Responsibility to pRotect... itself?

Marek Menkiszak fiiA bRiefinG pApeR 131 • May 2013

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

131

RussiA’s stRAteGy towARds the cRisis in syRiA

• Despiteattemptstopresentitselfasaneutralforce,RussiadefactosupportedSyrianPresidentBasharal-Assad’sregimebybothpoliticalandmilitarymeans.Moscow’smaingoalwastodefendthe regime against the pressure to relinquish power to the opposition, and also to deter anyattemptataWestern/ArabmilitaryinterventioninSyria.

• Various factors have influenced Russia’s strategy towards the Syrian crisis. Among them areconcernover strategicandeconomic interests inSyriaas the last symbolicoutpostofRussianinfluenceintheMiddleEast,aswellasafearoftheconsequencesofaregionalimbalance,involvingthespreadof Islamicradicalism,spillingover toRussia itself.Obviously, theWesternmilitaryengagementinLibyastronglyinfluencedRussianbehaviour,providingMoscowwithanegativereferencepoint.

• Ofcrucial importance intheRussianapproachtoSyria,however, isaperceptionthatprevailsamongtheconservativetopmembersoftheRussianrulingelite.ItinvolvesthebeliefinaUS-ledconspiracytoadvanceitsgeopoliticalintereststhroughregimechangebymeansofbothsoftpowertechnologiesandtheunilateraluseofmilitaryforce,withSyriabeingyetanothertarget.Butitalsostemsfromagrowingsenseofdomesticvulnerability,whichparadoxicallyprovokestheKremlintoactivelydefenditself,bothinRussiaandinSyria,againstaperceivedexternalthreat.

• OneshouldnotexpectRussiatochangeitscurrentpositionontheSyrianconflict.MoscowseemstobereadytoacceptanyscenariowhichwilleffectivelypreventaregimechangeinSyria,throughprolongingtheconflictandthe“Lebanization”ofSyria,orviaaninterimagreementwhichwouldfreezethestatusquo.ThisofferslittleroomforcooperationbetweentheWestandRussia.

Responsibility to pRotect... itself?

fiiA briefing paper 131

May 2013

RussiA’s stRAteGy towARds the cRisis in syRiA

the eu’s eastern neighbourhood and Russia research programme

the finnish institute of international Affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

Marek Menkiszak

head of the Russian department, centre for eastern studies (osw)

Visiting Researcher, the finnish institute of international Affairs

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 3

Introduction

ThecrisisinSyriahascapturedtheworld’sattentionformanymonths.WhatstartedinMarch2011asapublicprotestagainsttheauthoritarianregimeofBasharal-AssadwaswidelyseenasacontinuationoftheArabSpring.Beforelong,however,duetothebrutalforceusedbytheregimetosuppresspeacefuldemonstrations,itslowlyturnedintoabloodycivilwar tearing the country apart, and subsequentlyintoahumanitariancrisisandregionalflashpoint.This, in turn,hassparked intensive international,mainlydiplomaticactivity,involvingbothregionalandnon-regionalactors.

Russiawas among thosewho reacted.As Syria’s“traditionalpartner”,Moscowactivelyengagedinsupportfortheal-Assadregimebothpoliticallyandthroughweapondeliveries,despitetryingtomain-taintheimageofaneutralobserver.SuchastancehascastRussiaintoopenandsometimesemotionalconflictwiththemembersoftheArabLeague,theUS,andEUmemberstates.Ineffect,ithascontrib-utedtothecoolingofrelationsbetweenRussiaandtheWestandhasdamagedMoscow’simagewithintheArabWorld.

Many interpretations surfaced in apublicdebateon the actual reasons for Russia’s position. Tounderstand the country’s strategy towards theSyrian crisisoneshouldtakethebroadercontextintoconsideration.Twointerrelatedfactorsseemtobecrucialinthisrespect:aperceivedgeopoliti-calchallengeposedbytheregimechangepolicyofthe United States, and a sense of vulnerabilitywithin Russia’s narrow ruling elite, exacerbatedby the domestic political unrest inRussiawhichstartedattheendof2011.Theaimofthispaperisconsequently,firsttosummarizetheessenceoftheRussianapproachtotheSyriancrisis,and,second,to discuss its sources and their geopolitical anddomesticcontext.

“Hands off Syria!” - Russia as al-Assad’s supporter

During the crisis, Russia hasmaintained regulardirect contact with representatives of the al-Assadregime(evenifontheRussiansideithasn’texceeded foreignminister level), and hailed theso-calledpoliticalreformsproclaimedbytheSyr-iangovernment,includingtheamendmentofthe

constitution and a partial amnesty. At the sametime, and onnumerous occasions as the conflictwasescalating,RussiacriticizedtheSyrianopposi-tion,blamingitforbeingincreasinglydominatedbytheradical forcesapplyingterrorism.Moscowalsosubscribedtoblamingtheopposition,notthegovernmentforces,fortheuseofchemicalweaponsduringthelaterstageoftheconflict.

When the al-Assad regime resorted to theuseofmilitaryforcetosuppressgrowingpoliticalunrestinthecountry,Moscowfiercelyresistedinitiativesby the Arab andWestern countries to adopt theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)resolutionscondemningthegovernmentforcesandsuggestingthe possibility of introducingnon-military sanc-tions against Syria (including an arms embargo).Moscowvetoed thedraftUNSC resolutions threetimes,blamingitsauthorsfortheirrefusaltoplaceresponsibilityfortheviolenceontheopposition,forexertingtoomuchpressureontheSyriangovern-ment,andforpavingthewayforpossibleexternalinterventioninSyria.

Unilateral sanctions against Syria applied by theEuropean Union, the US, and Arab states werestrongly criticizedbyMoscow.Whendiplomaticpeace efforts failed and unofficial military sup-portfortheSyrianoppositionbyindividualArabandWestern countries grew, Russia condemneditstrongly.Moscowalsovehementlyopposedtheintroductionofano-flyzoneoverSyria,andcriti-cizedappealsforal-Assadtostepdownonnumer-ousoccasions,suggestingthatitwoulddecreasethechancesofsolvingtheconflict.

Anothervisiblesignofsupportforal-AssadwerethevisitspaidbyRussianwarshipstotheSyrianportofTartusand/orSyrianwaters.Severalsuchvisitsoccurredin2012,startinginJanuarywhentheRus-sianaircraftcarrierAdmiralKuznetsovdockedinTartus.However,sincelateDecember2012,Russianwarships(mostlylandingships)havebeenmakingshuttletripstoandfromTartus.BetweenJanuaryandApril2013,atleastfivenavalvisitshavetakenplace.Apparently,thereweretworeasonsforthis:Clearlyitwasapolitical-militarydemonstrationbyMoscowaimedatdeterringtheUS(andsomeofitsallies)frompossibleactivemilitaryengagementintheSyrianconflict.ButitisalsoplausiblethatthevisitswereusedtodeliverRussianheavyarmamentsfortheSyrianregimeforces.

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 4

Indeed, the arms deliveries have been the mostconcreteandeffectiveindicationofRussia’ssupportfortheal-Assadregime.Giventhesensitivityofthesubjectanddegreeofconfidentialityofthecontractsanddeliveries,it isdifficulttocompileacompleteandaccuratepictureoftheRussianweapontransferstoSyria.1Suchdeliveriesweremadeinsubstantialquantitieslargelyaftercontractssignedinearly2005duringBasharal-Assad’svisittoMoscow.

Afterbeingstronglycriticized,mostlybyWesterngovernmentsandNGOs,ofcontinuingarmsdeliveriestoSyriaduringtheconflict,Moscowmaintainedthatsuchdeliverieswerefirstofalllegal(perfectlytruesinceRussiavetoeddraftUNSCresolutionsstipulatingtheimpositionofanarmsembargoonSyriaanditwasnotboundbytheembargodeclaredbytheEUandtheUS);thattheyweremerelyinexecutionof“old”contracts(probablypartlytruesincethenewcontractforthedeliveryof36Yak-130trainers/com-bataircraft,worth550millionUSD,wasreportedlysignedin2011,buttheplaneswereapparentlynotdelivered);andthattheweaponsdeliveredwereonlydefensive,andimpossibletouseinacivilwar.

Thelastclaimwasuntruesincetheyincludednotonlydefensiveanti-aircraft,anti-shiporanti-tankmissile systems (Buk-M2E, Pechora-2M, PantsirS-1,Bastion-P,Khrizantem,Igla-S-clearlyaimedat strengthening the Syrian regime against anyexternalmilitary intervention)but alsoweaponswhichwere (orcouldbe)used incombatagainsttheoppositionforces(20modernizedMi-25com-bat helicopters).2 Moreover, there were reports

1 Onthismattercf.:TrendsinInternationalArmsTransfers,

2012,SIPRIFactsheet,March2013http://books.sipri.org/

product_info?c_product_id=455.Accessed25April2013;

LettertoRosoboronexportonSyrianweaponssupplies,Hu-

manRightsWatch6April2012,http://www.hrw.org/

news/2012/04/06/letter-rosoboronexport-syrian-weapons-

supplies.Accessed24April2013;DmitryGorenburg,Newre-

portonRussianinterestsinSyria,part2:Russianarmssales,

29.06.2012,http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2012/06/29/

new-report-on-russian-interests-in-syria-part-2-russian-

arms-sales/.Accessed24April2013.

2 DmitryGorenburg,Newreport…,op.cit;SimonShuster,Is

RussiaRunningaSecretSupplyRoutetoArmSyria’sAssad?,

Time,29November2012,http://world.time.com/2012/

11/29/is-russia-running-a-secret-supply-route-to-arm-

syrias-assad/#ixzz2QnPvIkB6.Accessed25April2013.

ofRussian-madeheavymortars and sniper riflesbeing used in combat by the Syrian governmentforces.Severalincidentswerealsorecordedwhencargoships(orplanes)carryingweapons(includingammunition)ontheirwayfromRussiatoSyriawerespottedand/orstopped.TherewerealsoreportsofanunspecifiednumberofRussianmilitaryinstruc-torsbeingpresentinSyria.

In general, Russia’s arms deliveries were highlyvaluable for the Syrian government as they –according to SIPRI estimates – provided 78% ofSyria’s weapon imports between 2007 and 2011.Furthermore,unverifiableassessmentsmadebytheRussianthinktankCASTsuggestedthatthevalueoftheweaponsdeliveredincreasedduringtheconflict(from700millionUSDin2010toatleast960millionUSDin2011).3ForRussia,however,itwasstillnotadominantdirectionsincebothfiguresrepresentedroughly7%ofthetotalexportbytheRosoboronex-portstatemonopoly.

Russia as a “neutral force”?

Russian criticism of the Syrian governmentwasrareandvague. ItwasdeliveredmainlybyPresi-dentDmitriMedvedev in thefirstmonthsof theconflict. After each act of bloodshed committedbygovernmentforcesinSyriancities,theRussianMFAtypicallyissuedstatementsexpressingconcern,quotingbothsidesblamingoneanotherandappeal-ingforbothtorestrainthemselvesoverfurtheruseofviolence.Inextremecases(e.g.themassacreinAl-QubeirnearHamaonJune6,2012),Russiancon-demnationwasfollowedbytheuseofthenotionof“provocation”(whichsuggestedgovernmentforceswerebeingfalselyaccusedoftheatrocities).

Russiaclaimsithasmaintainedregularcontactandengaged in dialogue with the Syrian opposition.However,afterthefirstsuchcontactswithmembers

3 YaakovKatz,RussiasellsdozensofcombataircraftstoDa-

mascus,The Jerusalem Post,23January2012,http://www.

jpost.com/Middle-East/Russia-sells-dozens-of-combat-

aircraft-to-Damascus.Accessed25April2013;Russiacount-

ingonSyriatokeeparmsexportshigh–report,Reuters,31

January2012,http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/uk-

russia-arms-idUKTRE80U1P520120131.Accessed25April

2013.

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 5

oftheSyrianNationalCouncil(thefirst,reportedinJune2011evenbeforetheSNCwasformed,wastermed“unofficial”andonly the second, inmid-November2011,involvedtheRussianforeignmin-ister), theywere discontinued. Instead,MoscowengagedindialoguewithotherSyrianoppositiongroupswhichweren’tsupportiveoftheSNC.Thesewere mostly minor leftist alliances (such as theNationalCoordinationCommitteeforDemocraticChange), marginal or even puppet oppositiongroups.What united all of these was resistancetowards“externalinterference”inSyria.

Therefore,we can regard such a dialogue as partRussianPReffortandpartattempttoplayoutinter-naldifferenceswithintheSyrianopposition.RussiareturnedtotheformalhigherleveldialoguewiththemainstreamSyrianoppositiononlyinNovem-ber2012.Buteventhenitsentmixedsignalstothenewly establishedmain opposition coordinatingbody,theNationalCoalitionfortheSyrianRevolu-tionaryandOppositionForces(NCSROF).

Russia also lent its formal political support tothe numerous peace initiatives. In particular, itsupported the Arab League’s peace initiative inNovember2011,andUNSpecialEnvoyKofiAnnan’s6-point peace plan inMarch 2012. InApril 2012,RussiavotedtwiceinfavourofUNSCresolutionsonsendingArabLeagueobserverstoSyria.Theprob-lemwas,however,thatMoscowresistedexertinganyvisiblepressureontheal-Assadregimetofulfiltheprovisionsoftheseinitiatives,whichturnedouttobeafailure.

Moscowalsoparticipatedinaministerialmeetingon Syria in Geneva in June 2012, which consti-tuted the Action Group on Syria, and endorseda comprehensive peace plan on June 30, whichsubsequentlybecamethemainpointofreferencein Moscow’s official stance on the Syrian crisis.However, during the talks in Geneva, Moscowsucceeded inexcluding fromthedraftdocumentpreparedbytheUNSpecialEnvoythosefragmentswhichincluded:(i)asuggestionforal-Assadtostepdownorpreventthemembersofhisregimefromtakingpart in thenewSyriangovernment, (ii)ademandtotheSyriangovernmenttopullitstroopsoutofthecitiesimmediately,and(iii)aproposaltoadoptthenewUNSCresolution,includinganoptionforsanctions.

RussianconsentonconveningapeaceconferenceonSyria,aimedatbringingthesidesintheconflictintonegotiationwithoutanyprecondition,andwhichfollowedthenewUSSecretaryofStateJohnKerry’svisittoMoscowon7May2013,wasalsofullyinlinewiththepreviousRussianposition.

Challenging the “US conspiracy”: Understanding

the Russian strategy towards the crisis in Syria

ThevariousfactorsinfluencingtheRussianapproachto Syria could be analyzed at three basic levels:global,regionalanddomestic.Inthepublicdebate,regionalfactors,includingtheRussianinterestsinSyriaandRussia’sconcernoverregionalstability,areoftenprioritized.However, greater attentionshouldbepaidtocertainglobalanddomesticfac-tors,especiallyRussianperceptionsoftheUSregimechange policy in connectionwith concerns overinternalpoliticalstabilityinRussia.

Regional factors of Russia’s strategy: Russia’s interests in SyriaItseemstobetheconventionalwisdomthatSyriahasalwaysbeenastateofstrategicimportancetoRussia,anditsstrategicpartnerintheMiddleEast.However,ifwetakeacloserlookatthefactualbasisforsuchaperception,wediscoverthatitisnotnec-essarilythecase.ClosertiesbetweenMoscowandDamascusobviouslypertaintotheSovietpast4whentheUSSR helpedbuild infrastructure (around90objects),educatestudents(35,000,joiningSyria’selite)and,aboveall,deliverweaponstoSyria.

Thetwocountrieswereboundin1980bytheTreatyon Friendship and Cooperation. The end of theColdWarandthesubsequentbreakupoftheSovietUnion in 1991 revealed that Syria was marginalfor the newly created Russian Federation. Tradeturnover plummeted in the 90s from 2.3 billionUSD(perannumin1990)towellbelow100millionUSD(inthemid-90s)sincetheweapondeliverieswerediscontinued (until 1997).Political contactswerescarce.Russiaseemedtobeweak,distantanddisinterested.Whatremainedwasthehugeburdenof Syria’s post-Soviet debt. And there was still

4 Formoreonthiscf.:W.Akhmedov,SirriapriBashareAs-

sadeiperspektivyotnosheniysRossiyei,in:BlizhniyWostok

isovremennost,Moskva2006,pp.205-222.

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 6

Tartus–notaNavybasebutmerelyaLogisticsSup-portPoint(establishedin1984)oftheRussianBlackSeaFleet(notreallyneededsincetheformerSovietNavy’s5thRapidResponseSquadronoperatingintheMediterraneanSeaceasedtoexist).

Thesituationchangedsomewhatintheearly2000s,but the realbreakthroughoccurredonly in2005when thepoliticaldecisionwasmade inMoscowto scrap as much as 74% of Syria’s post-Sovietdebt (then estimated at 13.5 billionUSD). Syriaclearlyreapedthebenefits.Thepoliticaldialogueintensified(withfourvisitsbyBasharal-AssadtoRussiabetween2005and2010).DespiteDamascus’questionablefinancialcredibility,thetradeturnoverrosefrom440millionUSDin2005to1,942millionin2011(amere0.26%ofRussia’sglobaltradeturno-ver),mostlyduetotheRussianarmsdeliveries.

Acloseranalysisofthetradeinarmsshowsthateventhoughitgrewconsiderably,itsrelativeimportancewithin Russia’s portfoliowas limited. Accordingto theUS assessment, arms transfer agreementsbetweenRussiaandSyriarosefrom2.1billionUSDin2003-2006(5.6%ofRussia’stotal)to4.7billionin2007-2010(12.6%ofRussia’stotal),butactualdeliverieswereconsiderablylower:0.4billionUSDin2003-2006(2.06%ofthetotal)and1.2bnUSDin2007-2010(5.76%ofthetotal).5Moreover,accord-ing to some estimates, only 20% of these wereactuallypaid for by the Syrians.Despite the factthatseveralRussiancompanies(Stroygazmontazh,Tatneft’,andSoyuzneftegaz)weregrantedcontractsinSyria,mostlyintheenergysphere,theconcreteoutputwasn’tyet there. Inall,wemayconcludethatevenifRussian-Syrianrelationsvisiblyinten-sified,SyriawasclearlynotapriorityforMoscowpriortothecrisis.

On the otherhand, both strategic and economicconsiderations cannot be excluded as factorsinfluencingRussia’sstrategy.Asearlyas2006,theRussianNavyannounceditsplanstore-establishapermanentpresenceintheMediterraneanSea(reit-eratedatthebeginningof2013).TartuswastreatedinthiscontextasafutureRussiannavalbaseand

5 RichardF.Grimmet,ConventionalArmsTransfersto

DevelopingNations,2003-2010,CongressionalResearch

Service,22September2011,http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

weapons/R42017.pdf.Accessed23April,2013.

somelimitedworkhassubsequentlygotunderwaythere.Asfortheeconomicaspect,almost4billionUSDlostinLibyaaftertheregimechange,whenthearmsdeliverycontractswerediscontinued,werementionedinaRussiandebateonSyria.VladimirPutinalsoclearlyreferredtothisinhisprogrammearticleon foreignpolicy.6 In suchacontext,out-standingRussianarmsdeliverycontractsinSyriaofatleastcomparablewortharenotwithoutinfluenceontheRussianpolicy.

Regional factors of Russia’s strategy: Syria and regional stability NumerousstatementsbytoprepresentativesintheRussiangovernmentclearly indicatedthatRussiawasconcernedabout themounting instability intheregion,includingthespreadofIslamicradical-ism.Itwassuggestedinter aliathattheoverthrowof some state leaders inNorthernAfrica and theMiddle East, especially bymeans of theWesternmilitary engagement in Libya, contributed sig-nificantlytothis.Itmustberemembered,however,thattheRussianoppositiontowardsexertingpres-sureontheal-AssadregimeoccurredwellbeforecertainnegativeconsequencesoftheArabSpringbecamevisible,whetherinLibyaorinSyriaitself.Thisconcerns,amongotherthings,thegrowthofthe role of Islamic radicals in the Syrian-armedopposition,whichbecamediscernibleonlyattheendof2011.Partof theproblemforMoscowwastheparticipationofradicalvolunteersoriginatingfromtheNorthernCaucasusinthecivilwarinSyria,sincetheirpossiblefuturereturntotheregioncouldfurtheraggravatesecurityproblemsintheNorthernCaucasus.

From the perspective of Russian interests in thebroader Middle East, the increase in the role ofTurkeyandespeciallyQatarandSaudiArabiaduetothecrisisinSyriacouldhaveposedanotherproblemasitchallengedtheexistingstatusquoandusheredinmorerivalryoverinfluenceintheregion.PartoftheproblemwasthetendencytowardsashiftintheregionalbalancebetweentheShiaandSunniforcesinfavourofthelatter.TheSyriancrisishasconsoli-datedbutalsoweakenedtheunofficialShianexusofIran,therulingAlawitesinSyria,andHezbollahin

6 VladimirPutin,Rossiyaimenyayushchiysyamir,

MoskovskiyeNovosti,27February2012,http://mn.ru/

politics/20120227/312306749.html.Accessed19April,2013.

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 7

Lebanon,allofwhichhappentobeanti-Americanforces.However,officialMoscowtendedtoremainsilentinthisrespect,eventhoughitsrelationswithQatarbecamevisiblytense.

Global factors of Russia’s strategy: The geopolitical advance of the USAnalysisofthestatementsmadebyVladimirPutinand by conservative-minded Russian officials,researchersandcommentatorssympathetictohim,revealsthattheirattitudetowardstheSyriancrisiswashighlyinfluencedbytheirperceptionoftheUSforeignpolicy.TheybelievethattheUSistryingtoadvancegeopoliticallybyusingthetwoinstrumentsofregimechange:supportforthedomesticopposi-tionintargetedcountriesbysoftpowermeansandtheuseofmilitary force tooverthrowunwantedgovernments.

ManyprominentRussianexpertsonIslamandtheMiddleEast argued that theArabSpringwas theresultofseriousinternalsocio-economicandpoliti-calprocessesandthatexternalactors,includingtheUS,werecaughtoffguardbythefast-developingevents.However, their conservative-mindedcol-leaguesmaintained that it was in fact aUS con-spiracy,well planned and executedwith theuseofmodernmanipulationtechnologies(viamobilephones,internet,socialnetworks,etc.).Theydrewclear parallels between the “colour revolutions”withoverthrowngovernmentsinYugoslavia(2000),Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan(2005),andtheArabSpringascarriedoutbyactiv-iststrainedwiththeuseofAmericanmanuals.7ItseemsthatsuchviewswereinfactsharedbysometopmembersoftheRussianrulingelite.Forexam-ple,inFebruary2011IgorSechin(inhiscapacityas

7 Onbothapproachessee:VitaliyNaumkin,Movingfromthe

bottomupandbackdownagain.TheArabSpringandthe

globalinternationalsystem,Rossiyawglobalnoypolitike,

2August2011http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/

Moving-From-the-Bottom-Up-and-Back-Down-

Again-15327.Accessed21April,2013;V.Naumkin,V.Popov,V.

Kuznetsov(eds.),BlizhniyVostok,Arabskoyeprobuzhdeniye

iRossiya:chtodalshe?,Moskva2012;SarkisTsatu

ryan,StrategiyanenasilstvennogosoprotivleniyanaBlizh-

nemVostokeivSevernoyAfrike:rol’SShA,in:SSha,Kanada.

Ekonomika,politika.kulturaNo.9/2012;Ismaskiy

ekstremizm:otsenkiivozmozhnostiRossiysko-Amerikan-

skogovzaimodeystviya,in:ibidem.

deputyprimeminister) clearlyalluded to thisbysaying:“See,well,whatseniormanagersofGooglehavebeendoinginEgypt,whatkindofmanipula-tionsoftheenergyofthepeopletookplacethere”[sic].8

Forhispart,VladimirPutin(asprimeministeranda candidate in the presidential elections) in hisprogrammearticleonforeignpolicypublishedinFebruary2012,whilelistingthelessonsoftheArabSpring,had this to say on theuse of soft power:“Regrettably,thesemethodsarebeingusedalltoofrequentlytodevelopandprovokeextremist,sepa-ratistandnationalisticattitudes,tomanipulatethepublic and to conduct direct interference in thedomesticpolicyofsovereigncountries”.9

WhatwasveryopenlychallengedwastheUSpolicyontheuseofmilitaryforcetobringaboutregimechange. After theWestern aerial bombardmentsinLibyainMarch2011,VladimirPutinlaunchedatiradeagainsttheUSpolicy,statingthattherewasacleartrendinitfortheunilateraluseofmilitaryforceasapolicyinstrument,judgingbywhathap-penedpreviouslyinYugoslaviain1999,inAfghani-stanin2001,inIraqin2003andcurrentlyinLibya,whichwas reminiscentof theMedieval call for acrusade10(interestingly,Putindidnotdifferentiatebetweenthosecases).ThiswasjustoneexampleofmanysuchstatementsbyPutin,accusingtheUSofapolicyofregimechangebyforce,andofexporting“themissile-and-bombdemocracy”.

Global factors of Russia’s strategy: Responsibility to protect and the global orderIn various statements, Vladimir Putin accusedtheUSofusinghumanitarianpretextsformilitaryengagement.SomeothermembersoftheRussiangovernmentmadeitexplicitlyclearthatitrelatestotheconceptofresponsibilitytoprotect.Theideathatanygovernmentisresponsibleforprotectingitscitizensagainstmassviolenceand,ifitfailstodoso,thattheinternationalcommunityshouldintervene

8 Russia’sSechinDefendsInvestmentClimate,TheWallStreet

Journal,22.02.2011,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014

24052748704476604576158140523028546.html.Accessed21

April,2013.

9 VladimirPutin,Rossiyai…,op.cit.

10 http://www.newsru.com/russia/21mar2011/putin_libya.

html

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 8

with various measures, including military, hasbeenintenselydebatedbydiplomatsandexpertsininternationallawsincetheearly2000s.Russiahasneverformallyandflatlyrejectedthisidea,howeveritwasclearlynotinterestedinmakingitabindingnormofinternationallawandwantedtoseriouslylimititsusage,especiallywhenitcametoprioritiz-ingassistancefortherespectivegovernmentsandsafeguardingtheexclusivecompetenceoftheUNSContheuseof force.11ButMoscowprimarilycriti-cizedandresistedwhatitregardedasattemptbytheWesternandArabcountriestooverusetheconceptformilitaryintervention,especiallyintheeventofcrisesinthecountriesaffectedbytheArabSpring.

Russia’s seriousness in this respect is evident inthefactthatawholepassagewaspresentedonthematterinthenewRussianForeignPolicyConceptsignedbyPresidentPutininFebruary2013:“Itisunacceptablethatmilitaryinterventionsandotherformsofinterferencefromwithout,whichunder-mine the foundations of international law basedontheprincipleofsovereignequalityofstates,becarried out on the pretext of implementing theconceptof‘responsibilitytoprotect’”.12ThereasonbehindsuchaRussianapproachshouldbeconsid-ered,however,notonlyinthecontextofitsvisionoftheglobalorder,butalsointhedomesticpoliticalcontextinRussia.

Domestic factors behind Russia’s strategyThedomesticpoliticalcontextalsoarousedconcernamongrepresentativesof theRussianrulingeliteovertheArabSpring ingeneral,andthecrisis inLibyaandSyriainparticular.TheArabSpringsud-denlyeruptedattheendof2010andthebeginningof2011ataverydelicatemomentinRussianpolitics:

11 Formoreonthissee:GennadiyGatilov,Opytkrizisnogo

reagirovaniya,ilikogoobyazanozashchishchat’mezhdun-

arodnoyesoobshchestvo?,Rossiyawglobalnoypolitike

6November2012,http://interaffairs.ru/read.php?item=8883.

Accessed20April,2013;OlgaLabyuk,”Otvetstvennost’po

zashchite”ipravonavmeshatelstvo,MezhdunarodnyePro-

cessyvol.6,No.3(18)/2008,http://www.intertrends.ru/

eighteenth/007.htm.Accessed20,April2013.

12 ConceptoftheForeignPolicyoftheRussianFederation,

ApprovedbyPresidentoftheRussianFederationV.Putinon

12February2013,http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.

nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014

c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument.Accessed19April,2013.

aboutayearbeforetheparliamentary(December2011)andpresidential(March2012)elections.

Atthattime,PresidentDmitriMedvedevwassend-ingoutsignalsthathewouldliketoremaininofficeforyetanother term.Hekeptpresentinghimselfasaproponentofliberalvalues,ofthemoderniza-tionofRussiaandofconstructivecooperationwiththeWestintheinternationalarena.Thiswasalsoreflectedinhisattitudetowardsthedevelopmentsintheregion.InFebruary2011hecondemnedLibyanleaderMuammarGaddafiforusingforceagainstthecivilianpopulation(anunnamedaideevenleakedtothepresshisopinionthatGaddafiwasapoliticalcorpse).

Medvedev also instructed Russian diplomats toabstainduringcrucialvotingon17March,2011onUNSC resolution 1973 on theno-fly zone in Libya,allowingtheuseofforcetoprotectthecivilianpopu-lation,andsubsequentlypubliclyreprimandedPrimeMinisterPutinforcriticizingthedocumentanditsimplementation.WhenitcametoSyria,Medvedevwarnedal-AssadinearlyAugust2011thatifhedidn’tundertakethenecessarypoliticalreforms,hewouldface“asadfate”andRussia“wouldbeforcedtotakesomedecisions”.13 Such statementswere in starkcontrast to thoseofVladimirPutin.However, thesituationendedwiththeannouncementofPutin’scandidacyforpresidencyinSeptember2011.

The announcementwas greetedwith disappoint-mentwithin themore liberal-minded sectors ofRussiansociety.WhentheparliamentaryelectiontookplaceinDecember2011andnumerouscitizenobserverreportsrevealedirregularitiesanddown-right falsification,mass public protests suddenlyerupted in Russia, reminiscent of the very firstprotestsduringtheArabSpring.

VladimirPutin and conservativemembers of theRussianrulingelite,caughtoffguard,clearlybecameconcerned.Moreover,theyseemedtobelievethataUSconspiracywasafoot,withtheaimofcarryingoutanother‘colourrevolution’andwithsightssetonaregimechange,thistimeinRussia.VladimirPutinopenlyaccusedtheUSStateDepartmentofincitingtheprotests.Accordingtohim,someofits

13 InterviewofPresidentDmitriMedvedev,5August2011,

http://www.kremlin.ru/news/12204.Accessed15May,2013.

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 9

organizersacted“inaccordancewithawell-knownscenario”andahastycritiqueoftheelectionsbyUSSecretaryofStateHillaryClinton“setthetoneforsomeactivists”and“gavethemasignal;theyheardthissignalandstartedactivework,withthesup-portoftheStateDepartment”.14EventhoughthewaveofprotestbegantosubsideaftertheMay2012inaugurationofVladimirPutin,thefearofexternalinterferencehaspersistedwithintheRussiangov-ernment,revealedforexamplewhenjustifyingthecrackdownonthoseNGOswhichreceivedWesternfunding.

Yetanotherlinkexistedbetweenthesituationintheso-calledArabSpringcountries (includingSyria)andthatinRussia.ItisquitepossiblethatVladimirPutin and like-minded members of the Russianelite may have believed in a domino effect: the“US-made”ArabSpring, followedby themilitaryinterventioninLibya,andaregimechangeinSyriaasapreludetotheencirclementandsubsequentUS/IsraeliattackonIran15,withtheprocesseventually

14 RIANovosti8.12.2011(video)http://ria.ru/politics/

20111208/510441056.html.Accessed25April,2013.

15 TheoutspokenformerRussianambassadortoNATO,

DmitriyRogozin,justbeforehispromotiontothepostof

deputyprimeministerresponsibleforthedefenceandspace

industry,suggestedinaninterviewthattheplanningofa

WesternmilitarycampaignagainstbothSyriaandIranwas

alreadyunderway.Izvestya,3August2011http://izvestia.ru/

news/496371.Accessed20April,2013.

beingextendedtoRussiaitself.DuringhisMarch2011 visit to the Votkinsk plant (where Russianintercontinental ballisticmissiles are produced),PutincriticizedthebombardmentofLibya,stating:“Today’seventsagainprovethatwearerightinwhatwedo instrengtheningRussia’sdefencecapabili-ties”.Evenifwetakehiswordsaspurerhetoric,itreveals thedeep suspicion that exists inMoscowtowardstheperceivedUSpolicyofregimechangeasachallengetoRussia.

This way of thinking can be summarized in thewordsoftheheadoftheForeignRelationsCommit-teeoftheStateDuma,AlexeiPushkov,aninfluentialpoliticalcommentator:“USforeignpolicyisaimedatneutralizingallfactorswhichcreateobstaclestotheAmericanglobalstrategy.Asaresult,inthelasttwelveyearstheUnitedStateshasconductedfourwarsinvariousregions.InYugoslaviaitwasMilo-sevicwhowasanobstacle.InIraq,itwasSaddamHussein.InLibya,Gaddafi.NowAssadinSyriaposesanobstacleforthem.Today,yetanotherwarisbeingprepared–againstIran,whichisalsoanobstaclefortheUS.Andwe[Russia]arealsoanobstacleforthem.Ideally,theUSwouldliketoisolateuswhenitcomestoSyria,butthisisimpossible”.16

16 AlexeiPushkov,Nedat’sebyaprizhat’.Glavnyevyzowy

dlaRossiyi,RossiyskayaGazeta,8May2012,http://www.

rg.ru/2012/05/08/pushkov.html.Accessed20April,2013.

the Russian aircraft carrier

Admiral Kuznetsov close

to the uK on its way to the

syrian port of tartus. this visit

marked the beginning of a

period of an intensive Russian

military presence around syria.

photo: Ministry of defence

of the united Kingdom.

the finnish institute of inteRnAtionAl AffAiRs 10

Conclusion

Despite some negative consequences of Russia’sapproachtothecrisisinSyria,suchasacoolingofrelationswiththeWestandcertainArabstatesaswell as a tarnished image,Moscow’smajor goalshavebeenachievedforthetimebeing.NoforeignmilitaryinterventionorregimechangehastakenplaceinSyria.TakingintoaccountRussia’sstrategy,butabovealltheperceptionofthesituationamongthetopRussianelite,weshouldnotexpectMoscowtochangeitscurrentposition.

Evenifthereareclearrisksconnectedwithprolong-ingtheconflict,Moscowseemstobelievethiscon-stitutesalesserevilcomparedtoaregimechange,whichwouldbringforcesperceivedaspro-Westernto rule the country. Consequently, the possible“Lebanization”ofSyria(dividingthecountryintozonescontrolledbythevariousforces)seemstobeanacceptablescenarioforMoscow.However,Russiawouldsupportpeaceinitiatives,includingapossi-bletrucemonitoredbyUNobservers,asitwouldfreezethestatusquo.Takingtheaforementionedinto account, the scope for possible cooperationbetweentheWestandRussiaonSyriaseemstobeverylimited,unlesstheWestabandonsitssupportforaregimechangeinSyria.

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