Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare

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Transcript of Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare

8/17/11

Three Types of Warfare since 1648

Wars of the Third Kind: Conflicts within StatesInsurgency, Irregular Warfare, Internal War, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Peoples War

! A) Institutionalized Wars. ! B) Total Wars. ! C) War of the Third Kind or Peoples War

Institutionalized (Limited) Warfare! Type of warfare fought by professional armies of monarchical regimes in Europe from 1648-1789. War was used as an instrument of monarchs who conducted limited battles in terms of contest of vile, tactics and precision manoeuvring of formations. The purpose of combat was to force the surrender of the adversary.

Total Wars! The monarchical states were replaced by nationstates that waged wars with unlimited manpower pools, conscription, and armed forces motivated by nationalism. The purpose of combat was to destroy the enemy, not force it to surrender.

War of the Third Kind! the adversaries are a s y m m e t r i c i n organization, capabilities, and the weaker side, usually a sub-state actor, attempts to bring political change by organizing and fighting more effectively ! and ruthlessly that its stronger adversary (usually state actors).

The War of the Future?! Internal wars have made up 80% of the armed conflicts and casualties since the end of the Second World War. ! Internal wars have also become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1996, only 5 of the 96 recorded armed conflicts were inter-state.

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The Nature of Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare! The weaker side, the revolutionary movement, seeks to obtain political power through the mobilization of a significant ! portion of the population against the state.

The Nature of Revolutionary

! The purpose of such war is often to to politicize the masses, to turn them into good revolutionaries or guerrilla bases.

The Nature of Revolutionary! The key strategy of the insurgents is not to outfight the state but to undermine its legitimacy and political and administrative control over the population. ! In almost all cases, the length of successful and unsuccessful irregular warfare campaign is measured in decades not years.

The Nature of Revolutionary! Insurgents achieve success by gaining political advantage over their adversaries in terms of space, legitimacy and support.

The Nature of Revolutionary! Internal wars come in the forms of revolutionary, partisan, guerrilla, national liberation, civil wars, and secessionist movements.

The Other Side of Revolutionary Warfare: Counter-Insurgency! The state responding by the application of counter-insurgency warfare. Counterinsurgency campaign deemphasize the military component and instead stresses the integration of military and development program, forestalling the insurgency by correcting the social/political conditions that engender the revolutionary violence.

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Counter-Insurgency! In general counter-insurgency strategy is made up of the following componentsbalanced development, security of the population against the guerrillas or insurgents, neutralization of the insurgents by physical and psychological separation from their population base, and mobilization of popular support for the state.

History of Revolutionary Warfare! Guerrilla (small war) dates back into 1807 during the Spanish uprising against the Napoleonic invasion and occupation of Spain. ! This type of armed conflict was applied by the weaker side in Algeria against the French, in South Africa against the British, and in the Philippines against Americans.

History of Revolutionary! Applied by T.W. Lawrence against the Ottomans during the First World War in the Middle East. ! Based on Chinas experience, Mao developed his famous three-stages of revolutionstrategic defensive, stalemate, and counter-offensive.

History of Revolutionary Warfare! M a o a l s o developed the four components of revolutionary guerrilla warfare party; mass support and united front; a loyal professional army; and Yenan style revolutionary bases. ! General Vo Nguyen Giaps refinement of Maos strategy in Vietnam against the Frencha state of contention; a s t a g e o f equilibrium, and a stage of counteroffensive.

History of Revolutionary Warfare! Ernesto Che Guevarras strategy of guerrilla foco in Cuba, which emphasizes the development of the military rather that the political component of the war.

History of Revolutionary! The Reagan Administrations active effort to roll-back the tide of communism in the Third World by supporting insurgencies against Marxist-style regimes backed by Moscow in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua.

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Stages of Revolutionary! Establishment of a political party. ! Wining over mass support and creation of a mass base.

Stages of Revolutionary! Development of a military arm that will conduct a guerrilla war against the state. ! Development of a mobile warfare capability for a full-scale military campaign against the state as a prelude to the final campaign of annihilation.

Limits of Revolutionary Guerrilla Movements! Successful revolutionary movements required sanctuaries in and out of the country, and external sources of arms. ! Revolutionary guerrilla movements seldom succeeded if they are confronted by an independent and strong state the determination, resolute action and skillful handling of the state to survive; and second, the depth of its social base

Counter-Insurgency! Recognition of the nature of the threat. ! Isolating the insurgents from their bases of support.

Counter-Insurgency! Eradication of insurgents through the physical destruction of insurgent political bases.

Preventing Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare! It is not to say that the state needs the support of the population to win. So long as the guerrilla movement lacks the support of and fails to control, a large part of the population (which is rare) the state needs only a relatively limited social base. Yet it is generally to the state advantage to introduce concrete improvement and reforms, even if they are limited, for the deprived sectors it seeks to win over. ! Gerard Chaliland, 1985

! Preventing external support to the movement by denying it any sanctuary in and out of the country, and preventing arms transfer and direct military support by external forces.

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Preventing.! A strong argument is often made that the very feature of counter-revolutionary warfare of introducing reforms and making concessions to disaffected groups to win popular support is in part at least the very thing the insurgents are seeking. Violence in this sense is seen to be successful in forcing the government to change its policies and give opponents what they want. ! John Baylis, 1975

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