Revolution in Military Affairs

PPA 706 -- National DefensePPA 706 -- National Defense

November 13/14, 2000November 13/14, 2000

Perspectives on RMA

Revolution doesn’t exist -- future construct will Revolution doesn’t exist -- future construct will look like the presentlook like the present

The Revolution arrived -- Gulf WarThe Revolution arrived -- Gulf War This is the middle of the Revolution -- “system of This is the middle of the Revolution -- “system of

systems”systems” The Micro Revolution -- info systems will The Micro Revolution -- info systems will

dominate all other variablesdominate all other variables Continuous Revolution -- technology renders all Continuous Revolution -- technology renders all

things obsolete continuouslythings obsolete continuously

RMA Hypothesis

Capabilities are more important than Capabilities are more important than geopoliticsgeopolitics

““strategic pause” -- conditions have strategic pause” -- conditions have changedchanged

Holding pattern....... or transformation?Holding pattern....... or transformation? significant adjustment in time or space significant adjustment in time or space

assumptions can constitute an RMAassumptions can constitute an RMA

Hypothesis (cont)

RMA assumed to be “synergistic” RMA assumed to be “synergistic” positive interaction of forces/elements to positive interaction of forces/elements to

produce a more desirable outcomeproduce a more desirable outcome ““Whigs “ and “Calvinists”Whigs “ and “Calvinists” adaptation -- range of competence required to adaptation -- range of competence required to

use new technologyuse new technology ““defining event” usually required to defining event” usually required to

determine if RMA occurreddetermine if RMA occurred

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Intellectual Origins

The military historiansThe military historians Soviet writings in the late 1970’s and Soviet writings in the late 1970’s and

1980’s -- “The Military Technical 1980’s -- “The Military Technical Revolution”Revolution”

The Gulf WarThe Gulf War Admiral Owens and the “System of Admiral Owens and the “System of

Systems”Systems”

Questions

Is there a revolution?Is there a revolution? What drives warfare?What drives warfare? What are the policy challenges?What are the policy challenges? What are the greatest threats?What are the greatest threats?

Four American Views

Owens IIOwens IIThe Uncertain RevolutionaryThe Uncertain Revolutionary

The Gulf War VetThe Gulf War VetThe SkepticThe Skeptic

#1 Owens II“Build the System of Systems” a single revolution resulting from a single revolution resulting from

employment of information technologiesemployment of information technologies most of warfare has been wasted motion most of warfare has been wasted motion

because of uncertaintybecause of uncertainty utilize the array of utilize the array of availableavailable systems to systems to

improve space awareness & employ forcesimprove space awareness & employ forces ““the enemy is us” -- service parochialism and the enemy is us” -- service parochialism and

bureaucratic inertia bureaucratic inertia

#2 The Uncertain Revolutionary

“Let a hundred flowers bloom” One in a series of revolutionsOne in a series of revolutions Revolutionary change occurs from a mixture Revolutionary change occurs from a mixture

of technology, organization, and operational of technology, organization, and operational conceptsconcepts

Challenges are experimentation and Challenges are experimentation and innovationinnovation

Threats are (1) diffusion of technology; (2) Threats are (1) diffusion of technology; (2) peer competitorpeer competitor

#3 The Gulf War Veteran“Been there, done that”

The revolution occurred in the 1980sThe revolution occurred in the 1980s Recruitment and training make all the Recruitment and training make all the

differencedifference Challenge is developing new technology Challenge is developing new technology

while keeping an adequate force structurewhile keeping an adequate force structure Threats are asymmetric responses (terror, Threats are asymmetric responses (terror,

weapons of mass destruction)weapons of mass destruction)

#4 The Skeptic“What revolution?”

The history of warfare is a history of The history of warfare is a history of evolutionevolution

Human nature, not technology, drives Human nature, not technology, drives warfarewarfare

The challenge is keeping the warrior spirit The challenge is keeping the warrior spirit alive in the face of social changealive in the face of social change

The danger of being too cleverThe danger of being too clever

ConsequencesOwens II: Owens II: radical cuts in force structure and radical cuts in force structure and

organizational surgery; make the current organizational surgery; make the current technologies work together technologies work together

Cautious Revolutionaries: Cautious Revolutionaries: experimentation; experimentation; organizational and educational reform; organizational and educational reform; incrementalismincrementalism

Gulf War Veterans: Gulf War Veterans: emphasis on readiness emphasis on readiness and training & current technologies >and training & current technologies >

Skeptics: Skeptics: continue the current strategy and see continue the current strategy and see what world changes occurwhat world changes occur

Revolution in Military Affairs

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