Rethinking Feelings

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This article describes and analyzes the regular conception of feelings in average using of language in contrast to neurological findings

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  • Rethinking Feelings: An fMRI Study of theCognitive Regulation of Emotion

    Kevin N. Ochsner1, Silvia A. Bunge2, James J. Gross1, andJohn D. E. Gabrieli1

    Abstract

    & The ability to cognitively regulate emotional responses toaversive events is important for mental and physical health.Little is known, however, about neural bases of the cognitivecontrol of emotion. The present study employed functionalmagnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural systemsused to reappraise highly negative scenes in unemotionalterms. Reappraisal of highly negative scenes reduced subjective

    experience of negative affect. Neural correlates of reappraisalwere increased activation of the lateral and medial prefrontalregions and decreased activation of the amygdala and medialorbito-frontal cortex. These findings support the hypothesisthat prefrontal cortex is involved in constructing reappraisalstrategies that can modulate activity in multiple emotion-processing systems. &

    INTRODUCTION

    We humans are extraordinarily adaptable creatures.Drawing upon a vast array of coping skills, we cansuccessfully manage adversity in even the most tryingof circumstances. One of the most remarkable of theseskills was described by Shakespeares (1998/1623, p. 216)Hamlet, who observed, there is nothing either good orbad, but thinking makes it so. Although Hamlet himselffailed to capitalize on this insight, his message is clear:We can change the way we feel by changing the way wethink, thereby lessening the emotional consequences ofan otherwise distressing experience.The cognitive transformation of emotional experience

    has been termed reappraisal. In both experimentaland individual-difference studies, reappraising an aver-sive event in unemotional terms reduces negative affectwith few of the physiological, cognitive, or social costsassociated with other emotion-regulatory strategies,such as the suppression of emotion-expressive behavior( Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, & Davidson, 2000;Richards & Gross, 2000; Gross, 1998, 2002; Gross &John, in press). The mechanisms that mediate suchreappraisals, however, are not yet understood. The goalof the present study was to use functional magneticresonance imaging (fMRI) to elucidate the neural basesof reappraisal.Although little prior work has directly examined the

    neural systems involved in the cognitive control ofemotion, we expected that it would involve processingdynamics similar to those in implicated in other well-

    studied forms of cognitive control. In general, cognitivecontrol is thought to involve interactions betweenregions of lateral (LPFC) and medial prefrontal cortex(MPFC) that implement control processes and subcor-tical and posterior cortical regions that encode andrepresent specific kinds of information (Miller & Cohen,2001; Knight, Staines, Swick, & Chao, 1999; Smith &Jonides, 1999). By increasing or decreasing activation ofparticular representations, prefrontal regions enableone to selectively attend to and maintain goal-relevantinformation in mind and resist interference (Miller &Cohen, 2001; Knight et al., 1999; Smith & Jonides, 1999).Based on these cognitive neuroscience models, as wellas process models of emotion and emotion regulation(Gross, 2002; Ochsner & Feldman Barrett, 2001), wehypothesized that comparable interactions between cog-nitive control and emotion-processing systems wouldunderlie reappraisal.With respect to cognitive-processing systems, we

    hypothesized that reappraisal would involve three pro-cesses implemented by lateral and medial frontal corti-ces. The first is the active generation of a strategy forcognitively reframing an emotional event in unemo-tional terms, and keeping that strategy in mind as longas the eliciting conditions endure. In neuropsycholog-ical (Barcelo & Knight, 2002; Stuss, Eskes, & Foster,1994), functional imaging (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000;Smith & Jonides, 1999; Barch et al., 1997), and electro-physiological (Barcelo, Suwazono, & Knight, 2000; Niel-sen-Bohlman & Knight, 1999) studies, these functionshave been associated with working memory processeslocalized in the LPFC. The second process may monitorinterference between top down reappraisals that1Stanford University, 2Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2002 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14:8, pp. 12151229

  • neutralize affect and bottomup evaluations that con-tinue to generate an affective response, signaling theneed for reappraisal to continue. In a variety of tasksinvolving response conflict (Barch et al., 2001; vanVeen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001;Phelps, Hyder, Blamire, & Shulman, 1997) or overridingprepotent response tendencies (Carter et al., 2000;Peterson et al., 1999), these functions have been asso-ciated with the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (forreviews, see Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen,2001; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). The third processinvolves reevaluating the relationship between internal(experiential or physiological) states and external stim-uli, which may be used to monitor changes in onesemotional state during reappraisal. The dorsal regionsof the MPFC are activated when making attributionsabout ones own (Paradiso et al., 1999; Lane, Fink,Chau, & Dolan 1997) or another persons (Gallagheret al., 2000; Happe et al., 1996) emotional state as wellas during viewing of emotional films (Beauregard et al.,1998; Lane, Reiman, Ahern, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1997;Reiman et al., 1997) or photos (Lane, Reiman, Bradley,et al., 1997). Importantly, activation of the medialfrontal cortex when anticipating painful shock (Chua,Krams, Toni, Passingham, & Dolan, 1999; Hsieh, Stone-Elander, & Ingvar, 1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999) may beinversely correlated with the experience of anxiety(Simpson et al., 2000), suggesting its importance forregulatory control (cf. Morgan & LeDoux, 1995).With respect to emotion-processing systems, we hy-

    pothesized that reappraisal would modulate the pro-cesses involved in evaluating a stimulus as affectivelysignificant. Many theories of emotion posit that at leasttwo types of evaluative processing are involved in emo-tion generation (Lazarus, 1991; for a review, see Scherer,Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). One type is important fordetermining whether a stimulus is affectively relevantand may be relatively automatic, whereas a second typeis important for evaluating contextual meaning and theappropriateness of possible responses (Scherer et al.,2001; Lazarus, 1991). Evidence suggests that two highlyinterconnected brain structures (Cavada, Company,Tejedor, Cruz-Rizzolo, & Reinoso-Suarez, 2000), theamygdala and medial orbital frontal cortex (MOFC),are associated with these two types of emotion process-ing (Ochsner & Feldman Barrett, 2001; LeDoux, 2000;Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). On one hand,the amygdala is important for the preattentive detectionand recognition of affectively salient stimuli (Anderson &Phelps, 2001; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999; Whalenet al., 1998), learning and generating physiological andbehavioral responses to them (LeDoux, 2000; Becharaet al., 1999), and modulating their consolidation intodeclarative memory (Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts,1999; Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch, & McGaugh,1995). On the other hand, the MOFC is important forrepresenting the pleasant or unpleasant affective value

    of a stimulus (Kawasaki et al., 2001; ODoherty, Kringel-bach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Davidson & Irwin,1999; Rolls, 1999; Elliott, Frith, & Dolan, 1997) in aflexible format that is sensitive to momentary changesin social and motivational context (Ochsner & FeldmanBarrett, 2001; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Rolls,1999). Together, the amygdala and the MOFC differ-entially encode and represent the affective properties ofstimuli (Bechara et al., 1999; Rolls, 1999), and we soughtto determine whether reappraisal modulates activity inthe MOFC, amygdala, or both.To test these hypotheses, we adapted an experimen-

    tal procedure used to study regulation of the fear-potentiated startle eyeblink response ( Jackson et al.,2000). In that study, participants viewed aversive pho-tos and were instructed either to increase, maintain, ordecrease (postexperimental debriefing suggested thatparticipants reappraised) their emotional reactions.Startle eyeblink magnitude (which was used as anindicator of the relative strength of an emotional reac-tion across trial types) increased, remained constant, ordecreased according to the regulatory strategy beingemployed. This result suggests that participants cansuccessfully regulate their emotional responses on atrial-by-trial basis. To isolate the processes related tothe cognitive control of emotion, we needed to com-pare reappraisal to another condition that draws onprocesses invoked by reappraisal, but are not related tothe regulation of affect per se. Because we hypothe-sized that reappraisal involves both attention to and

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    Figure 1. Average negative ratings made during scanning for themost negative photos (the third of photos that elicited the mostnegative affect for a given participant). Negative affect was strong onAttend trials and decreased significantly on Reappraise (Reapp) trials( p< .01). When participants attended to their feelings towards neutralphotos, the negative affect elicited was significantly weaker than for allother trial types (both p < at least .01).

    1216 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 14, Number 8

  • awareness of ones emotional state, as well a