retail

N E W S L E T T E R

SUMMER 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Williamsburg, Virginia, and

Melbourne, Australia, Host

Strategic Planning and

Management in Retailing

Program

2. Strategic Planning and

Management in Retailing

Does Cases!

3. Hennes and Mauritz

CONTACT

BABSON COLLEGE

Babson Park, MA

02457-0310 USA

Phone: 1-800-882-EXEC

or +781-239-4354

Fax: +781-239-5266

E-mail: [email protected]

www.babson.edu/bee/retailing

LAWRENCE J. RING, EDITOR

Chancellor Professor and

EMBA Alumni Distinguished

Professor of Executive Education

Mason School of Business

The College of William and Mary

[email protected]

P R O G R A M S U M M A R Y

Williamsburg, Virginia, and Melbourne,Australia, Host Strategic Planning andManagement in Retailing ProgramThe Strategic Planning and Management in Retailing Program was conducted in

Williamsburg, Virginia, at the Mason School of Business of The College of William and Mary

in May 2010. In addition, the program was offered in Australia later in the month at the

Mt. Eliza Executive Education facility of the Melbourne Business School just outside of

Melbourne. This program is currently offered twice in North America (at Babson and at

William and Mary) and once in Australia. The program is next scheduled to be offered

September 11–17, 2010, at Babson College. Those interested are encouraged to apply

early. For more information, please visit www.babson.edu/bee/retail or contact Deirdre

Murphy at [email protected] or at 781-239-4340.

The programs kicked off with “The Eight Ways to Win in Retailing,” and, with slight differ-

ences from program to program, featured cases on Target Stores, Best Buy and Best Buy in

2005, Seven Eleven Japan, Starbucks, Home Depot, Zara and Zara in 2007, and Meijer. In

addition, the faculty delivered lectures and exercises on financial and productivity analysis,

strategic thinking and planning, category scorecards, customer relationship management,

customer and associate satisfaction, and supply chain management, including a simulation.

On Wednesday afternoon at the Williamsburg program, the group participated in a store

tour with visits to Wal-Mart Supercenter, Target Greatlands, Costco, Lowe’s, World Market,

Martin’s, Best Buy, hhgregg, PetSmart, Toys “R” Us, T.J.Maxx, and others. In addition, they

were given a guided tour of Colonial Williamsburg, followed by dinner at Shields Tavern in

the restored colonial area.

Australia program participants enjoyed the Mt. Eliza Executive Education Center, set in its

picturesque waterfront position on the shores of Port Phillip Bay. It is ideally located near

The program is next scheduled to be offered September 11–17, 2010, at BabsonCollege. Those interested are encouraged to apply early. For more information,please visit www.babson.edu/bee/retail or contact Deirdre Murphy [email protected] or at 781-239-4340.

Retailing

B A B SON E X ECU T I V E EDUC AT I ON R ETA I L I NG N EWS L ET T E R

the traditional resort areas and the burgeoning wine,

food, and golf district of the Mornington Peninsula.

Participants in the programs represented nine countries:

the United States, Australia, Canada, Colombia,

Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, and

Sweden. The group included companies in the drug,

food, furniture, apparel, home improvement, consumer

electronics, office supplies, optical, convenience, and

consulting sectors. The class was composed of senior

executives from buying and merchandising, marketing,

store operations, strategic planning, human resources,

logistics and supply chain, finance and control, and

business development. Professors Larry Ring and John

Strong were the primary program faculty for each of the

programs. Professors Ron Hess and Ram Ganeshan

also participated in the U.S. program.

Strategic Planning andManagement in RetailingDoes Cases!The Strategic Planning and Management in Retailing

Program faculty always have relied heavily on cases to

illustrate the models we use in the program and to give

participants an opportunity to apply them. Cases also

allow us to present examples from many retail sectors.

Increasingly, we have come to write and produce our own

case materials for both the open enrollment program and

custom versions of it. Many of these cases may be of

interest to our readers.

This newsletter features one of our most recent cases:

Hennes and Mauritz, the rapidly expanding Swedish fast

fashion retailer. It is available in soft copy from me at

[email protected]. This case is organized around

the Homans Model and the Pentagon and Triangle. In

addition to the H&M case, we have several other recently

written cases that can be ordered. They include:

1. Lowe’s Stores in 2010, (authored by Larry Ring, Ron Hess,and Amruta Kanitkar), 2010, 28 pp., W&M-M-170.

2. Target Stores 2006–2009: Fall from Grace or SlightMisstep? (authored by Ron Hess), 2009, 16 pp.,W&M-M-169.

3. Starbucks (B): Period of Poor Strategic Decisions,(authored by Ron Hess), 2009, 4 pp., W&M-M-168.

4. Hennes and Mauritz, (authored by Larry Ring and RachelHutson), 2009, 21 pp., W&M-M-167.

5. Zara in 2007, (authored by Larry Ring and ElizabethGalloway), 2008, 21 pp., W&M-M-164.

6. Target Stores in 2006, (authored by Larry Ring, GregoryHiggins, and Xiaobing Nie), 2007, 30 pp., W&M-M-159.

7. Best Buy 1996–2005, (authored by John S. Strong), 2005,9 pp., W&M-M-158.

8. The Gap, 1999–2002 (authored by Larry Ring), 2005,9 pp., W&M-M-156.

9. The Home Depot, 2000–2005 (authored by Larry Ring,John Strong, and Yelena Shekhovtsova), 2005, 26 pp.,W&M-M-154.

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN RETAI L ING DOES CASES!

2


Hennes and MauritzThis case was prepared by Lawrence J. Ring,

Chancellor Professor of Business and EMBA Alumni

Professor, and Rachel Hutson, MBA 2009, as a basis

for class discussion. It is not intended to illustrate

either effective or ineffective management.

Copyright 2009 by the Mason School of Business

Foundation Board

In 2009, H&M’s business concept was to offer fashion

and quality at the best price.i The firm specialized in fast

fashion. H&M’s in-house designers were encouraged to

interpret fashion trends, and create new fashions quickly

that were accessible to all through the convenience of

H&M’s many storefronts. The stores’ inventories were

revitalized daily to enable the company to keep up with

the pace of changing fashion trends. Quality was a central

issue to H&M. The company had tester stores where new

products were tested before company-wide distribution

occurred. H&M prided itself on extensive Green and CSR

policies. In order to keep costs down, all production was

outsourced primarily to Asia and Europe. H&M did not own

any of its stores, but rather leased so it could vacate an

undesirable property if it decreased in popularity

over time.

Throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, H&M expanded

rapidly. The company entered the United States market in

2000, and as of 2009 had 169 stores in the United States.

As of January 31, 2009, H&M had 1,741 stores in 33

countries.ii Exhibit 1 outlines where the company was

located as of November 2008. The company’s goal for

the 2009 fiscal year was to expand the number of stores

by 10 to 15 percent per year, while increasing sales in

existing stores. H&M planned to finance all of this

growth through reinvestment of company funds. Exhibits

2 and 3 present the H&M income statement and balance

sheet. In 2008, the company opened an additional 216

stores while expanding into new countries such as Japan,

Egypt, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. The company

planned to open new stores in Russia, Egypt, and Israel

during 2009 and 2010. Many investors were apprehensive

of this massive expansion. In the 2008 H&M Annual

Report, CEO Rolf Eriksen responded to the current eco-

nomic crisis by stating:

“Historically, H&M has not been greatly impacted by eco-

nomic downturns, but of course the recession is affecting

us. In the fourth quarter of the year most of our markets

were affected by consumption being more restrained,

although we continued to increase our market shares in

increasingly competitive markets. H&M stands strong and

we are focusing on the future. The economic situation is

creating great opportunities that we are going to take, for

example in terms of access to new attractive commercial

locations and being in a strong position to negotiate. This

year we plan to open a net amount of 225 new stores

and recruit 6,000 to 7,000 new employees.” iii

In 2009, H&M’s main competitor, Zara, also was on an

expansionary path. Zara, one of the companies owned by

global conglomerate Inditex, was one of the world’s largest

international fashion companies.iv Also focusing on fast

fashion and integrating cutting-edge design with manufac-

turing and distribution, Zara was posed to compete with

H&M’s expansion goals. In order to compete in an untapped

H&M market, Inditex signed a joint deal with the Indian

conglomerate, Tata, to move Zara stores into India by

2010.v Globally, Zara and H&M were locked in a race

to control the fast fashion market in 2009 and beyond.

Analysts were not sure who would win. Zara focused its

efforts in major European and global cities, while H&M

focused on geographic market saturation in fewer countries.

Zara designed, produced, and manufactured products in

Europe, while H&M outsourced all manufacturing to mostly

Asia. Both companies planned to expand in 2009 during

an economic crisis. Would this be a good decision? Would

the companies have to change their strategies? Who would

win the race for market share?

HENNES AND MAURITZ

3

Fast Fashion Overview

The concept of fast fashion was pioneered by Zara. Fast

fashion’s central concept was to provide customers new

products in limited supply at a constant rate. Customers

felt an exclusivity and impulse to buy products in fast-

fashion stores because it was not guaranteed that the item

would remain on the shelves for long or that the company

would restock the item once it sold out. Fast-fashion

retailers created and distributed tens of thousands of new

designs on an annual basis. Some designs resembled

the latest couture fashion trends while others were more

classic in style. Fast-fashion retailers typically beat high-

fashion designers to the market due to their efficient

manufacturing and distribution channels. In addition, the

products were less expensive because fast-fashion retailers

used less expensive fabrics and benefited from economies

of scale. The fast-fashion system depended on the strength

of the companies’ supply chains and tester stores.

Companies such as H&M and Zara tested small batches

Market Year Est.

No. Storesas of 30Nov 2008

New Storesopened2008

ClosedStores 2008

2008 Sales(USD m)

2007 Sales(USD m)

Avg. No.Employees % Male

EXHIBIT 1: H&M LOCATIONS DATAxxxii

Sweden 1947 150 29 3 $917 $890 4,924 21%

Norway 1964 85 4 1 $652 $635 1,575 7%

Denmark 1967 69 5 1 $476 $462 1,335 6%

UK 1976 146 20 3 $904 $902 4,275 24%

Switzerland 1978 66 7 1 $601 $518 1,599 12%

Germany 1980 339 25 5 $3,140 $2,729 10,746 19%

Netherlands 1989 96 8 1 $837 $757 2,395 19%

Belgium 1992 55 3 2 $385 $349 1,332 15%

Austria 1994 60 2 $618 $560 1,986 10%

Luxemburg 1996 9 1 $43 $41 134 11%

Finland 1997 36 3 1 $302 $277 840 10%

France 1998 114 16 $984 $859 3,396 25%

USA 2000 169 24 $802 $717 6,820 31%

Spain 2000 99 20 $712 $630 4,528 20%

Poland 2003 53 11 $309 $219 1,956 21%

Czech Republic 2003 16 2 $83 $75 281 6%

Portugal 2003 17 2 $94 $83 606 25%

Italy 2003 46 15 $330 $215 1,052 30%

Canada 2004 43 8 $223 $179 1,011 22%

Slovenia 2004 9 3 $73 $60 129 15%

Ireland 2005 9 2 $60 $51 220 15%

Hungary 2005 8 2 $37 $24 135 12%

Slovakia 2007 3 1 $17 $10 65 38%

Greece 2007 8 5 $37 $17 247 20%

China 2007 13 6 $109 $59 1,109 26%

Japan 2008 2 2 $24 203 33%

Franchise (1) 2006 18 8 $48 $32 N/A N/A

Total 1,738 234 18 $12,818 $11,350 52,899 19%

HENNES AND MAURITZ

B A B SON E X ECU T I V E EDUC AT I ON R ETA I L I NG N EWS L ET T E R 4


HENNES AND MAURITZ

5

of new designs in tester stores and if the designs sold out,

more products were ordered and put into stores quickly.

Fast fashion appealed to everyone from celebrities, fash-

ionistas, and bargain shoppers to Michelle Obama on the

campaign trail.vi

History

H&M has had an ever-expanding presence in the retail

industry. H&M began when Swedish founder Erling Persson

visited the United States in 1947. During his trip, he

became interested in a different type of clothing store

that combined current fashion trends, high inventory

turnover, and low prices. When he returned to Sweden,

he opened the first Hennes (Swedish for “hers”) retail

store on September 13, 1947. Persson began expanding

his women’s clothing store chain throughout the 1950s

and 1960s. In 1968, Persson acquired Mauritz Widforss,

a hunting and gun store located in Stockholm, Sweden.

After the acquisition he combined the new store’s stock

of men’s clothes with his stock of women’s clothes and

changed the name to Hennes & Mauritz (H&M).vii

EXHIBIT 2: H&M INCOME STATEMENTxxxiii

(In Millions USD) 2008 2007 2006

Sales including VAT 16,100 15,403 3,390

Sales excluding VAT 13,700 13,099 11,436

Cost of Goods Sold (5,271) (5,099) (4,637)

Gross Profit 8,429 8,000 6,799

Selling Expenses (4,973) (4,629) (4,008)

Administrative Expenses (332) (297) (233)

Operating Profit 3,116 3,073 2,558

Interest Income 164 133 86

Interest Expense (1) (1) (1)

Profit after financial items 3,279 3,205 2,643

Tax (912) (933) (838)

Profit for the year 2,367 2,272 1,805

EXHIBIT 3: H&M BALANCE SHEETxxxiv

(In Millions USD)

Assets 2008 2007 2006

Fixed assets

Intangible fixed assets

Brands 69

Customer Relationships 19

Leasehold rights 102 44 37

Goodwill 67

256 44 37

Tangible fixed assets

Buildings and land 74 78 70

Equipment, tools, fixtures, and fittings 1,851 1,475 1,193

1,925 1,553 1,263

Long-term receivables 74 42 26

Deferred tax receivables 201 148 17

Total fixed assets 2,456 1,787 1,343

Current assets

Stock-in-trade 1,315 1,332 1,207

Current receivables

Accounts receivable 308 88 145

Other receivables 187 60 42

Prepaid expenses 147 106 94

641 353 280

Short-term investments 819 1,463

Liquid funds 3,517 2,686 1,651

Total current assets 5,474 5,191 4,602

Total assets 7,930 6,978 5,945

Equity and liabilities

Equity

Share Capital 32 35 35

Reserves 218 44 4

Retained earnings 3,101 3,015 2,801

Profit for the year 2,367 2,272 1,805

Total equity 5,718 5,366 4,645

Long-term liabilities

Provisions for pensions 35 26 22

Deferred tax liabilities 281 109 109

Other provisions 57

374 135 130

Current liabilities

Accounts payable 566 415 325

Tax liabilities 198 340 205

Other liabilities 504 245 261

Accrued expenses 571 476 380

1,838 1,477 1,170

Total liabilities 2,212 1,612 1,300

Total equity and liabilities 7,930 6,978 5,945

Full-time equivalent employees (2008) 53,430

Total Store Space (2008) 20.856 mm ft2


Values and Culture

H&M was driven by its core values of teamwork, believing

in people, simplicity, salesmanship, fast-pace working,

cost-consciousness, constant improvements, and entrepre-

neurship.viii H&M had a strong culture built around its

expansive history and a strong desire to maintain the highest

standards of corporate responsibility. In order to foster

corporate responsibility, H&M compiled a CSR Report

on an annual basis. The company focused on supplier

working conditions, sustainable supply chain practices,

and cultural awareness.

Eriksen remarked, “H&M for me is a business based on

teamwork, humility and respect for people. At the same

time we are cost-conscious and have a competitive instinct

that makes us aim for constant improvements. We have

experienced fantastic growth, but we are always heading

toward the next challenge.”ix

Environmental Analysis

During the global economic recession of 2009, both H&M

and Zara decided to continue their global expansion. In

March 2009, The Wall Street Journal reported that Zara

posted strong sales gains that illustrated how low prices

and rapid response to fashion trends enabled it to

compete with Gap Inc. for highest global specialty apparel

retail sales. In contrast, Gap reported a drop in sales for

2008. Exhibit 4 compares total sales, profit, and margin

for the three leading global clothing retailers Gap, H&M,

and Zara. As Exhibit 4 illustrates, H&M and Zara saw

increasing sales from 2004 to 2007 while prior to the

recession Gap began to see flattening to decreasing sales.

During the recession, it seemed that retailers who special-

ized in low prices and efficient supply chains fared best.

In March 2009, Lars Olofsson, chief executive officer of

Carrefour, mentioned that “Ikea, Lidl, Wal-Mart, Tesco,

Zara, H&M—they have for the last 20, 30 years hammered

on the same nail every time.”x

In contrast to Zara, H&M seemed to be struggling in

March 2009. H&M reported a 12 percent drop in 2009

first-quarter profits, and posted weak February 2009

results.xi Many analysts believed that this was a sign that

the fashion retailer was negatively impacted by the

economic slowdown. Two weeks prior to posting results,

H&M’s Eriksen said “with retail sales across the globe

plunging, many retailers face a bleak future. However,

H&M finds the low retail prices as an advantage in poor

economic conditions. I won’t say it [the crisis] will help us,

but we won’t be hurt so much. … We plan to open five

stores this spring in China, including two in Beijing, and

will open one more in the autumn.”xii Two weeks later,

after the first quarter results were posted, an H&M repre-

sentative was quoted in saying sales “were affected by

a continued restrained consumption due to the current

recession.”xiii Analysts believed that the results were worse

than expected due to rising costs, including expenses from

opening new stores as well as worse-than-expected

currency exposure. In February 2009, total sales rose

1 percent from February 2008; however, sales from stores

open for more than a year fell 8 percent signaling an

overall real decrease in sales.xiv Many questioned whether

H&M should consider slowing down its expansive growth.

However, H&M remained upbeat and stated that it

“remains positive toward future expansion and the

company’s business opportunities.”xv

H&M Strategy

In 2009, H&M employed a combination of strategies in

order to be one of the world’s leading clothing retailers

by sales. H&M’s collections were created by in-house

designers whose primary goal was to offer its customers

the latest fashion trends at the best price. H&M’s strategy

depended on keeping its prices low so that it could pass

on its cost savings to the end customer. In order to keep

prices low, H&M limited the number of middlemen in its

supply chain, bought in large volumes, outsourced its

manufacturing to low-cost areas of the world, had a

culture of cost-consciousness at all levels, and maintained

an efficient distribution system.

6

HENNES AND MAURITZ


Pentagon Activities: Place

Location

The availability of attractive business locations was a

significant determining factor when it came to where H&M

decided to expand. H&M analyzed population structure,

economic growth, purchasing power, infrastructure, and

political risk. H&M believed that being in the best place

was critical to success. The company leased its store space

so that if a location did not turn out to be what it thought it

would be, it could relocate to a better location. It believed

that a store could easily be moved elsewhere if a city’s

top location changed over time.

Location was so important to H&M that it claimed it would

rather wait until the right storefront was available instead

of accepting a second choice. H&M focused its analysis on

the local customer base, competition within the area, and

customer traffic flow. It also looked at the possibility of

targeting different stores to different customer bases.

Some locations were more attractive to teenagers while

other locations were more attractive to families. H&M

believed that choosing the right combination of location

factors to suit the market was the best strategy.

In addition to looking at a wide variety of location factors,

H&M believed that controlled growth while maintaining

profitability was a central strategic issue. From 2002 to

2007, H&M expanded rapidly; all of this expansion was

internally financed.

Store Size, Layout and Design, and Sales Channels

In 2009, H&M used three complementary sales channels:

stores, Internet, and catalogs. H&M believed that its most

important channel was its stores.

While in the stores, the customers could touch, see, and

try on H&M’s latest designs. H&M prided itself on its elab-

orate display windows that showcased the merchandise

and drew customers into the stores. Its goal was to place

H&M stores in the best shopping districts in each city,

whether the best location was a store on the main

shopping street or a shopping mall. The company prided

itself in having stores on Fifth Avenue in New York, Corso

Vittorio Emanuele in Milan, Regent Street in London, and

Queen’s Road in Hong Kong. Recently, the group was

raising the standard of its stores and developing new con-

cepts for store interiors. Its flagship stores were increas-

ingly inspirational design experience for its customers.

H&M used a variety of different types and sizes of stores

depending on the location. It had large stores that offered

a full range of merchandise to smaller concept stores that

offered a limited line of merchandise. The store size varied

from 2,000 square feet to more than 30,000 square

feet.xvi Sources estimated that H&M achieved more than

$600 of sales per square foot of gross leasable space.

Nordic H&M customers had been able to shop from home

for more than 25 years. Initially shopping from home was

done through H&M catalogs, but, starting in 1998, H&M

offered Internet shopping as well. In 2006, H&M expanded

the shopping from home option to non-Nordic customers.

HENNES AND MAURITZ

7

EXHIBIT 4: COMPANY COMPARISON – SALES, NET INCOME, PROFIT MARGIN xli

H&M 2008 H&M 2007 H&M 2006 Inditex 2008 Inditex 2007 Inditex 2006 GAP 2008 GAP 2007 GAP 2006

Sales $13,700 $13,099 $11,436 $13,946 $12,800 $10,527 $14,526 $15,763 $15,923

GM% 61.5% 61.1% 59.5% 56.7% 56.2% 56.2% 37.5% 36.1% 35.5%

GM$ $8,429 $8,000 $6,799 $7,906 $7,195 $5,915 $5,447 $5,692 $5,657

Net Income $2,367 $2,272 $1,805 $1,848 $1,564 $1,254 $967 $833 $778


Although Internet sales were increasing more than catalog

sales, H&M executives believed that catalogs remained an

important part of its sales strategy. The company pub-

lished four catalogs per year: two for fall and two for

spring. Each catalog had a different theme and highlighted

seasonal changes and fashion trends. Catalogs were sent

out at the beginning of each season and created interest

in the new collection. Most merchandise offered in the

catalogs also was available in stores. The catalogs gave the

customers an overview of the entire season’s collection

as well as fashion tips and ideas for the coming season.

Catalogs offered a way for H&M to stay personally

connected to its customer base.

Product

Merchandise Intensity and Assortment

H&M was known to operate its stores at a very high level

of merchandise intensity, particularly as related to arch

competitor, Zara. The company also carried relatively

broad assortments. At any given time, H&M was working

on several trend directions at once. According to company

sources, one trend is always tailored, one sporty, one

ethnic, one romantic, and one futuristic. Each trend could

be found in every department—women, men, young, and

children. H&M prided itself on its constantly changing

range of products. The H&M design team also focused on

what was popular during the previous season and where.

Customer demand in different markets and stores deter-

mined the merchandise assortment for an area of the

world, or store in general. The size and location of a store

factored into what merchandise would be shipped to that

store. High fashion, limited quantity garments were

typically distributed to larger stores in big cities while basic

items that generally reflected the style of the season were

shipped to many different stores.

H&M stores were known for being packed full of pieces of

the latest fashion. Most major stores were restocked daily.

H&M fans knew that the store displayed two of every size

each day. If a size was not available, then the customer

had a good chance of it being available the next day. This

created the sense of the need to go to the H&M store on

a regular basis to find the best deals. One loyal customer

stated that “I’m an H&M bulimic. … You have to dig, sort,

and slave for a bargain. I wear light clothes to go shopping

there because otherwise you’re so hot you’d lose 50 kilos.”xvii

Designs

H&M worked to create a balance between fashion, quality,

and low price. H&M had a culture of teamwork in which

the designers, pattern makers, and buyers created the

collections together. Designers monitored the world, and

drew inspiration from street and runway fashion, films,

and history. Designs and styles were centered on a unique

combination of trendy, fashionable pieces as well as basic

classic pieces. The overall theme and most pieces for

a collection were planned up to a year in advance while

H&M’s trendiest clothing was picked up on short notice.xviii

Each H&M collection was planned, designed, and created

at the H&M headquarters in Stockholm by more than 100

staff designers and many guest designers. H&M believed

that understanding what customers wanted was paramount

to its success. It created the “Idea to Store” concept, in

which the desires of the end customer were the key

focus throughout the entire design process. The designers

offered different concepts for different customers. H&M

served men, women, and children of all ages who had

different fashion preferences. The designers adapted

global influences and trends to styles and clothing cuts

that fit the diverse needs of its customers. Colors, quality,

themes, silhouettes, and certain types of garments

combined together to create each season’s collection.

Value

Price

H&M believed it achieved the “best price” by having

few middlemen, buying in large volumes, purchasing the

right product from the right market, being cost-conscious

in every part of the organization and having efficient

distribution processes.

8

HENNES AND MAURITZ


HENNES AND MAURITZ

9

Quality

“There’s no contradiction in H&M’s business concept of

offering fashion and quality at the best price,” says Tomas

Persson, H&M director of quality control. “It’s an equation

that has to add up. Quality is extremely important. The

customers have to get value for their money. For the

customer to feel satisfied with a product, it not only has

to be fashionable, it has to be durable and work the way

it’s supposed to. It should be safe and stand up to fairly

rough use.” Persson and his colleagues put together the

guidelines and standards manufacturers have to follow.

At every production office, there are quality teams that

monitor compliance. The guidelines exist to ensure that

all H&M products live up to the toughest standards.

“Quality work is a living process that is constantly devel-

oping. The goal is to make our products durable, easy to

use, practical, and safe.”xix

People

H&M believed that its employees were its most valuable

asset. In fiscal year 2007, H&M employed approximately

68,000 employees. The average number translated into

full-time jobs was 47,029.xx Exhibit 1 lists H&M’s markets

as of 2008 and each market’s number of employees and

gender. Worldwide, 80 percent of H&M employees were

women; among employees with a position of responsi-

bility, 76 percent were women.xxi H&M’s employment

concept included growing with the company, career

development through a variety of ways, internal recruit-

ment, and improving through partnerships.

H&M believed that the opportunity for personal growth

created an attractive workplace. It believed that each

employee had the ability to use common sense, assume

responsibility, and assume individual initiatives. These

three qualities created the “H&M Spirit.”xxii H&M encour-

aged continued education and offered courses with an

emphasis on skill development.

The company developed its employees’ careers through

job rotations. By rotating through customer service, the

cash register, the stockroom, the fitting room, merchandise

presentation, and promotions, employees were given the

opportunity to learn about the entire sales process. Job

rotations encouraged recruitment from within. In order to

ensure consistent service levels, H&M trained employees of

new stores in new countries by sending the management

teams to train with established H&M stores. Nevertheless,

service in most H&M stores could be described as

essentially “self-service.”

Eriksen commented, “At H&M we share the same goals at

the same time as we minimize bureaucracy and focus on

the individual. We delegate a lot of responsibility to local

markets, stores, and individual people—and we encourage

people to take their own initiatives at all levels.”xxiii

The H&M Annual Report featured comments by several

sales associates and store managers regarding their jobs:xxiv

First Associate. How did you first come in contact with

H&M? “Through H&M’s website. I had been looking at the

website ever since I heard H&M was coming to Japan.” Why

did you apply for a job here? “H&M believes in people, and

after I heard about H&M’s values, I was very interested in

working here.” How did you learn to do your job? “We spent

five days in a classroom in Tokyo learning about H&M’s

history, values, clothing presentation, and much more.”

What’s the best thing about working at H&M? “Teamwork,

I would have to say. I respect all of my colleagues, and

my supervisor is fantastic.”

Second Associate. How did you first come in contact

with H&M? “I grew up with H&M. It was always my first

choice.” Why do you want to work with fashion? “Because it’s

a fantastic way of expressing your personality.” What do

you expect from your job? “I hope I can put my creativity

in the service of my colleagues and gain new ideas from

them and the customers. I would like to see everybody

leave the store with a smile on their face.” How did you

learn to do your job? “The introduction was intense—there

was really a lot to learn! Everybody on the team helped

out and provided support and people told me they

appreciated my ideas.”


Third Associate. What are you expecting of your job?

“A wonderful team that makes it fun to work. It’s exciting to

meet so many different kinds of customers, too. And then

there are the development opportunities for me and the

team.” How did you learn to do your job? “I felt welcome,

even though there was a lot to learn; I could always count

on help from my colleagues. During the first few weeks,

there was one colleague in particular who helped me with

everything.” What’s the best thing about working at H&M?

“The team and the many opportunities to develop and

take on new challenges. It is really fun to try new things

and meet so many different kinds of people every day.”

First Manager. What is a typical day at work like for you?

“The day begins with deliveries. Then, I review the goals

for the day for every department with all the floor managers.

After that, I spend most of the day out in the store,

because I believe in symbolic leadership, but also in order

to meet our customers.” What is special about the store

where you work? “We have a fantastic atmosphere, are

very structured and professional yet have a lot of fun. The

employees are very committed.” What’s the best thing

about working at H&M? “The people and the possibilities.

H&M is a workplace where you can achieve your full

potential.” How do you inspire your colleagues’ enthu-

siasm? “By being a good example. I love working at H&M,

and I’m passionately dedicated to my work. I believe that

makes me a role model. I also try to inspire the team to

be creative, take responsibility and develop.” What is the

biggest challenge for a store manager? “Keeping a cool

head amidst everything that’s happening. I have to main-

tain a consistent, professional attitude toward employees

and customers even if I’m having a bad day.”

Second Manager. What is a typical day at work like for

you? “We start the day with a review of our turnover and

other sales figures. After that, I have brief conversations

with all the assistant managers. I feel it’s important to stay

in close contact with my colleagues and I make time to do

so. I have a look at the store floor and displays; they have

to look neat and tidy, and there has to be enough clothing

on the shelves and in the display areas. Finally, I check

to make sure the signage is inviting and inspiring. At

lunchtime, we meet again to discuss the priorities for the

afternoon. After that, we continue to focus on customers

and sales.” What is special about the store where you

work? “Our fantastic team. Even though there are a lot of

us, it feels like a big family, and that’s what makes work

fun.” What’s the best thing about working at H&M? “Every

day is a new challenge, so it’s never boring, and there are

many opportunities to develop and take on new responsi-

bilities.” How do you inspire your colleagues? “By working

with the team and maintaining open communications, and

by taking part and providing support.”

Communications and Brand

H&M believed that part of its competitive advantage was

its strong brand. It promoted its brand through stores,

magazines, catalogs, public relations (PR) activities, events,

designer collaborations, collections, and fashion shows.

The company maintained its brand through making fashion

available for everyone, icon and designer collaborations,

and using the same message worldwide. The company’s

underlining goal was to have each activity promote its

brand and concept of “fashion and quality at the

best price.”

Store openings were paramount to promoting the H&M

brand throughout the world. For example, in April 2009,

H&M launched its first store in Beijing, China. The brand

new store was located in a newly developed shopping

area in the center of the cultural capital. To celebrate the

opening, H&M planned an elaborate event that entailed

the gathering of Beijing’s celebrities, fashion crowd, and

media. The first experience of the H&M store left a strong

impression among the guests, who dressed their personal-

ities in H&M’s various party styles to glamorize the

event.xxv By making fashion available to everyone, H&M

became the store for the everyday fashion-conscious

consumer. New merchandise arrived daily at each store.

Flashy, fun marketing campaigns were launched frequently.

10

HENNES AND MAURITZ


The store and its window displays were H&M’s most

important channel of communication with customers,

and the right design was particularly important. Every two

or three years, H&M created a brand new interior design

program for a large number of stores based on one new,

special store in an interesting market. “Simple, smart, and

sustainable” were the keywords for the latest store design

update, which was to be rolled out in 2009.xxvi

H&M also collaborated with celebrities and iconic

designers to strengthen its brand position. In spring 2009,

H&M collaborated with designer Matthew Williamson.

Williamson debuted his exclusive H&M collection at the

first Beijing store opening in April of that year. His collec-

tion included iconic pieces from his past collections com-

bined with new trendy, colorful pieces. This line was

available exclusively at H&M stores worldwide. One of

H&M’s most popular celebrity campaigns was in spring

2007 when it partnered with style icon and mega super-

star Madonna to promote its line of clothing. By partnering

with celebrities and designers, H&M added legitimacy to

its concept and message of fashionable clothing for all.

Triangle Activities

Operations

H&M outsourced the majority of its manufacturing to com-

panies primarily in Asia and Eastern Europe. In 2009, H&M

did not own a factory. The company bought its products

from 700 independent suppliers throughout the world.xxvii

H&M prided itself on its corporate social responsibility

(CSR) and tasked its purchasing department with verifying

that each supplier lived up to H&M’s CSR requirements.

The purchasing department used six factors to determine

whether to do business with that supplier. Quality, price,

capacity, lead time, flexibility, and living up to H&M’s CSR

requirements were the determining factors when choosing

a supplier. The production of all supplier products had to

take place under satisfactory conditions. H&M maintained

more than 20 production offices in Europe, Asia, and

Africa to mediate contact between the internal buying

department and the independent suppliers. These offices

also identified new suppliers and negotiated contracts

with them.

Purchasing flexibility was central to the Hennes & Mauritz

strategy. The pattern of seasonal flexibility that applies

to many retail fashion stores was changed at H&M in

the 1960s. Instead, buyers started to purchase 12 times

a year, making rapid switches of fashion possible. In their

cultural perception, management perceived the company

as being very informal in terms of decision-making

processes. The director of development said,

“We know from previous experience that decision making

is based 90 percent on feeling and 10 percent on history.”

Nevertheless, company tactics were extremely visible to

employees. The first CEO introduced “takten” (the pace),

an instrument that still remains in place and now sup-

ported by information and communications technology

(ICT). This was a visible list that arrived weekly; showing

each buyer how much has been sold in the stores of each

particular product. Everyone understood the risks involved

in falling short, and, according to several sources, the

saying “shape up or ship out” was always present in

the background.

Supplier lead times varied from a few weeks to six

months. Optimal lead times varied as well. Fast-fashion

garments had the shortest lead time and smallest volume

while high-volume fashion basics and children’s clothing

had longer lead times. In its case, H&M could go from

design concept to hanger in the store in 20 days—nearly

as good as Zara—and probably 30 percent less expensive.

Gap’s minimum turnaround was three months.

All stores needed to have the most crucial goods on stock

at all times. Furthermore, the central logistics department

needed to follow the sales progress of individual goods in

order to avoid overproduction of goods which could not

be sold. In order to do this, the procurement staff worked

HENNES AND MAURITZ


closely with the production offices, and ICT was a crucial

tool used to follow sales and make intelligent choices.

A benefit of owning the stores was that they shared a

common ICT platform where all sales were reported. Thus,

the procurement and logistics employees could keep track

of sales and stock status (at individual stores as well as at

the central warehouse).

From idea to store, H&M controlled every link in its supply

chain. Most of its products were shipped by boat. The

company used trains, trucks, and planes to transport

products. This flexibility resulted in a more efficient system

than those of its individual suppliers. The company also

used an information technology (IT) system to record and

produce rapid feedback about the popularity of certain

items and individual store results on a daily basis. This

system helped the purchasing and distribution teams

know what items needed to be shipped where.

Once the goods were manufactured, they were shipped

using H&M external contract companies, generally to the

company’s central warehouse in Hamburg. However,

shipping also could be to the national offices (if the

goods were country specific), or directly to the store if

the quantities were large enough. This transaction model

is depicted in the diagram (Figure 1).xxviii H&M chose

the most appropriate transportation method for each

shipment. It used a combination of factors including time

and environmental impact. It preferred to ship products

by train. It preferred to ship efficiently with high utilization

rates and ship directly to the sales country. After the

merchandise was received and checked it was either

distributed directly to the store or to a central restocking

warehouse. Store shelves were replenished based on

individual item and store demand.

The individual stores did not have backup stocks; they

were replenished as required from central stockrooms.

As soon as a product was sold a request was sent for

replenishment. Every day, the H&M stores received

new goods.

The most significant triangle challenges for Hennes &

Mauritz were thought to be (1) continuous expansion;

(2) cost-efficient production and logistics; and

(3) reduction of lead times.

Competition

Gap Inc.

Gap historically was a strong competitor in the fashion

industry. Exhibit 5 illustrates Gap Inc.’s annual sales from

1999–2008. As the chart shows, Gap maxed out its

annual revenue at approximately $16.3 million in sales

per year in 2004. In 2007, Gap had 3,100 stores in six

Figure 1: H&M Transaction Modelxxix

HENNES AND MAURITZ


countries. The retailer had seen little store growth in five

years. In 2008, H&M had $13.8 million in sales (excluding

valued added tax) and planned to open at least 225

stores in 2009. Many analysts believed that H&M was

on the same expansionary path that Gap was on in the

late 1990s.

Analysts believed that Gap’s demise was due to the fact

that it lost sight of its target customer. Instead of following

the trend toward fast fashion and best price, Gap con-

tinued to offer basic pieces at higher price levels. Even its

other stores, such as Old Navy and Banana Republic, were

scrutinized for forgetting their respective target markets.

Gap’s loss of customers resulted in major financial implica-

tions for the company. As Exhibits 4 and 6 indicate,

Gap was the world leader in annual sales in 2008; how-

ever, both its profit margin and net income were lower

than Inditex and H&M’s. In addition, Gap’s productivity was

significantly lower than H&M and Inditex, and had dropped

significantly during the decade as shown in Exhibit 7.

Some past Gap consumers were lured away from the retail

giant by H&M and Zara’s trendy, fashionable clothing at

lower prices. (See Exhibits 8 and 9 for Gap Inc.’s Income

Statement and Balance Sheet.)

Zara

Zara, owned by retail conglomerate Inditex, was H&M’s

primary competitor. Zara was Inditex’s original concept

store. It was famous for its concept of idea to in the stores

in two weeks. Zara boasted that it was able to generate a

new clothing idea, design, manufacture, and ship the idea

to its stores within two weeks. This two-week lead time

created a strong competitive advantage for the company.

Zara was known for its open communication with con-

sumers, innovative ideas and inventory policies, and

equipping its stores with IT systems that enabled man-

agers to report emerging trends to headquarters. These

strong lines of communication allowed Zara to claim that it

was “in step with society.”xxx It became a popular shopping

destination for the fashion-conscious consumer. The com-

pany relied on ever-evolving fashion trends to increase

inventory turnover throughout the stores. Zara was known

for ordering small batches of items that would not be

reordered once sold out. This practice created a sense of

urgency for customers to visit Zara stores frequently and

buy immediately. This was one of Zara’s strongest, most

important competitive advantages. (See Exhibits 10 and

11 for Inditex’s Income Statement and Balance Sheet.)

Looking Ahead

In 2009, Zara and H&M were locked in a tight race to

become the top fast-fashion retailer in the world. Each

company believed that if it could saturate the fast-fashion

market it would beat Gap Inc. in global retail sales. Gap

had grown rapidly in the late 1990s but began to falter

in early 2000s. Company sales had peaked at around

$17 billion in annual sales and begun to decline. Many

analysts believed that H&M and Zara needed to slow down

their expansion plans and refocus on their core competences.

First-quarter sales results in 2009 revealed that Zara was

doing well through the global economic recession while

H&M and Gap Inc. were not. Would Zara be able to con-

tinue to increase sales faster than H&M? Would H&M’s

slower lead time end up being its Achilles’ heel? Would

expansion during a recession be considered a stroke of

genius or a financial blow to H&M? Who would win the

race to become the top global specialty apparel retailer?

H&M’s Eriksen was concerned that “When we expand into

new markets it’s important that we do not lose sight of

EXHIBIT 5: HISTORICAL GAP DATAxxxvii

Gap Inc. Revenue 1999–2008

HENNES AND MAURITZ

17,000

16,000

15,000

14,000

13,000

12,000

11,000

10,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008


EXHIBIT 8: GAP INCOME STATEMENTxxxviii

(In Millions USD)except for per share items FY 08 FY 07 FY 06 FY 05

Total Revenue 14,526 15,763 15,923 16,019

Cost of Revenue, Total 9,079 10,071 10,266 10,145

Gross Profit 5,447 5,692 5,657 5,874

Total Operating Expense 12,942 14,357 14,608 14,196

Operating Income 1,584 1,406 1,315 1,823

Income Before Tax 1,584 1,406 1,315 1,823

Income After Tax 967 867 809 1,131

Net Income Before Extra Items 967 867 809 1,131

Net Income 967 833 778 1,113

Full-time equivalent employees (2008) 67,000Total store space (2008) 39.5 mm ft2

“Gap (GPS)”. www.google.com/finance

EXHIBIT 7: STRATEGIC RESOURCE MODEL FOR 2000 VERSUS 2008xlii

H&M 2008 H&M 2000 Inditex 2008 Inditex 2000 GAP 2008 GAP 2000

Gross Margin 61.5% 50.6% 56.7% 50.5% 37.1% 37.5%

SI Index 10.43 6.84 9.37 10.67 9.65 7.18

GMROI 6.41 3.46 5.31 5.39 3.62 2.66

Merch Intensity $63 $70 $63 $39 $38 $61

Sales/Ft2 $657 $482 $591 $419 $368 $435

GMROF $404 $243 $335 $212 $138 $162

Service Intensity 390 302 384 317 590 263

Sales/FTE $256,000 $145,000 $227,000 $133,000 $217,000 $114,000

GMROL $157,000 $73,000 $129,000 $67,000 $81,000 $42,000

Derived by casewriter fromcase exhibits

EXHIBIT 6: COMPANY COMPARISON – RETURN ON NET WORTHxl

COMPANY ROS ATO ROA LEV RONW

H&M 2008 17.28% 1.73 29.86% 1.39 41.41%

H&M 2007 17.34% 1.88 32.56% 1.30 42.34%

H&M 2006 15.78% 1.92 30.36% 1.28 38.86%

Inditex 2008 13.25% 1.33 17.59% 1.68 29.64%

Inditex 2007 12.22% 1.43 17.44% 1.65 28.86%

Inditex 2006 11.91% 1.30 15.43% 1.78 27.49%

Gap 2008 6.66% 1.92 12.78% 1.72 22.04%

Gap 2007 5.28% 2.01 10.63% 1.83 19.49%

Gap 2006 4.89% 1.86 9.11% 1.65 15.04%

Strategic Profit Models forSelected Retailers by L. J. Ring

HENNES AND MAURITZ


HENNES AND MAURITZ

15

our core values.” He concluded, “We also

need to manage all of the components that

H&M consists of in an effective way and

ensure that our core values are upheld in all

parts of our organization regardless of country

or cultural differences. 2009 will be an

exciting and intense year with new stores,

new markets, and new products for our cus-

tomers, and above all, new opportunities.”xxxi

EXHIBIT 9: GAP BALANCE SHEETxxxix

(In Millions USD)except for per share items FY 08 FY 07 FY 06 FY 05

Cash and Equivalents 1,715 1,724 2,030 2,035

Short-Term Investments 0 177 570 952

Cash and Short-Term Investments 1,715 1,901 2,600 2,987

Accounts Receivable – Trade, Net - - - -

Receivables – Other - - - -

Total Receivables, Net - - - -

Total Inventory 1,506 1,575 1,796 1,696

Prepaid Expenses - - - -

Other Current Assets, Total 784 610 633 556

Total Current Assets 4,005 4,086 5,029 5,239

Property/Plant/Equipment, Total – Gross - 7,320 7,135 6,958

Goodwill, Net - - - -

Intangibles, Net - - - -

Long-Term Investments - - - -

Other Long-Term Assets, Total 626 485 318 336

Total Assets 7,564 7,838 8,544 8,821

Accounts Payable 975 1,006 772 1,132

Accrued Expenses 1,076 1,259 1,159 725

Notes Payable/Short-Term Debt - 0 0 0

Current Port of LT Debt/Capital Leases 50 138 325 0

Other Current Liabilities, Total 57 30 16 85

Total Current Liabilities 2,158 2,433 2,272 1,942

Long-Term Debt 0 50 188 513

Capital Lease Obligations - - - -

Total Long-Term Debt 0 50 188 513

Total Debt 50 88 513 513

Deferred Income Tax - - - -

Minority Interest - - - -

Other Liabilities, Total 1,019 1,081 910 941

Total Liabilities 3,177 3,564 3,370 3,396

Redeemable Preferred Stock, Total - - - -

Preferred Stock – Non Redeemable, Net - - - -

Common Stock, Total - 55 55 54

Additional Paid-In Capital - 2,783 2,631 2,402

Retained Earnings (Accumulated Deficit) - 9,223 8,646 8,133

Treasury Stock – Common - -7,912 -6,235 -5,210

Other Equity – Total 4,387 125 77 46

Total Equity 4,387 4,274 5,174 5,425

Total Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity 7,564 7,838 8,544 8,821


EXHIBIT 10: INDITEX INCOME STATEMENTxxxv

(In Millions USD) 2007 2006 2005

Net sales 13,946 12,800 10,527

Cost of merchandise (6,040) (5,605) (4,612)

Gross profit 7,906 7,195 5,915

Operating expenses (4,769) (4,373) (3,587)

Other net operating expenses

and income (39) (27) (49)

EBITDA 3,176 2,795 2,279

Amortization and depreciation (734) (677) (571)

EBIT 2,442 2,118 1,708

Financial results 1 (22) 13

Equity accounting losses (11) (4) (0)

Income before taxes 2,433 2,092 1,720

Income tax (573) (515) (454)

Net income 1,859 1,577 1,266

Minorities 11 13 12

Net income attributable

to the parent 1,848 1,564 1,254

Full-time equivalent employees (2008) 61,487Total store space (2008) 23.590 mm ft2

Inditex 2007 Annual Report

HENNES AND MAURITZ

EXHIBIT 11: INDITEX BALANCE SHEETxxxvi

(In Millions USD) 1/31/2008 1/31/2007 1/31/2006Assets

Current Assets 4,407 3,355 3,196

Cash and cash equivalents 2,167 1,415 1,544

Receivables 685 568 511

Inventories 1,489 1,287 1,069

Income tax receivable 3 33 48

Other current assets 64 53 25

Noncurrent assets 6,096 5,612 4,929

Property, plant, and equipment 4,704 4,355 3,764

Investment property 14 19 22

Rights over leased assets 746 709 641

Other intangible assets 20 24 14

Goodwill 186 155 124

Financial investments 53 52 95

Investments in associates – 7 11

Deferred tax assets 197 139 121

Other 177 153 136

Total assets 10,503 8,968 8,125

Liabilities – – –

Current liabilities 3,634 2,943 2,890

Trade and other payables 2,920 2,528 2,357

Financial debt 549 227 327

Income tax payable 165 189 206

Noncurrent liabilities 636 604 673

Financial debt 63 74 119

Deferred tax liabilities 164 163 167

Provisions 70 70 66

Other noncurrent liabilities 339 297 322

Net equity 6,234 5,420 4,562

Net equity attributable to the parent 6,198 5,385 4,527

Net equity attributable

to minority interest 35 35 34

Total Liabilities and Equity 10,503 8,968 8,125


i2008 Annual Report.http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/ANNUAL_REPORT_ARCHIVE2008__ITEM_3_1237462089192.pdf.March 23, 2009.

ii“H&M Group Sales Development in January.”http://www.hm.com/us/investorrelations/financialreports/salesdevelopment/financepressrelease.ahtml?pressreleaseid=409569&nodeid=563.February 16, 2009.

iii2008 Annual Report.http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/ANNUAL_REPORT_ARCHIVE2008__ITEM_3_1237462089192.pdf.March 23, 2009.

ivwww.zara.com

v“Inditex and Trent of the Tata Group agree to open storesin India beginning 2010.”http://www.inditex.com/en/press/press_releases/extend/00000689. February 25, 2009.

vi“Michelle Obama Endorses Fast Fashion”http://www.blackbookmag.com/article/michelle-obama-endorses-fast-fashion/4333. October 1, 2008.

vii“Facts About H&M.”

http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/

RM_DOWNLOAD_FACTSANDHISTORY_FACTSABOUTHM_PDF_

ENGLISH_US_1209368513139.pdf. March 17, 2009.

viiiH&M 2008 Annual Report.


ANNUAL_REPORT_ARCHIVE2008__ITEM_3_1237462089192.pdf.

March 23, 2009.

ixhttp://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/ANNUAL_REPORT_ARCHIVE2008__ITEM_3_1237462089192.pdf

xRohwedder, Cecilie. “Zara Grows as Retail Rivals Struggle.”

The Wall Street Journal. March 26, 2009.

xiKinnander, Ola. “H&M’s Earnings Fall 12%, Missing

Expectations.” The Wall Street Journal. March 27, 2009.

xii“H&M to Open 5 Stores in China Soon.” Indian Retailing

Bureau. March 13, 2009.

xiiiKinnander, Ola. “H&M’s Earnings Fall 12%, Missing


xivKinnander, Ola. “H&M’s Earnings Fall 12%, Missing


xvKinnander, Ola. “H&M’s Earnings Fall 12%, Missing


xvi“Facts About H&M.”




xvii“Inside the H&M Fashion Machine.” Time magazine.

Monday, February 9, 2004.

http://www.time.com/time/2004/style/020904/article/

inside_the_h_m_fashion_01_print.html. May 11, 2009.

xviii“Idea and Design.”

http://www.hm.com/us/abouthm/factsabouthm/fromideatost

ore/ideaanddesign__fromideatostoreideaanddesign.nhtml.

May 5, 2009.

xixhttp://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/A

NNUAL_REPORT_ARCHIVE2008__ITEM_3_1237462089192.pdf

xx“Facts About H&M.”




xxi“Facts About H&M.”




xxii“Facts About H&M.”




xxiiihttp://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/

ANNUAL_REPORT_ARCHIVE2008__ITEM_3_1237462089192.pdf

xxivH&M 2008 Annual Report.



March 23, 2009.

xxv“H&M Finally Lands in Beijing, China.”

http://www.fibre2fashion.com/news/company-news/hennes-

mauritz-group/newsdetails.aspx?News_id=71794. April 25, 2009.

HENNES AND MAURITZ

xxvihttp://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/

ANNUAL_REPORT_ARCHIVE2008__ITEM_3_1237462089192.pdf

xxvii“Facts About H&M.”




xxviiihttp://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/publications/200

4/ef0465en_1.pdf

xxixhttp://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/publications/2004

/ef0465en_1.pdf

xxxGalloway, Elizabeth. “Zara in 2007.” Mason School of

Business. 2008.

xxxiH&M 2008 Annual Report.



March 23, 2009.

xxxiiH&M 2008 Annual Report.



March 23, 2009.

xxxiiiH&M 2008 Annual Report.



March 23, 2009.

xxxivH&M 2008 Annual Report.



March 23, 2009.

xxxvInditex 2007 Annual Report

xxxviInditex 2007 Annual Report

xxxviiGap Inc. – 10 Year Summary.

http://moneycentral.msn.com/investor/invsub/results/statem

nt.aspx?Symbol=gps&lstStatement=10YearSummary&stmtVie

w=Ann. April 27, 2009.

xxxviii“Gap (GPS).” www.google.com/finance

xxxix“Gap (GPS).” www.google.com/finance

xlStrategic Profit Models for Selected Retailers by L. J. Ring

xliDerived by casewriter from case exhibits

xliiDerived by casewriter from case exhibits

18B A B SON E X ECU T I V E EDUC AT I ON R ETA I L I NG N EWS L ET T E R

HENNES AND MAURITZ


GO GLOBAL OR GO HOME?

19

Coaching Consortia• Coaching Inside the Organizat ion: The Cer t i f icat ion Program

for Internal Coaches

• IT Leader Development Consor t ium

Consulting

Custom Programs

Open Enrollment Programs• Bio-Pharma: Master ing the Business of Science

• Finance for Today’s Nonfinancial Professionals

• Leadership and Inf luence

• Moving From Manag ing to Leading: The Women’s Program

at Babson

• Social Media Management: Strateg ies and Pract ices for the

New Social World

• Strateg ic Planning and Management in Retai l ing

Babson Executive Education offers a variety of engaging, high-impactsolutions to help companies and individuals reach their strategic goals.

egBabson Park, MA 02457-0310 USA

Phone 1·800·882·EXEC or +781·239·4354 Fax +781·239·5266 E-mail [email protected]

www.babson.edu/bee/retail

PROGRAM DATES

Babson College, September 11–17, 2010

William and Mary, April 30–May 6, 2011

Mt. Eliza/Melbourne Business School, May 22–27, 2011

CONTACT

Babson College

Babson Park, MA

02457-0310 USA

Phone: 1-800-882-EXEC

or +781-239-4354

Fax: +781-239-5266

E-mail: [email protected]

www.babson.edu/bee

RETAILING NEWSLETTER CATALOG

If you would like to view past issues of the Retailing Newsletter, please

visit our Web site: www.babson.edu/bee/retailing_newsletter

Lawrence J. Ring, Editor

Chancellor Professor and

EMBA Alumni Distinguished Professor

of Executive Education

Mason School of Business

The College of William and Mary

[email protected]

Eddie Tritton

Director, Melbourne

Mt. Eliza Executive Education

Melbourne Business School

[email protected]

Visit www.babson.edu/bee for any program changes and updates.

©2010 Babson Executive Education. Al l Rights Reserved. 06/10_10-052

retail

Documents

Transcript of retail