S.C.C. File No. 37513

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA)

BETWEEN:

JEFFERY THOMAS RAYMOND SEIPP

APPELLANT (Appellant)

AND:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

RESPONDENT (Respondent)

RESPONDENT’S FACTUM

(Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

Solicitors for the Appellant: Ottawa Agents for the Solicitors for the

Appellant: NICHOLAS J. PREOVOLOS N.J. Preovolos Law Corporation 325 – 625 Agnes Street New Westminster, BC V3M 5Y4 Telephone: (604) 521-5291 Facsimile: (604) 643-2811 Email: nicholas@npcriminallawyer.com

MICHAEL J. SOBKIN Barrister & Solicitor 331 Somerset Street West Ottawa, ON K2P 0J8 Telephone: (613) 282-1712 Facsimile: (613) 288-2896 Email: msobkin@sympatico.ca

Solicitors for the Respondent: Ottawa Agents for the Solicitors for the

Respondent: MEGAN A. STREET MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL Criminal Appeals and Special Prosecutions 6th Floor, 865 Hornby Street Vancouver, BC V6Z 2G3 Tel: (604) 660-1126 Fax: (604) 660-1133 Email: megan.street@gov.bc.ca

ROBERT E. HOUSTON, Q.C. GOWLING WLG 2600-160 Elgin Street Ottawa, ON K1P 1C3 Tel: (613) 783-8817 Fax: (613) 788-3500 Email: Robert.houston@gowlingwlg.com

(i)

INDEX

PART I –OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................1

A. Overview ..............................................................................................................................1 B. Statement of Facts ................................................................................................................4

(i) Break-in and theft of Lisa Davidson’s car and debit card ......................................... 4 (ii) The collision and the applicant’s flight .................................................................... 5 (iii) The appellant’s explanation for leaving the scene of the accident scene ................. 5 (iv) Defence counsel’s concession of the appellant’s guilt ............................................. 6 (v) The trial judge’s reasons for judgment ...................................................................... 6 (vi) The Court of Appeal for British Columbia ................................................................ 6

PART II – RESPONDENT’S POSITION ON QUESTIONS IN ISSUE .................................7 PART III – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT.............................................................................7

A. The Court of Appeal reached the correct interpretation of the mens rea ............................7 (i) Principles of statutory interpretation .......................................................................7 (ii) Grammatical and ordinary sense of “civil or criminal liability” ..............................8 (iii) The remainder of s. 252 .........................................................................................10 (iv) The transportation offences scheme .......................................................................11 (v) Legislative history ..................................................................................................12 (vi) Legislative evolution ..............................................................................................16 (vii) Pending amendment to s. 252 ................................................................................25 (viii) The jurisprudence supports a broad reading of the mens rea ................................28 (ix) There is no discordance between the English and French versions .......................31 (x) All interpretive aids point to a broad interpretation ...............................................32

B. There is no compelling reason to change the landscape of statutory interpretation ..........33

(i) There is no compelling reason to expand the modern principle ............................34 (ii) There is no compelling reason to relax the test for genuine ambiguity .................36

C. The appellant’s conviction is not a miscarriage of justice .................................................38

PART IV – COSTS ......................................................................................................................40 PART V – NATURE OF ORDER SOUGHT ............................................................................40 PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................41 PART VII – STATUTORY PROVISIONS ...............................................................................46

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PART I – OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Overview

1. The offence of failing to stop at an accident (s. 252 in the Criminal Code) was enacted

more than a century ago. Yet, until now, the scope of the mens rea, which still bears the

language from its original enactment, appears never to have been the subject of a thorough

statutory analysis. The primary issue for this Court is whether the mens rea – “with intent to

escape civil or criminal liability” – includes the intent to escape liability for conduct which

relates to the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident (i.e. driving while

disqualified, impaired driving, driving a stolen vehicle), but is not the cause of the accident. The

Court of Appeal for British Columbia correctly found that it does, and that the appellant was

therefore properly convicted of failing to remain when he fled an accident, of which he was not

the cause, to avoid prosecution for having possession of a stolen car.

2. On December 29, 2013, someone broke into Lisa and Tim Davidson’s home. The

Davidsons and their 20-year-old daughter, Laura, were home asleep. Among other things, Mrs.

Davidson’s debit card and SUV were stolen. Mr. Davidson and Laura drove around to look for

it. Mr. Davidson observed the appellant driving his wife’s SUV, caught up to him, and tried to

overtake him in a roundabout. This manoeuvre resulted in a collision between the vehicles, from

which the appellant fled without providing either his name or address.

3. Surveillance footage of the appellant using Mrs. Davidson’s debit card and photo pack

identification of the appellant by Mr. Davidson led to the appellant being charged with eight

offences related to the break-in, including possession of Mrs. Davidson’s SUV and failing to stop

at the scene of an accident contrary to s. 252(1)(b) of the Code.

4. The appellant testified in his defence, but called no other witnesses. He denied breaking

into and stealing from the Davidsons’ home, but admitted driving Mrs. Davidson’s SUV under

suspicion that it was stolen. He claimed his friend invited him to drive around in a car she had

acquired and that he dropped her off at some point and continued joyriding until the collision

with Mr. Davidson’s car. He testified that he fled the collision scene because he suspected the

SUV was stolen and thus, did not want to be there when the police arrived.

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5. At the end of the defence case, the trial judge asked defence counsel whether she was in a

position to admit that the evidence established the appellant’s guilt on any of the counts.

Defence counsel submitted the Crown had proven the possession of Mrs. Davidson’s SUV and

failing to stop at the scene of an accident. After closing submissions, the trial judge convicted

the appellant of these two offences, and adjourned to deliberate on the six outstanding counts.

Upon her return to the courtroom she convicted the appellant of an additional two counts relating

to the use of Mrs. Davidson’s debit card. Having accepted that the appellant’s explanation for

possessing the SUV and debit card might reasonably be true, the trial judge could not find he had

been involved in the break-and-enter. She thus acquitted him of the remaining four counts.

6. On appeal in the court below the appellant impugned only his conviction for failing to

stop. He argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider his exculpatory explanation for

fleeing. An error he said flowed from his counsel’s failure to appreciate the specific intent

nature of the offence and her unilateral decision to concede his guilt. He relied on an affidavit

from his trial counsel, in which his counsel deposed that she had conflated the Code offence of

failing to stop at the scene of an accident with failing to comply with the duties of a driver at the

scene of an accident under s. 68(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act.1 He claimed that but for his

counsel’s errors, the trial judge would have found he did not have the requisite mens rea at the

time of the offence.

7. The question of whether the appellant’s counsel had provided ineffective assistance

necessitated a determination of whether the appellant suffered any prejudice as a result of his

counsel’s conduct. This latter issue, in turn, required consideration of the mens rea for failure to

stop . The appellant suggested that there are two lines of authority as to the scope of the “civil or

criminal liability” referenced in s. 252(1) of the Code. He urged the Court to accept the first line

(R. v. Fournier2; R. v. MacLean3), which he argued restricts the civil or criminal liability sought

to be avoided to liability for having caused the accident. The second line (R. v. Benson4), in his

view, defines the liability too broadly by incorporating any liability that might arise from the

operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. The respondent argued that there is no 1 RSBC 1996, c 318. 2 (1978), 8 CR (3d) 248, [1979] JQ no 215 (CA) [Fournier]. 3 (1982), 18 MVR 275, [1982] PEIJ No 6 (Sup Ct) [MacLean]. 4 (1987), 50 MVR 131, [1987] OJ No 1493 (ON Dist Ct) [Benson].

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true conflict as to the scope of the mens rea; that the various cases accept that the liability an

accused intends to avoid by fleeing an accident scene must be sufficiently linked or connected to

the accident.

8. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Court

accepted there are two lines of authority as to the interpretation of the mens rea, but also

recognized that the jurisprudence “generally finds that acts that are connected or related to the

driving will be caught by the provision”.5 After having considered the legislative history and

evolution of the offence, and the extant jurisprudence, the Court concluded that the liability

intended to be captured by Parliament was not limited to liability for the accident. The Court

ultimately adopted the Benson definition: “‘civil or criminal liability should be broadly

interpreted to include any liability, civil or criminal, which might properly arise from the

operation of the motor vehicle by the defendant at the time the accident takes place.’”6

9. Accordingly, the Court found that the appellant’s flight to avoid criminal liability for

possession of a stolen car at the time the accident occurred fell within the criminal liability

contemplated by s. 252(1)(b), and could not have rebutted the presumption of intent. The Court

therefore held that the appellant’s counsel did not err in admitting that the Crown had proven the

elements of the offence, and that the trial judge did not err in convicting the appellant.

10. On appeal to this Court, the appellant impugns the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the

mens rea. He contends that the modern principle and the absence of a common law duty to

rescue favour a narrow interpretation that restricts the liability captured by s. 252 to that for the

accident. In the alternative, the appellant argues that the mens rea is ambiguous and must be

defined through the application of the rule of strict construction.

11. There is no error in the Court of Appeal’s application of the modern principle. The

phrase “civil or criminal liability” in s. 252(1) of the Code, when read in its entire context and in

its grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the transportation offences scheme in the

Code, the purpose of this scheme, and the intention of Parliament, means all civil or criminal

liability arising from the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident.

5 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, pp 26, 29, Court of Appeal Reasons, paras 32, 42. 6 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 30, para 46 [underlining in original].

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12. In enacting this offence Parliament sought to maintain and promote our social fabric by

encouraging prosocial and responsible behaviour on the part of all persons involved in an

accident. Behaviour that assists with the productive determination of liability for accidents,

minimizes injuries to the parties involved, and ensures that whatever assistance may be required

by someone involved in the accident is provided. The Court of Appeal’s broad interpretation of

the mens rea best aligns with this intention because it holds accountable all persons who flee to

avoid any liability arising from the operation of a motor vehicle at the time of the accident,

instead of only those who flee to avoid liability for having caused the accident. As the broad

interpretation captures a larger ambit of conduct than the narrow interpretation, it promotes a

higher rate of compliance with the prosocial behaviours Parliament sought to reinforce.

13. The appellant makes a further alternative argument, in which he asks this Court to: (i)

incorporate the rule of strict construction into the modern principle or, (ii) relax the test for

ambiguity set out in R. v. Bell ExpressVu.7 But, he provides no compelling reason for this Court

to do so. The principle of strict construction is no longer a dominant legal norm and therefore

ought not to be incorporated into the modern principle. Additionally, there is no need to revisit

the test for legal ambiguity. The test is clear. It is also necessary for the preservation of the

purposive approach to statutory interpretation.

B. Statement of facts

(i) Break-in and theft of Lisa Davidson’s car and debit card

14. In December 2013, Lisa Davidson, her husband (Tim Davidson), and their daughter

(Laura), lived in Surrey, B.C. Between two and seven o’clock a.m. on December 29, 2013,

someone broke into their home and stole various items, including Mrs. Davidson’s 2009

Chevrolet Equinox, cell phone, debit card and wallet. Later that morning the appellant used Mrs.

Davidson’s debit card multiple times.8

7 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559 [Bell ExpressVu]. 8 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 1, p 2, Trial Reasons, paras 1-2; Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 16, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 7.

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(ii) The collision and the appellant’s flight

15. Mr. Davidson decided to drive around their neighbourhood in search of Mrs. Davidson’s

SUV because he surmised that a neighbourhood kid had likely taken the car and left it on the side

of the road somewhere. Laura accompanied Mr. Davidson. While driving around, Mr. Davidson

saw the appellant driving his wife’s SUV on Old Yale Road. He caught up to the appellant and

tried to overtake him in a roundabout. This manoeuvre resulted in a collision between the two

vehicles. Immediately following the collision, the appellant got out of Mrs. Davidson’s SUV

and ran away. He did not provide either his name or address. Mr. Davidson was not injured in

the collision, but his daughter was not as fortunate. One of the steel rods that had been implanted

in her back to correct her scoliosis came loose and threatened to poke through her back. Surgical

remediation was required.9

(iii) The appellant’s explanation for leaving the scene of the accident

16. The appellant was 18 years old in December 2013. He had a youth and an adult criminal

record. He denied breaking into and stealing from the Davidsons’ house, but admitted to driving

Mrs. Davidson’s SUV and using her debit card under suspicion that both were stolen.10

17. The appellant testified that he came to be in possession of both of these items when his

friend, Alyssa, unexpectedly came to his house around four or five in the morning on December

29, 2013, and asked if he wanted to go out in a car she had acquired. At some point he dropped

Alyssa off and continued joyriding until he collided with Mr. Davidson’s car. 11 In his direct

examination, the appellant testified that he fled from the collision because he thought the SUV

was stolen and therefore did not want to be around when the police arrived. He was not asked in

either direct or cross-examination whether he had another reason for fleeing.12

9 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 1, p 2, Trial Reasons, para 2; Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 16, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 7. 10 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 1, p 2, Trial Reasons, para 2; Appellant’s Record Vol 1, Tab 2, p 8, Reasons for Sentence, para 4; Tab 3, Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 17, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 9; Appellant’s Record, Vol 2, p 91, Transcript, ll 10-13. 11 The police later located Mrs. Davidson’s cell phone in a basement suite in Surrey occupied by Alyssa McKewon: Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 1, p 3, Trial Reasons, para 3. 12 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 17, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 9.

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(iv) Defence counsel’s concession of the appellant’s guilt

18. At the close of defence counsel’s case, the trial judge asked defence counsel if she was in

a position to admit that the evidence established the appellant’s guilt on any of the offences

charged. Defence counsel submitted that the evidence established the appellant had been in

possession of Mrs. Davidson’s SUV and had failed to provide his name and address at the scene

of the collision. After closing submissions, the trial judge convicted the appellant of these two

offences and adjourned the trial for a short period to deliberate on the remaining six counts.13

(v) The trial judge’s reasons for judgment

19. Upon returning to the courtroom, the trial judge convicted the appellant of two additional

offences related to the use of Mrs. Davidson’s debit card. She acquitted him of the four

remaining offences related to the break-and-enter because she concluded the appellant’s

explanation for possessing Mrs. Davidson’s SUV and debit card “might reasonably be true.”14

(vi) The Court of Appeal for British Columbia

20. The Court of Appeal applied the modern principle of statutory interpretation and s. 12 of

the Interpretation Act15 to determine the scope of the phrase “with intent to escape civil or

criminal liability”. After reviewing the legislative history the Court concluded that Parliament

never intended to tie the onus on the driver to stop at the scene of an accident, provide his or

name and address, and render assistance, to his or her fault for the accident. The Court further

concluded the general consolidation of the Code in 1999 did not alter this intention.16

21. Upon reviewing the jurisprudence, the Court observed that, “there are two approaches in

the jurisprudence for what is meant by ‘intent to escape civil or criminal liability’ and what

amounts to ‘evidence to the contrary’”, but also that, “[t]he case law generally finds that acts that

are connected or related to the driving will be caught by the provision”.17 In light of the “context

and object of the legislation”, the Court concluded there was “no true ambiguity” as to the

13 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 17, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 10. 14 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 1, pp 4-5, Trial Reasons, paras 4-7; Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 17, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 10. 15 RSC 1985, c I-21. 16 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, pp 22-25, 29, Court of Appeal Reasons, paras. 25-29, 43. 17 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, pp 26, 29, Court of Appeal Reasons, paras 32, 42.

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meaning of the mens rea and thus, no need to invoke the principle of strict construction of penal

statutes.18 The Court ultimately concluded that the 1999 amendments to the Code support the

interpretation set out in Benson: that, “civil or criminal liability should be broadly interpreted to

include any liability, civil or criminal, which might properly arise from the operation of the

motor vehicle by the defendant at the time the accident takes place”.19 It adopted this

interpretation of the mens rea and applied it to the facts, finding that “[f]leeing to avoid arrest as

the driver of a stolen vehicle after an accident … falls within the criminal liability contemplated

by [s. 252].”20 The Court therefore concluded that the appellant’s explanation for fleeing could

not have rebutted the legislative presumption of intent, even if it had been accepted by the trial

judge. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the appellant’s counsel did not err in admitting that the

offence had been made out and the trial judge did not err in convicting the appellant.21

PART II – RESPONDENT’S POSITION ON QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

22. The phrase “with intent to escape civil or criminal liability” means with intent to escape

all civil or criminal liability arising from the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the

accident. This includes, but is not limited to, liability arising for having caused the accident.

23. The respondent’s conviction did not constitute a miscarriage of justice. The appellant is

guilty of failing to remain because he was driving Mrs. Davidson’s SUV at the time the collision

occurred and fled to avoid being arrested for possession of stolen property.

PART III – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

A. The Court of Appeal reached the correct interpretation of the mens rea

(i) Principles of statutory interpretation

24. Issues of statutory interpretation are resolved by the application of Elmer Driedger’s

modern principle. This principle mandates that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire

context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act,

18 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, pp 28-29, Court of Appeal Reasons, paras 41-42. 19 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 30, Court of Appeal Reasons, paras 43, 46 [underlining in original]. 20 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 31, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 49. 21 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 31, Court of Appeal Reasons, paras 50-51.

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the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”.22 Determination of the proper

interpretation of a provision is thus reached by using several interpretive aids, including: the

language used, the statutory context, the condition or nature of society at the time the provision

was enacted, the legislative history and evolution, and the object and purpose of the provision.23

25. Statutory interpretation is also guided by section 12 of the Interpretation Act, which

directs that, “[e]very enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and

liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”.24 Regard is

had to other principles of statutory interpretation, such as Charter values and the principle of

strict construction, only in cases of ambiguity. A provision is ambiguous when it lends itself to

“two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute”

after having been considered in its entire context.25 This definition necessarily implies is that it

is insufficient to rely upon differences in judicial or academic interpretations of a provision to

establish ambiguity. Such an approach would circumvent the purposive approach to statutory

interpretation embodied in the modern principle.26

(ii) Grammatical and ordinary sense of “civil or criminal liability”

26. The starting point in any exercise of statutory interpretation is an assessment of the

grammatical and ordinary sense of the text of the provision. In other words, the first step is to

look for “the natural meaning which appears when the provision is simply read through as a

whole”.27 It is thus helpful to reproduce s. 252(1):

22 Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 SCR 27, [1998] SCJ No 2 at para 21 [Rizzo]; Bell ExpressVu, at para. 26; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2014) at 7, §2.1 [Construction of Statutes]. 23 Bell ExpressVu, at para 27; Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Hepworth Silica Pressed Brick Co (1915), 51 SCR 81, [1915] SCJ No 8 at 88; R. v. A.D.H., 2013 SCC 28, [2013] 2 SCR 269 at para 30 [A.D.H.]; R. v. L.B., 2011 ONCA 153, [2011] OJ No. 891 at para 51, leave to appeal dismissed, [2011] SCCA No 208. 24 RSC 1985, c I-21. 25 CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, [1999] SCJ No 87 at para 14, cited in Bell ExpressVu, at para 29 [CanadianOxy]. 26 Bell ExpressVu, at paras 28-30. 27 ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 SCR 140 at para. 41; Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Assn., [1993] 3 SCR 724, [1993] SCJ No 114 at para 7; Construction of Statutes, at 28, §3.5.

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252 (1) Every person commits an offence who has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident with (a) another person, (b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or (c) in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another person, and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his or her name and address and, where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.28

27. Section 252(1) plainly states that where: (i) a person with the ability to cause or direct

movement of a motor vehicle in which he or she is present, (ii) is involved in an accident (iii)

with another person, a vehicle, vessel or aircraft or cattle in the charge of another person (in the

case of a vehicle), (iv) must stop the vehicle, vessel, or if possible, aircraft, (v) provide his or her

name and address, and, (vi) offer assistance to any injured person or person appearing to need

assistance. The provision goes on to prohibit the failure to do any one or more of these things

with the intention of avoiding civil or criminal liability.

28. The phrase “civil or criminal liability” ordinarily refers to legal consequences in a civil

suit or criminal prosecution. In isolation this phrase would appear to refer to all possible civil or

criminal liability. But, the co-text narrows the meaning.29 The word “accident” confines the

scope of the liability to that connected or linked to the accident. But, it does not limit the

liability sought to be avoided to that arising from having caused the accident. This is because the

words “involved in” capture more than the person legally at fault for having caused the

accident.30 Several appellate courts in the United States have reached the same conclusion as to

the meaning of “involved in” in the context of similarly worded statutes.31 Thus, inclusion of the

28 RSC 1985, c C-46 [emphasis added]. 29 Co-text refers to the surrounding text required “to make sense of the words being read”: Construction of Statutes, at 30, §3.11. 30 R. v. Hannam (1986), 1 MVR (2d) 361, [1986] AJ No 1397 at para 14 (QB). 31 See e.g., People v. Sell (1950), 96 Cal App (2d) 521, 1950 Cal App LEXIS 1403 at 523 (4th App Dist); People v. Bammes (1968), 265 Cal App (2d) 626, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 1657 at 631-633 (3rd App Dist); People v. Kerger (1989), 191 Ill App 3d 405, 1989 Ill App LEXIS 1784 at 408-411 (2nd Dist); State v. Lian-Wen Chen (1994), 77 Haw 329, 1994 Haw App LEXIS 43at 336-338 (Int CA), reconsideration granted in part (on a separate issue), (1994), 77 Haw 329,

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words “involved in” indicates that the phrase “civil or criminal liability” includes not only

liability for having caused the accident, but also liability arising from the operation of the motor

vehicle at the time of the accident.

29. Had Parliament meant to limit the liability to that “arising out of fault for the accident”,

as urged by the appellant, Parliament would have used different language. Instead of “involved

in”, Parliament would have stated “and causes”. Or, it would have inserted the words “for the

accident” after “civil or criminal liability”. Indeed, the phrase “criminal or civil liability” is

narrowly defined in several other provisions of the Code: see ss. 257(2), 487.0195(2), 487.058.

30. In the appellant’s view, the absence of a common law duty to rescue supports the position

that the duty to assist in s. 252(1) is “based on a connection between the driver and injured

persons arising out of fault for the accident.”32 His analysis, however, neglects to account for the

co-text discussed above, namely Parliament’s use of the words “involved in”. The narrow

reading of “civil or criminal liability” he proposes is inconsistent with the broad meaning of

“involved in.” Additionally, the absence of a common law duty to rescue is not helpful in the

analysis because Parliament can vary the common law through legislation.

31. In sum, it is evident from reading the provision through as a whole that “civil or criminal

liability” means legal consequences in a civil suit or criminal prosecution for any acts or

omissions arising from the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. This

natural meaning should therefore be given significant weight.33

(iii) The remainder of s. 252

32. Subsections (1.1) through (2) of s. 252 provide further support for the ordinary meaning

discussed above. Subsections (1.1) to (1.3) set out levels of punishment depending upon whether

the person with care, charge or control of the motor vehicle knew another person involved in the

accident suffered bodily harm or death. Although these subsections reference causation for

bodily harm and death, they do not attribute causation to the accused by way of having caused

1994 Haw App LEXIS 47 at 339; People v. Oliver (2000), 242 Mich App 92, 2000 Mich App LEXIS 173 at 96-97 32 Appellant’s factum at para 57. 33 Canada Trustco Mortgage v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 SCR 601 at para 10.

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the accident. Section 252(2), which establishes the presumption of intent, also supports the

ordinary meaning because it reproduces the phrase “civil or criminal liability” without adding

any language that would restrict its scope to liability for having caused the accident.

(iv) The transportation offences scheme

33. No single purpose can be ascribed to the Code given the breadth of its procedural and

substantive provisions. One of its most basic objectives, however, is to maintain and promote

our social fabric.34 To this end, its scheme of negative penalties for harmful and potentially

harmful conduct seeks to protect society and reinforce prosocial and responsible behaviour. The

scheme of transportation offences within the Code contributes to this overarching objective by

criminalizing harmful, risky and dishonest conduct related to the use of conveyances.

34. The transportation offences scheme is found at ss. 249 through 261, under the subheading

“Motor Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft” in Part VIII of the Code, “Offences Against the Person

and Reputation”. Some of the offences enumerated relate to the operation of motor vehicles,

vessels, other water transportation, railway and/or aircrafts, and provide for increased penalties

where bodily harm or death results (s. 249, 249.4 (dangerous operation), ss. 249.2, 249.3, (street

racing), s. 253 (impaired driving/“over 80”)). Others relate to a failure to do something while

operating or having care, charge or control of a motor vehicle, vessel, railway equipment and/or

aircraft, and in some cases provide for increased penalties in the event of bodily harm or death (s.

249.1 (flight from a peace officer), s. 250 (failure to keep watch on person towed/towing a

person after dark), s. 252 (failure to stop at scene of accident), s. 254 (failure/refusal to comply

with a breath demand). The remaining offences relate to the endangerment of life resulting from

a failure to abide safety and regulatory standards or requirements (s. 251 (unseaworthy vessel

and unsafe aircraft and railway equipment), s. 259 (driving while disqualified)).

35. The offence of failing to remain is focused on encouraging prosocial and responsible

behaviour at the scene of an accident. In particular, behaviour that assists with the productive

determination of liability for accidents, minimizes injuries to the parties involved, and ensures

that whatever assistance may be needed is provided. Drivers are ill-equipped to determine or

apportion liability at the side of a road following an accident. They rely on one another to stop 34 R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 SCR 731, [1992] SCJ No 70 at 762.

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and provide their contact information so that people trained to investigate and resolve liability

issues may do so (i.e., police officers, adjusters, courts of law). Likewise, the occurrence of an

accident often places injured parties or those in need of assistance in a position of situational

dependency. They rely on the other parties involved to provide aid, even if it is simply to call an

ambulance and wait with them until it arrives. Thus, leaving an accident without stopping,

providing one’s contact information, and rendering assistance, could impede the determination of

liability for accidents and result in greater harm to the injured than would otherwise occur.

36. That these undesirable risks are present whether the person fled to avoid liability for

perceived fault for the accident or for something arising from the operation of the motor vehicle

at the time of the accident supports a reading of the mens rea that is not limited to liability for

having caused the accident. Such an interpretation, like the one reached by the Court of Appeal,

captures a larger ambit of conduct, and thereby promotes a higher rate of compliance with the

prosocial behaviours enumerated in the provision. This interpretation would also lead to the

increased detection of impaired and disqualified drivers, which in turn, would further advance

the objectives of the transportation offences scheme and the Code. Finally, as will be discussed

below, this interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of the provision.

(v) Legislative history

37. The legislative history of a provision is “everything that relates to its conception,

preparation and passage, from the earliest proposals for legislative change to royal assent.”35

This includes legislative debates, which “may be relied on as evidence of the background and

purpose of the legislation or, in some cases, as direct evidence of purpose”.36

38. Motor vehicles were introduced to the country in large scale in 1904 with the

establishment of Ford Motor Company of Canada Ltd.37 Thus, they were not a concern for

35 Construction of Statutes, at 679, §23.53. 36 Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40, [2014] 2 SCR 135 at para 47. 37 The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2000 ed (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999) at 166 [Canadian Encyclopedia].

13

legislators when the Code was first enacted in 1892.38 On May 4, 1910, however, Parliament

added the offence of failing to stop at the scene of accident to the Code as s. 285a by passing An

Act to amend the Criminal Code respecting injuries to persons due to Motor Vehicles.39 Three

years later there were approximately 50, 000 motor vehicles in the country.40

39. Section 285(a) read as follows:

Whenever, owing to the presence of a motor car on the highway, an accident has occurred to any person or to any horse or vehicle in charge of any person, any person driving the motor car shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars and costs or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty days if he fails to stop his car and, with intent to escape liability either civil or criminal, drives on without tendering assistance and giving his name and address.

40. The debates in Parliament on the first reading of the Act make plain that this offence was

enacted in response to the increase in injuries and fatalities following the introduction of the

motor vehicle:

Mr. Lewis: […] There is a precedent for the Bill I am now asking leave to introduce. I have a report here in which it is stated that the British parliament is alarmed at the destruction of life and at the damage to roads occasioned by motor vehicles. As part of the explanation of this Bill I would mention that while there was not one passenger killed on the railways of the United Kingdom in the years 1907 or 1908, there were 101 killed in New York alone by motor vehicles, and there were 5, 616 motor accidents in the United Kingdom 248 of which were fatal. […]41

41. The language of s. 285(a) suggests that the precedent referenced by Mr. Lewis was s. 6 of

the Motor Car Act, 1903, which introduced the offence of failing to stop after an accident to the

United Kingdom.42 The British offence, however, neither referenced a duty to assist the injured

nor included any wording resembling the phrase “with intent to escape liability either civil or

criminal”.

38 House of Commons Debates, 11th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol XCIII (19 November 1909) at 201 (Mr. Lewis) [1909 Debates]; Alan W. Mewett, “The Canadian Criminal Code, 1892-1992”, (1993) 72(1) Can Bar Rev at 2 [The Canadian Criminal Code]. 39 SC 1910, c 13; Debates of the Senate, 11th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol 1 (3 May 1910) at 935-936. 40 Canadian Encyclopedia, at 166. 41 1909 Debates, at 201 [emphasis added]. 42 3 Edw 7, c 36.

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42. That Parliament sought to maintain our social fabric in this period of significant societal

change by reinforcing prosocial and responsible behaviour is evident from the debates on the

second reading:

Mr. CARVELL: If the hon. member (Mr. Lancaster) will look at the Criminal Code, he will find that there is a provision making a man liable for an accident. This is something in addition. I have not the Criminal Code before me, but I was on the committee, as was the member for Portage la Prairie, I think, and we discussed it very carefully with the Minister of Justice. […]

…

Mr. R. L. BORDEN: As I understand the object of the legislation it is this. When an accident has occurred on the highway owing to the presence of a motor car, whether there has been negligence on the part of the persons driving the motor car or not, absolutely irrespective of that consideration, the motor car must stop and the driver must tender assistance and give his name and address. If he fails to do that, then he is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding $50 in costs. Mr. CARVELL: That is correct. Mr. R. L. BORDEN: That would be irrespective of whether he is in fault or not. If the accident occurs, and he drives on without tendering assistance or without giving his name and address, then he is liable. […] Mr. LANCASTER: […] But under this section, it seems to me that if a motor car driver does that he will escape the penalty imposed by simply giving his name and address, without tendering assistance to the parties he has injured. Under this section he is not required to do both, and I think he should be made to do both. I would, therefore, suggest that the word ‘or’ be struck out and the word ‘and’ substituted. If a man causes an accident he should not escape liability by merely shouting out his name and address. If he is a man at all, he ought to render assistance to the injured as well as be known so that he may be sued for civil damages.

…

Mr. LANCASTER: The hon. Prime Minister may be right in saying that the intention was to create a new offence, but even if that is so, the legislation as framed will be of no practical benefit if a man can escape liability by simply shouting out his name and address without rendering assistance. I am pointing out that he ought to do both. I would move that he word ‘or’ be struck out and the word ‘and’ substituted.

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Amendment agreed to.43

43. Parliament sought to realize this intention by instilling in all persons involved in motor

vehicles accidents a sense of responsibility to their fellow man, regardless of perceived fault;

responsibility to stop and identify themselves such that liability may ultimately be determined

and to assist anyone injured in the accident. Thus, the true intention of the enacting Parliament

was to encourage honesty, accountability and humanity on roadways.

44. The broad nature of Parliament’s intention in enacting this provision supports a broad

interpretation of the mens rea. As discussed above, at paragraph 36, a wide reading of the mens

rea holds more people accountable than a narrower reading, and therefore promotes higher

compliance with the prosocial behaviours Parliament desired.

45. The appellant argues that the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the House of Common

debates in 1910 demonstrate that the offence initially focused on the provision of a name and

address, and assistance to the injured, regardless of whether the driver was at fault for the

accident, is premised on a selective reading of the Hansard.44 He points to Mr. Lancaster’s

sentence beginning with “If a man causes an accident”, reproduced above at paragraph 42, as

evidence of a different interpretation. Mr. Lancaster, however, did not take issue with the fact

that the offence applied to all persons involved in an accident irrespective of fault for the

accident. Rather, the point of Mr. Lancaster’s comments, as evidenced by reading them in their

entirety, is that he believed the purpose of the provision would be best advanced if the persons

involved in an accident were required to not only provide their names and addresses, but also to

aid injured parties. His remarks therefore are of no concern.

46. In addition, there are no issues as to the reliability of the Hansard evidence, particularly

given that Mr. Carvell sat on the Committee that reviewed the Bill with the Minister of Justice.

43 House of Commons Debates, 11th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol XCVII (2 May 1910) at 8729-8731 [emphasis added]; see also R. v. McColl, 2008 ABCA 287, 235 CCC (3d) 319 at para 22 [McColl]. 44 Appellant’s factum at para 63; Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 23, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 28.

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The debates ought therefore to be considered significant evidence of Parliament’s broad purpose

in enacting the offence and strong support for a broad interpretation of the mens rea.

(vi) Legislative evolution

47. The legislative evolution of a provision “consists of the successive enacted versions of

the provision from its inception to the version in place when the relevant facts occur.”45 This

Court has repeatedly acknowledged that legislative evolution may be considered in the

application of the modern principle.46 In this case, the evolution of s. 285(a) discloses several

amendments and re-enactments since 1910, but none of these legislative events reflects a

narrowing of the enacting Parliament’s intention. The provision’s evolution thus supports the

proposition that Parliament intended for the mens rea to include, but not be limited to, the

intention to escape civil or criminal liability for having caused the accident. This, of course, is

the interpretation the Court of Appeal adopted.

48. Section 285(a) was enacted unchanged as s. 285(2) in the 1927 Code.47 On July 1, 1938,

s. 285(2) was repealed by s. 15 of An Act to amend the Criminal Code, and re-enacted as:

285(2) Whenever, owing to the presence of a motor car on the highway, an accident has occurred to any person or to any horse or vehicle in charge of any person, any person driving the motor car shall be guilty of an offence and liable, either on indictment or on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars and costs or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months if, with intent to escape liability either civil or criminal, he fails to stop his car, tender assistance, and give his name and address. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence of an intent as aforesaid.48

49. The new s. 285(2) made the offence hybrid, increased the maximum penalties, and added

a presumption of intent. These changes manifested Parliament’s intention to have prosecutors

45 Construction of Statutes, at 660, §23.18; See also Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 at para 43. 46 R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 SCR 867 at para 33; A.D.H., at para 30; R. v. Boroweic, 2016 SCC 11, [2016] 1 SCR 80 at para 18. 47 RSC, c 36. 48 SC 1938, c 44 [emphasis added].

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and the judiciary treat the offence more seriously and to aid the Crown in proving the mens rea,

but did not have any bearing on the scope of the mens rea.49

50. On July 17, 1947, s. 285(2) was repealed and re-enacted by s. 8 of An Act to amend the

Criminal Code.50 The re-enactment brought about another increase to the maximum penalties

and the replacement of the words “shall be” immediately preceding the word “guilty” with the

word “is”. None of these changes affected the meaning of the phrase “civil or criminal liability.”

51. The offence was re-enacted as ss. 221(2) and (3) in the 1953-1954 Code, assented to on

June 26, 1954:

221(2) Every one who, having the care, charge or control of a vehicle that is involved in an accident with a person, vehicle or cattle in charge of a person, with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop his vehicle, give his name and address and, where any person has been injured, offer assistance, is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years, or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. (3) In proceedings under subsection (2), evidence that an accused failed to stop his vehicle, offer assistance where any person has been injured and give his name and address is prima facie evidence of an intent to escape civil and criminal liability.51

52. The modernization of the language, increase in the punishment available on indictment,

and clarification of the operation of the presumption of intent were brought about by the Royal

Commission on the Revision of the Criminal Code. This Commission was tasked with

simplifying and consolidating the Code provisions, not re-evaluating bases for criminal liability

or making substantive amendments.52 It thus follows that none of these amendments altered the

scope of the mens rea.

53. On July 13, 1961, the offence of failing to stop at the scene of an accident between a

vessel and a person or another vessel was added to the Code as ss. 226A(5) and (6) by s. 5 of An

49 Debates of the Senate, 18th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol 1 (30 June 1938) at 579 (Hon. Mr. Dandurand). 50 SC 1947, c 55. 51 SC 1953-1954, c 51. 52 The Canadian Criminal Code.

18

Act to amend the Criminal Code.53 Apart from the use of the word “vessel” in place of

“vehicle”, the provisions mirrored the language in ss, 221(2) and (3) of the 1953-54 Code.

Accordingly, these amendments did not substantively change the mens rea of the offence.

54. Both ss. 221(3) and 226A(6) were amended on June 27, 1969, by s. 92(2) of the Criminal

Law Amendment Act, 1968-1969.54 The words, “is prima facie evidence”, were replaced with,

“is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof”. The same substitution was made to

13 other Code provisions at this time to ensure consistent use of language. This Court

subsequently ruled that, “[t]he change in wording effected by subs. 92(2) [was] merely the

substitution of an equivalent expression in English and in the French languages for the Latin

words prima facie” as opposed to a change in the law.55 As such, these amendments did not

affect the meaning of the phrase “civil or criminal liability.”

55. Sections 221(2), 221(3), 226A(5) and 226A(6) were re-enacted unchanged as sections

233(2), 233(3), 240(5) and 240(6), respectively, in the 1970 Code.56 They were renumbered

again in the 1985 Code57 as ss. 249(2), 249(3), 258(5) and 258(6).

56. On June 20, 1985, all four sections were repealed and replaced with the following

pursuant to s. 36 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985:

S. 252(1) Every one who has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident with (a) another person, (b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or (c) in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another person, and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop his vehicle, vessel or, where possible, his aircraft, give his name and address and, where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance, is guilty of an

53 SC 190-61, c 43 54 SC 1968-1969, c 38. 55 R. v. Proudlock, [1979] 1 SCR 525, [1978] SCJ No. 100 at 547. 56 RSC 1970, c C-34. 57 RSC 1985, c C-46.

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indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. (2) In proceedings under subsection (1), evidence that an accused failed to stop his vehicle, vessel or, where possible, his aircraft, as the case may be, offer assistance where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance and give his name and address is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of an intent to escape civil or criminal liability.58

57. The new section combined accidents involving vehicles and vessels, incorporated

aircraft, and added that persons with care, charge and control of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft

involved in accidents must also tender assistance to persons who appear to require assistance.

None of these changes narrowed the meaning of the phrase “civil or criminal liability”.

58. Section 252(1) was amended on December 15, 1994, by s. 12 of the Criminal Law

Amendment Act, 199459 to include both gender pronouns and to provide for an increased penalty

when prosecuted by indictment. Neither of these changes affected the scope of the mens rea.

59. Finally, on June 17, 1999, the penalty provisions set out in s. 252(1) were amended by s.

1 of An Act to amend the Criminal Code (impaired driving and related matters).60 The

amendment increased penalties for cases involving bodily harm and death:

S. 252(1) Every person commits an offence who has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident with (a) another person, (b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or

(c) in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another person,

and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his or her name and address and, where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.

(1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) in a case not referred to in subsection (1.2) or (1.3) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

58 RSC 1985, c 27 (1st Supp). 59 SC 1994, c 44. 60 SC 1999, c 32.

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(1.2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) knowing that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

(1.3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life if

(a) the person knows that another person involved in the accident is dead; or

(b) the person knows that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident and is reckless as to whether the death of the other person results from that bodily harm, and the death of that person so results.

60. These changes were responsive to the recommendation of the Standing Committee on

Justice and Human Rights that s. 252 be amended to provide penalties linked to the

consequences of collisions as had been done with impaired driving.61 Ms. Eleni Bakopanos

(then Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada) explained the

connection between failing to stop at an accident scene and impaired driving as follows:

Among its penalty changes Bill C-82 includes changes for two crimes which are sometimes directly related to impaired driving. The first is the offence of leaving the scene of an accident to escape civil or criminal liability. Bill C-82 would amend this provision to add the elements of bodily harm and death, which would increase the gravity of the offence. That in turn should signal to the courts that more severe sentences are required. […] The new formulation in Bill C-82 preserves the intent of the committee. Three levels of leaving the scene are created. Each contains different essential elements. […] The maximum penalty under Bill C-82 is life imprisonment. To the extent that penalties can discourage those who might leave an accident in order to evade getting caught for impaired driving, the changes to the offence of leaving the scene will send the message that running away from a collision where someone is injured or killed is egregious behaviour that carries a serious penalty.62

61. This Hansard evidence illustrates that in 1999, Parliament understood s. 252 to apply to

impaired drivers who leave the scene of an accident to avoid liability arising from having care or 61 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Towards Eliminating Impaired Driving (May 1999) at c 5 (Chair: John Maloney); House of Commons Debates, 36th Parl 1st Sess, No 241 (9 June 1999) at 16128 (Eleni Bakopanos) [1999 Debates]. 62 1999 Debates, at 16128 [emphasis added].

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control of a motor vehicle while impaired. There is neither an indication that Parliament thought

this provision targeted only those seeking to avoid liability for having caused the accident while

impaired nor an indication that it sought to amend the provision to achieve this effect. It simply

sought to harmonize the penalties for failing to remain and impaired driving. Thus, as observed

by the Court of Appeal, these amendments support a broad reading of the mens rea.63 One that

captures the intention to avoid prosecution for knowingly driving a stolen car, which in this case

was no less integral to the appellant’s involvement in the incident giving rise to the provision’s

obligations than is another driver’s impairment.

62. The appellant appears to suggest that since impaired driving was not an offence until

1921, it was neither an offence that the enacting Parliament could have contemplated as being

captured by the phrase “with intent to escape liability either civil or criminal”, nor one that

Parliament in 1999 could have properly understood to be caught by the phrase “civil or criminal

liability”. 64 The extension of his argument is that the Court of Appeal erred in its assessment of

the significance of the 1999 amendments. Although impaired driving was not a known offence

in 1910, it is conceivable that Parliament anticipated that new criminal offences relating to use of

motor vehicles, which had only recently been introduced to society, would soon be drafted and

thus purposely crafted a broad mens rea that would capture these offences.

63. Additionally, the “[t]he intention of Parliament or the legislatures is not frozen for all

time at the moment of a statute’s enactment, such that a court interpreting the statute is forever

confined to the meanings and circumstances that governed on that day.”65 The only way to

respect Parliament’s original intention is to interpret it “in light of prevailing, rather than

historical, circumstances”.66 This also applies to Parliamentary interpretation of legislation

enacted by an earlier government. The Court of Appeal therefore did not err in its assessment of

the 1999 amendments.

64. The appellant also contends that the Court of Appeal failed to appreciate that in the

debates on the 1999 amendments Parliament did not “repudiate” the extant jurisprudence which

63 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 29, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 43. 64 Appellant’s factum at para 62. 65 R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., 2001 SCC 81, [2001] 3 SCR 575 at para 38 [974649 Ontario]. 66 974649 Ontario, at para 38.

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had narrowly interpreted the mens rea.67 He appears to suggest that since Parliament did not

amend the provision to communicate that “civil or criminal liability” refers to liability arising

from operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident, Parliament must be understood to

have adopted the narrow interpretation of the phrase set out in contemporaneous judgments.

This argument is contrary to s. 45(4) of the Interpretation Act, which states that, “[a] re-

enactment, revision, consolidation or amendment of an enactment shall not be deemed to be or to

involve an adoption of the construction that has by judicial decision or otherwise been placed on

the language used in the enactment or on similar language.”68

65. In addition, unlike in Falk Bros. Industries Ltd. v. Elance Steel Fabricating Co.69, upon

which the appellant relies, there was no body of jurisprudence clearly in support of limiting the

liability to that arising from causation for the accident. Rather, a sampling of the decisions prior

to 1999 in which the scope of the mens rea is discussed shows a general acceptance of a broad

interpretation. These cases are summarized below:

Fournier (1978) (Qué CA)

Mr. Fournier drove into two parked cars, but thought he had hit only one. He left with the intention of calling the owner the next day. He returned to the scene the next day, saw he had hit two cars, and identified himself to the owners. The court had a reasonable doubt that he fled to avoid civil or criminal liability.

Para 26 (obiter): “[…] the civil or criminal responsibility that one must intend to escape by leaving the scene of an accident must be related to the accident, and not refer to all civil or criminal responsibility previously or otherwise incurred, e.g. risk of arrest for armed robbery”. [English translation, emphasis added]

R. v. Hofer70 (1982) (SK CA)

Mr. Hofer hit two parked cars. He fled because he had warrants for failure to pay fines. The court found this did not constitute intent to avoid civil or criminal liability.

Para 6: “There must be some link between the accident, or the course of conduct, leading up to the accident and the civil or criminal liability […]” [Emphasis added]

R. v. MacLean (1982) (PEI Sup Ct)

Mr. MacLean rear-ended another vehicle. He

Para 9: “I think that the law is clear that the liability in

67 Appellant’s factum at para 62. 68 RSC 1985, c I-21. 69 [1989] 2 SCR 778, [1989] SCJ No 97 at para 14. 70 (1982), 67 CCC (2d) 134, [1982] SJ No 395 (QB) (summary conviction appeal), reversed (1982), 2 CCC (3d) 236, [1982] SJ No 923 (CA).

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left the scene before police arrived because his license was suspended. The court found this constituted evidence to the contrary.

question, whether civil or criminal is liability to and arising out of the accident in question.” [Emphasis added]

R. v. Gummer71 (1983) (ON CA)

Mr. Gummer drove into a young man who had been walking along the highway. The man died. Mr. Gummer had consumed beer before the accident. He was convicted of dangerous driving for failing to keep a lookout and failing to remain. He received concurrent six month sentences. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown appeal and imposed consecutive sentences.

P 285: “ […] The offence of failing to remain under s. 233(2) of the Code imposes a duty on the person having the care of a motor vehicle which has been involved in an accident, whether or not fault is attributable to him in respect of the accident, to remain and discharge the duties imposed upon him in such circumstances.” [Emphasis added]

R. v. S.D.T.72 (1985) (NSSC App Div)

Mr. T. struck another car and left the scene. The trial judge acquitted Mr. T after finding the presumption of intent violated s. 11(d) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown appeal and remitted the matter for completion of the trial.

Para 7: “The ‘civil or criminal liability’ envisaged by s.s. (2) relates only to liability which could arise from the accident and not pre-existing liability”. [citations omitted] [Emphasis added]

R. v. Riopka73 (1986) (ON Dist Ct)

Mr. Riopka drove his car into the legs of his manager, causing his manager to hop onto the hood of Mr. Riopka’s car. Mr. Riopka drove in circles until he dislodged his manager and then drove away. The Court found Mr. Riopka left to avoid being caught with items he had stolen from work and thus did not leave to avoid criminal or civil liability.

Para 11: “… it is well established that the ‘civil or crime [sic] liability’ referred to in s. 236(1) must be in relation to the accident in issue.” [Emphasis added]

R. v. Benson (1987) (ON Dist Ct)

Mr. Benson struck and fatally injured a child who darted out in front of his van. He failed to stop, but returned a short time later. He then left without providing his name and address because he thought his license was

P 135: “[…] [C]ivil or criminal liability should be broadly interpreted to include any liability, civil or criminal, which might properly arise from the operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant at the time that an accident takes

71 (1983), 25 MVR 282, [1983] OJ No 181 (CA) [Gummer]. 72 (1985), 18 CCC (3d) 125, [1985] NSJ No 197 (SC App Div). 73 (1986), 45 MVR 145, [1986] OJ No 2717 (Dist Ct).

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suspended. The court concluded he fled to avoid civil or criminal liability.

place.” [Emphasis added]

R. v. Bilodeau74 (1993) (NWT SC)

Mr. Bilodeau left the scene of an accident because he feared losing custody of his child. The Court concluded Mr. Bilodeau’s primary intent was to avoid being blamed for the accident, which constituted intent to avoid criminal or civil liability.

Para 26: “I agree with those cases that have held that the ‘civil or criminal liability’ contemplated in s. 252 relates to liability which could arise from the accident and not any incidental or pre-existing potential liability”. [citations omitted] [Emphasis added]

R. v. Albert75 (1997) (NB Prov Ct)

Mr. Albert took his mother’s car without permission. He hit a cyclist and failed to stop. He later returned and took the cyclist to the hospital. He failed to stop because he was afraid of the discipline he knew his parents would impose for having taken the car. The Court found this did not constitute an intention to avoid civil or criminal liability.

Para 13: “…but the principle to be derived from this case [Fournier] is that the civil or the criminal liability that a person must intend to escape from is a liability which is in connection with the accident that brings the matter before the Court.” [Emphasis added]

66. Although the courts in the above-noted cases did not explain how they arrived at their

interpretations (apart from references to previous cases), they are instructive because they show,

on balance, that only liability entirely unrelated to the accident or the operation of the motor

vehicle at the time of the accident falls outside the scope of “civil or criminal liability”.

MacLean is the only case which calls this broad interpretation into question.

67. The respondent located one case from the Ontario Court of Appeal decided before the

1999 amendments, in which the mens rea was defined as, “the intent of the wrongdoer to escape

either civil or criminal liability arising by reason of the accident.”76 But, this statement of the

law directly conflicts with the Court’s more recent pronouncement of the underlying purpose of

provision in Gummer.77 The respondent also found two cases predating 1999 in which courts

appear by implication to have considered that the phrase “civil or criminal liability” refers to

74 (1993), 43 MVR (2d) 248, [1993] NWTJ No 22 (Sup Ct). 75 [1997] NBJ No 20, 185 NBR (2d) 343 (Prov Ct). 76 R. v. Kipling (1957), 119 CCC 171, [1957] OJ No 328 at 174 (OCA). 77 At 285.

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liability for the accident, but neither case includes an express definition or discussion of the mens

rea.78 Furthermore, in both cases there was no evidence of any intention to escape any form of

liability, meaning these cases cannot be said to have considered whether the mens rea includes,

but is not limited to, liability for having caused the accident. Finally, in R. v. Morys-Edge79, a

County Court judge in B.C. stated that, ‘[t]he wording of s. 252 of the Criminal Code makes it

clear that the purpose of the legislation is to prevent persons involved in vehicular accidents from

escaping civil and criminal liability for their actions.” This statement, however, was made in

obiter. Given this state of the law at the time of the 1999 amendments, it cannot be reasonably

stated that there was a uniform body of contemporaneous and authoritative jurisprudence which

Parliament could be expected to have repudiated.

68. In sum, the legislative evolution discloses no scaling back of the enacting Parliament’s

intention to promote prosocial and responsibility behaviours at accident scenes. As such, it

supports the broader interpretation of the mens rea adopted by the Court of Appeal.

(vii) Pending amendment to s. 252

69. On April 13, 2017, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada introduced

Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make

consequential amendments to other Acts.80 The Bill was passed by the House of Commons on

October 31, 2017 and is awaiting resumption of debates on the second reading in the Senate.81

Its terms propose to replace the heading before s. 249 with “Offences Relating to Conveyances”,

and to repeal ss. 249 through 261 of the Code and enact a new scheme of offences relating to the

use of a motor vehicle, vessel aircraft or railway equipment. If passed, s. 320.16(1) will take the

place of s. 252:

S. 320.16(1) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance and who at the time of operating the conveyance knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the conveyance has been involved in an accident with a person or another conveyance and who fails, without reasonable excuse, to stop the conveyance,

78 Chitty v. The Queen (1959), 124 CCC 45, [1958] NBJ No 12, at 52 (NBSC App Div); R. v. Deroo [1963] 3 CCC 282, [1963] BCJ No 77 at 285 (CA). 79 (1989) 20 MVR (2d) 137, [1989] BCJ No 1687 at 140 (Co Ct). 80 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2017 (as passed by the House of Commons 31 October 2017) [Bill C-46]. 81 Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 160 (22 November 2017) at 4185 [November 22nd Debates of the Senate].

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give their name and address and, if any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance. (2) Everyone commits an offence who commits an offence under subsection (1) and who at the time of committing the offence knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the accident resulted in bodily harm to another person. (3) Everyone commits an offence who commits an offence under subsection (1) and who, at the time of committing the offence, knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the accident resulted in the death of another person or in bodily harm to another person whose death ensues.82

70. Sections 320.19(5), 320.2, and 320.21 will replace ss. 252(1.1) – (1.3), allowing for

significantly higher penalties upon conviction and minimum penalties in cases of bodily harm

and death. 83

71. Although the proposed amendments, if carried through, would replace the phrase “civil or

criminal liability” with the broader legal term of art, “without reasonable excuse”, this

information is of little use for the interpretation task at hand.84 As this Court observed in United

States of America v. Dynar, subsequent legislative evolution “can cast no light on the intention of

the enacting Parliament or Legislature”. 85 At best, it may “reveal the interpretation that the

present Parliament places upon the work of a predecessor”, but “it is the judgment of the courts

and not the lawmakers that matters.”86 This view is supported by s. 45(3) of the Interpretation

Act, which states that, “[t]he repeal or amendment of an enactment in whole or in part shall not

be deemed to be or to involve any declaration as to the previous state of the law.”87

72. In this case, review of the amendments currently before Parliament does not even permit

an appreciation of how Parliament has interpreted the mens rea in s. 252 because there is no

discussion of this issue in the background documents, legislative debates, or in the Committee

82 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Fifteenth Report (October 2017) (Chair: Anthony Housefather) [Fifteenth Report]. 83 Bill C-46, cl 14-15. 84 R. v. Moser (1992), 7 OR (3d) 737, [1992] OJ No 602 at 748-750 (CA). 85 [1997] 2 SCR 462, [1997] SCJ No 64 at para. 45 [Dynar]. 86 Dynar at para 45; see also Sethi v. Canada, [1988] 2 FCR 552, [1988] FCJ No 547 at paras 11-12 (CA), leave to appeal dismissed, [1988] SCCA No 455. 87 RSC 1985, c I-21.

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report.88 Part one of the Bill “proposes to supplement the existing drug-impaired driving offence

by creating three new offences for having specified levels of a drug in the blood within two

hours of driving.”89 Part two, which includes the amendments to s. 252, is described as a

“reform [to] the entire Criminal Code regime dealing with transportation offences by repealing

all of the current transportation offence provisions and replacing them with a modern, simplified,

and coherent new Part VIII.1, Offences Relating to Conveyances.”90

73. The Legislative Background explains that the elements of all of the existing

transportation offences except for operating while impaired, operating “over 80”, and refusal will

“remain essentially unchanged from their previous versions although the drafting has, in some

cases, been modernized.”91 The document also states that Parliament expects previous

jurisprudence relating to the transportation offences to remain applicable in cases where the

language has simply been modernized.92 There is, however, no endorsement of any judicial

interpretation of the elements of the offence for failing to stop after an accident or any discussion

as to how Parliament views the elements. Thus, even if this Court is inclined to consider the

pending amendment in its analysis, there is very little it can add.

88 Fifteenth Report; Canada, Legislative Summary of Bill C-46: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, by Maxime Charron-Tousignant (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2017); Canada, Department of Justice, Legislative Background: reforms to the Transportation Provisions of the Criminal Code (Bill C-46), (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017) [Legislative Background]; Canada, Health Canada, Backgrounder: Changes to Impaired Driving Laws, (Ottawa, 2017); House of Commons Debates, 42nd, Parl, 1st Sess, No 181 (19 May 2017) at 11467- 11474, 11492-11502 [May 19, 2017, Debates]; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 182 (29 May 2017) at 11560-11583 [May 29, 2017 Debates]; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 184 (31 May 2017) at 11759-11809 [May 31, 2017 Debates]; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 219 (20 October 2017) at 14347-14377; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 221 (24 October 2017) at 14454-14484, 14499-14503; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 222 (25 October 2017) at 14550-14552; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 224 (27 October 2017) at 14637-14645, 14658-14667; House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 226 (31 October 2017) at 14791-14792; Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 154 (1 November 2017) at 4037; Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No156 (7 November 2017) at 4099-4107; November 22nd Debates of the Senate. 89 Legislative Background at 8; May 19, 2017 Debates, at 11647 (Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould). 90 Legislative Background at 9; May 19, 2017 Debates, at 11467 (Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould). 91 Legislative Background at 13. 92 Legislative Background at 13.

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(viii) The jurisprudence supports a broad reading of the mens rea

74. Several appellate courts and numerous lower courts across the country have considered

the meaning and application of the phrase “with intent to escape civil or criminal liability”. In

addition to the cases decided prior to the 1999 amendments, summarized above at paragraph 65,

this body of jurisprudence includes these 16 cases: R. v. Verboom93; Québec (Procureur

général) c. Sébastien Sirois94; R. v. Burden 95; R. c. Gagné96; R. c. Dubois97; R. v. Crowell98; R.

v. K.J.F.99; R. v. Morgan100; R. v. Jagoe101; R. v. Sanford102; R. v. Samuel103; R. v. Basra104; R. v.

Isaac105; R. v. Devison106; R. v. Hayam107; and, Dubé-Pelletier c. R.108 The definitions of the

mens rea provided in 13 of these cases do not tie “civil or criminal liability” to causation for the

accident. Rather, the common underpinning to the varied language used in these cases to

describe the mens rea is that the phrase “civil or criminal liability” encompasses all liability

arising from the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. The most significant

of these cases are summarized below:

Verboom (AB PC)

Mr. Verboom was driving a stolen car. When a police officer directed him to stop, Mr. Verboom drove away and hit the policer officer and his partner. He claimed he did not know he had hit them. He did not stop because he was afraid of

Para 28:

“ […] The Crown need only prove a causal link between a course of conduct of the accused, leading up to the accident, and the accident itself. In this case, the course of conduct of the accused is directly linked as the accused was

93 2003 ABPC 55, [2003] AJ No 317 [Verboom]. 94 [2005] JQ no 17182, 2005 CanLII 43524 (Prov Ct). 95 (2007), 46 MVR (5th) 61, [2007] NJ No 135 at para 27 (Prov Ct). 96 [2007] JQ no 11610 (Prov Ct), leave to app denied, 2008 QCCA 937, [2008] JQ no 4242. 97 [2008] JQ no 9588 (Prov Ct). 98 2009 ONCJ 235, [2009] OJ No 2183 at para 14. 99 2009 BCCA 344, [2009] BCJ No 1768 at para. 14. 100 [2011] OJ No 3850 (CJ) [Morgan]. 101 2011 NBQB 49, 10 MVR (6th) 23, affirmed, 2012 NBCA 72, [2012] NBJ No 493 (on other issues) [Jagoe]. 102 2014 ONSC 3164, 66 MVR (6th) 321. 103 2015 ONCJ 300, [2015] OJ No 2911. 104 2015 BCSC 1075, [2015] BCJ No 1291 at para 60. 105 2015 SKQB 46, [2015] SJ No 72. 106 2016 NSPC 43, 131 WCB (2d) 506 [Devison]. 107 2017 ONCJ 132, [2017] OJ No 1172. 108 2017 QCCS 687, [2017] JQ no 1564, leave to appeal decision deferred, 2017 QCCA 1369, [2017] JQ no 12515.

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being arrested for being in possession of a stolen car. The court accepted that he did not know he had hit the officers.

operating a motor vehicle, it was stolen, and he was seeking to leave the scene in order to avoid arrest for being in possession of a stolen motor vehicle.” [Emphasis added]

Gagné (Qué Prov Ct)

Mr. Gagné hit another vehicle and did not stop. When the driver of the other car caught up to him, Mr. Gagné said he had children and could not afford to lose his license. He ran away when told the police were on their way. He was intoxicated. The court concluded Mr. Gagné had fled to avoid criminal responsibility.

Para 55:

“[…] The intention must have a link with the accident or the driving that led to it.” [English translation, emphasis added]

Para 67:

“ […] [T]he words of the driver referring to his driver’s license and his employment are conclusive that the driver was looking to avoid the consequences of his criminal responsibility with regard to his privilege to drive” [English translation, emphasis added]

Sanford (ON Sup Ct Jus)

Mr. Sanford struck a cyclist. He stopped and ran back to the cyclist. A passerby did as well. The passerby reported the accident and requested an ambulance. Mr. Sanford remained at the scene for less than three minutes. He said he left to get water and blankets for the cyclist. He did not provide his name before leaving. Mr. Sanford’s license was suspended at the time of the accident. The cyclist died. The court concluded he fled to avoid civil or criminal liability.

Para 65:

“The s. 252(1) offence remains unproven unless the prosecution establishes […] that the driver’s prohibited conduct was accompanied by an intention to escape civil or criminal liability arising from the circumstances of the accident.” [Emphasis added]

Para 73:

“ […] A suspended driver remaining at the scene of a serious accident where the police are bound to attend will inevitably lead to discovery of the driver’s unlicenced status and exposure to liability for the s. 259(4) crime of driving while disqualified. …” [Emphasis added]

Samuel (ON Ct Jus)

Mr. Samuel rear-ended another vehicle. At the time of the collision his license was suspended and he did not have insurance. Mr. Samuel walked away from the accident when the other driver called the police. He neither provided his name or address nor offered assistance. The court found he fled to avoid civil or criminal

Para 33:

“[…] I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Samuel failed to stop for the purpose of escaping civil or criminal liability. … While Mr. Samuel’s motivation was likely to avoid being charged with driving while suspended, the term ‘civil or criminal liability’ has been interpreted broadly to include liability for this offence.”

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liability. [Citations omitted, emphasis added]

Isaac (SK QB)

Mr. Isaac stole a car from a parking lot. While backing up he struck another car in the lot. He then drove away. The court concluded he fled to avoid civil or criminal liability.

Para 78:

“ […]There was no evidence to the contrary … While Mr. Isaac may have had the dual intent to escape with the stolen Acura, the presumption applies even when there is a dual intent.” [Citations omitted, emphasis added]

Hayam (ON Ct Jus)

Mr. Hayam struck a van and did not stop at or near the scene. He had been drinking and was suspended from driving at the time of the accident. Mr. Hayam claimed that the other driver cut him off and that this led to an inevitable accident. The court concluded Mr. Hayam fled to avoid civil or criminal liability.

Para 42:

“The cause of the accident and or the fault element is really of no consequence in this trial. […]” [Emphasis added]

Para 51:

“ […] Mr. Hayam was very much aware that the arrival of police at the scene or his report of the accident to the police would inevitably lead to the discovery that he was a suspended driver that had consumed alcohol on this evening and in turn would expose him to possible criminal charges of impaired driving and or drive while disqualified.” [Emphasis added]

Dubé-Pelletier (Qué Sup Ct)

Mr. Dubé-Pelletier hit a parked car. When confronted by the owners, Mr. Dubé-Pelletier said he had to leave to make his court-ordered curfew. He provided his name before leaving. During cross-examination Mr. Dubé-Pelletier admitted to having been drinking all day and stated that he needed his license for employment. The trial judge concluded Mr. Dubé-Pelletier fled to avoid civil or criminal liability, and this finding was upheld on appeal.

Paras 76-77:

“[…] It can be inferred that in staying on the scene the appellant knew that he risked losing his driver’s licence and also his job as a truck driver.[…] [English translation, emphasis added]

“[T]he judge was permitted to infer as she did that the accused had other motives to want to leave the scene linked to the accident because he ‘did not want to find himself in other problems.” [English translation, underling in original]

75. The courts in three of the cases – Morgan109, Jagoe110, and Devison111 – stated that the

“criminal or civil liability” captured by s. 252 is that relating to causation for the accident. But,

109 At para 4. 110 At paras 39, 43.

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the cases offer neither any explanation for this interpretation nor any authority for it. On the

whole, the jurisprudence (including the cases decided before the 1999 amendments) suggests that

a broad interpretation of “civil or criminal liability” that includes liability for driving a stolen car

at the time of the accident, impaired driving, and driving while disqualified, accords with its

grammatical and ordinary meaning and Parliament’s intention to encourage prosocial and

responsible behaviour at accident scenes.

(ix) There is no discordance between the English and French versions

76. The equal authenticity rule holds that English and French language versions of a

provision are equally “official, original and authoritative expressions of the law.”112 The

corollary to this rule is that discordance between the English and French versions of a legislative

provision cannot be resolved by simply preferring or giving priority to one version.113 Rather,

where there is discordance, one must search for the common meaning between the two versions.

If one version of the provision is ambiguous and the other is plain, the shared meaning will be

the plain and unambiguous version.114 Additionally, if one version has a broader meaning than

the other, the common meaning will “favour the more restricted or limited meaning.”115 Once

the shared meaning is discerned, it must be assessed to determine whether it is consistent with

Parliament’s intent.116 When dealing with criminal legislation, any residual ambiguity should be

resolved in favour of the accused.117

77. In the French version of the 1910 statute, s. 285a states the mens rea as “dans le but de se

soustraire à toute responsabilité civile or criminelle”, which, in English, means “with the

intention to escape from all civil or criminal liability.”118 The French version of the mens rea in

the current provision reads, “omet dans l’intention d’échapper à toute responsabilité civile ou 111 At para 63. 112 Construction of Statutes, at 115, §5.7; See also R. v. Dubois, [1935] SCR 378, [1935] SCJ No 8 at 401. 113 Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721, [1985] SCJ No 36 at paras 140-141. 114 R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, [2004] 1 SCR 217 at para 28 [Daoust]; R. v. S.A.C., 2008 SCC 47, [2008] 2 SCR 675, at para 15 [S.A.C.]. 115 Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 SCR 269 at para 56 [Schreiber]. 116 Daoust, at para 30; S.A.C., at para.16. 117 R. v. Green, [1992] 1 SCR 614, [1992] SCJ No 18, at para 4. 118 SC 1910, c 13 [Emphasis added].

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criminelle.”119 In English, this phrase means “omits with the intention to escape all civil or

criminal liability”.

78. On their face, the words “à toute” in the French version appear to broaden the mens rea to

include the intention to escape all possible criminal or civil liability. Yet, the relevant co-text in

the current provision, which is the same as that in the English version, narrows the mens rea to

all liability arising from the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident (see

paragraph 28, above). Thus, there is no discordance between the English and French versions of

the provision requiring a separate analysis. Indeed, the Court of Appeal, which did not have the

benefit of the French version of the 1910 statute, did not reach a conclusion as to whether the

words “à toute” broadened the scope of the mens rea.120

79. In the event this Court disagrees and finds that the words “à toute” widen the meaning of

civil or criminal responsibility, application of the shared meaning rule will lead to the same

conclusion. This is because the narrower and unambiguous English definition is necessarily

included in the French definition. It is the definition common to both versions, and thus, the

definition upon which they can be reconciled. Furthermore, as the respondent has discussed

above, this interpretation is consonant with Parliament’s intent.

(x) All interpretive aids point to a broad interpretation

80. All of the interpretive aids discussed above lead to the conclusion that the Court of

Appeal was correct in defining “civil or criminal liability” as all civil or criminal liability arising

from the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident.

81. Additionally, this interpretation avoids the internal inconsistency in the transportation

offences scheme in the Code that would flow from the interpretation the appellant urges upon

this Court. On the appellant’s interpretation, an impaired or suspended driver who is involved in

an accident, but not responsible for having caused it, could leave the scene without undertaking

the duties enumerated in s. 252 because he or she does not want his or her impaired or unlicensed

status to become known. Given that both driving while impaired and driving while disqualified

are offences in the transportation offences scheme (regardless of whether the impaired or 119 RSC 1985, c C-36 [Emphasis added]. 120 Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 22, Court of Appeal Reasons, para 22.

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unlicensed driver causes an accident), it would be inconsistent to permit these drivers to escape

liability for failing to remain because they left to avoid other liability within the same legislative

scheme. Parliament is presumed to have enacted legislation that is both internally consistent and

coherent.121 The Court of Appeal’s interpretation reflects this presumption.

82. In the end, the phrase “civil or criminal liability” in s. 252(1) of the Code, when read in

its entire context and in its grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the transportation

offences scheme in the Code, the purpose of this scheme, and the intention of Parliament, means

all civil or criminal liability arising from the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the

accident.

83. It should be noted that even with this broad interpretation, the provision falls short of

achieving its objective because it appears to permit flight from an accident scene to avoid pre-

existing legal liability unrelated to driving (i.e. outstanding warrants, breaching a condition of an

undertaking) as well as seemingly unreasonable explanations (i.e. fear of parental discipline,

meeting a deadline, etc.).122 To best advance the public policy objectives underpinning the

provision, people involved in an accident ought to be liable for failing to remain absent a

reasonable excuse. This perhaps explains why Parliament is amending the provision.

B. There is no compelling reason to change the landscape of statutory interpretation

84. In the event that this Court concludes that application of the modern principle neither

leads to a construction of the mens rea that limits “civil or criminal liability” to that arising from

causation for the accident nor to a finding of genuine ambiguity that justifies the application of

the rule of strict construction, the appellant asks this Court to (i) incorporate the principle of the

strict construction of penal statutes into the modern approach, or (ii) relax the test for ambiguity

set out in Bell ExpressVu.123 In short, the appellant now claims, for the first time, that the test for

genuine ambiguity is unworkable and that application of the principle of strict construction ought

to be permitted absent a finding of ambiguity. Yet, he provides no compelling reason for this

Court to overrule these two key aspects of modern day statutory interpretation. He does not 121 R. v. L.T.H., 2008 SCC 49, [2008] SCJ No 50 at para 47. 122 R. v. Rampersad, 2006 ONCJ 182, [2006] OJ No 2027 at para 24; Manning, Mewett & Sankoff, Criminal Law, 5th ed (Markham, ON, 2015) at 1355-1356, §§25.96-25.98. 123 Appellant’s Factum at paras 68-75.

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explain why the principle of strict construction should be restored to its former status as a key

tool in statutory interpretation, identify any confusion in the jurisprudence as to the application

of the test for ambiguity, or describe how either of these changes would look.

(i) There is no compelling reason to expand the modern principle

85. In making his argument, the appellant adopts Ruth Sullivan’s critique of this Court’s

articulation of the modern principle in Bell ExpressVu.124 She contends that all presumptions of

legislative intent, including the principle of strict construction, embody “the entire body of

evolving legal norms which contribute to the legal context in which official interpretation

occurs.”125 She thus asserts that each of these presumptions “has a role to play in every

interpretive effort.”126 In her view, this Court’s statement in Bell ExpressVu that these

presumptions of intent “only receive application where there is ambiguity as to the meaning of a

provision”127 constitutes a rejection of the modern principle and a return to “the manipulable

plain meaning rule.”128

86. Sullivan also impugns the Court’s holding that “ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact

that several courts – or, for that matter, several doctrinal writers – have come to differing

conclusions on the interpretation of a given provision.”129 She posits that this position neglects

the fact that “two competent speakers of a language, acting in good faith and taking into account

a shared set of contextual factors, could reach different conclusions as to the meaning of a text

simply because other significant contextual factors are not shared”.130 She further contends that

decisions as to ambiguity will vary from one court to the next because “courts have no principled

way to measure degrees of ambiguity or distinguish plain from ambiguous texts.”131

87. Ultimately, she suggests (and the appellant agrees), that this Court’s treatment of the

presumption of subjective fault in A.D.H. is the preferred approach with respect to presumptions

124 Appellant’s Factum at paras 70-71, 74-75. 125 Construction of Statutes, at 8-9, §2.5. 126 Construction of Statutes, at 10-14, §§2.11-2.18, 485, §§15.12-15.13 127 Bell ExpressVu, at para 28. 128 Construction of Statutes, at 23-24, §2.34. 129 Bell ExpressVu, at para 30. 130 Construction of Statutes, at 24, §2.35. 131 Construction of Statutes, at 486-487 at §15.15.

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of intent.132 In A.D.H. this Court had to determine whether the mens rea for the offence of child

abandonment was subjective or objective. In applying the modern principle, this Court

considered the presumption of legislative intent in favour of subjective fault:

An important part of the context in which we must interpret s. 218 is the presumption that Parliament intends crimes to have a subjective fault element. […]133

As for the role of the presumption of subjective fault in assessing competing interpretations, it sets out an important value underlying out criminal law. It has been aptly termed one of the “presumptive principles of criminal justice”: R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, per Charron J., at paras. 22-23. While the presumption must – and often does – give way to clear expressions of a different legislative intent, it nonetheless incorporates an important value in our criminal law, that the morally innocent should not be punished. […]134

88. Sullivan suggests (and the appellant agrees) that the approach taken in A.D.H. somehow

differs from this Court’s post-Rizzo application of the modern principle, and that this approach is

more in line with Driedger’s conceptualization of the principle. But, this argument ignores the

import of the Court’s remark in A.D.H. that the presumption of subjective fault “is not an

outdated rule of construction which is at odds with the modern approach to statutory

interpretation.”135 Had the presumption of subject fault, like the principle of strict construction,

been statutorily and judicially recognized as a subsidiary tool of interpretation, it is unlikely this

Court would have considered it a relevant contextual factor.

89. The principle of strict construction arose in 17th century England, when penal legislation

called for severe punishment and judges were heavily influenced by natural law theory.136 With

the advent of more reasonable penal legislation and the reduced use of the death penalty in the

19th century, however, the principle began to occupy an auxiliary role.137 In 1951, this Court

held that that s. 15 of the federal Interpretation Act rendered the principle of strict construction a 132 Construction of Statutes, pp 485-486 at §15.14-15.15. 133 A.D.H., at para 23. 134 A.D.H., at para 27. 135 A.D.H., at para. 28. 136 Livingston Hall, “Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes” (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748 at 749-52; Construction of Statutes, at 11, §2.12; Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto, Ontario: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2011) at 506 [Legislation in Canada]; R. v. Paré, [1987] 2 SCR 618, [1987] SCJ No. 75 at paras 24-25 [Paré]. 137 Legislation in Canada, at 506.

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subsidiary tool of interpretation. 138 Section 15 corresponds to s. 12 in the current Act, which

states that, “[e]very enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal

construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.”139 Following the

decision in Robinson, this Court has affirmed that the principle only finds application in cases

where the modern principle of statutory interpretation reveals genuine ambiguity.140

90. With both Parliament and the courts having recognized that the principle of strict

construction of modern penal legislation is no longer a dominant legal norm, there is no

compelling basis on which to incorporate it into the modern principle as a contextual factor.

Moreover, inclusion of this rule of construction in the modern principle, even if accorded little

weight, has the potential to derail the search for the true meaning of the penal provision in

question because it focuses solely on the interests of the accused.

(ii) There is no compelling reason to relax the test for genuine ambiguity

91. The appellant impugns this Court’s statement in Bell ExpressVu that courts must not

circumvent the modern principle by finding ambiguity on the basis of conflicting judicial

interpretations:

[…] Just as it would be improper for one to engage in a preliminary tallying of the number of decisions supporting competing interpretations and then apply that which receives the “higher score”, it is not appropriate to take as one’s starting point the premise that differing interpretations reveal an ambiguity. It is necessary in every case, for the court charged with interpreting a provision to undertake the contextual and purposive approach set out by Driedger, and thereafter to determine if “the words are ambiguous enough to induce two people to spend good money in backing two opposing views as to their meaning” [citation omitted].141

92. He suggests this is nonsensical where “several courts have applied the modern approach

and arrived at or seriously considered” different interpretations.142 But his argument assumes the

impossible: that courts consider the same contextual factors (i.e. legislative history, legislative 138 R. v. Robinson, [1951] SCR 522, [1951] SCJ No. 9 at 529. 139 RSC 1985, c I-21. 140 See e.g., Paré, at paras 25-26; R. v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 SCR 398, [1993] SCJ No 57 at paras 30-31; Bell ExpressVu, at para 28; R. v. Mac, [2002] 1 SCR 856, [2002] SCJ No 26, at para 4; Daoust, at para 31. 141 Bell ExpressVu, at para 30. 142 Appellant’s Factum, at paras 72, 75.

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evolution, etc.) look at the same material, and hear the same arguments in cases involving

statutory interpretation. Given that these variables cannot be fixed, this heuristic approach to

statutory interpretation is bound to lead to false findings of ambiguity, the improper use of

subsidiary principles of interpretation, and ultimately, to interpretations that do not reflect

Parliament’s intent. This Court was thus right to prohibit reliance on conflicting jurisprudence

as evidence of ambiguity. It is also essential to note that this Court did not prohibit the

consideration of conflicting judicial interpretations as a factor in the application of the modern

principle.

93. In any event, none of the cases considered by the Court of Appeal as having given rise to

the two lines of authority respecting the scope of the mens rea in s. 252 indicate an application of

the modern principle. Nor do any of the other cases discussed in this factum. Thus, even if the

appellant’s proposition was well-founded, it would not be open to this Court to find the phrase

“civil or criminal liability” ambiguous based solely on the extant jurisprudence.

94. The appellant further argues that the test ought to be relaxed because this Court’s

assertion in Bell ExpressVu that a measure of ambiguity is whether “the words are ambiguous

enough to induce two people to spend good money in backing two opposing views as to their

meaning” is neither a practical nor a principled basis on which to determine ambiguity.143 Had

this been the only assistance offered by the Court as to how to assess ambiguity, some

clarification might be warranted. But, as evidenced by the excerpt below, it was not:

What, then, in law is an ambiguity? To answer, an ambiguity must be “real”. The words of the provision must be “reasonably capable of more than one meaning”. By necessity, however, one must consider the “entire context” of a provision before one can determine if it is reasonably capable of multiple interpretations. In this regard, Major J.’s statement in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), is apposite: “It is only when genuine ambiguity arises between two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute, that the courts need to resort to external interpretive aids.144

95. The appellant has not identified any cases in which judges have either struggled with the

application of this definition or called on this Court for clarification or refinement of the test.

143 Appellant’s Factum at para 73. 144 Bell ExpressVu, at para 29 [citations omitted; emphasis added].

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96. The appellant also adopts Sullivan’s argument about the inexactness of the ambiguity

threshold. Quoting from her text, The Construction of Statutes, he argues that there is “‘no

bright line between clarity and ambiguity’” and “‘no principled way to measure degrees of

ambiguity or distinguish plain from ambiguous texts.’145 In essence, Sullivan and the appellant’s

chief complaint is that there are degrees of clarity and ambiguity as opposed to a binary choice

between clear and ambiguous, which is bound to lead to conflicting interpretations. Yet, many

of the concepts and principles in our criminal justice system do not lend themselves to bright line

rules. In fact, courts often forgo such rules in favour of contextual frameworks to be applied on a

case-by-case basis.146 The appellant has not pointed to anything to suggest that the ambiguity test

set out in Bell ExpressVu is somehow different from other indeterminate concepts or principles

that judges apply daily.

97. Moreover, he fails to propose how the test for ambiguity could be “relaxed” to avoid

varied interpretations. The modern approach to statutory interpretation directs judges to

appropriate interpretive aids and provides some rules of construction, but still requires judges to

draw inferences and apply common sense. 147 As such, even with the relaxation of the test for

ambiguity, judges are still likely to arrive at different interpretations from time to time.

98. The test for genuine ambiguity in Bell ExpressVu has been a part of the landscape of

statutory interpretation for the past 15 years.148 It should only be overruled where there are

compelling reasons to do so. 149 The appellant has not presented any.

C. The appellant’s conviction is not a miscarriage of justice

99. In the court below the appellant alleged that his counsel erred by failing to appreciate the

specific intent nature of the offence when she conceded his guilt on the failing to remain charge.

But for this error, he argued, the trial judge would have found that he did not leave the collision

145 Appellant’s Factum at paras 74-75. 146 See e.g., R. v. Stachan, [1988] 2 SCR 980, [1988] SCJ No 94 at para 46; R. v. Mohamed, 2015 ONCA 335, [2015] OJ No 2383 at para 5; R. v. Kler, 2017 ONCA 64, [2017] OJ no 375 at para 60. 147 Construction of Statutes, at 25, §2.37. 148 18 years if CanadianOxy is considered. 149 R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609 at paras 44-46; Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, 2 SCR 489, at paras 25-27.

39

scene to avoid civil or criminal liability. He now argues it is unnecessary to determine whether

his trial counsel was ineffective because the primary issue is whether the appellant’s conviction

constitutes a miscarriage of justice. In effect, the appellant has abandoned his claim of

ineffective assistance.150

100. The appellant submits that he is not guilty of failing to remain on either the broad or the

narrow interpretation of the mens rea. On a narrow construction that limits the liability sought to

be avoided to that arising from causation for the accident, he argues that his evidence that he fled

to avoid being found by police in a stolen vehicle, concomitant with the evidence that he did not

cause the accident, rebuts the presumption of mens rea. He also contends that he rebuts the

presumption on a broad interpretation that includes all civil or criminal liability arising from the

operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident because his possession of Mrs.

Davidson’s SUV preceded the collision.151 Neither contention is correct.

101. On the broad interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeal, the appellant is guilty

because he was driving Mrs. Davidson’s SUV at the time the collision occurred and fled to avoid

being arrested for having possession of it. It matters not that the actus reus and mens rea of the

offence of possession of stolen property solidified earlier that morning when he came into

possession of the SUV. His criminal possession of the SUV continued until he fled the collision

scene.152 His flight to evade arrest for this offence was therefore to avoid criminal liability

arising from his operation of the SUV at the time the accident occurred.

102. In the event this Court concludes that “civil or criminal responsibility” is confined to

liability for having caused the accident, the appellant’s conviction remains sound. This is

because his use of Mrs. Davidson’s SUV was a factual cause of the collision, and his conduct

properly attracts criminal liability. The collision would not have occurred but for his possession

150 Appellant’s Factum, at paras 84-85; Appellant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3, p 31, Court of Appeal Reasons, paras 50-51. 151 Appellant’s Factum at paras 7, 85. 152 R. v. Bell, [1983] 2 SCR 471, [1983] SCJ No 83 at 488; Lalonde v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 923, [2016] OJ No 6318 at paras 15-17.

40

of the SUV and but for his unwillingness to stop the SUV when Mr. Davidson tried to overtake

him. In this sense, the liability he sought to avoid was for having caused the accident.153

PART IV – SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS

103. The appellant makes no submissions on costs.

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

104. The respondent respectfully requests that the appeal be dismissed.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

___________________ Megan A. Street

Counsel for the Respondent

November 24, 2017 Vancouver, B.C.

153 R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24, [2012] 2 SCR 30 at paras 15, 20; R. v. Romano, 2017 ONCA 837, [2017] ONCA No 5703 at paras 26-37.

41

PART VI TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PARAGRAPH ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 SCR 140 26

Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General) 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 SCR 471 47

Canada Trustco Mortgage v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 SCR 601 31

Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, 2 SCR 489 98

Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40, [2014] 2 SCR 135 37

Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Assn., [1993] 3 SCR. 724, [1993] SCJ No 114 26

CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 SCR 743, [1999] SCJ No 87 25, 94, 98

Chitty v. The Queen (1959), 124 CCC 45, [1958] NBJ No 12 (NBSC-App Div) 67

Dubé-Pelletier c. R., 2017 QCCS 687, [2017] JQ no 1564, leave to appeal decision deferred, 2017 QCCA 1369, [2017] JQ no 12515 74

Falk Bros. Industries Ltd. v. Elance Steel Fabricating Co, [1989] 2 SCR 778, [1989] SCJ No 97 65

Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Hepworth Silica Pressed Brick Co (1915), 51 SCR 81, [1915] SCJ No 8 24

Lalonde v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 923, [2016] OJ No 6318 101

People v. Bammes (1968), 265 Cal App (2d) 626, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 1657 (3rd App Dist) 28

People v. Kerger (1989), 191 Ill App 3d 405, 1989 Ill App LEXIS 1784 (2nd Dist) 28

People v. Oliver (2000), 242 Mich App 92, 2000 Mich App LEXIS 173 28

People v. Sell (1950), 96 Cal App (2d) 521, 1950 Cal App LEXIS 1403 (4th App Dist) 28

Québec (Procureur général) c. Sébastien Sirois, [2005] JQ no 17182, 2005 CanLII 43524 (Prov Ct) 74

R. c. Dubois, [2008] JQ no 9588 (Prov Ct) 74

R. c. Gagné, [2007] JQ no 11610 (Prov Ct), leave to app denied, 2008 QCCA 937, [2008] JQ no 4242 74

R. c. Isaac, 2015 SKQB 46, [2015] SJ No 72 74

42

CASES PARAGRAPH

R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., 2001 SCC 81, [2001] 3 SCR 575 63

R. v. A.D.H., 2013 SCC 28, [2013] 2 SCR 269 24, 47, 87, 88

R. v. Albert, [1997] NBJ No 20, 185 NBR (2d) 343 (Prov Ct) 65

R. v. Basra, 2015 BCSC 1075, [2015] BCJ No 1291 74

R. v. Bell ExpressVu, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559 13, 24, 25, 84, 85, 86, 89, 91, 94, 95, 98

R. v. Bell, [1983] 2 SCR 471, [1983] SCJ No 83 101

R. v. Benson (1987), 50 MVR 131, [1987] OJ No 1493 (ON Dist Ct) 7, 8, 21, 65

R. v. Bilodeau (1993), 43 MVR (2d) 248, [1993] NWTJ No 22 (Sup Ct) 65

R. v. Boroweic, 2016 SCC 11, [2016] 1 SCR 80 47

R. v. Burden, (2007), 46 MVR (5th) 61, [2007] NJ No 135 (Prov Ct) 74

R. v. Crowell, 2009 ONCJ 235, [2009] OJ No 2183 74

R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, [2004] 1 SCR 217 76, 89

R. v. Deroo [1963] 3 CCC 282, [1963] BCJ No 77 (CA) 67

R. v. Devison, 2016 NSPC 43, 131 WCB (2d) 506 74, 75

R. v. Dubois, [1935] SCR 378, [1935] SCJ No 8 76

R. v. Fournier, (1978) 8 CR (3d) 248, [1979] JQ no 215 (CA) 7, 65

R. v. Green, [1992] 1 SCR 614, [1992] SCJ No 18 76

R. v. Gummer (1983), 25 MVR 282, [1983] OJ No 181 (CA) 65

R. v. Hannam (1986), 86 1 MVR (2d) 361, [1986] AJ No 1397 (QB) 28

R. v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 SCR 398, [1993] SCJ No 57 89

R. v. Hayam, 2017 ONCJ 132, [2017] OJ No 1172 74

43

CASES PARAGRAPH

R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609 98

R. v. Hofer (1982), 67 CCC (2d) 134, [1982] SJ No 395, at 136 (QB), reversed (1982), 2 CCC (3d) 236, [1982] SJ No 923 (CA) 65

R. v. Jagoe, 2011 NBQB 49, 10 MVR (6th) 23, affirmed, 2012 NBCA 72, [2012] NBJ No 493 74, 75

R. v. K.J.F., 2009 BCCA 344, [2009] BCJ No 1768 74

R. v. Kipling (1957), 119 CCC 171, [1957] OJ No 328 (OCA) 67

R. v. Kler, 2017 ONCA 64, [2017] OJ no 375 96

R. v. L.B., 2011 ONCA 153, [2011] OJ No 891, leave to appeal dismissed, [2011] SCCA No 208 24

R. v. L.T.H., 2008 SCC 49, [2008] SCJ No 50 81

R. v. Mac, [2002] 1 SCR 856, [2002] SCJ No 26 89

R. v. MacLean (1982), 18 MVR 275, [1982] PEIJ No 6 (Sup Ct) 7, 65, 66

R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24, [2012] 2 SCR 30 102

R. v. McColl, 2008 ABCA 287, 235 CCC (3d) 319 42

R. v. Mohamed, 2015 ONCA 335, [2015] OJ No 2383 96

R. v. Morgan, [2011] OJ No 3850 (CJ) 74, 75

R. v. Morys-Edge, (1989) 20 MVR (2d) 137, [1989] BCJ No 1687 (Co Ct) 67

R. v. Moser (1992), 7 OR (3d) 737, [1992] OJ No 602 (CA) 71

R. v. Paré, [1987] 2 SCR 618, [1987] SCJ No 75 89

R. v. Proudlock, [1979] 1 SCR 525, [1978] SCJ No 100 54

R. v. Rampersad, 2006 ONCJ 182, [2006] OJ No 2027 83

R. v. Riopka (1986), 45 MVR 145, [1986] OJ No 2717 (Dist Ct) 65

R. v. Robinson, [1951] SCR 522, [1951] SCJ No 9 89

R. v. Romano, 2017 ONCA 837, [2017] ONCA No 5703 102

44

CASES PARAGRAPH

R. v. S.A.C., 2008 SCC 47, [2008] 2 SCR 675 76

R. v. S.D.T. (1985), 18 CCC (3d) 125, [1985] NSJ No 197 (SC App Div) 65

R. v. Samuel, 2015 ONCJ 300, [2015] OJ No 2911 74

R. v. Sanford, 2014 ONSC 3164, 66 MVR (6th) 321 74

R. v. Stachan, [1988] 2 SCR 980, [1988] SCJ No 94 96

R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 SCR 867 47

R. v. Verboom, 2003 ABPC 55, [2003] AJ No 317 74

R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 SCR 731, [1992] SCJ No 70 33

Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721, [1985] SCJ No 36 76

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 SCR 27, [1998] SCJ No 2 24

Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 SCR 269 76

Sethi v. Canada, [1988] 2 FCR 552, [1988] FCJ No 547 (CA), leave to appeal dismissed, [1988] SCCA No 455 71

State v. Lian-Wen Chen (1994), 77 Haw 329, 1994 Haw. App. LEXIS 43 (Int CA), reconsideration granted in part (on a separate issue), (1994), 77 Haw 329, 1994 Haw App LEXIS 47 at 339

28

United States of America v. Dynar, [1997] 2 SCR 462, [1997] SCJ No 64 71

HISTORICAL LEGISLATION PARAGRAPH

An Act to amend the Criminal Code respecting injuries to persons due to Motor Vehicles, SC 1910, c 13

38

Motor Car Act, 1903, 3 Edw 7, c 36 41

Criminal Code, RSC 1927, c 36 48

An Act to amend the Criminal Code, SC 1938, c 44 48

An Act to amend the Criminal Code, SC 1947, c 55 50

Criminal Code, SC 1953-1954, c 51 51

45

HISTORICAL LEGISLATION PARAGRAPH

An Act to amend the Criminal Code, SC 1960-61, c 43 53

Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-1969, SC 1968-1969, c 38 54

Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34 55

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 55

Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, RSC 1985, c 27 (1st Supp) 56

Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1994, SC 1994, c 44 58

An Act to amend the Criminal Code (impaired driving and related matters), SC 1999, c 32 59

PENDING LEGISLATION

Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2017 (As passed by the House of Commons 31 October 2017)

69

SECONDARY SOURCES

Alan W. Mewett, “The Canadian Criminal Code, 1892-1992”, (1993) 72(1) Can Bar Rev 1 38, 52

Canada, Department of Justice, Legislative Background: reforms to the Transportation Provisions of the Criminal Code (Bill C-46), (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017)

72, 73

Canada, Health Canada, Backgrounder: Changes to Impaired Driving Laws, (Ottawa, 2017) 72

Canada, Legislative Summary of Bill C-46: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts by Maxime Charron-Tousignant (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2017)

72

Debates of the Senate, 11th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol 1 (3 May 1910) 38

46

SECONDARY SOURCES

Debates of the Senate, 18th Parl, 3rd Sess, Vol 1 (30 June 1938) 49

Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 154 (1 November 2017) 72

Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No156 (7 November 2017) 72

Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, 160 (22 November 2017) 69, 72

House of Commons Debates, 11th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol XCIII (19 November 1909) 38, 40

House of Commons Debates, 11th Parl, 2nd Sess, Vol XCVII (2 May 1910) 42

House of Commons Debates, 36th Parl, 1st Sess, No 241 (9 June 1999) 60

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1 Sess, No 181 (19 May 2017) 72

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 182 (29 May 2017) 72

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 184 (31 May 2017) 72

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 219 (20 October 2017) 72

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 221 (24 October 2017) 72

47

SECONDARY SOURCES

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 222 (25 October 2017) 72

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 224 (27 October 2017) 72

House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 226 (31 October 2017) 72

House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Fifteenth Report (October 2017) (Chair: Anthony Housefather) 69, 72

House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Towards Eliminating Impaired Driving (May 1999) 60

Livingston Hall, “Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes”, (1935) 48 Har L Rev 748 89

Manning, Mewett & Sankoff, Criminal Law, 5th ed (Markham, ON, 2015) 83

Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto, Ontario: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2011) 89

Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2014)

24, 26, 28, 37, 47, 76, 85, 86, 87, 89, 96, 97

The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2000 ed (Toronto, ON: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999) 38

48

PART VII STATUTORY PROVISIONS Motor Vehicle Act, RSBC 1996, c 318 Duty of driver at accident

68 (1) The driver or operator or any other person in charge of a vehicle that is, directly or indirectly, involved in an accident on a highway must do all of the following:

(a) remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident; (b) render all reasonable assistance; (c) produce in writing to any other driver involved in the accident and to anyone sustaining loss or injury, and, on request, to a witness

(i) his or her name and address, (ii) the name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle, (iii) the licence number of the vehicle, and (iv) particulars of the motor vehicle liability insurance card or financial responsibility card for that vehicle, or such of that information as is requested.

(2) The driver or operator or any other person in charge of a vehicle that collides with an unattended vehicle must stop and must

(a) locate and notify in writing the person in charge of or the owner of the unattended vehicle of

(i) the name and address of the driver, operator or other person in charge, (ii) the name and address of the registered owner, and (iii) the licence number of the vehicle that struck the unattended vehicle, or

(b) leave in a conspicuous place in or on the vehicle collided with a notice in writing giving the information referred to in paragraph (a).

(3) The driver or operator or any other person in charge of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to property on or adjacent to a highway, other than a vehicle under subsection (2), must take reasonable steps to locate and notify in writing the owner or person in charge of the property of the fact of the accident and of the following:

(a) the name and address of the driver, operator or other person in charge of the vehicle; (b) the name and address of the registered owner; (c) the licence number of the vehicle.

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Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s. 12

Enactments deemed remedial

12 Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.

R.S., c. I-23, s. 11.

Principe et interprétation

12 Tout texte est censé apporter une solution de droit et s’interprète de la manière la plus équitable et la plus large qui soit compatible avec la réalisation de son objet.

S.R., ch. I-23, art. 11.

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s. 45

Repeal does not imply enactment was in force

45 (1) The repeal of an enactment in whole or in part shall not be deemed to be or to involve a declaration that the enactment was previously in force or was considered by Parliament or other body or person by whom the enactment was enacted to have been previously in force.

Amendment does not imply change in law

(2) The amendment of an enactment shall not be deemed to be or to involve a declaration that the law under that enactment was or was considered by Parliament or other body or person by whom the enactment was enacted to have been different from the law as it is under the enactment as amended.

Repeal does not declare previous law

(3) The repeal or amendment of an enactment in whole or in part shall not be deemed to be or to involve any declaration as to the previous state of the law.

Judicial construction not adopted

(4) A re-enactment, revision, consolidation or amendment of an enactment shall not be deemed to be or to involve an adoption of the construction that has by judicial decision or otherwise been placed on the language used in the enactment or on similar language.

R.S., c. I-23, s. 37.

Absence de présomption d’entrée en vigueur

45 (1) L’abrogation, en tout ou en partie, d’un texte ne constitue pas ni n’implique une déclaration portant que le texte était auparavant en vigueur ou que le Parlement, ou toute autre autorité qui l’a édicté, le considérait comme tel.

Absence de présomption de droit nouveau

(2) La modification d’un texte ne constitue pas ni n’implique une déclaration portant que les règles de droit du texte étaient différentes de celles de sa version modifiée ou que le Parlement, ou toute autre autorité qui l’a édicté, les considérait comme telles.

Absence de déclaration sur l’état antérieur du droit

(3) L’abrogation ou la modification, en tout ou en partie, d’un texte ne constitue pas ni n’implique une déclaration sur l’état antérieur du droit.

Absence de confirmation de l’interprétation judiciaire

(4) La nouvelle édiction d’un texte, ou sa révision, refonte, codification ou modification, n’a pas valeur de confirmation de l’interprétation donnée, par décision judiciaire ou autrement, des termes du texte ou de termes analogues.

S.R., ch. I-23, art. 37.

50

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-45 (Past version: in force between Jan 13, 2013 and Feb 27, 2013) Motor Vehicles, Vessels and Aircraft Dangerous operation of motor vehicles, vessels and aircraft 249 (1) Every one commits an offence who operates (a) a motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place; (b) a vessel or any water skis, surf-board, water sled or other towed object on or over any of the internal waters of Canada or the territorial sea of Canada, in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature and condition of those waters or sea and the use that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be made of those waters or sea; (c) an aircraft in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature and condition of that aircraft or the place or air space in or through which the aircraft is operated; or (d) railway equipment in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature and condition of the equipment or the place in or through which the equipment is operated. Punishment (2) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or (b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. Dangerous operation causing bodily harm (3) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes bodily harm to any other person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

Véhicules à moteur, bateaux et aéronefs Conduite dangereuse 249 (1) Commet une infraction quiconque conduit, selon le cas : a) un véhicule à moteur d’une façon dangereuse pour le public, eu égard aux circonstances, y compris la nature et l’état du lieu, l’utilisation qui en est faite ainsi que l’intensité de la circulation à ce moment ou raisonnablement prévisible dans ce lieu; b) un bateau ou des skis nautiques, une planche de surf, un aquaplane ou autre objet remorqué sur les eaux intérieures ou la mer territoriale du Canada ou au-dessus de ces eaux ou de cette mer d’une manière dangereuse pour le public, eu égard aux circonstances, y compris la nature et l’état de ces eaux ou de cette mer et l’usage qui, au moment considéré, en est ou pourrait raisonnablement en être fait; c) un aéronef d’une façon dangereuse pour le public, eu égard aux circonstances, y compris la nature et l’état de cet aéronef, ou l’endroit ou l’espace dans lequel il est conduit; d) du matériel ferroviaire d’une façon dangereuse pour le public, eu égard aux circonstances, y compris la nature et l’état du matériel ou l’endroit dans lequel il est conduit. Peine (2) Quiconque commet une infraction mentionnée au paragraphe (1) est coupable : a) soit d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans; b) soit d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire. Conduite dangereuse causant ainsi des lésions corporelles (3) Quiconque commet une infraction mentionnée au paragraphe (1) et cause ainsi des lésions corporelles à une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans.

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Dangerous operation causing death (4) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes the death of any other person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 249; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 32 (4th Supp.), s. 57; 1994, c. 44, s. 11.

Conduite de façon dangereuse causant ainsi la mort (4) Quiconque commet une infraction mentionnée au paragraphe (1) et cause ainsi la mort d’une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de quatorze ans. L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 249; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 32 (4e suppl.), art. 57; 1994, ch. 44, art. 11.

Flight

249.1 (1) Every one commits an offence who, operating a motor vehicle while being pursued by a peace officer operating a motor vehicle, fails, without reasonable excuse and in order to evade the peace officer, to stop the vehicle as soon as is reasonable in the circumstances.

Punishment

(2) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1)

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Flight causing bodily harm or death

(3) Every one commits an offence who causes bodily harm to or the death of another person by operating a motor vehicle in a manner described in paragraph 249(1)(a), if the person operating the motor vehicle was being pursued by a peace officer operating a motor vehicle and failed, without reasonable excuse and in order to evade the police officer, to stop the vehicle as soon as is reasonable in the circumstances.

Punishment

(4) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (3)

(a) if bodily harm was caused, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a

Fuite

249.1 (1) Commet une infraction quiconque conduisant un véhicule à moteur alors qu’il est poursuivi par un agent de la paix conduisant un véhicule à moteur, sans excuse raisonnable et dans le but de fuir, omet d’arrêter son véhicule dès que les circonstances le permettent.

Peine

(2) Quiconque commet une infraction visée au paragraphe (1) est coupable :

a) soit d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;

b) soit d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

Fuite causant des lésions corporelles ou la mort

(3) Commet une infraction quiconque cause des lésions corporelles à une autre personne ou la mort d’une autre personne en conduisant un véhicule à moteur de la façon visée à l’alinéa 249(1)a) dans le cas où il est poursuivi par un agent de la paix conduisant un véhicule à moteur et, sans excuse raisonnable et dans le but de fuir, omet d’arrêter son véhicule dès que les circonstances le permettent.

Peine

(4) Quiconque commet une infraction visée au paragraphe (3) est coupable d’un acte criminel passible :

a) s’il a causé des lésions corporelles à une autre

52

term not exceeding 14 years; and

(b) if death was caused, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

2000, c. 2, s. 1.

personne, d’un emprisonnement maximal de quatorze ans;

b) s’il a causé la mort d’une autre personne, de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité.

2000, ch. 2, art. 1.

Causing death by criminal negligence (street racing)

249.2 Everyone who by criminal negligence causes death to another person while street racing is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

2006, c. 14, s. 2.

Causer la mort par négligence criminelle (course de rue)

249.2 Quiconque, par négligence criminelle, cause la mort d’une autre personne à l’occasion d’une course de rue est coupable d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement à perpétuité.

2006, ch. 14, art. 2.

Causing bodily harm by criminal negligence (street racing)

249.3 Everyone who by criminal negligence causes bodily harm to another person while street racing is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

2006, c. 14, s. 2.

Causer des lésions corporelles par négligence criminelle (course de rue)

249.3 Quiconque, par négligence criminelle, cause des lésions corporelles à autrui à l’occasion d’une course de rue est coupable d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de quatorze ans.

2006, ch. 14, art. 2.

Dangerous operation of motor vehicle while street racing

249.4 (1) Everyone commits an offence who, while street racing, operates a motor vehicle in a manner described in paragraph 249(1)(a).

Punishment

(2) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1)

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Conduite dangereuse d’un véhicule à moteur (course de rue)

249.4 (1) Commet une infraction quiconque, à l’occasion d’une course de rue, conduit un véhicule à moteur de la façon visée à l’alinéa 249(1)a).

Peines

(2) Quiconque commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe (1) est coupable :

a) soit d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;

b) soit d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

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Dangerous operation causing bodily harm

(3) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes bodily harm to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

Dangerous operation causing death

(4) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes the death of another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

2006, c. 14, s. 2.

Conduite dangereuse causant des lésions corporelles

(3) Quiconque commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe (1) et cause ainsi des lésions corporelles à une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de quatorze ans.

Conduite dangereuse causant la mort

(4) Quiconque commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe (1) et cause ainsi la mort d’une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement à perpétuité.

2006, ch. 14, art. 2.

Failure to keep watch on person towed

250 (1) Every one who operates a vessel while towing a person on any water skis, surf-board, water sled or other object, when there is not on board such vessel another responsible person keeping watch on the person being towed, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Towing of person after dark

(2) Every one who operates a vessel while towing a person on any water skis, surf-board, water sled or other object during the period from one hour after sunset to sunrise is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 250; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36.

Omission de surveiller la personne remorquée

250 (1) Est coupable d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire quiconque conduit un bateau qui remorque une personne sur des skis nautiques, une planche de surf, un aquaplane ou autre objet, s’il ne se trouve à bord de ce bateau une autre personne responsable pour surveiller la personne remorquée.

Remorquage d’une personne la nuit

(2) Est coupable d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire quiconque conduit un bateau qui remorque une personne sur des skis nautiques, une planche de surf, un aquaplane ou autre objet entre une heure après le coucher du soleil et son lever.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 250; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36.

Unseaworthy vessel and unsafe aircraft

251 (1) Every one who knowingly

(a) sends or being the master takes a vessel that is registered or licensed, or for which an identification number has been issued, pursuant to any Act of Parliament and that is

Bateau innavigable et aéronef en mauvais état

251 (1) Est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans quiconque accomplit une des actions suivantes, mettant ainsi en danger la vie d’une personne :

a) envoie sciemment ou étant le capitaine, conduit sciemment un navire innavigable enregistré, immatriculé ou auquel un numéro d’identification a été accordé en vertu d’une loi

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unseaworthy

(i) on a voyage from a place in Canada to any other place in or out of Canada, or

(ii) on a voyage from a place on the inland waters of the United States to a place in Canada,

(b) sends an aircraft on a flight or operates an aircraft that is not fit and safe for flight, or

(c) sends for operation or operates railway equipment that is not fit and safe for operation

and thereby endangers the life of any person, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

Defences

(2) An accused shall not be convicted of an offence under this section where the accused establishes that,

(a) in the case of an offence under paragraph (1)(a),

(i) the accused used all reasonable means to ensure that the vessel was seaworthy, or

(ii) to send or take the vessel while it was unseaworthy was, under the circumstances, reasonable and justifiable;

(b) in the case of an offence under paragraph (1)(b),

(i) the accused used all reasonable means to ensure that the aircraft was fit and safe for flight, or

(ii) to send or operate the aircraft while it was not fit and safe for flight was, under the circumstances, reasonable and justifiable; and

(c) in the case of an offence under paragraph (1)(c),

(i) the accused used all reasonable means to ensure that the railway equipment was fit and safe for operation, or

fédérale :

(i) dans un voyage d’un endroit du Canada à un autre endroit situé soit au Canada ou à l’étranger,

(ii) dans un voyage d’un endroit situé dans les eaux internes des État-Unis à un endroit au Canada;

b) envoie sciemment un aéronef en vol ou conduit sciemment un aéronef qui est en mauvais état de vol;

c) met sciemment en service du matériel ferroviaire qui n’est pas en bon état de marche ou n’est pas sécuritaire ou conduit sciemment ce matériel.

Défense

(2) Un accusé ne peut être déclaré coupable d’une infraction prévue au présent article, s’il prouve :

a) dans le cas d’une infraction prévue à l’alinéa (1)a) :

(i) soit qu’il a eu recours à tous les moyens raisonnables pour s’assurer que le bateau était propre à la navigation,

(ii) soit qu’il était raisonnable et justifiable dans les circonstances d’envoyer ou de conduire le bateau dans cet état d’innavigabilité;

b) dans le cas d’une infraction prévue à l’alinéa (1)b) :

(i) soit qu’il a eu recours à tous les moyens raisonnables pour s’assurer que l’aéronef était en bon état de vol,

(ii) soit qu’il était raisonnable et justifiable dans les circonstances de conduire un aéronef qui n’était pas en bon état de vol;

c) dans le cas d’une infraction prévue à l’alinéa (1)c) :

(i) soit qu’il a eu recours à tous les moyens raisonnables pour s’assurer que le matériel était en bon état de marche,

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(ii) to send the railway equipment for operation or to operate it while it was not fit and safe for operation was, under the circumstances, reasonable and justifiable.

Consent of Attorney General

(3) No proceedings shall be instituted under this section in respect of a vessel or aircraft, or in respect of railway equipment sent for operation or operated on a line of railway that is within the legislative authority of Parliament, without the consent in writing of the Attorney General of Canada.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 251; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 32 (4th

Supp.), s. 58.

(ii) soit qu’il était raisonnable et justifiable dans les circonstances de mettre en service le matériel en question ou de le conduire.

Consentement du procureur général

(3) L’exercice de poursuites pour une infraction prévue au présent article à l’égard d’un navire, d’un aéronef ou à l’égard de matériel ferroviaire conduit sur une voie ferrée relevant de la compétence législative du Parlement est subordonné au consentement écrit du procureur général du Canada.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 251; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 32 (4e

suppl.), art. 58.

Failure to stop at scene of accident

252 (1) Every person commits an offence who has the care, charge or control of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in an accident with

(a) another person,

(b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or

(c) in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another person,

and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his or her name and address and, where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.

Punishment

(1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) in a case not referred to in subsection (1.2) or (1.3) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Offence involving bodily harm

Défaut d’arrêter lors d’un accident

252 (1) Commet une infraction quiconque, ayant la garde, la charge ou le contrôle d’un véhicule, d’un bateau ou d’un aéronef, omet dans l’intention d’échapper à toute responsabilité civile ou criminelle d’arrêter son véhicule, son bateau ou, si c’est possible, son aéronef, de donner ses nom et adresse, et lorsqu’une personne a été blessée ou semble avoir besoin d’aide, d’offrir de l’aide, dans le cas où ce véhicule, bateau, ou aéronef est impliqué dans un accident :

a) soit avec une autre personne;

b) soit avec un véhicule, un bateau ou un aéronef;

c) soit avec du bétail sous la responsabilité d’une autre personne, dans le cas d’un véhicule impliqué dans un accident.

Peine

(1.1) Est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans ou d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire quiconque commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe (1) dans tout cas non visé aux paragraphes (1.2) ou (1.3).

Infraction entraînant des lésions corporelles

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(1.2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) knowing that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

Offence involving bodily harm or death

(1.3) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life if

(a) the person knows that another person involved in the accident is dead; or

(b) the person knows that bodily harm has been caused to another person involved in the accident and is reckless as to whether the death of the other person results from that bodily harm, and the death of that other person so results.

Evidence

(2) In proceedings under subsection (1), evidence that an accused failed to stop his vehicle, vessel or, where possible, his aircraft, as the case may be, offer assistance where any person has been injured or appears to require assistance and give his name and address is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of an intent to escape civil or criminal liability.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 252; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; 1994, c. 44, s. 12; 1999, c. 32, s. 1(Preamble

(1.2) Est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans quiconque commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe (1) sachant que des lésions corporelles ont été causées à une personne impliquée dans l’accident.

Infraction entraînant des lésions corporelles ou la mort

(1.3) Est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité la personne qui commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe (1) si, selon le cas :

a) elle sait qu’une autre personne impliquée dans l’accident est morte;

b) elle sait que des lésions corporelles ont été causées à cette personne et ne se soucie pas que la mort résulte de celles-ci et cette dernière en meurt.

Preuve

(2) Dans les poursuites prévues au paragraphe (1), la preuve qu’un accusé a omis d’arrêter son véhicule, bateau ou aéronef, d’offrir de l’aide, lorsqu’une personne est blessée ou semble avoir besoin d’aide et de donner ses nom et adresse constitue, en l’absence de toute preuve contraire, une preuve de l’intention d’échapper à toute responsabilité civile ou criminelle.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 252; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36; 1994, ch. 44, art. 12; 1999, ch. 32, art. 1(préambule).

Operation while impaired

253 (1) Every one commits an offence who operates a motor vehicle or vessel or operates or assists in the operation of an aircraft or of railway equipment or has the care or control of a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment, whether it is in motion or not,

(a) while the person’s ability to operate the vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment is

Capacité de conduite affaiblie

253 (1) Commet une infraction quiconque conduit un véhicule à moteur, un bateau, un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire, ou aide à conduire un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire, ou a la garde ou le contrôle d’un véhicule à moteur, d’un bateau, d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, que ceux-ci soient en mouvement ou non, dans les cas suivants :

a) lorsque sa capacité de conduire ce véhicule,

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impaired by alcohol or a drug; or

(b) having consumed alcohol in such a quantity that the concentration in the person’s blood exceeds eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.

For greater certainty

(2) For greater certainty, the reference to impairment by alcohol or a drug in paragraph (1)(a) includes impairment by a combination of alcohol and a drug.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 253; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 32 (4th

Supp.), s. 59; 2008, c. 6, s. 18.

ce bateau, cet aéronef ou ce matériel ferroviaire est affaiblie par l’effet de l’alcool ou d’une drogue;

b) lorsqu’il a consommé une quantité d’alcool telle que son alcoolémie dépasse quatre-vingts milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang.

Précision

(2) Il est entendu que l’alinéa (1)a) vise notamment le cas où la capacité de conduire est affaiblie par l’effet combiné de l’alcool et d’une drogue.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 253; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 32 (4e

suppl.), art. 59; 2008, ch. 6, art. 18.

s. 254(1) [Omitted] Definitions s. 254(1) Définitions [omitted]

Testing for presence of alcohol or a drug

(2) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body and that the person has, within the preceding three hours, operated a motor vehicle or vessel, operated or assisted in the operation of an aircraft or railway equipment or had the care or control of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment, whether it was in motion or not, the peace officer may, by demand, require the person to comply with paragraph (a), in the case of a drug, or with either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b), in the case of alcohol:

(a) to perform forthwith physical coordination tests prescribed by regulation to enable the peace officer to determine whether a demand may be made under subsection (3) or (3.1) and, if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose; and

(b) to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in the peace officer’s opinion, will enable a

Contrôle pour vérifier la présence d’alcool ou de drogue

(2) L’agent de la paix qui a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner qu’une personne a dans son organisme de l’alcool ou de la drogue et que, dans les trois heures précédentes, elle a conduit un véhicule — véhicule à moteur, bateau, aéronef ou matériel ferroviaire — ou en a eu la garde ou le contrôle ou que, s’agissant d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, elle a aidé à le conduire, le véhicule ayant été en mouvement ou non, peut lui ordonner de se soumettre aux mesures prévues à l’alinéa a), dans le cas où il soupçonne la présence de drogue, ou aux mesures prévues à l’un ou l’autre des alinéas a) et b), ou aux deux, dans le cas où il soupçonne la présence d’alcool, et, au besoin, de le suivre à cette fin :

a) subir immédiatement les épreuves de coordination des mouvements prévues par règlement afin que l’agent puisse décider s’il y a lieu de donner l’ordre prévu aux paragraphes (3) ou (3.1);

b) fournir immédiatement l’échantillon d’haleine que celui-ci estime nécessaire à la réalisation d’une analyse convenable à l’aide

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proper analysis to be made by means of an approved screening device and, if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.

Video recording

(2.1) For greater certainty, a peace officer may make a video recording of a performance of the physical coordination tests referred to in paragraph (2)(a).

Samples of breath or blood

(3) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is committing, or at any time within the preceding three hours has committed, an offence under section 253 as a result of the consumption of alcohol, the peace officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, require the person

(a) to provide, as soon as practicable,

(i) samples of breath that, in a qualified technician’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be made to determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the person’s blood, or

(ii) if the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that, because of their physical condition, the person may be incapable of providing a sample of breath or it would be impracticable to obtain a sample of breath, samples of blood that, in the opinion of the qualified medical practitioner or qualified technician taking the samples, will enable a proper analysis to be made to determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the person’s blood; and

(b) if necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.

d’un appareil de détection approuvé.

Enregistrement vidéo

(2.1) Il est entendu que l’agent de la paix peut procéder à l’enregistrement vidéo des épreuves de coordination des mouvements ordonnées en vertu de l’alinéa (2)a).

Prélèvement d’échantillon d’haleine ou de sang

(3) L’agent de la paix qui a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une personne est en train de commettre, ou a commis au cours des trois heures précédentes, une infraction prévue à l’article 253 par suite d’absorption d’alcool peut, à condition de le faire dans les meilleurs délais, lui ordonner :

a) de lui fournir dans les meilleurs délais les échantillons suivants :

(i) soit les échantillons d’haleine qui de l’avis d’un technicien qualifié sont nécessaires à une analyse convenable permettant de déterminer son alcoolémie,

(ii) soit les échantillons de sang qui, de l’avis du technicien ou du médecin qualifiés qui effectuent le prélèvement, sont nécessaires à une analyse convenable permettant de déterminer son alcoolémie, dans le cas où l’agent de la paix a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’à cause de l’état physique de cette personne elle peut être incapable de fournir un échantillon d’haleine ou le prélèvement d’un tel échantillon serait difficilement réalisable;

b) de le suivre, au besoin, pour que puissent être prélevés les échantillons de sang ou d’haleine.

Evaluation

(3.1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is committing, or at any time within the preceding three hours has committed, an offence under paragraph 253(1)(a) as a result of the consumption of a drug or of a combination of alcohol and a drug, the peace officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, require the

Évaluation

(3.1) L’agent de la paix qui a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une personne est en train de commettre, ou a commis au cours des trois heures précédentes, une infraction prévue à l’alinéa 253(1)a) par suite de l’absorption d’une drogue ou d’une combinaison d’alcool et de drogue peut, à condition de le faire dans les meilleurs délais, lui

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person to submit, as soon as practicable, to an evaluation conducted by an evaluating officer to determine whether the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment is impaired by a drug or by a combination of alcohol and a drug, and to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.

Video recording

(3.2) For greater certainty, a peace officer may make a video recording of an evaluation referred to in subsection (3.1).

Testing for presence of alcohol

(3.3) If the evaluating officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has alcohol in their body and if a demand was not made under paragraph (2)(b) or subsection (3), the evaluating officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, require the person to provide, as soon as practicable, a sample of breath that, in the evaluating officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be made by means of an approved instrument.

Samples of bodily substances

(3.4) If, on completion of the evaluation, the evaluating officer has reasonable grounds to believe, based on the evaluation, that the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment is impaired by a drug or by a combination of alcohol and a drug, the evaluating officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, require the person to provide, as soon as practicable,

(a) a sample of either oral fluid or urine that, in the evaluating officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be made to determine whether the person has a drug in their body; or

(b) samples of blood that, in the opinion of the qualified medical practitioner or qualified technician taking the samples, will enable a proper analysis to be made to determine whether the person has a drug in their body.

ordonner de se soumettre dans les meilleurs délais à une évaluation afin que l’agent évaluateur vérifie si sa capacité de conduire un véhicule à moteur, un bateau, un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire est affaiblie par suite d’une telle absorption, et de le suivre afin qu’il soit procédé à cette évaluation.

Enregistrement vidéo

(3.2) Il est entendu que l’agent de la paix peut procéder à l’enregistrement vidéo de l’évaluation visée au paragraphe (3.1).

Contrôle pour vérifier la présence d’alcool

(3.3) Dans le cas où aucun ordre n’a été donné en vertu de l’alinéa (2)b) ou du paragraphe (3), l’agent évaluateur, s’il a des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner la présence d’alcool dans l’organisme de la personne, peut, à condition de le faire dans les meilleurs délais, ordonner à celle-ci de lui fournir dans les meilleurs délais l’échantillon d’haleine qu’il estime nécessaire à la réalisation d’une analyse convenable à l’aide d’un alcootest approuvé.

Prélèvement de substances corporelles

(3.4) Une fois l’évaluation de la personne complétée, l’agent évaluateur qui a, sur le fondement de cette évaluation, des motifs raisonnables de croire que la capacité de celle-ci de conduire un véhicule à moteur, un bateau, un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire est affaiblie par l’effet d’une drogue ou par l’effet combiné de l’alcool et d’une drogue peut, à condition de le faire dans les meilleurs délais, lui ordonner de se soumettre dans les meilleurs délais aux mesures suivantes :

a) soit le prélèvement de l’échantillon de liquide buccal ou d’urine qui, de l’avis de l’agent évaluateur, est nécessaire à une analyse convenable permettant de déterminer la présence d’une drogue dans son organisme;

b) soit le prélèvement des échantillons de sang qui, de l’avis du technicien ou du médecin qualifiés qui effectuent le prélèvement, sont nécessaires à une analyse convenable permettant de déterminer la présence d’une drogue dans son organisme.

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Condition

(4) Samples of blood may be taken from a person under subsection (3) or (3.4) only by or under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner who is satisfied that taking the samples would not endanger the person’s life or health.

Failure or refusal to comply with demand

(5) Everyone commits an offence who, without reasonable excuse, fails or refuses to comply with a demand made under this section.

Only one determination of guilt

(6) A person who is convicted of an offence under subsection (5) for a failure or refusal to comply with a demand may not be convicted of another offence under that subsection in respect of the same transaction.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 254; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 1 (4th Supp.),

ss. 14, 18(F), c. 32 (4th Supp.), s. 60; 1999, c. 32, s. 2(Preamble); 2008, c. 6, s. 19.

Limite

(4) Les échantillons de sang ne peuvent être prélevés d’une personne en vertu des paragraphes (3) ou (3.4) que par un médecin qualifié ou sous sa direction et à la condition qu’il soit convaincu que ces prélèvements ne risquent pas de mettre en danger la vie ou la santé de cette personne.

Omission ou refus d’obtempérer

(5) Commet une infraction quiconque, sans excuse raisonnable, omet ou refuse d’obtempérer à un ordre donné en vertu du présent article.

Une seule déclaration de culpabilité

(6) La personne déclarée coupable d’une infraction prévue au paragraphe (5) à la suite du refus ou de l’omission d’obtempérer à un ordre ne peut être déclarée coupable d’une autre infraction prévue à ce paragraphe concernant la même affaire.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 254; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 1 (4e

suppl.), art. 14 et 18(F), ch. 32 (4e suppl.), art. 60; 1999, ch. 32, art. 2(préambule); 2008, ch. 6, art. 19.

Regulations

254.1 (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations

(a) respecting the qualifications and training of evaluating officers;

(b) prescribing the physical coordination tests to be conducted under paragraph 254(2)(a); and

(c) prescribing the tests to be conducted and procedures to be followed during an evaluation under subsection 254(3.1).

Incorporated material

(2) A regulation may incorporate any material by reference either as it exists on a specified date or as amended from time to time.

Incorporated material is not a regulation

Règlements

254.1 (1) Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement :

a) régir les qualités et la formation requises des agents évaluateurs;

b) établir les épreuves de coordination des mouvements à effectuer en vertu de l’alinéa 254(2)a);

c) établir les examens à effectuer et la procédure à suivre lors de l’évaluation prévue au paragraphe 254(3.1).

Incorporation de documents

(2) Peut être incorporé par renvoi dans un règlement tout document, soit dans sa version à une date donnée, soit avec ses modifications successives.

Nature du document

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(3) For greater certainty, material does not become a regulation for the purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act because it is incorporated by reference.

2008, c. 6, s. 20.

(3) Il est entendu que l’incorporation ne confère pas au document, pour l’application de la Loi sur les textes réglementaires, valeur de règlement.

2008, ch. 6, art. 20.

Punishment

255 (1) Every one who commits an offence under section 253 or 254 is guilty of an indictable offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable,

(a) whether the offence is prosecuted by indictment or punishable on summary conviction, to the following minimum punishment, namely,

(i) for a first offence, to a fine of not less than $1,000,

(ii) for a second offence, to imprisonment for not less than 30 days, and

(iii) for each subsequent offence, to imprisonment for not less than 120 days;

(b) where the offence is prosecuted by indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; and

(c) if the offence is punishable on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term of not more than 18 months.

Impaired driving causing bodily harm

(2) Everyone who commits an offence under paragraph 253(1)(a) and causes bodily harm to another person as a result is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

Blood alcohol level over legal limit — bodily harm

(2.1) Everyone who, while committing an offence under paragraph 253(1)(b), causes an accident resulting in bodily harm to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment

Peine

255 (1) Quiconque commet une infraction prévue à l’article 253 ou 254 est coupable d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire ou par mise en accusation et est passible :

a) que l’infraction soit poursuivie par mise en accusation ou par procédure sommaire, des peines minimales suivantes :

(i) pour la première infraction, une amende minimale de mille dollars,

(ii) pour la seconde infraction, un emprisonnement minimal de trente jours,

(iii) pour chaque infraction subséquente, un emprisonnement minimal de cent vingt jours;

b) si l’infraction est poursuivie par mise en accusation, d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;

c) si l’infraction est poursuivie par procédure sommaire, d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix-huit mois.

Conduite avec capacités affaiblies causant des lésions corporelles

(2) Quiconque commet une infraction prévue à l’alinéa 253(1)a) et cause ainsi des lésions corporelles à une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans.

Alcoolémie supérieure à la limite permise : lésions corporelles

(2.1) Quiconque, tandis qu’il commet une infraction prévue à l’alinéa 253(1)b), cause un accident occasionnant des lésions corporelles à une autre personne, est coupable d’un acte criminel

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for a term of not more than 10 years.

Failure or refusal to provide sample — bodily harm

(2.2) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection 254(5) and, at the time of committing the offence, knows or ought to know that their operation of the motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment, their assistance in the operation of the aircraft or railway equipment or their care or control of the motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment caused an accident resulting in bodily harm to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans.

Omission ou refus de fournir un échantillon : lésions corporelles

(2.2) Quiconque commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe 254(5), alors qu’il sait ou devrait savoir que le véhicule — véhicule à moteur, bateau, aéronef ou matériel ferroviaire — qu’il conduisait ou dont il avait la garde ou le contrôle ou, s’agissant d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, qu’il aidait à conduire, a causé un accident ayant occasionné des lésions corporelles à une autre personne, est coupable d’un acte criminel passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans.

Impaired driving causing death

(3) Everyone who commits an offence under paragraph 253(1)(a) and causes the death of another person as a result is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

Blood alcohol level over legal limit — death

(3.1) Everyone who, while committing an offence under paragraph 253(1)(b), causes an accident resulting in the death of another person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

Failure or refusal to provide sample — death

(3.2) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection 254(5) and, at the time of committing the offence, knows or ought to know that their operation of the motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment, their assistance in the operation of the aircraft or railway equipment or their care or control of the motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment caused an accident resulting in the death of another person, or in bodily harm to another person whose death ensues, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

Interpretation

(3.3) For greater certainty, everyone who is liable to the punishment described in any of subsections

Conduite avec capacités affaiblies causant la mort

(3) Quiconque commet une infraction prévue à l’alinéa 253(1)a) et cause ainsi la mort d’une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel passible de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité.

Alcoolémie supérieure à la limite permise : mort

(3.1) Quiconque, tandis qu’il commet une infraction prévue à l’alinéa 253(1)b), cause un accident occasionnant la mort d’une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel passible de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité.

Omission ou refus de fournir un échantillon : mort

(3.2) Quiconque commet l’infraction prévue au paragraphe 254(5), alors qu’il sait ou devrait savoir que le véhicule — véhicule à moteur, bateau, aéronef ou matériel ferroviaire — qu’il conduisait ou dont il avait la garde ou le contrôle ou, s’agissant d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, qu’il aidait à conduire, a causé un accident qui soit a occasionné la mort d’une autre personne, soit lui a occasionné des lésions corporelles dont elle mourra par la suite est coupable d’un acte criminel passible de l’emprisonnement à perpétuité.

Règle d’interprétation

(3.3) Il est entendu que les peines minimales prévues à l’alinéa (1)a) s’appliquent dans les cas

63

(2) to (3.2) is also liable to the minimum punishment described in paragraph (1)(a).

Previous convictions

(4) A person who is convicted of an offence committed under section 253 or subsection 254(5) is, for the purposes of this Act, deemed to be convicted for a second or subsequent offence, as the case may be, if they have previously been convicted of

(a) an offence committed under either of those provisions;

(b) an offence under subsection (2) or (3); or

(c) an offence under section 250, 251, 252, 253, 259 or 260 or subsection 258(4) of this Act as this Act read immediately before the coming into force of this subsection.

Conditional discharge

Footnote *(5) Notwithstanding subsection 730(1), a court may, instead of convicting a person of an offence committed under section 253, after hearing medical or other evidence, if it considers that the person is in need of curative treatment in relation to his consumption of alcohol or drugs and that it would not be contrary to the public interest, by order direct that the person be discharged under section 730 on the conditions prescribed in a probation order, including a condition respecting the person’s attendance for curative treatment in relation to that consumption of alcohol or drugs.

Return to footnote *[Note: In force in the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan and Alberta and in the Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories and the Nunavut Territory, see SI/85-211 and SI/88-24.]

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 255; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; R.S., 1985, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 18(F); 1995, c. 22, s. 18; 1999, c. 32, s. 3(Preamble); 2000, c. 25, s. 2; 2008, c. 6, s. 21, c. 18, ss. 7, 45.2.

visés aux paragraphes (2) à (3.2).

Condamnations antérieures

(4) Une personne déclarée coupable d’une infraction prévue à l’article 253 ou au paragraphe 254(5) est, pour l’application de la présente loi, réputée être déclarée coupable d’une seconde infraction ou d’une infraction subséquente si elle a déjà été déclarée coupable auparavant d’une infraction prévue :

a) à l’une de ces dispositions;

b) aux paragraphes (2) ou (3);

c) aux articles 250, 251, 252, 253, 259 ou 260 ou au paragraphe 258(4) de la présente loi dans sa version antérieure à l’entrée en vigueur du présent paragraphe.

Absolution conditionnelle

Note de bas de page *(5) Nonobstant le paragraphe 730(1), un tribunal peut, au lieu de déclarer une personne coupable d’une infraction prévue à l’article 253, l’absoudre en vertu de l’article 730 s’il estime, sur preuve médicale ou autre, que la personne en question a besoin de suivre une cure de désintoxication et que cela ne serait pas contraire à l’ordre public; l’absolution est accompagnée d’une ordonnance de probation dont l’une des conditions est l’obligation de suivre une cure de désintoxication pour abus d’alcool ou de drogue.

Retour à la référence de la note de bas de page

*[Note : En vigueur dans les provinces de la Nouvelle-Écosse, du Nouveau-Brunswick, du Manitoba, de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard, de la Saskatchewan et d’Alberta et dans le territoire du Yukon, les Territoires du Nord-Ouest et le territoire du Nunavut, voir TR/85-211 et TR/88-24.]

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 255; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36; L.R. (1985), ch. 1 (4 e suppl.), art. 18(F); 1995, ch. 22, art. 18; 1999, ch. 32, art. 3(préambule); 2000, ch. 25, art. 2;

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2008, ch. 6, art. 21, ch. 18, art. 7 et 45.2.

Aggravating circumstances for sentencing purposes

255.1 Without limiting the generality of section 718.2, where a court imposes a sentence for an offence committed under this Act by means of a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft or of railway equipment, evidence that the concentration of alcohol in the blood of the offender at the time when the offence was committed exceeded one hundred and sixty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances relating to the offence that the court shall consider under paragraph 718.2(a).

1999, c. 32, s. 4(Preamble). Warrants to obtain blood samples

256 (1) Subject to subsection (2), if a justice is satisfied, on an information on oath in Form 1 or on an information on oath submitted to the justice under section 487.1 by telephone or other means of telecommunication, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

(a) a person has, within the preceding four hours, committed, as a result of the consumption of alcohol or a drug, an offence under section 253 and the person was involved in an accident resulting in the death of another person or in bodily harm to himself or herself or to any other person, and

(b) a qualified medical practitioner is of the opinion that

(i) by reason of any physical or mental condition of the person that resulted from the consumption of alcohol or a drug, the accident or any other occurrence related to or resulting from the accident, the person is unable to consent to the taking of samples of his or her blood, and

(ii) the taking of samples of blood from the person would not endanger the life or

Détermination de la peine : circonstances aggravantes

255.1 Sans que soit limitée la portée générale de l’article 718.2, lorsqu’un tribunal détermine la peine à infliger à l’égard d’une infraction prévue par la présente loi commise au moyen d’un véhicule à moteur, d’un bateau, d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, tout élément de preuve selon lequel la concentration d’alcool dans le sang du contrevenant au moment où l’infraction a été commise était supérieure à cent soixante milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang est réputé être une circonstance aggravante liée à la perpétration de l’infraction dont le tribunal doit tenir compte en vertu de l’alinéa 718.2a).

1999, ch. 32, art. 4(préambule).

Télémandats pour obtention d’échantillons de sang

256 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), un juge de paix peut décerner un mandat autorisant un agent de la paix à exiger d’un médecin qualifié qu’il prélève, ou fasse prélever par un technicien qualifié sous sa direction, les échantillons de sang nécessaires, selon la personne qui les prélève, à une analyse convenable permettant de déterminer l’alcoolémie d’une personne ou la quantité de drogue dans son sang s’il est convaincu, à la suite d’une dénonciation faite sous serment suivant la formule 1 ou une dénonciation faite sous serment et présentée par téléphone ou par tout autre moyen de télécommunication qui satisfait aux exigences établies à l’article 487.1, qu’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire :

a) d’une part, que la personne a commis au cours des quatre heures précédentes une infraction prévue à l’article 253 à la suite de l’absorption d’alcool ou de drogue et qu’elle est impliquée dans un accident ayant causé des lésions corporelles à elle-même ou à un tiers, ou la mort de celui-ci;

b) d’autre part, qu’un médecin qualifié est d’avis à la fois :

(i) que cette personne se trouve, à cause de

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health of the person,

the justice may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to require a qualified medical practitioner to take, or to cause to be taken by a qualified technician under the direction of the qualified medical practitioner, the samples of the blood of the person that in the opinion of the person taking the samples are necessary to enable a proper analysis to be made in order to determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol or drugs in the person’s blood.

Form

(2) A warrant issued pursuant to subsection (1) may be in Form 5 or 5.1 varied to suit the case.

Information on oath

(3) Notwithstanding paragraphs 487.1(4)(b) and (c), an information on oath submitted by telephone or other means of telecommunication for the purposes of this section shall include, instead of the statements referred to in those paragraphs, a statement setting out the offence alleged to have been committed and identifying the person from whom blood samples are to be taken.

Duration of warrant

(4) Samples of blood may be taken from a person pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to subsection (1) only during such time as a qualified medical practitioner is satisfied that the conditions referred to in subparagraphs (1)(b)(i) and (ii) continue to exist in respect of that person.

Copy or facsimile to person

(5) When a warrant issued under subsection (1) is executed, the peace officer shall, as soon as practicable, give a copy of it — or, in the case of a warrant issued by telephone or other means of telecommunication, a facsimile — to the person from whom the blood samples are taken.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 256; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; 1992, c. 1, s. 58; 1994, c. 44, s. 13; 2000, c. 25, s. 3;

l’absorption d’alcool ou de drogue, de l’accident ou de tout autre événement lié à l’accident, dans un état physique ou psychologique qui ne lui permet pas de consentir au prélèvement de son sang,

(ii) que le prélèvement d’un échantillon de sang ne risquera pas de mettre en danger la vie ou la santé de cette personne.

Formule

(2) Un mandat décerné en vertu du paragraphe (1) peut être rédigé suivant les formules 5 ou 5.1 en les adaptant aux circonstances.

Dénonciation sous serment

(3) Nonobstant les alinéas 487.1(4)b) et c), une dénonciation sous serment présentée par téléphone ou par tout autre moyen de télécommunication pour l’application du présent article comprend, au lieu des déclarations prévues à ces alinéas, une déclaration énonçant la présumée infraction et l’identité de la personne qui fera l’objet des prélèvements de sang.

Durée du mandat

(4) Une personne visée par un mandat décerné suivant le paragraphe (1) peut subir des prélèvements de sang seulement durant la période évaluée par un médecin qualifié comme étant celle où subsistent les conditions prévues aux sous-alinéas (1)b)(i) et (ii).

Fac-similé ou copie à la personne

(5) Après l’exécution d’un mandat décerné suivant le paragraphe (1), l’agent de la paix doit dans les meilleurs délais en donner une copie à la personne qui fait l’objet d’un prélèvement de sang ou, dans le cas d’un mandat décerné par téléphone ou par tout autre moyen de télécommunication, donner un fac-similé du mandat à cette personne.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 256; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36; 1992, ch. 1, art. 58; 1994, ch. 44, art. 13;

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2008, c. 6, s. 22. 2000, ch. 25, art. 3; 2008, ch. 6, art. 22.

No offence committed

257 (1) No qualified medical practitioner or qualified technician is guilty of an offence only by reason of his refusal to take a sample of blood from a person for the purposes of section 254 or 256 and no qualified medical practitioner is guilty of an offence only by reason of his refusal to cause to be taken by a qualified technician under his direction a sample of blood from a person for those purposes.

No criminal or civil liability

(2) No qualified medical practitioner by whom or under whose direction a sample of blood is taken from a person under subsection 254(3) or (3.4) or section 256, and no qualified technician acting under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner, incurs any criminal or civil liability for anything necessarily done with reasonable care and skill when taking the sample.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 257; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36; 2008, c. 6, s. 23.

Non-culpabilité

257 (1) Un médecin qualifié ou un technicien qualifié n’est pas coupable d’une infraction uniquement en raison de son refus de prélever un échantillon de sang d’une personne, pour l’application des articles 254 ou 256 ou, dans le cas d’un médecin qualifié, uniquement de son refus de faire prélever par un technicien qualifié un échantillon de sang d’une personne, pour l’application de ces articles.

Immunité

(2) Il ne peut être intenté aucune procédure civile ou criminelle contre un médecin qualifié qui prélève ou fait prélever un échantillon de sang en vertu des paragraphes 254(3) ou (3.4) ou de l’article 256, ni contre le technicien qualifié agissant sous sa direction pour tout geste nécessaire au prélèvement posé avec des soins et une habileté raisonnables.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 257; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36; 2008, ch. 6, art. 23.

Proceedings under section 255

258 (1) In any proceedings under subsection 255(1) in respect of an offence committed under section 253 or subsection 254(5) or in any proceedings under any of subsections 255(2) to (3.2),

(a) where it is proved that the accused occupied the seat or position ordinarily occupied by a person who operates a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft or any railway equipment or who assists in the operation of an aircraft or of railway equipment, the accused shall be deemed to have had the care or control of the vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment, as the case may be, unless the accused establishes that the accused did not occupy that seat or position for the purpose of setting the vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment in motion or assisting in the operation of the

Poursuites en vertu de l’article 255

258 (1) Dans des poursuites engagées en vertu du paragraphe 255(1) à l’égard d’une infraction prévue à l’article 253 ou au paragraphe 254(5) ou dans des poursuites engagées en vertu de l’un des paragraphes 255(2) à (3.2) :

a) lorsqu’il est prouvé que l’accusé occupait la place ou la position ordinairement occupée par la personne qui conduit le véhicule à moteur, le bateau, l’aéronef ou le matériel ferroviaire, ou qui aide à conduire un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire, il est réputé en avoir eu la garde ou le contrôle à moins qu’il n’établisse qu’il n’occupait pas cette place ou position dans le but de mettre en marche ce véhicule, ce bateau, cet aéronef ou ce matériel ferroviaire, ou dans le but d’aider à conduire l’aéronef ou le matériel ferroviaire, selon le cas;

b) le résultat d’une analyse d’un échantillon de

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aircraft or railway equipment, as the case may be;

(b) the result of an analysis of a sample of the accused’s breath, blood, urine or other bodily substance — other than a sample taken under subsection 254(3), (3.3) or (3.4) — may be admitted in evidence even if the accused was not warned before they gave the sample that they need not give the sample or that the result of the analysis of the sample might be used in evidence;

(c) where samples of the breath of the accused have been taken pursuant to a demand made under subsection 254(3), if

(i) [Repealed before coming into force, 2008, c. 20, s. 3]

(ii) each sample was taken as soon as practicable after the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed and, in the case of the first sample, not later than two hours after that time, with an interval of at least fifteen minutes between the times when the samples were taken,

(iii) each sample was received from the accused directly into an approved container or into an approved instrument operated by a qualified technician, and

(iv) an analysis of each sample was made by means of an approved instrument operated by a qualified technician,

evidence of the results of the analyses so made is conclusive proof that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood both at the time when the analyses were made and at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed was, if the results of the analyses are the same, the concentration determined by the analyses and, if the results of the analyses are different, the lowest of the concentrations determined by the analyses, in the absence of evidence tending to show all of the following three things — that the approved instrument was malfunctioning or was operated improperly, that the malfunction or improper operation resulted in the determination that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood

l’haleine, du sang, de l’urine ou d’une autre substance corporelle de l’accusé — autre qu’un échantillon prélevé en vertu des paragraphes 254(3), (3.3) ou (3.4) — peut être admis en preuve même si, avant de donner l’échantillon, l’accusé n’a pas été averti qu’il n’était pas tenu de le donner ou que le résultat de l’analyse de l’échantillon pourrait servir en preuve;

c) lorsque des échantillons de l’haleine de l’accusé ont été prélevés conformément à un ordre donné en vertu du paragraphe 254(3), la preuve des résultats des analyses fait foi de façon concluante, en l’absence de toute preuve tendant à démontrer à la fois que les résultats des analyses montrant une alcoolémie supérieure à quatre-vingts milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang découlent du mauvais fonctionnement ou de l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest approuvé et que l’alcoolémie de l’accusé au moment où l’infraction aurait été commise ne dépassait pas quatre-vingts milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang, de l’alcoolémie de l’accusé tant au moment des analyses qu’à celui où l’infraction aurait été commise, ce taux correspondant aux résultats de ces analyses, lorsqu’ils sont identiques, ou au plus faible d’entre eux s’ils sont différents, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :

(i) [Abrogé avant d’entrer en vigueur, 2008, ch. 20, art. 3]

(ii) chaque échantillon a été prélevé dès qu’il a été matériellement possible de le faire après le moment où l’infraction aurait été commise et, dans le cas du premier échantillon, pas plus de deux heures après ce moment, les autres l’ayant été à des intervalles d’au moins quinze minutes,

(iii) chaque échantillon a été reçu de l’accusé directement dans un contenant approuvé ou dans un alcootest approuvé, manipulé par un technicien qualifié,

(iv) une analyse de chaque échantillon a été faite à l’aide d’un alcootest approuvé, manipulé par un technicien qualifié;

d) lorsqu’un échantillon de sang de l’accusé a été prélevé en vertu du paragraphe 254(3) ou

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exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, and that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood would not in fact have exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed;

(d) if a sample of the accused’s blood has been taken under subsection 254(3) or section 256 or with the accused’s consent and if

(i) at the time the sample was taken, the person taking the sample took an additional sample of the blood of the accused and one of the samples was retained to permit an analysis of it to be made by or on behalf of the accused and, in the case where the accused makes a request within six months from the taking of the samples, one of the samples was ordered to be released under subsection (4),

(ii) both samples referred to in subparagraph (i) were taken as soon as practicable and in any event not later than two hours after the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed,

(iii) both samples referred to in subparagraph (i) were taken by a qualified medical practitioner or a qualified technician under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner,

(iv) both samples referred to in subparagraph (i) were received from the accused directly into, or placed directly into, approved containers that were subsequently sealed, and

(v) an analysis was made by an analyst of at least one of the samples,

evidence of the result of the analysis is conclusive proof that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood both at the time when the samples were taken and at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed was the concentration determined by the analysis or, if more than one sample was analyzed and the results of the analyses are the same, the concentration determined by the

de l’article 256 ou prélevé avec le consentement de l’accusé, la preuve du résultat de l’analyse ainsi faite fait foi de façon concluante, en l’absence de toute preuve tendant à démontrer à la fois que le résultat de l’analyse montrant une alcoolémie supérieure à quatre-vingts milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang découle du fait que l’analyse n’a pas été faite correctement et que l’alcoolémie de l’accusé au moment où l’infraction aurait été commise ne dépassait pas quatre-vingts milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang, de l’alcoolémie de l’accusé tant au moment du prélèvement de l’échantillon qu’à celui où l’infraction aurait été commise, ce taux correspondant au résultat de l’analyse, ou, si plus d’un échantillon a été analysé, aux résultats des analyses, lorsqu’ils sont identiques, ou au plus faible d’entre eux s’ils sont différents, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :

(i) au moment où l’échantillon a été prélevé, la personne qui le prélevait a pris un échantillon supplémentaire du sang de l’accusé et un échantillon a été gardé pour en permettre l’analyse à la demande de l’accusé et, si celui-ci fait la demande visée au paragraphe (4) dans les six mois du prélèvement, une ordonnance de remise de l’échantillon a été rendue en conformité avec ce paragraphe,

(ii) les échantillons mentionnés au sous-alinéa (i) ont été prélevés dans les meilleurs délais après la commission de l’infraction alléguée et dans tous les cas au plus tard deux heures après,

(iii) les échantillons mentionnés au sous-alinéa (i) ont été prélevés par un médecin qualifié ou un technicien qualifié sous la direction d’un médecin qualifié,

(iv) les échantillons mentionnés au sous-alinéa (i) ont été reçus de l’accusé directement, ou ont été placés directement, dans des contenants approuvés et scellés,

(v) l’analyse d’au moins un des échantillons a été faite par un analyste;

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analyses and, if the results of the analyses are different, the lowest of the concentrations determined by the analyses, in the absence of evidence tending to show all of the following three things — that the analysis was performed improperly, that the improper performance resulted in the determination that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, and that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood would not in fact have exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed;

(d.01) for greater certainty, evidence tending to show that an approved instrument was malfunctioning or was operated improperly, or that an analysis of a sample of the accused’s blood was performed improperly, does not include evidence of

(i) the amount of alcohol that the accused consumed,

(ii) the rate at which the alcohol that the accused consumed would have been absorbed and eliminated by the accused’s body, or

(iii) a calculation based on that evidence of what the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood would have been at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed;

(d.1) if samples of the accused’s breath or a sample of the accused’s blood have been taken as described in paragraph (c) or (d) under the conditions described in that paragraph and the results of the analyses show a concentration of alcohol in blood exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, evidence of the results of the analyses is proof that the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, in the absence of evidence tending to show that the accused’s consumption of alcohol was consistent with both

d.01) il est entendu que ne constituent pas une preuve tendant à démontrer le mauvais fonctionnement ou l’utilisation incorrecte de l’alcootest approuvé ou le fait que les analyses ont été effectuées incorrectement les éléments de preuve portant :

(i) soit sur la quantité d’alcool consommé par l’accusé,

(ii) soit sur le taux d’absorption ou d’élimination de l’alcool par son organisme,

(iii) soit sur le calcul, fondé sur ces éléments de preuve, de ce qu’aurait été son alcoolémie au moment où l’infraction aurait été commise;

d.1) si les analyses visées aux alinéas c) ou d) montrent une alcoolémie supérieure à quatre-vingts milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang, le résultat des analyses fait foi d’une telle alcoolémie au moment où l’infraction aurait été commise, en l’absence de preuve tendant à démontrer que la consommation d’alcool par l’accusé était compatible avec, à la fois :

(i) une alcoolémie ne dépassant pas quatre-vingts milligrammes d’alcool par cent millilitres de sang au moment où l’infraction aurait été commise,

(ii) l’alcoolémie établie par les analyses visées aux alinéas c) ou d), selon le cas, au

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(i) a concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood that did not exceed 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, and

(ii) the concentration of alcohol in the accused’s blood as determined under paragraph (c) or (d), as the case may be, at the time when the sample or samples were taken;

(e) a certificate of an analyst stating that the analyst has made an analysis of a sample of the blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance of the accused and stating the result of that analysis is evidence of the facts alleged in the certificate without proof of the signature or the official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate;

(f) a certificate of an analyst stating that the analyst has made an analysis of a sample of an alcohol standard that is identified in the certificate and intended for use with an approved instrument and that the sample of the standard analyzed by the analyst was found to be suitable for use with an approved instrument, is evidence that the alcohol standard so identified is suitable for use with an approved instrument without proof of the signature or the official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate;

(f.1) the document printed out from an approved instrument and signed by a qualified technician who certifies it to be the printout produced by the approved instrument when it made the analysis of a sample of the accused’s breath is evidence of the facts alleged in the document without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed it;

(g) where samples of the breath of the accused have been taken pursuant to a demand made under subsection 254(3), a certificate of a qualified technician stating

(i) that the analysis of each of the samples has been made by means of an approved instrument operated by the technician and ascertained by the technician to be in

moment du prélèvement des échantillons;

e) le certificat d’un analyste déclarant qu’il a effectué l’analyse d’un échantillon de sang, d’urine, d’haleine ou d’une autre substance corporelle de l’accusé et indiquant le résultat de son analyse fait preuve des faits allégués dans le certificat sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver l’authenticité de la signature ou la qualité officielle du signataire;

f) le certificat d’un analyste déclarant qu’il a effectué une analyse d’un échantillon d’un alcool type identifié dans le certificat et conçu pour être utilisé avec un alcootest approuvé, et qu’il s’est révélé que l’échantillon analysé par lui convenait bien pour l’utilisation avec un alcootest approuvé, fait foi de ce que l’alcool type ainsi identifié est convenable pour utilisation avec un alcootest approuvé, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver la signature ou la qualité officielle du signataire;

f.1) le document imprimé par l’alcootest approuvé où figurent les opérations effectuées par celui-ci et qui en démontre le bon fonctionnement lors de l’analyse des échantillons de l’haleine de l’accusé, signé et certifié comme tel par le technicien qualifié, fait preuve des faits qui y sont allégués sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver l’authenticité de la signature ou la qualité officielle du signataire;

g) lorsque des échantillons de l’haleine de l’accusé ont été prélevés conformément à une demande faite en vertu du paragraphe 254(3), le certificat d’un technicien qualifié fait preuve des faits allégués dans le certificat sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver la signature ou la

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proper working order by means of an alcohol standard, identified in the certificate, that is suitable for use with an approved instrument,

(ii) the results of the analyses so made, and

(iii) if the samples were taken by the technician,

(A) [Repealed before coming into force, 2008, c. 20, s. 3]

(B) the time when and place where each sample and any specimen described in clause (A) was taken, and

(C) that each sample was received from the accused directly into an approved container or into an approved instrument operated by the technician,

is evidence of the facts alleged in the certificate without proof of the signature or the official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate;

(h) if a sample of the accused’s blood has been taken under subsection 254(3) or (3.4) or section 256 or with the accused’s consent,

(i) a certificate of a qualified medical practitioner stating that

(A) they took the sample and before the sample was taken they were of the opinion that taking it would not endanger the accused’s life or health and, in the case of a demand made under section 256, that by reason of any physical or mental condition of the accused that resulted from the consumption of alcohol or a drug, the accident or any other occurrence related to or resulting from the accident, the accused was unable to consent to the taking of the sample,

(B) at the time the sample was taken, an additional sample of the blood of the accused was taken to permit analysis of one of the samples to be made by or on behalf of the accused,

qualité officielle du signataire, si le certificat du technicien qualifié contient :

(i) la mention que l’analyse de chacun des échantillons a été faite à l’aide d’un alcootest approuvé, manipulé par lui et dont il s’est assuré du bon fonctionnement au moyen d’un alcool type identifié dans le certificat, comme se prêtant bien à l’utilisation avec cet alcootest approuvé,

(ii) la mention des résultats des analyses ainsi faites,

(iii) la mention, dans le cas où il a lui-même prélevé les échantillons :

(A) [Abrogé avant d’entrer en vigueur, 2008, ch. 20, art. 3]

(B) du temps et du lieu où chaque échantillon et un spécimen quelconque mentionné dans la division (A) ont été prélevés,

(C) que chaque échantillon a été reçu directement de l’accusé dans un contenant approuvé ou dans un alcootest approuvé, manipulé par lui;

h) lorsque les échantillons du sang de l’accusé ont été prélevés en vertu des paragraphes 254(3) ou (3.4) ou de l’article 256 ou prélevés avec le consentement de l’accusé, un certificat d’un médecin ou d’un technicien qualifiés fait preuve des faits allégués dans le certificat sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver l’authenticité de la signature ou la qualité officielle du signataire dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants :

(i) le certificat du médecin qualifié contient :

(A) la mention qu’il a lui-même prélevé les échantillons et que, avant de les prélever, il était d’avis que ces derniers ne mettraient pas en danger la vie ou la santé de l’accusé et, dans le cas d’un ordre donné en vertu de l’article 256, que l’accusé était incapable de donner un consentement au prélèvement de son sang à cause de l’état physique ou psychologique dans lequel il se trouvait en raison de

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(C) the time when and place where both samples referred to in clause (B) were taken, and

(D) both samples referred to in clause (B) were received from the accused directly into, or placed directly into, approved containers that were subsequently sealed and that are identified in the certificate,

(ii) a certificate of a qualified medical practitioner stating that the medical practitioner caused the sample to be taken by a qualified technician under his direction and that before the sample was taken the qualified medical practitioner was of the opinion referred to in clause (i)(A), or

(iii) a certificate of a qualified technician stating that the technician took the sample and the facts referred to in clauses (i)(B) to (D)

is evidence of the facts alleged in the certificate without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate; and

(i) a certificate of an analyst stating that the analyst has made an analysis of a sample of the blood of the accused that was contained in a sealed approved container identified in the certificate, the date on which and place where the sample was analyzed and the result of that analysis is evidence of the facts alleged in the certificate without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed it.

l’absorption d’alcool ou de drogue, de l’accident ou de tout événement découlant de l’accident ou lié à celui-ci,

(B) la mention qu’au moment du prélèvement de l’échantillon, un autre échantillon du sang de l’accusé a été prélevé pour en permettre une analyse à la demande de celui-ci,

(C) la mention du temps et du lieu où les échantillons mentionnés à la division (B) ont été prélevés,

(D) la mention que les échantillons mentionnés à la division (B) ont été reçus directement de l’accusé ou ont été placés directement dans des contenants approuvés, scellés et identifiés dans le certificat,

(ii) le certificat du médecin qualifié énonce qu’il a fait prélever les échantillons par un technicien qualifié sous sa direction et qu’il était de l’avis mentionné à la division (i)(A),

(iii) le certificat du technicien qualifié énonce les faits mentionnés aux divisions (i)(B) à (D) et qu’il a prélevé les échantillons;

i) le certificat de l’analyste déclarant qu’il a effectué une analyse d’un échantillon du sang de l’accusé présent dans un contenant approuvé, scellé et identifié dans le certificat, indiquant le moment, le lieu de l’analyse et le résultat de celle-ci fait foi des faits énoncés dans le certificat sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver l’authenticité de la signature ou la qualité officielle du signataire.

Evidence of failure to give sample

(2) Unless a person is required to give a sample of

Preuve de l’omission de fournir un échantillon

(2) Sauf si une personne est tenue de fournir un

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a bodily substance under paragraph 254(2)(b) or subsection 254(3), (3.3) or (3.4), evidence that they failed or refused to give a sample for analysis for the purposes of this section or that a sample was not taken is not admissible and the failure, refusal or fact that a sample was not taken shall not be the subject of comment by any person in the proceedings.

Evidence of failure to comply with demand

(3) In any proceedings under subsection 255(1) in respect of an offence committed under paragraph 253(1)(a) or in any proceedings under subsection 255(2) or (3), evidence that the accused, without reasonable excuse, failed or refused to comply with a demand made under section 254 is admissible and the court may draw an inference adverse to the accused from that evidence.

Release of sample for analysis

(4) If, at the time a sample of an accused’s blood is taken, an additional sample is taken and retained, a judge of a superior court of criminal jurisdiction or a court of criminal jurisdiction shall, on the summary application of the accused made within six months after the day on which the samples were taken, order the release of one of the samples for the purpose of examination or analysis, subject to any terms that appear to be necessary or desirable to ensure that the sample is safeguarded and preserved for use in any proceedings in respect of which it was taken.

Testing of blood for concentration of a drug

(5) A sample of an accused’s blood taken under subsection 254(3) or section 256 or with the accused’s consent for the purpose of analysis to determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the blood may be tested to determine the concentration, if any, of a drug in the blood.

Attendance and right to cross-examine

(6) A party against whom a certificate described in paragraph (1)(e), (f), (f.1), (g), (h) or (i) is produced may, with leave of the court, require the attendance

échantillon d’une substance corporelle aux termes de l’alinéa 254(2)b) ou des paragraphes 254(3), (3.3) ou (3.4), la preuve qu’elle a omis ou refusé de fournir pour analyse un échantillon pour l’application du présent article, ou que l’échantillon n’a pas été prélevé, n’est pas admissible; de plus, l’omission ou le refus ou le fait qu’un échantillon n’a pas été prélevé ne saurait faire l’objet de commentaires par qui que ce soit au cours des procédures.

Preuve de l’omission d’obtempérer à un ordre

(3) Dans toute poursuite engagée en vertu du paragraphe 255(1) à l’égard d’une infraction prévue à l’alinéa 253(1)a) ou en vertu des paragraphes 255(2) ou (3), la preuve que l’accusé a, sans excuse raisonnable, omis ou refusé d’obtempérer à un ordre qui lui a été donné en vertu de l’article 254 est admissible et le tribunal peut en tirer une conclusion défavorable à l’accusé.

Accessibilité au spécimen pour analyse

(4) Si, au moment du prélèvement de l’échantillon du sang de l’accusé, un échantillon supplémentaire de celui-ci a été pris et gardé, un juge d’une cour supérieure de juridiction criminelle ou d’une cour de juridiction criminelle peut, sur demande sommaire de l’accusé présentée dans les six mois du prélèvement, ordonner qu’un spécimen de son sang lui soit remis pour examen ou analyse. L’ordonnance peut être assortie des conditions estimées nécessaires ou souhaitables pour assurer la conservation du spécimen et sa disponibilité lors des procédures en vue desquelles il a été prélevé.

Analyse du sang pour déceler des drogues

(5) Un échantillon de sang d’un accusé prélevé pour déterminer son alcoolémie en vertu du paragraphe 254(3) ou de l’article 256 ou avec le consentement de l’accusé peut être analysé afin de déterminer la quantité de drogue dans son sang.

Présence et droit de contre-interroger

(6) Une partie contre qui est produit un certificat mentionné aux alinéas (1)e), f), f.1), g), h) ou i) peut, avec l’autorisation du tribunal, exiger la présence de l’analyste, du technicien qualifié ou du médecin qualifié, selon le cas, pour contre-

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of the qualified medical practitioner, analyst or qualified technician, as the case may be, for the purposes of cross-examination.

Notice of intention to produce certificate

(7) No certificate shall be received in evidence pursuant to paragraph (1)(e), (f), (g), (h) or (i) unless the party intending to produce it has, before the trial, given to the other party reasonable notice of his intention and a copy of the certificate.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 258; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 32 (4th

Supp.), s. 61; 1992, c. 1, s. 60(F); 1994, c. 44, s. 14(E); 1997, c. 18, s. 10; 2008, c. 6, s. 24.

interrogatoire.

Avis de l’intention de produire le certificat

(7) Aucun certificat ne peut être reçu en preuve en conformité avec l’alinéa (1)e), f), g), h) ou i), à moins que la partie qui a l’intention de le produire n’ait, avant le procès, donné à l’autre partie un avis raisonnable de son intention et une copie du certificat.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 258; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 32 (4e

suppl.), art. 61; 1992, ch. 1, art. 60(F); 1994, ch. 44, art. 14(A); 1997, ch. 18, art. 10; 2008, ch. 6, art. 24.

Unauthorized use of bodily substance

258.1 (1) Subject to subsections 258(4) and (5) and subsection (3), no person shall use a bodily substance taken under paragraph 254(2)(b), subsection 254(3), (3.3) or (3.4) or section 256 or with the consent of the person from whom it was taken after a request by a peace officer or medical samples that are provided by consent and subsequently seized under a warrant, except for the purpose of an analysis that is referred to in that provision or for which the consent is given.

Unauthorized use or disclosure of results

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), no person shall use, disclose or allow the disclosure of the results of physical coordination tests under paragraph 254(2)(a), the results of an evaluation under subsection 254(3.1), the results of the analysis of a bodily substance taken under paragraph 254(2)(b), subsection 254(3), (3.3) or (3.4) or section 256 or with the consent of the person from whom it was taken after a request by a peace officer, or the results of the analysis of medical samples that are provided by consent and subsequently seized under a warrant, except

(a) in the course of an investigation of, or in a proceeding for, an offence under any of

Utilisation des substances

258.1 (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes 258(4) et (5) et du paragraphe (3), il est interdit d’utiliser les substances corporelles prélevées sur une personne en vertu de l’alinéa 254(2)b), des paragraphes 254(3), (3.3) ou (3.4) ou de l’article 256 ou prélevées avec son consentement à la demande d’un agent de la paix ou les échantillons médicaux prélevés avec son consentement et subséquemment saisis en vertu d’un mandat à d’autres fins que pour les analyses qui y sont prévues ou pour lesquelles elle a consenti.

Utilisation des résultats

(2) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3) et (4), il est interdit d’utiliser, ou de communiquer ou de laisser communiquer, les résultats des épreuves de coordination des mouvements effectuées en vertu de l’alinéa 254(2)a), les résultats de l’évaluation effectuée en vertu du paragraphe 254(3.1), les résultats de l’analyse de substances corporelles prélevées sur une personne en vertu de l’alinéa 254(2)b), des paragraphes 254(3), (3.3) ou (3.4) ou de l’article 256 ou prélevées avec son consentement à la demande d’un agent de la paix ou les résultats de l’analyse des échantillons médicaux prélevés avec son consentement et subséquemment saisis en vertu d’un mandat, sauf :

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sections 220, 221, 236 and 249 to 255, an offence under Part I of the Aeronautics Act, or an offence under the Railway Safety Act in respect of a contravention of a rule or regulation made under that Act respecting the use of alcohol or a drug; or

(b) for the purpose of the administration or enforcement of the law of a province.

Exception

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to persons who for medical purposes use samples or use or disclose the results of tests, taken for medical purposes, that are subsequently seized under a warrant.

Exception

(4) The results of physical coordination tests, an evaluation or an analysis referred to in subsection (2) may be disclosed to the person to whom they relate, and may be disclosed to any other person if the results are made anonymous and the disclosure is made for statistical or other research purposes.

Offence

(5) Every person who contravenes subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

2008, c. 6, s. 25.

a) dans le cadre de l’enquête relative à une infraction prévue soit à l’un des articles 220, 221, 236 et 249 à 255, soit à la partie I de la Loi sur l’aéronautique, soit à la Loi sur la sécurité ferroviaire pour violation des règles ou règlements concernant la consommation d’alcool ou de drogue, ou lors de poursuites intentées à l’égard d’une telle infraction;

b) en vue de l’application ou du contrôle d’application d’une loi provinciale.

Exception

(3) Les paragraphes (1) et (2) ne s’appliquent pas aux personnes qui, à des fins médicales, utilisent des échantillons, ou utilisent ou communiquent des résultats d’analyses effectuées à des fins médicales, qui sont subséquemment saisis en vertu d’un mandat.

Exception

(4) Les résultats des épreuves, de l’évaluation ou de l’analyse mentionnées au paragraphe (2) peuvent être communiqués à la personne en cause et, s’ils sont dépersonnalisés, à toute autre personne à des fins de recherche ou statistique.

Infraction

(5) Quiconque contrevient aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) est coupable d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

2008, ch. 6, art. 25.

Mandatory order of prohibition

259 (1) When an offender is convicted of an offence committed under section 253 or 254 or this section or discharged under section 730 of an offence committed under section 253 and, at the time the offence was committed or, in the case of an offence committed under section 254, within the three hours preceding that time, was operating or had the care or control of a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft or of railway equipment or was assisting in the operation of an aircraft or of railway equipment, the court that sentences the offender

Ordonnance d’interdiction obligatoire

259 (1) Lorsqu’un contrevenant est déclaré coupable d’une infraction prévue aux articles 253 ou 254 ou au présent article ou absous sous le régime de l’article 730 d’une infraction prévue à l’article 253 et qu’au moment de l’infraction, ou dans les trois heures qui la précèdent dans le cas d’une infraction prévue à l’article 254, il conduisait ou avait la garde ou le contrôle d’un véhicule à moteur, d’un bateau, d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, ou aidait à la conduite d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, le tribunal qui lui inflige

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shall, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place, or from operating a vessel or an aircraft or railway equipment, as the case may be,

(a) for a first offence, during a period of not more than three years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, and not less than one year;

(b) for a second offence, during a period of not more than five years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, and not less than two years; and

(c) for each subsequent offence, during a period of not less than three years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment.

Alcohol ignition interlock device program

(1.1) If the offender is registered in an alcohol ignition interlock device program established under the law of the province in which the offender resides and complies with the conditions of the program, the offender may, subject to subsection (1.2), operate a motor vehicle equipped with an alcohol ignition interlock device during the prohibition period, unless the court orders otherwise.

Minimum absolute prohibition period

(1.2) An offender who is registered in a program referred to in subsection (1.1) may not operate a motor vehicle equipped with an alcohol ignition interlock device until

(a) the expiry of a period of

(i) for a first offence, 3 months after the day on which sentence is imposed,

(ii) for a second offence, 6 months after the day on which sentence is imposed, and

(iii) for each subsequent offence, 12 months after the day on which sentence is imposed; or

(b) the expiry of any period that may be fixed

une peine doit, en plus de toute autre peine applicable à cette infraction, rendre une ordonnance lui interdisant de conduire un véhicule à moteur dans une rue, sur un chemin ou une grande route ou dans tout autre lieu public, un bateau, un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire :

a) pour une première infraction, durant une période minimale d’un an et maximale de trois ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné;

b) pour une deuxième infraction, durant une période minimale de deux ans et maximale de cinq ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné;

c) pour chaque infraction subséquente, durant une période minimale de trois ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné.

Programme d’utilisation d’antidémarreurs avec éthylomètre

(1.1) À moins d’ordonnance contraire du tribunal, le contrevenant peut, sous réserve du paragraphe (1.2), conduire, durant la période d’interdiction, un véhicule à moteur équipé d’un antidémarreur avec éthylomètre s’il est inscrit à un programme d’utilisation d’antidémarreurs avec éthylomètre institué sous le régime juridique de la province où il réside et respecte les conditions du programme.

Période minimale d’interdiction absolue

(1.2) Le contrevenant qui est inscrit à un programme visé au paragraphe (1.1) ne peut conduire un véhicule à moteur équipé d’un antidémarreur avec éthylomètre qu’après l’expiration :

a) soit de l’une des périodes suivantes :

(i) la période de trois mois suivant l’imposition de la peine, pour la première infraction,

(ii) la période de six mois suivant l’imposition de la peine, pour la deuxième infraction,

(iii) la période de douze mois suivant

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by order of the court that is greater than a period referred to in paragraph (a).

(1.3) and (1.4) [Repealed, 2008, c. 18, s. 8]

l’imposition de la peine, pour chaque infraction subséquente;

b) soit de la période supérieure à celle visée à l’alinéa a) que le tribunal peut fixer par ordonnance.

(1.3) et (1.4) [Abrogés, 2008, ch. 18, art. 8]

Discretionary order of prohibition

(2) If an offender is convicted or discharged under section 730 of an offence under section 220, 221, 236, 249, 249.1, 250, 251 or 252 or any of subsections 255(2) to (3.2) committed by means of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment, the court that sentences the offender may, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place, or from operating a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment, as the case may be,

(a) during any period that the court considers proper, if the offender is sentenced to imprisonment for life in respect of that offence;

(a.1) during any period that the court considers proper, plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, if the offender is liable to imprisonment for life in respect of that offence and if the sentence imposed is other than imprisonment for life;

(b) during any period not exceeding ten years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, if the offender is liable to imprisonment for more than five years but less than life in respect of that offence; and

(c) during any period not exceeding three years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, in any other case.

Consecutive prohibition periods

(2.1) The court may, when it makes an order under this section prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle, a vessel, an aircraft or railway equipment,

Ordonnance d’interdiction discrétionnaire

(2) Lorsqu’un contrevenant est déclaré coupable ou absous sous le régime de l’article 730 d’une infraction prévue aux articles 220, 221, 236, 249, 249.1, 250, 251 ou 252 ou à l’un des paragraphes 255(2) à (3.2) commise au moyen d’un véhicule à moteur, d’un bateau, d’un aéronef ou de matériel ferroviaire, le tribunal qui lui inflige une peine peut, en plus de toute autre peine applicable en l’espèce, rendre une ordonnance lui interdisant de conduire un véhicule à moteur dans une rue, sur un chemin ou une grande route ou dans tout autre lieu public, un bateau, un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire :

a) durant toute période que le tribunal considère comme appropriée, si le contrevenant est condamné à l’emprisonnement à perpétuité pour cette infraction;

a.1) durant toute période que le tribunal considère comme appropriée, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné si celle-ci est inférieure à l’emprisonnement à perpétuité, dans le cas où le contrevenant est passible d’un emprisonnement à perpétuité pour cette infraction;

b) durant toute période maximale de dix ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné, si le contrevenant est passible d’un emprisonnement de plus de cinq ans mais inférieur à l’emprisonnement à perpétuité;

c) durant toute période maximale de trois ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné, dans tout autre cas.

Périodes d’interdiction consécutives

(2.1) Dans l’ordonnance qu’il rend en vertu du présent article, le tribunal peut prévoir que la période d’interdiction visant tel moyen de transport

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as the case may be, order that the time served under that order be served consecutively to the time served under any other order made under this section that prohibits the operation of the same means of transport and that is in force.

s’applique consécutivement à toute autre période d’interdiction prévue relativement au même moyen de transport dans toute autre ordonnance rendue en vertu du présent article qui est toujours en vigueur.

Saving

(3) No order made under subsection (1) or (2) shall operate to prevent any person from acting as master, mate or engineer of a vessel that is required to carry officers holding certificates as master, mate or engineer.

Mandatory order of prohibition — street racing

(3.1) When an offender is convicted or discharged under section 730 of an offence committed under subsection 249.4(1), the court that sentences the offender shall, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place

(a) for a first offence, during a period of not more than three years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, and not less than one year;

(b) for a second offence, during a period of not more than five years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, and not less than two years; and

(c) for each subsequent offence, during a period of not less than three years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment.

Mandatory order of prohibition — bodily harm

(3.2) When an offender is convicted or discharged under section 730 of an offence committed under section 249.3 or subsection 249.4(3), the court that sentences the offender shall, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place

(a) for a first offence, during a period of not

Réserve

(3) Aucune ordonnance rendue en vertu des paragraphes (1) et (2) ne peut empêcher une personne d’agir comme capitaine, lieutenant ou officier mécanicien d’un bateau tenu d’avoir à bord des officiers titulaires d’un certificat de capitaine, lieutenant ou d’officier mécanicien.

Ordonnance d’interdiction obligatoire (simple)

(3.1) Lorsqu’un contrevenant est déclaré coupable ou absous, sous le régime de l’article 730, d’une infraction au paragraphe 249.4(1), le tribunal, indépendamment de toute autre peine qu’il lui inflige, rend une ordonnance lui interdisant de conduire un véhicule à moteur dans une rue, un chemin ou une grande route ou tout autre lieu public :

a) pour une première infraction, durant une période minimale d’un an et maximale de trois ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné;

b) pour une deuxième infraction, durant une période minimale de deux ans et maximale de cinq ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné;

c) pour chaque infraction subséquente, durant une période minimale de trois ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné.

Ordonnance d’interdiction obligatoire (lésions corporelles)

(3.2) Lorsqu’un contrevenant est déclaré coupable ou absous, sous le régime de l’article 730, d’une infraction à l’article 249.3 ou au paragraphe 249.4(3), le tribunal, indépendamment de toute autre peine qu’il lui inflige, rend une ordonnance lui interdisant de conduire un véhicule à moteur dans une rue, un chemin ou une grande route ou tout autre lieu public :

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more than ten years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, and not less than one year;

(b) for a second offence, during a period of not more than ten years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, and not less than two years; and

(c) for each subsequent offence, during a period of not less than three years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment.

Mandatory order of prohibition — death

(3.3) When an offender is convicted or discharged under section 730 of a first offence committed under section 249.2 or subsection 249.4(4), the court that sentences the offender shall, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place

(a) for an offence under section 249.2, during a period of not less than one year plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment; and

(b) for an offence under subsection 249.4(4), during a period of not more than ten years plus any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment, and not less than one year.

Mandatory life prohibition

(3.4) When an offender is convicted or discharged under section 730 of an offence committed under section 249.2 or 249.3 or subsection 249.4(3) or (4), the offender has previously been convicted or discharged under section 730 of one of those offences and at least one of the convictions or discharges is under section 249.2 or subsection 249.4(4), the court that sentences the offender shall make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place for life.

a) pour une première infraction, durant une période minimale d’un an et maximale de dix ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné;

b) pour une deuxième infraction, durant une période minimale de deux ans et maximale de dix ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné;

c) pour chaque infraction subséquente, durant une période minimale de trois ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné.

Ordonnance d’interdiction obligatoire (mort)

(3.3) Lorsqu’un contrevenant est déclaré coupable ou absous, sous le régime de l’article 730, d’une première infraction à l’article 249.2 ou au paragraphe 249.4(4), le tribunal, indépendamment de toute autre peine qu’il lui inflige, rend une ordonnance lui interdisant de conduire un véhicule à moteur dans une rue, un chemin ou une grande route ou tout autre lieu public :

a) s’agissant d’une infraction à l’article 249.2, durant une période minimale d’un an, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné;

b) s’agissant d’une infraction au paragraphe 249.4(4), durant une période minimale d’un an et maximale de dix ans, en plus de la période d’emprisonnement à laquelle il est condamné.

Interdiction à perpétuité obligatoire

(3.4) Lorsqu’un contrevenant est déclaré coupable ou absous, sous le régime de l’article 730, de l’une des infraction prévues aux articles 249.2 ou 249.3 ou aux paragraphes 249.4(3) ou (4), qu’il a déjà été déclaré coupable ou absous, sous le régime de l’article 730, de l’une de ces infractions, et qu’au moins une des déclarations de culpabilité ou absolutions concerne une infraction visée à l’article 249.2 ou au paragraphe 249.4(4), le tribunal qui lui inflige une peine rend une ordonnance lui interdisant à perpétuité de conduire un véhicule à moteur dans une rue, un chemin ou une grande route ou tout autre lieu public.

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Operation while disqualified

(4) Every offender who operates a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft or any railway equipment in Canada while disqualified from doing so, other than an offender who is registered in an alcohol ignition interlock device program established under the law of the province in which the offender resides and who complies with the conditions of the program,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Definition of disqualification

(5) For the purposes of this section, disqualification means

(a) a prohibition from operating a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft or any railway equipment ordered pursuant to any of subsections (1), (2) and (3.1) to (3.4); or

(b) a disqualification or any other form of legal restriction of the right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft imposed

(i) in the case of a motor vehicle, under the law of a province, or

(ii) in the case of a vessel or an aircraft, under an Act of Parliament,

in respect of a conviction or discharge under section 730 of any offence referred to in any of subsections (1), (2) and (3.1) to (3.4).

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 259; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 1 (4th Supp.),

s. 18(F), c. 32 (4th Supp.), s. 62; 1995, c. 22, ss. 10, 18; 1997, c. 18, s. 11; 1999, c. 32, s. 5(Preamble); 2000, c. 2, s. 2; 2001, c. 37, s. 1; 2006, c. 14, s. 3; 2008, c. 6, s. 26, c. 18, s. 8.

Note marginale :Conduite durant l’interdiction

(4) À moins d’être inscrit à un programme d’utilisation d’antidémarreurs avec éthylomètre institué sous le régime juridique de la province où il réside et d’en respecter les conditions, quiconque conduit un véhicule à moteur, un bateau, un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire au Canada pendant qu’il lui est interdit de le faire est coupable :

a) soit d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;

b) soit d’une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire.

Définition de interdiction

(5) Pour l’application du présent article, interdiction s’entend selon le cas :

a) de l’ interdiction de conduire un véhicule à moteur, un bateau, un aéronef ou du matériel ferroviaire prononcée en vertu de l’un des paragraphes (1), (2) et (3.1) à (3.4);

b) dans le cas d’une déclaration de culpabilité ou d’une absolution, sous le régime de l’article 730, relativement à une infraction visée au paragraphe (1), (2) ou (3.1) à (3.4), de l’interdiction ou de l’inaptitude à conduire ou de toute autre forme de restriction légale du droit ou de l’autorisation de conduire un véhicule à moteur, un bateau ou un aéronef infligée :

(i) en vertu d’une loi provinciale, dans le cas d’un véhicule à moteur,

(ii) en vertu d’une loi fédérale, dans le cas d’un bateau ou d’un aéronef.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 259; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 1 (4e

suppl.), art. 18(F), ch. 32 (4e suppl.), art. 62; 1995, ch. 22, art. 10 et 18; 1997, ch. 18, art. 11; 1999, ch. 32, art. 5(préambule); 2000, ch. 2, art. 2; 2001, ch. 37, art. 1; 2006, ch. 14, art. 3;

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2008, ch. 6, art. 26, ch. 18, art. 8.

Proceedings on making of prohibition order

260 (1) If a court makes a prohibition order under section 259 in relation to an offender, it shall cause

(a) the order to be read by or to the offender;

(b) a copy of the order to be given to the offender; and

(c) the offender to be informed of subsection 259(4).

Endorsement by offender

(2) After subsection (1) has been complied with in relation to an offender who is bound by an order referred to in that subsection, the offender shall endorse the order, acknowledging receipt of a copy thereof and that the order has been explained to him.

Validity of order not affected

(3) The failure of an offender to endorse an order pursuant to subsection (2) does not affect the validity of the order.

Onus

(4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, where it is proved that a disqualification referred to in paragraph 259(5)(b) has been imposed on a person and that notice of the disqualification has been mailed by registered or certified mail to that person, that person shall, after five days following the mailing of the notice, be deemed to have received the notice and to have knowledge of the disqualification, of the date of its commencement and of its duration.

Certificate admissible in evidence

(5) In proceedings under section 259, a certificate setting out with reasonable particularity that a person is disqualified from

o (a) driving a motor vehicle in a province, purporting to be signed by the registrar of motor vehicles for that province, or

Procédure d’ordonnance d’interdiction

260 (1) Le tribunal qui rend une ordonnance d’interdiction en vertu de l’article 259 s’assure que les exigences ci-après sont respectées :

a) l’ordonnance est lue au contrevenant ou par celui-ci;

b) une copie de l’ordonnance est remise au contrevenant;

c) le contrevenant est informé des dispositions du paragraphe 259(4).

Signature du contrevenant

(2) Après que les exigences du paragraphe (1) ont été satisfaites, le contrevenant signe l’ordonnance attestant ainsi qu’il en a reçu copie et qu’elle lui a été expliquée.

Validité de l’ordonnance non atteinte

(3) Le défaut de se conformer au paragraphe (2) ne porte pas atteinte à la validité de l’ordonnance.

Fardeau

(4) En l’absence de toute preuve contraire, lorsqu’il est prouvé qu’une personne fait l’objet d’une interdiction en conformité avec l’alinéa 259(5)b) et que l’avis de cette interdiction a été envoyé par courrier certifié ou recommandé à cette personne, celle-ci, à compter du sixième jour de la mise à la poste de l’avis, est présumée avoir reçu l’avis et pris connaissance de l’existence de l’interdiction, de sa date d’entrée en vigueur et de sa durée.

Admissibilité du certificat ou preuve

(5) Dans les poursuites engagées en vertu de l’article 259, un certificat constitue la preuve des faits qui y sont allégués sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver l’authenticité de la signature ou la qualité officielle du signataire lorsqu’il établit avec détails raisonnables ce qui suit :

o a) il est interdit à la personne visée par le certificat de conduire un véhicule à moteur

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o (b) operating a vessel or aircraft, purporting to be signed by the Minister of Transport or any person authorized by the Minister of Transport for that purpose

is evidence of the facts alleged therein without proof of the signature or official character of the person by whom it purports to be signed.

Notice to accused

(6) Subsection (5) does not apply in any proceedings unless at least seven days notice in writing is given to the accused that it is intended to tender the certificate in evidence.

Definition of registrar of motor vehicles

(7) In subsection (5), registrar of motor vehicles includes the deputy of that registrar and any other person or body, by whatever name or title designated, that from time to time performs the duties of superintending the registration of motor vehicles in the province.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 260; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 1 (4th Supp.),

s. 18(F); 2006, c. 14, s. 4.

dans une province et le certificat est censé être signé par le directeur du bureau des véhicules automobiles de cette province;

o b) il est interdit à la personne visée par le certificat de conduire un bateau ou un aéronef, et le certificat est censé être signé par le ministre des Transports ou la personne qu’il désigne à cette fin.

Avis à l’accusé

(6) Le paragraphe (5) ne s’applique à des procédures que si un avis écrit d’au moins sept jours est donné à l’accusé, indiquant l’intention de présenter le certificat en preuve.

Définition de directeur du bureau des véhicules automobiles

(7) Au paragraphe (5), directeur du bureau des véhicules automobiles s’entend de son adjoint et de toute personne ou de tout organisme qui, quel que soit son nom ou son titre, remplit les fonctions de directeur de l’immatriculation de ces véhicules dans une province.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 260; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 1 (4e

suppl.), art. 18(F); 2006, ch. 14, art. 4.

Stay of order pending appeal

261 (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), if an appeal is taken against a conviction or discharge under section 730 for an offence committed under any of sections 220, 221, 236, 249 to 255 and 259, a judge of the court being appealed to may direct that any prohibition order under section 259 arising out of the conviction or discharge shall, on any conditions that the judge or court imposes, be stayed pending the final disposition of the appeal or until otherwise ordered by that court.

Appeals to Supreme Court of Canada

(1.1) In the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court

Effet de l’appel sur l’ordonnance

261 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (1.1), dans les cas où la déclaration de culpabilité ou l’absolution prononcée en vertu de l’article 730 à l’égard d’une infraction prévue à l’un des articles 220, 221, 236, 249 à 255 ou 259 fait l’objet d’un appel, un juge du tribunal qui en est saisi peut ordonner la suspension de toute ordonnance d’interdiction prévue à l’article 259 et résultant de cette déclaration de culpabilité ou de cette absolution, aux conditions que lui ou le tribunal impose, jusqu’à ce qu’une décision définitive soit rendue sur l’appel ou jusqu’à ce que le tribunal en décide autrement.

Appels devant la Cour suprême du Canada

(1.1) Dans le cas d’un appel devant la Cour

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of Canada, the direction referred to in subsection (1) may be made only by a judge of the court being appealed from and not by a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada.

Effect of conditions

(2) If conditions are imposed under a direction made under subsection (1) or (1.1) that a prohibition order be stayed, the direction shall not operate to decrease the period of prohibition provided in the order.

R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 261; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 36, c. 1 (4th Supp.),

s. 18(F); 1994, c. 44, ss. 15, 103; 1995, c. 22, s. 10; 1997, c. 18, ss. 12, 141; 2006, c. 14, s. 5; 2008, c. 6, s. 27. For greater certainty

487.0195 (1) For greater certainty, no preservation demand, preservation order or production order is necessary for a peace officer or public officer to ask a person to voluntarily preserve data that the person is not prohibited by law from preserving or to voluntarily provide a document to the officer that the person is not prohibited by law from disclosing.

No civil or criminal liability

(2) A person who preserves data or provides a document in those circumstances does not incur any criminal or civil liability for doing so.

2014, c. 31, s. 20. No criminal or civil liability

487.058 No peace officer, and no person acting under a peace officer’s direction, incurs any criminal or civil liability for anything necessarily done with reasonable care and skill in the taking of

suprême du Canada, le juge autorisé à décider de la suspension de l’ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1) est celui de la cour d’appel dont le jugement est porté en appel.

Précision

(2) L’assujettissement, en application des paragraphes (1) ou (1.1), de la suspension de l’ordonnance d’interdiction à des conditions ne peut avoir pour effet de réduire la période d’interdiction applicable.

L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 261; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1er suppl.), art. 36, ch. 1 (4e

suppl.), art. 18(F); 1994, ch. 44, art. 15 et 103; 1995, ch. 22, art. 10; 1997, ch. 18, art. 12 et 141; 2006, ch. 14, art. 5; 2008, ch. 6, art. 27.

Précision

487.0195 (1) Il est entendu qu’aucun ordre de préservation ni aucune ordonnance de préservation ou de communication n’est nécessaire pour que l’agent de la paix ou le fonctionnaire public demande à une personne de préserver volontairement des données ou de lui communiquer volontairement un document qu’aucune règle de droit n’interdit à celle-ci de préserver ou de communiquer.

Immunité

(2) La personne qui préserve des données ou communique un document dans de telles circonstances bénéficie de l’immunité en matière civile ou pénale pour les actes ainsi accomplis.

2014, ch. 31, art. 20.

Immunité

487.058 L’agent de la paix ou toute personne agissant sous son autorité qui prélève des échantillons de substances corporelles au titre du mandat délivré en vertu de l’article 487.05, de

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samples of bodily substances from a person under a warrant issued under section 487.05, an order made under section 487.051 or an authorization granted under section 487.055 or 487.091.

l’ordonnance rendue en vertu de l’article 487.051 ou de l’autorisation délivrée en vertu des articles 487.055 ou 487.091 ne peut être poursuivi, ni au civil ni au criminel, pour les actes nécessaires qu’il accomplit à cette fin en prenant les précautions voulues.

1998, ch. 37, art. 17; 2000, ch. 10, art. 18; 2007, ch. 22, art. 15.