revisiting osirak IS.pdf

7/30/2019 revisiting osirak IS.pdf

1/33

Access Provided by Birkbeck College-University of London at 07/15/11 12:23AM GMT


2/33

Thirty years after theIsraeli attack on Iraqs Osirak reactor on June 7, 1981, its long-term implica-

tions for Iraqs nuclear weapons program remain hotly contested. The Israeli

attack on an alleged nuclear site in Syria in 2007 and the prospect of a similar

attack on Irans nuclear infrastructure have intensied interest in the lessons

from Osirak. This article examines the conclusions scholars have drawn about

the impact of the attack and offers a reinterpretation of these conclusions based

on sources that became available following the ouster of Saddam Hussein in2003.

Iraqs nuclear weapons program has been subject to long-standing contro-

versy. Disagreements revolve around the origins of the program, how Israels

attack on Osirak affected the future development of the program, and how

close Iraq came to producing nuclear weapons under Saddam.1 Other dis-

agreements concern the impact of the 198088 Iran-Iraq War and Saddams de-

cision to invade Kuwait in 1990 as Iraq approached the nuclear weapons

threshold. Some basic facts are undisputed. Iraqs nuclear program began in

the mid-1950s and accelerated as Baghdad began to pursue a complete nuclearfuel cycle (including the basic capability to produce and reprocess plutonium)

in the mid-1970s. These developments fueled international concerns that Iraq

was seeking these capabilities to produce weapons-grade plutonium for the

purposes of a military program.2 Israel sought to curtail Iraqs efforts by at-

Revisiting Osirak

Revisiting Osirak MlfridBraut-Hegghammer

Preventive Attacks and NuclearProliferation Risks

Mlfrid Braut-Hegghammer is Assistant Professor at the Institute for Defence Studies at the NorwegianDefence University College.

The author owes a great debt of gratitude to the external reviewers of International Security. A par-

ticular note of thanks is due to Graham Allison. She also wishes to thank Tom Bielefeld, MatthewBunn, Jeff Colgan, Zachary Davis, Charles Duelfer, Ehud Eiran, Thomas Hegghammer, NellyLahoud, Frode Liland, Martin Malin, Marvin Miller, Negeen Pegahi, Matthew Sharp, JonathanTucker, Richard Wilson, Melissa Willard-Foster, and participants at the Oslo International Contem-porary History Project conference at the Nobel Institute in August 2010.

1. The later controversy over whether Iraq pursued nuclear weapons capabilities from 1998 to2003 is discussed elsewhere. See Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to theDCI on Iraqs WMD (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofce, 2004); Charles Duelfer,Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009); and Mlfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Nuclear Entrepreneurs: Drivers of Nuclear Proliferation, Ph.D. thesis, Depart-ment of International Relations, London School of Economics, 2010.2. There are basically two ways to produce ssile material for the core of a nuclear bomb. States

can pursue the so-called plutonium route, producing plutonium-239 by reprocessing spent fuel. A

International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 101132 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

101


3/33

tacking Osirak, a French-supplied reactor complex that stood on the verge of

becoming operational in June 1981. In response, Iraq established a covert nu-

clear weapons program to pursue an alternative technical route, namely, ura-

nium enrichment. These efforts intensied after the invasion of Kuwait in the

fall of 1990, but were interrupted by the U.S.-led attack on Iraq in January

1991.

The academic debate on the consequences of the Osirak attack for Iraqs nu-

clear weapons program remains polarized. Supporters of the attack argue that

the strike prevented the development of an Iraqi nuclear weapons capability.3

Critics argue that the strike accelerated Iraqs nuclear efforts, pointing to the

establishment of a clandestine weapons program in the fall of 1981.4 Both sides

of the debate apply lessons from Osirak for predicting the consequences of

similar attacks on Iranian or North Korean nuclear facilities.5

Drawing on accounts from key players in the Iraqi nuclear establishment, I

reexamine the impact of the destruction of Osirak on Iraqs nuclear program.

I identify valid points made by both sides in the debate and integrate these

into an argument based on a more complete historical account of the Iraqi nu-

clear program. I describe Iraqs efforts to acquire nuclear weapons before andafter the Israeli attack over two separate phases: a drift toward a nuclear weap-

ons option from 1975 to 1981 and a covert nuclear weapons program from 1981

to 1991. I argue that the Israeli attack had mixed effects: it triggered a nuclear

weapons program where one did not previously exist, while forcing Iraq to

pursue a more difcult and time-consuming technological route. Despite these

challenges and added delays resulting from inefcient management, within a

decade Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Ultimately,

I conclude that the Israeli attack was counterproductive.

I develop these arguments in three main sections. First, I provide an up-dated history of the Iraqi nuclear program before the Osirak attack. I examine

the nature of the program, the proliferation risk posed by the Osirak reactor in

particular, and how far Iraq had advanced toward a nuclear weapons option

International Security 36:1 102

second, more challenging optionparticularly for small developing statesis to enrich uraniummechanically (by centrifuges) or chemically (gaseous diffusion) to produce uranium-235.3. See, for example, Jeremy Tamsett, The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered: SuccessfulCounterproliferation? Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 2004), pp. 7085; andShai Feldman, The Bombing of OsiraqRevisited, International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982),pp. 114142, especially p. 126.

4. Dan Reiter, Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the Success at Osiraq,Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005), pp. 355371; and Richard K. Betts, The OsirakFallacy, National Interest, Vol. 83 (Spring 2006), pp. 2225.5. See Reiter, Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the Success at Osiraq; andWhitney Raas and Austin Long, Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy IranianNuclear Facilities, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 733.


4/33

on the eve of the attack. Second, I consider the attacks inuence on Iraqs ef-

forts to develop nuclear weapons from 1981 to 1991. I juxtapose the effects of

the attack with an analysis of the impact of domestic drivers (e.g., bureaucratic

politics and technological path dependency) on the direction and pace of the

program. Third, I provide a net assessment of the impact of the attack on Iraqs

nuclear weapons program and consider whether this case holds lessons for

understanding how preventive attacks can inuence proliferation risks in the

long term.

New Sources and Perspectives

Since 2003, leading gures in Iraqs now-defunct nuclear weapons program

have published memoirs and accounts that present a different picture of the

Iraqi nuclear weapons program than that available in the scholarly literature.

These individuals include Jafar Dhiya Jafar, the scientic leader of the pro-

gram; Mahdi Obeidi, head of the centrifuge program; Imad Khadduri, who

was in charge of documentation and involved in procurement; and Hamam

Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur, the former head of the Iraqi Atomic EnergyCommission (IAEC). Dhar Selbi, former IAEC commissioner and head of ad-

ministration in the nuclear establishment, and some of his colleagues are cur-

rently producing an account of their involvement in the nuclear weapons

program.6

These accounts offer unique insights into Iraqi debates over the nuclear pro-

gram and its management. In particular, they shed new light on poorly under-

stood issues such as the origins of the program, the programs domestic

drivers, the timing of key decisions, and why Iraq opted for technologies that

other states had discarded because of their high costs and inefcient output.Together with analyses of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program provided by UN

agencies and multinational investigation teams, these sources help to ll gaps

in scholars analytical understanding of the program. Although these accounts

contain substantial disagreements concerning the programs technical priori-

ties and management, they present a coherent picture that contrasts sharply

Revisiting Osirak 103

6. See Jafar D. Jafar, Numan Saadaldin al-Niaimi, and Lars Sigurd Sunnan, Oppdraget:Innsidehistorien om Saddams atomvpen [The mission: The inside story of Saddams nuclear weap-ons] (Oslo: Spartacus, 2005); Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secret of

Saddams Nuclear Mastermind (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2004); Imad Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mi-rage: Memoirs and Delusions (Toronto: Springhead, 2003); Hamam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafurand Abd al-Halim Ibrahim al-Hajjaj, Istratijiyat al-barnamij al-nawawi al-Iraq: Fi itar siyasat al-ilmwal-tiknulujiya [Iraqs nuclear weapons program: Political and strategic aspects] (Beirut: Center forArab Unity Studies, 2009); and Dhar Selbi, Abdul Qader Ahmed, Zuhair Al-Chalabi, and ImadKhadduri, Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program: 19811991 (forthcoming).


5/33

with the account that most analyses have relied on, namely that of Khidhir

Hamza.7

Hamza was a nuclear scientist who began working in the Iraqi nuclear pro-

gram in the early 1970s. After 1981 he concentrated his efforts on the diffusion

process in the nuclear weapons program. He was reassigned to head the group

working on weapons design in 1987.8 After a few months, he was demoted to

work on theoretical physics in the Physics Department at the Nuclear Research

Center. He appears to have retired from the program altogether in 1990.9 After

defecting to the United States in the early 1990s, Hamza published a book inwhich he described himself as Saddams bomb-maker and argued that a de-

cision to pursue nuclear weapons was made in the early 1970s.10 Hamzas

claims contradict the accounts of his senior Iraqi colleagues with regard to his

personal role, the programs time line, the reasons for key decisions, and turn-

ing points in the nuclear program. Nonetheless, recent analyses still rely on his

claim that a political decision in 197172 triggered Iraqs nuclear weapons pro-

gram.11 As a result, the impression that the Israeli attack on Osirak interrupted

a nuclear weapons program remains prevalent.

A pressing analytical challenge is to discern the character and intensity ofIraqs efforts to acquire nuclear weapons before and after the Osirak attack.

Analyses have tended to focus on Iraqs technical capabilities and have had

less to say about the seriousness, level of funding, and degree of organization

that characterized Iraqs nuclear efforts. These latter issues exert signicant


7. For details, see Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mirage; Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget;Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden; al-Ghafur and al-Hajjaj, Istratijiyat al-barnamij al-nawawi al-Iraq; and Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program. Saddams son-in-law Hussein Kamel, who took charge of the nuclear weapons program in the mid-1980s, character-

ized Hamza in his 1995 debrieng with IAEA and United Nations Special Commission(UNSCOM) ofcials as a professional liar. Hamzas account is described as full of technical in-accuracies and prone to exaggeration, according to his former colleague David Albright. See Pe-ter Beaumont, Kamal Ahmed, and Edward Helmore, Should We Go to War against Saddam?Observer, March 17, 2002.8. See Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mirage, p. 91.9. Ibid, p. 92.10. Khidhir Hamza, Inside Saddams Secret Nuclear Program, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol. 54, No. 5 (September/October 1998), pp. 2633; and Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, SaddamsBombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York:Scribner, 2000).11. For examples, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 147; Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nu-clear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (New York: Ox-ford University Press, 2006); and Reiter, Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and theSuccess at Osiraq. The most comprehensive analyses by international disarmament verica-tion agencies do not comment on when the proliferation decision was made but note that a nu-clear weapons program was established after the Israeli attack in 1981. See Duelfer, ComprehensiveReport of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqs WMD; and United Nations Security Council Report,S/1997/779, October 8, 1997, Annex: Letter Dated 6 October 1997 from the Director General of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General.


6/33

inuence on whether and how fast a state can develop a nuclear weapons ca-

pability. Therefore, only with a comparison of the character of Baghdads ef-

forts to acquire nuclear weapons before and after the attack can analysts fully

assess its consequences. Below I describe the emergence of nuclear research

and development in Iraq.

drifting toward the bomb

Iraqs exploration of nuclear technology began in 1956 when the Iraqi govern-

ment initiated a nuclear program under the aegis of Atoms for Peace. The pro-grams initial efforts were characteristic of those of many developing states

early attempts to acquire nuclear capabilities: ambitious yet seemingly lacking

in direction.12 After the Baathist coup in July 1968, the regime accelerated de-

velopment of its nascent nuclear infrastructure. Later, the IAEC noted that

during this stage Iraqs program was open-ended with the main objective of

acquiring the know-how in various aspects of the nuclear technology includ-

ing the fuel cycle.13 According to Jafar Dhiya Jafar, who would later become

the scientic leader of Iraqs nuclear weapons program, even the senior man-

agement of Iraqs nuclear physics establishment struggled to identify the in-tentions of the political leadership for the direction of the program in the late

1960s.14 Beginning in the early 1970s, individuals in the nuclear program be-

gan to contemplate and advocate a nuclear weapons option, a fact that pre-

vious studies have not addressed. Specically, enterprising nuclear scientists

began to pursue a mandate from the political leadership to develop a nuclear

weapons option.15

In December 1972 Abdul Razzaq al-Hashimi, who was in charge of the

Baath Party organization at the IAEC (and later served as its vice chairman),

interrupted the commissions annual meeting to criticize the IAECs work asworthless academic exercises and to propose projects more likely to attract

attention and funding from the Iraqi leadership.16 One such option would be

to develop a nuclear weapons option. There is no evidence suggesting that


12. See, for example, the case of Pakistan in Samina Ahmed, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons Pro-gram: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999),pp. 178204; and Feroz Hassan Khan, Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Lessons from Pakistan,Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3 (November 2006), pp. 501517.13. Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, Preface, in Iraqi Nuclear Programme, 19561991 (Baghdad:Al-Adib, 1992), p. vii.14. Jafar Dhiya Jafar, unpublished manuscript, (no title), May 13, 2004, pp. 67.15. This dynamic was not exclusive to the nuclear arena. Iraqs efforts to develop biological weap-ons started in the early 1970s and intensied in the early 1980s when Nasser Hindawi persuadeddecisionmakers of the value of such capabilities in ghting Iran. A similar argument was proposedin Jed C. Snyder, The Road to Osiraq: Baghdads Quest for the Bomb, Middle East Journal, Vol. 37,No. 4 (Autumn 1983), pp. 565593, especially p. 589.16. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 14.


7/33

Baathist leaders supported al-Hashimis statement. There was, however, an

emerging consensus within the nuclear establishment that President Ahmed

Hassan al-Bakr and Vice President Saddam Hussein considered nuclear weap-

ons an inevitable consequence of advanced nuclear technology.17 Saddam, in

particular, took a strong personal interest in the nuclear question. On assum-

ing the IAEC presidency in 1973, he stated, I am the Godfather of the IAEC

and I love the IAEC.18 Others in Iraqs nuclear establishment assumed

that Saddam ultimately wanted a so-called breakout option from the nuclear

programdeveloping all the necessary skills and technologies to be able torapidly produce nuclear weapons from the civilian nuclear infrastructure

but they had no clear evidence to support this assumption.19 No explicit man-

date to develop such capabilities was forthcoming at this stage. Nonetheless,

al-Hashemis statement appears to have spurred initiatives from nuclear scien-

tists to develop a nuclear weapons option. Hamza reportedly proposed devel-

oping such an option to the political leadership in 1973 or 1974.

The 1973 oil crisis, following the nationalization of Iraqs oil industry the

previous year, represented a turning point for the countrys nuclear establish-

ment.20

Saddam seized this opportunity to turn Iraqs nuclear program intoone of the most ambitious in the Middle East.21 This development mirrored the

trajectory of the nuclear power program in Iran. The expansion of Irans nu-

clear infrastructure during the 1970s raised questions about whether Iran was

seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability as an offshoot of its civilian

program.22 Saddam instructed the Iraqi nuclear establishment to closely moni-

tor these developments.23 In 1975 he ordered the establishment of a nuclear

power program, an order that coincided with a restructuring of the IAEC to fa-

cilitate greater compartmentalization and secrecy.24 Saddam then instructed

the IAEC to prepare a strategy for the introduction of a nuclear power pro-gram and aspects of the related fuel cycle . . . based on turnkey projects and the

transfer of nuclear technology from abroad.25


17. Jafar D. Jafar, interview by author, Rome, Italy, May 45, 2005; Dhar Selbi, interview by au-thor, Amman, Jordan, September 5, 2005; and Imad Khadduri, interview by author, Toronto, Can-ada, March 31, 2005.18. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqs WMD, Vol. 1: Regime Stra-tegic Intent, p. 26.19. Jafar, interview by author.20. See Jafar, al-Niami, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, pp. 3233.21. Snyder, The Road to Osiraq, p. 566.22. For an account of the Iranian program under the shah, see William Burr, A Brief Historyof U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 1 (January/February 2009), pp. 2134.23. Khadduri, interview by author.24. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 17.25. Ibid.


8/33

Saddams decision to pursue a complete nuclear fuel cycle presented Iraq

with the option of developing a nuclear weapons capability. When procuring

the required technologies, the Iraqis emphasized plutonium extraction and

reprocessingtechnologies that would be essential for creating an indigenous

nuclear power program as well as developing ssile material for a bomb.26

During this period, Iraqi efforts were conned to procuring what may be

called the hardware for a nuclear weapons program but did not extend to

developing the software (human resources such as know-how) necessary for

an operational program.Iraqs initial efforts to explore a nuclear weapons option lacked the charac-

teristics of a formal nuclear weapons program: the Iraqis had no explicit man-

date, no dedicated organizational infrastructure, no budget, and no strategic

plan.27 The notion of a nuclear weapons option remained an abstraction. For

example, senior IAEC ofcials did not assess the technical requirements of an

indigenous nuclear weapons program.28 Their limited human and organiza-

tional resources during this period made it difcult for ambitious scientists to

start developing the skills necessary for a weapons program. For example,

Khalid Saeed, who coauthored the plan for introducing a complete nuclearfuel cycle commissioned by Saddam and later headed efforts to develop a nu-

clear weapon design, wanted to explore reprocessing technology in the mid-

1970s but was unable to do so for lack of human and technical resources.29

In the late 1970s, Iraq was assembling the building blocks of a complete fuel

cycle. After entering into nuclear cooperation agreements with France and

Italy in 1976, Iraq upgraded and expanded its nuclear infrastructure and re-

search and development facilities. It acquired the basic capability to explore

the production of nuclear fuel (the so-called 17 July project) and to reprocess

small amounts of plutonium into weapons-grade ssile material (the 30 Julyproject).30 From 1976 to 1979, Iraq procured a reactor complex from a French


26. Khadduri, interview by author; and Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National NuclearProgram.27. France, India, and Israel also began to pursue a nuclear weapons option without an explicitcommitment to acquire nuclear weapons. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: AmericanNuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006),p. 236.28. Jafar D. Jafar, interview by author, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 12, 2006.29. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, p. 9.30. The 17 July project encompassed two research reactors supplied by a French consortium, in-cluding the Osirak reactor destroyed by the Israeli attack and a laboratory for testing irradiatedmaterial. The 30 July project involved the acquisition of a complex of nuclear infrastructure fromItalian companies, including a research-scale radiochemistry laboratory capable of handling pluto-nium in gram quantities; an experimental fuel fabrication laboratory; a technological hall forchemical engineering research; a materials science laboratory; a laboratory for the production ofradioactive isotopes; and mechanical and electrical workshops. Jafar, unpublished manuscript,pp. 1822.


9/33

consortium, a laboratory-scale Italian reprocessing capability, and other com-

ponents essential for developing basic skills in nuclear fuel production and

reprocessing.

At the turn of the decade, Iraqs nuclear establishment was preparing to

initiate laboratory-scale plutonium reprocessing. The prototype radiochem-

ical laboratory installed in 1979, at the Nuclear Research Center in Tuwaitha,

provided the IAEC with the option of reprocessing up to one burned fuel

rod at a time from its Russian IRT-2000 reactor.31 Hussein Shahristani, a

director-general in Iraqs nuclear establishment, was in charge of the spentfuelreprocessing laboratory.32 The reprocessing project was not publicly an-

nounced within the IAEC.33 Although such compartmentalization was not

unique in the Iraqi context, it is indicative of the sensitive status of the project.

The international community greeted Iraqs increasingly rapid advance to-

ward a complete fuel cycle with growing suspicion. Concerns mounted fol-

lowing Iraqs acquisition of the two French (Osirak) reactors. These concerns

were rooted in fear that, despite International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

safeguards, plutonium . . . produced during normal operations . . . could be

diverted for weapons use.34

Iraqs original request to the French for a gas-graphite power reactor capable of producing 150 kilograms (kg) plutonium an-

nually appeared inappropriate for the purpose of power generation or civilian

research. External analysts interpreted Iraqs request as proof of Saddams de-

sire for nuclear weapons.35 Deeply worried about Iraqs nuclear intentions,

Israeli intelligence began targeting Iraqs nuclear scientists for assassination

and destroying some of Iraqs nuclear-related acquisitions.36 Although these

efforts inicted losses, including the assassination of an Egyptian scientist

working in the Iraqi nuclear program, they did not substantially halt Iraqs nu-

clear advances.

37

The Iraqi regimes concerns about domestic security following the 1979

Iranian Revolution, however, did succeed in disrupting the nuclear establish-

ments efforts.38 In December 1979, the authorities arrested Director-General

Shahristani.39 Shahristani, who was in charge of the reprocessing laboratory,


31. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, pp. 910.32. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 39.33. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, p. 10.34. Richard Stone, Prole: Jafar Dhia Jafar, Science, September 30, 2005, pp. 21582159.

35. See Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq, p. 115; and Snyder, The Road to Osiraq, p. 567. Formore on this request, see Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, pp. 3031.36. See Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 65; and Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 321.37. See Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 321.38. Jafar, interview by author, Rome, Italy, May 45, 2005; and Selbi, interview by author.39. Selbi, interview by author.


10/33

was suspected of supporting an illegal Shiite movement. Director-General

Jafar was arrested in January 1980 as a result of his repeated protests over

Shahristanis incarceration. As a consequence, Iraqs nuclear advances came to

a standstill.40

In June 1980, Saddam (now president) apparently decided that Iraq should

pursue nuclear weapons, yet he failed to act on this decision in any sub-

stantial way. Jafar and Shahristani, who were still imprisoned, were in-

formed that Saddam wanted a nuclear weapon.41 Jafar agreed to cooperate

while Shahristani declined. Jafar was subsequently upgraded to house ar-rest while Shahristani remained in custody until his escape in 1991. During his

house arrest, Jafar studied enrichment technologies. He refused to return to the

IAEC until Vice Chairman al-Hashemi, who had overseen his arrest, left

the program. Jafar remained incarcerated until the Israeli attack on Osirak.

We can only speculate on when Iraq would have established an operational

nuclear weapons program if Israel had not attacked Osirak in 1981. Neverthe-

less, it seems clear that Saddam was either unwilling or unable to initiate a for-

mal nuclear weapons program without Jafar. Saddam does not appear to have

approached other nuclear scientists during Jafars house arrest. He may nothave considered the establishment of a nuclear weapons program an urgent

matter, or he may have been distracted by Iraqs war with Iran.

pursuing a plutonium option

Iraqs efforts to move toward a nuclear weapons capability during the late

1970s were informal and incremental. They lacked the institutional founda-

tions and dedicated resources that constitute a nuclear weapons program in

any meaningful sense of the word. The absence of several critical resources

created this situation: a dedicated budget, a dedicated staff, a mandate, and anindependent infrastructure (i.e., one not subject to safeguards and external

oversight). As a result, Iraqs nuclear efforts during this period can be charac-

terized as a form of driftan exploration of the technical foundations for a

nuclear weapons program without an explicit political mandate guiding these

efforts.42 Iraqs approach mirrored developments in Iran, where the shahs

even more ambitious pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, combined with


40. Ibid.

41. Jafar, al-Niaimi, Sunnan, Oppdraget, pp. 4647; Amatzia Baram, An Analysis of IraqiWMD Strategy, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 28; Interview with al-Shahrastani, Al-Majalla (London), January 28February 3, 1996; and Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mi-rage, p. 79.42. This dynamic has also been observed in other states that proceeded to establish nuclear weap-ons programs, such as India and Pakistan.


11/33

his de facto admission of a nuclear weapons ambition, fueled suspicions that

he intended to develop a nuclear weapons option.43

In the spring of 1981, Iraq stood on the verge of having an operational light-

water research reactor and a laboratory-scale reprocessing facility at Tuwaitha,

which would enable the Iraqis to develop the skills necessary to establish an

operational weapons program. Iraq had made signicant advances toward de-

veloping the capability to produce such material but was not yet able to pro-

duce ssile material in large quantities or assemble nuclear weapons. Table 1

offers a summary of Iraqs technical advances toward developing the infra-

structure necessary for two critical components of a weapons program: ssile

material (fuel production and plutonium reprocessing) and a weaponizationcapability.

What can we conclude about the momentum driving Iraqs pursuit of a nu-

clear weapons option following Saddams seemingly inconsequential prolif-

eration decision? Figure 1 provides an overview of the political, nancial,

institutional, and technical resources available to Iraq in its pursuit of a nuclear

weapons capability by the spring of 1981.

In sum, on the eve of the attack on Osirak, Iraq was in the process of estab-

lishing a technological base that could facilitate developing the building blocks

for a nuclear weapons program (e.g., fuel experiments) but that would not eas-ily facilitate production of nuclear weapons. To produce sufcient plutonium

for several nuclear weapons, Iraq would need larger facilities that were not

subject to external oversight and safeguards. The political momentum driving

Iraqs efforts to develop a weapons option appears to have been inconsistent at

best. Saddam had not secured the basic organizational resources or budget. As

a result, Iraqs pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability was both directionless

and disorganized.

the osirak reactor

Could the Iraqis have employed the Osirak reactor as part of a nuclear

weapons program? Specically, could the reactor produce plutonium in suf-


43. See Burr, A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations, p. 22.

Table 1. Iraqs Advance toward a Plutonium Weapons Option by June 1981

Capability Experimental Scale Industrial Scale

Fuel production XReprocessing XWeaponization


12/33

cient quantities for such a program? At the time of the Israeli attack, ana-

lysts were concerned that the Osirak reactor complex at Tuwaitha (hosting the

40-megawatt research reactor and a smaller 500-kilowatt reactor) could be

used to produce sufcient amounts of plutoniuma reasonable concern

given that India and Israel used similar reactors in their nuclear weapons pro-

grams.44 Unlike these other reactors, however, the design characteristics of the

Osirak reactor and the fact that it was subject to IAEA safeguards placed

signicant constraints on the feasibility of using this reactor for the purposes

of a nuclear weapons program.45

A key concern among analysts was that Iraq would divert Osiraks reactor

fuel for making nuclear weapons. Iraqs original agreement with the French

stipulated that the two reactors at the Tuwaitha complex would be supplied

with 70 kg of 93 percent enriched uranium fuel. According to Jafars own esti-

mate, this amount of fuel could have sufced, in theory, to produce four to ve

nuclear weapons.46 Measures to detect any Iraqi attempts to divert reactor fuel

in the form of on-site French engineers and a bimonthly IAEA inspection re-gime made large-scale diversion unfeasible.47 In response to pressure from the

United States, France sought to amend its agreement with Iraq and reduce

the risk of fuel diversion. First, the French stipulated that only 1213 kilograms

of highly enriched uranium fuel would be available to the Osirak reactor at

any given time. This amount could have sufced for the production of one nu-


44. Israels DIMONA heavy water reactor was a copy of the French template for the Osirak reac-tor. Prior to the strike, there was disagreement within the Israeli government and the military andintelligence services as to whether an airstrike would reduce or intensify the risk that Iraq would

acquire nuclear weapons. See, for example, Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p. 322.45. This hardly represents an immediate proliferation risk.46. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, pp. 5354.47. How Long Would It Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive after Its Research ReactorBegan Operation? CRS Report for Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings:Israeli Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facility, 97th Cong., 1st sess., June 25, 1981.

Figure 1. Iraqs Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons prior to June 1981


13/33

clear weapon once Iraq possessed all of the other necessary skills, technolo-

gies, and components for weaponization.48 But, again, diversion of even this

amount of fuel would have been detected by French engineers on site or by

IAEA safeguards. Second, in early 1981 France proposed replacing this fuel

with less efcient caramel fuel (9 percent enriched uranium), which Iraqi

ofcials refused on the grounds that such fuel was not yet being produced on

an industrial scale.49

A U.S. assessment following the Israeli attack suggested that, if the Osirak

reactor was dedicated to producing plutonium, it could have provided mate-rial for a sophisticated bomb in fewer than two years and a simple device in

slightly more than one year.50 Although the reactor could have been used to

produce small amounts of plutonium, this may not have been realistic. Early

assessments are unlikely to have accounted for the design characteristics of the

reactor.51 Furthermore, it is unclear how Iraq would have secured consistent

access to sufcient highly enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel the reactors given

that it relied on French supplies and was still not fully capable of produc-

ing the HEU indigenously. Finally, Iraq would still have had to master an

additional range of skills, technologies, and materials to assemble nuclearweapons.

The design of the Osirak reactor made it suboptimal for the purposes of a

weapons program.52 For example, Osiraks neutron beam hall was too far

away from the reactor itself to facilitate large-scale plutonium production.53

Israeli estimates assumed that the reactor had the same neutron ux as the

French Osiris reactor (4 1014 n/cm2.s1).54 Osiraks neutron ux was

lower.55 According to Jafar, the neutron ux in the 40-megawatt light water re-


48. Ibid.49. Ibid.; and Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, pp. 5354. See also Richelson, Spying on theBomb, p. 321.50. How Long Would It Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive after Its Research ReactorBegan Operation?51. The assumed technical characteristics forming the basis for these calculations were not spec-ied.52. Richard Wilson, A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq, Nature, March 31,1983, pp. 373376; Hans Gruemm, Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record Straight, IAEABulletin, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1981), pp. 1213; Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden; Yves Girard, Unneutron entre les dents (Paris: Editions Rives Droite, 1997); and Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mirage,pp. 8182.53. Wilson, A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, p. 374.54. See Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq, p. 116; and Government of Israel, Ministry of ForeignAffairs and Atomic Energy Commission, The Iraqi Nuclear ThreatWhy Israel Had to Act,Jerusalem 1981.55. Wilson, A Visit to the Bombed Nuclear Reactor at Tuwaitha, p. 374.


14/33

actor was up to 3 1014 n/cm2.s.56 The reactor would require signicant

modications to facilitate timely production of large quantities of weapons-

grade plutonium.57

Apart from the Iraqi estimates from the late 1970s, there are no exact calcula-

tions available for how much plutonium the Osirak reactor could have pro-

duced based on its particular characteristics. A 1979 estimate by Jafar and

Shahristani and later assessments by IAEA ofcials concur that the reactor

could produce up to 2 kg of plutonium per year with uranium blankets placed

inside the reactor.58 According to Mahdi Obeidi, however, problems with thealuminum pipes in the reactor would have required repairs and possibly

imposed delays in its operation.59 Although the conventional wisdom may

have overestimated the ease with which Osirak could have been used to pro-

duce plutonium in large quantities, its production capacity could have been

enhanced.60 Two options have been suggested: (1) introducing natural or de-

pleted uranium into the reactors core or chimney, and (2) producing pluto-

nium in the neutron hall under the reactor.61 IAEA assessments deemed the

latter option unfeasible.62 Modifying the reactor would have been possible

only if Iraq withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty and the associatedIAEA safeguards regime.63

The question of whether the IAEA safeguards regime could provide suf-


56. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 17.57. For one scenario on how Iraq could modify the facility, see Wilson, A Visit to the Bombed Nu-clear Reactor at Tuwaitha, p. 376. See also Richard Wilson, Incomplete or Inaccurate InformationCan Lead to Tragically Incorrect Decisions to Preempt: The Example of OSIRAK, paper presentedat Erice, Sicily, updated February 9, 2008, http://phys4.harvard.edu/wilson/publications/pp896.html.58. The IAEC estimate assumed that uranium would surround the core of the reactor, according to

Jafar and Shahristani, whereas Herzigs estimate assumes placing uranium in the chimney of thereactor. Jafar and Shahristani, personal correspondence with author; Jafar, unpublished manu-script, p. 24; and Christopher Herzig, Correspondence: IAEA Safeguards, International Security,Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 195197. See also Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden.59. Reiter, Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the Success at Osiraq, p. 358; andObeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden, p. 50.60. The IAEA noted that the Iraqi Soviet-supplied IRT-5000 reactor was useful for research and de-velopment but of very limited usefulness as a plutonium production reactor. United Nations Se-curity Council Report, Attachment 1: The Components of Iraqs Clandestine Nuclear Programme,S/1997/779, p. 53.61. Feldman The Bombing of Osiraq, p. 116; Reiter, Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Pro-grams and the Success at Osiraq, p. 358; and Marvin M. Miller and Carol Ann Eberhard, ThePotential for Upgrading Safeguards Procedures at Research Reactors Fuelled with Highly En-riched Uranium, November 1982.62. Gruemm, Safeguards and Tamuz, pp. 1213; and Peaceful Nuclear Development MustContinue, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1981), pp. 37.63. See the debate in Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq; Gruemm, Safeguards and Tamuz;Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue; and Herzig, Correspondence.


15/33

cient protection against attempts to divert fuel or clandestine plutonium pro-

duction from the Osirak reactor was ercely debated following the Israeli

attack.64 The reactor was subject to an inspection regime designed to detect

fuel diversion and other proscribed activities, including structural changes of

the facility.65 Israeli ofcials argued that the safeguards regime could not detect

attempts to introduce uranium into the reactor between inspections.66 This

stood in contrast to the assessment of Iraqi ofcials that such attempts would

have been detected.67 Subsequent IAEA assessments argued that visual ver-

ication techniques and materials accounting would have detected suchefforts.68 In addition to the safeguards, on-site French engineers provided ad-

ditional insights into the activities at Tuwaitha. Carrying out proscribed en-

richment activities would have necessitated either collusion with the French

(highly unlikely) or their expulsion.69 One U.S. assessment concluded that Iraq

would have needed between ten and thirty years to produce enough material

for a bomb by diverting plutonium produced during routine operations. 70

the breakout option

A breakout option based on a declared facility entails high risks. To establish aviable breakout option from Osirak, Iraq would rst have to develop the other

components needed to build a nuclear weapon (notably, a large reprocessing

capability and weaponization technologies) under the watchful eye of an inter-

national community determined to deny Iraq this option. Even with all of

these other components in place, Iraq still would require at least three to four

years to produce the minimum amount of plutonium for a weapon (perhaps

more, given the problems with the reactors aluminum pipes). Thus Iraqs

breakout option in 1981 was subject to serious constraints. If, however, the re-

processing and fuel production capabilities had been enhanced and expanded


64. Miller and Eberhard, The Potential for Upgrading Safeguards Procedures at Research Reac-tors Fuelled with Highly Enriched Uranium; and Gruemm, Peaceful Nuclear DevelopmentMust Continue.65. See the debate in Herzig, Correspondence, pp. 195199; Hans Gruemm, SafeguardsVericationIts Credibility and the Diversion Hypothesis, IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1983),p. 29; Gruemm, Safeguards and Tamuz, pp. 1213; and Albert Carnesale, Israeli Attack on IraqiNuclear Facilities, hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st sess.,June 25, 1981, p. 48.66. See Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq, p. 120.67. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 22.68. See Herzig, Correspondence; Gruemm, Safeguards Verication; and Gruemm, Safe-guards and Tamuz.69. Herzig, Correspondence, p. 198.70. How Long Would It Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive after Its Research ReactorBegan Operation?


16/33

during the early 1980s, a breakout option by the middle of the decade could

have been theoretically feasible.

A more realistic scenario is one in which Iraq developed the necessary skills

for handling the complete fuel cycle in the Osirak facility and then established

an undeclared reactor elsewhere for the purposes of a weapons program.

Work at the French reactor could have aided the Iraqis in developing general

skills for handling radioactive materials and industrial procedures that would

have been helpful for a weapons program. Senior Iraqi ofcials believed that

this was the most likely route for acquiring nuclear weapons.71 This sce-nario would have been consistent with Iraqs enduring focus on plutonium

extraction and would avoid the risks of using a declared site well known to

the international community. Following this approach, Iraq could have de-

veloped a weapons capability by the mid-to-late 1980s (assumingperhaps

optimisticallythat necessary foreign assistance had been forthcoming de-

spite the Iran-Iraq War). Doing so would have required strong political will

and a large investment. It is unclear what would have intensied Saddams

determination to facilitate such efforts in the absence of the Israeli attack on

Osirak.

Iraqs Covert Nuclear Weapons Program, 198191

Israel destroyed the Osirak reactor as it stood on the verge of becoming opera-

tional. The Israeli government cited self-defense, claiming that the reactor was

designed to produce atomic bombs.72 Following the destruction of the

reactor, Iraq established a covert nuclear weapons program. This program

can be divided into three distinct phases: a research program (198187), an

operational program (198790), and a crash program (199091). The researchprogram was hampered by the arduous technological routes taken and subop-

timal management, resulting in years of delay. As a consequence, in 1987 the

Iraqis decided to restructure the program. From 1987 to 1990, the Iraqis made


71. See Robert E. Kelley, The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs: The Importanceof Management, Security Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 2738, especially p. 28.72. Statement by the Government of Israel on the Bombing of the Iraqi Nuclear Facility, June 8,1981, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. For an analysis laying out Israeli concerns about the re-actor, see Yuval Neeman, The Franco-Iraqi Project, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 37, No. 7(August/September 1981), pp. 810. The attack itself has been extensively studied elsewhere. Formore on the Israeli attack and the Begin doctrine, see Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, and UriBar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 1982). See also Raas and Long,Osirak Redux? For more recent arguments in support of Israels attack, see Nicholas Kristof,The Osirak Option, New York Times, November 15, 2002; and Alan M. Dershowitz, Preemption: AKnife That Cuts Both Ways (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).


17/33

substantial advances toward establishing a weapons capability. Finally, follow-

ing Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in 1990, a crash program was launched to at-

tempt to rapidly assemble a nuclear weapon by diverting safeguarded reactor

fuel.

a window of opportunity

The Israeli attack on Osirak created a window of opportunity for Iraqi nuclear

entrepreneurs to persuade Saddam to establish a nuclear weapons program.

First, the violation of Iraqi sovereignty created a strategic imperative to re-spond. Second, the attack refocused Saddams inconsistent attention on the is-

sue of nuclear weapons. In his public response to the attack, Saddam warned

the international community of the consequences of denying Iraq access to ad-

vanced nuclear technology. In July 1981, he stated that the attack will not stop

the course of scientic and technical progress in Iraq. Rather, it is an additional

strong stimulus to develop this course . . . with even greater resources and

with more effective protection.73 Ominously, he declared, [W]e have gained

from the side-effects of this attack, certain points which might not have oc-

curred to the Israelis when they launched their aggression.74

Further, whenwe feel an imminent danger posed by Israel to the Arab nation, we will let

the Iraqis minds operate to the maximum, and try by every possible means

to protect ourselves.75 These statements signaled a reinforced commitment to

bolster strategic defenses and a desire to sooth Iraqs wounded pride.

Behind the scenes in Baghdad, Jafar seized the opportunity to design a clan-

destine nuclear weapons program that would be technically feasible in the

wake of the Israeli destruction of Osirak. After the Osirak attack, Jafar wrote

to Saddam arguing that a nuclear weapons program was necessary if Iraq

wanted to continue its pursuit of nuclear power.

76

Jafar suggested that thenuclear weapons program ought to be based on the development of in-

digenous skills and technologies, rather than seeking to buy key components

from foreign suppliers. Furthermore, he argued that Iraq ought to pursue dif-

fusion technology rather than centrifuges.77 Jafars suggestions effectively


73. President Saddam Husseins Speech on National Day (1981): Thirteenth Anniversary of the 1730 July1968 Revolution, trans. Naji al-Hadithi (Baghdad: Dar Al-Mamun for Translation and Publishing,1981), p. 17.74. President Husseins Press Conference on Iraqs Internal, Arab, and International Policies (Baghdad:

Dar Al-Mamun for Translation and Publishing, 1981), p. 16.75. President Saddam Hussein Interviewed on Zionist Raid on Iraqi Reactor (Baghdad: Oar Al-Mamun,1987), p. 14.76. Jafar, interview by author; and Khadduri, interview by author.77. He also unsuccessfully argued in favor of withdrawing from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Jafar,interview by author.


18/33

came to constitute the road map for Iraqs nuclear weapons program.78 On

September 3, 1981, Jafar returned to the Nuclear Research Center at Tuwaitha

and established Directorate 3000, the organization initially charged with plan-

ning the nuclear weapons program.79

phase i: acceleration and stagnation, 198187

The Israeli attack on Osirak effectively forged an alliance between Iraqi nu-

clear entrepreneurs and the Iraqi leadership. This alliance produced a more

determined and organized effort to acquire a weapons capability. First, the nu-clear entrepreneurs were able to secure Saddams nancial support for the pro-

gram. From the fall of 1981, the nuclear weapons program experienced a

consistently high growth rate, despite general economic hardship during the

Iran-Iraq War. Saddams decision to start the program in September 1981 came

with the offer of a blank check: in other words, abundant and consistent

funding.80 From 1983 until 1991, the programs staff increased by 60 percent

annually.81 According to Jafar, the Iraqi nuclear establishment spent 792,899,913

Iraqi dinars on the weapons program from 1982 to 1988, and an additional

669,446,170 dinars during 198990.82

Second, Saddams strong personal sup-port enabled the nuclear entrepreneurs to effectively intensify the pace and

shift the direction of Iraqs efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

staking out a new direction. From 1981 to 1987, Jafar and his senior col-

leagues in the Iraqi nuclear establishment were given free rein to plan and im-

plement a nascent weapons program. Paradoxically, despite the establishment

of a large and well-funded nuclear weapons program, Iraq failed to make sub-

stantial progress toward an operational nuclear weapons program over the

next few years. How can this failure be explained? What was the role of

the Osirak attack in determining the new direction and pace of this program?Proponents of the attack have argued that denying Baghdad the plutonium

option played a crucial role in delaying Iraqs nuclear weapons program. On

the other hand, critics have argued that the Osirak reactor could not have

played a key role in a nuclear weapons program. I argue that the attack did

play a role in shaping Iraqs efforts to establish a nuclear weapons program,

but that other domestic factors contributed to create delays that have often

been attributed to the Israeli strike.


78. Ibid.79. Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mirage, p. 82; and Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs NationalNuclear Program, p. 17.80. Jafar, interview by author.81. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, p. 66.82. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, pp. 8890.


19/33

The Osirak attack led to a fundamental change in Iraqs efforts to acquire

nuclear weapons, by causing the Iraqis to pursue a more difcult and more

time-consuming technical route to develop ssile material for a nuclear

weapon (uranium enrichment rather than plutonium). Furthermore, faced

with an international environment rife with suspicion with regards to Iraqs

nuclear program, Jafar and his colleagues resorted to suboptimal technologies

in order to be able to secretly develop a uranium enrichment capability. Their

choices appear so inefcient and difcult to explain that observers have incor-

rectly suggested that the scientists wanted to sabotage the program. Below Iexplore why these choices were made in the rst place and why the Iraqis

failed to seriously consider alternative technological approaches until 1987.

As Iraqi scientists contemplated how to pursue nuclear weapons, lessons

from the attack on Osirak seem to have weighed heavily on their minds. Al-

though the Osirak reactor does not appear to have been intended for the pur-

poses of a weapons program, the attack did inuence how the Iraqis sought to

develop nuclear weapons. Their key priority was to develop a program with a

small signature (i.e., one that would be difcult to detect by other states) and

technologies that required developing minimal additional skills and capabili-ties.83 The plutonium route was ruled out because of the challenges and risks

of developing a suitable reactor not subject to safeguards (notably, because of

the likelihood that such a reactor would be attacked) and the need to develop a

large-scale reprocessing capability.84 Furthermore, a plutonium program

would necessitate reliance on external suppliers.85 The preference for a small

signature was a key factor informing the Iraqi decision to opt for a clandestine

uranium enrichment program. Already during the summer of 1981, the Iraqi

nuclear establishment had begun literature surveys focusing on uranium en-

richment. At the same time, Jafar prepared a report, while under house arrest,on how an indigenous enrichment program could be established.86

stagnation. From 1981 to 1987, the Iraqi leadership made available politi-

cal, organizational, and nancial resources to the nuclear establishment, yet a

viable technological basis for an operational nuclear weapons program re-

mained elusive. The Iraqis continued to pursue inefcient technologies, de-

spite failing to make signicant progress in uranium enrichment. Iraqi sources

demonstrate how the management of the program produced path dependen-

cies, resulted in years of delay and, arguably, created a deeply awed program.


83. See also David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms Americas Enemies(New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 85.84. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, pp. 4445.85. Kelley, The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs, p. 28.86. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program.


20/33

These factors appear to have played a much more direct role in creating sub-

stantial delays in the program than has thus far been recognized.

From 1981 to 1987, the Iraqis explored different avenues to developing a ura-

nium enrichment capability.87 Jafar and his colleagues began by focusing on

two different methods to enrich uranium: electromagnetic isotope separation

(EMIS) and gaseous diffusion. Iraqs research on EMIS technology, which ap-

peared to be feasible given Iraqs existing resources, predated the nuclear

weapons program.88 Information about the EMIS method was easily accessi-

ble, and it could be pursued with skills and resources already available in Iraq.In contrast, gaseous diffusion would require more intensive research and de-

velopment efforts and would have necessitated procuring components from

abroad.89 Gaseous diffusion proved to be particularly challenging given the

difculty of domestically manufacturing key components, such as compres-

sors, and the Iraqis made little progress with this approach.90Jafar and his col-

leagues therefore opted to focus on EMIS as the primary technology and

pursued gaseous diffusion as a secondary approach.

Iraqs adoption of EMIS and, to a lesser extent, gaseous diffusion, as the pre-

ferred enrichment technologies seems curious from a technical standpoint. TheUnited States, for example, had discarded EMIS decades earlier because of its

high costs, and gaseous diffusion was clearly beyond Iraqs existing capabili-

ties in 1981.91 To understand these choices, it is necessary to consider what op-

tions were considered feasible by the Iraqis given their existing industrial and

scientic capabilities, on the one hand, and the level of suspicion cast on their

nuclear program following the Osirak attack, on the other. In the aftermath of

the destruction of Osirak, the Iraqi regime and the nuclear establishment were

equally determined to base the nuclear weapons program on indigenous capa-

bilities and avoid reliance on foreign-supplied materials and assistanceevenat the expense of developing an expeditious nuclear weapons program. The

EMIS method was described in detail in open source literature, and the basic

materials could be produced indigenously.92 This meant that the Iraqis could

rapidly initiate research and development activities. Had they opted to pursue

centrifuges as their primary enrichment technology, this would perhaps have


87. Despite the emphasis on developing indigenous skills and resources, external suppliers andindividuals played a signicant role in setting up Iraqs nuclear weapons program. For details seeUnited Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779.

88. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, p. 17.89. Ibid., p. 18; and Jafar, unpublished manuscript, pp. 4041, 4445.90. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, p. 18; and Kelley, The Iraqiand South African Nuclear Weapon Programs, p. 28.91. Kelley, The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs, p. 28.92. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, p. 21.


21/33

facilitated a more efcient program in theory, but in practice it would have re-

quired a higher reliance on outside assistance. This would make Iraqs efforts

more vulnerable to detection and countermeasures from other states. There-

fore, EMIS was deemed the most feasible route to enrichment given Iraqs ex-

isting capabilities and the leaderships concern that other states should not be

in a position to determine the fate or the direction of its nuclear weapons

program.

Over the next few years, Iraqs nuclear weapons program focused on re-

search and development. Surprisingly, there was no direct pressure from theregime or an explicit focus on developing deployable nuclear weapons from

1981 to 1987. Weaponization appears to have remained an abstract goal, which

is puzzling given the common assumption that the Iran-Iraq War was a key

driver in the program.93 A closer look at the nuclear weapons program dur-

ing this period suggests that the senior managers freely determined the pace

and targets of the program while the political leadership remained detached

from these issues.

In a meeting between Saddam and the senior leadership of the Iraqi nuclear

weapons program in April 1985, Vice Chairman Hamam presented a report hehad prepared with Jafar. The report had not been circulated to their senior col-

leagues, including the ve commissioners of the IAEC who were also present

at this meeting. In the presentation, the vice chairman claimed that the

program would reach its objectivepresumably, establishing a nuclear weap-

ons capability or reaching a major milestone toward establishing such a

capabilityby 1990.94 This promise came as a surprise to the nuclear establish-

ment, because it still had not moved beyond laboratory experiments with the

chosen enrichment technologies.95 After the meeting, heated confrontations

ensued within the IAEC, as the commissioners argued that 1990 was not a real-istic target and resented the de facto implication of making what they consid-

ered would be an unfounded promise.96

Although it may appear logical to assume that the Iraqis were determined

to rapidly acquire a nuclear deterrent following the Israeli attack on Osirak,

and that their desire only intensied during the Iran-Iraq War, during this pe-

riod the nuclear weapons program was neither particularly efcient nor ori-

ented toward the war effort. Furthermore, Jafar and Hamams decision to

voluntarily impose a seemingly unrealistic deadline on the nuclear weapons


93. See, for example, Solingen, Nuclear Logics, pp. 143147.94. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, p. 24.95. Ibid.96. Ibid., pp. 2425.


22/33

program is perplexing. To understand the peculiar character and orientation of

the Iraqi nuclear program during the Iran-Iraq War, then, it is necessary to ex-

amine the impact of the leadership and organizational characteristics on it.

During the Iran-Iraq War, the nuclear programs leadership and organiza-

tional characteristics contributed to create path dependencies and, ultimately,

caused lengthy delays. The managers of the program failed to prioritize effec-

tively and typically favored convoluted technological solutions.97 The Iraqi

scientists, argues Robert Kelley, seemed to have given less thought to the con-

guration of the [nuclear weapons] system . . . size and weight were generaltargets. There was more discussion in the design documents of the physics

and expected performance of the device. This is more consistent with a pro-

gram run by physicists with a more abstract goal of emulating weapon state

programs.98

The inclination toward abstract and complex solutions was not unique to the

Iraqi context, and, as Kelley suggests, has also been seen in other nuclear

weapons programs dominated by nuclear scientists. Such programs tend to be

abstract in orientation, emphasizing theoretical problems and fundamental re-

search, rather than being primarily focused on solving the complex engineer-ing challenges associated with developing nuclear weapons. From the outset,

then, the leadership of the Iraqi program struggled to identify efcient solu-

tions to the many practical challenges facing developing states seeking to

produce nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Iraqis went on to pursue unvi-

able technological paths for more than ve years, wasting valuable time and

resources.99

The organizational inefciencies of the Iraqi program also contributed to in-

hibit the development of a large-scale uranium enrichment capability. The pro-

gram was heavily compartmentalized, with little interaction among thevarious departments involved in the operational program. This structure,

combined with the absence of institutional capacities to provide critical feed-

back and carry out internal audits, exacerbated inefciencies. Although indi-

viduals in the nuclear weapons program occasionally voiced concern to the

senior management about the chosen enrichment technologies or encouraged

exploration of alternatives, their suggestions had no discernable impact.

Given the organization of Iraqs nuclear weapons program, it is perhaps un-

surprising that mounting evidence that the chosen technologies were ill suited

for enriching uranium on a large scale did not result in any changes. There


97. See discussion in Kelley, The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs, pp. 3638.98. Ibid., p. 36.99. See ibid.


23/33

were no formal or informal rigorous internal audits that could identify inef-

ciencies. Instead, IAEC reporting appears to have exaggerated the programs

progress and provided overly optimistic assessments of the likelihood of meet-

ing self-imposed deadlines.100 Despite strong disagreements within the nu-

clear establishment concerning the chosen technological routes, voicing such

concerns carried personal risks.101 The lack of real progress and the programs

failure to meet self-imposed deadlines led to increasing tension within the nu-clear establishment.102 Figure 2 presents a summary of the resources available

to the Iraqi nuclear weapons program from 1981 to 1987.

phase ii: moving toward weaponization, 198790

By the spring of 1987, it was clear to the senior and midlevel management of

the Iraqi nuclear weapons program that the program was failing to achieve its

objectives.103 This failure was perceived as a mounting crisis and led to a reas-

sessment of the enrichment technologies and overall structure of the program.

In April 1987 Jafar presented the rst quarterly report of the year. He con-cluded this presentation by stating that it would not be possible to make the

deadline of 1990 that was promised to the president in 1985. His conclusion led

to a lengthy heated debate in the IAEC. During this meeting, Dhar Selbi,

IAEC commissioner and head of the directorate charged with overseeing the

administration of the entire IAEC as well as the Department of Engineering


100. Ibid. p. 30. See the forthcoming account in Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs NationalNuclear Program.

101. See Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqs WMD; and Selbi etal., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program.102. For example, in 1987 Khidhir Hamza allegedly led a report criticizing Jafar and cited theinefciencies of the chosen technological route. See Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mirage, pp. 8990.103. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program; and Khadduri, Iraqs Nu-clear Mirage.

Figure 2. Iraqs Covert Nuclear Weapons Program, 198187


24/33

Services, was given the responsibility of sharing some of Jafars duties in

Directorate 3000.104 This was meant to enable Jafar to focus on overcoming the

technical obstacles facing the nuclear weapons program. According to Selbi

and colleagues, the conclusion that the program would fail to meet the self-

imposed deadline of 1990 was not communicated to anyone outside the nu-

clear establishment.105

Confronted with the lack of progress, the management had to concede that

the chosen technology for performing EMIS, namely, the Penning ionization

gauge (PIG), remained deeply problematic and that alternative technologiesneeded to be explored. With regard to EMIS, a long overdue adoption of

calutrons as a parallel effort to the work on PIG in 1987 illustrates how patho-

logical path dependencies hindered technical advances in the program. Al-

though calutrons were a proven technology that had been used in the

Manhattan Project, PIG was a more recent technology for performing EMIS

and had been the preferred approach of Jafar from the outset of the nuclear

weapons program. During the 1987 reassessment, it emerged that although in-

dividuals in the program had manufactured calutrons at their own initiative,

these had not been put to any use because of the managements preference forPIG.106 Following heated debate, the decision was made to pursue further

work on calutrons.107 Subsequently, the nuclear weapons program was reorga-

nized to facilitate the development of technological alternatives to improve en-

richment capabilities (including a centrifuge program headed by Mahdi

Obeidi).

The reorganization of the nuclear weapons program and the efforts to de-

velop a centrifuge capability in tandem with the EMIS route accelerated Iraqs

advance toward a nuclear weapons capability over the next few years. In

late 1987, the nuclear establishment began to make preparations to establishan operational program. This effort enjoyed the necessary political, nancial,

organizational, and technical resources to facilitate an operational nuclear

weapons program (see gure 3). Although it is has been assumed that the Iran-

Iraq War was the direct cause of this development, recent Iraqi accounts sug-

gest that bureaucratic momentum played a more direct role in bringing about

the decision to establish an operational weapons program. In April 1987,

the vice chairman of the IAEC proposed to Saddam that the nuclear weapons

program was ready to transition from research and development to weapon-


104. Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, p. 28.105. Ibid.106. Ibid., p. 34.107. Selbi, interview by author. See also Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National NuclearProgram.


25/33

ization.108 Saddam agreed and put his son-in-law Hussein Kamel in charge of

the weaponization project.109 In this way, as the program entered a sensitive

phase, Saddam took measures to enhance the regimes oversight, involvement,

and control.110

The Al-Hussein Project was established to ascertain how Iraq would pro-

duce nuclear weapons.111 The target date for completing research and design

for a 20-kiloton implosion device was December 1990, and the target date for

weapons production was June 1991.112 In April 1988, efforts to develop a work-

ing enrichment capability intensied with the establishment of Group Four,

a unit dedicated to weaponization. In January 1989 the PC-3 unit, which fo-

cused on weapons design, was placed under Hussein Kamels supervision in

the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization.

How, then, did the Iran-Iraq War inuence the Iraqi nuclear weapons pro-

gram? Generally speaking, the experience of the war is likely to have intensi-

ed the regimes desire for a nuclear deterrent. Given that the war was a

catalyst for Iraqs development of chemical and biological weapons, this ap-

pears to be a reasonable assumption. Accounts from the Iraqi nuclear estab-lishment, however, suggest that there was no clear causal link between the war

and the intensication of the nuclear weapons program.113 As noted, during

the rst six years of the program, there was no pressure from Saddam to de-


108. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 57; and Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, p. 74.109. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 58.110. Khadduri, Iraqs Nuclear Mirage, p. 93.111. United Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779, p. 54.112. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, Currently Accurate,

Full and Complete Declaration, pt. 5, chap. 11, pt. 3: Nuclear Device Development, submitted toIAEA on December 7, 2002, pp. 4950. See also the account of how the initial deadline of 1990s wasset in Selbi et al., Unrevealed Milestones in Iraqs National Nuclear Program, pp. 2328. According toJafar, these targets were later adjusted. See Jafar, unpublished manuscript.113. For further analysis of the security motive and Iraqs nuclear program see Solingen, NuclearLogics, pp. 144149.

Figure 3. Iraqs Covert Nuclear Weapons Program, 198790


26/33

velop deployable weapons. Furthermore, the weaponization decision came at

the initiative of the nuclear establishment. If the regime wanted nuclear weap-

ons to end the war with Iran, presumably there would have been more direct

involvement at an earlier stage and an explicit emphasis on developing de-

ployable weapons.

Accounts of senior gures in the nuclear establishment suggest that senior

Iraqi ofcials were surprised that the political leadership did not draw a direct

link between Iraqs pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and the ongoing

war. At least, this did not translate into any added pressure to produce nuclearweapons. According to Jafar, Since Iraq was at war with Iran at that time and

heated battles were taking place almost daily, we were rather surprised that

Saddam had refrained from pushing us to do the impossible. On the con-

trary, he seemed happy to let us work at our own pace, which we did. . . .

Should Saddam have had Iran in mind, he would have been strident in his de-

mands.114 In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi nuclear establish-

ment made substantial progress toward establishing a nuclear weapons

capability. According to the IAEA, by 1991 Iraq was at, or close to, the thresh-

old of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS pro-cess, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas

centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear

weapon.115

The key challenge facing the Iraqis at this point was to produce HEU on an

industrial scale. The decision to opt for an implosion weapon, which would re-

quire less HEU than a gun-type weapon, was an acknowledgment of these

difculties.116 The EMIS route continued to face signicant obstacles. Iraqi sci-

entists disagree exactly how long it would have taken to solve the remaining

technical problems, but they concur that a nuclear weapons capability couldhave been established by the mid-to-late 1990s. In sum, by the early 1990s Iraq

stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. At this point, nuclear

weapons programs typically encounter a plethora of engineering challenges

that can add several years to their efforts to produce nuclear weapons. It is

likely that Iraq also would have experienced delays as a result of such chal-

lenges, given the noted characteristics of the program and its management.

By the turn of the decade, Iraq was overcoming many of the obstacles it had

faced with regard to uranium enrichment, such as producing gas centrifuge


114. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 62. See also Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, p. 62.115. United Nations Security Council Report, Appendix: Fourth Consolidated Report of the Direc-tor General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security CouncilResolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779, p. 21.116. United Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779, p. 56.


27/33

cascades.117 Iraq aimed to produce sufcient weapons-grade uranium to pro-

duce one nuclear bomb per year by 1994 (specically, 10 kg of 93 percent HEU

annually).118 The head of the centrifuge program, Mahdi Obeidi, did not be-

lieve, however, that Iraq could produce a 1,000-centrifuge cascade by this date.

According to his estimate, 1997 or 1998 was more realistic.119 With regards to

weaponization, Iraq was making progress in developing ignition mechanisms

and pursuing pilot production of uranium metal for the weapons core.120

The Iraqis also sought to reduce the weight of the nuclear warhead.121 Jafar

assessed that production and cold testing of a nuclear weapon would have be-gun by 1993.122

phase iii: the crash program, 199091

As Iraqs nuclear weapons program was approaching a critical stage, unre-

lated concerns once again disrupted the nuclear establishments efforts.

Saddams worries about the long-term consequences of an economic down-

turn for his regimes standing led to his decision to invade Kuwait on August

2, 1990.123 In January 1991, a U.S.-led coalition forced Iraq to leave Kuwait, and

subsequently a WMD disarmament regime was imposed by the UN SecurityCouncil. Despite the unfortunate timing, Saddams fateful decision to invade

Kuwait appears to have had little to do with the nuclear weapons program.

Saddam did not see nuclear weapons as useful for addressing the challenges

he associated with the economic crisis and apparently did not believe he could

afford to wait for the development of nuclear weapons.

Having observed the international communitys initial response to the inva-

sion of Kuwait, Iraq launched a crash program (Project 601/603) on August 17,

1990, to develop a crude nuclear weapon within six months.124 For the rst


117. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 1996), pp. 330333; andJafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, p. 97.118. Jafar, unpublished manuscript, p. 77; Albright, Berkhout and Walker, Plutonium and HighlyEnriched Uranium, 1996, p. 329.119. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996, p. 337.120. United Nations Security Council Report, Attachment 1, S/1997/779, pp. 5657.121. Ibid.122. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, pp. 9899.123. See for example, ibid., p. 102; Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conict, 19901991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995),pp. 3841; and F. Gregory Gause III, Iraqs Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990, Middle EastJournal, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 61.124. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, p. 100. See United Nations Security Council Report,Appendix, S/1997/779, pp. 1718, and Attachment 1, 1.3: The Intended Diversion of ResearchReactor Fuel; Hans Blix, Annex: Letter Dated 11 April 1996 from the Acting Director General ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General, in United Nations SecurityCouncil Report, S/1996/261, April 11, 1996, p. 8; Duelfer, Regime Strategy and WMD TimelineEvents, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraqs WMD, Vol. 1, appendix, p. 3;


28/33

time, a clear link was established between the nuclear weapons program and

the regimes immediate security concerns.125 As Iraq somewhat unexpectedly

came into conict with the United States and its allies, a nuclear deterrent car-

ried renewed appeal. At the same time, increasing attention to Iraqs nuclear

efforts in the international media gave rise to fears in Baghdad that a preemp-

tive strike similar to the Israeli attack on 1981 might be launched.126

Iraqs crash nuclear program was a mission impossible from the outset.

First, the program set out to use safeguarded reactor fuel as the basis for a nu-

clear weapon. This entailed signicant risks, because diversion of safeguardedreactor fuel would be discovered during upcoming IAEA inspections.127 This

step would constitute a clear break with the long-standing practice of seeking

to avoid rousing the international communitys attention. The alternative, re-

fusing to facilitate the upcoming inspections, would have alarmed the interna-

tional community. Second, although Iraq was rapidly approaching a nuclear

weapons capability, solving the remaining technical obstacles would have

taken more time than Baghdad had available.

Given the character of the Iraqi regime under Saddam, pointing out that the

crash program was doomed to fail entailed considerable personal risks. Thiscreated a situation where the regime may have believed that nuclear weapons

were within reach even though the nuclear establishment knew this was tech-

nically impossible.128 There is no evidence that the Iraqi nuclear establishment

actively led the regime to believe it could produce nuclear weapons in such a

short time frame, but the scientists did not inform the regime of the unfeasibil-

ity of the project. On January 17, 1991, Operation Desert Storm interrupted

Iraqs scramble for the bomb.

The Strike on Osirak: Consequences and ImplicationsThe debate on Osirak has been heavily polarized between scholars arguing

that it accelerated the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons and those arguing that

it caused delays in these efforts. The new history I have provided here sug-


and Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration, pt. 5, pt. 3: Nuclear Device Development,pp. 5051. There was also a biological crash program. See United Nations Special CommissionReport to the Security Council, S/1995/864, October 11, 1995, par. 78.125. Jafar, interview by author.126. For more information on the Iraqi concerns, see Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conict,pp. 32, 34; and Gause, Iraqs Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990, p. 55.127. Jafar, al-Niaimi, and Sunnan, Oppdraget, p. 100.128. Analysts have argued that the scientists were prone to exaggerate their prospects of successprior to the crash program. See, for example, Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and GeorgePerkovitch, with Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington, D.C.:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004), p. 26; and Kelley, The Iraqi andSouth African Nuclear Weapon Programs, p. 30.


29/33

gests that both arguments are basically valid but incomplete. Below, I provide

a net assessment of the consequences of the Israeli attack for the Iraqi nuclear

weapons program and relate these ndings to the academic debate on the case

of Osirak. Then, I consider whether we can draw implications from this case

for analyzing how preventive attacks elsewhere inuence nuclear proliferation

risks.

What does this updated history tell us about the following contested ques-tions: What were the origins of Iraqs nuclear weapons program? What were

the consequences of the Israeli attack on Osirak? How close did Iraq come to

developing a nuclear weapons capability? Table 2 compares Iraqs efforts to ac-

quire a nuclear weapons option prior to the attack with the weapons program

following the attack. These two phases differed in terms of technical orienta-

tion, resources dedicated toward acquiring a weapons capability, and the over-

all capability resulting from these efforts.

The intensity and scope of Iraqs efforts to pursue nuclear weapons differ

dramatically in 1981 versus 1991. Before 1981, the Iraqi nuclear establishmenthad a basic mandate to develop an infrastructure that could facilitate the de-

velopment of a nuclear weapons option over the next few years. By 1991, in

contrast, the Iraqis had all of the necessary resources to develop nuclear weap-

ons and were making rapid progress toward developing the overall capability

to do so.

The issue of resources is pertinent for comparing Iraqs nuclear weapons op-

tions in 1981 and 1991. It is clear that the Israeli attack effectively deprived

Baghdad of pursuing the plutonium route to develop a nuclear weapons capa-

bility. It is theoretically possible that Iraq could have developed nuclear weap-

ons by the mid-to-late 1980s if Israel had not attacked Osirak. Still, the Iraqislacked the organizational, nancial, and organizational resources to imple-

ment the 1980 proliferation decision. There were no signs in 198081 that

Baghdad was taking meaningful steps toward an operational program.


Table 2. A Comparison of Iraqs Nuclear Advances in 1981 and 1991

June 1981 January 1991

Resources mandate X Xbudget Xorganization Xtechnological base x x

Capabilities fissile material x xweaponization x

A capital X indicates a high value of the variable; a small x indicates a lower value.


30/33

Saddams failure to act on his proliferation decision in the year that passed be-

tween making this decision and the Israeli attack suggests that an operational

nuclear weapons program was simply not a high priority.129 In 1980 the Iraqi

leadership faced domestic security challenges and, from late September, a war

with Iran that detracted Saddams attention from the nuclear program. Thus, it

is far from clear that Iraq would have chosen to pursue this option in a deter-

mined manner in the early 1980s. Once the Iraqi leader had made this decision,

dysfunctional management would most likely have slowed the programs

progress, as it did in the enrichment program following the Israeli strike.The attack on Osirak triggered a well-funded covert program to produce

nuclear weapons, which increased the proliferation risk posed by Iraq in the

long term. The establishment of such a program created an independent

bureaucratic momentum toward weaponization and vested interests in the de-

velopment of a nuclear weapons capability. Another counterproductive conse-

quence of the attack was the fact that the destruction of the Osirak reactor gave

the international community a false impression that the Iraqi nuclear prolifera-

tion risk had been eliminated even while it was intensifying. The international

community underestimated Iraqs ability to pursue the enrichment route to anuclear weapons option, which effectively enabled the Iraqis to pursue nuclear

weapons without raising suspicion for nearly a decade.

Other studies have implicitly or explicitly posited Osirak as a critical case for

assessing the likely impact of preventive attacks on other states, but such con-

clusions can be misleading. First, because these analyses have not captured the

mixed impact the attack had, or the extent to which it transformed the Iraqi

program, they may have identied the wrong lessons. Second, the idiosyn-

cratic charac

revisiting osirak IS.pdf

Documents

Transcript of revisiting osirak IS.pdf