism, history, and reflexivity, noting that these are distinctive to the realm of

human history. By forging this separation between natural science and social science, Western

Marxists distanced themselves from Marx’s materialist conception of human history and his

materialist conception of nature. (It should be noted that not all Western Marxists were equally

444 The Sociological Quarterly 47 (2006) 425–450 © 2006 Midwest Sociological Society

Marxism, Positivism, and Scientific Sociology Richard York and Brett Clark

caught up within this move away from materialism.) For Marx, materialism must be both histor-

ical and dialectical (Anderson 1976; Bhaskar 1989; Foster 2000). Materialism without dialectics

tends toward mechanism and reductionism. Dialectics without materialism tends toward

idealism.3Marxist social movements have generally been more practical and less prone to esoteric philo-

sophical hang-ups than academic Marxists. We are focusing on issues in academic Marxism and

recognize that these same issues are not necessarily a principal concern of those involved in the

immediate practical aspects of social movements.4For an extensive discussion of various traditions, see Timpanaro (1980).5Throughout this article, we engage work by both social and natural scientists. In part, we rely on

the work of natural scientists to illustrate our argument because it is the natural sciences that are

usually used as a model for positivists in the social sciences. Many of our examples will also be

drawn from both the natural history and environmental literatures. The work of Marxist natural

scientists demonstrates that there is substantial heterogeneity in the natural sciences and that a

Marxist social science is not necessarily at odds with epistemological practice in the natural

sciences.6Karl Popper (2002) is perhaps the best-known critic of “laws of history,” such as those supposedly

suggested by crude versions of Marxism. The critical Marxist tradition we focus on here, charac-

terized by scholars such as Thompson (1978), Haila and Levins (1992), Foster (2000), Lewontin

(2000), Gould (2002), and Burkett (2005), generally takes a position at odds with Popper’s carica-

ture of Marxism, rejecting universal trans-historical laws of history and arguing for the prevalence

of contingency in the unfolding of historical processes. In other words, it takes history seriously.

The Marxist view of the philosophy of science is more in accord with Lakatos (1978) and even

Kuhn (1962) than with Popper, without thereby abandoning a realist perspective or rejecting all

of Popper’s insights. It should also be noted that Levins and Lewontin (1985) provide an impor-

tant example of how a dialectical and historical approach is used to study nature, as opposed to a

mechanistic approach.7The term “positivism” is not widely used within the natural sciences. Instead, critical scientists,

such as Lewontin and Gould, critique mechanism and crude reductionism.8Note that Galton is a complex historical figure who defies simple classification. In addition to pro-

viding insights into the evolutionary process, helping to lay the foundations of modern statistics,

and writing on and engaging in African exploration, among many other endeavors, he was a key

proponent of the eugenics movement. We recognize the irony that an advocate of biological deter-

minism (in the form of eugenics), also provided an important metaphor regarding the nature of

historical change (as well as structural constraint) that was utilized by Marxist-influenced schol-

ars (see Gould 1993, 2002).9The collapse of the Soviet Union caused much debate within the social sciences, as scholars

tried to determine why they had not predicted such an event (see the special issue of Theory

and Society in 1994 [Vol. 23, No. 2] devoted to this topic). As a result, a symposium in the

American Journal of Sociology (1995, Vol. 100, No. 6) was devoted to issues of prediction in the

social sciences. Collins (1995) contends that social science, given a set of conditional state-

ments, can make predictions about future social developments. Collins, using a modified

version of world-systems perspective, argues that he was able to predict the eventual downfall

of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, prediction making remains a contested issue, especially in

regards to issues of temporality, particularly if prediction is aimed at the moderately distant

future (e.g., 30–50 years). Kuran (1995) finds this type of prediction making to be unacceptable

Richard York and Brett Clark Marxism, Positivism, and Scientific Sociology

The Sociological Quarterly 47 (2006) 425–450 © 2006 Midwest Sociological Society 445

and imprecise, because there is inherent uncertainty about many social processes because of

fractured and incomplete knowledge. Kuran notes that surprises will frequently confront social

scientists in a contingent world. 10Our use of Wallerstein and the world-system perspective is for illustrative purposes. Wallerstein is

a theorist influenced by Marx, as well as other theoretical traditions. Wallerstein is in agreement

with classical Marxism that capitalism is, from birth, a globalizing system.11Mészáros, Sweezy, and Magdoff, along with Paul Baran, have all contributed to the development

of the Monthly Review school of thought, of which Wallerstein has drawn upon (and debated) at

times in his own theoretical development. This particular tradition is separate from the world-

system perspective as conceived by Wallerstein. At the same time, there is a similarity between

these perspectives in their view of capitalism as a global system.12In 1864, George Perkins Marsh (1864:11) highlighted the role humans had in the transformation

of nature, often in devastating ways, in the process of obtaining their livelihood (also see Clark and

Foster 2002:167–169). His work served as a warning to humanity that if wanton destruction of

nature continued the necessary conditions for human life would be destroyed.13Lewontin (2000) emphasizes that there is no evidence that organisms are becoming more adapted

to the environment. Environmental change is a given. Around 99.99 percent of all species that

have ever existed are extinct. He argues that what humans can try to do is to slow the rate of extinc-

tion and decrease the degradation of the earth so humans and other living creatures can have

decent lives (p. 68).14The long-standing view that nature exists in a static state and the challenges of analyzing dynamic

processes with data covering only a short span of time likely inhibited the recognition of the

anthropogenic climate change currently underway. Note that data from glacial and geologic

sources on climatic conditions stretching back well before modern humanity emerged were

important in firmly establishing the influence of modern societies on the global climate (IPCC

2001).15It must be noted that an overly mechanistic, reductionist tradition of Marxist materialism was

once quite popular, as seen in the crude work of Plekhanov (1974). This crude mechanistic posi-

tion was fairly common within the Second and Third Internationals and prompted Western

Marxist scholars such as Lukács (1972) and Gramsci (1995:293) to reject this direction of Marxist

theory. Unfortunately, this rejection resulted in the abandonment of any connection between the

dialectic and nature, and hence a distancing of Marxism from the natural and physical sciences

altogether. An epistemological Marxism wrapped in idealistic practice developed, leaving materi-

alism to natural science and positivists (Foster 2000:231–49). Fortunately, a historical materialist

approach, which rejects narrow mechanism, has resurfaced in environmental sociology (see

Burkett 1999a; Foster 2000) and continues in the natural sciences (see Levins and Lewontin

1985; Haila and Lewins 1992; Gould 1996; Lewontin 2000; Gould 2002).16We, of course, do not wish to imply that conjectures based on Marxist theory have the same like-

lihood of being correct as those based on the second law of thermodynamics! We are merely mak-

ing the point that both types of conjectures are based on extrapolating from known observations

into an unobserved future. It is important to recognize that in both cases (the heat death of the

universe and the collapse of capitalism) we do not reach a point of absolute certainty until we

make observations when such events occur. For example, Hawking (1988:143–53) notes the pos-

sibility (a possibility that he ultimately rejects, however) that under a certain set of assumptions

about the nature of the universe (i.e., it eventually contracts, collapsing in on itself), a reversal of

entropy may occur.



17Given monopoly capitalism, the contradictions of capital have only increased. Stagnation

becomes the normal state of the economy, even though it continues to expand (Baran and Sweezy

1966:108). Operating at less than full capacity, the valorization of surplus value and incentive to

invest capital is hindered, leading to further stagnation in the economy (Foster, Magdoff, and

McChesney 2003).

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Richard York, Brett Clark - Marxism, Positivism and Scientific Sociology

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