Revolutionaries or Bargainers?: Negotiators for a New ... · REVOLUTIONARIES OR BARGAINERS?...

REVOLUTIONARIES ORBARGAINERS

Negotiators for a New InternationalEconomic Order

By HAROLD K JACOBSON DUSAN SIDJANSKIJEFFREY RODAMAR and ALICE HOUGASSIAN-RUDOVICH

SINCE the heads of state of the Non-aligned Movement issued theircall for the creation of a new international economic order (NIEO)

at their meeting in Algiers in September 1973 this demand has beenin the forefront of North-South economic negotiations In the extensiveliterature that the NIEO controversy has spawned little attention hasbeen paid to the individuals who have been involved in the negotiationsThis study may fill that gap and thus contribute to a better understand-ing of the NIEO talks It analyzes an important category of these actorsmdashindividuals principally from less developed countries (LDCs)mdashwho ne-gotiated economic issues in international governmental organizations(IGOs) It examines aspects of their behavior in the negotiations and itexplores their attitudes toward some of the substantive issues at stake

There are several reasons why behavior and attitudes could affect theoutcome of the NIEO negotiations Since the discussions are largelyconducted within the framework of IGOs the processes of these insti-tutions will to some extent shape the outcome To understand theseprocesses fully one must comprehend not only the formal rules formaking decisions but also the behavior of the participants Becausecrucial aspects of behavior are not recorded in documents data gainedthrough interviews and observation are an important supplementarysource

Knowing the attitudes of the participants is also important for a fullunderstanding of what has happened and what might happen in IGOs

This research was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation Harold Jacobsondid considerable work on the manuscript during his residency in July 1981 at the RockefellerStudy and Conference Center in Bellagio We gratefully acknowledge this assistance SamuelH Barnes George A Codding Philip E Converse Barbara B Crane Barbara G FarahIsebill V Gruhn Ernst B Haas M Kent Jennings Margaret P Karns Robert O KeohaneUrs Luterbacher Miroslav Nincic and William Zimmerman read and commented on anearlier version of this article We appreciate their advice and suggestions The data on whichthe analyses were based have been deposited in the archive of the Inter-university Consortiumfor Political and Social Research They are available as ICPSR Study Number 9124

terms of use available at httpswwwcambridgeorgcoreterms httpsdoiorg1023072010157Downloaded from httpswwwcambridgeorgcore University of Basel Library on 30 May 2017 at 200920 subject to the Cambridge Core

336 WORLD POLITICS

The attitudes of delegates are likely to be reflected in their communi-cations with their governments and thus can affect the framing of theirinstructions Their outlook is also almost certain to affect the way inwhich they execute these instructions In cases where participants arenot instructed the effect of their attitudes can be even more direct

Attitudes however are not permanently fixed but can be altered byexperience Scholars have long assumed that participation in interna-tional institutions would have an impact on participants attitudes thisissue has been explored empirically though mainly to analyze whetheror not participation has led to greater support for international insti-tutions The interest here is to examine the interaction in shaping in-dividuals views on substantive problems between (i) personal attributessuch as age educational background and work experience and (2) roledefined in terms of position (whether an individual is an IGO officialor the representative of a state and if the latter what type of state) andfunction (the nature of the negotiations in which the individual is par-ticipating) This interaction can be a significant consequence of partic-ipation in IGOs and an important dynamic of negotiations

THE NIEO CONTROVERSY

The call for the creation of a new international economic order is ademand to change international regimes so that they would contributemore substantially to accelerating the economic development of LDCsThe LDCs proposals to achieve this end were embodied in the Programof Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Orderadopted on May 1 1974 by the 6th Special Session of the United NationsGeneral Assembly and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Dutiesof Statesmdashwhich they pushed through the General Assembly that fall1

The adoption of the program of action and the charter launched thecontroversy that has since pervaded international economic institutionsand negotiations

The industrialized states of the West have in varying degrees opposedthe LDCs proposals Their opposition has had both philosophical andpractical roots Some of the proposals involve greater interference withmarket mechanisms than the governments of several of the Westernstates believe is wise Few of them are willing to bear the burden thatfull implementation of the LDCs proposals would involve The finalvote on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States illustratestheir positions Belgium Denmark the Federal Republic of GermanyLuxembourg the United Kingdom and the United States voted against

UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX)


REVOLUTIONARIES OR BARGAINERS 337

the resolution Austria Canada France Ireland Italy Japan the Neth-erlands Norway and Spain abstained Australia Finland Greece Ice-land New Zealand Portugal Sweden and Turkeymdashall also OECDmembersmdashvoted for the resolution along with 112 LDCs and com-munist states

The LDCs proposals have been interpreted as a call for a revolu-tionary transformation of the existing economic connection between theLDCs and the industrialized states as a theatrical concoction inducedby the availability of international institutions and their peculiar pro-cedures or as a bargaining effort to improve the position of the LDCswithin the framework of existing relationships and institutions Theirultimate meaning of course will emerge only as the negotiations prog-ress In the meantime it may be possible to clarify some issues andnarrow the range of possibilities The nature of the proposals providessome clues The behavior and the attitudes of the negotiators may provideothers

THE DATA SET

The interviews on which the following analyses of the behavior andattitudes of participants in the NIEO negotiations are based were con-ducted in Europe in the summer of 1976 during the early days of theNIEO confrontation All of the respondents were participants in ne-gotiations that were in progress at the time Sixty-nine were delegateswho represented states in the Group of 77 (G-77) the LDC caucus ininternational institutions four were nationals of G-77 states who wereemployed by IGOs and seven were nationals of OECD states Six ofthe OECD delegates were nationals of states that voted for the Charteron the Economic Rights and Duties of States one was a national of astate that abstained Four OECD delegates were nationals of three statesthat had per capita GNPs that were smaller than those of several LDCsthus the OECD states that the delegates represented had many of thecharacteristics of those of their G-77 colleagues

The 80 respondents were nationals of a total of 56 states 51 of themmembers of the Group of 77 and 5 of OECD2 Thirty-five or 44 percentwere participants in the Tokyo Round of negotiations within the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the others were participantsin the 22nd session of the Governing Council of the United NationsDevelopment Program various working groups of the United NationsConference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the 61st session

They included one national from each of 38 states 2 from 14 states 3 from 2 statesand 4 from 2 states


338 WORLD POLITICS

of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the firstmeeting of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers (the supreme decision-making body provided for in the Lome Convention which structuresthe relationships between the African Caribbean and Pacific countriesand the European Economic Community)3

Because of the difficulty of interviewing delegates to internationalconferences we interviewed whom we could scientific canons notwith-standing Since the more active participants in the negotiations wereeasier to identify they tended to predominate among the individualsincluded in the sample Only two persons refused to be interviewedOn the whole the sample of G-77 states is reasonably representativeboth in terms of income levels and types of economic system4

None of the questions involved fixed responses Each interview wascoded separately by two of the authors then the differences betweenthe codings were reconciled by discussion among the members of theresearch team and in a small number of cases by one of the principalinvestigators

3 The distribution of the respondents among the five institutions is as follows

GATT UNDP UNCTAD ECOSOC ACP-EEC Other TotalG-77 delegates 30 10 7 8 13 1 69G-77 IGO

employees 1 0 1 0 1 1 4OECD delegates 4 1 _ 1 1 0 _0 7 _

35~ n 9 9 14 2 80(44) (14) (11) (11) (17) (3)

The two respondents under other cannot be categorized by negotiations One IGO em-ployee had participated in several international economic negotiations but had not partic-ipated in any in 1976 and one delegate had just taken up his post but had not yet participatedin a negotiation

4 The World Bank divides LDCs into low-income countries (those with per capita GNPof $300 or less in 1979) middle-income countries (those with per capita GNP of more than$300 in 1979) and capital-surplus oil exporters (Saudi Arabia Libya and Kuwait) SeeIBRD World Development Report 1979 (Washington DC IBRD 1979) The distributionamong the three categories of the 51 G-77 states that are included in this opportunitysample (39 low-income 59 middle-income and 2 capital-surplus oil exporters) almostexactly duplicates the distribution of the 95 states included in the World Banks classifications(39 58 and 3 respectively) In its annual surveys Freedom House categorizes statesaccording to the economic ideology of their governments as capitalist mixed or socialist(See Raymond D Gastil The Comparative Survey of FreedommdashVII Freedom at IssueNo 39 [January-February 1977] 5-15 criteria used for categorization are found on p 12)In this categorization which reflects the situation in 1976 of the 104 countries that wouldbe included among the LDCs as that term is used here (excluding Asian and Caribbeanstates with centrally planned economies) 48 had capitalist economic systems 33 hadmixed systems and 19 had socialist systems In our sample of G-77 states 53 hadcapitalist economic systems 31 had mixed systems and 16 had socialist systems In oursample capitalist economic systems are thus slightly overrepresented and mixed and socialistsystems are slightly underrepresented Because this sample contains multiple respondentsfrom some states the proportion of respondents falling in the several categories is differentfrom the proportion of states Thirty-seven percent of the respondents were nationals oflow-income countries 62 were nationals of medium-income countries and 1 came fromcapital-surplus oil exporters Fifty-six percent of the respondents were nationals of stateswith capitalist economic systems 27 came from mixed systems and 17 came fromsocialist systems



PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEGOTIATORS

The negotiators in the sample were overwhelmingly male well-trained(largely at Western universities) cosmopolitan and experienced Thecharacteristics of the respondents did not vary significantly with theinstitutional framework of the negotiations except that a substantiallyhigher proportion of the respondents engaged in the GATT negotiationswere members of their countries permanent missions in Geneva andmore than a majority of those participating in the UNCTAD negoti-ations were regularly employed by functional ministries in their homecountries However these differences appear to have had little conse-quence either in terms of reported behavior or expressed attitudes

Contrary to the inference that might be drawn from the unity amongthe less developed countries displayed in roll-call votes such as that onthe Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States the respondentsin this sample displayed a wide range of views Even nationals fromthe same state did not always agree They were more likely to agreehowever when reporting behavior than when giving their attitudesabout policy issues

SHAPING STATES POLICIES

As a point of departure delegates were asked how their countriesdetermined their positions on the issues involved in the NIEO negoti-ations in which they were participants The responses indicated over-whelmingly that the delegates were acting primarily as instructed agentsAll of the 7 OECD delegates and more than 90 percent of the 61 G-77delegates who gave codable responses statedmdasheither as their sole answeror as a part of a more complex answermdashthat the position of their countrywas determined by decisions in the national capital No respondent saidthat the delegation alone determined its position

These responses contrast sharply with those to a similar question adecade earlier by delegates to conferences of the World Health Organ-ization (WHO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) Inthat case a much smaller proportion of the delegates mentioned decisionsin their national capitals The difference fits with the impression thatgovernments tend to take negotiations about economic issues more se-riously than they do negotiations about social issues Another factorexplaining the difference may be the development of national bureau-cracies in LDCs Members of the Group of 77 were in a much strongerposition in 1976 than they had been a decade earlier they had trained

5 See Harold K Jacobson Deriving Data from Delegates to International AssembliesA Research Note International Organization xxi (Summer 1967) 592-613


340 WORLD POLITICS

and experienced personnel who were capable of giving instructions totheir negotiators

It is indicative of strengthened bureaucracies that the process of de-veloping instructions in LDC as well as in OECD governments appearsto include considerable interdepartmental consultation usually involvingthe foreign ministry and the economic ministry In addition all of theOECD delegates and 80 percent (n = 52) of the LDC delegates indicatedthat for some issues at least consultation with domestic interest groupswas part of the process of determining their countries positions Mostfrequently and specifically mentioned by both were manufacturers andproducers groups

Interactions among LDCs also played an important role in deter-mining the position of the delegations Almost half (46 percent n = 28)of the G-77 delegates stated that some form of consultation with otherLDC delegates or governments contributed to determining their coun-tries positions By contrast none of the OECD delegates mentionedconsultations with other states

Thus we find that LDC delegates in NIEO negotiations are hardlyless instructed than those from the Western countries the processes bywhich these instructions in both groups of countries are formulatedinvolve a variety of domestic institutions International economic rela-tions have important domestic consequences for less developed and in-dustrialized states as a consequence ministries with responsibilities fortheir countries domestic economies are likely to seek to influence thepositions their countries take in international negotiations about eco-nomic issues For LDCs consultation with other LDCs is also importantfor among other reasons the bargaining strength they derive from theirnumbers and from taking a uniform position Much of the literatureabout the NIEO negotiations has tended to emphasize the G-77 caucusand the solidarity of its members The data gained from our interviewsunderscore that the positions of the LDCs have deep roots in theirnational governments group consultation in IGOs is a secondary ratherthan a primary factor

International actors also played a part in the NIEO negotiations Therole of secretariats in preparing documents for international conferencesis well known but the extent of consultation between national delegatesand representatives of international organizations is less well understoodOur questionnaire contained several items about consultation with IGOsThe responses indicated that the delegates engaged in an impressiveamount of consultation with members of IGO secretariats The answersto specific questionsmdashwhether they consulted the secretariats of GATT



and UNCTAD during the- negotiationsmdashare particularly interestingSeventy-five percent (n = 3) of the OECD delegates and 72 percent ofthe G-77 delegates (n = 44) affirmed that they consulted members of theGATT secretariat 40 percent of the OECD delegates (n = 2) and 85percent of the G-77 delegates (n = 52) said they consulted with theUNCTAD secretariat The interaction between GATT and UNCTADdelegates and the secretariats of the two organizations is notable Ninety-three percent of the G-77 delegates to GATT (n = 28) said unambig-uously that they consulted members of the GATT secretariat and theremaining two gave a qualified affirmative response (whether or notthey did depended upon circumstances) What is even more striking isthat all 30 of the G-77 delegates to GATT said without qualificationthat they consulted members of the UNCTAD secretariat and half(n = 3) of those G-77 delegates to UNCTAD who answered the questionresponded similarly with respect to consultations with the GATT sec-retariat

Some commentators on the NIEO negotiations maintain that LDCsaspire to have UNCTAD displace GATT as the principal forum fornegotiations about commercial policy In view of the attachment of theWestern industrialized countries to GATT and its procedures that isunlikely to happen However the UNCTAD secretariat has become animportant source of assistance to LDCs in GATT negotiations andis used extensively Furthermore contrary to the general impressionthat they are hostile to GATT at least some LDCs utilize the GATTsecretariat as a source of assistance in negotiations conducted withinUNCTAD These interactions are undoubtedly made easier by the factthat both GATT and UNCTAD are located in Geneva and manymembers of permanent missions participate in negotiations organizedby both institutions

Beyond consulting IGOs many of the delegates also reported a strongpropensity to consult international non-governmental organizations(INGOs) Forty-nine percent of the G-77 delegates (n = 32) said thatthey had consulted INGOs during the course of the negotiations Del-egates participating in the negotiations conducted within the frameworkof the United Nations Development Program and the UN Economicand Social Council were somewhat more likely to consult INGOs thanthose participating in the other three sets of negotiationsmdashprobablybecause of the more diverse subject matter covered by UNDP andECOSOC which attracts INGOs to their sessions and because of thegreater INGO representation allowed by their procedures Delegatesfrom socialist states were considerably less likely to consult INGOs than


342 WORLD POLITICS

those from capitalistor mixed economies reflecting the relatively smallerrole of non-governmental organizations within socialist systems

Despite the extensive consultations in which they engaged G-77 del-egates did not feel completely satisfied with their situation When theywere asked if things could be done to improve their countries capacityto conduct the negotiations 52 or 81 percent responded yes Twenty-four mentioned that they needed more experts 14 desired better com-munications and data analysis facilities and 11 wanted more informationLater in the interview respondents were asked directly if they werehandicapped by a lack of information Although 37 percent (n = 24) saidno the other answers were positive in varying degrees We inferredfrom their statements that by information they primarily meant anal-yses directed specifically at the interests of their own countries

PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE AND POLARIZATION

Beyond wanting to learn how negotiators behaved we also wantedto learn how they perceived the negotiating processes We were partic-ularly interested in their perceptions of influence and alignments Tothe question whether some countries had more influence on the outcomeof the negotiations than others 85 percent (n = 57) of the G-77 delegatesanswered yes only in the ACP-EEC Council did more say no than yesWhen they were asked to specify which countries (we coded up to threeresponses) the United States was mentioned more frequently than anyother country the US members of the EEC and Japan accounted foralmost two-thirds of the countries specifically mentioned 78 percent ofthe countries that were specifically mentioned were members of theOECD The West was clearly and broadly perceived as having influencein the negotiations The only G-77 countries to be mentioned more thanonce were Brazil (three times) and India (twice) The USSR wasmentioned only three times which is indicative of the limited role theSoviet Union has in economic negotiations

Economic strength figured prominently in the negotiators under-standing of the bases of influence Seventy-four percent of the respond-ents (n = 42) said that the states they mentioned were influential in thenegotiations because of their economic strength or their relatively highGNP Other reasons frequently given for countries having greater in-fluence were negotiating skill (mentioned 13 times) and relatively largefinancial contributions to international organizations (9 times)

In addition to determining the extent to which the respondents per-ceived influence in the NIEO negotiations to be stratified we also soughtto find out the degree to which they perceived the negotiations as a



polarized bloc-to-bloc confrontation All respondents were ranked on apolarization-perception index according to their answers to four ques-tions6

Roll-call analyses of voting in the UN Assembly portray the nego-tiating process as an unrelieved North-South polarized bloc-to-blocconfrontation There were much greater nuances in the perceptions ofthe negotiators whom we interviewed Figure i shows the distributionof the 72 negotiators who answered the questions in the polarizationindex More than two-thirds of them gave responses of the polarization-perception type to one or two of the questions only Twelve gave nopolarization-perception responses at all while 9 gave three or four suchanswers

Table 1 shows how the respondents were distributed on the polari-zation-perception index according to their positions in the negotiationsA striking feature of the table is the difference between LDC nationalswho were IGO employees and those who served as their countriesdelegates None of those who were secretariat officials had a polarizationperspective Since because of its components the polarization index isslanted against the West it is more surprising that the OECD delegatesscore at all than that their scores are lower than those of the G-77

6 The following answers are illustrative of those that were scored as indicating a perceptionof polarized bloc-to-bloc confrontation

(Q17) With which country is your country most frequently aligned during this roundof negotiations

A Group of 77 and all developing countries or in the case of the ACP-EEC CouncilACP countries

(Q6b) Why so these issues [mentioned in response to a preceding question] create greaterdivergences [in the negotiations]

A Developed and less developed countries cant agree proposals by developedcountries arent acceptable to LDCs developed countries want a bigger share ofthe market

(Qi7b) Which countries most frequently oppose the solutions sought by your countryduring this round of negotiations

A The US the EEC and Japan the developed countries OECD some combi-nation of EEC member states the US and Japan

(Q6ac) Why do you think that these issues [mentioned in response to the precedingquestion] are not included [in this round of negotiations]

A Developed countries prevent their being discussedThese questions are listed in descending order of the frequency with with which a polar-ization-perception type response was given There were 39 such responses for the firstquestion 32 for the second 20 for the third and 8 for the fourth Negotiators who gavepolarization-perception responses to all four questions were given a score of 5 those with3 such responses a score of 4 with 2 a score of 3 and with 1 a score of 2 Negotiatorswho answered the questions but did not give any polarizarion-perception type responsewere given a score of 1 Those who did not answer any of the four questions were givena score of 0 and were excluded from subsequent analyses Applying a Guttman scale tothe four questions coded in this manner yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of 917

The application of a Guttman scale with the missing data and negative responses collapsedyielded a coefficient of reproducibility of 92 Jackson plus percentage ratios are respectively73 and 75


344 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF NEGOTIATORS

ACCORDING TO PERCEPTIONS OF POLARIZATION

50

230

UJ2013

UJO

aclOUJ0_

3 6 IXCN = 26) 317

(N-25)

1 6 IV(N-12)

97Z

28(Nraquo3)

1 2 3 1 5SCORES ON POLflRIZflTION-PERCEPTION INDEX

delegates The explanation may lie in the fact that some of the OECDdelegates represented countries that have lower per capita GNPs thanthose of some of the G-77 delegates These OECD countries and someof their delegates perceived their economic interests as paralleling thoseof LDCs and obviously felt that their economic advance was blockedby the richest states As we have seen most of these countries joinedthe LDCs in voting for the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties ofStates

Negotiators participating in the GATT Tokyo Round were mostlikely to have a high score on the polarization-perception index thoseparticipating in UNCTAD were next and those participating in theACP-EEC Council were least likely to have a high score GATT andUNCTAD dealt with trade issues where conflicts of interest could besubstantial it is therefore not surprising that perceptions of polarizationwere highest among participants in these negotiations



POLARIZATION

Score onPolarizationPerception Index

12345

TABLE 1

PERCEPTIONS OF NEGOTIATORS ACCORDING

(percentages)

G-77 NationalIGO Employee

(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132

Chi square 1822 level of significance 02

The positions that individuals held and the functions they performedwere strongly related to the tendency to perceive negotiations as polar-ized G-77 delegates engaged in negotiations where substantial conflictsof interest are possible were more likely to perceive polarization thanthose of their colleagues who were engaged in other types of negotiationsor delegates from other types of states7 In other words the negotiatorsperception of polarization was directly related to what they were doing

Some observers of the NIEO negotiations have noted that the extentto which G-77 delegates perceive polarization varies They argue thatconfrontations in international economic negotiations will ease eventu-ally because as countries progress economically they will become lessconfrontationist they will have a greater interest in the existing economicorder and will therefore be less inclined to challenge it The data analyzedhere provide no support for this position On the contrary the higherthe level of per capita GNP in a delegates country the more likely thedelegate was to have a high score on the polarization-perception indexA least-squares regression analysismdashusing a delegates score on the po-larization-perception index as the dependent variable and his or hercountrys per capita GNP in current 1976 dollars (n = 62) as the inde-pendent variable8mdashproduced the following equation

7 By using the respondents positions on the polarization-perception index as the dependentvariable and the two components of role as independent variables we arrive at the followingleast-squares regression results (n = j2)

Polarization perception = 121 + 72 Position + 56 Function(Standard error 21) (Standard error 20)

R square 20 standard error of estimate 83 level of significance 0004(The partial coefficient is unstandardized)8 Source for per capita GNP data International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-

ment World Ban Atlas 1978 (Washington DC IBRD 1978)


346 WORLD POLITICS

Polarization perception = 231 + 0004 per capita G N P

(Standard error 0001)R square 10 standard error of estimate 91 level of significance 01(The partial coefficient is unstandardized)

This result corresponds to findings concerning individuals as well asto the recent experience of decolonization Individuals who have begunto make economic progress are more likely to push hard to better theirsituation than those who are stagnating in poverty Similarly territoriesthat had achieved some political privileges were more likely to bridleunder colonial rule than those that had not gained any such privilegesThus it seems unlikely that economic progress among LDCs will lessenthe conflict in international economic negotiations between LDCs andindustrialized countries

NEGOTIATORS PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

In turning from process to substance the negotiators attitudes con-cerning broad issues involved in development strategies are an appro-priate starting point We asked the respondents What do you thinkare the most promising ways of promoting the economic growth ofdeveloping countries during the next decade Fifty-eight respondentsdiscussed both international and domestic measures and 17 discussedonly international measures this finding reflects an understandable pro-pensity among persons involved in international institutions to concen-trate on international measures

In analyzing the responses we coded as many as three internationaland three domestic measures The various international measures men-tioned by the respondents have been grouped into four broad categoriesand the domestic measures into five categories The four categories ofinternational measures are (1) increasing the flow of economic assistanceto LDCs (2) improving conditions for the sale of primary commoditiesexported by LDCs (3) improving access to the markets of developedcountries for manufactured goods exported by LDCs and (4) restruc-turing international economic institutions and the relevant internationalpolitical processes Of the 75 respondents 59 percent discussed measuresin more than one category while 41 percent concentrated on one cate-gory only GATT negotiators typically mentioned items in two orthree categories the average was 229 The average number of categoriesmentioned by negotiators in the other forums were ECOSOC 213UNDP 170 ACP-EEC 167 UNCTAD 15 Although variousscholars and government officials have argued that as an institutionUNCTAD has a broader view of development than GATT the per-



ceptions of participants in the GATT negotiations appear to have beenbroader than those of UNCTAD negotiators

Fifty-nine percent of the respondents (n = 44) discussed various meas-ures related to increasing the flow of financial resources to LDCs noother category of international measures was mentioned by more thanhalf of the respondents Restructuring international economic institutionsand political processes was mentioned by 45 percent (n = 34) improvingconditions for the sale of primary commodities by 41 percent (n = 3i)and improving market access for manufactured goods by 37 percent(n = 28)

The issues discussed by the negotiators were not strongly related totheir personal attributes but they were related to aspects of their rolesParticipants from socialist states were considerably more inclined tomention increasing the flow of financial assistance than those from stateswith capitalist or mixed economies (80 percent versus 56 percent) Inaddition negotiators who had been or were currently employed by theirforeign ministries were slightly more inclined to mention restructuringissues than those who had never worked for their foreign ministries

Table 2 shows that those respondents who felt that the United Statesthe European Community and Japan frequently opposed solutions soughtby their countries (cf fn 6 Qijb the question used in the constructionof the polarization index) were inclined to list the restructuring ofinternational institutions as an important measure for facilitating theeconomic growth of developing countries

The sharpest distinction among the negotiators concerned the expe-rience of their respective countries in international commodity marketsThose whose countries had experienced declining terms of trade in the1970s were much more likely to mention measures concerning com-modities than those whose countries had experienced stable or improv-

TABLE 2

SALIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING IN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES(percentages)

View of Opposition

Did not mentionUS EEC and Japan

Mentioned US EECand Japan

Did Not MentionRestructuring

(n=23)

70

30

MentionedRestructuring

(n=21)

38

62Chi square 438 level of significance 04


348 WORLD POLITICS

ing terms of trade during this period9 The relationship is shown inTable 3

The respondents attitudes toward development strategies were alsorelated to the institutional frameworks within which they were nego-tiating though not in the obvious ways One might expect that partic-ipants would stress the issues with which they were currently dealingthus participants in GATT would stress market access in UNCTADcommodities and in UNDP economic assistance Actually negotiatorsin all of the forums except the ACP-EEC Council were more likely tomention measures relating to financial assistance than any other categoryHowever negotiators in UNDP and UNCTAD were equally as likelyto mention institutional restructuring As collective entities both UNDPand UNCTAD have pressed for greater authority and resources Bycontrast only slightly more than one-third of the negotiators (n= 12) inGATT mdashwhich has authority in international commercial policy com-parable to that which UNCTAD would like to gainmdashmentioned re-structuring The frequency with which GATT negotiators mentionedmarket access was no greater (n= 12) An even smaller proportion ofUNCTAD negotiators (n = 2) mentioned commodities and only one ofthe negotiators in the ACP-EEC Council mentioned commodities de-spite the fact that the system for the stabilization of earnings fromcommodity exports is one of the principal features of the Lome Con-vention On the other hand more than half of the ACP-EEC negotiators

TABLE 3

SALIENCE OF COMMODITY MEASURES IN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES(percentages)

Did Not Mention MentionedCommodity Measures Commodity Measures

Terms of Trade (n=38) (n=22)

Country experienceddeclining terms oftrade 395 682

Country experiencedstable or improvingterms of trade 605 318


9 The figures for terms of trade were taken from International Bank for Reconstructionand Development World Development Report igyg (Washington DC IBRD 1979) Table8 The Growth of Merchandise Trade 140-41 Index numbers in this table use the termsof trade for 1970 as a base Countries with index numbers of less than 100 for 1977 werecategorized as experiencing declining terms of trade and those with index numbers of 100or more were categorized as experiencing stable or increasing terms of trade



mentioned market access and institutional restructuring (67 percent and58 percent respectively)

Respondents appeared to accept the philosophical positions generallyarticulated in the institutions in which they were participating Thusrestructuring was salient for those in UNCTAD and UNDP but notfor those in GATT At the same time the negotiators almost seemedto minimize the importance of the substantive problems on which theywere working perhaps out of a sense derived from their experience ofthe limitations of feasible policies

The five categories of domestic measures are (1) social policy (2)economic policy (3) issues concerning the functioning of political andgovernmental institutions and processes (4) steps to increase the role ofgovernment in the economy and (5) idiosyncratic proposals (a residualcategory) Social policy includes responses related to education and tohealth care especially family planning Economic policy includes a broadrange of responses that mentioned diversifying exports developing par-ticular economic sectors increasing investment developing infrastruc-tures and making increased use of technology The third categorypolitical and governmental factors includes the need for more govern-mental stability better political leadership greater political mobilizationand streamlined institutions The fourth category consists of suggestionsfor national economic planning control of investment and nationali-zation of foreign-owned enterprises Several of the responses in the finalcategory dealt with moral issues Economic policy issues were mentionedby more respondents (59 percent n = 34) than any other category ofinternal measures Twenty-eight percent of the respondents (n=i6)mentioned political and governmental issues and 24 percent (n = 14)mentioned social issues Twelve percent (n = 7) discussed increasing therole of government in their economies Thirty-six percent ^ = 21) gaveidiosyncratic responses making this the second largest category of re-sponses after economic policy measures

As was the case with respect to external measures of developmentthe internal measures mentioned were not significantly related to therespondents personal attributes but they were related to aspects of theirroles Again GATT negotiators tended to mention more internal meas-ures than the negotiators in other forums They appeared to have broaderperspectives concerning development strategies although the differenceis not nearly as marked as in the former case

The United Nations Development Program and the UN Economicand Social Council have mandates that clearly involve domestic economicdevelopment policies such matters are not as much within the purview


350 WORLD POLITICS

of GATT UNCTAD and the ACP-EEC Council However negoti-ators in the latter three were much more likely to mention domesticeconomic policies than those in UNDP and ECOSOC Table 4 showsthe distribution of responses Negotiators who have to deal with externalmeasures through their concentration in international trade issues appearto develop both a sense of the linkages between international trade anddomestic economic policy and of the limitations of international measuresas strategies for stimulating economic growth

As mentioned above only twelve percent (n = 7) of the respondentsmentioned increasing the role of government in economic managementas a measure important to stimulating economic growth While nonational of a socialist state gave such a response three of the personswho did were among the 15 negotiators in ECOSOC and the ACP-EEC Council and 4 were among the 41 negotiators in the other threeinstitutionsmdasha significantly disproportionate distribution (Chi square376 level of significance 05) Again the negotiators appear to havebeen influenced by the philosophical positions generally articulated inthe institutions in which they operated both ECOSOC and the ACP-EEC Council are more likely to stress governmental planning than theother bodies

Finally whether or not G-77 respondents mentioned social issues wassignificantly related to the level of wealth of their countries Only oneof the 20 respondents from low-income countries who discussed internalmeasures to promote economic growth mentioned social issues By con-trast 11 of the 33 respondents from the other G-77 s t a t e s noted socialissues such as the need to increase educational opportunities and to slowthe rate of population growth (Chi square 571 level of significance 02)There appears to be an income threshold below which these issues arenot salient

TABLE 4

SALIENCE OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURESIN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

(percentages)

Negotiating Forums

GATT UNCTADand ACP-EEC

UNDP and ECOSOC

Did Not MentionDomestic Economic

Policy Measures(n=23)

565435

MentionedDomestic Economic


8812




The most notable feature about our respondents views concerningdevelopment strategies is that they are both moderate and pragmaticTheir focus on the international transfer of resources and on domesticeconomic issues coincides with many mainstream Western economicanalyses Only a small minority wanted to increase the role of govern-ment in economic management Fewer than half perceived the restruc-turing of international institutions as an important issue Not surpris-ingly this issue was salient for those who felt that the major Westernstates had blocked solutions which their countries had sought to eco-nomic problems Commodity issues were salient for those whose coun-tries had experienced declining terms of trade In other words preferreddevelopment strategies appear to be causally related to concrete expe-riences

Perhaps most striking is the fact that participation in negotiations ona particular subject appears to result in a sense of the limitations ofsolutions in the relevant area rather than of the opportunities On theother hand negotiators have a tendency to take on the philosophicalviews generally articulated in the organizations in which they work

REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Beyond examining broad views toward development strategies wewere concerned with certain narrower key issues that have been prom-inent in international discussions about development and in the NIEOdebate Regional economic cooperation among LDCs has been advancedas an important technique for promoting development goals ever sinceRaul Prebisch and his associates in the UN Economic Commission forLatin America began publicizing the idea in the 1950s It has been asignificant element of the UNs international development strategiesand a large number of economic cooperation schemes have been createdamong LDCs10 Our interviews explored the respondents attitudes to-ward regional cooperation among LDCs and the extent of coordinationin the negotiations among states that were members of regional economiccooperation schemes

Of the 75 respondents only one an OECD national doubted thatmembership in a regional economic cooperation group could have abeneficial effect on the economic growth of a member state Ninety-two

10 For a description of the nature and institutional structures of many of these organi-zations see Dusan Sid janski Current Problems of Economic Integration The Role of Institutionsin Regional Integration Among Developing Countries (Geneva UN Publication Sales NoE73IIDio 1974) see also UN Document TD13609 Economic Cooperation and Integra-tion Among Developing Countries (Geneva UNCTAD 1976) Vols I and II and AddendaVols 1-5


352 WORLD POLITICS

percent (11 = 69) gave unqualified affirmative responses and 7 percent(n = 5) were affirmative with some qualifications When we asked therespondents to explain why membership in a regional group could bebeneficial we coded up to 3 different explanations More than two-thirdsof these (68 percent n = 103) related to specialization in production andeconomies of scale Respondents said that regional economic cooperationcould lead to the creation of larger markets and more rational utilizationof resources Fifteen percent (n = 23) dealt with increasing the bargainingstrength of the member states in international negotiations and 7 percent(n= n ) broadly referred to increasing the political power of the mem-bers Only 2 percent (n = 3) said that regional groups of states would bein a better position to control transnational corporations than the samestates acting alone The outstanding feature of the responses is theoverwhelming concentration on the internal aspects of regional economiccooperation a focus that logically accompanies an economic developmentstrategy emphasizing import substitution

Strengthening the bargaining position of member states in interna-tional negotiations is one of the putative advantages mentioned in theliterature about regional economic cooperation We therefore asked sev-eral questions designed to ascertain whether delegates from regionaleconomic groups actually took measures to coordinate their positionsduring the negotiations and the extent to which they sought to adoptcommon stands Five questions were particularly relevant to this issue

The questions and illustrative answers indicative of regional cooperation are as follows

(Q8) How does your country determine its position concerning the issues that areinvolved in the negotiations

A In consultation with members of the regional economic cooperation to whichthe state belongs by persons in the national capital and in consultation with themembers of the regional cooperation group

(Qn) Are there countries or groups of countries which your country regularly consultsconcerning the issues that are involved in the negotiations Which countries doesyour country consult with respect to which issues

A Name of the regional group or of countries that are members of the group(Q13) What importance do you attach to consultations with your countrys partner

countries in (name of the regional group to which the country belongs)A Very important important of some importance

(Q13C) Do the states involved in the consultations agree to coordinate negotiating po-sitions

A Always generally occasionally(Q17) With which countries is your country most frequently aligned during this round

of negotiationsA Mention of the regional group to which the country belongs or of individual

members of the group

Regional cooperation was indicated by 21 (n=io) of the responses to question 8 28(n= 13) to question 17 68 (n = 32) to question 11 83 (n = 39) to question 13c and 87(n = 4i) to question 13



We used responses to these questions to create an index of regionalgroup cohesion12

This index was applied to G-77 delegates representing states belongingto eight prominent economic cooperation organizations the East AfricanCommunity (EAC) the Central African Customs and Economic Union(UDEAC after its French title Union douaniere et economique de VAf-rique centrale) the Economic Community of West African States (ECO-WAS) the West African Economic Community (CEAO after its Frenchtitle Communaute economique de IAfrique de IOuest) the Andean Com-mon Market (ANCOM) the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) theCentral American Common Market (CACM) and the Association ofSouth East Asian States (ASEAN) Forty-seven of the respondents werenationals of member states of one or more of these organizations Theirresponses were weighted so that in the instances in which the sampleincluded more than one respondent from a member state the total wouldbe equal to that of a member state that was represented in the sampleby only a single respondent The responses of 4 of the 47 delegatesgained the maximum possible score of 15 The composite score for eachgroup was calculated by averaging the weighted scores of respondentsfrom countries belonging to the organization Thus the composite scoreis an average of country scores

The scores are shown in Table 5 Since the probability of achievinga relatively high score is affected by the number of respondents in thesample and the relationship of this number to the number of countriesand since the validity of the score is related to the proportion of memberstates included in the sample these figures are provided in addition tothe average of the weighted scores for each of the eight groups and theirrank orders

In the literature on regional economic cooperation it is generallyargued that the stronger an organizations central community institu-tions the more effective the cooperation should be including their co-ordination of bargaining in international negotiations In the light ofthis proposition ASEANs and CARICOMs high scores on the cohesionindex are surprising The members of ASEAN had only just agreed to

Each question was weighted equally For each a response indicating regional coop-eration was given a score of 3 making 15 the maximum possible In cases where respondentscould either mention the regional group or members of it (questions 11 and 17) respondentswere awarded a score of 3 if they gave the name of the regional group or scores of 1 foreach individual member state respondents could not receive more than 3 points but theycould receive 1 or 2 if they merely mentioned the names of 1 or 2 other members of theregional scheme For questions 8 and 13 the scoring was either 3 or o For question 13cresponses of always or generally were scored 3 and responses of occasionally werescored 2 Applying a Guttman Scale to the five questions coded in this manner yielded acoefficient of reproducibility of ioo


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create a central secretariat and to appoint a Secretary-General of thissecretariat in 1976 the year in which the interviews were conductedCARICOMs central institutions were also weaker than those of theother organizations On the other hand the East African Communitysdismal showing clearly reflected the crisis that led to its demise in 1977

If the strength of the central community institutions of regional or-ganizations is not the key to explaining the extent of their cohesionwhat are the important factors Since the G-77 delegates were predom-inantly acting as instructed agents one would not expect their personalcharacteristics to make much difference and indeed they generally didnot However the regional groups that achieved higher scores on thecohesion index tended to have more delegates with greater experienceand higher rank than those that achieved lower scores

More important for the relative cohesion of the regional groups wasthe nature of the negotiations in which most of the respondents wereparticipating G-77 delegates participating in GATT and UNCTADwere much more likely to engage in practices of regional group co-ordination than those in the ECOSOC UNDP and the ACP-EECCouncil (Chi square 7578 level of significance 0000) Since GATTand UNCTAD have mandates that focus directly and exclusively oninternational trade issues while the other institutions have mandatesthat are more diffuse regional issues would seem to be more clearly atstake in GATT and UNCTAD consequently one would expect greaterregional cooperation there The sharpness of the relationship thoughis striking There is also a significant relationship between regional groupcohesiveness and states that have exports of substantial absolute value^

Relative levels of economic development are even more strongly re-lated to levels of regional cohesion There is almost a perfect relationshipbetween the rank order of the eight groups on the cohesion index andthe rank order of the groups median per capita GNPst The Kendalltau-beta rank-order correlation for regional group cohesion and themedian per capita GNP for the groups is 9966 (level of significance0000) Were it not for the fact that ANCOM and CACM had identicalmedian per capita GNPs this relationship would have correlated per-fectly We found earlier that rising per capita GNP appears to be related

13 The results of a least-square regression are (11 = 32)

Regional Group cohesion = 375 + 0003 Exports(Standard Error 00014)

R square 15 standard error of estimate 211 level of significance 03(The partial coefficient is unstandardized)14 Because of the distorting effects of petroleum export earnings on per capita GNP of

Gabon and Venezuela median per capita GNP seems to be a more appropriate measurethan mean per capita GNP


356 WORLD POLITICS

to a sharpening perception of bloc polarization it appears to be evenmore strongly related to increasing ability for groups of countries to actcohesively in international negotiations

ASEANs high score on the regional group cohesion index is inaddition a testimonial to the effectiveness of the large-scale UNCTADproject financed by UNDP that was designed to assist ASEANs memberstates in the GATT Tokyo Round Project personnel emphasized theimportance of regional cooperation during the negotiations and pro-vided advice about how it could be achieved While this may have madeup for ASEANs absence of central institutions it in no way diminishesthe relationship between economic development and group cohesionThe project made sense because ASEANs member states had importanteconomic interests at stake in the negotiationsmdasha clear consequence ofthe level of economic development that the states had achieved

NEGOTIATORS VIEWS CONCERNING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

In the confrontation about a new international economic order de-fining the appropriate role for transnational corporations (TNCs) hasbeen one of the principal issues Several of our questions were designedto ascertain the negotiators views about TNCs and their role in theworld economy The first was What in your view are the economicimplications of the expansion of transnational corporations for devel-oping countries Of the 65 negotiators who responded to the question9 percent unambiguously stated that the implications were positive 45percent answered that the implications were mixed (both positive andnegative) 14 percent gave answers that took a neutral stance and 32percent answered that the implications were clearly negative Of thethree G-77 nationals working as IGO officials and the three OECDdelegates who responded none gave a purely negative answer In viewof the rhetoric that has dominated some international meetings the factthat only one-third of the respondents expressed exclusively negativeviews should be noted The proportion of G-77 delegates expressingonly negative views was only slightly higher (36 percent n = 2i) thanthat of the total sample

Nonetheless those with negative views were a sizable minority theirpersonal attributes were significantly related to their answers Thosewho expressed negative views tended to be under 40 years of age ratherthan over 40 to have concentrated in a social science in their universitystudies rather than in other subjects and to be currently employed bytheir foreign ministry or to have worked for their foreign ministry atsome time rather than never to have had a connection with it Table



6 shows these relationships There is a strong interaction between ageand education Training in the social sciences had virtually no impacton the views toward TNCs of the respondents who were over 40 yearsof age (Chi square 02 level of significance 89) but was strongly as-sociated with the views expressed by those under 40 (Chi square 492level of significance 03 tau-beta 34)

The nationality of the respondents was also strongly associated withtheir view of transnational corporations First as Table 7 shows nationalsof socialist states were more likely to express a negative view of theimplications of the expanding role of TNCs than those from states withcapitalist or mixed systems Second nationals of states with higher percapita GNP were less likely to express a negative view of TNCs than

TABLE 6

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND VIEWS CONCERNING T N C S(percentages)

View on TNCs

Not exclusivelynegative

Exclusivelynegative

Chi square 320 level


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

Social Science(n = 43)

Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03

FOREIGN MINISTRY EXPERIENCE

Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7

ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND VIEWS CONCERNING T N C S(percentages)

View on TNCsNot exclusively negativeExclusively negative

Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636


those of states with lower per capita GNP15 When the respondents areconsidered as nationals of OECD states and of G-77 states the negativeview continues to be significant for the latter group but not for theformer it is stronger among G-77 delegates than among the broadergroup of G-77 nationals6

States with higher per capita GNP probably are more familiar withTNCs that may give their nationals a greater sense of confidence indealing with them and also a better appreciation of the potential benefitsthey offer

The five factors discussed thus farmdashthe three personal attributes ofage education and career experience plus the two role attributes relatedto the economic system and the level of per capita GNP of the respond-ents statemdashcan be combined in a regression analysis using the respond-ents views concerning the implications of the expanding role of TNCsas the dependent variable The results of a least-squares regression are

15 Using only the 56 responses that can be coded as negative mixed or positive a least-squares regression of these views with the per capita GNP of the respondents states producesthe following results

TNC Attitude = 237 + 0001 per capita GNP(Standard error 00004)

R square 10 standard error of estimate 62 level of significance 02(The partial coefficient is unstandardized)16 The results of the three least-squares regression are

OECD Delegates (n=j) TNC Attitude = 229 +0003 per capita GNP(Standard error 00055)

R square 23 standard error of estimate 72 level of significance 68

G-77 Nationals (11=41) TNC Attitude = 219 +0001 per capita GNP(Standard error 00004)


G-yy Delegates (n = 38) TNC Attitude = 218 +0001 per capita GNP(Standard error 00004)

R square 14 standard error of estimate 55 level of significance 02(The partial coefficients are unstandardized)



shown in Figure 2 In combination these five independent variablesexplain almost 50 percent of the variance in the dependent variable

Respondents to the question about the implications of the expandingrole of TNCs expressed their views in some detail Up to four responsestwo positive and two negative were coded for each respondent Thefollowing positive features of TNCs were mentioned by respondentsthey provided for the transfer of technology (n = 16) promoted indus-trialization and development (n= 15) brought investment (n= 14) andprovided jobs (n = 9) The negative feature mentioned most frequentlywas that TNCs interfered with state affairs (n = 27)mdashfor example byignoring laws Other negative aspects were that transnational corpora-tions failed to reinvest in the host countries (n=i9) interfered withdevelopment planning (n=i6) and pursued harmful pricing policies(n= 10) Both the positive and negative features are frequently cited inscholarly discussions Except for the respondents emphasis on sover-eignty their views are not strikingly different from those of others whohave concerned themselves with the role of transnational corporations

In order to understand how much the negotiators views were basedon the direct experience of their states we asked What has been theexperience of your country in regard to transnational corporationsThirty-two percent of the 59 negotiators who answered this questionreported that their countries experience had been mixed 22 percentgave exclusively negative answers and 19 percent gave exclusively pos-itive answers Seventeen percent said that their countries had had solittle experience with transnational corporations that they could notcomment and 10 percent gave neutral responses

There is a strong association between the answers to the questionconcerning the implications of the role of TNCs in the world economyand to that about the experience of the respondents countries withTNCs Those who gave a negative response to one were likely to givea negative response-to the other so too with positive responses (Chisquare 1872 level of significance 03) Negative experiences with TNCsare most strongly associated with respondents from countries that havenationalized several TNCs Table 8 shows the relationship Apparentlycountries either nationalized TNCs because of bad experiences withthem or their bad experiences grew out of the process of nationalizationAs one would expect states with socialist economies were much morelikely to nationalize foreign investment than those with capitalist ormixed economies (Chi square 4769 level of significance 0001) Andstates with higher per capita GNP were less likely to nationalize TNCs


360 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 2FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ATTITUDES TOWARD T N C S

(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES

Age(Partial 49sig 0003)

Measured in5-yearsegments

Education(Partial 32sig 02)

(1) Concentrationin social or political science

(2) Otherconcentration

Foreign MinistryExperience(Partial 34sig 02)

(1) Some foreignministry experience

(2) No foreignministry experience

VIEW OFIMPLICATIONSOF EXPANDING

ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES

Economic System (1) Socialist(Partial 29 (2) capitalistsig 04) and mixed

Per Capita GNP(Partial 36sig 01)

(1) Negative

(2) Mixed (negative andand positive)

(3) Positive

Actitude toward TNCs = mdash 43 + 16 Age + 36 Educational + 38 Foreign MinistryBackground Experience

(Standard (Standard (Standarderror 40) error 15) error 15)

+ 36 Economic System - 00009 per capita GNP

(Standarderror 15)

(Standarderror 00003)




TABLE 8

RESPONDENTS EXPERIENCES WITH T N C S ANDNUMBER OF NATIONALIZATIONS OF T N C S

(percentages)

Number of Experience with TNCsNationalizations Positive Mixed Neutral Negative1960-1976 (n = U) (n = 19) (n=6) (n = 13)

0 182 421 100 1541-5 545 158 0 3086-10 182 211 0 231More than 10 9A 2 U 0 308Chi square 1921 level of significance 02

Source United Nations Document EC1038 Transnational Corporations in World De-velopment A Reexamination (New York United Nations 1978 E78IIA5) 232

than those with lower per capita GNP17 In other words negotiatorsviews concerning the implications of the growth of TNCs appear tohave been strongly associated with their own countries experiences andparticularly with the contentious issue of nationalization

Finally we asked respondents how the influence of transnationalcorporations on developing countries could be made more beneficialTwenty-nine percent (n= 19) commented on the need to develop somemeasure of international control 27 percent (n= 18) stated that the hostcountries should exercise greater control and 14 percent (n = 9) said thatthe TNCs themselves must develop attitudes of responsibility and changetheir policies Six percent (n = 4) asserted that the home countries of theTNCs should exercise greater control and another 5 percent (n = 3)spoke of control in general terms Only 3 percent (n = 2) mentioned thepossibility of regional economic organizations developing investmentcodes and another 3 percent suggested that host countries should na-tionalize or threaten to nationalize the TNCs Six percent asserted thatthe influence of TNCs could not be made beneficial and the remaining5 negotiators who responded to this question gave individualistic re-sponses Views on making the influence of TNCs more beneficial werenot related to either the personal or role attributes of the respondentsthey appear to be distributed randomly

The general moderation and sophistication of the views concerning17 A least-squares regression using the number of nationalizations categorized as the

dependent variable and per capita GNP as the independent variable resulted in the followingequation (n = 79)

Nationalize TNC = 251 mdash0002 per capita GNP(Standard error 00007)



362 WORLD POLITICS

TNCs is impressive Almost 60 percent of the respondents made at leastsome positive comment about the expanding role of TNCs in worlddevelopment and in the economies of the LDCs The catalog of potentialbenefits offered by TNCs and the problems they may cause broadlyresembles an academic treatise on the subject At the core of the con-tention between less developed countries on one side and the TNCsand their Western home countries on the other appears to be a concernof the LDC nationals about the sovereignty of their countries One couldhypothesize that this concern is the reason for a large number of thenationalizations Whether negative views about TNCs cause national-ization or vice versa there is a strong association between the two Notmany negotiators however advocated nationalization as a strategy fordealing with TNCs Clearly nationalization was not the negotiatorspreferred policy for dealing with transnational corporations Whetheror not a larger number would advocate nationalization if efforts toachieve international or national control proved fruitless or unsatisfactoryremains to be seen In any case the nationals of the poorer rather thanof the relatively richer states (as measured by per capita GNP) weremore likely to express negative views about TNCs It will be interestingto see if this relationship holds as levels of per capita GNP increaseProgress toward appropriate and effective measures of control will prob-ably be an important determining factor

NEGOTIATORS VIEWS CONCERNING THE LOME CONVENTION

In 1975 about a year before the interviews were conducted themember states of the European Economic Community and more than40 African Pacific and Caribbean states had signed the first LomeConvention (By 1982 there were 63 signatories) The Convention re-placed the Yaounde Agreement that had been in force for several yearsand had governed the economic relations between the original six mem-bers of the EEC and several of their former colonies Even though someof its stipulations had existed in the earlier agreement the new Con-vention because of its many new features was widely regarded as aresponse to the LDCs demands for changes in the international eco-nomic order

The Lome Convention provided for tariff-free and quota-free entryinto the EEC for all manufactured goods and more than 95 percent ofthe agricultural products from the ACP countries The mechanismsprovided under the STABEX system for stabilizing the ACP countriesearnings from the exports of their primary commodities were the Con-ventions most innovative and notable feature It also continued the



European Development Fund (established in the earlier agreement fortransferring resources to the LDC signatories) but expanded the re-sources that would be available to it and earmarked some of them forprojects that would promote regional economic cooperation among theACP recipients Decision making concerning the implementation of theConvention was to be handled in the ACP-EEC Council Fourteen ofthe respondents included in our survey participated in the first sessionof this Council In a broad way the Lome Convention offered an al-ternative conceptualization of North-South economic relations that em-phasized substantial efforts to manage market forces EEC and ACPsignatories alike applauded it as a progressive move in North-Southeconomic negotiations

We asked our respondents whether or not they thought the LomeConvention was beneficial for the developing countries that are in-volved Seventy-three percent (n = 54) answered without qualificationthat it was beneficial and another 22 percent (n= 16) felt that it wasbeneficial in some ways The features of the Convention concerning thetreatment of the ACP countries commodity exports including theSTABEX mechanisms were mentioned by more than half of the respond-ents in explaining why they thought that the Convention was beneficial

Four percent of the respondents (n = 3) said it was to soon to evaluatethe effects of the Lome Convention The only respondent who expressedan exclusively negative view was a participant in the ACP-EEC CouncilFor this individual working with the Convention appears to have ledto a tendency to be more critical than those who did not have first-handexperience with it As a group however the participants in the ACP-EEC Council were as positive toward the Lome Convention as otherrespondents

When confronted with the issue of the broader application of theLome concepts the respondents enthusiasm dropped To our questionwhether they thought the Lome Convention should be regarded as amodel for defining the relationship between developed and developingcountries only 37 percent (n = 26) answered yes 23 percent (n=i6)equivocated indicating in some manner both yes and no 10 percent(n = 7) said that it was too soon to tell and 31 percent (n = 22) answeredunambiguously no

The hesitation about applying the Lome formula more broadly is noteasy to explain A majority of those who thought that problems associatedwith the export of primary commodities should be dealt with in orderto promote economic growth responded that it was too soon to tellwhether or not the Lome Convention should be a model for North-


364 WORLD POLITICS

South relations generally In view of the novelty of the STABEX mech-anisms they apparently wanted to see how the program would beimplemented

Nationals of states with socialist economies were much more likelyto be negative about using the Lome Convention as a model than thosefrom states with capitalist or mixed economies as shown in Table 9On the other hand nationals of states that were parties to the LomeConvention were more likely to be in favor of its being used as a modelthan those who were not nationals of that subset of states that had beenassociated with the EEC through the Yaounde Agreement were evenmore likely to be positive on this question18

These two role attributes of the negotiatorsmdashwhether they were na-tionals of socialist states or of states that were parties to the LomeConvention and the Yaounde Agreementmdashwere the only factors thatsignificantly predicted their view of the desirability of Lome as a modelfor structuring North-South economic relations Put in a least-squaresregression however the two factors explain less than 15 percent of thevariance

Again the rather random character of attitudes toward the desirability

TABLE 9

ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND VIEWS CONCERNING THE LOME CONVENTION ASA MODEL FOR NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS

(percentages)

View toward Lomeas a Model

Not exclusively negativeExclusively negativeChi square 577 level of significance

18 The relationship is

Views ConcerningLome as a Model

PositiveMixedNegative

Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667

Slates not Partiesto Yaounde

(=47)

31-9298383


The difference between the nationals of states that were parties to the Lompound Conventionand all others is not large enough to be statistically significant However the differencebetween nationals of states that had been parties to the earlier Yaounde Agreement and allothers is statistically significant



of using the Lome Convention as a model for North-South economicrelations may well have stemmed from the relative newness of theagreement at the time the interviews were conducted Negotiators gen-erally were familiar with its terms but at that time they could knowlittle about how it would be implemented The negotiators overwhelm-ingly viewed the Convention as beneficial to its LDC parties The factthat nationals of those states that had had the longest associations withtreaty arrangements linking the EEC and LDCs were the most likelyto favor using Lome as a model could indicate that as experience withLome progresses individuals may become more favorably inclined to-ward applying its features more broadly

GLOBAL BARGAINING ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE

WORLD PRODUCT

Our analysis illuminates the NIEO negotiations in several ways Firstthe negotiators views are much more diverse than would appear fromanalyses of roll-call votes In the UN General Assembly where eachstate has one vote the Western industrial states appear to be a belea-guered minority faced by an implacably hostile and firmly united coa-lition of less developed and communist countries The data and analysespresented here show that the LDC component of this coalition whileit might find it tactically advantageous to vote as a bloc actually containsa wide spectrum of views with only a minority seriously hostile towardthe Western industrialized states and their economic institutions

It is fair to ask whether positions of governments can validly beinferred from the responses of individual delegates The argument issupported by the fact that our respondents were important governmentofficials who had some say in the formulation of their countries policiesand who were charged with executing these policies Moreover timeand again role rather than personal attributes emerged as significantpredictors of their attitudes It therefore seems clear that the answersof our respondents were strongly influenced by their official positionsand responsibilities In other words they could hardly have been ex-pected to give answers that would seriously contravene their govern-ments policies

A second conclusion is that the positions taken in the NIEO nego-tiations are firmly grounded in national political processes and in prag-matic conceptions of a countrys national economic interests The LDCdelegates in our sample were only marginally less instructed than theOECD delegates and the process in which their instructions were pre-pared was just as complicated Positions that countries take in inter-


366 WORLD POLITICS

national economic negotiations are more the result of proceedings innational capitals than of proceedings in the international institutionssponsoring these negotiations disagreements are most frequently causedby conflicting national economic interests not by the procedures ofinternational institutions The negotiators concepts of desirable strate-gies to promote economic development were notable for their pragmaticemphases They tended to stress issues that were quite clearly relatedto their countries economic needs Only a small minority argued forsubstantive governmental intervention in domestic economic affairs andthe pressure for restructuring institutions was relatively modest

Third despite all of the information produced by international andnational agencies LDC negotiators obviously felt a need for more in-formation as evidenced by their extensive consultations with IGOs andINGOs They clearly would appreciate having more information avail-able to them or perhaps the information that is available should bebetter organized to suit their needs Efforts at institutional reform couldwell concentrate on this issue Because of the relatively small populationsof most LDCs their bureaucracies will never be able to match thecapabilities of the major Western industrialized states

Fourth respondents from countries with socialist economies standout as a group with distinctive views Although negotiators from allstates were inclined to stress the transfer of resources to developingcountries more than any other measure as a desirable action to promoteeconomic development negotiators from socialist states emphasized thisissue even more strongly They were less inclined to consult INGOsthan their colleagues from states with capitalist and mixed economiesand more likely to have negative views about transnational corporationsand about using the Lome Convention as a model for North-Southeconomic relations

Fifth although the negotiators almost unanimously supported re-gional economic cooperation rhetorically efforts to achieve cohesion inthe several regional groups varied markedly and not according to thestrength of the regional organizations At least as of 1976 the negotiatorssaw regional economic cooperation primarily in terms of import sub-stitution rather than of export promotion thus de-emphasizing almostto the point of ignoring one of the putative advantages of regionalcooperation In several cases they gave little evidence of attempting toact as members of coordinated regional groups

Sixth the effect of participation in economic negotiations conductedwithin the framework of international institutions appears to be modestbut consequential Individuals seem to accept to some extent the broad



philosophical positions generally articulated within the institutions Moreimportantly in working with particular substantive issues individualsare likely to become more sophisticated about the real potentialities andlimitations of possible solutions in the relevant area Those who wereinvolved in real negotiations about trade issues rather than merelytalking about them were more inclined to take the the view that so-lutions in other areas are also essential

Seventh and perhaps most significant are the attitudinal and behav-ioral characteristics associated with nationals of states that have higherper capita GNPs They are (i) heightened perceptions of polarizationbut also include (2) paying greater attention to such social issues as theneed for limiting population growth and promoting education as im-portant elements of development strategies (3) more cohesive behavioramong the members of regional economic cooperation organizationsand (4) less negative views toward transnational corporations Whetherthese relationships will continue as the level of countries per capita GNPincreases remains to be seen If they did global bargaining about eco-nomic issues would become neither less salient nor less intense Indeedconflicts of economic interest may well be pursued more forcefully inthe future with LDCs taking advantage of the added strength thatmembership in regional groups can give them However some of theideological contention may be removed from these negotiations partic-ularly if appropriate international measures can be crafted to controlsome of the more objectionable practices of transnational corporationsgreater attention may also be given to important domestic aspects ofdevelopment

On the basis of this analysis the NIEO negotiations appear to bemisnamed They are not really negotiations about the creation of a newinternational economic order rather they aremdashin the apt phrase coinedsome years ago by Helmut Schmidtmdasha struggle for the world prod-uct9 Those who are disadvantage^ in the existing international eco-nomic system can be expected to continue to call for action (such asgreater intervention in market forces to redress their condition) and tobargain to better their position (just as those comparably disadvantagedin domestic political systems have done) But that hardly amounts to arevolutionary call for the overthrow of the old order

bulllaquo Schmidt The Struggle for the World Product Foreign Affairs Vol 52 (April 1974)437-5-


336 WORLD POLITICS

The attitudes of delegates are likely to be reflected in their communi-cations with their governments and thus can affect the framing of theirinstructions Their outlook is also almost certain to affect the way inwhich they execute these instructions In cases where participants arenot instructed the effect of their attitudes can be even more direct

Attitudes however are not permanently fixed but can be altered byexperience Scholars have long assumed that participation in interna-tional institutions would have an impact on participants attitudes thisissue has been explored empirically though mainly to analyze whetheror not participation has led to greater support for international insti-tutions The interest here is to examine the interaction in shaping in-dividuals views on substantive problems between (i) personal attributessuch as age educational background and work experience and (2) roledefined in terms of position (whether an individual is an IGO officialor the representative of a state and if the latter what type of state) andfunction (the nature of the negotiations in which the individual is par-ticipating) This interaction can be a significant consequence of partic-ipation in IGOs and an important dynamic of negotiations

THE NIEO CONTROVERSY

The call for the creation of a new international economic order is ademand to change international regimes so that they would contributemore substantially to accelerating the economic development of LDCsThe LDCs proposals to achieve this end were embodied in the Programof Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Orderadopted on May 1 1974 by the 6th Special Session of the United NationsGeneral Assembly and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Dutiesof Statesmdashwhich they pushed through the General Assembly that fall1

The adoption of the program of action and the charter launched thecontroversy that has since pervaded international economic institutionsand negotiations

The industrialized states of the West have in varying degrees opposedthe LDCs proposals Their opposition has had both philosophical andpractical roots Some of the proposals involve greater interference withmarket mechanisms than the governments of several of the Westernstates believe is wise Few of them are willing to bear the burden thatfull implementation of the LDCs proposals would involve The finalvote on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States illustratestheir positions Belgium Denmark the Federal Republic of GermanyLuxembourg the United Kingdom and the United States voted against

UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX)





THE DATA SET





338 WORLD POLITICS







35~ n 9 9 14 2 80(44) (14) (11) (11) (17) (3)













340 WORLD POLITICS












342 WORLD POLITICS























344 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 1



50

230

UJ2013

UJO

aclOUJ0_

3 6 IXCN = 26) 317

(N-25)

1 6 IV(N-12)

97Z

28(Nraquo3)






POLARIZATION


12345

TABLE 1


(percentages)


(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132









346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS
















THE DATA SET





338 WORLD POLITICS







35~ n 9 9 14 2 80(44) (14) (11) (11) (17) (3)













340 WORLD POLITICS












342 WORLD POLITICS























344 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 1



50

230

UJ2013

UJO

aclOUJ0_

3 6 IXCN = 26) 317

(N-25)

1 6 IV(N-12)

97Z

28(Nraquo3)






POLARIZATION


12345

TABLE 1


(percentages)


(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132









346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS













338 WORLD POLITICS







35~ n 9 9 14 2 80(44) (14) (11) (11) (17) (3)













340 WORLD POLITICS












342 WORLD POLITICS























344 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 1



50

230

UJ2013

UJO

aclOUJ0_

3 6 IXCN = 26) 317

(N-25)

1 6 IV(N-12)

97Z

28(Nraquo3)






POLARIZATION


12345

TABLE 1


(percentages)


(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132









346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS






















340 WORLD POLITICS












342 WORLD POLITICS























344 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 1



50

230

UJ2013

UJO

aclOUJ0_

3 6 IXCN = 26) 317

(N-25)

1 6 IV(N-12)

97Z

28(Nraquo3)






POLARIZATION


12345

TABLE 1


(percentages)


(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132









346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS


















342 WORLD POLITICS























344 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 1



50

230

UJ2013

UJO

aclOUJ0_

3 6 IXCN = 26) 317

(N-25)

1 6 IV(N-12)

97Z

28(Nraquo3)






POLARIZATION


12345

TABLE 1


(percentages)


(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132









346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS




























344 WORLD POLITICS

FIGURE 1



50

230

UJ2013

UJO

aclOUJ0_

3 6 IXCN = 26) 317

(N-25)

1 6 IV(N-12)

97Z

28(Nraquo3)






POLARIZATION


12345

TABLE 1


(percentages)


(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132









346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS














POLARIZATION


12345

TABLE 1


(percentages)


(n=3)

100

OECDDelegate(n=6)

333333333

TO POSITION

G-77Delegate(n=63)

11138136511132









346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS













346 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS



















TABLE 2


View of Opposition




(n=23)

70

30


(n=21)

38



348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS













348 WORLD POLITICS



TABLE 3
















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS




















350 WORLD POLITICS




TABLE 4


(percentages)

Negotiating Forums


UNDP and ECOSOC



565435



8812











352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS





















352 WORLD POLITICS






















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS




















Ran

TA

BL

E 5

IND

EX

O

F C

OH

ES

ION

AM

ON

G

ME

MB

ER

S O

F R

EG

ION

AL

OR

GA

NIZ

AT

ION

S

Org

an

i-za

tion

Index

Sco

re(M

axi

mum

= 1

5)

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

inO

rganiz

ati

on

Num

ber

of

Mem

ber

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

3R

ati

o o

fSam

ple

to

Org

aniz

ati

on

Mem

ber

ship

(21

)

Num

ber

of

Del

egate

sin

Sam

ple

Rati

o

of

Del

egate

s to

Sta

tes

in S

am

ple

(42

)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

AS

EA

NA

NC

OM

CA

CM

CA

RIC

OM

UD

EA

CC

EA

O

EC

OW

AS

E

AC

107

510

67

105

010

20

863

700

575

517

5 5 5 12 4 6 16 3

4 3 2 5 4 4 12 2

80

60

40

42

100 6

77

56

7

7 3 2 7 7 5 17 4

175

100

100

140

175

125

142

200

Reg

iona

l O

rgan

izat

ion

Mem

bers

hip

ASE

AN

mdashIn

done

sia

M

alay

sia

Phi

lippi

nes

Sin

gapo

re

Tha

ilan

d A

NC

OM

mdashB

oliv

ia

Col

ombi

a E

cuad

or

Peru

V

enez

uela

C

AC

Mmdash

Cos

ta R

ica

El

Salv

ador

G

uate

mal

a H

ondu

ras

Nic

arag

ua

CA

RIC

OM

mdashA

ntig

ua

Bar

bado

s B

eliz

e D

omin

ica

Gre

nada

G

uyan

aJa

mai

ca

Mon

tser

rat

St

Kitt

s-N

evis

-Ang

uilla

S

t L

ucia

S

t V

ince

nt

Tri

nida

d an

d T

obag

o U

DE

AC

mdashC

amer

oon

Cen

tral

Afr

ican

R

epub

lic

Con

go

Gab

on

CE

AO

mdashIv

ory

Coa

st

Mal

i M

auri

tani

a N

iger

Se

nega

l U

pper

Vol

ta

EC

OW

ASmdash

Ben

in

Cap

e V

erde

G

ambi

a G

hana

G

uine

a G

uine

a-B

issa

uIv

ory

Coa

st

Lib

eria

M

ali

Mau

rita

nia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Se

nega

l Si

erra

Leo

ne T

ogo

Upp

er V

olta

E

AC

mdashK

enya

T

anza

nia

Uga

nda

Si

nce

CE

AO

mem

ber

stat

es a

re a

lso

mem

bers

of

EC

OW

AS

re

spon

dent

s ar

e in

clud

ed i

n bo

th g

roup

s












356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS























356 WORLD POLITICS










TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS
















TABLE 6


View on TNCs


Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative



Exclusivelynegative


Personal Attributes

A G E

Under 40(n = 44)

Over 40(n=19)

614 842

386 158

of significance 07



Other(n = 21)

581 857

419 143

of significance 03


Some(n = 44)

591

409

of significance 01

None(n = 20)

900

100


358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS













358 WORLD POLITICS

TABLE 7



Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=54)

741259

Socialist

364636





















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS



















360 WORLD POLITICS


(n = 54)

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES










ROLE OF T N C s

ROLE ATTRIBUTES



(1) Negative


(3) Positive




(Standarderror 15)





TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS














TABLE 8


(percentages)











362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS













362 WORLD POLITICS













364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS




















364 WORLD POLITICS





TABLE 9


(percentages)






Economic System

Capitalistand Mixed

(n=60)

733267

02

YaoundeSignatories

(n = i7)

64711823-5

Socialist(n=9)

333667


(=47)

31-9298383







WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS
















WORLD PRODUCT





366 WORLD POLITICS













366 WORLD POLITICS













Revolutionaries or Bargainers?: Negotiators for a New ... · REVOLUTIONARIES OR BARGAINERS?...

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Transcript of Revolutionaries or Bargainers?: Negotiators for a New ... · REVOLUTIONARIES OR BARGAINERS?...