Responsibility Citizenship and Criminal Law

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Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law Page 1 of 25 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy ). Subscriber: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru (PUCP); date: 30 April 2015 University Press Scholarship Online Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law R.A. Duff and Stuart Green Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780199559152 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001 Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law RA Duff (Contributor Webpage) DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0007 Abstract and Keywords This chapter starts with a claim about a central, distinctive purpose of criminal law — one that helps distinguish criminal law from other modes of legal regulation. It argues that a distinctive and proper purpose of our criminal law has to do with accountability and the attribution of responsibility. Section 2 discusses the kind of community that our criminal law — criminal law of a kind apt for a liberal republic — requires, and argues that in the context of the domestic criminal law of nation states (still the salient paradigm of criminal law) it is the community of citizens. Anyone who gives citizenship this central significance faces a range of objections, to the effect that such a conception of criminal law cannot do justice to transnational criminal law, to the status of non-citizens who are either permanent residents of or temporary visitors, or to the status of citizens who may find themselves excluded from full membership of the polity; that it fosters a dangerous distinction between an exclusive group of ‘citizens’, who are full members of the polity and receive all the protections that the criminal law offers both victims and off enders,

description

Responsabilidad de la sociedad y Derecho Penal

Transcript of Responsibility Citizenship and Criminal Law

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    UniversityPressScholarshipOnlineOxfordScholarshipOnline

    PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLawR.A.DuffandStuartGreen

    Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199559152PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

    Responsibility,Citizenship,andCriminalLawRADuff(ContributorWebpage)

    DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0007

    AbstractandKeywords

    Thischapterstartswithaclaimaboutacentral,distinctivepurposeofcriminallawonethathelpsdistinguishcriminallawfromothermodesoflegalregulation.Itarguesthatadistinctiveandproperpurposeofourcriminallawhastodowithaccountabilityandtheattributionofresponsibility.Section2discussesthekindofcommunitythatourcriminallawcriminallawofakindaptforaliberalrepublicrequires,andarguesthatinthecontextofthedomesticcriminallawofnationstates(stillthesalientparadigmofcriminallaw)itisthecommunityofcitizens.Anyonewhogivescitizenshipthiscentralsignificancefacesarangeofobjections,totheeffectthatsuchaconceptionofcriminallawcannotdojusticetotransnationalcriminallaw,tothestatusofnon-citizenswhoareeitherpermanentresidentsofortemporaryvisitors,ortothestatusofcitizenswhomayfindthemselvesexcludedfromfullmembershipofthepolity;thatitfostersadangerousdistinctionbetweenanexclusivegroupofcitizens,whoarefullmembersofthepolityandreceivealltheprotectionsthatthecriminallawoffersbothvictimsandoffenders,

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    andawidergroupofoutsiders,ofactualorpotentialenemies,towhomsuchmembershipandprotectionaredenied.SuchobjectionsareaddressedinSection3,anditisarguedthatalthoughtheconceptofcitizenshipcanbegiventhisunacceptablyexclusionarysignificance,weneednotdoso:wecanandshouldretrieveamoreinclusionaryconceptionofliberalcitizenshipthatcanstructureanormativelyplausiblepictureofcriminallaw.

    Keywords:criminallaw,accountability,responsibility,citizenship,salientparadigm

    Itwouldberashtopositasingle,determinatepurposeorfunctionasthepurposeorfunctionofcriminallaw.Thatwouldbemisguidedasaninterpretiveclaimaboutexistingsystemsofcriminallaw:wecannotunderstandasetofinstitutionalpracticeswithaslongandcomplexahistoryasthosethatconstitutethecriminallawofanydevelopedpolityintermsofanysinglepurposeorfunction.Itmightseemmoretemptingtopositsomeunitarypurposeasamatterofnormativetheory:toargue,forinstance,thatthepurposeofcriminallawistomaximizedominion,1ortoachieveretributivejusticebysecuringthepunishmentofmoralwrongdoers.2Icannotarguethepointhere,butbelievethatsuchnormativeclaimsarealsountenable:anyplausiblenormativetheoryofcriminallawwillbecomplexandmessy,3positing(p.126) acollectionofpurposesthatcannotfittogetherintoatidywhole.Thischapterstartswithalessambitiousclaim:notaboutthepurpose,butaboutacentral,distinctivepurposeofcriminallawonethathelpsdistinguishcriminallawfromothermodesoflegalregulation.

    Myclaimismodestinanotherway.Topositeithertheorapurposeofcriminallawmightbetakentomakeaclaimaboutallsystemsofcriminallaw,atalltimesinallplaces;butImakenosuchclaimhere.Mystartingpointismorelocal,withoursystemsofcriminallaw,ratherthanwithcriminallawassuch.Thatidentifyingdescription(oursystems)isdeliberatelyvague:Ileaveopenthequestionofhowwideitsextensionmightbe,ofhowlargeawecanjoininthediscussionofthepurposesofourcriminallaw.Ibeginwithanimagined(thoughIhopenotimaginary)groupofpotentialinterlocutors:oftheoristswhoworkwithinthebroadtraditionsofWesternliberalism,andcitizens(includingtheorists)wholiveinpolitiesthataspiretobeliberaldemocracies.Itwouldbeasubstantialachievementtoengage,andtosecureeitheragreementorfruitfuldisagreement,withaweofthatscope.Wemustalsohopethattheconversationcanexpandandonetaskforlegaltheoristsistoseehowfaritcanexpand,andwhichotherconversationstheycanjoin.Butmypresentconcerniswiththeearlierstagesofthatprocesswithwhatarelativelylimitedwecansayaboutoursystemsofcriminallaw.

    Adistinctiveandproperpurposeofourcriminallawhastodo,Iwillargueinsection1,withaccountabilityandtheattributionofresponsibility.Thecriminallawprovidestheinstitutionalframeworkwithinwhich,andproceduresthroughwhich,perpetratorsofpublicwrongscanbecalledtoaccount(heldresponsible)forthosewrongs.Suchapracticeofcallingtoaccountispossible,however,onlywithinanormativecommunitytowhichbothcalledandcallerscanbesaidtobelong.Insection2Iwilldiscussthekindofcommunitythatourcriminallaw,criminallawofakindaptforaliberalrepublic,requires,andarguethatinthecontextofthedomesticcriminallawofnationstates(stillthesalient

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    paradigmofcriminallaw)itisthecommunityofcitizens.Anyonewhogivescitizenshipthiscentralsignificancefacesarangeofobjections,totheeffectthatsuchaconceptionofcriminallawcannotdojusticetotransnationalcriminallaw,tothestatusofnon-citizenswhoareeitherpermanentresidentsofortemporaryvisitors,ortothestatusofcitizenswhomayfindthemselvesexcludedfromfullmembershipofthepolity;thatitfostersadangerousdistinctionbetweenanexclusivegroupofcitizens,whoarefullmembersofthepolityandreceivealltheprotectionsthatthecriminallawoffersbothvictimsandoffenders,andawidergroupofoutsiders,ofactualorpotentialenemies,towhomsuchmembershipandprotectionaredenied.Iwillfacesuchobjectionsinsection3,andwillarguethatalthoughtheconceptofcitizenshipcanbegiventhisunacceptablyexclusionarysignificance,weneednotdoso:wecanandshouldretrieveamoreinclusionaryconceptionofliberalcitizenshipthatcanstructureanormativelyplausiblepictureofcriminallaw.

    (p.127) 1ANSWERINGFORCRIME4Thecriminallaw,initssubstantivedimension,definescertaintypesofconductascriminal(anddefinescertaindefencesforthosewhocommitsuchcriminalconduct).Insodoing,itdefinesandcondemnssuchconductaswrong:notmerely,andtrivially,aslegallywrong,asabreachoftherulesofthisparticulargame,butasmorallywronginawaythatshouldconcernthosetowhomitspeaks,andthatwarrantsthefurtherconsequences(trial,conviction,andpunishment)thatitattachestosuchconduct.Tosaythatitdefinessuchconductaswrongisnot,however,tosaythatitcreatesthatwrongfulness:althoughitistriviallytruethatcriminalconductiscriminallywrongfulonlybecausethecriminallawsodefinesit,itissubstantivelyfalsetosaythatsuchconductismorallywrongfulonlybecausethecriminallawdefinesitaswrong.Thecriminallawdoesnot(cannot)turnconductthatwasnotalreadywrongfulintoamoralwrong:itdoesnotdetermine,butpresupposes,themoralwrongfulnessoftheconductthatitdefinesascriminal;itdetermineswhichpre-criminalwrongsshouldcountaspublicwrongswhoseperpetratorsaretobecalledtopublicaccount.Itsadjectivaldimensionthenspecifiestheproceduresthroughwhichthoseaccusedofperpetratingsuchwrongsarecalledtoaccount:thecriminaltrial,astheformalculminationofthecriminalprocess,summonsadefendanttoanswertoachargeofpublicwrongdoing,andtoanswerforthatwrongdoingifitisproved;ifhecannotofferanexculpatoryanswer,heisconvictedandthuscondemnedasawrongdoer.Finally,initspenaldimension,thecriminallawprovidesforthedeterminationandadministrationofpunishmentsforthoseconvictedofsuchpublicwrongdoing.

    Tospelloutthisconceptionofcriminallawinalittlemoredetail,wecanbeginwiththefamiliarrangeofso-calledmalainsecrimesconsistinginconductwhose(supposed)moralwrongfulnessislargelyindependentofthelaw.Wedonotneedthecriminallawtotellusthatrape,murder,andotherattacksonthepersonarewrong.Itrathertakesforgrantedourpre-criminalunderstandingoftheseaswrongsfromwhichwealreadyhavegoodreasontorefrain,andidentifiesthemaswrongsthatarepublicinthesensethattheyarethebusinessofthewholepolityandrequireapublicresponsefromthepolity.5Thesalientpurposeofcriminallaw,onthisview,isnotdirectlytoguideconduct(although

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    theprospectofcriminalliabilitymighthavethateffect,andsecuringthateffectmightbeaproperpurposeforcriminallaw);it(p.128) istoprovideforanappropriateformal,publicresponsetothepre-legallywrongfulconductthatitdefinesascriminal.Thatresponseincludespoliceaction,preventiveandinvestigative;prosecutorialactionindecidingwhetherandhowtopursueallegedoffenders;courtactionintryingallegedoffendersandsentencingconvictedoffenders;andpunitiveactioninpunishingsentencedoffenders.Whatiscentraltoit,however,isholdingallegedpublicwrongdoerstopublicaccount.(Bypublicwrongs,andholdingtopublicaccount,Idonotreferonlytowrongscommittedinpublicorhavingadirectimpactonthepublic,oronlytocallingstoaccountconductedinpublic,likecriminaltrialsinopencourt.Adomesticassaultcommittedinthehomeisasmuchapublicwrongasanassaultcommittedinapublicstreet,sinceitisasmuchawrongthatproperlyconcernsallmembersofthepolity:tocallawrongpublicinthissenseisnottogiveareasonforthepublictotakeaninterestinit,buttoexpressthejudgmentthatitistheirbusiness.6Anoffenderwhoreceivesaformalcaution,oraprosecutor'sfine,7withoutgoingtocourtisstillcalledtopublicaccount,byanauthorizedpublicofficial,whoseactionsaresubjecttopublicscrutiny,actingonbehalfandinthenameofthepolity.)

    Itmightseemthatevenifthisaccountofcriminallawcandealwithmalainse,itcannotcopewithso-calledmalaprohibita,whichareorthodoxlyunderstoodasoffencesconsistinginconductthatisnotwrongfulpriortoitslegalproscription.8Butitcanmakeroomformalaprohibita(thoughweshouldnotexpectittojustifythevastrangeofsuchoffencesfoundinourexistinglaws)oncewedistinguishthequestionofregulationfromthatofcriminalization.Therearetworoutestocriminalizationmoreprecisely,tworoutestothedeterminationthatwehavegoodreasoninprincipletocriminalizeaparticulartypeofconduct(thequestionofwhetherweshould,allthingsconsidered,criminalizethatconductraisesfurtherverycomplexissues).Onebeginswithwrongfulness:weaskofsomekindofpre-legallywrongfulconductwhetheritinvolvesatypeofwrongthatisinprinciplethepolity'sbusiness,andthatmeritspubliccondemnationasawrong;wethusidentifyacategoryofpotentialmalainse.9Theotherroutestartswithadecisionthatwehave(p.129) reasontoregulateaparticulartypeofconduct,areasonthatdoesnotdependonthewrongfulnessofsuchconduct.Wehavegoodreason,forinstance,toregulatedriving;andwhilesomeoftheregulationsthatwemayintroducewillbegroundedinpre-legalmoraldemands(asspeedlimitsaregroundedinthedemandtodrivesafely),others(suchasregulationsconcerningdrivinglicencesorvehicleregistration)cannotbeseenasformalizedversionsofsuchmoraldemandsindeed,itis,oftenimpossibletoengageintheconductprohibitedbytheregulationpriortotheregulation'sexistence.Nowsuchregulationsmustofcoursebejustifiedbyshowing,aswithanylegalregulation,thattheyserveanaspectofthecommongood.Butthatjustificationneednotbegroundedinthesupposedpre-legalwrongfulnessoftheconductinquestion;norhaveweyetaskedhowtheregulationsshouldbeenforced,orhowweshouldrespondtobreachesofthem.Thequestionofcriminalizationcomesuponlywhenweaskthatlatterquestion;andwehavegoodreasontocriminalizesuchbreachesifandonlyif,giventheregulationanditsjustification,abreachofitconstitutesamoralwrongforwhichtheperpetratorshouldbecalledto

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    publicaccount.10

    Thatiswhyitismisleadingtosay(asitisoftensaid)thatthesubstantivecriminallawconsistsinprohibitions:forthatimpliesthatthecriminallawseekstomakewrongwhatwasnotwrongbefore,ortoofferusnewreasons(reasonsgroundedinitsauthorityorpower)torefrainfromtheconductthatitcriminalizes.Whatisdistinctiveaboutcriminallaw,whatmarksitoutfromothermodesoflegalregulation,isthatratherthanprohibitingorrequiringconduct,itdefinescertaintypesofconductthatarealreadysupposedlywrongfulaswrongsofakindthatcallforaparticularkindofresponsearesponsethatformallycondemnsthatconduct,andthatseekstocallitsperpetratortopublicaccount:criminallawisfocusedonthepolity'sformalresponsetotheconductwithwhichitdeals.

    Itisthussignificantfromthisperspectivethatcriminalcodesarenottypicallycastinthelanguageofprohibitions:theyrathertellusthatapersonisguiltyofaspecifiedoffenceif(ModelPenalCode);orcommitsanoffenceif(astandardformulainEnglishstatutes);orthat[w]hoeveractsinaspecifiedwayshallbeliabletoaspecifiedpunishment(GermanStrafgesetzbuch);orthatcertainkindsofactconstituteaspecifiedoffence,orarepunishedbyaspecifiedkindanddegreeofsentence(FrenchCodePnal).

    Itmightseemthatwhatismostdistinctiveofthecriminallaw'sresponsetocrimeisthatitinvolvespunishment:thisisexplicitintheformulationsofFrenchandGermanlaw,andisperhapsimplicitintheformulationsofEnglishandAmericanlaw.Itistruethatpunishmentisasignificantaspectofourformalresponsesto(p.130) crime:anyadequatetheoryofcriminallawmusteitherexplainthelegitimizingrationaleofpunishmentorshowhowcriminallawcandowithoutit.Butthecriminalprocessthatconnectscrimetopunishmentisanindependentlysignificantdimensionoftheformalresponseforwhichthecriminallawprovides.Acriminaltrial(themostpubliclyvisiblemanifestationofthecriminalprocess)isnotjustaprocedurethroughwhichpunishmentsareallocatedtothosewhosupposedlydeservethem.Itisbestunderstoodasaprocessthroughwhichallegedoffendersarecalledtoanswerortoaccount:toanswertothechargeofwrongdoing(initiallybypleadingGuiltyorNotGuilty);andthen,iftheprosecutionprovesthattheycommittedtheoffencecharged,toanswerforthatcommissioneitherbyofferinganexculpatorydefence,orbyacceptingthecondemnationthataconvictionexpresses.11

    Thecriminalprocessisnottheonlylegalprocessthroughwhichpeoplemaybecalledtoanswer.Somecivilcaseshavethischaracter,atleastintheeyesandintentionofthosewhobringthem:theiraimisnotsomuchtosecurethecompensationthatprovidestheirsuit'sformalfocus,astobringtoaccountthosewhomtheyholdresponsibleforthelosstheyhavesuffered.First,however,acivilcaseisformallyfocusedonprovidingremediesratherthanoncallinganyonetoaccount:thequestioniswhoshouldbearthecostoftheharmthatmustberepairedoraverted.Second,theformalfocusisonharmsratherthanwrongs:eveniffault,andthuswrongdoing,isaconditionofcivilliability,thefocusisonpayingfortheharmforwhichthedefendantisculpablyresponsibleratherthanonthewrongfulnessofhisconduct.12Third,thecaseisbroughtbytheallegedlyinjured

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    claimant:althoughthelawenableshertopursuethecomplaint,itishercase;itistoherthatthedefendant(ifliable)owesexplanation,apology,andcompensation.Inmanycriminalcasesthereisalsoadirectvictimtowhomthedefendantowessomething,13andthereismuchtobesaidabouttheroleofvictimsinthecriminalprocess:butthecaseisbroughtbythestateorthepolity,notbythedirectvictim;thedefendantiscalledtoanswerbyandto,not(just)thedirectvictim,butthewholepolity.Thatistheforceofcallingcrimespublicwrongs:theyarewrongsinwhichthewholepolitytakesaproperinterest,notsimplybyprovidingtheinstitutionsthroughwhichvictimscanpursuetheiroffenders,asthecivillawdoes,butbycallingtheoffendertoanswerforawrongthatispublicratherthanprivate.

    Ifthisisright,however,itraisesafurtherimportantquestionaboutthecriminallaw:whocallstheallegedwrongdoerstoaccount;towhommusttheyanswer?

    (p.131) 2CRIMINALLAWANDCIVICCOMMUNITYAcentralpurposeofcriminallawwhichdistinguishesitfromothermodesoflegalregulationistoprovideforthosewhocommitpublicwrongstobecalledtopublicaccountforwhattheyhavedone.Nowanyaccountofcriminallawraisesquestionsaboutwhohastheauthoritytodowhattowhom:whetherweseecriminallawas,forinstance,atechniqueforpreventingharmbydeterringorincapacitatingpotentialharmcausers,orasamethodofensuringthatwrongdoerssufferthepunishmentstheydeserve,wemustasknotonlywhoshouldbesubjecttothecriminallaw'scoerciveattention,butwhoisauthorizedtocoercethem,inwhosename.Anaccountfocusedoncallingtoaccountraisessuchquestionsverydirectly.Wemustask,ofcourse,whoiscalledtoaccount;andtheobviousfirstanswerthosewhocommitpublicwrongscannotbeafullanswer,sinceanyplausiblecriminalprocessmustalsosummonsomeinnocentstoanswertocriminalcharges.Soweneedanaccountoftheconditionsgivenwhichpeoplewhomightwellbe(andmustbepresumedtobe)innocentmaybesubjectedtoinvestigationandprosecution;oftheproceduresthroughwhichpeoplemaybecalledtoanswer;andtheconditionsgivenwhichtheymaybeconvicted.Butwemustalsoaskby,andtowhom,theyarecalledtoaccount.Foraccountingisatwo-wayrelationship:AiscalledtoanswerbyandtoB,whoclaimstherightthustoholdAtoaccount.WhenAisthedefendantinacriminaltrial,whoorwhatisB?

    Furthermore,apracticeofcallingtoaccountpresupposesacommunitytowhichcallerandcalledbelong,withinwhichthisprocessmakessense.Moreprecisely,itmustpresupposealinguisticandnormativecommonality;andasubstantialcommunity,thoughnotnecessarilyonetowhichcallerandcalledbothfullybelong.

    ItmustpresupposesomelinguisticandnormativecommonalitybecausewhenBcallsAtoanswer,thelegitimacy(indeed,theintelligibility)ofthatcallingdependsonAbeingabletounderstandandrespond:itmakesnosensetocallsomeonetoanswerifthatpersoncannotdoso.14Butthecalling(andanswering)mustthenbeconductedinalanguagethat,evenifitisnotAs(orBs)ownlanguage,isaccessibletohimeitherdirectlyor,failingthat,throughaninterpreter.ItalsorequiresthatthevaluesbyreferencetowhichAiscalledtoaccount,thevaluesthatheisaccusedofviolating,areaccessibletohimas

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    valuesthathecouldmakehisown.WecallAtoaccountfordoingsomethingthatheshouldnot,weclaim,havedone,ieforactingashehadgoodreasonnottoact;butwecansaythatAoughtto,orhasgoodreasonto,onlyifthatreasontoiswithinAsconceptualandmotivationalgrasp.15(p.132) Furthermore,incallingAtoaccountweseekaresponsefromhimananswerthatmightinvolveadenialthatheactedasweallege;oradenialthatheviolatedthevaluestowhichweappeal;orareasoneddenialofthosevalues;oranexplanationofhisactionwhich,whilstadmittingthatheactedagainstthereasonsthatwecite,seekstojustifyorexcusehisaction;oranadmissionthatheactedwrongly,andanapologeticexplanationofhisconductwhichdoesnotseektoexculpatehim.Butwhateverkindofanswerheistogive,hewillbeabletogiveitonlyifhecanunderstandthechargetowhichitistobeananswer:onlyifhecanunderstand,thatis,notmerelywhateverfactualclaimswemakeaboutwhathedid,butthevaluestowhichouraccusationappeals,andrecognizethosevaluesasimaginablesourcesofreasonsforaction.

    Iwon'tspendlongerontheneedforthiskindoflinguisticandnormativecommonalitybetweencallerandcalledhere,becauseourconcerniswithamoresubstantialrequirementofcommunityasaframeworkwithinwhichpeoplecanbecalledtoaccount.

    Callingtoaccountinvolvesarelationshipbetweencallerandcalled:arelationshipwhich,thoughitmightbetransformedbythecalling(andanswering),cannotbecreatedexnihilobythisinteraction.TheremustbesomerelationshipbetweenBwhocallsandAwhoiscalledthatgivesBtherightorthestandingthustocallA:somerelationshipthatmakesAsallegedwrongdoingBsbusiness,andthatentitlesBtomakethisdemand.Thisisacentralaspectofourdealingswitheachotherthatnoteverythingiseveryone'sbusiness.Ifyouseemeinacafe,eatingalargehamburgerwithdoublechips,youmightthinkthatIambeingimprudentwithmyhealth;butifyoutakeitonyourselftoapproachmeandcallmetoaccountformybehaviour,Imightreasonablyrespond,notbyansweringtoyouformyconduct(explaining,justifying,excusingmybehaviour,oradmittingitsimprudence),butbysayingthatitisnoneofyourbusiness.Ianswertosomepeopleformydietarymisconductmyfamily,mydoctor,perhapsmyfriends;butIamnotanswerabletoyou,apassingstranger.16ToshowthatAisbeinglegitimatelycalledtoaccount,wemustshownotjustthatthereissomethingforwhichheshouldhavetoanswer,butthatthosewhocallhimhavethestandingtodosothatitistheirbusiness.Wemustthereforeunderstandjustwhoiscallingthedefendanttoaccountinacriminaltrial;onlythencanweaskwhethertheyhavetheappropriatestanding.

    ItmightseemthatIamexaggeratingtheproblemhere.Ihavearguedthatcriminallawisconcernedwithmoralwrongdoing(ofcertainkinds);butwhilstmydietaryorotherspeciesofimprudencemightnotbeastranger'sthebusiness,surelymoral(p.133)wrongdoingisthebusinessofeverymoralagent.17Sowhatgivesusstandingtocallcriminaloffenderstoaccountisthefactthatweareallmembersofthebroad,indeeduniversal,communityofmoralagents.SuchaviewisimpliedbyMoore'saccountofthefunctionofcriminallawtopunishallandonlythosewhoaremorallyculpableinthedoingofsomemorallywrongfulact:18ifanactionismadeeligibleforthecriminallaw's

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    attentionbyitsculpableimmorality,itisthebusinessofallmoralagents.Onequestionthatthissuggestionprovokesiswhethermoralwrongdoingisalwaysthebusinessofallmoralagents.Thatseemstrueofthemostegregiousmoralwrongs:ifIseeorbecomeawareofamurder,arape,aviolentassault,aseriousfraud,Icannotsaythatitisnoneofmymoralbusinessandliterallyormetaphoricallypassonby;Ihavereasontointervene,ortotakestepstosecureinterventionbyothers.19ButtherearemanywrongsinrelationtowhichbothwrongdoerandvictimcanreasonablyrebuffanintervenerwithsomeversionofIt'snotyourbusiness:thewrongdoercanarguethatheisnotanswerabletothisstranger;norcanweplausiblyexplainthisbysayingthatwhilstanyothermoralagenthasreasontointervene,countervailingreasonsoftenmakeinterventiononbalanceinadvisable.IfIregularlyfailtobuymyroundforthefriendswithwhomIdrink,thatistheirbusiness;butitisnoteveninprinciplethebusinessofthepassingstrangerwhohappenstohearaboutit.

    However,evenifallmoralwrongdoingisinprinciplethebusinessofallmoralagents,thisdoesnotprovideaplausibleaccountofwhosebusinesscrimeis:ofwhohasthestandingtocallcriminalwrongdoerstoaccount.For,first,thecriminallawisnotproperlyconcernedwitheverykindofmoralwrongdoing:ofsomemattersitisappropriatetosay,inaliberalpolity,thattheyare,inbriefandcrudeterms,notthelaw'sbusiness.20Itcouldbearguedthatalthoughallmoralwrongsareinprinciplethecriminallaw'sbusiness(thereisgoodreasontocriminalizethemsothattheirperpetratorscanbecalledtoaccount),formanykindsofmoralwrongtherearepersuasivecountervailingreasonsagainstcriminalization:21butitseemsasimplausibletosaythatthereisreasontocriminalizemyfailuretobuyaroundastosaythatitisanyone'smoralbusinessexceptmyfriends.(p.134)

    Second,domesticcriminallawislimitednotmerelyinthekindsofwrongoverwhichitclaimsjurisdiction,butinthejurisdictionitclaimsevenoverthekindsofwrongwithwhichitdeals.IfaPolishcitizenattacksaFrenchcitizeninGermany,thatisnotacrimeforwhichhecouldbetriedorconvictedinanEnglishcourt,evenifhehappenedtocometoEngland,andsufficientevidenceforaconvictionwasavailableinEngland.Hemightbearrested,andextraditedtofacetrialinGermany:22buttoextraditesomeoneisnottocallhimtoanswerinthejurisdictionfromwhichheisextradited;itistoassistanotherjurisdictioninholdinghimtoaccountunderitslaws.

    Itmightbearguedthatthisisamatterofpragmaticconvenience(andofinternationalpolitics).Whatultimatelymattersisthatwrongdoersbebroughttoaccount,butitissensiblethatthosewhoarebestplacedtodischargethistaskshouldtakechargeofit;whenproperlyfunctioningnationstatesareableandwillingtodealwithwrongscommittedwithintheirterritory,theyshouldbeallowedsovereigntyovertheseasoverothermatters,andneitherotherstatesnorinternationalbodiesshouldhavetherighttointervene.23ThisprovidesonerationalefortheTerritorialityPrinciple,whichlargelydeterminestheissueofjurisdictioninmanylegalsystems:24astate'scourtshavejurisdictionoverallcrimescommittedwithinitsterritory.Onewaytoputthispointwouldbetosaythattheoffencesdefinedbythecriminallawcanbecommittedanywhere,so

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    thatthePolishassailantcommitsthecrimeofwoundingunderEnglishlaw;butthatEnglishcourtshavenojurisdictionoverthattokenofthecrime.Thatwould,however,bemisleading:criminalstatutespassedbytheUKlegislaturedonotextendtootherpartsoftheworld(theymightnotextendtoallpartsoftheUnitedKingdom).ThebetterwaytoputthepointisthatanassaultinGermanyisnotacrimeunderEnglishcriminallaw:notbecauseEnglishlawpermitssuchconduct,butbecauseithasnoauthorityoveritandisthereforerightlysilentaboutit.Ifweaskwhythatshouldbe,anobviousansweristhatthispromotestheefficientenforcementofthedemandsofcriminaljustice,whilstrespectingstatesovereignty:solongasastatedealsefficientlywiththekindsofwrongcommittedwithinitsterritorythatrequiresomeformalresponse,itshouldbeleftfreetodoso;otherstatesshouldnotintrudebytryingtodealwithsuchwrongsthemselves.EnglishlawandcourtsshouldbeallowedexclusivelocaljurisdictionovercrimescommittedinEngland,ifandbecausethisisanefficientwaytosatisfythe(universal,non-local)demandsofjustice.Shouldastateutterlyfailtosatisfythosedemandsofjustice,however,otherstatesorinternationalbodiesmightbeentitledtointervene.They(p.135) holdbackfromclaimingjurisdiction(ajurisdictionwhichtheycouldinprinciplehaveclaimed)overcrimescommittedwithinanotherstate'sbordersoutofrespectforthatstate'ssovereigntyandarecognitionthatitisbetterplacedtodealwithsuchcrimes;butinprinciplethatclaimcanberevivedifthatconditionisnotsatisfied.

    Thatanswer,however,seemsunsatisfying,ratherascomparablyimpersonalaccountsofmoralityareunsatisfying.Moralphilosopherssometimesstruggletomakemoralsenseofarangeofpartial,particularattachmentsthatarecentraltoourlives,butthatdonotfiteasilyintothestructureofimpartialistmoraltheories,inparticularconsequentialisttheorieswhosegroundingprincipleissomeversionoftheUtilitarianmaximthatoursinglemoraldutyistopromotethegreatestgoodofthegreatestnumber.Fromtheperspectiveofthatimpersonalmaxim,ourparticularattachmentstoourfriends,families,colleagues,countriesseemhardtojustify:surelywecouldoftenachievemoregoodbybenefitingstrangersthanbybenefitingourownfriends,family,colleagues,orfellowcitizens.Ontheotherhand,andthoughmostofusshouldcertainlydomuchmorethanwedofordistantstrangers,itisveryhardtoimagineasatisfactoryhumanlifewithoutsuchpartialattachments:canwereallyacceptthatweactwronglyinshowingpreferenceforfriends,families,andotherswhoareinvariouswaysclosetous?25Icannotdiscussthisquestionhere,savetonoticeonekindofattempttoreconcilethedemandsofanimpersonalistmoralitywithourpartialattachmentsbyarguingthatweusuallyservethoseimpersonaldemandsmostefficientlybyfosteringsuitablepartialattachments:Imaypayspecialattentiontomyfriends,myfamily,andsoon,solongasbydoingso(andbymaintainingthosedispositionsthatleadmetodoso)Iamactuallydoingasmuchascouldbereasonablyexpectedofmetoadvancethegeneralgood.However,apartfromdoubtsaboutthelargeempiricalclaimsonwhichsuchargumentsdepend,theydonotdojusticetotherolethatsuchattachmentsplayinourlives:theworth,includingthemoralworth,ofmyloveformyfriendsorfamilydoesnotdependonthecontributionthatsuchlove,orthedispositionitmanifests,makestosomelarger,universal,generalgood;wefinditsvaluewithin,ratherthanbeyond,therelationshipsthatitstructures.26

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    Somewhatsimilarly,suchapragmaticorinstrumentalistexplanationofthejurisdictionofdomesticcriminallawshouldbeunsatisfyingformembersofanyproperlyfunctioningpolity.OnereasonforthisemergeswhenweaskwhyitseemedimportantforSaddamHusseintobetriedinIraqforcrimeshecommittedagainstIraqis;orwhypeoplemightobjectwhencrimesagainsthumanitycommittedwithinaparticularnation(ashappenedinformerYugoslavia,forinstance)aretakenoverbytheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC);orwhyitwouldhavebeenbetterfor(p.136) AugustoPinochettobetriedinChileforhiscrimesagainstChileanvictims,ratherthaninaEuropeanstate'scourtsunderaclaimofuniversaljurisdiction;orwhythevictimofaseriousattack(andthoseclosetohim)mightnotbecontenttoseehisattackerconvictedinaforeigncourt,evenifhewasabletoattend.Thethoughtisineachcasethatweshouldtryourwrongsandtheirperpetrators,andthattrialbysomeforeignorinternationalcourt,evenifitproducesawarrantedconvictionandsentence,canbeatbestaninadequatesubstitute.27Weshouldtrythecasenotbecausewearecontingentlybestplacedtodoso,butbecauseitisourbusinessinawaythatitisnotsoespeciallythebusinessofotherstatesorbodies.Whothenisthiswe?Itisnotaweaslargeashumanity,ortherealmofmoralagentsforthatwouldnotexplainthesemorelocalfeelings.Norisitaweaslimitedasthedirectvictimsofthecrimesinquestion,ortheirfamiliesandfriends:itis,Isuggest,aweconsistinginallmembersofthepoliticalcommunitywithinwhichthecrimeswerecommitted,whorecognizethevictimsasfellowmemberswhosewrongstheyshouldshare.

    Itisworthnotingtoothatwhilethepragmaticaccountcansaysomethingbothabouttheauthorityofinternationalcriminaltribunals,andaboutclaimstouniversaljurisdictionoversomecrimesmadebysomelegalsystems,itcannotexplainwhytheprinciplesofnationalityandofpassivepersonalityshouldseemplausible.Astointernationaloruniversaljurisdiction,thefoundingstatuteoftheICCaffirmsthatthemostseriouscrimesofconcerntotheinternationalcommunityasawholemustnotgounpunished,28andclaimstouniversaljurisdictiontypicallyfocusoncrimesofwhichsomethingsimilarcouldbesaid:29apragmatictheoristcouldexplainsuchprovisionsbyarguingthatinternationaloruniversaljurisdictionisappropriateforcrimesinrelationtowhich,giventheirseriousness,thedemandthattheirperpetratorsbebroughttojusticeissoinsistentthatitisworthmakinginternationalprovisionfortheirpunishmentifthelocalcourtscannot(orwillnot)carryoutthattask.30Astotheprinciplesofnationalityandofpassivepersonality,theformergivesthenationalcourtsjurisdictionovercrimescommittedabroadbythestate'scitizens,whilstthelattergivesthemjurisdictionovercrimescommittedabroadagainstthestate'scitizens:31neitherofthesecanbereadily(p.137) rationalizedintermsoftheefficientsatisfactionofthedemandsofanimpersonalanduniversaljustice.

    OtherexplanationsofaTerritorialityPrinciplemightbeofferedwhichdonotappealtoanyrichnotionofpoliticalcommunity.Itmightbeargued,forinstance,thateveryoneliving,permanentlyortemporarily,inageographicalareahasaninterestintheenforcementwithinthatareaofalegalsystemwhichcriminalizescertainkindsofharmfulwrongdoing,andthatthisgroundsthejurisdictionofthatsystem'scourtsovercrimescommitted

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    withinthatarea.Theinterestsofeveryonewithinthatareaareservedbyacriminallawthatbindsandprotectsthemall;thisgivesthestateinwhoseterritorythatareafallstheauthoritytomaintainsuchasystemoflaw.32Itiscertainlytruethatweeachhaveaninterestinbeingprotectedagainstthekindsofwrongthatadecentsystemofcriminallawcriminalizes;itisalsotruethat,formanysuchwrongs,wehavethatinterestwhetherwearelivinginastateofwhichwearemembers,oraretemporaryresidentsinorvisitorstoaforeignland.33Butisthisenoughtomakesenseofastate'speculiarjurisdictionovercrimescommittedwithinitsterritory?

    Suchanaccountseparatesthestate,asthesourceandenforcerofcriminallaw,fromthepoliticalcommunitywhoselaw(onemightthink)itshouldbe,andofwhichthestateshouldbetheformalmanifestation:thestatehas,apparently,justthesamerelationshiptoallthoselivingwithinitsterritory.However,ifwearetounderstandthecriminallawnotsimplyasasetofprohibitions,butasapracticethroughwhichwrongdoersarecalledtopublicaccount,wemustbeabletogrounditinsomekindofcommunityawewhocallthemtoaccount.Thiswerequiresnotmerelyanaggregateofindividualinterestsinsuchmattersassecurity,butacollectiveinterestthatisourinterest.34Acollectiveinterest,however,requiresmorethanacollectionofpeoplewhohappentofindthemselvesinthesamegeographicalterritory;itrequirespeoplewhocanseethemselvesasbeingengagedinacommonenterpriseoflivingnotjustalongsideeachother,buttogether.Peoplewhohappentobethrowntogethermightformsomesuchcommonenterprise(astheydo,withgreaterorlessersuccess,infilmsaboutcastaways),andthecriminallawcanstrengthensuchanenterprise:butitmustpresupposeanalreadyexistingwe,analreadyexisting(evenifpartlyaspirational)communitywhoselawitis.Norcanthatcommunitybesimplyamoralcommunitytowhichallrationalagents,orallhumanbeings,belong.35Theintelligibilityofsuchanall-embracingcommunityiscrucialtothe(p.138) prospectsofacosmopolitanpoliticaltheory,36andperhapstotheambitionsoftheICC,ifwetakethePreambletotheRomeStatuteseriously.37Butsystemsofdomesticcriminallawarethelawsofsmallercommunitiesthanthat;andsincethecriminallawispartoftheapparatusofthestate,theybelongtopoliticalratherthantopurelymoralcommunities:thecriminallaw'scommunitymustbeapolity.

    ThatiswhyIhavearguedpreviouslythatweshouldappealtocitizenshipasthebasisofthecommunityonwhichcriminallawdepends.38Therearetwostagestothisargument.Thefirstclaimisthatanysystemofcriminallawrequiresapoliticalcommunitywhoselawitis:awewhosebusinessthecriminallawdeclarescertainkindsofwrongtobe,towhomthosewhocommitsuchwrongsmustanswer.Thatistheweoverwhomthelawprimarilyclaimsauthority;andsincethecriminallawisanaspectofthestate,thewemustbethemembersofthepolitywhosestateitis.Furthermore,criminallawisanongoing,notjustamomentary,enterprise:itinvolveslaws,notmereorders;institutionsandprocedures,notmerelyadhocarrangements.Itispossibleonlywithintheframeworkofalargerpoliticalcommunity,whichembodiestheconstitutionalstructuresthatmakelawpossible(andthatarethemselvesmadepossiblebylaw),andstructurestheformoflifewithinwhichcriminallawcanoperate.39

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    Thisisnotyettosay,however,thatcriminallawrequiresthekindofdemocraticpolitythattalkofcitizensmightconnote:non-egalitarianpoliticalcommunitieshavecriminallaws.Aconceptionofcriminallawasalawforcitizensdependsonademocraticpoliticaltheory,toarguethatalegitimatecriminallawrequiresapoliticalcommunitywhosememberssharethestatusofcitizen;citizenshipbeingunderstoodroughlyasequal,mutuallyrespectfulparticipationinthecivicenterprise.40Thenatureofthatcivicenterprise,andthecharacterandextentofitsclaimsoncitizenslives,isamatterforpoliticaldeliberation.Atoneextremelieambitiouslydemandingkindsofcommunitarianismthatmakewhatliberalsseeasoppressivelyintrusivedemandsoncitizens,andleavetoosmallaprivaterealminwhichindividualscanpursuetheirownconceptionsofthegood,inthecompanyofthosewithwhomtheychoosetoassociate:religiouscommunitiesthatclaimthebodiesandsoulsoftheirmembersareextremeexamplesofthiscommunitarianvision,or(p.139) nightmare.Atanotherextremeliesthekindofradicalindividualistliberalismthatcommunitariancriticsfear,whichinsistsuponanextensiverealmofprivatelife,andaminimalpublicsphere.Weneednotengageinthisdebatehere,however.Allweneedtonoteisthathoweverminimalthepublicsphereofmattersthatconcernallcitizensistakentobe,anypolitymusthaveapublicsphere,structuredbyitsself-definingvalues.Thosevaluesincludenormsabouthowcitizensshouldtreateachother,whichgivesusthebasisforanideaofpublicwrongsofwrongdoingthatviolatesthepolity'sdefiningvalues;andthisthengivesusabasisforanideaofcriminallawasaformalwayofidentifyingandrespondingtosuchwrongs.41

    Publicwrongsareourwrongsascitizenswrongsinwhichwetakeaproperinterest,towhichweshouldcollectivelyrespond,forwhichweclaimtheright(andperhapstheduty)tocalltheperpetratortoanswertous.Somesuchwrongsarepublicintheirmaterialimpact:ifweaskwhoiswrongedtheansweristhepublic;thisistrueof,forinstance,somewrongsofgeneralendangermentandenvironmentaldamage;ofwrongsthatthreatenpublicinstitutions;offraudscommittedagainstthepublicpurse.Otherstakeindividualsastheirdirectvictims,butcountasourwrongsbecausetheyviolateourpublicvalues,andbecausewesharethemwiththevictim:ourconcernforthevictimasourfellowcitizenmakesthemourbusiness.Sodoesourrecognitionofthewrongdoerasafellowcitizen:whatisdonebyoneofus,whenitimpingesonoursharedvalues,isourbusiness.42Ifawrongisourbusiness,wemay,perhapsshould,respondtoit,andseektocallitsperpetratortoaccount.

    Toavoidmisunderstanding,Ishouldmakeclearthatthewrongfulnessofapublicwrongdoesnotdependonitsbeingpublic:publicwrongsare,inthiscontext,wrongsthatconcernusallascitizens.Sometimes,asInotedabove,conductiswrongfulbecauseofitsimpactonthepublicbecauseitattacksorthreatensapublicgood,oraninstitutionthatiscrucialtoourciviclife.Sometimesthewrongfulnessofapublicwrongliespartlyinitsciviccharacter:thewrongconsists,forinstance,infailingtoshowafellowcitizentherespectorconcernduetoherasafellowcitizen.Often,however,whatmakestheconductwrongisindependentofitsimpactonawiderpublic,anditiswrongbecausethatisnothowoneshouldtreatanyone,fellowcitizenornot.Thisisobviouslytrueoffamiliarmalainse:whatmakesmurderorrapewronghastodowithwhatisdonetothe

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    directvictim;norisitplausibletoarguethatwhatmakesthemcriminalizableissomefurtherfeaturetodowiththeireffectonthepublic.43Tosaythatsuchwrongsarepublic(p.140) wrongsis,rather,tosaythattheyarewrongsthatconcernallcitizens,invirtueoftheircivicfellowshipwiththevictim(andtheoffender).Toidentifyawrongasapublicwronginthecontextofaparticularpolity'scriminallawthusdoesnotimplythatitisnotawrong,ornotsoseriousawrong,whencommittedelsewhereoragainstsomeonewhoisnotacitizenofthepolity.InsayingthatarapecommittedinEnglandisacrimeinEnglishlawforwhichtherapistmustanswerinanEnglishcourt,whilstarapecommittedinPolandisnotawronginEnglishlaworamatterfortheEnglishcourts,44wedonotimplythattherapeinPolandisnotwrong,orlesswrong,orwrongondifferentgrounds.Nordoweimplythatitisnotawrongthatmatterstousashumanbeings,orasmoralagents:itis,wecansay,ourmoralorhumanbusiness(thoughthatraisesthequestionofwhatwecandoaboutitsimplyashumanbeingsormoralagents),asaseriouswrongcommittedagainstafellowhumanbeing.Whatisatissuehere,however,iswhatconcernsusascitizens,andwhatconcernsthecriminallawofthisparticularpolity;wecannotseearapecommittedinPolandasawrongcommittedwithinourcivicenterpriseasapolityor,therefore,asawrongthatconcernsourcriminallaw.

    Wecanputthecorepointhereinthelanguageofassociativeobligations.45Thecriminallawgivesinstitutionalformtoaparticularsubsetofwhatwemightcallsecondaryassociativeobligations:associativebecausetheyareobligationsweowetoourfellowcitizensinvirtueofoursharedmembershipofthepolity;secondarybecausetheyconcernourcivicresponsestobreachesoftheprimaryobligationsthatthecriminallawpresupposestocommissionsofthekindsofwrongwithwhichthecriminallawisconcerned.Ascitizens,wehaveaspecialdutytoattendtopublicwrongscommittedwithinthepolity:adutytorespondtosuchwrongsbycallingthewrongdoertopublicaccount,whichweowetobothvictimandwrongdoer;adutytoanswertoourfellowsforourowncommissionsofsuchwrongs,andtoanswertoanyaccusationsofsuchwrongdoingthatarereasonablybroughtagainstus.

    Icannotdevelopthisaccountoftherelationshipbetweencitizenshipandthecriminallawhere,thoughmuchmoreclearlyneedstobesaidaboutcitizenship,aboutthecivicenterprise,andabouthowwecandeterminewhichkindsofwrongaretocountaspublic,criminalizablewrongsthecentralissueofcriminalization.Instead,Iwanttoconsiderasetofobjectionstogivingcitizenshipsocentralaroleinourunderstandingofcriminallaw:objectionsthatfocusontheexclusionarypotentialoftheideaofcitizenship.

    (p.141) 3CITIZENSANDNON-CITIZENSOnequestionabouttheideasofcitizenshipandpoliticalcommunityasIhaveusedthemhereiswhetherwecanseethesocietiesinwhichmostofusliveasgenuinepoliticalcommunities,whosecitizensshareacommitmenttoasubstantialsetofvaluesthatdefineacivicenterpriseinwhichtheyseethemselvesasmutuallyengaged.AllIcansayonthatquestionhereisthatifwedonotliveinwhatcancountaspoliticalcommunities,thelegitimacyofcriminallawisradicallyundermined,asisthelegitimacyofmuchelseaboutthestate.However,ifwebearinmindthattherealityofapoliticalcommunitycanbea

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    matterofaspirationasmuchasofachievedfact;andthatapoliticalcommunitycanstillbearelativelythinone,structuredbyarangeofliberalvaluesthatleaveextensiveroomforotherkindsofcommunityfreefromthedemandsofthepolityanditscivicenterprise,wemightbelesspessimistic.ThequestionsIwanttofocuson,however,concernthelimitsofcitizenship.46

    Citizenshiphasbothinclusionaryandexclusionarydimensions.Inagenerouslymindedpolity,citizenshipisinclusive:allthosebornwithinthepolityarecitizens;incomerscangaincitizenshiprelativelyeasily.Eventhencitizenshipisalsoexclusionary:absentacosmopolitanworldorder,whentherearecitizenstherearealsonon-citizens,whoareexcludedfromsuchrightsandbenefitsascitizenshipbrings.Suchexclusionisnotalwaysdisturbing.ItisnocauseforconcernthatstateAdoesnotgrantthebenefitsofcitizenshiptopeoplelivinginstableandprosperousstateselsewhere;northatitdoesnotgrantcitizenshiptothoselivingelsewhere,undermoreadverseconditions,whodonotseekentrytoitthoughthereismuchelsethatitshoulddotoassist.NorisitcauseforconcernthatthosewhovisitAastourists,ortodobusiness,arenoteligibleforfullcitizenship,thoughwemustaskabouttheirstatus.Butfocusingoncitizenshipraisesatleasttwoworriesaboutthetreatmentofnon-citizens.

    Oneworryconcernsthosewhoarenot,anddonotseektobecome,citizens,butwhovisitthestateforshorterorlongerperiods.Howwillacriminallawforcitizenstreatsuchvisitors?Thisworryisnotadeepone.Politiescanbehostile,disrespectful,uncaringtowardsforeignvisitors,denyingthemtheprotectionsthatcitizensenjoy;butthatisnotanimplicationofafocusoncitizenship.Manysocialgroupsorinstitutionsoperatewithaconceptionofguestsorvisitors:thegroup(afamily;avillage;agroupofcohabitingfriends;auniversity)consists,atitscore,initsmembers;butitwelcomesvisitors,whomittreatswithrespectandconcern.Theydonotplaytherolethatmembersplayindeterminingthegroup'sactivities(theydonottakedecision-makingrolesinpoliticaldeliberationoritsanalogue);butdecentgroupsaccordvisitorsthekindsofsupportandprotectionthattheirmembersenjoy.There(p.142) ismuchmoretosayaboutthestatusofguestorvisitor,andwhatitcaninvolve;butthecrucialpointisthatinanydecentpolity,guestsandvisitorsareprotectedbyitscriminallawinthesamewayasitscitizens.

    Moreprecisely,theyareprotectedandboundbythecriminallaw.Astoprotection,thekeyissueisnotwhetherconducttowardsthemthatthelocallawdefinesascriminalwhendonetoacitizencountsaswrong.Theremightbesomewrongsthatcanonlybecommittedagainstfellowcitizens:electoralmisconduct,forinstance,orfailingtopayone'staxes.Mostcriminalwrongs,however,arewrongswhethercommittedby,oragainst,citizensornon-citizens:thecriminallaw,aswesaw,presupposeswrongfulnessratherthancreatingit.Themoreimportantpointconcernsresponsestowrongdoing:adecentpolitywillcountandtreatwrongscommittedwithinitsbordersagainstvisitorsasnolesspublic,nolesswrongful,thanwrongscommittedagainstcitizens.Notonlyshouldwenotwrongguests:ifaguestinourhomeiswronged,thatisourbusiness;andwhilsttherearedangersthatcitizenswillnottakewrongsagainstvisitorsasseriouslyastheytake

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    wrongsagainstcitizens(Shewasonlyatourist),membersofacivilizedpolitywillnotdiscriminateinthisway.47

    Thatistruewhethertheguestisattackedbyacitizenorbyanothervisitor,whichbringsustoothersideofthecoin:thatguestsarebothprotectedandbound.ThefactthatthepersonIattackisavisitor,ratherthanacitizen,doesnotexemptmefromcriminalprosecution;nordoesthefactthatIammyselfavisitorwhoattacksanothervisitor.Therearetwoversionsofthispoint,relevanttodifferenttypesofcrime.Ononeversion,visitorsareexpectedtoabidebythelocalrules(WheninRome),andmaybecalledtoaccountbytheirhostsiftheydonot:whateverkindsofconductmightbepermissibleathome(astowhichthelocallawisproperlysilent),whentheyareheretheyshouldobeyourrules.Thisversionisappropriateinsomecontexts.Thepointisnotmerelythatlocalconventionsoftendifferforinstance,thatherewedriveontheleft:insuchcasesthewrongitself,whethercommittedbyaguestorbyacitizen,consistsinfailuretorespectajustifiedconvention.Rather,itisthatsometimeswemustrecognizethefactofreasonabledisagreement(especiallygivendifferentculturalbackgroundsthatmayalterthemeaningsofactions)aboutvaluesthatinformourcriminallawforinstance,aboutwhatcountsasoffensiveconduct,orasdishonesty.Insuchcaseswesaytovisitorsthattheyshouldeschewsuchconductwhiletheyarehere,not(just)becauseitiswrong,butoutofrespectforthelocalvaluesandattitudes.48Inothercases,however,ourclaimshouldbemore(p.143) robust:suchconductiswrong,whereveritiscommitted,althoughitbecomesourbusinessasapolity(thebusinessofourcriminallaw)onlywhenitiscommittedinourterritory.Weshouldnotsaytoawife-beater,forinstance,thatheoughttorefrainfrombeatinghiswifewhilstheishereoutofrespectforlocallaws;weshouldsaythatwife-beatingisawrongthatheoughtnottocommitanywhere,andforwhichwewillcallhimtoanswerifhecommitsithere.Sometimeswecriticizeguestsforfailingtorespectlocalrulesorsensibilities;sometimeswecriticizethemforcommittingwrongsinourhome,whenthesignificanceofthelocationisnotthatitmakeswrongfulwhatmightnothavebeenwrongelsewhere,butthatitmakesourbusinessawrongthatwouldnothavebeenourbusinesshaditbeencommittedelsewhere.

    Anaccountthatemphasizescitizenshipfacesdeeperworriesinotherkindsofcase,whichwecanapproachviaJakobsnotoriousdistinctionbetweenBrgerstrafrecht(citizencriminallaw)andFeindstrafrecht(enemycriminallaw).49Brgerstrafrechtisforcitizens.Itrespectsthepresumptionofinnocence,notonlyasaprinciplegoverningtheallocationofburdensofproofinthetrial,butasabroaderprincipleoftrust:weshouldpresumeeachothertobefreeofharmfulintentions,50andtrusteachothertorefrainfromfuturecrimes.Ittreatsoffendersasmembersofthepolity,whosetrialsandpunishmentsmustrespectthatstatus.Bycontrast,FeindstrafrechtabandonscriminallawasIhavecharacterizedit:ittreatsthoseonwhomitisimposednotascitizens,butasactualorpotentialenemies;itseekstocontrolthemforthesakeofsecurity,ratherthantoaddressthemasmembersofthenormativecommunity.

    Suchadistinctioniscertainlydrawnincontemporarypenaltheory,rhetoric,andpractice.Inpenaltheory,somearguethatthosewhocommitcrimeslosetheirstandingascitizens,

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    sothatwecantreattheminwaysinwhichwecouldnottreatcitizens,anddenythemtherespectandconcernthatweowetocitizens;51suchaviewfindsformallegalexpressioninthelossoftherighttovote(acentralaspectofcitizenship)sufferedduringtheirincarcerationbythoseservingprisontermsinBritain,52andforlifebyconvictedfelonsinsomeAmericanstates.53Inpenalrhetoric,wearealltoofamiliarwithtalkofawarondrugs,orcrime,orterrorism,whichportraysthe(p.144) disfavouredgroupof(actualorpotential)offendersasoutsidersathemagainstwhomthelaw-abidingwemustbeprotected.Inpenalpracticethedistinctionisseenin,forinstance,theprovisionsforimprisonmentforpublicprotectioninEngland,54andthethreestrikesprovisionsintheUnitedStates;55inprovisionsforthosesuspectedofbeinginvolvedinterroristactivities,inparticularprovisionsfordetention,orotherkindsofrestriction,withoutaconviction;56andinawiderangeofotherrestrictivemeasuresthataremoreconcernedwithpreventingfuturecrimethanwithrespondingappropriatelytopastcrimes.57Soisitasoundobjectiontoacitizenship-basedaccountofcriminallawthatitallows,orevenencourages,suchdiscriminationbetweencitizensandenemies?

    TheanswerisafirmbutqualifiedNo.Theanswerisfirm,becausethecriminallawcanandshouldbeacriminallawforallcitizensincludingactualandsuspectedoffenders:asIarguedinsection2,thecriminallawmustaddressusall,includingthemanyofuswhoareactualorpotentialoffenders,asmembersofthenormativecommunitywhoselawitis.Itmusttakeourpublicwrongdoingseriously,holdingustoaccountforit,andthusalsoaimingtorepairourcivicrelationshipswithourfellowcitizens:butitholdsustoaccountpreciselyascitizenswhosefullmembershipofthepolityisnotindoubtwhichiswhytherighttovoteinprisonissymbolicallyimportant.Suchaconceptionofthosewhocommitcrimesischallenging:itistemptingforself-definedlaw-abidingcitizenstoregardoffendersaslessthan(full)citizens.Butthatistosayonly,andunsurprisingly,thatpoliticalcommunityischallenging.NoristhecommunitarianapproachthatIhavetakenpeculiarlyvulnerablehere:theaspirationtosecurerespectfortherights(human,moral,political,legal)ofoffenders,ortotreatthemstillasfullpartiestothesocialcontract,isnolesschallenging.Theproblemofexclusion,whetherfromcitizenship,fromtherealmofrights,orfromthesocialcontract,neednotbeaproblemfornormativetheory;itisamoralproblemforourattitudesandpractices.58(p.145)

    ThefirmNoofferedinthepreviousparagraphmustalso,however,bequalified,sincetwokindsofcaseputitunderpressure:butsuchcasesmustbeproblematicforanynormativetheoryofcriminallaw,andthereforedonotcastdoubtontheaccountofferedhere.

    Thefirstkindofcaseconcernsthosewhoengagepersistentlyincrimesofacharacterandseriousnessthatdenythebasicvaluesonwhichthecivicenterprisedepends(or,othersmightsay,denythemostbasictermsofthesocialcontract);crimessopersistentthattheyconstituteacriminalcareer,ratherthanaseriesofindividualwrongs.Shouldweinsistthatsuchpeoplemuststillberecognizedandtreatedasfullmembersofthenormativecommunitythatsuchmembershipiswhollyunconditional?Ordoestherecomeapointatwhichwemay,ormust,saythatwhilstwestillowethemtherespectand

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    concernduetoanyhumanbeing,thechancetorestorethemselvestofullcitizenshipbyshowingthattheycanagainbetrusted,andhelpinachievingthis,wecannotnowtreatthemasfullmembers?Butwecannottacklethequestioninsuchabstractterms:wemustaskwhatisatstakeinretainingorlosingfullcitizenshipinthiscontextandbearinmindthatwhatisatstakeneednotbecitizenshipasaunitaryorseamlessstatus,butmoreparticularaspectsofmembershipofthepolity.

    Someofthoseaspects,weshouldsurelysay,arenotalienableorconditional,forinstance,therightstosuchbenefitsofcitizenshipaseducation,healthcare,andsocialsecurity.Othersmightbearguedoverforinstance,therighttovoteorotherwiseparticipateinthepoliticalprocess:justbecausetherighttovoteissoimportantasymbolofcitizenship,shouldwesaytotheseriouscareercriminalGivenyourpersistentandflagrantviolationofthebondsofthepolity,youcannowclaimnorighttohelpdeterminethedirectionofitsciviclife;orshouldweinsistthatwemuststillgivethissymbolicexpressiontothehopethathewillrehabilitatehimself?Themostobviouslyproblematicaspects,however,concernthekindsoflibertyandprivacythatcitizensnormallyhavearighttoexpect,andtheassociatedrighttoberestoredtofullliberty,andtobefreefromintrusivesupervision,onceonehasservedanappropriateanddeterminatepunishmentforone'scrimes.Anessentialfeatureofaliberalpenalsystemisthatpunishmentisfiniteandlimited:whattheoffenderistoundergoisdeterminedinadvancebyasentencingprocessstructuredbythequestionofwhatconstitutesanappropriateresponsetohiscrime.Hissentencemightinvolverestrictionsonhisliberty,includingimprisonment,andformsofsupervisionthatwouldnormallybeillegitimate;59butonceitisover,heisfreefromthoserestrictionsandfromsuchsupervision,withouthavingtoprovethathewillrefrainfromfuture(p.146) crimes;havingservedhissentence,heisonceagainentitledtothebroadpresumptionofinnocence.60Provisionsfordangerouspersistentoffendersthatallowfortheirindefiniteorlife-longdetentionabandonthisaspectofliberalcriminallaw,61andimplythatapersistentoffendercanlosehisrighttothatpresumptionnotjustforalimitedtime,butindefinitelyorforlife.Thoseprovisionsarecertainlyfartoobroad:theydeprivefartoomanyoffendersoftheircivicstanding.Butshouldwerecognizethattheremaybewhatwemusthopeisaverysmallclassofdetermined,persistent,anddangerousoffenderswhosecriminalcareersdodisqualifythemfromthatpresumption:offenderswhom,giventheirhistoryofunrepentantlyflagrantcriminality,wecannolongerbeexpectedtotrustasfellowcitizens?

    Werewetogodownthisroute,muchmoreworkwouldofcourseneedtobedoneontheconditionsgivenwhich,andtheproceduresthroughwhich,suchexceptionalmeasurescouldbeimposed;ontheformthatsuchmeasurescouldproperlytake;ontheproceduresthroughwhichtheycouldbelifted.Thatlastpointiscrucial:evenifasufficientlypersistentcareerofsufficientlyseriouscriminalitycouldjustifyusinturningthepresumptionofinnocenceintoapresumptionofcriminality,thatpresumptionwouldhavetoberebuttable;wemightplaceontheoffendertheonusofofferingsufficientevidencethathehaschangedhisways,butitmustbeanonusthathecoulddischarge.Wemightthenfindthatwecannotspecifyproceduresforsuchmeasuresthatwouldbeadequatelysafeandreliable,butthequestionhereiswhetherweshouldevenconsider

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    theminprinciple.Iremainuncertainabouthowtoanswerthatquestion:aboutwhetherthecivicpresumptionthatthosewhohaveundergonetheirpunishmentcanbetrusted,asanycitizenistrusted,torefrainfromfuturecrime(apresumptionthatiscentraltoaliberalrepublicancriminallaw)shouldbeirrebuttable:62butitisonethatfacesanypenaltheory,andanypolitythattakescitizenshipseriously.

    Thesecondkindofproblemcaseconcernsthoseinvolvedinterroristactivitiesor,moreprecisely,giventhedifficultyofdefiningterrorism,thoseinvolvedinviolencethataimstodestabilizethepolity.63Mightwehavetosaythatsuchterroristsdenytheirmembershipofthepolitythattheyattack:whetherornottheyare,formally,citizensofthatcommunity,theymakethemselvesinsubstanceenemiesengagedinawaragainstit?Thiswouldnotexcludethemfromthepolityonthebasisofourownviewoftheiractivities:itwouldacceptatfacethevaluethedenialofmembershipthattheiractionsexpress;theyactandshouldbeseenasenemysoldiersengagedincovertmilitaryoperations.Ifwearefightingawar,thecriminallawwithdrawssomewhat:wedonotchargeenemysoldierswhokillinactionwith(p.147) murderinacriminalcourt.Wetrytothwartthem,ifnecessaryusingfatalmilitaryforceagainstthem;ifwecapturethem,wedetainthemasprisonersofwar,whilethewarlasts.Butsuchdetentionisnotpunishment:itdoesnotdependoncriminalconviction,orexpresscondemnation,oraimtobringthedetaineetorecognizehiswrongdoing;itisapreventivemeasurejustifiedbythedetainee'sstatusasanenemysoldier.64

    Enemysoldiersarenotoutsidethelaw.Theyarebothprotectedandboundbythelawsofwar:ourconducttowardsthem,assoldiersorasprisonersofwar,isgovernedbythelawsofwar;theirconductissubjecttothedemandsofthoselaws,bothadbellumandinbello;theycanbechargedwithwarcrimesiftheyviolatethem.Thiscreatesanobviousproblemforthisperspectiveonterroristactivities:theydonotfitintotheorthodoxframeworkofthelawsofwarfare.Thereisnoformaldeclarationofwarbetweenstates;fightersdonotwearuniformsthatmarkthemascombatants(andactivatetheprotectionsthatcombatantscanclaim);andiftheyattackciviliantargets,theyviolatetherulesofjusinbello.Furthermore,whatevercanbesaidaboutterroristswhoattackfromoutsidethepolity,thosewhoattackfromwithin,atleastiftheyareformallycitizens,cannotbesoreadilyportrayedasenemysoldiers:theylookmoreliketraitors,whounderthelawsofwararenotentitledtobetreatedasenemysoldiers.However,itcouldbearguedthatthephenomenaofmodernterrorismrequireustorethinkourexistingcategories:neithertheframeworkofnormalcriminallaw,northatofwarfareasclassicallyconceived,canaccommodatemodernterrorism;wemusteitherarticulateanewnormativecategory,ordevelopourexistingcategories.65

    Ifweshouldseethoseengagedinterrorismwithinthenormativeframeworkofwarfareratherthanofcriminallaw,weshouldnotexpectaliberalcriminallawtodealwiththem.Buttherearetworeasonsfornotgoingdownthisroute.Oneisthatinsofarasterrorisminvolvesattacksonciviliantargetsthatmustcountasinnocent,thosewhocommitsuchattacksshouldhavetoanswerforthemaswrongs,andsuchansweringisproperlydoneinacriminalcourt(althoughthereisacaseforlookingtointernationalratherthan

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    domesticcriminalcourtstotryseriousterroristcases).Theotherreasonisthat,absentproofofterroristactivityofakindthatcouldgroundacriminalconviction,ourquestionmustconcernthemeasuresthatwemayusenotagainstterrorists,butagainstsuspectedterrorists.Enemysoldiersinclassicalwarfareweartheirstatusvisiblyasauniform:althoughundertheconditionsofmodern(p.148) warfareitisoftendifficulttodistinguishcombatantsfromnon-combatants,66weknowhowtorecognizeanenemysoldier.Interrorism-relatedcasesthatcomebeforeourcourts,however,inwhichspecialpreventivemeasuresmightbeimposed,67thosewhoareliabletothesemodesoflegalcoercionappearnotasproventerrorists,butaspeoplesuspectedofinvolvementinterrorismwhomightbeinnocentcitizens.Theyarethereforeentitledtothepresumptionofinnocence,andtoapropercriminalprocess;anyquestionofspecial,preventivemeasurescanariseonlyaftertheyhavebeendulyconvictedofanoffencethatcanproperlybesaidtoamounttoadeterminedattackonthepolityitself.Thisisnottodenythatcriminallawcancomeunderpressureintimesofemergency,orthatmeasureswhichsubvertorbypasstherequirementsofliberalcriminallawmightthenbequalifiedlyjustified.Icannotdiscussthispossibilitynow;68thepointtonotehereisthatitdoesnotrevealaweaknessinacitizenship-basedaccountofcriminallaw,sinceitisnotthataccountoflawthatinvitesorencouragesustoexcludesomepeoplefromthelaw'sprotection.

    4CONCLUSIONIhavearguedthatwecanbestunderstandtheauthorityandclaimsofcriminallawinaliberalpolitybyunderstandingitasalawforcitizens:alawtowhichcitizenssubjecteachotherandthemselves,underwhichtheycallpublicwrongdoerstoaccountforwhattheyhavedone,andarethemselvesreadytoanswertotheirfellows.Ihavealsoarguedthatsuchanaccountneednothavethekindsofexclusionaryeffectthatworrysomecriticsbutthatitdoeshighlighttwoproblematickindsofcaseinwhichitisnotclearthatacitizenscriminallawremainsviable.

    Notes:(1)SeeJBraithwaiteandPPettit,NotJustDeserts:ARepublicanTheoryofCriminalJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1990).

    (2)SeeMSMoore,PlacingBlame(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),ch1.

    (3)SeethecommentsoncomplexityandmessinessintheIntroduction,atnn1727.

    (4)Formoredetaileddiscussion,seemyAnsweringforCrime(Oxford:HartPublishing,2007),chs4,6.

    (5)Notefirst,however,thatthecriminallawmayprovidedistinctivedefinitionsofthepublicwrongsthatitidentifies,especiallywhenthepre-criminalunderstandingofthosewrongsisconflictedoruncertain.Second,myclaimisnotthatonlymorallywrongfulconductisactuallycriminalized,butthattocriminalizeconductmustbetoportrayitasmorallywrong(seeVTadrosandSTierney,ThePresumptionofInnocenceandtheHumanRightsAct(2004)67ModernLawReview402).

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    (6)SeeSEMarshallandRADuff,CriminalizationandSharingWrongs(1998)11CanadianJournalofLawandJurisprudence7;alsoMMDempsey,ProsecutingDomesticViolence:APhilosophicalAnalysis(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),especiallychs89.

    (7)SeePDuff,TheProsecutorFine(1994)14OxfordJournalofLegalStudies565.

    (8)SeeDHusak,MalumProhibitumandRetributivism,inRADuffandSPGreen(eds),DefiningCrimes(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),65;Overcriminalization:TheLimitsoftheCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),10319.Thedistinctionbetweenmalainseandmalaprohibitaisofcourseneitherclearnorundisputed:seeegRLGray,Eliminatingthe(Absurd)DistinctionbetweenMaluminSeandMalumProhibitumCrimes(1995)73WashingtonUniversityLawQuarterly1369.

    (9)Ileaveasidethecomplicating,butnotnowcrucial,pointthatourunderstandingofsomemalainsemaybestructuredbythelaw,asourunderstandingoftheftisstructuredbythelawofproperty;seeAMHonor,TheDependenceofMoralityonLaw(1993)13OxfordJournalofLegalStudies1.

    (10)SeefurtherDuff,AnsweringforCrime,chs4.4,7.3.Theconductconstitutingamalumprohibitumisthusnotnecessarilywrongfulpriortoitslegalregulation,butmustbewrongfulpriortoitscriminalization.

    (11)SeefurtherRADuff,LFarmer,SEMarshall,andVTadros,TheTrialonTrialIII:TowardsaNormativeTheoryoftheCriminalTrial(Oxford:HartPublishing,2007).

    (12)Punitivedamages,whichpreciselyfocusonfaultandwrongdoing,areinconsistentwiththisaccount,butarearguablyinconsistentwiththeproperpurposesofcivillaw.

    (13)Thoughwhatheowes,what(ifanything)couldcountasreparationforwrongdoing,isanotherquestionthatwecannotpursuehere.

    (14)Whichiswhyitmattersthatthedefendantinacriminaltrialisfittopleadabletounderstandandanswertothecharge.

    (15)ThereismuchmoretobesaidaboutthesenseinwhichthereasonsthatwetakeAtohavemustbewithinhisreach:forusefulsurveysseeJLenman,ReasonsforAction:Justificationvs.Explanation,StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Spring2010),athttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/;SFinlayandMSchroeder,ReasonsforAction:Internalvs.External,StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Fall2008),athttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/reasons-internal-external/.

    (16)Mattersmightbedifferentifyourreasonforchallengingmehadtodonotwithmyhealthbut(eg)withtheimmoralityofeatingmeat;Iturntothiskindofcaseshortly.

    (17)CompareTMScanlon,MoralDimensions:Permissibility,Meaning,Blame

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    (Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUniversityPress,2008),13940:themoralrelationshipthatgroundsthelegitimacyofmoralblameisamatterofthemutualconcernthat,ideally,weallhavetowardotherrationalbeings.

    (18)Moore,PlacingBlame,335.

    (19)Ihavemoralreasontointervene,evenifIhavenolegaldutytodoso.

    (20)AstheWolfendenCommitteefamouslyputit,inrelationtoconsensualhomosexualactivitybetweenadults:JWolfenden,ReportoftheCommitteeonHomosexualOffencesandProstitution(London:HMSO,1957),para61.Eventhosewhobelieve,misguidedly,thatsuchconductismorallywrongshouldalsoagreethatthisisnotamoralissueonwhichthecriminallawshouldtakeaviewthatitisinthatsenseprivate.

    (21)CompareMoore,PlacingBlame,ch16;ATaleofTwoTheories(2009)28CriminalJusticeEthics27,313.

    (22)OnwhetherhecouldbetriedinFranceorinPoland,andontheuniversaljurisdictionthatsomesystemsofdomesticcriminallawclaimoversomecrimes,seeatnn29,31below.

    (23)ComparetheaccountofinternationallawofferedinAAltmanandCHWellman,ALiberalTheoryofInternationalJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),espch4;andseeWellmaninthisvolume.

    (24)SeeMHirst,JurisdictionandtheAmbitoftheCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),ch1;alsoegGermanCriminalCode,s3.

    (25)Somewouldsayfirmlythatwedo,becausemeredistance(whetherphysicalorpsychological)cannotbearelevantmodifierofthebasicdemandsofmoralityapositionassociatedparticularlywithPeterSinger.

    (26)LBlum,Friendship,AltruismandMorality(London:Routledge,1980);JCottingham,PartialityandtheVirtues,inRCrisp(ed),HowShouldOneLive?(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),57.

    (27)Thereareofcourseotherreasonsbearingontheseexamples:egargumentsagainsttryingSaddamHusseininIraqthathavetodowithhischancesofafairtrial;reasonsformistrustingtheICChavingtodowithitsperceivedpoliticalcharacter.TheEichmanncaseisalsoworthconsideringinthiscontext:shouldheideallyhavebeentriedinIsrael,orinGermany,orbyaninternationalcourt?

    (28)RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,Preamble.

    (29)EgCriminalJusticeAct1988,s134:torturecommittedorsanctionedbypublicofficialsisacrimetriableinEnglishcourts,whereverandagainstwhomeveritiscommitted;appliedinRvBowStreetMetropolitanStipendiaryMagistrateexpPinochet

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    Ugarte[2000]1AC147.

    (30)SuchatheoristmightalsofindsupportintheICCsprincipleofcomplementaritythatitcantryonlycasesthathavenotbeenproperlyinvestigatedbyastatewithjurisdiction(RomeStatute,art17).

    (31)SeeegFrenchCodePnal,art113.67;GermanStrafgesetzbuch,s7.12,SexOffendersAct1997,s7.SeegenerallyHirst,JurisdictionandtheAmbitoftheCriminalLaw,ch5.

    (32)SeeAChehtman,TheExtraterritorialScopeoftheRighttoPunish(2010)29LawandPhilosophy127(hearguesagainstuniversaljurisdiction,andagainsttheprinciplesofnationalityandpassivepersonality).

    (33)Onlyformanysuchwrongsbecausesomecriminalwrongs,notablythosethatthreatenthelongertermoperationsofthestate,canplausiblybesaidtoaffectonlymembers.

    (34)AsChehtmanrealizesinTheExtraterritorialScopeoftheRighttoPunish,egat134.

    (35)CompareScanlon,MoralDimensions;onthedifferencebetweentalkofrationalagentsandtalkofhumanbeings,seeRGaita,GoodandEvil:AnAbsoluteConception(2ndedn;London:Routledge,2004),ch3.

    (36)SeeegSCaney,JusticeBeyondBorders:AGlobalPoliticalTheory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005);DHeld,Cosmopolitanism:ADefence(Cambridge:PolityPress,2003).

    (37)Seeatn28above;RADuff,AuthorityandResponsibilityinInternationalCriminalLaw,inSBessonandJTasioulas(eds),PhilosophyofInternationalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010).

    (38)SeeDuff,AnsweringforCrime,ch2.2.

    (39)Ontheimportanceofsettingcriminallawinitsconstitutionalcontext,seeThorburninthisvolume.

    (40)Suchatheoryisbestarticulatedinrepublicanism:seeegRDagger,CivicVirtues:Rights,CitizenshipandRepublicanLiberalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),andinthisvolume;alsoRMDworkin,AMatterofPrinciple(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1985),ch8,ontheequalconcernandrespectthatcitizensoweeachother.

    (41)Butonlyabasis:seefurtherRADuff,Responsibility,RestorationandRetribution,inMTonry(ed),RetributivismHasaPast:HasitaFuture?(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).

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    (42)Thatiswhatgroundstheprinciplesofnationalityandpassivepersonality(seeatn31above).

    (43)SeefurtherMarshallandDuff,CriminalizationandSharingWrongs;Duff,AnsweringforCrime,ch6.5.ContrastJGardnerandSShute,TheWrongnessofRape,inJHorder(ed),OxfordEssaysinJurisprudence,4thSeries(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),193,arguingthatalthoughthemoralwrongnessofrapedoesnotlieinitsharmfuleffects,ourreasonsforcriminalizingitdodependonthewidereffectsoffailingtocriminalizeit;foranincisivecritique,seeJStanton-Ife,HorrificCrime,inRADuff,LFarmer,SEMarshall,MRenzo,andVTadros(eds),TheBoundariesoftheCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010).

    (44)Unlessweacceptaprincipleofnationalityorofpassivepersonality(seeatn31above),andcountitasourbusinessifitiscommittedbyoragainstanEnglishcitizen:buttheviewofferedhere,whileitshowshowwecanmakesenseofthoseprinciples,doesnotcommitustoadoptingthem.

    (45)SeeRMDworkin,LawsEmpire(London:Fontana,1986),ch6;JHortonInDefenseofAssociativePoliticalObligations(2006)54PoliticalStudies427and(2007)55PoliticalStudies19.

    (46)IamespeciallygratefultoLuciaZednerforforcingmetothinkmoreseriouslyabouttheseissues.

    (47)Supposetheguestisuninvitedanillegalimmigrant?OnequestionthatIcannotpursuehereconcernstheconditionsunderwhichapolityshouldadmitwould-beentrantseithertoresidenceortocitizenship(howopenitsdoorsshouldbe);butforsolongastheyareinthepolitytheymustbetreatedwithrespect.

    (48)AnotherquestionthatIcannotpursuehereiswhetherweshouldsometimessaysomethinganalogoustoacitizenwhoreasonablydissentsfromthevaluesexpressedinthelaw:shouldwe(eg)saytoonewhobelievesthatcertainkindsofeuthanasiashouldbelegallypermissible,notthatsheoughttoacceptthelawsdeclarationthattheyarewrong,butthatthoughherviewisreasonable,sheshouldrespectthepublicviewasexpressedinthelaw?(Inbothcaseswemustofcourseaskwhetherwecouldsorevisethelawthatreasonabledissenterscouldactastheythinkrightwithoutfacingcriminalliability.)

    (49)SeeegGJakobs:BrgerstrafrechtundFeindstrafrecht(2004)HRRS88athttp://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/archiv/04-03/hrrs-3-04.pdf.Forcriticaldiscussion,seeCG-JDez,EnemyCombatantsVersusEnemyCriminalLaw(2008)11NewCriminalLawReview529;alsoLZedner,Security,theState,andtheCitizen:theChangingArchitectureofCrimeControl(2010)13NewCriminalLawReview379.

    (50)SeeJFloudandWYoung,DangerousnessandCriminalJustice(London:Heinemann,1981),44.

    (51)EgAIGoldman,TowardaNewTheoryofPunishment(1982)1LawandPhilosophy

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    57;CWMorris,PunishmentandLossofMoralStanding(1991)21CanadianJournalofPhilosophy53.

    (52)Despitethe(veryqualified)ECtHRrulinginHirstvUK(2006)42EHRR41.

    (53)SeeLWacquant,DeadlySymbiosis(2001)3Punishment&Society95.

    (54)SeeCriminalJusticeAct2003,ss22436;CriminalJusticeandImmigrationAct208,ss1320;PRamsay,APoliticalTheoryofImprisonmentforPublicProtection,inTonry(ed),RetributivismHasaPast.

    (55)SeeegCaliforniaPenalCode,667,1170.12;FZimring,GHawkins,andSKamin,PunishmentandDemocracy:ThreeStrikesandYoureOutinCalifornia(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).

    (56)LZedner,SecuringLibertyintheFaceofTerror:ReflectionsfromCriminalJustice(2005)32JournalofLawandSociety507;VTadros,JusticeandTerrorism(2007)10NewCriminalLawReview658.

    (57)SeegenerallyAshworthandZednerinthisvolume,andDefendingtheCriminalLaw:ReflectionsontheChangingCharacterofCrime,Procedure,andSanctions(2008)2CriminalLawandPhilosophy21.

    (58)Foranargumenttosimilarconclusionsfromcontractualistpremises,seeCBrettschneider,TheRightsoftheGuilty:PunishmentandPoliticalLegitimacy(2007)35PoliticalTheory175;seealsoRADuff,ACriminalLawforCitizens(2010)14TheoreticalCriminology293.Acitizenship-basedapproachcanalsoexplainwhyweshouldworryaboutpunishingthosewhohavesufferedseriouslyunjustdisadvantages(seeGreeninthisvolume):ourcollectivefailuretotreatthemasfellowcitizensunderminesourstandingtocallthemtoaccount(seeVTadros,PovertyandCriminalResponsibility(2009)43JournalofValueInquiry391;RADuff,Blame,MoralStandingandtheLegitimacyoftheCriminalTrial(2010)23Ratio1).

    (59)Ontheroleofdifferentmodesofpunishmentinapenalsystemthattakescitizenshipseriously,seeRADuff,Punishment,CommunicationandCommunity(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),ch4.2.

    (60)Seeatn50above.

    (61)Seeatnn545above.

    (62)SeeDuff,Punishment,CommunicationandCommunity,ch4.4.

    (63)CompareSScheffler,IsTerrorismMorallyDistinctive?(2006)14JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy1,5.

    (64)Ontheissuesraisedbysuchdetention,seeAWalen,AUnifiedTheoryofDetention,

  • Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law

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    withApplicationtoPreventiveDetentionforSuspectedTerrorists,forthcomingin(2011)70MarylandLawReview.

    (65)SeePGilbert,NewTerror,NewWars(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,2003).Othersmightarguethattheterroristisneithercriminalnorsoldier,butanoutlaw,hostishumanigeneris(seeBlackstone,CommentariesontheLawsofEngland(Oxford:ClarendonPress,17659),iv.5);againstthisview,weshouldinsistthatterroristsarefellowhumanbeingswhomustbeprotectedaswellasboundbylaw.

    (66)Whichiswhythereareseriousgroundstodoubtwhethermanykindsofwarfarecanbecompatiblewiththeclassicaljusinbelloprotectionsfornon-combatants.

    (67)Seeatn56above.Thekeypointhereisthattheproceduresthroughwhichsuchmeasuresareimposeddonotinvolveproofofinvolvementinterrorismofakindthatacriminalconvictionwouldrequire.

    (68)SeeZedner,SecuringLibertyinthefaceofTerror:ReflectionsfromCriminalJustice;Tadros,JusticeandTerrorism;JWaldron,SecurityandLiberty:TheImageofBalance(2003)11JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy191;FTanguay-Renaud,IndividualEmergenciesandtheRuleofCriminalLawCLPEResearchPaperNo.37/2008,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292805.

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