Revisiting kinship in bali

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Revisiting kinship in baliArlette Ottinoa University of La Rochelle, FranceVersion of record first published: 19 Aug 2006.

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REVISITING KINSHIP IN BALICore-lines and the emergence of elites in commoner groups

Arlette Ottino

Back in 1975, Hildred and Clifford Geertz argued in Kinship in Bali that Balinese

society can be divided into two broad categories: gentry and commoners. 1 Gentry

corresponds to the three groups of the Triwangsa (Brahmana, Satria, Wesia), a

system recalling the Indian warna system, which makes up about 10 per cent of

the population. Commoners, who constitute the majority, are included in the

category of Sudra. Geertz and Geertz's argument rests upon the premise that themain unit of social organisation, the dadia (defined as an ancestor group), exhibits

different features according to whether it is found among the gentry or the

commoners. The contribution of Kinship in Bali lies in recognising the unique role

of kinship in the drive for status and power in Balinese society. The dadia

encapsulates all aspects of kinship organisation considered essential to engage inthe competition for status. It is a corporate group large enough to be a significantactor on the public scene, an ancestral group in which all members are unitedunder common awareness and worship of apical ancestors, setting them out as

being all of a 'similar kind' (asoroh) as opposed to non-members who are of a'different kind'. As such it constitutes the largest kin group beyond which kin ties

simply no longer operate. We may add also that, as a 'house' in the Levi-Strauss

sense of the term (L6vi-Strauss 1987:158-9; Waterson 1995), the dadia is

animated, as Bourdieu has argued more generally, 'by a tendency to perpetuate its

social being, with all its powers and privileges, which is at the basis ofreproduction strategies' (Bourdieu 1998:19). In brief, it is the institution by means

of which, even today, the Balinese can engage in the political and economic life oftheir social environment.

The distinction between gentry and commoners is fundamental to Kinship

in Bali. Although commoner dadia may sometimes exhibit internal stratification,

they nevertheless promote equality among their members, and are characterised

by a shallowness of genealogical awareness which prevents the emergence of acore-line of any significance (Geertz and Geertz 1975:65). Gentry dadia, on thecontrary, are hierarchically organised according to 'the principle of sinkingstatus', meaning that the further the distance of a family from the core-line, thelower its rank within the group. The principle of sinking status is deduced from

The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 4(1 & 2) 2003:25-53

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26 REVISITING KINSHIP IN BALI

the attribution of progressively lower titles as one moves further away from themain line, so that those members who are closest in terms of genealogical distanceto the contemporary members of the core-line are also higher in status than thosewho are related to it from several generations back. Unless carefully arrangedmarriages or specific privileges bring those lower-ranking branches back closer tothe core-line, in time this gradual drop in status leads to them merging intoinsignificance. 2

In short, it is the absence of titles expressing differences in ranking withinthe dadia which characterises the commoner dadia. Although both gentry andcommoner dadia are status groups, functioning as a 'microcaste claiming,defending, and demonstrating an established position in an ascriptive hierarchy ofcorporate status groups' (ibid.:168), they do so in two structurally different ways.Whereas in gentry groups the interests of the core-line predominate, commonergroups tend to privilege collective interests over those of individual members. As

a result, gentry dadia exhibit a hierarchical inner structure coupled with a high

degree of genealogical awareness, while several cultural mechanisms such as

teknonymy (ibid.:85) and structural tensions between commoner groups and theirimmediate environment (ibid.:113) prevent them from ever developing a

significant core-line, stable and powerful enough to structure permanently the

group in a hierarchical manner.Subsequent studies have shown that the distinction between gentry and

commoner which is paradigmatic of Kinship in Bali may be too abrupt (see Boon1977, esp. Chapter 7; Howe 1989, 1995). For instance, Guermonprez grappledwith the difficulty of finding an adequate niche for the prestigious Pande groups in

the existing gentry/commoner paradigm (Guermonprez 1987) and Schaaremanencountered similar problems in his ethnographic account of a Bali Aga village in

Karangasem (Schaareman 1986). As Boon has argued, and the examples belowwill show, certain high-ranking groups, which previously formed a local

aristocracy in their own right and were arbitrarily 'included by the Dutch into a

broad caste of Sudra' (Boon 1977:159), continue to exhibit inner hierarchical

features similar to those of the gentry. Moreover when principles such as seniority

and birth-order naming, present in commoner and gentry groups alike, combinewith access to restricted resources or privileges, they have a hierarchisingpotential which was not sufficiently appreciated in Kinship in Bali (ibid.:183). Asthe existence of core-lines in certain commoner groups began to emerge from laterethnographic accounts (Howe 1980; Danandjaja 1980), it became increasinglydifficult to explain them (Howe 1989:459). In order to get out of this dilemmaHowe hypothesised that the presence of gentry in a community may 'skew it

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ARLETTE OTTINO 27

towards greater degrees of hierarchy or greater comprehensiveness in the coverageof hierarchy' (ibid.:460).

My own research, however, shows that the situation may be more complexsince core-lines can emerge even in the absence of gentry, in high-rankingcommoner groups when they are in a position of political and ritual supremacy(Ottino 1994, 1998, 2000, in press). In extreme circumstances, the group may thendevelop features similar to those of the Satria ruling houses. This is the case withthe Kabayan of Wangaya Gede in Gunung Batukau, who succeeded inmonopolising ritual and political power in the entire region. Or transformationswithin the village environment may prove too challenging for a core-line, forcingit to share its resources more democratically and seek alliances with another core-line. This was the fate of the village founders in Munduk where the land reform,the reorganisation of the village under Suharto and the conversion of key membersof the core-line to Christianity, have considerably weakened a previously highlycohesive and powerful dadia. Such different responses to basically similar socialand political constraints in two neighbouring villages, sharing the same historyand culture, are interesting. They suggest the need for a different methodologicalapproach, an approach which would focus on the strategies available to a group orto key individuals within the group within the constraints of their immediateenvironment, as constitutive of structuration in a manner which a systematickinship study focusing on existing structures cannot appreciate.

The case studies given below reveal that there is a correlation between thedegree of convertibility of a group's symbolic and material resources into status,and the emergence of a core-line. They show that the status of a core-line isrelated to its capacity to exert domination over its social environment and controlthe differential distribution of resources within that environment. In other words,status must be conducive to power in order to endure. In this perspective theBalinese gentry may be said to represent an extreme on a continuum of tendenciespresent in the whole of Balinese society toward the formation of elites within kin-based groups, endowing kin relations, as H. and C. Geertz have noted, with adefinite political dimension. Among gentry and commoners alike, this processrelies on the concentration of symbolic and material resources and theirconversion into what Bourdieu would call 'cultural capital' - which in Bali mayrightly be said to be status 3 - within core families regarded as hierarchicallysuperior by virtue of their most direct descent from the founding ancestors.4 Theextent to which a group can convert its resources into status becomes the keyelement for assessing differences between dadia. In the 1950s, because of theDutch's previous consolidation of the caste system, 5 gentry titles were still highlyconvertible into status, endowing the Triwangsa order with a legitimacy that it no

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longer enjoys in contemporary society. As will be seen in the next section, Geertzand Geertz's remark to the effect that among the gentry a distinction is madebetween 'pure status' based on inherited title and political power, describes theposition of a particular group (the former ruling Satria houses) at a particular time.It pertains to a period when the legitimacy of the Triwangsa's hierarchicalsupremacy was still ratified by cultural values embedded in social norms and the

still vivid memory of sanctions, as well as in religious beliefs and ritual practices.The extensive transformations undergone by Balinese society in the

religious, economic and social domains have contributed to making Triwangsatitles less relevant today. Nevertheless, I think it would be a mistake to conclude

that Bali is moving towards the abolition of hierarchy as a whole. What has

changed is the balance of power which nowadays privileges what Goldman

termed 'achieved status' (Goldman 1970:110) rather than 'ascribed status', as

commoners become socially mobile through increased wealth, education and

professional opportunities. Yet, apart from the fact that the gentry are still

disproportionably represented in prestigious positions in various professional

fields, one need only consider the case of the Warga Pasek Sapta Rsi, an island-wide federation of Pasek dadia (Pitana 1997) to realise that what is at stake is not

so much the democratisation of Balinese society as the demise of a previous elite

(Geertz and Geertz's 'gentry') in favour of its replacement by a new elite better

adapted to the demands of modern life, whose claims for status and prestigenevertheless remain largely grounded in titles.6

The Warga Pasek Sapta Rsi example suggests that the cultural valueaccorded to ascribed status has not diminished, but is expressed differently,

nowadays favouring a different faction in society. In this respect it is worth

stressing once more that ascribed status which finds its most elaborate and

permanent expression in gentry titles, especially in ruling Satria houses, is also

present in the principles of birth-order and seniority which play a role in

determining access to the group's resources for commoners as well as gentry. Inthe following case studies it is clear that those who are in the most direct line of

descent from the group's founder are set apart as being superior to other members

of the group, even in the absence of a specific title to ratify their supremacy.Nevertheless, closeness to the origin is never sufficient, since status necessarily

entails power - the capacity to dominate and control the differential distribution

of resources, the sense given to it by Bourdieu (1986:241-58) - both within andoutside the group. Among commoners and gentry alike, a system of selectiveshedding of individuals each generation, or even in extreme cases contestation onthe part of a powerful outsider, ensure that the core-line retains only those whodemonstrate qualities and capacities associated with their elevated rank in the

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ARLETTE OTTINO 29

group. Furthermore, the extent to which ascribed and achieved status lead topower and leadership depends upon the readiness on the part of the community toaccept the legitimacy of the claims put forward by a group. Therefore, thecharacteristics and constraints of the social environment in which the group isembedded play a determining role in allowing or preventing the formation ofelites at any given time.

Many of Geertz and Geertz's findings reflect the political climate peculiarto the period when they undertook their field research in Bali. In 1957-8,commoner groups were restricted by a highly normative village environment, thenational political crisis and the monopoly exercised by gentry houses over abudding local business economy. Whereas gentry houses operated on a regionallevel, commoner dadia were strictly confined to the village. This is reflected inthe structure of the dadia which, in the case of the gentry, is a non-localisedcorporate group held together by a father/son succession line, whereas amongcommoners, the dadia is a spatially restricted corporate group (Geertz and Geertz1975:7). The strongly egalitarian discourse adopted by the commoner dadia,which so struck the authors, may be traced back to the intense politicisation oftraditional groups and the polarisation of interests between landowners and tenantfarmers as a prelude to the land reform. For economic and ideological reasons inthe late 1950s, the Sukarno government began to operate a redistribution ofagrarian land in order to dispose of absent landowners. Problems raised by theland reform as it was applied in Java and Bali would take us beyond the aims ofthis paper. Suffice it to say here that, as Pauker has shown, although more than33 per cent of the land belonged to absent landlords in Bali and only 8.5 per centwas redistributed (Pauker 1968:389), the land reform resulted in thefactionalisation of rural masses and the intensification of a sentiment of socialinjustice amongst peasants as a whole (Robinson 1995:251-72).

CONTEXTUALISING KINSHIP IN BALI

The last years of the 1950s were a critical period in the history of the youngRepublic of Indonesia, leading to the creation by Sukarno in 1959, of a newsystem of government: the 'Guided Democracy' which effectively put an end toparty politics, at least in the formal field of parliamentary debate. In Bali, thoseyears are characterised by the factionalisation of traditional social groups, as partyaffiliations reproduced existing patron-client ties (ibid.:261-3). In his earlier studyof economic changes in Tabanan, Peddlers and princes, Clifford Geertz himselfexplicitly states this fact, noting that Balinese society became divided into twofactions: the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) and PSI/PKI (Partai SosialisIndonesia and Partai Komunis Indonesia), the PSI soon to merge into the PKI to

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form a single party, after its banning in 1960 (Geertz 1963:22). Both the PKI andthe PNI became involved in the implementation of the land reform, the PKI, towhich many tenant farmers rallied, advocating unilateral actions (aksi sepihak) toappropriate forcibly the fields from unwilling landowners if no other method wassuccessful.

A glance at the membership composition of the PNI and the PKI both inTabanan and Klungkung brings up important differences in the role of the gentryin the political and economic life of each region (see Robinson 1995:196).Tabanan and Klungkung are contrasted by the fact that, whereas the houses of theKlungkung royal dynasty constitute an homogeneous political faction, in Tabanan,on the contrary, heterogeneity is the rule. According to Robinson, in the 1950s,the Klungkung gentry belonged almost entirely to the PNI, whereas Tabanangentry houses were split between PNI, PKI and PSI affiliations. Some of the 1955statistics provided by him make this clear. In Klungkung the PNI holds a hefty68.8 per cent of the seats in local government, whereas the PKI holds 8.9 per centand the PSI 10.8 per cent, the remainder (11.5 per cent) being shared by minor

parties. In Tabanan, however, the picture is more complex. The PNI holds only

41.5 per cent of the seats, the PSI 51.9 per cent and the PKI 2.9 per cent. Minor

parties share 3.7 per cent. After the banning of the PSI, its seats went to the PKIwhich, in Tabanan, was particularly well entrenched. These later statistics clearly

support H. and C. Geertz's earlier findings of an hegemonic domination of the

PNI (associated with the ruling houses) in Klungkung, and political rivalries and

factionalisation in Tabanan, with however a strong PNI orientation among the

gentry (Geertz and Geertz 1975:106-8). In Tabanan they note that gentry dadia

which do not belong to the PNI are in the minority, and they are 'usually very

poor, kind of marginal dissidents without much power to wield'. We can deduce

from this that if, as is known to be the case, commoner dadia adhered to the

political parties of the gentry, the loyalties of the Tabanan gentry were more

spread out between various parties than was the case in Klungkung. This accordswith my own research findings in north Tabanan and Robinson's argument that

Tabanan rural masses were divided between PNI and PKI, with the PKI being

particularly strongly entrenched in the mountainous areas.We can better understand, therefore, why in Bali the PNI was reluctant to

support the implementation of a land reform which would enable tenant farmers to

become sole owners of the fields they worked and would signal the end of absentlandlords, most of them members of the ruling gentry. As Pauker has argued, therise of the communist party (PKI) to power in Bali reflects the incapacity on the

part of the local authorities to carry out a just and equitable redistribution of land.In a political climate such as this, values of equity, egalitarianism, and the

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ARLETTE OTTINO 31

rejection of the existing hierarchy as an obsolete feudal system which hadmanaged to survive only through the help of the Dutch, became associated withthe republican ideals and values of modernity promulgated by the Sukarnogovernment, and they were embraced equally by commoners and progressivegentry houses. 7

As Geertz has shown in Peddlers and princes, the volatile situation inTabanan is partly due to the fact that, prevented from taking an active role inpolitics, many gentry houses diversified in business and secured the control of thenew economy, thereby preventing commoners from participating in the moderneconomy, while reactivating existing patron-client ties to secure cheap labour fortheir business ventures and political support from the popular masses (Geertz1963:22). This unique situation, which from a commoner's point of view wasreally not very different from the days of 'feudalism', led to the rise of a smallcapitalist class which was entirely dominated by noble entrepreneurs whodepended on the traditional patterns of organisation and loyalty they were able tomobilise - often, as Robinson comments, using support from the local wing ofthe national government to achieve their goals (Robinson 1995:246).8 Economicprosperity and political affiliation were thus conflated in a way which encouragedcommoners to adopt the political party of their 'gentry' patron who had alsobecome their employer, thereby encouraging political factionalisation betweengroups in the same village setting. It is therefore reasonable to assume that inTabanan at least, the rural masses, for the most part tenant farmers of the gentryhouses, must have felt doubly exploited and turned to the PSI and the PKI in thehope of finding some social justice. Interestingly enough, in Peddlers and princesClifford Geertz is aware of this situation, noting quite correctly that the rise of ahigh-caste capitalist class in Tabanan in the late 1950s is perceived by commonersas 'a betrayal of the promises of the Revolution', and he concludes with muchinsight that 'it is upon such resentment that communism, just beginning to appearin Bali, feeds' (Geertz 1963).

The fact that traditional social forms were used to secure political allegianceexplains why the dadia, corporate kin group by excellence, arose as a politicalunit of significance, and that it was at that level that political affiliations weremostly crystallised. In other words, as Vickers notes (1989:164), in the 1950s thedadia became the locus of political energies and activities for commoners andgentry alike. Furthermore, since patron-client ties often cut across villageloyalties, this may explain also why commoner dadia at that time promoted astrong sense of cohesion and solidarity among their members, and why as Geertzand Geertz have consistently argued, they were often in conflict with communityinterests within the village.

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32 REVISITING KINSHIP IN BAL.I

The existing hierarchical order being denounced as a feudal system and a

system of caste (kasta), it is not surprising also to find that the commoner dadia

would actively promote - in discourse at least - values of equity and

egalitarianism. Such values were conveyed not only by the PSI and the PKI but by

most political parties after the revolution and independence, and were actively

promoted by Sukarno himself, especially through the image of Marhaen the noble

peasant, a figure which left a deep impression on the collective consciousness of

Balinese commoners. Such values should not be confused with equality however.

Whereas equity and egalitarianism have to do with social and political justice,

equality implies that everyone in society should be treated as being, by nature,

identical in every way. Anyone who has lived among commoners in Bali will

know that nothing could be further from the truth. From the nuclear family to the

society at large, the culture is permeated with hierarchising principles such as

birth-order naming, elder-younger and first-born-last-born and other asymmetrical

relationships, which clearly define the position every individual and family may

rightly occupy in the world order and often determine access to valuable cultural

and material resources. It is important, therefore, to be quite clear about the

distinction between egalitarianism and equity on the one hand, and equality on the

other, as the confusion between the two has contributed to the erroneous (but

commonly held) view that in the Balinese traditional village (desa adat) everyone

is equal. Yet, whereas egalitarianism is an important dimension of village

solidarity, and village associations treat all their members as being equal in the

context of their specific activities, in other domains such as wealth, access to

prestigious positions, leadership, and so on, no two individuals or families may be

considered equal.Since much of the argument in Kinship in Bali revolves around the fact that

all members are considered equal in rank and in status in commoner dadia, it may

be useful to investigate now to what extent the discourse of egalitarianism which

is still current among those groups does correspond to an equality of opportunities

for all. The following examples, taken from my own research in Gunung Batukau,

from the 1986-7 period of my main fieldwork to 2002, actually suggest the

reverse. Before turning to them I must specify that, although with the exception of

Trunyan, the term dadia is not used locally, the groups considered here conform

to H. and C. Geertz's definition of the dadia as 'an agnatic, preferentially

endogamous, highly corporate group of people who are convinced ... they are all

descendants of one common ancestor' (Geertz and Geertz 1975:5), where

membership is 'optional' (ibid.:5) but desirable and even compulsory if a family

wishes to be active on the local public scene. I must also note the fact that the

villages can arguably be said to come under the category of Bali Aga which

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ARLETTE OTTINO 33

Geertz and Geertz did not include in their category of 'commoners' (ibid.:198,n.18). For one thing, I tend to agree with Howe who preconises that Bali Agashould be reintegrated into the category of commoners (Howe 1989:447).Moreover the Pande dadia of Tihingan, who play a key role in the analysis ofcommoner dadia in Kinship in Bali, would today be included into the Bali Aga.Finally, the populations of Gunung Batukau are not generally known as Bali Aga,and indeed would reject such categorisation, although they do share manycharacteristics with the better-known Bali Aga populations of Gunung Batur. Thefact that they were exposed to Christianity as early as the late 1930s and areremembered especially for their bravery in the guerrilla warfare during therevolution, has no doubt contributed to them being perceived in a manner notnormally associated with the Bali Aga. In any case, as with many Bali Agavillages, only a minority of the population can properly claim to belong to thiscategory. Other groups, such as those surveyed here, are later arrivals whoseidentification with commoners as defined by Geertz and Geertz is indisputable.

THREE VARIANTS ON CORE-LINES IN 'COMMONER GROUPS'

In commoner dadia, according to Geertz and Geertz, core-lines emerge at a stagein the evolution of the family, when the transmission of the father's property andassets privileges one heir (usually the last-born son) over the others, to become thehead of the parental houseyard (Geertz and Geertz 1975:53). Over severalgenerations, these heirs constitute a lineage of core-houseyard heads which, whenthe family expands to become a dadia in its own right, has the potential tofunction as a core-line. However, 'institutionalised genealogical amnesia'resulting from teknonymy (ibid.:85) and the absence of a 'principle of sinkingstatus' linked to the transmission of a title in the core-line (ibid.:31), together withthe need to preserve a cohesive and solidary front in the village political arena,prevents the formation of a fully-fledged core-line and its institutionalisationwithin the dadia.

The Pasek Gelgel of Trunyan9

This process of formation and resorption of potential core-lines in commonerdadia assumes that the group emerges from a single founding ancestor whoseidentity soon becomes blurred in favour of a collective notion of 'origin point'(kawitan) stressing spatial remoteness rather than genealogical distance. However,this is only one mode of dadia formation, which is related to a specific type ofevolution through segmentation or, to use Geertz and Geertz's terms'differentiation' and 'essaiming' (ibid.:63-6), all of which imply a move awayfrom the mother group, culminating in the foundation of a new, autonomous dadia

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which nevertheless acknowledges a ritual subordination to the mother group as

kawitan. But dadia may also arise from the association of several unrelated

families who, for various reasons, decide to pool their resources. In this case, one

family is designated as the leader and the group is hierarchically structured from

the start, with resulting consequences upon its evolution. In Trunyan, for instance,

the dadia Pasek Gelgel is made up of three distinct groups which never shared a

common apical ancestor. Each group traces its respective ancestry to an emissary

from the kingdom of Gelgel who held a specific administration function within the

village (Pasek, Tangkas and Panyarikan). This suggests that sub-dadia are not

necessarily offshoots of a mother dadia which, for one reason or another, decide

to secure their autonomy. If this were so, sub-dadia would always be potential

new dadia in formation, and this is patently not the case here. That segmentation

is only one aspect of dadia formation is evidenced here in the federation of three

unrelated family clusters in order to form a single, more powerful group. Although

relegated to the rank of sub-dadia, each group permanently retains its separate

ritual identity within the dadia. Although, through intra-dadia endogamy,

contemporary families may share a common ancestry, it is clear what is at stake is

the awareness of a common origin from the kingdom of Gelgel as well as the

preservation of the elevated status derived from such exalted origin.

Members of the Pasek Gelgel thus form a dadia made up of three distinct

sub-dadia ranked according to the functions of their respective apical ancestors in

the government of the village. l°0 They live in the banjarjero, walled-off quarters

separated from the banjar jaba where all other dadia reside, including the high-

ranking Pasek Kayu Selem, a dadia made up of the descendants of the very first

rulers of Trunyan,l 1 who were replaced by the Pasek Gelgel. What is interesting

in this case is that, at the time of Danandjaja's research there in the mid-1970s, the

dadia Pasek Gelgel conducted itself i a Triwangsa-like fashion. All male

members of the three sub-dadia bear the title of guru which they acquire upon

marriage. Their wives do not have any title. Jero men may marry jaba women but

the reverse is not true. Hypogamous marriages were, until recently, punishable by

death, and ajaba woman had to undergo rites of purification before being allowed

to marry ajero man. Group endogamy is highly prized. Comments on the part ofDanandjaja's informants to the effect that it would be humiliating for a person to

be reborn into a lower-ranking dadia also suggest a high degree of awareness

regarding the hierarchical ordering between dadia.

Alliances between core-lines - the case of Munduk1 2

A different situation is found in Munduk where the recurrent alliances between the

core-lines of the Pasek Mas village founders, the first settlers (padukuhan Apuan)

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ARLETTE OTTINO 35

and, more recently, a wealthy newcomer (Pasek Gelgel), have led to the formation

of an elite core of powerful families who share immediate ancestry, although they

do not belong to the same dadia, and amongst whom all positions of ritual andpolitical leadership are concentrated. The following diagram showing the patternof alliances between the Pasek Mas core-line and their privileged partner, the

padukuhan Apuan, illustrates this point.

Figure 1.Alliances between former village rulers and first settlers.

G+1

GO

G-1

Y

APUAN MAS

Since no single dadia can be said to monopolise leadership, this pattern of

alliances, which is complemented by intra-group endogamy with first and second

cousins, would appear to justify the discourse of ideological egalitarianism held in

the 1980s when I was staying there. Yet appearances can be misleading. A closer

look at the alliances reveals an unequal distribution of leadership functionsbetween the three partners. As village founders and former rulers, the Pasek Masprovide a disproportionate number of 'secular' leaders in the administrativevillage (desa dinas) and the agricultural associations, two domains which areintimately related to the economic life of the village, as well as ritual experts,temple priests and village high priest (balean desa). Their elaborate pattern ofalliances with the first settlers, who provide only ritual leaders, is linked to the

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transmission of corpuses of esoteric knowledge (agama) which, before the

modernisation of Balinese religion and to some extent still today, formed the basis

for ritual expertise in the region of Gunung Batukau. Alliances with the Pasek

Gelgel newcomers are more recent and obey a different logic. Although they

privilege marriages with the core-line, the group is more loosely structured than

its other two partners. Wealth and political power are not concentrated in its core-

line but in several politically powerful families of ordinary members. As such,

while the alliances between the village rulers and the first settlers are clearly

related to the concentration of valuable material and symbolic resources (ritual

and political power, esoteric knowledge) bearing a direct relevance to status,

alliances with the newcomer core-line are not explicable in those terms, unless

status derived from being in the most direct descent line from the ancestral

founder is considered a valuable resource in its own right.

An investigation into the historical background of Munduk may shed some

light on this. The former village rulers form a sanggah gede13 which was founded

by five ancestors, brothers and their families, who were brought over to Gunung

Batukau to look after a forest sanctuary in the name of the Tabanan king. The

current core-line is made up of the most direct descendants of the first leader.14

Following a war, the community moved downhill to Munduk's present place, a

spot already occupied by another community, a padukuhan established by a

hermit (dukuh) from nearby Wangaya Gede. The padukuhan Apuan is made up of

the direct descendants of the adopted son of their own founder. They constitute a

sanggah gede in its own right, but also function as core-line for a cluster of small

sanggah gede who look to the padukuhan as their origin point, with or without

being able to trace genealogical ties to the padukuhan's forebears. 15

The village was founded by the two groups who became the core-villagers

of the desa adat, integrating newcomers as secondary villagers to whom access to

land and right to residence were granted in return for services, tributes and the

willingness to conform to local customs (adat). Secondary villagers took no part

in decision-making. Village leaders were chosen from the Pasek Mas and the

functions of priesthood were shared between the village rulers and the padukuhan.

Those times are remembered as a period of hegemonic rule by a priestly elite,

when the sanggah gede was very much a 'micro-caste' which determined the

social status and ritual identity of its members. The transformations brought to

land tenure and to village organisation, together with the democratisation of

access to religious knowledge under the Sukarno and Suharto governments,

however, have resulted in the dismantling of the sanggah gede as a land-holding

unit and the abolition of the hierarchical distinction between core-villagers and

secondary villagers. Nowadays every household is a full member of the desa adat

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ARLETTE OTTINO 37

with, in principle, equal rights to decision-making and to the enjoyment of the

collective resources. The Pasek Gelgel became very active at that time, placingtwo brothers - both ex-policemen - into the two most important villagepositions. One of them became leader of the desa dinas and the other leader of theirrigation association. Between them they ensured that Munduk joined the ill-fatedBimas program ('mass guidance' rice-intensification program) and that Christiancommunities became permanently established in the village (see also Ottino2002). The difference between Gelgel and the other two groups lies in that, whiletheir core-line enjoys the status reserved for the most direct descendants of thefounders, political power is concentrated in families of ordinary members. Thecore-line merely provides the temple priest for a desa adat temple, the PuraDalem.

While village reorganisation is usually linked to Suharto's Village Law of1979, Munduk and other villages in the region of Gunung Batukau began thisprocess much earlier, in 1967, as part of an effort on the part of the Indonesiangovernment to obliterate the last strongholds of PKI. Given the mystical nature ofthe local agama, the priestly elite was branded as 'communist' by the localChristian communities and the progressive faction of villagers who had adoptedthe religious reforms of the Parisada and were pushing for a better integration ofthe village into modern Balinese society. By 1967, all distinctions in rights andaccess to resources between villagers had been abolished. As a result, the formerelite lost the material foundations for its authority and became relegated to theranks of private citizens. In the space of thirty years, therefore, the Pasek Maswent from enjoying supreme status as villager rulers able to enforce their ownviews on customs, residence, land and other resources, and more importantlyapply sanctions for non-compliance, to that of ordinary villagers expected to deferto the common will like anyone else. It is understandable that those who weremost profoundly affected by those changes - the core-line - should engage inmatrimonial strategies aimed at protecting their own interests. In the process theylooked not to other sanggah gede members but to families from other core-lineswho, because of their position, shared the same interests.

In addition to those external transformations, the Pasek Mas were seriouslyundermined from within by the conversion of their leader to Protestantism in thelate 1930s and the subsequent conversion of a number of members of the group toCatholicism in the 1950s and 1960s. In the mid-1980s, the group was severelyweakened by internal conflicts, the dismantling of its collective estate, and thesegmentation of dissident families into autonomous sanggah gede, a newphenomenon in a village where previously, because of an abundance of unclearedland, segmentations were unknown.

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In spite of all this, the Pasek Mas still managed to provide a significantnumber of leaders in the political and ritual spheres, although secular leadershippositions were now secured by individuals in the periphery of the core-line. Forinstance, the leader of the desa dinas, an ex-ABRI (armed forces) man, was anephew (father's brother's son) of the sanggah gede core-line, and his brother(treasurer of the subak) was married to one of the leader's daughters. The subakleader was a second cousin of the leader of the core-line, but the desa adat leaderwas the head of a recent offshoot - modernist dissidents who favoured Parisada-inspired reforms and challenged the authority of the current village high priest,who was then and still is the Pasek Mas leader's younger brother.

It is important to take these facts into consideration in order to appreciatewhat is at stake in the matrimonial alliances between the core-lines of Munduk'stwo most important groups. The alliances between the three core-lines, whichcould otherwise be thought to be motivated solely by a concern to maintain thestatus associated with a former hierarchical structure, should be viewed as aresponse on the part of a desa adat threatened by outside governmental andreligious agencies, to protect not only its own cultural resources, but also its veryexistence.

The unusual pattern of core-line alliances must be viewed as a strategiccompromise on the part of a village elite, brought about by betrayals from withinas well as outside the group, in order to reconstruct what had been dismantled andprevent further harm to their own interests. The following case study highlightsthe strategic dimension of core-line alliances. It concerns the transmission of thefunction of village high priest (balean desa) which, unlike ordinary templepriesthood, is not inherited. The village high priest is selected by the communityon the basis of a candidate's high level of mystical and ritual expertise. In a regionwhere Brahmanical high priests are forbidden to officiate, he is the ultimateauthority in the ritual sphere. His tasks consist of ensuring the prosperity, healthand welfare of the community by removing all hindrances emanating from thespirit world. As such he must be a man of considerable supernatural power(kesaktian) and he derives his authority largely from this fact. Yet, although thefunction is not hereditary, as the diagram below shows, it remains very much theprerogative of the two leading families in the first settlers and village rulersgroups.

The reason for this has to do with the traditional mode of access to theesoteric knowledge necessary for developing such expertise. Until the Parisadaand other governmental agencies made religious instruction freely available totemple priests and other villagers, access to ritual knowledge was strictlyrestricted to a small number of carefully selected individuals in core-line families,

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ARLETTE OTTINO 39

and constituted one of the most highly valuable collective resources of the group

as a whole. Although a full discussion of this would take us beyond the scope ofthis paper, it must be stressed, as I have noted elsewhere (Ottino in press), that in aset-up such as this, where ritual knowledge is turned into a scarce resource andcompetition for it is fierce, spiritual achievements become a means of legitimatingauthority and power. This explains why the first individuals to convert toChristianity were the village high priest and other temple priests, already wellversed in the local agama and not, as might be expected, ordinary villagers who,because of their low social ranking, could not gain access to those agama.16

Figure 2.Transmission of function of balean desa.

The diagram goes back three generations, to the first balean desa (1) whoconverted to Protestantism in 1937. He had two wives, both from the padukuhanApuan and was a renowned guru with a large following of disciples, some ofwhom followed him into Christianity. Apart from balean desa, he was also thepriest of temples associated with the foundation of the village. His conversion toProtestantism nearly brought the desa adat to an end. He was eventually expelledfrom his own sanggah gede and from the desa adat, his elder sister succeedinghim as leader of the group. She had previously contracted a nyeburin marriage(the reversed marriage in which the wife is transformed into an heir), with a manfrom the padukuhan, a disciple of her own brother. By marrying her, he also took

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over the function of priest of the prestigious forest sanctuary associated with the

village leaders and the Tabanan royal house, while the custody of the temple of

village origin (Pura Puseh) went to her father's brother's son. After the death ofher first husband, she married the leader of the padukuhan, her brother-in-lawfrom the padukuhan Apuan, who had earlier married her sister and had become

balean desa (2) after the conversion of her brother.The fact that no children were issued from this marriage, which took place

well after her child-bearing age, suggests that the union was a 'marriage of

reason', an alliance aimed at consolidating the ties between the families of the two

core-lines and preventing the dispersion of their assets. Her new husband

combined his function of village high priest with that of priest of the irrigation

association (subak) until his death in the mid-1970s, and was at one stage leader

of the desa adat as well. More importantly, he undertook to train one of his

second wife's sons to become balean desa (3) by sending him to study first with

I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, one of the founders of the Parisada Hindu Dharma, then

with a reputed local guru in a nearby village, who was also his relative. Studying

under Sugriwa gave the young man the official legitimacy needed to consolidate

his position as ritual specialist in the village in the face of a growing modernist

faction, at a time when Christianity presented the greatest threat to the village

traditional beliefs and ritual practices.With such a hybrid preparation, the new balean desa steered an uneasy

course between two village factions: the conservatives who accused him of having

sold out to the Parisada, and the progressives who reproached him for his

continued adherence to the 'superstitions' of yesteryear. In the late 1980s, his

situation became so precarious that a new candidate was chosen to replace him,

this time with the priest of the Pura Puseh, who had become leader of an offshoot

of the mother-group (4). However, he was able to weather out the storm, mainly

by refusing to transfer his esoteric agama to his successor, and was still practising

as balean desa in 2002.This case study is remarkable in that it shows the resilience of the local

traditions in the face of the imposition of a new official Balinese religion, as well

as the remarkable versatility of the local elite in adapting to potentially threatening

circumstances, when the core-villagers found themselves facing a hostile

community on several fronts. Indeed, nothing could have had a more

democratising effect on the society than introducing religious studies in schools

and training professional teachers in Munduk. As a result, the old elite of

traditional guru agama were made redundant, as a new generation of

professionally trained guru agama took over, eager to replace the old,

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superstitious ways of their elders with a new, rational creed which could competewith the two Christian churches by then solidly implanted in the village.

The dadia of king-priests in Wangaya Gedel 7Although they were threatened by the conversions of core-line members toChristianity, land reform and village reorganisation in the same way as the PasekMas in Munduk, the Kabayan have been able to retain a great deal of their formerstatus. This is due mainly to the prestige enjoyed by their leader at a regional aswell as a local level. Formerly, the Kabayan leaders ruled as kings of a smallmountain kingdom covering the south face of the volcano, and they still act ashigh priests of the state temple Pura Luhur Batukau. The royal status of theKabayan leaders is still endorsed today by the royal House of Tabanan whoacknowledge their seniority over the current Cokorda dynasty (see Ottino inpress). 18 Today the Kabayan leader is still the head of the regional adat, beingconsulted on all decisions concerning adat matters in the villages located in theancient kingdom which survives in the network of four regional temples (sibak)subordinated to Pura Luhur. 19

The enduring status of the Kabayan can be traced to the support theycontinue to enjoy on the part of the House of Tabanan, but also to the highspiritual achievements of their past leaders as well as to their claim of beingempowered to rule by the tutelary goddess of Pura Luhur. Such claims tosupremacy of status are absolute and cannot be challenged without challengingalso the entire worldview from which they take their meaning. As the temple isrenowned as a place of power, which is regularly visited by Indonesian statesmenas well as local yogi, the exceptional relation between the Kabayan leader and thegoddess of Pura Luhur has yet to be questioned. On a more pragmatic level, it isrelated also to their ability to place close relatives into positions of power in theregional government during Suharto's regime, thereby securing the possibility ofchannelling governmental funding for development projects in the village. One ofthe previous leader's brothers was Bupati in the mid-1980s, another was assistantBupati until his retirement, and a first cousin of the present leader is currently inthe Camat's office. They also provide village leaders. The previous leadercombined his functions with those of leader of the irrigation association and of thedesa adat, and a nephew of the current leader has recently become leader of theadministrative village. Today the Kabayan core-line are the main actors in thedevelopment of Wangaya Gede for tourism. Although land is now privatelyowned, they still possess large estates of prime rice land, some of which has beenleased to Indonesian entrepreneurs to build a luxury country club, a boutique hoteland losmen-type accommodation. In so doing, they do not differ from the gentry

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houses' involvement in business ventures, described earlier by C. Geertz inPeddlers and princes.

The uniqueness of the Kabayan, and the reason why it is difficult to classifythem under the category of 'commoner' dadia, lies in the fact that all material andsymbolic resources of the group are concentrated in the core-line, which isconsidered qualitatively distinct from other, ordinary members. The group

possesses two temples: one for the core-line (mrajaan Siwa), which is located intheir own compound, and the other (mrajaan Kabayan) for the needs of ordinarymembers. The core-line, or garis purusa, is set apart as a descent group of titledagnatic relatives, considered ritually distinct from untitled relatives and otherunrelated families who constitute the remainder of the group or warga. The wargaare best described as clients and for reasons that will be seen presently, disciples(sisia) of the core-line (Ottino in press). The core-line resides in a separatecompound called jeroan Baleran, located to the north of the residential area

(banjar) occupied by the warga. As may be expected of a group in such a strong

position, segmentations are unknown. Families who move out of the banjar

because of space restrictions remain full members of the Kabayan, although theyno longer share the same residential banjar.

The core-line behaves like a true aristocratic elite in its own right. 20

Married men bear the title of mekel to which, in the past, a regional administrative

function was attached, except for the leader who, after the necessary rites of

investiture, receives the title of Jero Kabayan Lingsir.21 The leader is always

chosen from the previous leader's sons. Membership in the warga does not

require the existence of kin ties with the core-line. It is determined by the

willingness to enter into a relation of ritual subordination vis-A-vis the core line, as

evidenced in the practice of masiwa ke garis purusa: requesting the consecrated

water necessary for all their rituals directly from the core-line - or more

specifically from the lineage of former leaders.Group endogamy, expressed as kawin sederajat (marrying someone of

one's own rank), is preferred - a stipulation which belies the hierarchical

distinctions between the core-line and other members found in other domains. Itno doubt contributes to the high degree of cohesiveness exhibited by the groupand must be related to their capacity to survive the vicissitudes of their recenthistory. However, the marriage strategies of the core-line differ from those of thewarga in one significant way. Nyeburin, the reversed marriage in which the wifeis transformed into an heir, is forbidden to members of the core-line. Familieswithout sons find male heirs through adoption, frequently by requesting one oftheir immediate relatives' sons or adopting their daughter's husband as son. Theban on nyeburin unions, a form of marriage which is otherwise widespread in the

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ARLETTE OTTINO 43

region,22 may be explained by the fact that a title is transmitted exclusively

through the agnatic line. Furthermore, with the exception of its leader, the core-

line is exogamous. Men from the core-line must seek wives outside, preferably

from within the warga.By contrast, the Kabayan leader must marry an agnatic cousin from the

core-line, preferably a brother's daughter. 23 This specific marriage, which is

forbidden to all other core-line members, must be understood in the context of theleader's peculiar status within the group. As former king and the high priest ofPura Luhur, the Kabayan leader is the representative as well as the physical

manifestation in the human world, of the tutelary goddess. 24 As such he is

considered purer and closer to the divine than anyone else. Marriage with the

father's brother's daughter, a woman who is the closest relative after the sister

with whom marriage is forbidden, reflects the supreme status accorded to this

king-priest, and more pragmatically suggests the desirability of diluting as little as

possible the purity of the lineage's blood. The strategy of marrying one's closest

agnatic relative beyond the sister, leads to the reproduction of an elite lineage of

potential leaders into whom the highest concentration of pure, undiluted ancestralroyal blood is found. Such strategy is possible only in a situation where, as is the

case here, supremacy is so firmly established that the family no longer feels the

need to engage in political alliances to legitimate it.The Kabayan of Wangaya Gede probably represent an extreme instance of

internal hierarchisation in the so-called 'commoner' groups.2 5 Three qualitatively

different modes of belonging are acknowledged, each with its specific title.

Ordinary members are known simply as 'Kabayan', a 'title' which merely sets

them out as being different from other dadia. Core-line members bear the title of

'mekel', one to which regional administrative functions were formerly attached, aswell as the more ancient titles of 'Gde' and 'Luh' for men and women

respectively. Gde and Luh are found among high-ranking Bali Aga groups in

general. Although usually used as first names (nama depan) elsewhere, they aretreated here as titles in so far as they serve to distinguish between core-linemembers and non-members. Women who leave the core-line cannot transmit themto their children, whereas the children of an in-marrying woman can bear them.The titles and the fact that its current members hold important positions in theTabanan administration suggest that the Kabayan core-line perceives itself ashaving, or as having had in the past, a legitimate role to play in government. 26

Finally, the leader bears the title of 'Jero Kabayan Lingsir', one which sets himapart as supreme ruler in the ritual and (formerly) political domains, and who,through near-incestuous marriage, stands as the closest living representative of thelineage of prestigious ancestral leaders.

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Built upon the cooperation and support of the Tabanan kings, the Kabayansupremacy is nevertheless beginning to be threatened by ambitious local dadiawho have joined such powerful island-wide political associations as the WargaPasek Sapta Rsi (WPSR). Not so surprisingly perhaps, this has laid bare theweakness in the Kabayan's stance: their reliance on a single, prestigious partner,the House of Tabanan, and their deliberate alienation from other potentiallychallenging groups, previously considered subordinate.

In Wangaya Gede the Pasek dadia, whose leader cumulates the functions ofvillage high priest (balean desa) and priest of thejaba in Pura Luhur, have made abid to become known as Pasek Kabayan, in agreement with the WPSR's officialposition that 'Pasek' formerly referred to the highest ranking village function, andtheir own views that in Wangaya Gede the Kabayan must have usurped it fromthem in the past. This was vehemently opposed by the Kabayan, and in spite offierce lobbying on the part of the WPSR, the Pasek have been forced to withdrawthe term 'Kabayan' and replace it with Pasek 'Kubayan', insisting upon thedifferent spelling which they now claim is 'more correct'. The dispute would

appear to be settled were it not for the fact that the previous Pasek leader was aguru agama of great reputation whose son, still in his late thirties, appears set to

follow in his father's footsteps and would now be willing to challenge the

Kabayan's ritual expertise. As the present Kabayan leader - a former publicservant who proved an unwilling successor when his father died in 1991 - still

lacks the expertise required, a full-blown challenge between the two leaders is notunlikely in the future.

Another sign that the ritual supremacy of the Kabayan may be doomed in

the near future is the progressive dismantling of the regional temple network of

the sibak as powerful local dadia press for their autonomy. In Jatiluih, for

instance, successful steps have been taken by the local priesthood to sever ties ofritual subordination with the Kabayan. As part of the sibak, Jatihluih's Pura Patali

used to be subordinated to Pura Luhur. In actual terms, it meant that the Kabayanleader was entitled to 'finish the rituals' (muputin karya) there, and that water

fetched from Pura Luhur was considered necessary for the rituals in Pura Patali tobe complete. In 2002, however, its priesthood 27 successfully managed to have thename 'Pura Luhur Patali' accepted by the Tabanan Department for Religious

Affairs, thereby placing their temple on the same level as Pura Luhur Batukau.

DISCUSSION

I have endeavoured to show that, at least in certain contexts where competition forpower and leadership are at stake, commoner dadia may develop features similarto those found by Geertz and Geertz in gentry dadia. The fact that this struggle for

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ARLETTE OTTINO 45

power and prestige is played out in the restricted arena of the village, instead ofthe prestigious stage of the former kingdom, does not make it less important. Each

of the groups treated here has been, in the past, in charge of village governmentforming what may properly be termed a 'village elite'. In Munduk and inWangaya Gede, the former village rulers held and, to some extent continue tohold, supremacy of status in the community, the majority of political and ritualleadership functions being concentrated within their core-line.

In each case the existence of a core-line is indisputable, even - and this is

an important point - in the absence of a title giving access to ruling power.Where it is found, as with the Kabayan, the core-line holds two different types oftitles. The leader's title gives him the right to rule in the temporal and spiritualsphere and, according to their ideology at least, is bestowed directly by thetutelary goddess of the regional temple. By contrast, the title of other core-linemembers is acknowledged by all as pertaining to regional administration. There isnothing divine about it and it is generally recognised as being a relatively recentintroduction. This peculiarity leads some to postulate that only the Kabayan leadercan lay claim to equality of status with the Tabanan royal family, and theprivileges enjoyed by him do not extend to other members of his family.2 8 Thisdual system differs, therefore, from the titles of the Triwangsa ruling houses fromwhich H. and C. Geertz extracted the 'principle of sinking status' whicharticulates their argument about the gentry dadia (Geertz and Geertz 1975:124).Whereas for the gentry dadia where the principle of sinking status worksinternally to structure the group hierarchically in a pyramidal way - the furtherone is from the core-line, the lower the title and the less significant one's positionwithin the dadia - among the Kabayan the distinction between the leader, the

core-line and the remainder of the group is absolute. There is no question ofgradual disappearance of status as one becomes further removed from the core-line. Non-core-line members are simply considered as being of a different kindfrom the core-line.

Similar principles are at play in the relation between the padukuhan Apuanand its satellite sanggah gede in Munduk. Here, although no title is at stake,inheritance of the dukuh's considerable mystical and ritual expertise works as theprinciple which differentiates between ordinary members and the privileged groupof his direct descendants. As the padukuhan's founder is said to have originatedfrom Wangaya Gede, the similarities between those two origin groups may referto an ancient mode of social organisation formerly widespread in the region,whereby clients and followers of a spiritual mentor became loosely identified asrelatives of some kind,29 and to whom certain privileges such as secondary accessto land and the right to partake of tirta were granted. This is still explicitly stated

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among the Kabayan core-line for whom the warga, in the past, constitutedprivileged subjects to whom such privileges were extended.

By contrast, the Pasek Mas conform to the better-known definition of thedadia as an ancestral group where awareness of a genealogical connection ofsome sort with the founding ancestor (in this case five related founders) unites allmembers. Although no titles are found, the presence of a strong core-line is herealso, related to supremacy in the political and ritual domains. Yet although thegroup exhibits all conventional features of the commoner dadia, the strategicalliances between its core-line and other prestigious families suggests that thecohesiveness and group solidarity exhibited by commoner dadia in general are notstructural features of this type of social grouping, but a response to a certain kindof social environment. When, as was the case here, the group is undermined fromwithin by betrayal on the part of its own members, what Bourdieu has called the'enchanted state of doxa' between collective and individual interests gives way toa bleaker reality. The fact that the group was more threatened by the conversions

of the leader and other core-line members than by those of their ordinary membersfurther suggests that, although the dadia may present an 'egalitarian' front, aqualitative distinction is made between the two. In this instance, the group'ssources of power and authority were concentrated exclusively within its core-line.As the dadia struggled to maintain its supremacy in the face of the conversions

and governmental reforms, core-line interests became increasingly detached fromthe interests of the group, bringing to the fore the existence of a core of powerfulfamilies of close relatives and allies who could not be fitted into conventionalancestral categories, but from whom village leaders and priests continued to berecruited.

This raises the issue of the extent to which core-lines and the principle of

sinking status are interdependent. The examples treated here have shown that the

formation of core-lines should be kept analytically distinct from the principle of

sinking status. Both are manifestations of hierarchical principles, but whereas the

principle of sinking status can only operate with a core-line, the reverse is not true.

The principle of sinking status operates only when access to ruling power is linked

to the title. By contrast, core-lines can be found in the absence of the principle ofsinking status. Moreover the principle of sinking status ought to remain ananthropological description of a pattern of regularities exhibited by Satria rulinghouses and not a structuring principle. 3 0 Titles constitute one resource amongstmany which can be mobilised by individuals or families to enforce their claim tosupremacy, or may serve as a legitimating factor for restricted access to thoseresources. In certain circumstances, as in the Kabayan's case, titles do have astructuring effect on the group. In most non-Triwangsa groups, however, it is

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ARLETTE OTTINO 47

irrelevant to their internal structures. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude thatthe absence of titles automatically entails egalitarianism. The notion that thosewho are genealogically closer to the apical ancestor are superior to othermembers, and that this closeness sets them apart from others as somehow wiser,purer, or more apt to deal with collective matters, is widely held in Bali. Core-lines emerge when circumstances are right for the transformation of this statusinto actual power both within and outside the group.

A consequence of this is that what appears to be essential structural featuresof commoner and gentry dadia in Geertz and Geertz's study, may equally beviewed as the consequence of relations of domination and power betweendifferent factions in Balinese society over a period of time. The village-boundorientation of the commoner dadia, for instance, is less tenable today than it wasin the 1950s because of the tremendous economic and political changes whichhave taken place in Balinese society during the last forty years. This is perhaps asmall point but it has important methodological implications as it allows for thepossibility of social change. Indeed, if kinship institutions are shaped by thepolitical, economic and social forces around them, the possibility of themexhibiting different features at different times inevitably becomes commonsense,although certainly not trivial. In this respect it may be useful to ask: what are thecriteria considered relevant in leaders in contemporary Bali? The case of theKabayan core-line who occupy key regional administrative positions suggests thatformer values still play a role in determining not who is going to be selected forthe job, but differential access to resources, such as better education, wealth, orfamily networks, needed to be considered as a potential candidate.

The case studies presented in this paper clearly demonstrate that theegalitarian discourse of high-ranking commoner groups is contradicted by theirown matrimonial practices which recall those of the gentry. The anthropologicalsignificance of this fact should be appreciated as non-caste Balinese increasinglystep into domains previously reserved for the aristocratic elite of the Triwangsa,justifying their actions by reference to their being the 'natural' bearers of values ofdemocracy and egalitarianism. On a final note, I should like to add a fewcomments on the relevance of kinship studies as a methodological tool ofanthropological analysis. I hope to have shown here that what is at stake is not thediscarding altogether of kinship surveys which remain an invaluable andunequalled means of learning about a kin-based society such as Bali. What is nolonger tenable is the use to which kinship data have been put, namely to generateelegant systematic models of social structures. It is widely accepted today thatsocial structures are not permanent. As the result of the strategic actionsindividuals engage in, within the limits that local historical and social conditions

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allow, they have no permanence. Thus, what was the case in the late 1950s was no

longer so thirty years onward. But this does not mean that we can dispose of

kinship studies altogether. In fact, as far as Bali is concerned, it is dangerous to do

so as it robs us of a privileged means of counterbalancing our informants'discourses.

Perhaps no other contemporary theorist was more acutely aware of the

danger of disposing of the study of social institutions, of which kinship is aninstance, than Bourdieu who always refused to replace the idealism and

objectivism of former structuralist studies with the uncritical subjectivity of

postmodernism. Although he accepted as legitimate the postmodernist claim that

anthropological knowledge is a constructed discourse generated by the

interactions between the researcher and the object of research, Bourdieu was too

finely attuned to the social construction of cultural subjectivity to ignore the

importance of institutions in the formation of individual consciousness. According

to him, anthropological knowledge should thus always take into consideration the

subjective (individual) and objective (social) dimensions of action. Although

Bourdieu's approach may at first glance resemble an old Durkheimian approach,

he differs significantly in his insistence upon the importance of individual

positioning in the various fields of the social environment as a determinant factor

not only for the range of actions considered possible but also for individual

understanding of this environment. For this reason individual discourse is always

fractional, oriented, limited and - one could say - biased, and must always be

complemented by the analysis of the social environment through the existing

institutions. In this respect the study of the structuring potential of matrimonial

strategies can reveal much that would otherwise remain veiled by

cultural ideologies.

NOTES

I The division of society into two categories, an aristocratic elite and commoners, whichdeliberately lumps together Brahmana and Satria, recalls perhaps intentionally IrvingGoldman's proposition for Polynesian society (Goldman 1970:4).2 Lack of space prevents me from discussing the principle of sinking status here, except tosay that it cannot be applied to all Triwangsa groups. As defined in Kingship in Bali, it isspecific to the Satria ruling houses only. The inner stratification found in Satria rulinghouses pertains to a domain where hierarchical status is directly linked to access to rulingpower. It is this combination of hierarchy and power, and - one might say - the fact thataccess to ruling power is subordinated to hierarchical supremacy which gives the principleof sinking status its necessity as an organising principle in Satria dadia. The principle ofsinking status does not operate in the same way in Brahmana houses. Among this groupwhich represents the apex of the Triwangsa system and whose supremacy in many ways

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ARLETTE OTTINO 49

legitimates this hierarchical order, status differences are traceable to the very foundation ofthe Brahmana as a caste, from the differential ranking of the wives of their single apicalancestor, the Javanese sage Dang Hyang Nirartha. Another interesting aspect of theprinciple of sinking status which is not covered in Kinship in Bali is that differential titleshierarchically order the relation between the main ruling houses.3 As those notions permeate the later works of Bourdieu, from 1985 onward, it is difficultto give specific references here. For an excellent discussion of their methodologicalimplications see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 and Bourdieu 1998. See also Calhoun 1995for a critical assessment of Bourdieu's key concepts of capital and habitus.4 It was pointed out to me several years ago that Bourdieu's concepts could not be appliedto Balinese society. But Bourdieu himself disagreed with this. He always maintained thathis theory was meant to provide the methodology for an analysis of social change whichwould be applicable across all disciplines in the social sciences, and personally viewed itas particularly relevant to the study of the transition of traditional, highly structuredsocieties, such as Bali, to modernity (Bourdieu, pers. comm. 1995).5 See Schulte Nordholt 1986, 1996; Vickers 1989.6 The case of the Warga Pasek Sapta Rsi shows that, although ideologically devalued incontemporary Bali, gentry titles still constitute the reference point by which individuals orgroups calculate their relative ranking in society. Although space does not allow me toelaborate on this here, it is made obvious in the Warga Pasek Sapta Rsi's reference toBrahmanical apical ancestors and the adoption of Brahmanical rites of ordination for theirown priests, as well as their concern to prove their own hierarchical superiority over therecently arrived Triwangsa gentry by demonstrating the temporal seniority of their own'Brahmanical' founders.7 Such as Jero Subamia in Tabanan, for instance.8 According to Robinson this explains why some of the Tabanan gentry houses whichwere pro-PNI in the early 1950s later turned to the PSI and the PKI (Robinson 1995:47).9 Data for this section was taken from Danandjaja's comprehensive ethnographic accountof the village of Trunyan (Danandjaja 1980).10 The highest ranking is the Pasek (village treasurer), followed by the Panyarikan(secretary/scribe) and the Tangkas (village police). All three functions were retained untilthe arrival of the Dutch in the twentieth century (Ottino 1994:504; Danandjaja 1980:123).11 But not of the autochthonous population, believed to be even more ancient.12 Data for this section is taken from a comprehensive kinship survey of every householdin the village of Munduk during my main fieldwork period there in 1986-7. It covers anaverage of three generations of marriages, going back to the late 1930s/early 1940s.13 Munduk's equivalent of H. and C. Geertz's dadia in its corporate dimension and itsactive involvement on the public scene.14 Their status as core-line is ratified by a written genealogy which is now read out duringceremonies in the group's temple. However this appears to be a recent development,dating probably from the late 1960s or early 1970s, as local groups became interested inconnecting themselves to the trans-local commoner origin groups kawitan, which werevery fashionable at that time.15 Together, the sanggah gede and the padukuhan form a federation of corporate extendedfamilies who are loosely united through inter-marriage and the cult rendered to the dukuh,with whom no-one can claim genealogical ties. This mode of organisation based on

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patron-client ties is not specific to Munduk. As will be seen in the next section, it is alsofound in Wangaya Gede and generally throughout the region of Gunung Batukau. It isproblably related to the mode of access to land in former times, as newcomers came tosettle in this underpopulated but very fertile region of Bali.16 The reason for this is simply that Christianity was introduced (and presented) as oneagama similar to the existing local agama. As one of the main aims of the local agamawas the acquisition of power (sakti), ritual practitioners (priests and magicians) sought thisthrough conversion to Christianity which was considered purer (suci) and more powerful(sakti) because it dared to place the name of its highest deity in the first sentence of itsholy book (the Bible) and used holy water so strong that one needed to take it once to bepurified forever. The fact that Christians take their dead to church before burying themprovided further proof of the purifying power of their tirta.17 Data for this section is taken from the core-line genealogy compiled by a Kabayanmember in 1967, which I completed and updated during my fieldwork in 2002. Thegenealogy goes back four generations from 1967 (which would situate the earliestgeneration covered at the turn of the twentieth century, around the time when the Dutchinvaded Bali) and records exclusively the marriages of the core-line.18 This is idiomatically expressed in the saying 'the Kabayan is the elder brother of theking'. It is unclear, however, whether this refers to a temporal precedence or a perceivedhierarchical superiority over the Tabanan royal dynasty of the Cokorda. As Tabanan hasknown two successive dynasties, the earlier Arya and the current Cokorda, it is notpossible to say whether the Kabayan is considered superior to Tabanan kings in general orto a specific dynasty. The fact that the shrines of those dynasties are located in relativelyinferior positions in relation to the Kabayan shrine in the inner yard of Pura LuhurBatukau would suggest that the former is the case.19 These are Pura Patali, Pura Besikalung, Pura Tambawaras, and Pura Puncak Sari.Together with Pura Luhur Batukau and the summit temple, Pura Pucak Kadaton, theyform what is known as the sibak, a temple network almost certainly related to theadministration of the former kingdom. Each temple has a specific function in relation tothe other temples in the sibak. Pucak Sari is devoted to economy and commerce,Tambawaras to healing and medicine, Besikalung to weapons making and metal forging,and Patali is associated with law, justice and jurisdiction.20 Although there are many reasons to believe that the Kabayan as well as the Pasek Masof Munduk probably behaved in a caste-like manner in former times, it is impossible toobtain reliable information on this nowadays. In accord with the ideology of egalitarianismwhich now prevails throughout the region, informants vigorously deny any possibility ofthis, although they do refer to cases of people being sold as slaves or drowned formarrying hypogamously in the past, and to a time when their forebears assembled anddecided to do away with all forms of 'caste' (kasta) distinctions. They stress the need forand the positive value of merendahkan diri (lowering oneself in order to adapt one'sattitude and position to the existing social standards) in contemporary society.21 The function of mekel seems to be similar to that of perbekel as treated by CliffordGeertz in Negara (Geertz 1980). In the case of the Kabayan core-line it is congruent withtheir acknowledged status as rulers and the fact, reported by Howe, that in villages wheregentry groups were found, the perbekel was often chosen from the direct descendants of apre-colonial ruling family (Howe 2002:20).

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22 In my kinship survey of Munduk, up to 25 per cent of marriages were nyeburin,sometimes repeated systematically over two or three generations in the same family. Insome cases more than one daughter married nyeburin, resulting in houseyards headed bywomen only.23 For a number of reasons this was not observed by the present leader, although thisexception to the rule is the subject of heated discussions among members of the core-line.24 This is clearly articulated in the rite of investiture which the Jero Kabayan mustundergo before taking up his functions (see Ottino in press for a description).25 By 'commoner' I mean here: other than Triwangsa - although it is doubtful whetherthe Kabayan can be included in the category of commoners. For the sake of coherence,however, I must maintain this classification.26 In addition, the core-line provides nine of the eleven priests required in Pura Luhur. Thetwo other priests are, respectively, the leader of Pasek who has custody of the outer yard inthe main temple enclosure, and the leader of the Ngukuhin, a Bhujangga priest who hascustody of the two sacred sources of water near the main temple, the beji and the taman.While this may conflict with what is known of temple priests in Bali in general, it seemsappropriate to speak of hegemony here, since the priesthood reigns supreme in PuraLuhur, taking all decisions without having to defer to the royal family of Tabanan, and hasmanaged to retain its autonomy in the liturgy of the rituals till this day.27 Bhujangga Waisnawa (also members of the WPSR).28 For instance, the Kabayan leader may enter the royal chambers any time, sit on thesame level as the king, address the king in the same level of language and generallybehave toward the king as a brother would. No mention, however, is made of theextension of those privileges to other members of the core-line. This suggests that theKabayan owes his royal status to the intervention of the goddess of Pura Luhur, and hissubsequent role as her spokesman and representative. This 'transfiguration' of the leader,which is graphically expressed in the rite of investiture, does not in any way affect othermembers of his family.29 Indeed, the local tradition of transmission of the agama favours the identification of thedisciple as a 'spiritual son' who should consider his 'spiritual father' as more importantthan his biological father.30 Here again I must refer to Bourdieu's remark about the fallacy of slipping from:

To slip from regularity, i.e. from what recurs with a certain statistically measurablefrequency and from the formula which describes it, to a consciously laid down andconsciously respected ruling (reglement), or to unconscious regulating by amysterious cerebral or social mechanism, are the two commonest ways of slidingfrom the model of reality to the reality of the model [italics in original] (Bourdieu1990:39).

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Revisiting kinship in bali

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