Resourcing schools in Australia: A proposal for the restructure of ...

are FaringYoung PeopleHow

an update about the learning + work situation of young australians

‘09

foundation forYoung Australians

Resourcing schools in Australia

a proposal for the restructure

of public fundingjack keating

II ResourcingschoolsinAustralia:Aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfunding

Firstpublished2010byTheFoundationforYoungAustralians21–27SomersetPlace,MelbourneVictoria,3001,Australiawww.fya.org.au

Copyright©TheFoundationforYoungAustralians,2010

Allrightsreserved.Exceptforthequotationofshortpassagesforthepurposesofcriticismandreview,nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise,withoutpriorpermissionofthepublisher.

NationalLibraryofAustraliaCataloguing-in-Publicationentry

AuthorKeating,Jack.

TitleResourcingschoolsinAustralia:aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfunding/byJackKeating;prefacebyLucasWalsh.

ISBN9780980789249(pbk.)

SubjectsEducationandstate--Australia.Governmentaidtoeducation--Australia.Education--Economicaspects--Australia.Publicinvestments--Australia.

Other Authors/ContributorsWalsh,Lucas,1969-FoundationforYoungAustralians

Dewey Number379.94

AcknowledgementsThisproposalhasbeenpreparedbyProfessorJackKeating,EducationFoundationThoughtLeader.IthasbeenmadepossiblethroughagrantfromTheR.E.RossTrust.

WewouldliketoacknowledgetheinspirationprovidedbyEllenKoshlandandthecontributionofseveralkeypeopletothedevelopmentofthisproposal.WeareparticularlygratefulforthesupportprovidedbyAustinPaterson,RebekahLautman,RosalynBlack,DrBarbaraLemonandEmilyMellon.

ThisreporthasbeendigitallyprintedbyaISO14001EnvironmentalManagementSystemaccreditedprinteronMegaSilkRecycled,anenvironmentallyresponsiblerecycledpapermadefrom50%post-consumerwaste,FSCmixedsourcecertified.ItismadeinamillwhichoperatesundertheISO14001EnvironmentalManagementSystem.

i

01 How to read this proposal

02 An overview03 Principles03 Autonomy04 Publicguarantee05 Thepoliticsofschoolresourcing05 Resourcesources05 Mechanisms06 Themodel07 Thecommunityguaranteefund08 Somegovernancequestions08 Subsidiarity08 Systemicfunding08 Capitalworksandcharitablestatus08 Fundingdistributions

09 The proposal09 Introduction10 FundingandAustralianfederalism11 Whyfunding16 Justifyingpublicfunding20 Governanceandfunding22 Postsystems–governanceandfunding25 Thepoliticsofschoolfunding27 Anewfundingmodel27 Objectivesandprinciples28 Resourcing:publicandprivateinvestment28 Fundingandautonomy,andtheresponsibilitytoprotect31 Publicandprivate–thefutureofschooling32 Fundingmodels32 Thestatusquo33 Anintegratedsystem34 Transferstothestates34 Fundingteaching34 Vouchers35 Schoolfunding:analternativeproposal36 Themodel38 Thecommunityguaranteefund39 Educationalneedsandthepublicguarantee39 Systemicfunding40 Charitablestatus40 Levelsofgovernment41 Fundingdistributions42 Newrelationshipswithgovernment43 IssuesandAlternatives43 ResourceindexorSES43 Specialneeds43 Feesingovernmentschools43 Basefundingandmarginalfunding43 Capitalfunding43 Thedevilisinthedetails44 Thepoliticsofthemodel

45 References

Contents

Preface

In the context of a major Review of Funding for Schooling in Australia, this proposal responds to fundamental issues related to funding, such as the principles against which funding should be measured and the most effective means of distributing resources. It is the latest in a body of thinking dating back several years and a call to action by Education Foundation (now a division of The Foundation for Young Australians) which seeks to stimulate discussion, thinking and policy change to improve the conditions for equity and quality of Australian schooling.

Thispaper,“ResourcingschoolsinAustralia:Aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfunding”,isthesecondpartofaproposalfornationalreformagendadevelopedbyProfessorJackKeating,EducationFoundationThoughtLeader.AlongwithProfessorKeating’s2009paper“ANewFederalisminAustralianEducation”,thisproposalprovidesinsightintohowallAustralia’sschoolsarecurrentlyfunded,andhowthehistoricaldevelopmentofthesefundingarrangementshaveshapedAustralianschoolinginauniqueandofteninequitableway.Inparticular,ProfessorKeatingidentifiescertainstructuralarrangements,systemsandregulationsfortheresourcingofschoolsthatareinconsistentandlacktransparencyandsometimesareunfair.

AsweenterpublicdiscussionaboutfundingAustralianschooling,thisproposalhighlightstheimportanceofprovidingsafeguardsandstandardstoensureanequitabledistributionoffundingtoensurequalityeducationforallinthefuture.AstheMinisterforEducation,JuliaGillard,suggests:“HowweresourceschoolsgoesdirectlytoaspirationsAustralianshaveforthefuture,fortheirchildren,fortheircommunitiesandfortheirsenseoffairnessinAustraliansociety.”

Inrecentyears,wehaveseengrowingattentiongiventothepurposesofschoolinginrelationtosocialjustice.Akeypropositionwithinthispaperisthatanyreformineducationalfundingneedstokeepsocialjusticeatthefrontandcentreofpublicdebateandpolicy.Withrightscomeobligations,andwiththereceiptofpublicmoneycomecertainpubliccommitments.Mindfulofthiscorefeatureofallpubliclyfundededucation,thecurrentdiscussionaboutfundingmustbeaccompaniedbyrobustandvigorousdebateaboutthesocialidealsandpoliticalprinciplesforschoolinginAustralia.ThisproposalseekstoprovideaconceptualframeworkuponwhichsuchadiscussionandarticulationcantakeplaceconcerningwhatProfessorKeatingreferstoasthe“publicguarantee.”

Wheremuchofthecurrentthinkingfocuses(andwithgoodreason)onparticularelementssuchastransparencyandaccountability,teacherqualityandcurriculum,thisproposalrespondstothebroaderhistoricalandinstitutionallandscapeofresourcingAustralianschools.

Throughthisproposal,theFoundationwantstoliftthedebatebeyondtheseeminglyintractableandoftenhighlyideologicaldebatesoverschoolfunding.Inthepastthesedebateshavebecomelostinargumentsoveraccountabilityandcompliance,schoolsectors’shareoffunding,andthemeaningofsecularisminthecontextofAustraliandemocracy.

Therehasarguablyneverbeenabettertimetoreflectuponwhatweneedtodotodevelopaworldclasseducationsystemforallstudents.AsMinisterGillardassertsinthedraftTermsofReferencefortheReview of Funding for Schooling,“thetimeisrighttohavethisdiscussioninaconstructiveandopenmanner.”

Duringthemanyforums,discussionsandconsultationsthattookplaceduringthedevelopmentofthisproposal,onerecurringthemehasbeenthatthe“devilwillbeinthedetail”.Thisproposaldoesnotseektoprovidealltheanswers,buttoenrichthediscussionofschoolfundingandensurethatreformidentifies,articulatesandincorporatescoreprinciplesandstandardsalongsideandunderneath“thedetail”.ItrepresentsanothermajorcontributionbytheFoundation,incollaborationwithTheR.E.RossTrust,tothinkingandpolicyrelatedtoequityandqualityinAustralianschooling.Overthelastyearinparticular,numerousstakeholdershavebeenconsultedthroughforums,conferencesandinformalconsultations.Wearegratefulforthegenerosityofthoughtandtime.Mostofall,EllenKoshlandhasbeenadrivingforcebehindthisinitiativeandIwouldliketoexpressmygratitudeforhervision,passionandsupport.

Schoolresourcingcontinuestobeasensitiveandhighlypoliticisedissue.Insubmittingthisproposalforpublicdebate,theFoundationstronglyarguesthatdiscussionshouldremainfocusedoncoreissuessuchaswhatweexpectofschoolingwithinanAustraliandemocracy,andhowthestructure,valuesandinstitutionsoffundingsupporttheseexpectations.

Theproposalprovidesaframeworkthoughwhichitbecomespossibletomovebeyondhistoricalandideologicalbattlegroundssothatthedistributionofresourcescanbebetterdirectedtoreducegapsinachievement.Itpresentsalanguageofpossibilitythroughwhichwecanarticulatearealisticandviableoptiontoimprovethedistributionoffunding.

Dr Lucas Walsh SeniorExecutive,ResearchTheFoundationforYoungAustralians

ii ResourcingschoolsinAustralia:Aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfundingii ResourcingschoolsinAustralia:Aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfunding

This paper is presented in two parts. The first part provides a brief overview of a proposal by Education Foundation, a division of The Foundation for Young Australians. You are urged to read this overview first as it seeks to provide a synopsis of key themes, issues and contexts, as well as a summary of the full proposal. The second part of this paper provides a more detailed discussion and analysis for those wishing to delve in more deeply.

How to read this proposal

01

This paper proposes a model of public resourcing for school education in Australia that can be applied to all registered Australian schools, irrespective of the sector in which they are located. The systems and regulations for the public and private resourcing of schools across the government, Catholic and independent school sectors are inconsistent, lack transparency and are arguably unfair. They have an impact upon the patterns of school enrolments in Australia, the quality of schooling that is delivered, and the patterns of educational outcome of students across the country. The methods and conditions for the distribution and use of public resources in schooling also raise questions about their consistency with the social objectives of government, including those of social inclusion.

PublicresourcingofschoolinginAustraliaislocatedattwolevelsofgovernment:statesandterritories,andtheCommonwealthornationallevel.WehavepreviouslyarguedthatfederalismhashadamajorinfluenceuponthestructuresandsociologyofschoolinginAustralia(Keating,2009a).Thereforemajorstructuralchanges,includingthatofresourcingreform,willneedtobeundertakenacrossthefederalistframe.

Thepurposeofthefullproposalistopositanapproachtoschoolresourcingthat:

> Ismoreconsistent,transparentandfairthanthecurrentarrangements;

> CancontributetoorbelessofabarriertothebroadsocialandeconomicgoalsthathavebeensetforschoolingbyAustraliangovernments;

> Ispoliticallyviableinthatitwouldprovidethebasisfornegotiationswiththethreeschoolsectorsandacrossthetwolevelsofgovernment.

Theproposaldoesnotincludeahighlevelofdetailabouttheamountofresourcingortheformulathatwouldneedtobeemployedinimplementingit.Theresourcingmodelthatitproposesisessentiallyconceptual.Itproposesawayofinter-relatingresourcingfromprivate,stateandCommonwealthsources,therequirementsandtriggersforthesupplyofpublicresources,andtheirrelationshiptostudentpopulationsandagreededucationalandassociatedsocialandeconomicgoals.Asamodeltheremustbeflexibilityintheserelationshipstotakeaccountoftherealitiesofgovernmentfiscalrequirementsandcapacities,andasabasisfornegotiations.

An overview

02 ResourcingschoolsinAustralia:Aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfunding

PrinciplesTheproposaltakesasitsstartingpointtheMelbourneDeclarationonEducationalGoalsforYoungAustralians(MCEETYA,2008b).Thispresentsatwofoldgoal:thatAustralianschoolingpromotesequityandexcellence;andthatallyoungAustraliansbecomesuccessfullearners,confidentandcreativeindividuals,andactiveandinformedcitizens.

WhilethesegoalsinevitablyhavearhetoricaltonetheyareassociatedwithtangiblegoalssetforschoolingbyAustraliangovernments(COAG,2008).Thegoalsandtargetsincludegreaterequity,thecommongood,improvementsinnumbersofstudentsreachingliteracybenchmarks,andhigherlevelsofcompletionofYear12oritsequivalent.

Currentpatternsofpublicresourcingofschoolsandtheconditionsforthisfundingarenotoptimalfortheachievementofthesegoals.Schoolswithinaneducationalmarketarenotencouragedtobeinclusiveintheirenrolmentpatterns,andtheburdenofcateringforcommunitiesandstudentswiththegreatestneedisfallinguponarelativelysmallproportionofschools.

AutonomyThecoreissueinschoolresourcingisautonomy.Mostcountriesprovidepublicfundsfornon-governmentschools.Inmostofthesecasesthepublicfundscomewithsomerestrictionsupontheautonomyoftherecipientschools.Typicallytheircapacityforprivateresourcegatheringisrestrictedandfrequentlytherearesomerestrictionsontheautonomyofrecipientschools’enrolmentpractices.Non-governmentschoolsinAustraliaareunusualintheirlicensetogainpublicfundingwhilechargingenrolmentfeesandhavingahighlevelofautonomyovertheirenrolmentpractices.

Autonomyinschoolingistypicallyassociatedwiththecharacteroftheschool,includingreligiouscharacter,curriculumandenrolmentpractices,includingfees.AlloftheseelementsarepresentinAustraliannon-governmentschools.Thegovernanceframesfortheseelementsarethelegalrequirementsandprocessesofschoolregistrationandtheconditionsandreportingprocessesforfunding.

Undercurrentarrangementsnon-governmentschoolsarefreetoexpressphilosophies,whichinmostcasesarereligious.Itisexpectedthatthesecharacteristicsshouldnotthreatenthewidergoodofthecommunity,orrestricttherightsofstudents.Schoolregistrationrequirementsshouldprotectthecommunitygoodandstudents’rights.Inregardstopublicfunding,alogicalappendageoftheregistrationrequirementsshouldbethatpublicfundingeitherisnotusedfortheteachingofreligion,orthatpubliclyfundedreligiousinstructionsandactivitiesshouldbeconfinedtonominalhoursintheschools’timetables.

Countrieswithinstitutionsandtraditionsofstatereligionhavebeenmorelikelytoallowpublicfundstobeusedforreligiousinstructions.Thosethathaveneededtodampensectarianismand/orprotectreligiousfreedom,suchastheUSA,GermanyandAustralia,havetypicallybeenmorecautiousabouttheuseofpublicfundsforreligiousinstruction.

Inregardstothecurriculum,theredoesnotappeartobesignificantpressurefromschoolstostrayfarbeyondwhatmightbeseenasamainstreamschooleducation.Withtheadventofanationalcurriculumthereistheopportunityforthisrelationshiptobecomeclearer,suchthatallregisteredschoolswouldbeexpectedtodeliverthecoreelementsoftheschoolcurriculum.Inregardstofundingthiscouldbelinkedtoaprinciplethatallregisteredschoolsthatdeliverthecoreelementsofanationalcurriculumshouldbeguaranteedaminimumorcommunitystandardofresources.

ItisthethirdelementofautonomyoverenrolmentsthatisproblematicinAustralia.Australiaisunusualinthecapacityofschoolsthatarepubliclyfunded,andinmostcasesmostlypubliclyfunded,toreceivepublicfundsbutrestrictenrolmentsthroughfeebarriers,scholasticandsportingcapacities,andbehaviouralandothersocialandeconomiccharacteristicsofstudents.Restrictiveorselectiveenrolmentpracticesexistinthegovernmentsector.However,theyaremuchmoreprevalentacrossthenon-governmentsector,anditisthesepracticeswithinacontextofsubstantialpublicfundingregimesthatmostcontributetothehighlevelsofdisputationoverschoolresourcingpolicyinAustralia.

03

Thedirectregulationofnon-governmentschoolenrolmentsinAustraliaisnotpossible.Theprincipleandconditionsofautonomyofnon-governmentschoolsarewellestablished.HistoricallytherewererestrictionsonthesettingoffeesthroughthereductionofCommonwealthpaymentstonon-governmentschoolsbaseduponameasureofprivateresourceincome,theEducationResourceIndex.Thistypeofarrangementcontinuesforstategovernmentgrantstonon-governmentschools,buthasweakenedatthenationallevelssincetheintroductionoftheSES(socioeconomicindex)model.Itwouldappeartostillhaveaplaceinanewresourcingmodel.

Feesarejustoneformofenrolmentrestrictionandtheprocessesofsegregationwithinschoolingaremulti-dimensional.Historicallyinmostcountries,schoolinghadacommunityorlocalbase,andwastypicallylocatedlargelyatthelocallevelofgovernment.Australiawasexceptionalhereinlocatingschoolingatthelevelofthestategovernment,andschooling’scommunityaspectwasrealisedthroughzoning.ThishasnowcollapsedandtheprincipleofschoolchoiceiswellestablishedacrosstheAustraliancommunityandpolity.

Amorepositiveandwiderapproachtoschoolingandcommunityisneeded.Itshouldbeonethatencouragesandrewardsopenenrolmentsandschoolsthattakeallcomers,irrespectiveofsector.However,itshouldalsobeanapproachthatencouragesthemoreactivebuildingofschoolandcommunitylinksandlocatesschoolingasanidentifiableandvaluablecommunityasset.Inthisregardcommunityhasastronggeographicdefinition.Thisshouldnotexcludeotherformsofcommunity.However,suchcommunitiesshouldalsobecontributorstothesocialgoalsoftheMelbourneDeclaration,includingtheideaofthecommongood.

Anewfundingmodelcouldcontributetotheseobjectivesthroughtwoelements.Oneisneedsbasedresourcing,whichhasresurfacedasaprincipleandresourcingmechanisminAustralianschooling.Theotherisasetofresourcesdesignedtoencourageacommunityapproachinschoolingsuchthatschoolsareencouragedtoworktogethertogiveaccesstoall,workwitheachotherandbuildstronglinkswiththeircommunitiesandcommunityagencies.

Public guaranteePublicinvestmentinschoolingneedstobepremiseduponthepurposeofpublicbenefit.Thisbenefitcanbeconstructedindifferentways.Withinapublicchoiceframeitcouldbetheaggregationofprivatebenefits.Withinacommunityframetherelationalelementsoftheeducationalbenefitneedtobetakenintoaccount,sowithinthisframethedistributionandequityofbenefitsareimportant.

Irrespectiveofthesedifferentconstructsofpublicbenefit,withinauniversalandcompulsorysystemofschoolingthereisacoreresponsibilitytoprotecttherightofalltoaccessschoolingofreasonablequalityandbydoingthisprotectthecommunitygoodfromafailuretoachievethis.Thestateanditsgovernmentshaveacoreresponsibilitytoprotect,ortoprovidethepublicguaranteeofaccess.Governmentsmayutiliseotheragenciestoachievethisguarantee.However,thestateretainsthefundamentalresponsibility.

ForAustraliangovernmentsthechallengeintheresourcingofschoolsistoassesswhetherthecurrentresourcingarrangementsareunderminingthisresponsibility,andifsowhatshouldbedoneaboutit.


The politics of school resourcingSchoolresourcingisasensitivepoliticalissue.Ithasbeencontestedforseveraldecadesandthiscontestationcontinues.Italsohasdifferentdimensions.Forthegovernmentschoolsector,resourceissuesareconcentrateduponstategovernmentsandtheireducationdepartmentsandstatetreasuries.Theseissuesaremostmanifestinclasssizesandteachers’paylevels.Fornon-governmentschoolstheissuesarelocatedmainly,butnotexclusively,atthenationallevelandaremanifestinrelativelevelsofpublicfundingtothoseofgovernmentschools,andtheconditionsforthisfunding.

Thesedifferenceshavecreatedquitedifferentpoliticalclimatesforpolicydecisionsonschoolfunding.Forgovernmentschoolsthepoliticsareessentiallyindustrialandarelocatedwithinthetotalstategovernmentbudgetaryframes,wherethestatetreasuriesplaykeyroles.Fornon-governmentschoolstheyarelocatedonamoreexposedpoliticalstage,andhavemoretodowiththecyclesandelectoralcontextsofgovernment.

Thetwobroadsectorsthereforehavedifferentenginesforpublicfundingoftheirschools.Theseenginesrunatdifferentratesandhavedifferentpatternsthathavecontributedtotheinconsistencies,lackoftransparency,andostensiblelackoffairnessinschoolresourcingarrangementsinAustralia.Onlybybringingthetwosystemstogether–stateandCommonwealth,andgovernmentandnon-government–canthesedifferencesbereconciled.

Resource sourcesThecostsofschoolingareconsiderable.Apartfromthedirectenrolmentcostsmetthroughgovernmentpaymentsandenrolmentfeesthereareincidentalsthatareestimatedtocostfamiliesover$2,000foreverychildatschool(BondandHorn,2009).Therealsoaretheopportunitycostsofthe13yearsthatmostyoungpeoplespendinschooling.

Governmentinvestmentinenrolmentcostsofstudentsarejustoneelementoftheconsiderablesocialinvestmentinschooling.Bond(2009)estimatesthat40nongovernmentorganisationsinVictoriacontributeoveronebilliondollarsperyeartoextraeducationalactivities.

Thesepatternsraisethedifficultquestionoftherelationshipbetweenhouseholdeducationalinvestmentsandpublicinvestment.Parentsshouldnotbepenalisedforinvestingintheirchildren’seducationthroughthereductionofpublicfunding.However,theinstitutionalisationofthisinvestmentintoschoolfeeregimesthatrestrictenrolmentsthreatenthepublicguarantee.

Thecurrentsystemforavoidingthisthreatisthemaintenanceofagovernmentschoolsystemthatisformallybaseduponfreetuition.Ahealthyanduniversallyaccessiblepublicsystemcanavoidthisthreat,andsotheexistenceofprivateschoolsthathaverestrictiveaccessassmallminoritysectorsisacceptedinvirtuallyallcountries.

However,therearetwotrendsinAustraliathatmayincreasethethreat.Thefirstisasteadydriftofenrolmentsfromthefreegovernmentschoolstothefeebasedandautonomousnon-governmentschools.Atsomepointthisdriftwillthreatenthecapacityofthegovernmentschoolsystemtomaintainitsroleasthepublicguarantor.Thesecondtrend,whichisinpartaresponsetothefirst,isthetendencyofthegovernmentsystemtobecomemoreselectiveinitsenrolmentpractices.

Eachofthesetrendsatleastinpartisanexpressionofschoolchoice.AlthoughthisprincipleisfirmlyestablishedinAustralianschoolingthereisaquestionofwhethertherelationshipbetweenpublicandprivateresourcingshouldbesuchthatitrestrictsaccessandchoiceforthelessadvantaged.

MechanismsTheAustraliancontextandthehistoryofresourcingofschoolinginthiscountryprecludethetypicaloptionoflinkingpublicfundingwithrestrictionsonenrolmentsandarequirementforfreeaccess.Alternativemechanismsneedtobefoundthatallowmuchoftheautonomyofthesectortobepreservedbutthatencouragemoreinclusiveenrolmentanddeliverypractices.Toachievethisendthefollowingareproposed:

> Publicresourcingsystemsshouldbeconsistentacrossthefederalistframe.ThatisstateandCommonwealthgovernmentsfundingsystemsshouldapplytogovernmentandnon-governmentschoolsinthesamemanner;

> Baselevelfundingandaguaranteedminimumresourcelevelshouldbelinkedtoschoolsmeetingtherequirementsforregistrationanddeliveringthenationalcurriculum.

> Publicresourcelevelsneedstobelinked,atleastinpart,toprivateresourcelevels.WhiletheSESmodelwasintroducedinpartasameansofencouragingprivateinvestment,itdecouplesthelinkwithenrolmentfeesandsoremovesadisincentiveforschoolstoimplementthemainformofenrolmentrestriction.

> Atthewiderlevelresourcingmechanismsshouldseektopreserveoveralllevelsofprivateinvestment.Thereareadvantagesinhavingprivateresourcesthatcansubsidiseandallowformoretargetedpublicinvestment.

> Needsbasedresourcingshouldbemaintainedandenhanced,giventhegrowingconcentrationsofeducationalneed.

> Governmentshouldalsoinvestineducationcommunitybuilding.Thisisforthepurposesofencouragingandrewardingopenenrolmentanddeliverypracticesandforbuildingtheintegrationofschoolsandtheircommunities,especiallyatthegeographicallevel.

> Governmentwillneedtoretainthecapacityforinterventionforspecialneedsandprograms.

05

The model

Figure 1Proposed national common resourcing model

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Private resource levels

Community ratePublic fundingPrivate fundingNeeds basedCommunity guarantee fund

1 Theproposedmodelisoutlinedinthefigureaboveandwouldworkasfollows:

> TheCommonwealthandstateandterritorygovernmentswouldprovidearesourcingguaranteeforallschools,governmentandnon-governmentintheformofacommunity rate(representedasaconstantlevelof100onthe‘y’axis).

> Thecommunityratewouldbesetatalevelbelowthatofthemedianresourcelevelsforschoolsinordertoprovidesufficientpublicfundsfortheotherelementsofthemodel.Thediscountofthecommunityrateagainstthemedianresourcelevelswouldneedtobeabout18to20percent.

> Themedianresourcelevelwouldbesomeconstructofaveragegovernmentschoolresourcelevels.

2Againstthiscommunityratewouldbeaguaranteedresourcinglevelthatcombinedpublicandprivatefunding.Thiswouldconsistof:

> Thepublic fundingrate(darkgreyline)madeupofCommonwealthandstatefunds,ataratioofapproximately40:60.

> Private revenue(representedasaconstantfactorof‘x’axisasthedottedpinkline).

Thereisaninverseratiobetweenthepublicandprivateresources.However,thisisnotaconstantratio.Thereareadvantagesinmaintainingahighlevelofprivaterevenueasthisreducesthepressuresuponpublicrevenueandincreasesthepubliccapacityforneedsbasedfunding.Almostallschoolshavesomelevelofprivateresourcing,althoughitissmallinmost.

> Thereforetheinverserelationshipbetweenpublicfundingandprivaterevenuewouldneedto:

– Haveabufferthatallowsschoolstoreachalevelofprivate revenuebeforethereisanyreductioninpublic funding;

– Betaperedsothata1:1reductioninpublic funding forincreasesinprivate revenue isapproachedgradually.

> Allschoolsirrespectiveoftheirprivate revenue levelswouldbeguaranteedaminimumlevelofpublic funding.Alevelof15percentmightbefeasible.Thisisrepresentedonthegraphasthelevellingoffinthedeclineinthebaserate.

Therearecompetingargumentsforbasingpublic funding onSESorprivaterevenue.SESremovesdisincentivesforschoolstoraiseprivaterevenue.Converselythiscanleadtopressureuponfamiliestopayforschooling.TheSESmodelalsoappearstohavecontributedtosomeinconsistenciesinresourcelevelsacrossschools.Insystemsthatareblockfundedandwherethereissomedeliberateorplanneddistributionoffunding,whichincludestheCatholicsystemicschoolsandgovernmentschools,theargumentsfortheSESmodelareweakerbecausetherelationshipbetweenprivaterevenueandpublicfundingislessdirect.Therefore,itisproposedthatpublic funding shouldbelinkedtoameasureofprivate revenue andthateducationalneedshouldbemetthroughaseparatefundingstream.

> Thoseschools,governmentandnon-government,withlowlevelsofprivaterevenuewouldhaveresourcelevelsthatarenotaboveormuchabovethecommunitybenchmark.Thecompensationforthiswouldbethroughtwoothersourcesofpublicfunds.


3Needs basedfunding(lightpinkline)couldbeallocatedbythestateorCommonwealthgovernments,oracombinationofthetwo.Theyshouldbelargerthancurrentlevels,notwithstandingtherecentCommonwealthinvestmentundertheNationalPartnerships.Withthesavingsfromthediscountingofthelevelofpublic funding againstrealschoolrecurrentresourcelevelsapproximately$2.8billionwouldbeavailableforneeds based funding.

4Community guarantee fund(lightgreyline)wouldbeanewinnovationunderthemodel.Thepurposeoftheseresourcesistwofold:asanincentiveforschoolstohaveopenenrolmentpoliciesandtocooperatewitheachotherindeliveringandimprovingthequalityofschooling;andasameansofsupportingcloserintegrationofschoolswiththeircommunities.Ifsuccessfulthiswouldbeasubstantialfundofupto10percentofthecurrentrevenueofmostnonandlowfeeschools.Itcouldbeforasmanyas60percentofallschools,andprobablyagreaterpercentageofprimaryschools.Onthebasisofcurrentfundinglevelsitwouldrepresentabout$2.0billion.

5 Special purpose fundingTheCommonwealthandthestatesandterritorieswouldcontinuetoinvestinspecialpurposeprograms,suchascareerseducation,specialneeds,literacyprograms,indigenousandruraleducationprograms.

Theoutlineofthesystemasshownaboveisindicativeonly,aslevelsandrelationshipsbetweenelementsoffundingwouldrequiregreaterinvestigationandmodelling.

The community guarantee fundThemodelputforwardbythisproposalthereforehastwocoreinnovations.Oneistheelimination of the parallel systems of funding withinthefederalistframe.Thisiscriticalforanygenuineandlongstandingreform.TheparallelsystemhasbeenthebasisfortheaberrationsoftheAustralianapproachestoschoolresourcinganditsmaintenancewillensuretheircontinuance.

TheotheristheproposalforaCommunity Guarantee fund.Thisfundisdesignedtoactasabridgebetweenthoseelementsofthegovernmentandnon-governmentsectorsthatsharecommoneducationalandsocialobjectives.Indoingthis,togetherwiththeavailabilityofasubstantialamountofneedsbasedresources,ithelpstocompensatethoseschoolsthatdonotseekincreasedrevenuethroughfeeregimesandothercharges,whichthemodelcontinuestoallow.Withthesavingsfromthediscountingofthelevelofpublic funding againstrealschoolrecurrentresourcelevels,approximately$2billionwouldbeavailableforthisfund.

Anoverlappingpurposeistoenhancethepublicguarantee,orcommunityguaranteeofqualityschoolingforall.Thisguaranteeneedstobeattwolevels:

> Accesstoschoolingforall.Thishasbeenservedmainlybythegovernmentschoolsector,butnotexclusivelyandnotconsistently–especiallyatthesecondarylevel.Giventrendsinenrolmentsbetweenthesectorsandwithinthemthereisaneedformechanismstoexpandtheschoolcontributionstothisguarantee.

> Qualityforall.Therearemultipleeffortstoincreaseschoolqualityanddelivertheobjectivesharedbybothlevelsofgovernmentofqualityschoolingforall.Themechanismsincludemarketbasedapproaches,andformsofinterventionsincludingplacebasedinterventions.TheCommunity Guarantee fundispremisedupontheargumentorhistoricalobservationthatmarketmechanismswillalwaysproduceresidualisingconsequences.Giventheembeddedstatusofeducationalchoiceandtheprincipleoftransparencyofeducationaloutcomes,communityapproachesareneededtocomplementthemandmoderatetheirnegativeimpacts.

Thecommunityorlocallevelhasbeenalongestablishedorganisationalbaseforpublicschoolsystemsinmostcountries,andseveralincludingtheScandinaviancountrieshavedevolvedthefundingandsomeothercentralgovernancefunctionsofschoolingtothemunicipalorlocallevelinrecentdecades.InAustraliaseveralstateshaveemployednetworkapproachestoschoolimprovementandprogramdelivery.

Schoolswouldretaintheirautonomy,buttherewouldbealocalordistrictfunctionofsupportingschools,linkingthemwithotheragencies,providingservices,supportingandinformingparents,andlinkingschools.Theapproachwouldhavesomesimilaritieswiththe‘HealthNetworks’thatcurrentlyoperateinVictoriawithapparentsuccess.

07

Some governance questionsSubsidiarityThelargestgroupoflowfeeandrelativelyopenaccessnon-governmentschoolsarelocatedintheCatholicsector.Thesectorisbaseduponsubsidiarity,theprinciplethatdecisionsshouldbetakenascloseaspossibletothosethattheydirectlyaffect.Thisreflectsitshistoricalbaseofparishes,complexgovernancestructureandlegacyoftheteachingorders.

Theprincipleunderpinsitshistoryofautonomy,andtherewouldbesubstantialbarrierstotheincorporationoftheCatholicsectorwithinawiderpublicsystem,ashasbeenthecaseintheUKandNewZealand.Itneedstoberecognisedthateachoftheseformsofincorporationhavebeendoneondifferentterms.NewZealandCatholicschoolshave‘specialcharacteristics’.InEnglandmostofthe2400Catholicschoolsarevoluntaryaided.Theseschoolsineachcountryhavebeenincludedinawiderpublicsystemonavoluntaryandnegotiatedbasis.

TheNewZealandandEnglishcontextsandhistoriesaredifferenttothoseinAustralia,andtheexperienceoftheAustralianCatholicschoolshasreinforcedtheprinciplesofsubsidiarityandautonomy.Theoptionofsomevoluntaryincorporationwithinthestatesystems,evenifitwasonoffer,wouldnotbeaccepted.

TheprincipleofsubsidiaritythereforesuggeststhatanypartnershipwithCatholicschoolsinenhancingthepublicguaranteeneedstobeatthelocallevelandonavoluntarybasis.Thesameappliestoindependentschools,whichbydefinitionareindependent.

SoapurposeoftheCommunity Guarantee fundistolocateanelementofthefundingatalevelwherenon-governmentsschoolscanbeengaged.Whetherthisisdoneatstate,regionalorlocallevelswouldneedtobeinvestigated.

Systemic fundingItissuggestedthatsystemicfundingshouldcontinuetooperate.Blockgrantsthroughsystemicagencieshavebeenasignificantinstrumentfortheestablishmentanddeliveryoftheneedsbasedprincipleinnon-governmentschoolfunding(O’Brien,1999).

Capital works and charitable statusTheproposedfundingmodelisbasedupontheassumptionthattheformalownershipofaschoolshouldnotinfluenceitslevelofpublicfunding.

Attheinternationallevel,withinincorporatedorvoluntaryaidedmodels,capitalworksaretypicallypartiallytheresponsibilityofnon-governmentschools.Thisprovidesthejustificationfortheircharitablestatus.Thispaperdoesnotaddresstheissueofcapitalfunding.However,tobeconsistentwiththepublicfundingprinciplesoutlinedinthepaper,publicinvestmentinnon-governmentschoolcapitalshouldbesubjecttoplanningcriteria,suchastheformerCommonwealthNewSchoolspolicy,andbebenchmarkedagainstafacilitiesstandard.

Thereisacasetobemadethatcharitablestatusshouldbeawardedeithertoallschoolsoruponthebasisoftheirmission,ratherthantheircapacitytochargefeesandhaveautonomyoverenrolments,whichineffectarethecurrentarrangementsinAustralia.Giventhelegalcomplexities,themostviableapproachistoallowallschoolsthatmeetregistrationrequirementstohavecharitablestatus.Giventhegreatercapacityofthenon-governmentsectorandespeciallyelementswithinittoraiseprivatefunds,thisstatuswouldcontinuetoadvantagetheseschools.

Funding distributionsThecurrenttotallevelsofincomeforrecurrentcostsforAustralianschoolsapproach$45billionperyear.Commonwealthpaymentsalsoincludeapproximately$2billioninspecificprogrampayments.Neverthelessitsshareoftotalcostsislessthan25percentofallschooleducationrevenueandlessthan30percentofallgovernmentpayments.WithoutashiftinGSTthiswouldneedtobereflectedintheaggregatesforeachoftheelementsoftheproposedmodel.

Thebulkofthefundingwithintheproposedmodelislocatedinthepublic funding component.ItisnotpoliticallyfeasibletohaveafurthertransferofGSTfundsbacktotheCommonwealth.Therefore,responsibilityforthedeliveryofthiscomponentwouldneedtobesharedbetweentheCommonwealthandthestatesandterritoriesonaratioofapproximately40:60.

ThereislogicinlocatingtheneedsbasedfundingatthestatelevelandtheCommunity Guarantee fundatthestateandterritorylevel.However,ifneedsbasedfundingisformulabased,itcouldbelocatedattheCommonwealthlevel,orboth.TheCommunity Guarantee fund,ideally,shouldhavemorelocalisedgovernance.


The proposal

IntroductionThis paper proposes a new model for government funding of Australian school education. It follows the publication by Education Foundation, a division of the Foundation for Young Australians, of a set of proposed reforms and program initiatives that are designed to restructure the federalist arrangements for school education (Keating, 2009a).

TheearlierpublicationarguedthatwhilethequalityofAustralianschoolingishighbyinternationalstandards,itsrelativelevelshaverecentlybeenfallingandamajorcontributiontothisisthesignificantnumberofstudentsfromdisadvantagedbackgroundswithpooroutcomes.ThisanalysiswasrecentlyreflectedinanannouncementfromtheDeputyPrimeMinister(Gillard,2010a).ItarguedthatthereareunderlyingstructuralfactorsinAustralianschoolingthatarecontributingtothesetrends,mostsignificantlythroughagrowingconcentrationinsomeschoolsofstudentsfromlowincomehouseholdsandwithhighlevelsofeducationneed.

ThepublicationarguedforstructuralchangesinAustralianschoolingtocomplementtheinvestmentstoimproveschoolleadershipandqualityandthequalityofteaching.Thesechangesincludedthemovementtowardsacommongovernanceframeworkforgovernmentandnon-governmentschoolsandareabasedinvestmentsincrosssectoralprogramsatkeystagesinschooling.

ThekeystructuralandgovernanceissueinAustralianschoolingisfunding.Thispaperpicksupfromthepreviouspublication.ItarguesthecaseforthecentralityoffundingasakeypolicyissueandproposesareformedmodelforthepublicfundingofallregisteredschoolsinAustralia.

ThispaperreviewssomeoftheissuesthatwereelaboratedinthefirstpublicationandthenexplorestheadministrativeandpoliticalaspectsofschoolfundinginAustralia.Itpositsthatthecharacteristicofpublicfundingsystemsandtheirevolutionhavedonemuchtoinfluencethecharacteristicsoftherelationshipsbetweengovernmentandnon-governmentschoolinginAustralia.Itproposesarestructureoffundingsystemsaroundthefederalistframe.

09

1 MostofthesenonstateagenciesarewithintheCatholicsystemandconsistofthediocesanbasedCatholicEducationOfficesandstateandnationalCatholicEducationCommissions,aswellastheteachingorders.Otherfaithbasedschoolsalsoareclassifiedassystemic,notablytheAnglicanschools,andalsohavecentralagencies.Thedegreeofautonomyoftheschoolswithinalloftheseagenciesisvariable.

2 TheCommonwealththroughitsNationalAuditandRegistrationAgency(NARA)hasrecentlyassumedmostoftheregulatoryresponsibilityfortheVocationalEducationandTrainingSector.TheCommonwealthGovernmenthasmadeitclearthatitwantsallstatesandterritoriestodelegatetheirregistrationandqualityassurancefunctionstotheAgency(Gillard,2008a).Therearegradualmovestowardsanationalstructureforteacherregistrationwiththeestablishmentofnationalframeworkfortheprofessionalstandardsforteaching(MCEETYA,2003)andtheestablishmentoftheAustralianInstituteforTeachingandSchoolLeadership.

Funding and Australian federalismNumerousauthors(e.g.Marginson,1993;Meadmore,2001;Lingard,2000)havenotedtheunusualgovernancearrangementsforschoolinginAustralia.Schoolsarelocatedwithintheadministrativeauthoritiesofstategovernmentagenciesornon-statefaithbasedagenciesorareautonomousentities1.Regulatoryframeworksareestablishedthroughstategovernmentlegislationandareadministeredbystategovernmentappointedagencies.Theregulatorysystemsapplyeithertoallschoolsordifferentlytothethreesectorsofgovernment,non-governmentsystemic(mostlyCatholic),andindependentschools.Responsibilityforcurriculumandawardsismostlylocatedwithinstategovernmentappointedagencies,butsomeresponsibilityisshiftingtowardsanationalagency(theAustralianCurriculum,AssessmentandReportingAuthorityorACARA),andschoolshavedifferentlevelsofautonomyovercurriculum.Fundingisthroughstategovernments,theCommonwealthGovernment,andprivaterevenue.Theratiobetweenthesethreesourcesandtheformulaandcriteriaforthemacrossthethreesectorsaredifferent.

Thesegovernancearrangementshavebecomemoredynamicinrecentdecades.Stategovernmentshavedevolvedelementsofgovernancetoschoolstovaryingdegrees,althoughrecentpatternsofstateandCommonwealthinterventionsmayindicateacessationorevenareversalofthesetrends.MostrecentlytherehasbeenamarkedshiftinfundingandcurriculumresponsibilitiesandsomeadministrativerolestotheCommonwealthGovernment,andthereisthepossibilityofashiftofsomeregulatoryresponsibilitiestotheCommonwealth.2Thesechangeshaveaccompaniedenrolmentchangesacrossthesectorswithalongtermshifttowardsthenon-governmentsectorandamorerecentshifttotheindependentsector.Theenrolmentshiftsarehavingtheeffectofincreasingthedifferencesintheaveragesocio-economicstatus(SES)ofstudentenrolmentsbetweenthethreesectors(WatsonandRyan,2009).ThesocialpatternsoftheseenrolmentsarematchedbysimilarshiftsinenrolmentswithinthegovernmentandtoalesserextentwithintheCatholicsectors,andespeciallyatthesecondarylevel.

Ithasbeenarguedthattheseshiftsinenrolmentsarethreateningtheprincipleofequityinschooling,areweakeningthecapacityoftheAustralianschoolsystemtoraiseoverallstandardsofeducationaloutcomes,andareweakeningthecapacityofschoolingtopromotegreatersocialinclusion(Keating,2009a).Thereisaworldwidetrendtowardsgreatereconomicinequalityacrosssocieties(WilkinsonandPickett,2009)andthetrendhasbeenquitestronginAustralia(Stilwell,2008).Schoolenrolmentpatternscancompensatefororexacerbatethistrend.

DelaCroixandDoepke(2007)postulatethatwithindemocraticsocietiespubliceducationhasevolvedasacompensatoryresponsetoincomeinequalityanditsgrowthhascorrespondedwithdeclininglevelsofincomeinequality.Withintheserelationshipsdemocraticgovernancehasinfluencedincomedistribution,andtheyconcludethat“the size of the public system depends on the evolution of the income distribution” (p43).However,theyalsoarguethatstrongpublicschoolsystemsareanoutcomeofdemocraticgovernance,andthisgivesthecharacteristicsofschoolsystemsadegreeofindependencefromnationalsocialandeconomiccharacteristics.Inasegregated(publicandprivate)schoolsystem“the quality of public schools is sufficiently low for rich households to prefer paying for private schools to enhance the education of their children. When inequality is low, on the other hand, the rich decide to send their children to public schools…” (p41).

Australiadoeshavestronglydemocraticgovernance,butitalsohasgrowinglevelsofincomeinequalityandincreasedlevelsofpovertythatareconcentratedwithinhouseholdswithschoolagechildren(ParliamentofAustralia,2008)andgrowinglevelsofsegregationwithinschooling.Thelatterisaproductoftwotrends:anenrolmentdriftofstudentsmainlyfrombetteroffhouseholdsfromgovernmenttonon-governmentschools(WatsonandRyan,2009)andthetrendwithinthegovernmentandCatholicschoolsystemsofgreaterdifferenceinthehouseholdincomelevelsofstudentsbetweenschools(Lamb,2007;LongandBurke,2004).


11

Wehavepreviouslyarguedthattheinstitutionalsettingsforthegovernanceofschoolingareexacerbatingratherthanamelioratingthesetrends,despitestateandnationalgovernmentpolicypositionsthatrecognisetheimportanceofaninclusiveschoolsystemfortheagendasofbuildinghumancapitalandsocialinclusion(Keating,2009a).Theinstitutionalsettingshavecreatedapolicypathdependencythatgovernmentsfindimpossibletoalterinregardstothedistributionofautonomyandfundingregimes,andtheirinter-relationswithkeyeducationalandpoliticalconstituencies.AllOECDcountrieshavepublicandprivateschools.Insomeormost,privateschoolsreceivepublicfunding,andinmostcasesthisisatlevelsclosetothoseforpublicschools.Inallcasesthereisarelationshipbetweentheprovisionandlevelofpublicfundingandtheautonomyofschoolsoverkeygovernancematters,includingenrolmentsandfeecharging(Eurydice,2000).Australiaisexceptionalinitsweakrelationshipbetweenpublicfundingandenrolmentpractices.

Italsohasbeenarguedthatthecorehistoricalreasonsforthisuniquesetofgovernancearrangementshavebeentheintersectionoftheseparationofgovernancearrangementsforgovernmentandnon-governmentschoolingandAustralianfederalism.Inshort,theinstitutionaloverlayoffederalismhascementedthesegregatedgovernancearrangements,includingthedifferencesinfundingregimesandinthedistributionoflevelsofautonomyofschoolsandsectors.Asaconsequencethereareweakandinconsistentlinksbetweenpublicandprivaterevenueregimesacrosstheschoolsectors,andtheseweaknessesandinconstancieshaveallowedaschoolsystemtoevolvethathasweakcapacityforsocialinclusionand,asaconsequence,aweakcapacitytodeliveranationalobjectiveofhighlevelsofhumancapitalforall.

Asetofstructuralreformsandprograminitiativeshasbeenproposedasameansofchangingthispathtowardssegregationwithinschooling(Keating,2009a).ToanextentsomeofthemhavealreadybeeninitiatedinAustralia.Anationalcurriculum,moreconsistentregulatoryarrangementsandfundingdirectedtowardsschoolsandcommunitieswithhighlevelsofeducationalneedareconsistentwiththissetofproposals(COAG,2008).However,centraltoanyrealchangemustbethequestionofpublicfundingofschooling.Thisisfortworeasons.Firstithasbeenthemostcontested.Thecontestationhasensuedforatleastthreedecades(Furtado,2001),andarguablyforoveracentury(Austin,1961).AlthoughthecontestationmayhavealimitedinfluenceupontheschoolfundingdecisionsofCommonwealthandstategovernments,itdoeshaveanimpactupontherelationshipsbetweengovernmentandschoolsandtheiragencies,andespeciallythoseofthenon-governmentsector.Thesecondisthatfundingislinkedtothequestionofautonomy.Inturnthedistributionofautonomyacrossaschoolsysteminamarketenvironmentisamajorfactorthatinfluencesitscapacityforsocialinclusionorexclusion.

Why fundingIn2006Australiaspent3.9percentofitsgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)onschooling,alevelslightlyabovetheOECDaverageof3.7percent.Ofthis,73percentwasgovernmentspending,ofwhich24.5percentwasdirectandindirectpaymentstonon-governmentproviders,thehighestamongstOECDcountries(OECD,2009;MCEETYA,2008a).

From1990to2008theshareofgovernmenteducationalexpenditureasapercentageofGDPhadbeenstableat2.7percent(MCEETYA,2008a).Giventhesubstantialeconomicgrowthoverthisperiod,andadecliningleveloftheschoolagepopulationasapercentageoftheoverallpopulation,thispatternrepresentsasignificantrealincreaseingovernmentspendingonschooling.Itcompareswitharelativedeclineinpublicexpenditureonhighereducationandvocationaleducationandtraining(VET)–untilthemostrecentyears.3Thisincreasetogetherwithmorerapidlygrowinglevelsofprivateinvestmentinschoolingsuggestabroadersocietalcommitmentthatisbaseduponexpectationsofpublicandprivatereturnsfromschooling.

Public funding of schooling is contested in all countries, and within a context of expectations of growing returns to education this contestation intensifies. Social and private investment in schooling is also driven by the individual consequences of non-completion of schooling. The likelihood of social and economic exclusion is reduced through educational attainment (Robinson & Lamb, 2009).

ThestructuresandgovernanceofschoolinginAustraliaarerelativelycomplex.Schoolingisdelineatedbetweengovernmentandnon-governmentsectors,withthenon-governmentsectorconsistingofindependentandmostlyCatholicsystemicschools.ResponsibilityforschoolingisdividedbetweentheCommonwealthandstateandterritorygovernments.Asanareaofpublicpolicy,schoolfundinghasproventobepoliticallysensitiveinAustralia.Thispoliticisednatureofschoolfundingdoesmuchtoexplainitscomplexity,andlackofconsistencyandtransparency(McMorrow,2008;Dowling,2007;ANAO,2009).

3 From1996to2004publicfundingofuniversitiesroseby12.6percent,inabsolutelevels(UniversitiesAustralia,2005).From2002to2006publicinvestmentinVETroseby12.6percentinabsolutelevels,andfrom2004to2008by21.0percentinabsolutelevels(NCVER,2008).

11

4 Addedtothedirectrecurrentandcapitalgrantstonon-governmentschoolsareindirecttransfersintheformofgovernmentrevenuelossthroughthecharitablestatusofnon-governmentschoolsandthenon-governmentsectorshareofadministrativeandservicecostsofCommonwealthandstategovernments.Stategovernmentgrantstonon-governmentschoolsvaryfromabout19percentofaveragegovernmentschoolresourcecostsinVictoria(toriseto22percentin2010)toover25percentinQueensland.Asaconsequencewhenallofthesefactorsareaddedsomeestimatesshowsomenon-governmentschoolsinQueenslandreceiveasmuchpublicfundingasgovernmentschools(correspondencewithofficialsfromtheDepartmentofEducationandTraining,Queensland).

5 Privaterevenueingovernmentschoolsisapproximately5percentofallrevenue,althoughthemediumlevelisbelowthispercentage(McMorrow,2008).

6 ThreeOECDcountries,theNetherlands,BelgiumandIrelandhavealargerpercentageofenrolmentsinnon-governmentschoolsthanAustralia.However,mostoftheseschoolsarefullypubliclyfundedanddonothaveenrolmentfees.AcrosstheOECDafterAustralia,Spainhasthehighestenrolmentlevelsin‘private’schoolsthathaveenrolmentfeesandsubstantiallevelsofautonomy.OutsideoftheOECDthereismorevariationacrosscountries(Eurydice,2008).AmongstmiddlelevelcountriesChileandArgentinaaresimilartoAustraliawithprivateandrelativelyautonomousfeechargingschoolsthatalsoarepubliclysubsidised(McEwan,2002).

7 ABSSchoolsAustralia,2000–2008.8 Thisisthesamepatternwithingovernmentschools.Forexample,Year12studentsingovernmentschools

livingintheVictoriannorthernmetropolitanregionwhoattendedaschoolotherthantheirlocalschoolachievedanaveragepercentileassessmentscorethatwas10percenthigherthanthosestudentswhoattendedtheirlocalhighschool(calculatedfromVictorianCurriculumandAssessmentAuthoritydata).

9 Heretheconsumptionfunctionisthatoftypicalconsumptionpatternsbaseduponassumptionsofastableautonomousconsumptionfactorplusavariableofincreaseddisposableincome.Aneducationproductionfunctionistheschoolbasedfactorsthatinfluenceeducationaloutcomes.

10EducationconsumptionpatternshavenotbeenfullyanalysedinAustralia.Thesocialdistributionofnon-governmentschoolenrolmentscanbeobservedusingcensusdata(Preston,2003).However,asSmith(2008)shows,amongstthosefamilieswhousetheCatholicsystemandwhohavetwoormorechildrenaboutaquarteralsosendoneormoreoftheirchildrentogovernmentschools.Sofactorsotherthaneconomicinfluenceschoolchoice.

ThecaseforthereformoffundingforschooleducationinAustralianeedstobeconsideredintermsofthehistoryofnon-governmentschoolandCommonwealthfundingandthecontemporarypoliticalrelationshipswithinthewidereducationpolicycommunity.Thisincludesthevariablerelativelevelsofautonomythatareheldbydifferentschoolsanddifferentschoolsectors,andtheirrelationswithdifferentgovernance,regulatoryandfundingagencies.Thefundingsystemshaveevolvedoverthepasthalfcentury,buthavemutatedquiterecently(Wilkinsonetal,2006).Fromahistoricalbaseofminimallevelsofpublicfunding,non-governmentschoolshaveadvancedtoapositionwheretheiroverallmediumandaveragerevenuelevelsaremorethanthoseforgovernmentschools,andwheresomelowfeenon-governmentschoolscanreceivealmostasmuchpublicfundingasgovernmentschoolaverages(McMorrow,2008).4Onatrendbasis,bothpublicandprivaterevenueperstudentlevelsfornon-governmentschoolsarelikelycontinuetogrowatfasterratesthanlevelsforgovernmentschools.5

Correspondingtothesetrendsinfundinghavebeentrendsinenrolments.Followingtheadventoflargescalepublicfundingofnon-governmentschoolsfromthemid1970s,thethentrendofanincreasedgovernmentschoolenrolmentsharehadreversedbythelate1970s(WatsonandRyan,2009).Overthepast25yearstherehasbeenanaverageannualenrolmentsharegainbythenon-governmentsectorof0.4percent,andthisratehasincreasedslightlyoverthepastdecade.Theimpactisstrongerinthesecondaryschoolsector.Table1indicatestheenrolmentshareofthethreesecondaryschoolsectorsoverthepasttwodecadesandprojectedtrendsifthecurrentratesofenrolmentchangecontinueoverthenexttwodecades.Atthecurrentrates,withinagenerationmostsecondaryschoolstudentswillbeinfeebasedschools,andthiswillbeapercentagethatfarexceedsthoseforanyotherOECDcountry6.Thisstatuswillbereachedwithin15yearsacrossYear12enrolments,andonatrendbasisthestateofVictoriawillhaveaminorityofstudentsingovernmentsecondaryschoolsbeforetheendofthisdecade.7

Table 1Enrolment share by sectors, secondary schools, 1988 – 2008 and 2028 trend

1988 1998 2008 2028 (trend)

Government 69.13 65.24 60.82 51.98

Catholic 19.73 20.79 21.65 23.45

Independent 11.14 13.96 17.53 24.67

4221.0–Schools,Australia,2008

Theenrolmentdriftissociallyskewed,withmostnewnon-governmentschoolenrolmentsbeingfromhighersocio-economicstatus(SES)households(unpublisheddata,DepartmentofEducationandEarlyChildhoodDevelopment;ANAO,2009).TheeffectoftheenrolmentdrifthasbeentolowertheaverageSESlevelsofboththegovernmentandnon-governmentsectors(whileincreasingitfortheCatholicsector).However,WatsonandRyan(2009)showthattheincreasedenrolmentsinnon-governmentschoolshavehadarelativelysmalldownwardsimpactupontheirsocialmixandtheirfeeregimes.Theincreasedfundinghasbeenusedtoimproveservicesandthis,theyconclude,hasattractedalargerstudentclientele.So,correspondingly,non-governmentschoolenrolmentpatternsarelikelytobeskewedinfavourofstudentswithstrongerscholasticbackgrounds.ThisisbecausehigherSESstudentstypicallyachievestrongereducationaloutcomesandstudentswhoseparentsactivelychooseschoolstendtoachievestrongeroutcomesthanthosewhostaywithlocalschools(Reay,2004;Bell,2005;Cullenetal,2005).8

Virtuallyalltestingregimesdemonstratethis.Acombinationofconsumptionandeducationproductionfunctionsproducestheseresults.9Sincefamilieswithstrongereconomicandculturalcapitalaremorelikelytochooseandpaythefeesofnon-governmentschools,thetestresultsoftheseschoolswillbestrongerthanthoseschoolswiththeresidualstudentpopulations.10Theproductivecapacitiesofthenon-governmentschoolshaveincreasedthroughincreasedresourcelevelsandtherelativestabilityoftheirscholasticcapital.Thatis,aselectiveandmorehomogeneousstudentpopulationcreatesgreatercertaintyinstudentenrolmentnumbers,lessdemandsintermsofsubjectrange,andlessdemandsandmorecertaintyinthedevelopmentandtargetingofteachingmethods.Theseschoolsareinabetterpositiontoestablishandstrengthensuccessfulscholasticprograms.


11 Secondaryschoolscanhavemorestableclientpopulationsthatcanbeachievedbyfeeregimesorselectivepracticesincontextofhighenrolmentdemand.Underthesecircumstancessuchschoolstendtohaveamorenarrowrangeofsubjectsdeliveredinthesenioryears,amorenarrowrangeofscholasticlevelsamongststudents,lessturnoverinteachingstaffandhighconcentrationofexperiencestaffincoressubjectareas.Forexample,independentschoolshavefewerstudentsundertakingVETsubjectsthantheothersectors(NCVER,2008),andamongstnon-governmentschoolsinVictoriatherangeofstudentassessmentscoresnarrowsasschoolenrolmentfeelevelsincrease(KeatingandLamb,2004).

12 Theeffectofdifferentcombinationsofpeergroupshasbeenthesubjectofasubstantialbodyofresearch.Theeffectsarecomplexanddisputed.However,therearerelativelyconsistentfindingsofgreatergapsineducationaloutcomesfromsegregatinghighandlowperformingstudents.

13 SeearticlesinPlankandSykes,2003.14 Therealsowasasubstantialretirementofdebt,especiallythroughoutthe1980s.15 Contributingresourcesincludedthecontributionofthereligiousteachingordersthatwereatlowcosts.

Theyconcludethattheincreasedinvestmentinprivateschoolingisassociatedwithanimprovementinthequalityoftheirprograms.14Thisqualityimprovementhasresultedfromacombinationofresourceincreasesandtheadvantagedconditionsforanincreasededucationalproductionfunction(Hanushek,2007).However,theseconditionsexistedinelementsoftheindependentsectorpriortotheadventofpublicfunding.Thedeclineinnon-governmentschoolenrolmentspriortothiswascausedbythecrisisintheindigentCatholicsectorthatwasrelatedtoacombinationofadeclineincontributingresources15andtherelativeimprovementintheresourcesofgovernmentschools.Decliningresourcelevelsdidnotexistintheindependentsectoratthistime,yetitsenrolmentsharewasnotincreasing.Therefore,thecorrespondencebetweenrealincreasesinindependentschoolfeelevelsandincreasesinenrolmentsharemustberelatedtoperceptionsofgreaterqualitydifferencesbetweengovernmentandindependentschools(perceptionsofaproductionfunction),agreatercapacitytoinvestthroughincreaseddisposableincome(aconsumptionfunction),andperceptionsofgreaterrelativeorcompetitivereturnstoeducation–orgreaterpressureforpositionalcompetition,especiallyinsecondaryschoolinganditsrelationshipwithhighereducationaccess.

ItseemslikelythatstatefundinghadtheimpactofhaltingthedeclineandthenincreasingtheenrolmentshareoftheCatholicsectorinthelate1970s.Overthepast15years,thisenrolmentsharehasstabilisedandmostoftherecentandacceleratedincreaseinthenon-governmentsectormarketshareisintheindependentsector.WatsonandRyan(2004,2009)andWilliams(1985)haveidentifiedtheincreaseinpublicfundingasthemainfactorintheincreasedabsoluteandrelativeenrolmentsinboththeCatholicandindependentsectors.However,itissuggestedthatthisexplanationshouldbeexpandedtoaccommodatethesethreefunctionsrelatedtoperceptionsofqualitydifferences,disposableincome,andprivatereturns.

ThereisaconsiderablerecentliteratureontheimpactoftheliberalisationoftheschooleducationmarketinnationssuchasEngland(Taylor,2002),theUSA(Viteritti,2005),Chile(CarnoyandMcEwan,2000)andSweden(Bunar,2010).Theeffectsofthesemeasuresarecontested.However,onbalance,itdoesseemthattheydoleadtogreaterselectivityinschooling–especiallyasthepurposeistoincreasechoice–andasaconsequencetogreaterinequality.13

ThebroadimpactuponenrolmentpatternsiseasytodemonstrateinAustralia.However,thepeculiaritiesoftheAustralianmarketdorequirebetterlocalisedanalyses.

Therehasbeenacoincidenceofareversalintherelativedeclineinnon-governmentschoolenrolmentsandtheadventoflargescalestatefundinginthemid1970s.However,asWilliams(1985)andWatsonandRyan(2009)demonstrate,increasedstatefundingintheensuingthreedecadesdidnotresultinareductioninrealfeelevelsacrosstheCatholicandindependentsectors,apartfromashortperiodofdeclineintheindependentsectorfrom1979to1985.Inallotherperiods,therehasbeenapatternsofrisingfeelevelsintheindependentsectorandrisingfeelevelsintheCatholicsector,albeitfromalowbaseandwithinacontextofrisinglevelsofdisposableincomeacrosslargesectionsofthepopulation.

Asindicatedinseveralstudies(LongandBurke,2004;Lamb,2007;Bonnor,2009;Keating,2009a)therearecorrespondinginternalenrolmentstrendswithinthegovernmentschoolsectorand,toalesserextent,withintheCatholicschoolsector,especiallyatthesecondarylevel.Theseenrolmentpatternsdonotcarrytheunevenresourcelevelsthroughenrolmentfeesthatexistacrossthenon-governmentsector.Howeveraneducationalproductionfunctiondoesoperate:someschoolsareactivelychosenfortheirperceivedqualitybyfamiliesandothershavemoreofadefaultstatusbaseduponneighbourhoodandaccessibility.Apositiveproductionfunctionoperatesthrougheconomiesofscaleandthegreatercertaintyandstabilityofstudentenrolments,andasaconsequenceinworkforcestability,thataredeliveredthroughtheinvestment.11

Peerconcentrationsofscholasticallyweakandstrongstudentsweakenandstrengthentheproductionfunction,respectively(Holmes-Smith,2006).12

Underpressurefromamoreactiveschooleducationmarket,especiallyatthesecondarylevel,stategovernmentsandeducationagenciesoverthepasttwodecadeshavereducedenrolmentregulations,establishedpercapitarecurrentfundingregimesandallowedandinitiatedscholasticselectivepracticesacrosstheirsecondaryschools.Asaconsequenceofthesepracticesandtheenrolmentdriftsacrossthesectors,thereappearstobeagrowingconcentrationofstudentswithhighlevelsofeducationalneedsandmainlyfromlowincomehouseholdsinmostlysmallandunder-performingschools(Lamb,2007;Achterstraat,2008).

13

16Forexample,inAustraliatheCatholicsectorhasnotinvestedinselectiveentrysecondaryschools,althoughtherearesomehighfeeCatholicschools.

Enrolmentsandchangesinenrolmentsacrossthethreesectorshavedifferentsocialcharacteristics.GovernmentschoolenrolmentsareskewedtowardslowSESstudentsandindependentschoolenrolmentsarestronglyskewedtowardshighSESenrolments(Preston,2003).Correspondingly,theexchangeofstudentsbetweenthesesectors,especiallyatthepointoftransitionfromprimarytosecondaryschooling,exacerbatesthesedifferences(Williams,1985).CatholicsectorenrolmentsarethemostheterogeneousintermsofSESandthemoststableofthethreesectors.

TherelativestabilityoftheCatholicsectorenrolmentsmaybeinstructive.Thesectorismorehomogeneousinitsprovision(e.g.mainlycomprehensivesecondaryschools)andresourcingmodels(ANAO,2009).LongandBurke’s(2004)studysuggeststhatlowSESchildrenfromCatholicfamiliesarelesslikelytoattendCatholicschoolsthanhighSESchildrenfromCatholicfamilies,andthesectorhasconsistentlylostasmallpercentageofsecondaryenrolmentsamongsthighSESstudentstotheindependentsector(WatsonandRyan,2009;LongandBurke,2004).ThereasonsfortherelativestabilityoftheCatholicsectorinwhatconstitutesarobustschooleducationmarketmaybeanexhaustionofitsnaturalmarketamongstCatholicfamiliesandanunwillingnesstocompromiseitscurriculummodelanditscorrespondingfeeregimes.16Or,correspondingly,thegrowthintheindependentschoolenrolmentsmaybeassociatedwiththesector’sgreaterdiversity,includingitscapacitytorespondtoexpandingmiddleandhighfeemarkets.

AsWillms(1984)notes,schooleffectivenessvariesfarmorewithinthanbetweensectors,anobservationaboutAustralianschoolsmadebyLambetal(2004).Schoolswiththehighestlevelofdemandaretobefoundinthegovernmentsector,nottheCatholicandprivatesectors.Academically,selectivegovernmentschoolshavelargelevelsofunmetdemand,whichultimatelyisrelatedtotheirrelativescarcity.Thereisnosuchscarcityoftheseschoolsintheprivatesectorbecausedemandismediatedbypriceratherthanscholasticcapacity.ThereisascarcityofsuchschoolsintheCatholicsector,albeitlesssothaninthegovernmentsector.However,demandintheCatholicsectoralsoismediatedbyfeecosts.

Therearedifferentpatternsofdemand,enrolmentfees,andautonomyoverenrolmentsacrossandwithinthethreesectors.Schoolsystemsthathavehighdegreesofautonomytypicallyaremorediversified(Ringer,1979).Typically,autonomyismediatedbythecharacteristicsandbehaviourofgovernment.However,itcanalsobemediatedthroughotherorganisationalforms,suchaschurchesorfaithorotherpurposefulgroups,andthesemediationscanbeenhancedorweakenedthroughtherelationshipsbetweengovernmentandtheotherorganisationalforms.InAustralia,theorganisationalformsoftheCatholicschoolsectorinitsformalrelationship,includingfundingwithgovernment,haslimitedtheautonomyofitsschools.Theselimitationsareexpressionsofsocialphilosophyandacomplexsetofhistoricalinteractionsbetweenreligiousandeducationalauthoritieswithinthesectorandnegotiationsandrelationswithgovernmentanditsagencies(O’Brien,1999;Praetz,1982).

Thedimensionsandextentoftheagencies’autonomyinschooling,whicharemostlyindividualschoolsandcollectiveauthorities–whetherthroughstatute,ownershiporvoluntary–arekeyfactorsthatinfluencethecharacteristicsofschoolsystems.Thisisespeciallysoinarelativelyliberalormarketenvironmentforschooling,whichisthecaseinAustralia.

Toomuchshouldnotbereadintothesenationalpatternsastherearesignificantregionalvariationsinthelevelsofenrolmentshareacrossthethreesectors.Nevertheless,thecounter-intuitivepatternsofincreasednon-governmentsectorenrolmentpricesaccompanyingincreaseddemanddorequiresomeexplanation.Theattributedexplanationofincreasedqualitywouldexplainatleastsomeofthis.Theconsumptionfunctionsandpositionalcompetitivefunctionaregeneratedbyfactorsthatareexternaltoschoolsystems.Intermsofeducationpolicy,thisleavestheeducationconsumptionfunctionandtheperceptionsofitasthemainvariable.However,mostoftheincreasedresourcesthathavebeengainedfrompublicandprivatesourceshavebeeninvestedinreductionsofstudent–teacherratios(McMorrow,2008).Althoughnotalloftheseresourceshavebeenusedforreducingclasssizes,alargeproportionwillhavebeen.Mostanalysesofeducationproductionfunctionsconcludethattheproductivityofthisinvestmentisverylow(Hanushek,2007).Giventheconsistencyoffindingsaboutclasssizes,theremustbeeitherotherfactorsthatcontributetotheproductionfunctioninprivateandbetterresourcedschoolsorotheraspectsofquality,ortheperceptionsofthem,thataredrivingthemarket.

Astudyofthe2000OECDPISAdataconcluded“that private government-dependent schools are more effective than comparable public schools with the same students, parents and social composition. The main explanation of this higher effectiveness is the better school climate in the former; in comparison to the latter (and)that private independent schools are less effective than public schools with the same students, parents and social composition. The main explanation of their initially higher effectiveness is the better social compositions of these schools”(DronkersandRobert,2004,p8).ThesefindingsmatchthoseofColemanetal’s(1982)seminalworkof‘socialcapital’inCatholicschoolsinNewYork.


17 Using2006datafromMcMorrow(2010)thesedataare:(AGSRC+capitalcosts)x0.95(discountfor5%privateincome)=($8,7894-$6,350(averagegovernmentresourceallocations))x1,121,128enrolments=$2.73billion.(It is possible that this is an underestimate as MCEETYA data for 2007–8 show that average per capita recurrent expenditure for government school students was $12,639, and the Productivity Commission average for 2006 – 7 was $11,864. All figures are subject to challenge because of what allocations should and are used in their calculations.)

18 Thisiscalculatedforthe1996–2006period,usingdatafromMcMorrow(2008)asfollows: >Thenetincreaseingovernmentgrantstonongovernmentschools(NGS)minusthenetincrease

forgovernmentschools=$768perenrolment. >Thetotalincreaseinnon-governmentschoolenrolmentsfortheperiodwas199,670) –NetincreaseinNGSpercapitagrantsx2006enrolments:$768x921,458= $698m –PlusincreaseinNGSenrolmentsx2006averagegrants:199,670x$6350= $1,268m –Totalincreasedgovernmentcosts(perannum): $1,817 m –MinuscostsifincreasedNGSenrolmentswereingovernmentschools:

199,670x$8790(averagegrantstogovernmentschools)= $1,755m –Netannualincreasedcosts: $62m (These estimates have not incorporated the impact of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustments (EBA)

introduced by the Commonwealth Government in 1996. This mechanism effectively funds each new non-government school enrolments with cuts in funding to government schools. It would appear to be a mechanism designed to prevent the cost shifting from the states to the Commonwealth as the enrolment share of the non-government sector increases.

19Thereareahandfulofprivateschoolsthatdonotchargefees.Mostoftheseeitherserveparticularcommunitiessuchasindigenousstudents,orareinnovationstomeetspecialneeds.ForexamplesomeoftheformerAustralianTechnicalColleges(ATC)haveinvestigatedthepossibilityofre-establishingthemselvesasprivateschoolstogainpublicfunding(personalcorrespondencewithATCpersonnel).TheNationalCatholicEducationCommission(NCEC)hasadoptedapositionthatprivaterevenueshouldbeapproximately17percentoftotalrevenue(Interview,Doyle,2009).

ThissuggeststhatanyreformofschoolresourcinginAustraliashouldtakeintoaccountthenatureoftherelationshipsbetweengovernment,schoolsandcollectiveauthoritiesoragencies.Governanceofschoolingdoesnotresidesolelywithgovernmentinanyliberaldemocraticstate.ThisisespeciallythecaseinAustraliawherenon-governmentschoolagencies,includingthoseoftheCatholicsectorthatformthebulkofthenon-governmentsector,publiclyarguethattheirschoolsshouldcontinuetohavetheautonomyandflexibilitynecessarytoachievetheirmission(Praetz,1982;Elder,2009).

Increasedparentalfinancialinvestmentinschoolingcouldhaveanumberofcauses.Theycouldincludeanexpectationacrossthepopulationthatfamiliesnowhavetopayforschooling,illustratedbytheevolutionofvoluntaryfeesingovernmentschoolsandthesubstantialincidentalcostsofschoolingasestimatedbyBondandHorn(2009);increasedaveragefamilydisposableincomeandreducedfamilysize(consumptionfunction);theincreaseeconomicandsocialrisksofeducationalfailureandnon-completion;andaperceptionofincreasedprivateeconomicreturnsfromeducation.

Asamarket,schoolinginAustraliaishealthy,withamongstthehighestandmostrapidlyincreasinglevelsofprivateinvestmentamongstOECDcountries,mostlystrongperformancelevels(OECD,2009),andrelativelyhighalbeitfallinglevelsofparentalsatisfaction(DEST,2007).TheHowardGovernmenttookmeasurestostimulatethismarket,andthiswasacorereasonforcuttingthenexusbetweenthelevelsofprivateandpublicinvestmentinnon-governmentschooling(DEETYA,1996).Whilepercapitagrantstonon-governmentschoolshaveincreasedpubliccosts,thetransferofstudentsfromgovernmenttonon-governmentschoolshasreducedoverallpublicexpendituredemands,andresultedincostsshiftingfromthestatestotheCommonwealth.

However,therealcostsforgovernmentofincreasesinsubsidiesforprivateschoolingareonlymarginalasincreasesinsubsidiestoincreaseprivateinvestmentapplytoallnon-governmentschoolenrolments,notjustnewones.Overtheperiod1996to2006,thenetcosttostateandCommonwealthgovernmentsoftheincreaseingrantstonon-governmentschoolsandtheincreaseinnon-governmentschoolenrolmentswasapproximately$62millionperannum.18AsWatson(1998)points,outasgovernmentsubsidieshaveincreased,“thenetfiscalbenefittogovernmentsfromprivateschoolinghasdiminished.”(p.146).Uponthisbasis,themostfiscallyadvantageousfundingpolicyforgovernmentwouldbetomaintainfundingtonon-governmentschoolswithanexpectationthatenrolmentdriftstothesectorwillcontinue,albeitatalesserratethanonethatisstimulatedbyincreasedpublicsubsidies.

Therefore,intermsofbudgetarypolicy,thereappearstobenojustificationforincreasedlevelsofpublicpaymentsforprivateschoolsrelativetothoseforgovernmentschools.Governmentsshouldbesecureinthisbudgetaryargument,andintheobservationthattheaveragelevelsofprivateschoolrevenuearehigherthanthoseforthegovernmentsectorandthattheCatholicsectorhasaveragelevelsthatareequivalenttothoseofthegovernmentsector(McMorrow,2010).Whilegovernmentpaymentsacrossthesectorsareunequal,inpartthisisrelatedtothedesireofthenon-governmentsectortomaintainfees.19

TherearehighlevelsofprivatedemandforbothhighereducationandresourceintensivesecondaryschoolinginAustralia.Thehighereducationundergraduatemarkethasproventobesustainable,andhasallowedtheCommonwealthGovernmenttomakecutsinrealstudentpercapitafundingbecauseofthestrengthofprivateinvestmentandthecapacityoftheuniversitiesforincreasedrevenueraising.Theprivateinvestmentinschoolinghasbeenstimulatedbysubstantialrealincreasesinpublicfunding,andthisappearstobethroughtheproductionfunctionoftheprivatesectorratherthanthesubstitutionofprivateforpubliccosts(Williams,1985).Publicinvestmentinprivateschoolinghasstimulatedhigherdemandnotthroughfeeorpricereductionbutthroughincreasedqualityofservices.Giventhatpublicsubsidiesremainbelowthoseforgovernmentschools,thereisamarginalfiscalpayoffforgovernmentinsubsidiesthatstimulateenrolmenttransfersfromgovernmenttonon-governmentschools.

Overall,theannualbudgetarycoststogovernmentifallnon-governmentschoolenrolmentsweretoshifttogovernmentschools,baseduponthedifferencebetweenaveragegovernmentresourceallocationstogovernmentandnon-governmentschoolstudents,wouldbeintheorderof$2.7billion.17

15

20Theconceptofentitlementhasseveraldimensions.TherightorentitlementofanindividualisbroadlyrecognisedacrossschoolsystemsandnotablythroughtheUNDeclarationofHumanRights(UNESCO,2001).However,theconceptofentitlementwithinpublicsectorprinciplesismoredisputed.InAustraliatheclaimoftheentitlementofthechurchschoolstopublicfundingwasnotacceptedbythecolonialandsubsequentparliaments(Gregory,1973)andsubsequentfundinghaslargelybeenbasedupontheprincipleofneed.Whiletherearesubtledifferencesbetween‘need’and‘entitlement’themoredirectclaimsofentitlementbaseduponasinglepercapitapaymenthavenotbeensupportedbyanyAustraliannationalorstategovernment(O’Brien,1999).

21 Bond(2009)showsthat49communityagenciescontributed$1,015,816inemergencyeducationreliefinVictoriain2008–9.“Giventhereareanestimated700non-governmentorganisationsprovidingemergencyprovidingemergencyreliefinVictoriathisrepresentsjustafractionofthelikelytotalannualcost.”(Bond,2009,p.v).Onapopulationbasisthesefigureswouldbequadrupledatthenationallevel.

Ontheotherhand,therearesomenon-governmentschoolsthatdonotwanttochargefees.TheyincludeschoolsestablishedorsponsoredbyNGOsthataredeliveringprogramstoparticularsocialgroups.Inmostandpossiblyallcases,theseschoolsdonotreceivethesamelevelsofpublicresourcesasgovernmentschools.Thereisastrongcasethattheyshould.

Atthispointintime,ahistoricalpositionhasbeenreached.Nongovernmentschools,andespeciallytheCatholicsectorthathasbeenthemainpoliticaldriverfornongovernmentschoolfundingforoverahalfcentury,haveachievedtheirobjectiveofresourcingparity.However,thisachievementhascreatedthreeeffectsthatnowneedtobedealtwith.

Thefirstisthecomplex,inconsistentandopaqueresourcingarrangementsandtheirapparentlyinherentcharacteristicofastrongerresourcemultiplierfortheprivatesectorcomparedtothatforthegovernmentsector.Itispossiblethattherelativegrowthratesofpublicresourcingbetweenthesectorsmaybecomemoreeven,andtherearesomeearlysignsofthisthroughtheRuddGovernment’sresourcinginitiatives.However,uponthebasisofthepatternsofthepastthreedecadesandthepoliticalprocessesthroughwhichfundingdecisionsarenegotiatedandmadewithinthefederalistframe(Furtado,2001),theremustbesomedoubts.Inalllikelihood,privatepercapitainvestmentinschooling,whichispredominantlywithintheprivatesector,willgrowatamorerapidratethanpublicpercapitafunding.Itisunlikelythatthiswillbematchedwithacommensuratedisproportionategrowthinpublicfundingofgovernmentschools.

Thesecondisthatthepoliticsofschoolfundingoverthepastthreedecadehaveshapeditspurposestoemphasiseaconceptoffundingentitlementratherthanbroadersocialpurposes.Thepolicyandpoliticaldiscourseshavebeencentreduponrelativelevelsofandtherightorentitlementtofunding.

Inacontextwheregovernmentsarelookingtowardsschoolingtodeliverhumancapital,socialinclusion,socialcohesionandhigherschoolcompletionrates–aswellasthetraditionalcivicpurposesofresponsible,tolerantandengagedcitizens–afundingsystempremisedmostlyonentitlementseemsinadequate.However,theclaimofentitlement,whichessentiallyisbaseduponindividualrights,hasnowbecomeestablished,bothrhetoricallyandinstitutionally.Australiaisunusualinbasingitspublicfundingofprivateschoolsmainlyupontheprincipleofentitlementratherthanthemoretraditionalsocialprinciplesorpurposessuchascitizenship(Heater,2004).20

TheAustralianexperience,influencedbytheparticularhistoryofnon-governmentschoolingandfederalism,hasshapedthestronglinkbetweenpublicfundingandindividualentitlement.PublicorcommunitypurposehasbeenlocatedinthestatefundedgovernmentschoolsystemsandinCommonwealthprogramsthataretargetedatelementsofthecommunityandparticularproblemsinschooling,notablyliteracy.Thishasledtoadegreeofdefactoneedsbasedfunding.However,thesefundingprogramshaveonlypartiallybeencarriedbyandhavehadalimitedcapacitytopromoteapublicpurposediscourseofcommunitybuilding,socialcohesionandinclusion.

Justifying public funding Allpublicfundingshouldbebuiltuponpublicpurposes,otherwiseitisdifficulttojustify.Aminimalistpositiononpublicpurposewouldbetheliberalideathatthestateshouldhavenorole,apartfromthatofasafetynetoraguarantorinthecontextofthefailureofthenon-governmentsector(Mill,1975).Anothermightbearedistributiverole.Yeteventheseminimalpositionsarebaseduponpublicpurpose.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheentitlementclaimdoesnothavelegitimacy.However,inabstraction,itisaprinciplewithoutclothesasitisaclaimthatshouldonlyhavetractionwithinapublicpurposeconstruct.Assuchitneedstobemediatedbythepublicpurposes,andthisrequiresafundingsystemthathelpstoshapethemediation.Intheabsenceofpublicpurposestheinstitutionalarrangements,includingthepoliticalprocessesthathaveallowedtheschoolswiththegreatestlevelsofautonomyfromgovernmentandthustheweakestlinkstopublicpurposetogainthemostfromincreasedpublicfunding,willcontinue.AnddespitetheexistenceoftheMelbourneDeclaration,whichisastrongstatementofpublicpurposes,theprevailingdiscourse,especiallythatrelatedtofunding,willremainattachedtotheconceptofindividualentitlement.

Athirdeffectistoemphasiseacleardistinctionbetweenpublicandprivateschools.Thisdistinctiondoesnotallowtheblurringoflinesbetweenthetwo.TheNGOsectorcontributesseveralbilliondollarsperannumtoschoolinginAustralia,bothdirectlyandintheformoffamilysupport.21

Whilemuchandprobablymostofthesefundsaresourcedfromgovernment,mostisdirectedtowardshighneedstudentgroupsandtheirfamilies.Publicfundingregimeshavelittlecapacitytorecogniseandaccommodatethisprovision,apartfromitsinclusionwithintheformulabasedfundingfornon-governmentschools.Theseformulaearebasedupontheassumptionofadditionalprivatefeebasedrevenue,whichisunlikelytoexistinthecaseofhighneedgroups.


22Institutionalhereisdefinedinbroadertermsandincludesorganisationsandsystems,theircodesofpracticesandprocedures,whetherplannedorthroughhabitandexpectations.

23TheladofpartssymbolisedtheopportunityforthebrightScottish‘lad’toprogressfromthevillageschoolintotheScottishacademyanduniversities,andopportunitythatdidnotexistforhiscounterpartsouthoftheborderinEngland.

24Therearenumerousexamplesofthereluctanceofpolicymakerstorecogniseandsupportdiversity.TheAustralianGovernmenthasnotcontinuedthefundingofAustralianTechnicalColleges;InitiativessuchastheVocationalCollegeestablishedbyHolmesglenTAFEhavestruggledtogainpolicysupportandfunding;appliedlearningprogramsthathavebeensponsoredbyschoolsandotherorganisationshaverarelygainedgovernmentfunding.

25Amongst17yearoldsinfulltimeeducation90.4percentwereinschoolsand4.7percentwereinTAFEin2006(ABS,2006census).Amongstseniorsecondaryschoolstudents33.4percentwereenrolledinVETinSchoolsprograms(NCVER,2008)in2007.Ofthesemostweretakingonesubjectinyear11.Thusthevastmajorityof17yearoldsinfulltimeeducationandtrainingtakegeneralistseniorsecondaryprograms.

However,publicpurposesshouldnotbeamonolithicconcept.Increasesingovernmentpaymentstonon-governmentschoolsarejustifiedbyargumentsotherthancostsandentitlement.TheCatholicsectorinparticularseesitselfaspartofabroaderpublicsectorandarguesthatitmakesasubstantialcontributiontothecommunity(Sheehan,2004).Thistakesthequestionofpublicinvestmentbacktothequestionofautonomy.Autonomyisfrequentlyjustifieduponthebasisofschooleffectiveness.Thisjustificationcanbeappliedtoallschools,notjustnon-governmentschools,anditisusedasajustificationforvouchersandmarketbasedsystemsoffundingandgovernance.Sorelativeordifferenttypesofautonomywithinapublicfundingregimeneedtorelatetothedifferenttypesofmissionandinstitutional22orcommunitycontributioninschooling.

DebateonfundingofschoolinginAustraliaandtheassociatedpatternsoftherelativeautonomyofschoolsectorsfromregulationandmanagementhasconcentrateduponthedifferencesbetweengovernmentandnon-governmentschools.However,bothsectorsareinternallyheterogeneous.Therearedifferenceswithinthesectorsbetweenpatternsofenrolmentandenrolmentpracticesofschools,andlevelsofprivateincome–althoughthesedifferencesaregreaterwithinthenon-governmentsector.Asaconsequencetherearesimilaritiesbetweensomeelementsofthetwosectorsinenrolments,enrolmentpracticesandprivateincome.

Ontheotherhand,thereremainsignificantdifferencesintheformalgovernancearrangementsbetweenthetwosectors,andespeciallythelocationofresponsibilityforpublicschoolinginthestategovernmenteducationdepartmentswhichhavetakendefensiveactionsinthefaceofthebroadenrolmentdrifttothenon-governmentsector.Thesedefensiveactionsintheformofgreaterscholasticselectivityandcompetitivebehavioursbyindividualschoolstosecuremorescholasticstudentenrolmentsleadtoacomplexquestionaboutthenatureandpurposeofschoolsectors.Theyalsotendtosullytheargumentsforautonomyintermsoftheirimpactupontheeffectivenessofschoolsystemsandtheparticularcontributionsofdifferentmissionsandphilosophiestocommunitiesandthenation.

Theostensiblepurposeofselectionistoprovideopportunitiesforacademicallycapablestudentstothrivewithinschoolsandprogramsthathavestrongerpeereffectsbecauseoftheconcentrationofscholasticcapital.Thishasbeenanhistoricalfeatureofmanysecondaryschoolsystems.Initsoriginsitwasademocraticfeaturethatgaveopportunitiestopoorbutbrightyoungpeople,asintheScottishtraditionofa‘ladofparts’.23Itbecamecontroversialinthecontextofmasssecondaryandespeciallyuppersecondaryeducation.

AsShirleyWilliamsnotedfully40yearsago:“…a grammar school must necessarily and logically imply the existence of a non-grammar school, and a non-grammar school is not, and cannot be, the same thing as a comprehensive school. It is really a form of semantic “double-think” that the late George Orwell so rightly condemned to talk about a comprehensive school existing side by side with a grammar school. A “creamed” comprehensive school is no longer a comprehensive school”(Williams,1970,p.716).

Therealpurposeofselectiveprogramsistoprojectanimageofscholasticexcellencewithinthegovernmentsector,reinforcedbypollingthatshowsthattheseschoolsarepopular‘amongstvoters’.Becausetheinitiativesofestablishingtheseschoolsandprogramsarelocatedwithinacomparativeframebetweengovernmentandnon-governmentschoolsthatisconcentrateduponacademicperformance,ithashamperedthediversificationofAustraliansecondaryschooling(Keating,2009b).Schoolsthatspecialiseinnon-academicareasruntheconsiderableriskofaflightofstudentsfromtheirschools.Moredirectlyhowevertheyfaceproblemsofresourcing,curriculumandtertiarypathwaysandhavenotbeenabletofindtheirplaceswithinpolicyregimesthatareconcentrateduponthebuildingofacademicexcellence.24Australiaarguablyhasthemostgeneralistofsecondaryschoolsystemsandtherelationshipbetweenthesectorsislikelytobeoneofthecausesofthis.25Anewfundingmodelneedstoreducethecompetitiverelationshipbetweentheschoolsectorsandencourageratherthaninhibitdiversity.

ThetraditionalconceptofaschoolsystemasthepublicorstateschoolsystemthatguaranteedschoolingonaneighbourhoodbasiswaschallengedbytheKarmelReport(1973;seealsoWhitlam,1985).Thereportputforwardabroaderideaofamoreeclecticschoolsystemthatcontributedtotheschoolingofchildrenandthepublicorcommongood.Thiswasaviewthatappearstohavebeenembracedbylargeelementsofthenon-governmentschoolsector.TheCatholicsectorinparticularseesitselfasoffering“theCatholiccommunityandthepeopleofAustraliaaneducationalfoundationforlifetothefull,meaningthefulldevelopmentoftheperson”(NCEC,2009,p2),andarguesthatitmakesasignificantcontributiontotheeconomyandcommunity(Sheehan,2004).

17

26Percapitaenrolmentfundingisnowcommonacrossgovernmentschoolsystems.Thishasasimilarimpacttothatofvouchersasitencouragesschoolstoseekextraenrolments.However,asWatson(1998)notes“policies to promote client choice can only be implemented effectively if all schools – both government and non-government – are funded within a common policy framework.”(p146)

ThelocationofsuchconceptswithintheeducationconsumptionideologythathasbeendominantacrosstheAustralianpolityisnotclear,andarguablyquiteproblematicforthemarketbasedassumptionsthatunderpintheconsumptionapproach.Themodelrangesfromabroadacceptanceoftherightofparentstochoosetosendtheirchildrentothoseschoolsthatareavailabletothemtoamorecontestedconceptofopenschoolcompetitionwithinaneducationalmarketplace.Ifagencies,includingschools,otherthanthestateorthosecontrolledbythestatearetoclaimdegreesofautonomyinschoolingwithinapubliclyfundedregime,theyneedtobeaccountablefortheirparticularcontributions.Formalaccountabilitysystemsarequiteextensivefornon-governmentschools,andgreateraccountabilityforoutcomesisbeingestablishedthroughnationaltestingandreportingprograms.However,theclaimsofmissionandcontributiontocommunityandthebehavioursofschoolsandsectorswithinaschoolmarketraisemoresubtlequestionsofrelationalaccountability–thatis,accountingfortheimpactofbehavioursthatservesomecommunitiesaboveothercommunitiesorthenationalcommunity.Suchaccountabilityisunlikelytobeestablishedthroughregulation,asitismoreaproductofdialogueandengagement.

However,fundingsystemscanplayapart.Vouchersystemshavebeenproposed,andtoanextentimplementedinAustralia,asmeansofdeliveringautonomytotheeducationalconsumerandpromotingqualityimprovementthroughcompetitionforenrolments(Novak,2009).Whiletheseargumentstendtoignoretheunequaldistributionofautonomyacrossschoolsandsectors,theydomakethepointthatfundingregimesarenotneutralinregardstotheirimpactuponthedeliveryofmissionandpurposeineducation.26Withanabsenceofpublicandcommunitymissionandpurposeinschoolingitisdifficulttojustifyitscoreinstitutionsofcurriculum,compulsionand,arguably,publicfunding.

Australiaisnottheonlytheatrefordebatesaboutschooling,publicandprivatepurposes,andtheeducationalmarketplace.However,itisunusualinhavingastrongcompetitiverelationshipbetweenthepublicandprivatesectors,whichinturnappearstohavedrivenaninternallycompetitiveandmoreselectivemodelwithinthepublicsector.Complexsetsofrelationshipshaveevolvedbetweenschools,betweenschoolsandtheirsectoralagencieswithinandacrosssectors,andbetweensectoralagencies.Inthiscontext,thefociofthecompetitiverelationshipscanbecomelost.Someasureswithinthegovernmentsectortoincreaseselectivityasameansofcompetingwiththenon-governmentsectorwilldrawstudentsfromnonorlessselectiveschoolsinthegovernmentsectoraswellaslessselectiveandlowfeeschoolsinthenon-governmentsector.

Bothofthesetypesofschoolsarelikelytobeneighbourhoodbasedandarecentraltostrategiesforimprovingeducationaloutcomesandincreasedschoolretentionrates(MCEETYA,2008a;COAG,2008).Thisisbecausethecapacityformarginalimprovementsinoutcomesandcompletionsinthemoresociallyandeconomicallyselectiveschools,whetherfeeorscholarshipbased,areminimalgiventheirexistinghighlevelsofoutcomesandcompletions.Thesamepatternoflimitedcapacityformarginalimprovementswillexistinthecommunitiesthattheseschoolsserve.Improvementsneedtocomefromthegeneralistandnonselectiveschoolsthatservethebulkofcommunities.

Aweakeningofthescholasticbaseoftheseschoolsthroughgreaterscholasticselectivitywillweakentheircapacityforimprovement.ThedefensivereactionofthegovernmentschoolauthoritiestowardstheenrolmentdriftismostlytargetedasacompetitiverelationshipwiththeCatholicsectorthatincorporatesmostofthelowfeenon-governmentschools.Parentswhomightbeencouragedtomovetheirchildrentothegovernmentsectoraremostlikelytobethosethatareusinglowfeeschools.AmongstfamilieswhouseCatholicschoolsandthathavetwoormorechildren,onequarteralsouseschoolsinthegovernmentsector(Smith,2008).ItispossiblethattheincreaseduseofselectiveenrolmentstrategieswithinthegovernmentsectormayincitesimilarresponsesfromtheCatholicsector.

Adrivetowardsaschoolsystemdifferentiatedintoselectiveandnon-selectiveschoolswillhaveimplicationsforthetargetsandgoalsforAustralianschoolingestablishedbythenationalstateandterritorygovernments.ItwillbedifficulttoachievethetargetforYear12completionwhenthemarginalincreasesinstaying-onratesneedtocomefromschoolsthatfacethegreatestdemandsintermsofeducationalneedsandthatfrequentlyareleastequippedtoinnovateandprovidethediversityofprogramsthatwillbeneededtoengagestudentsinlearning.Thereareimplicationsfortheprinciplesofsocialjusticeandequalityofopportunityineducation.Thelackofprogressoverthepasttwodecadesinachievinggreatersocialequityinpatternsofparticipationandoutcomesinschoolingandcorrespondinglyinaccesstohighereducation(Bradley,2008)coulddeepenandbegintoreversethegainsthatweremadeinthe1960sand1970s.

Acorequestionhereistheconceptandexerciseofautonomyinschoolinganditsrelationshiptodiversity.Autonomyisvaluedbyschoolsandschoolagenciesforreasonsofbothmarketandoperationalcapacityandeducationalandsocialprinciples.


27Neighbourhoodeffectisthecommunitybenefitsoflowercrimerates,betterhealth,greatersocialcohesion,etc.

28In2007,57.07percentofallnon-governmentschoolsrecurrentrevenuewasfromstateandCommonwealthgrants.FortheCatholicsectorthefigurewas71.97percent,andfortheindependentsectoritwas41.17percent(MCEETYA,2008a).Commonwealthpercapitapaymentsvariedbetween13.7and70.0percentofAGSRC.Themediumfortheindependentsectorwasabove50percent.TheintroductionofSESpercapitafundingfollowingagreementsin2007willhavealteredthesefiguresbyincreasingthepercentagesofgovernmentfunding.Allschoolsremainoutsidedirectgovernmentagencymanagementinmatterssuchasstaffingandsalaries,enrolmentpoliciesandthelengthoftheschoolyear.Mostnon-governmentschoolsintheUK,CanadaandmostEuropeancountrieshavebeenincorporatedwithinthepubliclyfundedandadministeredsystemsandarefullyoralmostfullyfunded.Theirdegreeofautonomyvaries.However,inalmostallofthesecasestheschoolscannotchargefeesandhaverestrictionsontheircapacitytoselectstudents.

29ThethreesystemsaretheSocioEconomicStatus(SES)system;thenodisadvantagesyetem:theoptionforthoseschoolswhowouldhaveafundingreductionundertheSESmodeltostayinthepreviouslyarrangementsbasedupontheEducationResourceIndexthatlinkedCommonwealthfundingtotheprivateresourcesavailabletonon-governmentschools;andthearrangementsforCatholicsystemicschoolsthatarefundedasablocatoneleveloffundingrate.OnlytheERImodellinkspublicfundingtolevelsofprivateresourcing.Acrossthegovernmentsectorwherethereareahandfulofschoolsthathavehighlevelsofprivateincomeofupto$6,000perstudentenrolment,andtherearenolinksbetweenlevelsofpublicandprivaterevenue.

Ontheotherhand,schoolinghasalwayshadalargeelementofcommonality,includingcommonalityincurriculum,whichisbeingreinforcedwiththemovementtowardsanationalcurriculum.Italsohasincludedtheideaofthecollectiveasbothapublicgoodthroughneighbourhoodeffect27andasasocialordemocraticprincipleoflifeopportunitiesorsocialandeconomicinclusion.Therearetensionswithintherelationshipbetweenautonomy,commonalityandcollectiveacrossalleducationsystems,andespeciallywithinliberaldemocracies.However,thereisandmustbearelationship–whichissomethingthatboththeclaimantsofhighlevelsofautonomyandadvocatesofvouchersystemsbaseduponnarrowhumancapitalprinciplesignore.Fundingsystems,therefore,areimportantmediatorsinthisrelationship.

IthasbeenarguedthatthecurrentstructuresofgovernanceandfundingofpublicandprivateschoolinginAustraliahavearestrictiveimpactuponpublicpolicyinAustralia(Keating,2009a).Thecoreissueinregardstoprivateornon-governmentschoolingisitsautonomyfromgovernmentrequirementsforenrolments,whichformostgovernmentschoolsareopenenrolmentsonanareabasis.Non-governmentschoolscanchargefees,andrestrictenrolmentsonthebasisofscholasticrecords,behaviouralpatternsandreligion.Effectively,theydonotcarrytheresponsibilitiesfordeliveringtheprincipleofuniversalaccesstoschooling.Thisisnotwithstandingtheobservationthatelementsofthegovernmentsystemshaveadoptedselectiveorrestrictiveenrolmentpracticesandthatelementsofthenon-governmentsectorhaveenrolmentpracticesoftakingallcomers,and,insomecases,ofprovidingfeereliefforsomeparents.

Unsurprisingly,therefore,governmentstypicallyhavelookedtowardstheideaofaccountabilityasameansofinducingnon-governmentschoolstoacceptashareofthepublicorsocialresponsibilityforschooling.Regulatoryregimesforteacherregistration,schoolregistrationandcurriculumhavebeenimplementedmainlybystategovernmentsandbothlevelsofgovernmenthavedetailedaccountabilityandauditingrequirementsforgovernmentfunding.TheRuddGovernmentearlyinitstermsignalledthatitwouldrequireincreasedaccountabilityfromthenon-governmentsectorandsubsequentlyhaspursuedandagendaofgreaterpublicaccountabilityforeducationaloutcomesfromallschools.

Funding,however,remainsthefundamentalissueintherelationshipsbetweenpublicandprivateschooling.Thisisforseveralreasons.Thefirstisthesizeandmarketpowerofthenon-governmentsector.Asarelativelyautonomousprivatesectoraswellasapubliclyfundedprivatesectorratherthananincorporatedsector,itisbyfarthelargestintermsofmarketshareamongstOECDcountries.28Thisfactoralonewouldseemtorequireafundingregimethatisbaseduponaclearandrelativelywidelyacceptedsetofprinciplesandprocedures.NeitheroftheseexistsinAustralia.

Asecondreasonisthecomplexityandinconsistencyinthecurrentfundingarrangements.Dowling(2007)citesseveralcommentatorswhohavecriticisedandnotedtheinconsistenciesinthesearrangements.TheexistenceofthreedifferentCommonwealthfundingsystemsfromwhichnon-governmentsystemscaneffectivelychoosetheirbestoptionisthemostobviousinconsistency,asthesearrangementsproducesignificantdifferencesinfundinglevelsforindividualschools.29ApartfromthisvariabilitytherehasbeeninconsistencyinthelevelsofCommonwealthfundinginrelationshiptothelevelsforgovernmentschools.CommonwealthfundinghasbeenbasedonapercentagelinktoAverageGovernmentSchoolsResourceCosts(AGSRC).Assuch,anyincreasesingovernmentschoolfundingbystategovernmentsautomaticallyleadtoanincreaseinCommonwealthpaymentstonon-governmentschools.However,theCommonwealthforpolicyreasonsandunderpoliticalduresshasaddedfurtherincreasesontopofthesepercentageincreases(McMorrow,2008).Therehasbeennoreverserelationship,asincreasesinCommonwealthfundstogovernmentschoolsarebaseduponaconstantsupplementationtostatebasedresourcingoftheirschoolsof9percentand10percentforprimaryandsecondaryschoolsrespectively.TheRuddGovernmenthasredressedthisimbalancebyraisingtheprimarylevelstothatforsecondaryschools.

19

30ThisisakeyfactorintheAustralian‘system’.Thenon-governmentsectorhasamistrustofthestatesandsohaslookedtotheCommonwealthforconsistencyandcertaintyinfunding.However,theyalsohavemaintainedpressureuponthestatestogainfunds,andparticularrelationswithstategovernmentsinsomestates,notablyNewSouthWalesandQueensland,haveledtoquitegenerouslevelsoffunding.Victoriainanobtusesensemayhavebeenadriverasithasbeenthestatethathasstrengthenedthefeelingthatitsgovernmentsandagenciesarenotsupportiveofthenon-governmentsector,andespeciallytheCatholicsector.TheSplitintheLaborPartyanditsaftermathwereconcentratedinthisstate,andthelegacymayhavebeenadriverfortheconsiderablepushforCommonwealthfunding.

31 See:http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_2649_35845581_31420934_1_1_1_1,00.html

Anotherelementoftheinconsistencyisthelevelsofstategovernmentfundingthathavevariedbymuchasmuchas43percentacrossthestates(MCEETYA,2008a).ItispossiblethattherelativelylowleveloffundinginVictoria,whichhasitslargestimpactuponthelowfeeandmostlyCatholicschools,haveaddeddrivetotheclaimsofthenon-governmentsectorupontheCommonwealthfortheincreasedlevelsoffundingthathavebeendeliveredoverthepastdecadewhichhasdrivenaverageresourcelevelsinthesectortoatleastandpossiblyhigherthanthelevelsforgovernmentschoolsinsomestates.30

Theseinconsistenciesandthelackoftransparencyarerelatedtoathirdreasonforconfrontingthefundingissueastheycompoundthehighdegreeofcontestationacrosstheeducationalcommunityovertheissuesoffunding.Thiscontestationhasensuedforthepastthreedecades,withlittlechangeinpositionsandcompositionoftheprotagonists.Ontheoneside,peopleassociatedwiththegovernmentschoolsseetheincreaseinpublicfundingtonon-governmentschoolsasunjustifiedgiventheirhighdegreeofautonomy,especiallyoverenrolmentsandfees.Theyalsohaveobservedthedriftsinandcompositionsofenrolmentsandtherelativeincreasesinresourcelevelsofnon-governmentcomparedwithgovernmentschools.Ontheother,peopleinthenon-governmentsectornotethatnon-governmentschoolsreducethecostsforgovernmentforresourcingschooleducationincomparisontomostotherOECDcountries.Theyalsoareawareofthelegacyofoppositiontoanypublicfundingofnon-governmentschools,tracesofwhichremainsobservableinstateeducationagencies.

Afourthistheimpactofthecurrentarrangementsfornon-governmentschoolinguponthegovernanceofschoolinginAustralia.Therearetwoeffectshere.Animmediateeffectisthelackofconsistencyintheapplicationofregulations,directionsandinitiativesacrossschooling.Theincapacityofstateeducationauthoritiestoinfluencenon-governmentschoolenrolmentandfeepolicieshasbeenapointofcontention.However,therealsoappearstobeadefaultpositionwithinstateeducationdepartmentsofconfiningtheirinitiativestothegovernmentschoolsector.Thesebehavioursreinforceapre1970scultureofpublicversusprivateschooling,whichinregardstopublicpolicyisincreasinglydysfunctional.Forexample,AustraliangovernmentshavesetatargetforYear12orequivalentcompletionratestobereachedby2025.Bythisdate,oncurrenttrends,theshareofstudentsinnon-governmentsecondaryschoolswillbealmosthalfandtheshareofYear12studentswillbemorethanhalf.Thebehavioursalsoservetoreinforcetheculturalandpolicyseparationbetweengovernmentandnon-governmentschooling.

Inacontextwherestategovernmentsindividuallyandcollectivelyaresettingstateandnationaltargetsforlevelsofeducationaloutcomes,itisdifficulttoimplementcoherentstrategiesforthesetargetswhenincreasingpercentagesofstudentsandprovidercapacityarelocatedoutsideofthegovernmentschoolsector.Thisbroadenrolmenttrend,togetherwiththewidermovementofeducationsystemgovernancetrendsinAustraliaandinternationally,constitutewideranddeepereffectsthatneedtobeconsideredinsomedetailbeforealternativefundingstrategiesareconsidered.

Governance and funding Inprimaryschooling,29.86percentofstudentswereenrolledinnon-governmentschoolsin2007withaprojectedlevelof32.29percentin2016(MCEETYA,2008a).Atthisrateofenrolmentdrift,itwouldtakehalfacenturybeforethenon-governmentsectorwouldachieveamajoritystatus,comparedwith25yearsforsecondaryeducation.

Withinadecade,athirdofprimarystudentswillbeinnon-governmentschoolsandwithinageneration,amajorityofsecondaryenrolmentswillbeinnon-governmentschools.Whendemographicfactorsofbirthratesacrosslowincomesectionsofthecommunity,thegrowingincidenceofschoolagechildrenlivinginlowincome,singleornoparentandunemployedhouseholds,andareaandschoolconcentrationsofrefugee,indigenousanddisabledstudentsareadded,itislikelythatprimaryschoolingwillincreasinglyreflectsomeofthesocialandscholasticsegregationcharacteristicsthatareincreasinglyapparentacrosssecondaryschoolinginAustralia.Underthesecircumstances,itwouldseemhighlyunlikelythatAustraliangovernmentswillcontinuetobeabletoabidedifferentiatedgovernancesystemsforthegovernmentandnon-governmentsectorsiftheyaretomaintainanddeliverontheirgoalsforparticipation,outcomesandequityineducation.

TherehavebeenbroadgovernancetrendsofgreaterautonomyforschoolsacrossmostOECDcountriesoverthepasttwodecades.Thesetrendshaveattractedanenormousvolumeofliterature.Muchofithasanalysedtheimpactofmarketbasedapproachesineducationalgovernanceandrecentlytherehasbeenalargebodyofworkonthefutureofeducationsystems,includingtheworkthathasemanatedfromtheOECDSchoolingforTomorrowproject31.


Themaingovernancechangeshavedeliveredgreaterdecisionmakingpowerovertheallocationofresourcesandstaffappointmentsandmanagementtoschoolleadersandcouncilsorboards.Mostschoolsarenowfundedonapercapitabasis,withprincipalsbeingresponsiblefortheallocationoftheseresourcesandbalancingbudgets.IntheUSAandtheUK,somepublicschoolsalsohavebeenabletooperateinasimilarmannertoprivateschoolsbyeffectivelybreakingawayfromeducationauthoritysupervision,althoughsomerestrictionsonenrolmentpracticescontinuetoexist.IntheUSA,thishasbeenthroughCharterschoolsandintheUKthroughanumberofinitiativesincludingschoolsthat‘optout’oflocalgovernmentcontrol,thesecondary‘academies’thathaveautonomyovermostelementsofschooloperationsapartfromenrolments,andTrustschoolsthatwereintroducedunderthe2007EducationAct.

Insomecountries,thechangeshavebeendesignedtointroduceaneducationalmarket.Chilewasthefirstcountrytointroducemoreradicalmarketprinciplesintoschooleducationinthe1980s.NewZealandalsointroducedmarketorientedmeasuresinthe1990s.Somewhatunexpectedly,theSwedenSocialDemocraticgovernmentinthe1990sallowedpubliclyfundedindependentschools,includingfor-profitschoolsandchainsofschools,toenterthemarketandgaingovernmentfunding.

Thesechangeshavealsocomewithgreater‘steerage’ofschoolsystems.Steerageistypicallyenactedthroughthesettingofgoalsandtargetsandgreateraccountabilityrequirements–includingaccountabilityformeetingperformancemeasures.Thishasledtomoredirectinterventionsin‘failing’schoolsintheformofthereplacementofschoolleadershipandinsomecasesschoolstaff,andgreaterdirectionoverschoolbudgetsandsomeotheraspectsofschooloperations.

Therearedifferentaccountsofthereasonsfortheintroductionofmarketorientedgovernanceinschooleducation.Muchoftheliteraturehasconcentratedupontheideologicaldriveofneo-liberalisminpublicpolicy.However,publicandprivatedemandsuponeducationhaveincreasedsubstantiallyoverthepasttwodecades,andwhilegovernments–includingAustraliangovernments–haveinvestedmoreinschooling,theyexpectgreaterreturns.

AllOECDcountriesappeartoacceptthehumancapitalimperativeofeducation,despitesomescepticismamongstsomeeconomists.Asaconsequence,governmentsregardthequalityofnationaleducationsystemsasakeycomponentofinternationaleconomiccompetitiveness,andalsoinvestfortheneighbourhoodeffect.Education’sroleinindividualeconomicandsocialoutcomesiswidelyvalidated.Asaconsequence,itscentralitytosocialpolicyisacceptedbyallgovernments.Undertheseconditionsandinacontextwherethereareheavydemandsfromotherareasuponbudgets,governmentshaverequiredschoolstobemoreaccountablefortheoutcomesofpublicinvestmentinschoolingandhavesoughttoimprovethequalityofeducationalinputsandoutcomes.

Atthesametime,privateinvestmentinanddemandsuponeducationhaveincreased.Politically,ithasnotbeenfeasibleinmostcountriestodenyparentssomecapacityforchoiceinschooling.ThisisespeciallythecaseinAustraliawherethereissuchalargenon-governmentsector.ApartfromthedirecteffectofthecapacityofalargepercentageofAustralianparentstochoosefeebasednon-governmentschoolscomparedwithallotherOECDcountries,thereisitseffectuponthegovernmentschoolssectorwherestategovernmentshavebeenrequiredtoreducezoningandotherregulationstoallowgreaterparentalchoice,asreflectedinsomerecentstategovernmentlegislation(ParliamentofVictoria,2006).

Formanygovernments,andespeciallythoseinAustralia,themovementtowardsamoremarketbasedmodelhasmajorbenefits.Itencouragesprivateinvestmentinanareathatmanygovernmentsdeemasanationalpriority.Itispoliticallyattractive–especiallyinmeetingthedemandsofthe‘chatteringclasses’.Anditincorporatesorganisationaldevelopmenttoolsthathavebeenusedacrossawiderangeofindustriestodriveefficiencyandqualityimprovement.

21

32TwoprincipalsofschoolsinEnglandthathadgainedhighdegreesofautonomy(AndrewHutchinson,ParksideCommunityCollege,Cambridge(21.9.2009),andDavidDaniels,PetcheyAcademy,HackneyDowns(22.9.2009)bothobservedthatschoolinginEnglandismovingtowardsapostsystemmodelinpresentationstoastudytourgroup.

33Anearlierexpansionofthenumberofindependentschoolshasnowabated.However,theenrolmentshareofthesectorhasincreasedasestablishedschoolshaveincreasedtheirenrolmentsandaddednewcampuses,oraddedprimaryorsecondarylevels(MCEETYA,2008a).

However,ithasconsequences.Schoolsthathaveweakproductionfunctionsaremorevulnerableineducationalmarkets.Theweaknessescanberelatedtopoorqualityofleadership,teachingqualityandprogramdelivery,orotherinputfactorsorthenatureofenrolments.Inamarketcontext,schoolsneedtoseekmarketpowerwhichcanbegainedthroughthequalityofprogramsanddelivery,outcomesandphysicalandculturalresources.Outcomesandculturalresourcescanbeenhancedorweakenedthroughselectivepractices.Asaconsequence,choiceandeducationalmarketstypicallyhavenegativeimpactsuponeducationalequityandexacerbatesomeschools’vulnerabilitytofailureandtheriskofbecoming‘sink’schools.ThesetendenciesalsohavebeenincreasedinacontextofgreatersocialinequitywheremostOECDcountries–includingAustralia–haveexperiencedrisesintheirGiniindicesofpovertysincetheearly1980s.

Inresponsetothesetwoeffects,governmentshaveadoptedtwotypesofmeasures.First,theyhaveintervenedmoredirectlyinfailingschoolsthroughprogramsdesignedtostrengthenthequalityofleadershipandteachingand,ifnecessary,throughmoredrasticmeasuresincludingchangeofschoolleadershipandstaffandschoolclosuresandamalgamations.Second,theyhavemovedtowardsareabasedapproachesthataredesignedtoencouragepartnershipsorformsofmentoringbetweenschools(Smith,2002).Ontheonehand,thisisbaseduponthelogicofthepracticeoftransportingthesuccessfulpracticesandcapacitiesofoneschooltolesssuccessfulschools.Ontheother,itispartoftheplacedbasedapproachtosocialpolicythatgovernmentshaveturnedtointhecontextofhighconcentrationsofindicatorsofsocialstressincludingpoverty,unemployment,poorhealth,crimeandpooreducationaloutcomes(COAG,2008).

Post systems – governance and fundingOneofthemoreinterestingandpossiblymostinstructivespacesinschooleducationgovernanceintermsofitsrelevancefortheAustraliancontextisthatofEngland.Here,successivegovernmentshaveundertakenaseriesofreformsoverthepasttwodecadesthathavebeendesignedtoincreasethequalityofschooleducationoutcomes.Theyarebaseduponasetofliberalisationmeasurestogetherwithmorecentralisedsteerage.Liberalisationmeasuresincludetherelaxationofenrolmentregulations,theestablishmentofgreaterautonomyforschoolsfromlocalauthorities,andtheencouragementofspecialisationanddiversityinsecondaryschooling.Steeragehasbeenincreasedthroughaccountabilitydemandsthatincludenationalcurriculumandtestingregimes,schoolinspectionsandthepublicationofschoolperformancemeasures.Morerecently,therehavebeeninnovationssimilartotheCharterschoolsintheUSA.Trustschoolsandacademiesareestablishedwithsimilargovernancerightstothoseofindependentschools,albeitoverlaidwiththeinterventionmeasuresofleadershipprogramsandaccountabilitymeasures,aswellassomerestrictionsonenrolmentpractices.

Englandappearstobeheadingtowardsa‘postsystem’formofschooleducation.HeretheconceptestablishedinEnglandatthebeginningofthe20thcenturyofaschoolsystemthatishighlystandardisedinregardstooperationalcharacteristics–includingindustrialmodes–andbaseduponneighbourhoodenrolmentsisgivingwaytooneofautonomousoperationalmodesandmarketorsemimarketbasedenrolmentpatterns.32Centralmanagementisthroughoutcomessteerageintheformofstandardsbasedcurriculumandassessmentsthatalsofacilitatethemarketinputintoqualitybuilding.Socialpolicyinregardstogoalsofequityanduniversalaccessarealsoachievedthroughaccountabilitymeasures.

Thelimitationsoftheseapproachesforequityoutcomeshaverequirednewconceptsofpartnershipbetweenschoolsandareabasedapproaches.Baselineaccesstoschoolingisdeliveredthroughthemaintenanceofsomeareabasedenrolmentrequirements.Theselimitationsareintensifiedinasituationofunderorlimitedsupplyofschools,whichexistedinsecondaryschoolinginAustraliauntilthe1980s.Underthesecircumstances,thereislittlecapacityforchoice.TheplanoftheBritishConservativePartytoallowprivateforprofitcompaniestoenterthepubliclyfundedschoolsmarket(Furlong,2009)isdesignedtoexpandsupply.

TheEnglishcaseisinstructivebecausethereissomeevidencethatthecurrentCommonwealthgovernmentpolicyisframedinasimilarformandpossiblyhasbeeninfluencedbytheEnglishapproach.Thecrisisofthegovernmentschoolsystem,especiallyatthesecondarylevel,andthelongstandingandintractableissueofpublicversusprivateschoolingcouldalsohavedriventheadoptionofa‘postsystem’oraquasiintegratedsystemapproachinschooleducationpolicy,especiallyfromthestandpointoftheCommonwealth.Australiaalsohasareasofoversupplyofschools,whichhasbeenstrengthenedbytheabolitionoftheNewSchoolsPolicy.33Anationalcurriculum,nationaltargetsforschooling,agradualmovementtowardsanationalregulatoryframework,nationaltestingprogramsandgreateraccountabilityrequirementsfornon-governmentschoolstogetherwithstatementsfromtheFederalMinisterthattheolddivisionsbetweengovernmentandnon-governmentschoolsarenolongerrelevant(Gillard,2008b)areconsistentwithamodelofpostsystemorquasiintegratedsystemapproachtoschooleducationgovernance.


34http://www.myschool.edu.au/35Toanextentthismechanismworks.Schoolsthatappeartofailtypicallyareabandonedbyalarge

proportionofparents.Systemsarethenleftwithasinkschoolwithlowenrolmentsandinitiateproceduresfortheclosureoramalgamationoftheseschools.

StatementsthatthedivisionsbetweenpublicandprivateschoolsarenolongerrelevantcanbepremiseduponanassumptionthatthecurrentstatesystemswillorshouldevolveintoacollectionofrelativelyautonomousschoolssimilartoindependentschoolsandcollectionsofschoolsfromthegovernmentandCatholicsector.Thealternativeofthe‘incorporation’ofelementsofthenon-governmentsectorintothestatefundedschoolsystemshasbeenmootedinthepast,buthasneverbeenaviablepolicyoptionforlogisticalandpoliticalreasons(Praetz,1980;Furtado,2001).Thisapproachcandovetailwiththemovementtowardsgovernancearrangementsthatarebasedupongoalsandtargets,standardsandaccountabilitysystems–allwithinthedynamicofarobustschoolmarketasadriverforefficiencyandquality.TheMySchoolswebsite34asaplatformofcommonmeasuresandcriteriaisatangiblesteptowardsthis.Theoptionsofanationalinspectorateandcommonstudentidentifiersasameansoftrackingstudentprogress(Harrison,2010)mootedbytheCommonwealthMinisterforEducationwouldbefurthertangiblestepstowardsapostsystemsapproach.ThesemeasureswouldweakentheresponsibilitiesofthestateeducationdepartmentsandtheCatholiceducationofficesinfavourofanationalframeworkandinterventionsystemforunderperformingschoolsandstudents.

Supplementingthisaremeasuresforneedsbasedfundingandareabasedapproachestoeducationalregeneration.SomeoftheinitialpolicymovestowardsareabasedapproacheshavebeenthroughCOAGandwithinthestateschoolsectors.

Thepostsystemapproachtoschoolgovernancehasacorerationaleconsistingofthreeelements:

> Schoolsaretodaylocatedinamarketwheretheprincipleofchoiceiswellestablishedandstronglyrealisedinelementsofthecommunity;

> Underthesecircumstances,thereisaneedandanopportunitytomovetowardsagovernancemodelofautonomousschoolsoperatingwithinaconsistentregulatoryframework,withstandardsbasedaccountabilitysystemsthatarelinkedtomeasurablenationalgoals;

> Becausethemarketimpactontopofpatternsofcommunitydisadvantagewillexacerbatedifferencesineducationaloutcomes,thereistheneedformoreactiveinterventionstoaddressneedandtointerveneincasesofpoorquality.

Theapproachalsoappearstohaveelementsofthesocial investment states (Perkinsetal,2004)conceptproposedbyAnthonyGiddensasoneoftheelementsoftheThirdWaypoliciesoftheformerBritishNewLabourgovernment.ThisconceptisbothpostwelfareandpostneoliberalandislocatedintheideaofsocialinclusionthathasbeenakeyplankofstateandnationalLaborgovernmentsinthe21stcentury(Smyth,2010).Ineducation,itleadstoanewconstructofitstraditionalroleofcitizenshipandnationbuilding.Socialinclusiongoesbeyondwelfarethatconcentratesuponincomesupportandthepunitiveneoliberalideaofmutualobligation.Abroaderideaofhumancapitalthatallowspeopletoparticipateinbotheconomicandsociallifebeckonstheresponsibilityofthestatetoinvestinindividuals,andtointervenewhenindividualsareatriskofsocialexclusionthrougheducationalfailure.NumerousstatementsfromthenationalLaborGovernmentandnationalpolicystatementsfromCOAGandMCEETYAreflectthisapproach.

Thismodelofschoolingismorelikelytoevolveatthesecondaryratherthantheprimarylevel.Primaryschoolingremainsmorestronglypublic,bothinthepercentagesofstudentsingovernmentschoolsandthecharacteristicsoftheCatholicschoolsthatmakeuptwothirdofnon-governmentprimaryschools.Together,90percentofprimaryschoolsareneighbourhoodbasedandnoorlowfee.Theyalsoenjoyahighlevelofparentalsatisfaction(DEST,2007)thatdampensmarketmanifestationsofprivateinvestmentandactiveschoolchoice,especiallybeyondneighbourhoods(DelaCroixandDoepke,2007).

Secondaryschoolsaremorediverseintheirownershipandcharacteristicsandthereisarobustsecondaryeducationmarketwithalargepercentageofstudentstravellingtogovernmentandnon-governmentschoolsoutsideoftheirlocalareas.Parentalsatisfactionisnotashighandisdeclining.Correspondingly,thelevelsofprivateinvestmentarehigherinsecondaryeducation.Thepolicytemptationsforgovernmentstomovetowardsapostsystemmodelinsecondaryeducationareconsiderable.Thisapproachpotentiallydistancespoliticalresponsibilityforweakschools,locatesschoolfailure,whetherrealorapparent,withinthefailureoftheproductionfunctionwithinaschoolratherthanwithinasystem,andprovidesanapparentsolutionthroughschoolchoice35.Itjustifiesastandardtowhichtheschoolratherthangovernmentcanbeheldaccountable,justifiesstrongerinterventionsforschoolfailure,andappearstoprovideapotentialsolutiontothepublic–privateschoolissuebyeffectivelymovingallschoolstowardsanautonomousorindependentmodel.Itcouldbetermeda‘thirdway’tothetraditionalgovernmentversusnon-governmentschoolpolicydualismofthepastthreedecadesandthepurerchoiceormarketbasedapproachoftheHowardGovernment.

23

ThemovementtowardslesssystembasedmodelofschoolinginAustraliaraisesissuesofequityandpublicpurposesorobjectivesforschooling,andquestionsoftheobstaclestoitsevolution.Inregardstoequity,apartfromthecontestationovertheimpactofchoiceormarketbasedapproachesinsecondaryschoolinguponlevelsofequity,thereisthecoreproblemofthecapacityofprivateschoolstochargefeesandhaveautonomyovertheirenrolments.ApartfromAustralia,onlyChileandArgentinaamongstadvancedandmiddleleveleconomiesextendthisautonomytopubliclysubsidisedprivateschools.Theforemostmodelsofpubliclyfundedautonomousschools–thoseintheUSA,EnglandandSweden–alldenytheseschoolsthecapacitytochargefeesandcontroltheirenrolments.SotheremustbedoubtsastowhetherthemodelthatisevolvinginAustraliacanovercometheintrinsicproblemsofgrowinginequitythatareexacerbatedbythepublic–privatedivision.Thereisreasontoexpectthatintheabsenceofothermeasures,thesedevelopmentswillexacerbatethetendencywithingovernmentsecondaryeducationofthesocialandscholasticsegregationofhighdemandandhighperformingandlowdemandandlowperformingschoolsthatissoapparent,especiallyinthelargeurbansettings.Andinthemeantime,thedriftofmainlybetteroffstudentswithstrongscholasticrecordstothenon-governmentandmainlytheindependentsectorwillcontinue.

TherealsoisthelikelyobstacleofresistancetotheideaofapostsystemicschoolingfromstategovernmentsandtheiragenciesandtheCatholicschoolsagencies–and,tosomeextent,someotherfaithschoolagenciesorcollectives.

Bothsetsofinstitutionsretainacommitmenttoacollectiveofschoolsformanysimilarandsomedifferentreasons.Thestategovernmentsandespeciallytheiragenciesretaintraditionsofeducationforallthatmustremainareabased,sothatallstudentsacrosseachofthestatesareguaranteedaccesstofreeschooling.Increasingly,schoolinghasbeenlinkedtopatternsofsocialandeconomicinclusionandtoideasofcommunitybuildingandwholeofgovernmentservices.TheCatholicandsomeotherfaithschoolsub-systemshaveseentheirschoolsascontributingtothebroadsocialorpublicgoalsofschooling,traditionalobjectivesofeducating‘thepoor’,and,ofcourse,sustainingtheirparticularfaithwithintheircommunities.Aswell,theCatholicschool‘system’isasignificantandarguablythemostimportantassetoftheCatholicChurchandonethatisunlikelytobeabandonedtotheideaofautonomousCatholicschools.Thesectorinestablishingitsindependencefollowingthe1870educationactsestablisheditscommunitylinksthroughtheparish,ratherthanthestate(Austin,1961).Itisunlikelytoabandonthisinfavourofamarketbasedupontheinstitutionalautonomyofschools.

Theseissuesmeanthatiftheevolvingmodelofschoolingistohaveethicalandpoliticalviability,itwillneedtoaccommodatecollectiveelements–andnotjustcommonelementssuchascurriculum.Whetherthesecollectiveelementsareareaorcommunitybasedorfaithbased(orboth),theywillneedtobenegotiatedandmodelledthroughthefederalistframe,andwillneedtotacklethecoreissueoffunding.Thereisavastliteratureontheimpactofmarketbasedapproachestoschooling,muchofwhichattributesthesetrendstopolicyfailure.Giventheinternationalnatureofthesetrends,theremustbeenvironmentalfactorsthatareinfluencingthem.

Underthesecircumstances,itisimportanttolookforopportunitieswithinthedynamicsforchange.ApostsystemorquasisystemmodelofschoolinghaspotentialadvantagesinAustralia.Themulti-systemmodelhasbeenoneofthefoundationsofthecurrentpublic–privatestructureofschooling,andparallelmovementsofgreaterschoolautonomybutwithinmorecommongovernanceframeworksprovideconsiderableopportunity.TherearesignsthattheCommonwealthGovernmentisawareoftheseopportunitiesinstatementsbytheDeputyPrimeMinisterthatconsiderationshouldbetakenoffunding“allschoolsfromallsources”(Gillard,2010b).


36ThefundingthatfollowedfromtheKarmelreportdidnotincludethehighestfeeschools.

The politics of school fundingThehighlypoliticisednatureofschoolingfundinginAustraliaisdemonstratedbyitsfrequentpresenceinthepreelectionmanoeuvresofgovernmentsandoppositionparties,especiallyatthenationalbutalsoatthestatelevel.ItislikelythatithasaparticularintensityinAustraliaduetoitshistoryandthedivisionofresponsibilitiesacrossthetwolevelsofgovernment.

Italsoisduetotheparticularconstructandgovernanceofnon-governmentschoolinginAustralia.Thesectorisheterogeneousinitscombinationsoffaithbasedcollectivesofschoolsandautonomousorunaffiliatedschools.However,italsoisgroupedinaformalmannerthroughCommonwealthfundingassystemicandnon-systemicschools.Onapoliticallevel–wherethefundingdecisionsaremade–thereisadivisionbetweentheCatholicschoolsandothernon-governmentschools.Intermsofpublicreportingofenrolmentandotherdata,thesectorisdividedbetweenCatholicandnon-Catholicschools.

CatholicschoolsandtheCatholicChurchhavebeenthemainengineofthepoliticsofeducationalfundinginAustralia.TheChurchanditsschoolswerekeyplayersinthepoliticsthatledtothesettlementsofthe1870seducationact.ThedecisionoftheChurchtoestablishitsownschoolswithoutstatefundinganditscapacitytodothisthroughthereligiousordersandthesupportofitsparishescreatedtheconditionsthatwouldunderminethesettlementoftheact.ThepersonallinksbetweenthechurchandtheLaborPartyintensifiedthepoliticisationofthe‘stateaid’(forchurchschools)inAustralia,andcontributedtothe1955‘split’intheParty(Murray,1970).Theintensityofthe‘stateaid’campaignprovidedanelectoralmotivefortheMenziesGovernmenttoinitiateelementsofCommonwealthfunding.TheneedtohealthesplitwasoneofthedriversfortheWhitlamGovernmenttoproviderecurrentfundingtonon-governmentschools.36

TheCatholicsectoralsohasbeenthemajorforceinshapingthefundingsystemfornon-governmentschoolsthatexiststoday.AtthetimeoftheKarmelReport,thebroadernon-governmentsectorandtheAustralianParentsCouncilfavouredanentitlementbasedpercapitafundingundifferentiatedbytheSESbackgroundofstudentsortheprivateincomeofschools.ThishadthesupportofasizablepercentageoftheCatholicbishopsandthestrongadvocacyoftheinfluentialB.A.Santamaria.ThealternativeofneedsbasedfundingwassupportedbytheSchoolsCommissionandotherelementswithintheChurch,includingFr.FrankMartinwhowasamemberoftheCommission.NeedsbasedfundingwasdeliveredthroughblockgrantstothesystemicschoolsandtheadventoftheSchoolsCommissionsawtheestablishmentofnationalandstateCatholicEducationCommissions(CECs).BlockgrantsnecessitatedtheestablishmentofCatholicEducationOffices(CEOs)ineachdiocese.TheseofficesmostlydrawtheirpersonnelfromtheCatholicschoolsandinsomecasesfromthegovernmentschoolsystems.SomeofthepeoplefromtheCatholicschoolshavealsopreviouslyworkedingovernmentschools(Praetz,1982;O’Brien,1999).

ThegovernancearrangementsforCatholicschoolingthereforearecomplex.Parishes,religiousorders,dioceses,CEOs,stateandnationalcommissions,andthebishopsasindividualsandcollectivesareallpartofthesegovernancearrangements.Atthestateandnationallevel,thekeyagenciesinthenegotiationsandpublicpoliticsoffundingandothermajorpolicymattersarethebishopsasindividualsandascollectives–especiallytheAustralianCatholicBishops,andtheCECs.TheCEOsandCECsprovideanalternativevoicetothatofthebishops,andonethatismorelikelytorepresentthebroaderspreadofthemainlylowfeeCatholicschools.Anypoliticalstrategiesandnegotiationsaroundfundingneedtobeconsciousofthis.

ThereareintrinsicandhistoricalbarriersbetweentheCatholicandgovernmentschoolsectors.ThegovernancestructureandthecultureoftheCatholicschoolsisacombinationofthecollectiveofCatholicsocialphilosophyandmultiplelocationsofautonomy:schoolsandtheirparishes,orders,thebishopsandtheirdioceses,andtheCEOsandtheCECs.Themovementtowardsgreaterschoolautonomyacrossthegovernmentsystemshasreducedthegulfingovernancephilosophiesbetweenthesectors.Neverthelessitwasthecharacteristicsofthe‘statesystems’incomparisontothe‘Catholicsystems’andtheirhistoricalmutualrejectionthathashelpedtoshapetheCatholicschoolsectoranditsdefenceofitsautonomy(Austin,1961;Albinski,1966).

Forthesereasons,theoptionoftheincorporationoftheCatholicschoolsintothestatesystemsalongthelinesofthearrangementsintheUK,CanadaandmostEuropeancountriesisnotpossible,andprobablywasneverpossibleinAustralia.Inthe1970s,theCatholicsectorinNewZealandacceptedarrangementsfortheirschoolstobeincorporatedwithinthepublicsectorwhilemaintaininga‘specialcharacter’(Furtado,2001).ThisdidnotoccurinAustralia,despitethepositionofthethenAustralianPrimeMinisterGoughWhitlam(Whitlam,1985)andaproposalfromtheSchoolsCommissionin1975(Praetz,1982).

25

37Thereisconsiderabledisagreementabouttherealcostsofschooling.AGSRCistypicallylowerthanthedataprovidedthroughtheProductivityCommissionandMEECDYA.However,stategovernmentexpenditurecanincludesomeadministrativeexpendituresthatcouldinpartbeattributedtothenon-governmentsector,andservicessuchasbusesalsoareusedbythenon-governmentsector.InastrictsenseAGSRCshouldbeusedasabenchmarkfigureonly,ratherthanacomparativemeasureofrealaveragepercapitaschoollevelfundingwithinthegovernmentsector.

GiventhehistoryoftheWhitlamGovernmentandthehostilityofthegovernmentsectorschoolunionsandsomeotherstakeholders,togetherwiththeimmaturityofCommonwealth–Staterelationsinschooleducation,inallprobabilitythiswasnotpossibleatthetime.ThiswasdespitethecrisisinthethenindigentCatholicschoolsectorwithitsfallingenrolments.ThepoliticalbackdropofthelegacyoftheSplitintheLaborPartyandthenatureofthetwopartydominanceofAustraliangovernmentsalwaysplaced‘stateaid’aheadof‘incorporation’asasolutiontothiscrisis.IndicativeofthishavebeenthefinancialconcessionsthatweregrantedbysomeofthestatespriortotheWhitlamGovernmentandsubsequentlybyallstates(Watson,1998;Wilkinsonetal,2006).

Variousversionsoftheincorporationoptionhavebeenmootedorinferredinreportsandbypoliticalfigures.DavidKemp,thefirsteducationministerintheHowardGovernment,hasbeenreportedassupportingagoaloffullpublicfundingforCatholicschools(Furtado,2006).AsPrimeMinisterin1991,PaulKeatingputforwardanoptionofthestatestakingoverallresponsibilityforschoolingwhilecedingtrainingtotheCommonwealth.In1996,theNationalCommissionofAuditrecommendedthatthe“States should be responsible for preschool, primary and secondary education. The Commonwealth should be responsible for vocational education and higher education” (p.8).TheVictorianDepartmentofPremierandCabinetsponsoredareport(AllenConsulting,2004)thatadvocatedandmodelledan‘integration’model,fundedbytheCommonwealth.In2009,theQueenslandPremierAnnaBlighmootedasimilarfederalistdivisionorresponsibilities,orwhatistermedcollateralfederalism(Bligh,2008).

TheseoptionsarenotpossibleinAustraliabecausethenon-governmentschoolsectorandespeciallytheCatholicsectorasthemajorityofthissectorandmostcohesivepolicyandpoliticalforcewillnotacceptthem.TheCatholicsectorhasstrongrecenthistoriesofworkingcooperativelywithstategovernmentsandthegovernmentschoolsector,butisunwillingtocedeautonomytothestates,ormorespecificallytothestateschoolsystems.ThisisaviewthatissharedacrossthemultiplegovernancelocationsoftheCatholicsectors,includingthediocesesandtheirbishopsandtheCECs.

Withitsprincipleofsubsidiarity(CongregationforCatholicEducation,1997)theCatholicsectorhasfoundthestatecentralisedstatesystemstobeunattractive.WhiledifferenthistoriesledCatholicschoolsintheUKledCatholicschoolstobe‘grantaided’,theseschoolsalsohadtodealwithlocalauthoritiesratherthanlargestatesystemsoftheAustraliantype.

Therealsoarebarrierswithinthestatesystems.Thefinancialcostsofincorporatinglowfeenon-governmentschoolswouldbeconsiderableforthestates(AllenConsulting,2004).IncorporationcouldbefacilitatedbyCommonwealthtransferstothestates,asproposedbyWatson(1998).However,thiswouldaddfurthercomplicationsandinconsistenciesinthealreadyopaqueAustralianschoolfundingsystem(Dowling,2007).Therealsoremainsadegreeofhostilitytowardstheincorporationoffaithanddenominationalbasedschoolingwithinthegovernmentschoolsystems.Secularismanditsunderpinningoftheliberaldemocraticstatewasakeyand,someargue,thekeyfactorinthedecisionsofthecolonialparliamentstoexcludechurchschoolsfromthepublicfundingregimesofthe1970s(Gregory,1951).Thispositioncontinuestobereassertedinpubliceducationforums(Robertson,2009)andbygovernmentschoolpersonnel.

FortheCatholicsector,thestateschoolsystemscontinuetorepresentacultureofschoolingthatisintensionwiththeirsocialphilosophy.Yettherealissueisfundingandtheconditionsforfunding.ThesocialphilosophiesofthebulkofthelowfeeCatholicschoolshavemuchincommonwiththedemocraticprinciplesofapublicsystemthatprovidesforall,andisincontrasttovarioustonesofelitismandsocialseparatismthathavepervadedelementsoftheindependentschoolsector.ThestickingpointisfundingthatlinkstheCatholicschoolstotheadministration,includingtheindustrialadministration,ofthestateschoolsectors.

YettheCatholicsectorwantsasettlement.Theobjectiveofthe‘stateaid’campaignshasbeenlargelyachieved,withcombinationsofCommonwealthandstatefundingthatareclosetothe85percentofAverageGovernmentSchoolResourceCosts(AGSRC)inallstates.Victoria,thestatethathaslaggedinitscontributions,hasagreedtoliftitscontributionfrom18percentto22percentofAGSRC(Perkins,2009).Asusual,thisdecisionanditsannouncementweremadeaboutayearpriortoastateelection.37

AsettlementfortheCatholicsectorwouldbeintheformofconsistentandagreedfundinglevelsthatprovidesadegreeofcertaintyandconsistency.Preferably,thiswouldbeembeddedthroughlegislation.Forgovernments,suchasettlementwouldneedtobeuniversal.Itshouldapplytoallschools,governmentandnon-government,forpoliticalreasonsandprinciplesofgoodgovernance.Therefore,anysolutiontothedecadesoldissueofpublicandprivateschoolingneedstobebaseduponafundingregimeforallschoolsthathasitscoreorguaranteedelementattheCommonwealthlevel.


A new funding modelObjectives and principlesAnewfundingsystemforschoolingwouldseemtobecriticalirrespectiveofthetrajectoryofpublicpolicy.Thisisbecauseschoolinghasreachedahighlydynamicphase.Thecurrentfundingsystemsarehistoricalconstructsandtheirinconsistency,inequity,andlackoftransparencyareproductsofpiecemealadjustmentstocontextualchanges,theiropennesstopoliticalopportunism,andideologicaldrives.ThecontinuedmutationofAustralianschoolingcombinedwithpoliticalvicissitudeandtheoverlayofAustralianfederalism–whichalsohasaconsiderabledynamic–intheabsenceofafundamentalrestructurewillmeanacontinuationanddeepeningofthepublicfundinghybrid.

Thereisaneedtolooktowardsafundingsystemthatincorporatessetsofpolicyprinciplesdesignedtoserveobjectivesforschooling,thatareinturnbaseduponsocialandeconomicobjectives.FundingcannolongerexistonlyinadependentrelationshiptothevariablesofthepoliticalmanoeuvringsacrossAustralianschooling.Itneedstobeprotectedwithsomesetsofprinciples.Theymightincludethefollowing:

> TransparencyandconsistencyaretwoobviousyetabsentprinciplesoftheAustralianschoolfundingsystem.Itispossibletolocateanddownloadthedetailedfundingbaseforall22,000Englishschoolsontheinternet.ThisshouldbepossibleforAustralia’s10,000schools.Theargumentforconsistency–notsameness–isselfevident.Acasewouldneedtobemadeforlackofconsistency,andthereappearstobenocrediblecaseinanyofthepolicyandacademicliterature.

> Fundingshouldincludeanelementofneedsbased.ThisappearstoagainhavebeenacceptedpoliticallyinAustralia,afterlanguishingforadecadeormore.Thenatureoftheneedsandtheamountoffundingandhowthefundingtranslatesintoeducationalprogramsaremorecomplex.Thereisabodyofresearchthatsuggeststhatsmallamountsofextrafundingareunlikelytomakesignificantdifferencesineducationaloutcomesandthatextrafundingneedtobedirectedtowardsplannedandvalidatedinterventionswithsufficientfollowuptoachievesustainedimprovementsineducationaloutcomes.

> Thissuggeststhatneedsbasedelementsoffundingshouldbelocatedrelativelyclosetoschoolsandhavethecapacityforvariationbaseduponprogramorinterventioncosts.HerethereisanopportunitytolinkwithCatholicschoolswiththeirprincipleofsubsidiarityandtheintrinsicautonomyofelementsoftheindependentsector.

> Thequestionofneedsandtheprincipleofconsistencyleadtothecomplexquestionofequityinfunding:

> Ifequityisstudentbaseditwouldmean,leavingtothesidethequestionofneed,thatmoststudentsshouldhavesimilarlevelsofresourcesavailabletothem,whetherthroughpublicorprivatesources.ThisprincipleunderpinsmostoftheOECDcountryschoolfundingsystems.Somecountriesprovideadegreeofleeway,suchthatschoolscangainuptocertainpercentagesoftheirrevenuefromprivatesourcesbeforethelevelsofpublicfundingaredecreased.Thisflexibilityalsoallowstheinclusionofnon-publicornon-secularelementsofthecurriculumsuchasfaithbasedinstructiontoberegardedasextraandprivatelyfunded.

> Analternativeinterpretationisthatallschoolsshouldhaveanentitlementtoabaseleveloffunding.InAustraliaallschoolsreceiveaminimumlevelofapproximately17.5percentofAGSRC,consistingof13.7percentfromtheCommonwealthandtherestfromthestates.

> Afurthervariationrelatestothequestionoftherightofparentstoinvestintheirchildren’seducation.Thisrightisalmostuniversallyacceptedinregardstoactivitiesthatareoutsideoftheschool,suchascoaching,andlanguageandmusicdevelopment.Itismoredisputedwhenappliedtoprogramsorservicesdeliveredthroughtheschool.TheEducationResourceIndex(ERI)thathasbeenusedasamechanismtoassessthelevelsofprivaterevenueforschoolsincludesawiderangeofsourcesandthereisdisputationastowhetherrevenueforsuchactivitiesasschoolcampsandextracurricularactivitiesshouldbeincluded.

> Anothervariationoftheprincipleofequityisacombinationoftheprincipleofneedandtheprincipleoffamilyeffort,asembodiedinthecurrentSESCommonwealthfundingmodel.LeavingasidethetechnicalissueswiththemodelandschoolselectivitywithinthecollectordistrictsfromwheretheSESmeasuresaredrawn,theapproachisbaseduponaprincipleofneedstogetherwiththerightoffamiliesthatwishtomakeextracontributionstotheirchildren’sschooling.

27

> Thesetensionssuggestthatallschoolsshouldbegivenabufferintheircapacitytoraiseprivaterevenueandthatgovernmentsneedtobemorespecificinregardstowhatpublicfundingpaysfor.Forexample,afterthe2004increasesinCommonwealthfundingtonon-governmentschools,someindependentschoolsindicatedthatthisextrafundingwastobeusedinparttoexpandtheirscholarshipprogram.Thismayhavebeenappropriate.However,itwouldalsobeappropriatefortheCommonwealthtobemorespecificaboutwhatthefundingwastobeusedfor,especiallyasthepoliticaljustificationwastoincreasechoicethroughfeereduction.

> Fundingshouldutiliseappropriatemechanisms.Thesemechanismsincludeuntiedpercapitagrants,purchasebasedfundingandprogrambasedfunding.Thesemechanismsneedtobeusedstrategicallyacrossthetwolevelsofgovernment.

> Fundingneedstoberestructuredacrossthefederalistframe.ThecurrentpatternsoffundingarehistoricalandpoliticalartefactsthathavebeenunderpinnedbyCommonwealthgrantstothestates.Thethreecoreelementsoffunding–statefundingforschools,directCommonwealthfundingforschools,andCommonwealth-statetransfers–needtobeincorporatedinanewfundingmodel.

Resourcing: public and private investmentAllcountriesresourcetheirschoolsthroughacombinationofpublicandprivaterevenue.Publicresourcingisjustifieduponthebasisofthesocialreturnsfromschoolingandasastimulusforprivateinvestment.

Withinhumancapitalterms,thisisacombinationofalimitedcapitalbaseandmarketfailure.Thesourcesofcapitalforprivateinvestmentarelimitedandthediscountratesforindividualsarehighandhigherforpoorerfamilies.Withinpublicpolicyterms,thisisthesubstantialsocialandeconomicreturnstosocieties.Nodevelopednationhasfashioneditsschoolsysteminpurelymarketterms,asallhaveimplementedlegalcompulsionasameansofovercomingelementsofmarketfailure,butalsoforsocialpurposesofcitizenshipandsocialinclusion.

Thesefactorsraisequestionsaboutthebalancebetweenpublicandprivateinvestment,theratiobetweentheseelementsacrossareasofeducationandpopulations,andtheimpactoftherelationshipbetweenthemuponnationalsocialandeconomicpurposes,includingthosedefinedbyprinciplessuchasequityandsocialinclusion.Therehavebeendebatesabouttherelativeratesofpublicreturnsforinvestmentindifferentstagesofeducation.Typicallypublicinvestmentinschooling,andespeciallyprimaryschooling,ishighbecauseofthestrengthofthesocialreturnsandhighdiscountratesforfamilies,andespeciallypoorfamilies.38Correspondingly,itislowerforuniversityeducation,wherethediscountratesforindividualsislowerbecauseoftherelativelyshortperiodforgainingprivatereturnsandthesocialbackgroundsofthetypicalparticipants.

Ifthesocialpurposesofschoolingwhichincludesocialprinciplesofequityofopportunityandsocialinclusionaretakenasgiven,andinAustraliahavebroadlybeenexpressedintheMelbourneDeclaration(MCEETYA,2008b),thenpublicinvestmentpatterns,andtheirregulatoryarrangements,shouldoptimallybedesignedtominimiseorcompensatefortheunequallevelsofdiscountratesacrossthecommunity.Aswell,itshouldberecognisedthatdiscountratesarerelativetoreturns.Soinvestmentinhighqualityschoolinghasalowerdiscountratethaninlowqualityschooling.

Herethepatternsofpublicinvestmentinschoolingandtheirrelationshipswiththepatternsofprivateinvestmentsaffectboththelevelofreturnsandthediscountrates.Ifthefundingregimeshavetheeffectofconcentratingeducationalunderachievement,theindividualreturnstoschoolingarelikelytobeweaker,andthediscountrate–includingtherelationofopportunitycoststoreturnsforindividuals–willbehigher.Fundingregimes,especiallyinacontextwheretargetsforlevelsofoutcomesandparticipationratesarehigher,shouldalsorecognisethevariabilityindiscountratesduetounevendistributionsofeconomicandculturalcapital(BourdieuandPasseron,1979).

Althoughgovernmentshaveafiscalimperativeofmaximisingprivateinvestmentinschooling,therelationshipsbetweenpublicandprivateinvestmentcaninfluencerelativediscountrates.Forexample,ifpublicfundinghastheeffectofcreatingamoreselectiveschoolsystemwhereprivatefeesbecomeagreaterbarriertohigherqualityschooling,therelativediscountratesforthosewhoareexcludedfromthisschoolingwouldrise.Soinstraighthumancapitalterms,thiswouldjustifystrongerpublicinvestmentforthesestudents.

38Economicreturnsforprimaryschoolingtakeaconsiderabletimetoberealisedanditisdifficultforpoorfamiliestomakesuchlongterminvestments.


39Forexampleduringthe‘stateaid’debateofthe1960sanAustralianAssociationfortheFreedomofEducationwasformedbysupportersofstatefundingofnon-governmentschools(Albinski,1966).

Funding and autonomy, and the responsibility to protectSchoolssystemshavethreesetsofagencies.Theuserismainlylocatedinthefamilyorparents;thestateistheprincipalfundingagencyandculturalagencyorbroker;andschoolsorcollectionsofschoolsarethedeliveryagencies.Allotheragenciesarelinkedinclientrelationshipswiththeseagencies.Therelationshipsbetweentheseagenciesarebaseduponvariousdegreesofsovereigntyandresponsibility,includingclientresponsibility.Theprincipleofchoicederivesfromtheacceptancethanthestatehaslimitedsovereigntyinschooling.Thismeansthatautonomyisdistributedandrelational.

Theprincipleofchoicehastwojustifications–asastimulustoeducationalefficiencyandeffectivenessandasasocialrightorthesovereigntyofthefamilywithinaliberaldemocracy.Withintherelationshipbetweenpubliclyfundedschoolingandtheclientisthequestionoftheautonomyofeducationalproviders.Withinapuremarketmodelprovidersshouldhavehighlevelsofautonomy.Thisautonomy,however,ismarketdependent–thatis,whileaschoolcanhaveahighlevelofautonomyitdependsuponparentschoosingtopatroniseitandthusdelegatingsomeoftheirsovereigntytotheschoolorcollectiveofschools.

Withinschooling,publicfundingisbaseduponmorethancompensationformarketfailure:ithassocialpurposesofcitizenshipandcommunitybuildinganditisdesignedtocompensateforvariablediscountrateswhichareinfluencedbyindividuals’economicandsocialcircumstances–includinggeographiccircumstances.Therelativediscountratesalsoareinfluencedbymarketbehavioursbecauserestrictivemarketpracticesaffectnotonlyprovidersbutstudentaccess.IntheUnitedNations’termsthestate“hastheresponsibilitytoprotect”(Evans,2009–intitle).

Providersorschoolscannothaveabsoluteautonomy,andthisautonomyisreducedthroughregulationsoncurriculum,minimumprovisionstandards,anddutyofcarerequirements.However,aneducationalmarketalsoneedstohavediversity,andwithinaliberaldemocracyparentsalsohavetherighttoinvestextraprivateresourcesintheirchildren’seducation.Hencethereisanaturaltensionbetweenthesocialpurposesofschooling,whicharecommonlyassumedtobetheresponsibilityofgovernment,andtheparentalrightofchoice,includingthechoicetofinanciallyinvestinschooling.Thesetensionsexistinalldemocraticcountriesandinmosttheyaremoderated,atleasttosomeextent,throughpublicfundingsystems.

Publicfundingprovidestheguaranteeforalltoaccesseducationaswellastocompensateforthehigherdiscountrateofsomestudentsandtomeeteducationalneed.Publicfundingisalsolinkedtothepubliccurriculum.Inthissense,publicfundingislinkedtothecommon–thecommonguaranteeandthecommoncurriculum.Thecommonguaranteeincludestheresponsibilitytoprotectorcompensate.

Non-governmentschoolsandagenciestypicallyhaveassertedtheirautonomyintermsoffreedom39andrights.Thishasmostlybeenintermsoftherightofparentstochoosetosendtheirchildrentonon-governmentschools,orthroughaclientrelationship.Ontheotherhand,theconceptofsocialmissionofaschoolorcollectionofschoolsispotentiallyastrongerassertionoftheautonomyofaschoolorcollectionofschools.Forexample,theQueenslandCatholicEducationCommissionbaseditsstudyofCatholicschoolsonthequestion:What are to be the defining features of Catholic schools in the context of the Church’s evolving mission in the world?”(Harkness,2002,p.2).

Inthisregardtheschoolsaremorethanagenciesinaregulatedrelationshipwiththestateandaclientrelationshipwithparents.Theyhaveamission,whichinthiscaseislocatedatagloballevelthroughtheorganisationofthechurch.Sothereisaneedtoacknowledgeanotherelementwithintherelationshipsbetweenthestate,thefamilyandtheprovideragency.Acoreelementofhealthyliberaldemocracieshasbeenarobustcivilsociety,onedefinitionofwhichisany‘voluntary’organisation–includingchurchesorcollectionsofschoolsthatmaybebasedtovaryingdegreesuponmissions,whetherreligious,socialoreconomic.Allvoluntaryorganisationshaveapurpose,whichcanrelatetotheinterestoftheirmembersorthewholesociety,orboth.Theseorganisationsandtheirpurposesshouldnotthreatenthecommongoodorotherlegitimategroupswithinthesociety.Withinrobustliberaldemocracies,voluntaryoriginationsincludingchurches,businessorganisations,unionsandnon-governmentorganisationshaveanactiveengagementwithgovernmentascontributorstopolicy,partnersindelivery,clientsandserviceproviders.

InthecaseoftheCatholicschoolsector,thereisanexplicitexpectationthattheCatholicschool“hasnotcomeintobeingasaprivateinitiative,butasanexpressionoftherealityoftheChurch,havingbyitsverynatureapubliccharacter”and“therefore,undertakesacordialandconstructivedialoguewithstatesandcivilauthorities’(CongregationforCatholicEducation,1997,pp.16–17).Therealsoisanexplicitrecognitionthatwithinapluralistsocietythereisaresponsibilitytoexpressasetofviewsandvaluesbothaspartofthepluralitybutalsoasengagementwiththewidersociety.

Inschooling,giventhatthestatemissionasexpressedthroughregulationandthepubliccurriculumisnottotal,thereshouldbesomecapacityforcollectivemissions,suchasreligiouslybasedsocialmissions.

29

40ThisisnotwithstandingthecalculationsofsomethatsomelowfeeschoolsinQueenslandnowreceiveatleastthesamelevelofpublicfundingasequivalentgovernmentschools.

However,thishastwolimitations.First,thestatehasthefinalandoverridingresponsibilitytoprotect.Thethreeagenciesoftheparent,theschoolandthestaterepresentrespectivelytheindividual,thecollectiveandthecommon.Theparentretainssovereignrights.Elementsofthissovereigntycanberepresentedinatemporalmannerandonparticularmattersthroughtheirvoluntarycedingtocollectiveagenciessuchasschoolsandchurches.Whilethestate’sresponsibilitytofurtherthecommongoodcanandshouldbeinpartnershipwithcivilsociety,ithasacentralresponsibilitytoprotectallelementsofthecommunity,includingtheprotectionofthewidercommunityagainstthreatstotheirdemocraticrightsandtheprotectionofindividualsagainstadversecircumstancesanddiscriminationanddisadvantagecausedbythebehaviourofothers.AsLevin(1989)hasargued,justasparentshaverightsovertheeducationoftheirchildren,theliberaldemocraticstatealsohastherighttoprotecttheconditionsforthisdemocracy,andthisincludestheknowledgeandvaluesthatunderpinthedemocraticinstitutions.Thepublicguaranteeistheguaranteedaccessofalltoqualityschoolingandthestateresponsibilitytoprotecttheconditionsforaliberaldemocracy.Thereisevidenceofwidespreadacceptanceofthisresponsibility.Forexample,thevastmajorityofpeopleinAustraliadonotagreewiththeautonomyof‘privateschools’to‘expelstudentsbecausetheyaregay’or‘expelgirlsiftheyarepregnant’.Thepercentagesofpeoplewhorejectthisautonomydidnotvarywhethertheyattendedapublicorprivateschoolorsenttheirchildrentoapublicorprivateschool(Wilkinson,etal,2004).

Thesecondisthequestionofwhatthestateshouldfundinschooling.Acoreargumentforthelimitingofstatefundingtostateownedschoolswasthatwithinamulti-religiousordenominationalsociety,schoolingshouldremainsecularandstatefundsshouldnotbeusedforthepromotionofanyreligion(Gregory,1951).Thedevelopmentsofthepasthalfcenturyhavesweptawaythisargumentandbythe1960s,mostpeopleinAustraliafavouredthepublicfundingofchurchschools(Albinski,1966).However,afterahalfcentury,Australiangovernmentsdonotyetfullyfundnon-governmentschools,40anditisassumedthatalmostallnon-governmentschoolswillraiseprivaterevenue.

Thebasisofthegovernmentfundinghasbeenacombinationofschools’privaterevenueandpubliclyfundededucationalneed.ThisprinciplehasprevailedindifferentandtosomeextentcorruptedformssincetheKarmelReport(1973).However,nostateorCommonwealthfundingregimes,apartfromthosethroughSpecialPurposeProgramsandtargetedprograms,havespecifiedwhatthefundingshouldbeusedfor,apartfromthedeliveryofthegeneralcurriculum.ThiscompareswithanationsuchasFlandersthatprovidesstatefundingforaspecifiednumberofhoursofreligiousinstruction,butrequiresschoolstogeneratetheirownresourcesforprovisionabovethesehours.

Itissuggestedthatanewfundingmodelshouldspecificallyaddressthesetwoquestions.Itshould:

> Bestructuredinawaythatidentifiesandsupportsthecommonrightofalltoreceivethepubliccurriculumthroughqualityprovision;

> Delineatewhatisandwhatisnotpubliclyfunded.Thelattershouldincludesomecircumstanceswhereindividualschoosetoundertakeandschoolschoosetodeliverelementsofthepubliccurriculuminarestrictivemanner;

> Recogniseeducationalneed;and> Encourageschoolbehaviorsthatareinclusiveratherthanrestrictiveandthatreducethediscountratesforeducationalinvestmentsforthoseelementsofthecommunitywiththeweakestlevelsofeconomicandculturalcapital.

Theseelementscannotbetreatedasabsolutesorinisolation.Theyareessentiallyin-principleandneedtobeinter-connectedintheirimplementation.


Public and private – the future of schoolingTheseparationbetweenpublicandprivateschoolingisbaseduponlegalownershipandautonomy.Thereisanobviousrelationshipbetweenthetwo.Howeverthisrelationshipalsoisvariable.IntheNetherlands,themajorityofschoolsareunderthelegalownershipofthechurches,butaresubjecttothesamelevelsofgovernmentdirectionasthepubliclyownedschools.

InAustraliathecoreissueinregardstopublicandprivateschoolingisthedefaultstatusofthegovernmentownedschoolstoprovidethepublicguaranteeofaccesstoallandofservingthepublicmissionofcompensatingfordisadvantage,includingloweringthediscountrateofeducationalinvestmentforthelessadvantaged.Theevolutionofpublicfundingfornon-governmentschoolshasacknowledgedtheprincipleofneed.However,ithasneverincorporatedthedistributionoftheresponsibilityforthepublicguarantee.Thisisdespitethefactthatthesectorisapproachingmajoritystatusinsecondaryschoolingandthatthebulkofschoolswithinthesectorgainthebulkoftheirresourcesfromgovernment.Thisisbecauseofthenatureofthepoliticalprocessesandcontestationsthatfashionedtheevolutionofstatefunding(Albinski,1966;Watson,1998;Wilkinsonetal,2006),andthedefaultpositionofstateeducationdepartmentsthatpublicschoolingisentirelylocatedwithinthejurisdictionsoftheirstateschoolsystems.Thesetwofactors,togetherwiththehistoricallegacyofpubliceducationandfundinginAustralia(Austin,1961;Gregory,1951),havemadeimpossiblethefashioningandnegotiationofanewsettlementsuchasthatachievedinNewZealandinthe1970sforthesharingofthepublicguaranteeandthepublicmission.

Themajorityelementsofthenon-governmentsectorwithjustificationclaimacontributiontothepublicmission,or,intheMelbourneDeclarationterms,the‘commongood’(Sheehan,2004).Angelico(2006)notesthat“through the combined capacities of the institutions of religion and schooling, Catholic schools engage with broader social processes, such as, social cohesion, social stability, social integration and social transformation”(p.2).However,inAustraliatheyarenotpartofthepublicguarantee(asdistinctfromthepublicgood)astheyareinmanyothercountries,andperhapsthemainreasonforthisisthattheyhaveneverbeenaskedorexpectedtocontribute,orbecausethetermsofsuchcontributionshaveneverbeenacceptable,especiallytotheCatholicsector,andsomeotherelementsofthenon-governmentschoolsector.AnexampleofthisistheexpressionbyaseniorCatholiceducationofficialofawillingnesstohaveclosercooperationbetweenthegovernmentandCatholicschoolsectors,butqualifiedbythesignal“that any plans for Catholic education to come under the control of the state would be opposed” (Tomazin,2008,p5).

Thecharacteristicstatecentricmodelofpublicschooling(Furtado,2001)thatwasformedfromthe1880sthroughtothe1960shaslargelyremainedintactinthesubsequenthalfcentury.Thiswasinthefaceoftheexistenceofthefactthatthepercentagesofstudentsattendingnon-governmentschoolsthroughoutthe130yearsofthishistorywasalwaysabove20percent,afigurefarexceedingthoseoftheUK,NorthAmerica,andNewZealand.Ithasbeenarguedthatthereasonsforthis,apartfromthesizeoftheCatholiccommunity,arerelatedtotheparticularhistoryofthesettlementsthatwereconstitutedintheeducationactsofthe1870sandAustralianfederalism,andtheirsubsequentandsimultaneouscollapseinthe1970s.Asaconsequence,thenegotiatedandincrementalevolutionofpublicfundingofnon-governmentschoolinghasincludednodialogueoversomesharingofthepublicguarantee.

Wehavearguedthatthepublicguaranteeandtheassociatedpublicmissionsofaddressingneedanddisadvantagestemfromthestateresponsibilitytoprotect.Thisremainsastateresponsibility.However,itneednotandshouldnotbeundertakensolelybythestate.AllianceswithcivilsocietytoachievethisinhealthandwelfarearecommonandchurchownedschoolsinEngland,Canada,NewZealandandmostEuropeancountriescontributetowardsthepublicguarantee.Thestateretainsoverallresponsibilityandthisjustifiesitspublicexpenditureoneducation.Thesharingofthedeliveryoftheguaranteeisnegotiatedwithnon-governmentschoolsuponthebasisofthepublicfunding.Thenegotiationscan,andwhereappropriateshould,accommodatetheparticularmissionofschoolsorgroupsofschoolsandthismissioncancontributetothepublicmissionandthepublicguarantee.Butasacontractualrelationship,wherefundinggainsatleastsomeofitsdirectionfromthepublicguarantee,autonomycannotbeabsolute.Itmustbenegotiatedautonomyovertheuseofthepublicresources.Thatis,theprincipleofentitlementwhichhasdrivennon-governmentschoolfundingisconditional.Theconditionalityisrelatedtothenatureofschoolautonomy.

IncontrasttootherOECDcountries,Australiahasestablishedadifferentrelationshipbetweengovernmentandthepubliclyfundednon-governmentsectorinschooling.Incrementallevelsofstatefundinghavebeenachievedthroughintenseandon-goingpoliticalcampaignsandmanoeuvringsthatarestronglymediatedbytheCommonwealthandstateelectoralcycles.Largescalepublicfundingwas‘won’asarightorentitlementbythenon-governmentsectoranddeliveredlargelyaspoliticalconcessionsandopportunities.

31

41 ForexampletheVictorianGovernmenthasannouncedtwonewselectiveentryhighschoolsasameansofretainingmorescholasticstudentswithinthegovernmentsector.Italsohasannouncedincreasedgrantstonon-governmentschools.InresponsetheVictoriaOppositionspokesmanindicatedthatthe“Governmenthadstolentheireducationpolicy”(Perkins,2009),whichisreminiscentofthepoliticalstrategiesover‘stateaid’ofthe1960s(Albinski,1966).

Itissignificantthatthemostforthrightpublicstatementontheassociationbetweennon-governmentschoolingandthepublicmissionineducationwastheKarmelReportin1973,thatwasreleasedmorethanathirdofacenturyago.Thesubsequentcontestationoverpublicfundinghasreinforcedadivisionbetweennon-governmentschoolsandthegovernmentschoolsystemsthatassumestheownershipofthepublicguaranteeandmissionwithinthegovernmentschoolsystemsandwhichtheirstateandterritorygovernmentsascribetothem.Asaconsequence,stategovernmentschooldepartmentshaveadopteddefensiveandcompetitivestrategiesagainsttheincursionofthenon-governmentschoolsatthesametimeastheirgovernmentshaveincreasedfundingforthesector.41Suchpolicyschizophreniaisaresultofthelackofacommongroundfordialogueaboutthepublicguaranteeandthepublicmissionandnegotiationoveritsdelivery.Theseobjectiveshavebeenreplacedbythe‘principle’ofautonomyinthenegotiationsoverfunding.

ObduratecultureshaveformedaroundthefundingandgovernanceofschoolinginAustralia.Theideaofgovernmentschoolingastheagencyforthedeliveryofthepublicguaranteeandmissionandtheassociatedrejectionoftheclaimsofandthepotentialforanon-governmentcontributiontowardsthis;theattachmentofthenon-governmentschoolsandtheiragenciestoautonomyandanentitlementtopublicfunding;andtheinstitutionalseparationsbetweenthesectorshaverootsthathavematuredovermanydecades.Federalismhasreinforcedthis,inpartbecauseithasallowedthestatestoavoidconfrontingtheroleofthenon-governmentschoolswithintheirinstitutionalarrangementsforschooling.Asthenon-governmentschoolsectorisfullyaware,theachievementofitscurrentlevelsofpublicfundingsolelythroughthestategovernmentswouldhaverequiredamuchgreaterlevelofcompromiseofthesector’slevelofautonomy.

Asaconsequenceoffederalism,theinstitutionalarrangementshavebeenpremiseduponthestategovernments’constitutionalresponsibilityfordeliveringuniversalschooling,butentirelythroughthegovernmentschoolsystems.Henceindustrial,funding,governance,andplanninginstitutionshavenotincludednon-governmentschoolsortheiragencies,whichratherthanbeincludedascontributorstothe‘publicsystem’havebeenregardedascompetitorsthatweakenthegovernmentsector’scapacity.Thisinstitutionalmindsethashadanelementofselffulfilment.Asaconsequence,aconcessionalratherthananegotiatedapproachtofundinghascharacterisedtherelationshipsbetweengovernmentandthenon-governmentsectorforahalfcentury.

GiventhelongandobduratehistoryofthefailurepreandpostKarmeltoachieveanysubstantialdialogueoverthesharingofthepublicresponsibilityacrossthebroaderschoolsector,anysignificantprogresswillneedtobeachievedthrougharadicalratherthanapiecemealapproachtothereformofschoolfunding.Itwillalsoneedtobenegotiatedaroundtheattachmentofthenon-governmentsectortoitsautonomy,whichisnowdeeplyembeddedinitsinstitutionalstructuresandcultures.Itwillneedtoacknowledgethehistoricalstandoffbetweengovernmentorstateschoolsandnon-governmentorprivateschools.Itwillneedtoexploitthedifferenttypesoffundingandtheirlocation,andtherelationshipsbetweenfundingandregulation.Soitwillneedtoexploitratherthanberestrictedbythefederalistframeinschooling.Itwillneedtorecognisetheheterogeneousnatureofthenon-governmentsectors,and,forthatmatter,thegovernmentsector.

Funding models Therehavebeenseveralproposalsforrestructuringofmajorpartsorallofthepublicfundingofschooling.Mosthavebeenputforwardoverthepastdecade,apartfromthatputforwardbytheSchoolsCommissionin1975.Withtheexceptionofthisproposal,whichwasforestalledbyadversepoliticalandeconomiccircumstances,noneoftheseoptionshasgainedanysignificantpoliticaltraction,andmosthavehadminimalstakeholderengagement.

However,theseproposalsallhavetheirhistories,andthesehistoriescanberevealinginhelpingtounderstandtheinstitutionalandculturebarrierstotheformationofpublicfundingarrangementsforschoolinginAustraliathatmeettheprinciplesoutlinedabove.

The status quoAfirstoptionwouldbetomaintainthestatusquo.Fromthenon-governmentschoolperspective,mostofwhathasbeenpetitionedforhasbeenachieved.TheCatholicschoolsectorisatornearlyatthelevelsofresourcingoftheirgovernmentschoolequivalents(Burkeetal;2004;McMorrow,2008).Therehasbeenasignificantmovementtowardsnationalconsistencyincurriculum,regulationandaccountability.Withhigherlevelsofselfgovernanceacrossgovernmentschools,itshouldthereforebereasonablefortheCommonwealthMinistertoconcludethatthedivisionsbetweenpublicandprivateschoolshaslittlerelevanceforthefuture(Gillard,2008b).


Ashasbeensuggestedabove,theideaofapostsystemmodelofschoolinghassomesignificantadvantages.Itispremiseduponaheterogeneousschoolsystemwheretheprincipleofparentalchoiceiswidelyaccepted,andincreasedlevelsofproviderautonomy.Withinthesearrangements,amovementtowardsamoreconsistentframeworkofcurriculum,supplysideregulationandoutcomesaccountabilityisappropriate.Inasimilarmanner,aheterogeneousfundingsystem,whichisbaseduponabenchmarkofaveragegovernmentschoolsresourcecostsandeducationalneed,isappropriate.Federalismmakesacomplexfundingsysteminevitable.However,italsogivesitadynamiccharacter,whichreducesthelikelihoodofitbecomingoutdatedandcorrupted.

Themainweaknesseswiththisapproach,apartfromthefactthatcontestationshowsnosignofabating,arethatitdoesnotacknowledgetheunequaldistributionacrossschoolsandsectorsofautonomyandresponsibilityforthepublicguarantee,andthecurrenttrajectoriesofschoolresourcinginAustralia.Educationalneedmustbelinkedtoresponsibilitybecausetherearenodirectandusablemeasuresforlevelsofeducationalneedandforlevelsofdifficultythatschoolsfaceinprovidingschoolingforindividualstudentsandachievingeducationaloutcomes.Socio-economicstatus(SES)isonlyaproxyforeducationalneedasmanystudentsfrompoorhouseholdsarehighlymotivatedandscholasticallycapable–andviceversa.Theschoolchallengeisrelatedtotherelativescholasticcapacityandengagementofstudents,nottheirSESlevels.Thereisnofeasiblewayofdistributingtheresponsibilityforthepublicguaranteeotherthanrequiringschoolstoacceptallcomers,bothwithintheirformalenrolmentconditionsandbehavioursandtheirscholasticandsocialcultures.

Thiswasonceachievedthrough‘neighbourhoodschools’andtoasignificantextentthisremainsthecaseinprimaryschooling.However,itisaweakeningmechanism,andespeciallyinsecondaryschooling,whichinAustraliaisapproachingtheuniquestatusofbeingpredominantlyfeebased.

Becauseitisnotfeasibletoregulatetoreduceautonomyacrossthenon-governmentsector,awiderdistributionoftheresponsibilityforthepublicguaranteewouldneedtobeachievedthroughengagementandfunding:thatis,engagementwithapublicagendaofqualityeducationforallandfundingtosupporttheresponsibility.

An integrated systemThemostcommonformoffaithbasedschoolinginmostEuropeancountries(Eurydice,2000),Canada,andNewZealandisthroughwhatiscommonlytermed‘integrated’orwhattheBritishterman‘incorporated’system.Underthesearrangementschurchschools,whileremainingtheformalpropertyoftheirparentorganisations,arefullyoralmostfullyfundedforrecurrentcostsbygovernment,andoftenformostofthecapitalcosts.Theyeffectivelyarepartofawiderpublicsystemdeliveringthenationalcurriculum,cannotchargefees,andaresubjecttothesameregulatoryregimes,includingindustrialregulations,asthegovernment-ownedschools.Thechurchesmaintainvaryingdegreesofautonomywithinthesesystems.However,inallcasesthisismuchlessthaninAustralia.Insomecountries,notablySweden,privatefor-profitcompaniesownschoolsthatalsoarepartofthepublicsystem(Bunar,2010).Theyalsoaresubjecttosimilarregulatoryregimes.

ThemostsignificantattempttointroduceanintegratedmodelinAustraliawastheproposalfromtheSchoolsCommissionin1975(Praetz,1982).ThisoptionhadbeenenvisagedbythethenPrimeMinisterGoughWhitlam(Whitlam,1985),andseveralauthorshavequestionedwhyAustraliadidnotfollowtheNewZealandinitiativeofincorporatingchurchschoolsintoawiderpublicsystematthistime(Furtado,2001),orsubsequently.

Whilethisoptionisdefensibleinprincipleandprecedent,itisnotfeasiblewithinthecurrentandforeseeablepolityofAustralia,andarguablyitneverwas.TheexistenceofhistoricalopportunitiesatthetimeoftheWhitlamGovernmentandtheearlyyearsoftheHawkegovernmentforaNewZealandtypesettlementbetweengovernmentandthechurchschools,whichinrealityweretheCatholicschools,makesforaninterestinghistoricalquestion.ItseemsdoubtfulthatsuchasettlementcouldhavebeenachievedinAustraliabecauseofthecomplexitiesoffederalism(Lingard,2000),thefactthattheCatholicsectorhadtwicethemarketshareinAustraliaasitdidinNewZealand,andtheparticularnatureoftherelationshipbetweentheCatholicChurchandAustralianpolitics(Albinski,1966;Praetz,1980;O’Brien,1999).Irrespectiveofthishistoricalquestion,anintegratedsystemisnotpossiblenowbecausethenon-governmentschoolsareinafarmorepowerfulpositionthaninthe1970sandwillnotbepreparedtotradetheirautonomy,especiallywhentheyhaveachievedclosetothelevelsofpublicfundingthattheyhistoricallyhavesought.RecentannouncementsbyCommonwealthandStateGovernmentonfundingofnon-governmentschoolshavecomewithstatementsof‘accountability’(Gillard,2008c;Tomazin,2008)butnosuggestionsofreducedautonomy.

33

42Thiswasachievedwithanationallyintegratedcurriculumandqualifications,fundingandregulatoryframework.InrecentyearstheCommonwealthrolehasincreasedwiththeestablishmentofanationalproviderregulatoryagencytobeimplementedin2010withresponsibilityfortheregistrationandauditofregisteredtrainingprovidersandtheaccreditationofcourses(COAG,2009).

Morerecently,theAllenConsultancyGroup(2004)producedaproposalfortheVictorianDepartmentofPremierandCabinetofanintegratedmodelofschoolfundinginAustraliawhichenvisagedfullpublicfundingformostlowfeenon-governmentschools.Itgainedlittlepoliticaltraction,possiblybecauseoftheparticularpoliticalcontextatthetime,butalsobecauseofapotentialcostofover$2billion.

Separation of roles – coordinate federalismIn1991,thethenPrimeMinisterPaulKeatingproposedthattheCommonwealthmightrelinquishitsroleinschoolinginexchangeforacompletetakeoverofthevocationaleducationandtraining(VET)sector.Theproposalwasprobablynotveryserious,havingalmostnopossibilityofbeingacceptedbythestates,wouldhavefacedsubstantialdisquietinthenon-governmentschoolssectors,andwasdesignedtopropelmovestowardsanationalVETsystem.42In2006,theNationalCommissionofAudit(2006)alsoproposedthattheresponsibilityforschoolingincludingfundingshouldbelocatedsolelyatthestatelevel.Recently,theQueenslandPremierAnnaBligh(2008)alsospeculatedoverthepotentialforarelocationofresponsibilitiesforeducationandtrainingbetweentheCommonwealthandthestates.

Eachofthesesetsofproposalshasbeenforatypeofcoordinatefederalism(Wiltshire,1981)wherespecificpartsofeducationandtrainingarethediscreteresponsibilityofonelevelofgovernmentonly.Eachofthese,ifimplemented,wouldshiftfundingresponsibilityformostelementsofnon-governmentschoolingtothestates.

Theseproposalsareunlikelytobesuccessfulforpoliticalreasons.TheKeatingandBlighproposalscanberegardedasambitandsemihypotheticalproposalswithinthecontinuingpoliticalmachinationsofAustralianfederalism.TheAuditCommissionproposalwasanobservationaboutthecomplexityofthecurrentfundingarrangements.

Morefundamentally,theseproposalswouldbeunacceptabletothenon-governmentschoolssectorbecausetheywouldbeseenastantamounttodeliveringtheirschoolstothegovernanceregimesofthestatesandtheirstateeducationdepartments.Broadlythenon-governmentschoolsectordoesnotfullytrustthestatesinschooling.Therehasbeenasignificantgulfbetweenthestatesintheirlevelsoffundingofnon-governmentschoolsandtheirgovernmentschoolsectorsremainthebastionoftheresistancetostatefundingofnon-governmentschools,albeitmostlythroughassociatedorganisations.

Transfers to the states Watson(1998)hasproposedthattheCommonwealthshouldtransferitsrecurrentfundingofuntiedFinancialAssistancegrantstothestates.TheCommonwealthwouldretainaroleofsettingnationalframeworksforschoolinginAustralia,andwouldretainitstargetedprogramsforthesepurposes.Shealsoproposestheestablishmentofanationaloranindependentagencytomonitorschoolperformance.ThesechangeswouldrequiresomenegotiatedchangestotheGrants’Commission’sfiscalequalisationformula,withoutwhichnon-governmentschoolsinVictoriaandNewSouthWaleswouldbedisadvantaged.

Theproposalhastheobviousadvantageofdeliveringthefundingresponsibilityforallschoolstothestatesandterritoriesandofbringingallschoolsintomorecommonregulatoryandfundingframeworks.However,assuggestedabove,suchamovewouldbestronglyresistedbythenon-governmentsector,whichinalllikelihoodwouldbemilitantinitsresistancetotheirtotalrelianceuponthestatesforpublicfunding.

Analternativetothisapproachwouldbethetransferofspecialpurposeandtargetedprogramsfundingtothestates.Thiswouldrequirethestatesandtheireducationdepartmentstobuildmoreholisticorcrosssectoraltargetedinterventionstrategiesinschooling.TheCommonwealthwouldbereluctanttoallowsuchtransfersastheseprogramshavebeenthemaininstrumentsofnationalpolicyinschooling.Whilemostfundingisrecurrentgrantstoschools,amajorityofwhichgoestonon-governmentschools,thesegrantsaremoreanexpressionofeducationalandpoliticalneedandhistories.AlternativemeansofsatisfyingtheCommonwealth’spolicyprerogativeinschoolingwouldbeneededtoachievethis.TheVETsectormayoffersomeusefulprecedenthere.PublicfundingwithinthenationalVETsystemhasbeenbasedupontrainingprofilesthatarenegotiatedbetweenthetwolevelsofgovernment.

Funding teachingConnorsandMcMorrow(2010)haveproposedafundingmodelthatisbaseduponthepublicfundingofteachersbytheCommonwealthacrosstheschoolsectors.Itisdesignedtoencourageinvestmentsinqualityteaching,addresseducationalneed,andlocatehighqualityteachersinschoolswheretheyaremostneeded.Itisbasedupontherecognitionthatabout95percentofAustralianschoolshaveasimilarlevelofrecurrentfundingandneedtohaveaconsistentsetoffundingmechanismsatthenationallevel.


ItisadetailedproposalthatlinkswithinaconsistentframeworkCommonwealth,stateandprivatefunding.Itlocatestheresponsibilityforcapitalfundingwiththerespectiveownersofschoolsandincludesmechanismstoencourageschoolstobemoreinclusiveintheirenrolmentpolicies.

VouchersTheallocationofvoucherstostudentsandparentswhichcouldberealisedatanyregisteredschoolshaslongbeenproposedinAustralia.TheInstituteofPublicAffairshasbeenapersistentadvocateofthismechanism(Novak,2009).Voucherstakethefundingsystemsawayfromprovidersandsectors,andallschoolswouldcompetewithinaneducationalmarketforenrolmentsthatwouldprovidetheirincomestream.AsNovak(2009)proposes,voucherscanalsoaccommodateeducationalneedwithweightingsattachedtovariousmeasuressuchasSESorparentaloccupationsandeducationallevels.Underthesecircumstances,thedifferencesbetweenpublicandprivateschoolsdiminish.

Toanextent,aformofvouchershasevolvedinmostschoolsystems.Enrolmentbasedfundingandfundinglinkedtostudents’backgroundshaveasimilareffecttothatofvouchers.Sotherewouldappeartobeadvantagesintheestablishmentofasingleandconsistentsystem.Vouchershavebeenamongstthelongeststandingandmostpersistentproposals,andextendbeyondthoseofMiltonFriedmaninthe1950s(Friedman,1955).AformofvouchershasbeenintroducedinSweden,andvouchershavebeenusedforprogramelementsinAustralia.

Themainissuewithvouchersistheconditionsoftheiruse:thecapacityforextraortop-upfees,theuseofotherenrolmenteligibilitymeasures,andthecapacitytorefuseenrolments.GiventhefundingmodelsinAustralia,vouchersofferlittlethatisnewwithoutallowinganextensionoftheautonomyenjoyedbynon-governmentschoolstothegovernmentschools.Withoutthisextension,themarketadvantagesofthenon-governmentschoolswouldbevastlysuperiorandahighlysegregatedschoolsystemwitharesidualisedgovernmentsectorwouldbeinevitable.Withtheextensionofthisautonomy,theconditionsforthepublicguaranteewouldbeundermined.

Atamorefundamentallevel,vouchersappeartohaveaweakhistoryofsuccess.TheyhavehadsomepowerfuladvocatesinandbeyondgovernmentintheUSA,theUKandAustralia,andtypesofvouchersystemshavebeenintroducedinelementsoftheeducationandtrainingsystems.Despitefavourablepoliticalcircumstances,theyhaverarelybeenintroducedatscale.OneexceptionwastheTrainingCreditsintroducedbytheConservativeGovernmentintheUKinthe1980s,onlytobeabandonedbythesameGovernment.Itappearsthatonereasonwastheincapacitytovarylevelsofpaymentsforthevouchersinordertoaccommodatedifferentratiosofmarginaltofixedandaveragecostsacrosstrainingproviders.Inordertobeviable,andespeciallyencouragenewprovidersintothemarket,theTrainingCreditsweretooexpensive.

School funding: an alternative proposalEachoftheseoptionshasweaknessesintheirpoliticalfeasibility,theirimpactortheiroperationallogistics.Ashaspreviouslybeenargued(Keating,2009a)itisthefederalstructureofAustraliangovernmentanditsintersectionwithalargenon-governmentschoolsectorthatoveracenturyhadestablishedastrongcultureofautonomy,incontrastwithathenhighlystatecentricpublicsystem(Butts,1955;Furtado,2001)thathasproducedAustralia’sheterogeneousschoolgovernanceandfundingarrangements.Anysignificantchangesinfundingarrangementswillneedtobethroughthefederalistframeandwillneedtorespectthecharacterofthepolityinwhichtheysit.Thisincludesthenatureoftheautonomyofnon-governmentschools,theirattitudetowardsstategovernmentsandeducationdepartments,thepoliticalneedsoftheCommonwealthandstategovernments,thepolicyprerogativesoftheCommonwealthGovernment,andtheroleofstategovernmentsindeliveringthepublicguarantee.

Radicalreformproposalshaveswungbetweenatraditionalstatecentricmodelofnon-governmentschoolintegrationorabsorptionwithinthestateschoolsystemstoformsofprivatisationthroughselfgovernanceandvouchers.Eachoftheseapproacheschallengesthegovernancephilosophyofoneorotherofthesectors:incorporationchallengestheautonomyofthenon-governmentschools,andselfmanagementandvoucherschallengetheprincipleofthepublicguarantee.Analternativeneedstoprovideaplatformfortheobjectivesofextendingtheresponsibilityforthepublicguaranteeintoelementsofthenon-governmentsectorwithinagreedlevelsofautonomyforthesector.

35

43Comparisonsofpercapitaresourcelevelsbetweenthesectorsaredifficultanddisputed.TheAGSRCisanindexratherthanameasure,andappearstounderestimatetherecurrentcostsforgovernmentschools.TheProductivityCommission(2010)estimatedtheaverageinschoolexpenditureforgovernmentschoolsas$10,539forprimaryand$13,366forsecondaryschoolsin2004–5.However,thefundingformulaeforgovernmentschoolstypicallyincludeenrolmentbasedpaymentsthatarelowerthanaveragerecurrentcosts.Abettermeasuremaybestudent–staffratios.Averagestudentteacherratiosin2009were14.0forgovernmentschools,15.1forCatholicschools;and12.2forindependentschools.Theratiosofnonteachingtoteachingstaffin2009were0.36;0.35;and.0.47forthegovernment,Catholicandindependentsectors,respectively(calculatedfromdatafromABS,2009).

Thisisbasedupontheassumptionthatsignificantelementsofthenon-governmentsectorhaveacommitmenttothecommongoodandarewillingtomakeacontributiontothepublicguarantee.Italsoisbasedupontheargumentthatcurrentfundingarrangementsandtheassociatedgovernancearrangementsmilitateagainstamoredirectandnegotiatednon-governmentsectorcontributiontowardsthepublicgood.

Uponthisbasisitisproposedthatareformedfundingmodelshould:

> Beconsistentlyappliedacrossthegovernmentandnon-governmentschoolsectors;

> Bewithinanationalframeworkforallschoolsinregardstocurriculum,standardsofprovisionanddutyofcare,andappropriateorganisationalbehaviours;which

> Entitleallsuchschoolstominimumresourcelevels,orwhattheCommonwealthhastermed‘basicfundingentitlement’(Gillard,2010a);

The model

Figure 1Proposed national common resourcing model

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Private resource levels

Community ratePublic fundingPrivate fundingNeeds basedCommunity guarantee fund

> Continuetolocatetheresponsibilityforachievingthepublicguarantee,consistentwiththeconstitutionalsettlement,atthestategovernmentlevel,butthroughnewpartnershipswiththeCommonwealthatthenationallevelandelementsofthenon-governmentsectorattheregionalorlocallevel;

> Locatetheresponsibilityforgoalsandobjectives–includingthosefordifferentgroupsacrossthecommunity–atthenationallevel;

> Locatetheresponsibilityforinterventionstoachieveandimproveoutcomesatthestateandgovernmentandnon-governmentsystemslevels;and

> Shareresponsibilityforthemonitoringandanalysisofoutcomesbetweenthelevelsofgovernmentandgovernmentandnon-governmentagencies.

1 Theproposedmodelisoutlinedinthefigureaboveandwouldworkasfollows:

> TheCommonwealthandstateandterritorygovernmentswouldprovidearesourcingguaranteeforallschools,governmentandnon-governmentintheformofacommunity rate(representedasaconstantlevelof100onthe‘y’axis).

> Thecommunityratewouldbesetatalevelbelowthatofthemediangovernmentrecurrentresourcelevelsforschools.Thisdiscountingisnecessaryinordertoprovidesufficientpublicfundsfortheotherelementsofthemodel.Thediscountofthecommunityrateagainstthemedianresourcelevelswouldneedtobeatleast15percentandprobablyabout20percent.

> Themedianresourcelevelwouldbesomeconstructofaveragegovernmentschoolrecurrentresourcelevels.McMorrow(2010)hasestimatedthetotalrecurrentresourcesperstudentin2006as$8,335inCatholicand$11,597inindependentschools.TheAGSRCfor2006was$8,593.43


2Againstthiscommunityratewouldbeaguaranteedresourcinglevelthatcombinedpublicandprivatefunding.Thiswouldconsistof:

> Thepublic funding rate(darkgreyline)madeupofCommonwealthandstateandterritoryfunds,ataratioofapproximately40:60.ThisratiowouldavoidanytransferofGSTfunds,whichhamperedthenationalhealthsystemnegotiationsbetweentheCommonwealthandthestatesinApril2010.

> Private revenue(representedasaconstantfactorofthe‘x’axisasthedottedpinkline).Thereisaninverseratiobetweenthepublicandprivateresources.However,thisisnotaconstantratio:

– Schoolsthatgainedprivaterevenuewouldnothavetheirpublic funding reduceduntilthisrevenuesurpassedagivenlevel(possiblyabout$1,500perenrolmentforsecondaryschools).Thisisnecessarytopreventamajorfallinprivatecontributionstoschooling.

– OntheotherhandthislevelcouldbelowerasthebulkoflowfeeschoolsareCatholicschoolsandtheNationalCatholicEducationCommissionhasapositionthatprivateresourcesshouldrepresentabout15percentoftheirschools’revenue.

– Thediscountingofpublicfundingagainstprivaterevenuewouldbegraduatedsoastomoderatethedisincentivesforschoolswithmediumlevelsofprivaterevenue,suchthatschoolswithprivaterevenueof$3,000mighthavetheirpublicfundsdiscountedby$1,500.Afterthisleveldiscountingmightbeclosetodollarfordollar.

– Withinaframeofcostneutralityanyreductionofthediscountingofthepublicfundingforincreasesinprivatefundingwouldhavetheeffectofloweringthelevelofthecommunityrate.Detailedresearchandmodellingoftherates(communityanddiscount)wouldneedtobeundertaken.

– Schoolsubsystemsshouldcontinuetobebulkfunded.ThiswouldallowsystemauthoritiestovarylevelsoffundingforindividualschoolswithinthequantumoffundingascurrentlyoccurswiththegovernmentandCatholicsystems.

– Allschoolsirrespectiveoftheirprivaterevenuelevelswouldbeguaranteedaminimumlevelofpublicfunding.CurrentlythecombinedminimumlevelsofCommonwealthandstatefundingisabout17.15percent(McMorrow,2008)ofAGSRC.Alevelof15percentmightbefeasible.Thisisrepresentedonthegraphasthelevellingoffinthedeclineinthebaserate.

– Thereisacasetobemadethatthelevelofbenchmarkfundingshouldbelinkedtoneeds,usingameasuresuchastheICSEAscale.Thishastheadvantagesof:

– Noteffectingincentivesforprivaterevenue–althoughthereisanothersidetothisargumentinthatparentsandfamiliesshouldnotbesubjecttounduepressuretocontributetodirectcostsofschooling;and

– Beingbaseduponparents’andfamilies’capacityratherthanwillingnesstocontribute.

Analternativewouldbetoincludetwotypesofpublicfunding:onebaseduponlevelsofprivaterevenueandonebaseduponneed.TogethertheywouldprovidetheguaranteedbenchmarkfundingandtheneedsbasedfundingabovethebenchmarklevelandcouldbedeliveredbythestateandterritoryandCommonwealthGovernmentsrespectively,asiscurrentlythecase.Thisarrangementwouldmoderatethepressuresforreducingprivaterevenuewhenpublicresourcingisdiscountedagainstprivateresourcelevels.

However,ifsuchmeasuresledtoorconstitutedtheabandonmentofthelongstandingprincipleoffreeschoolingtheywouldbeuntenable.Forthisreasonthebenchmarkfundingwouldneedtobelinkedtoprivaterevenue.

– Soacorestructuralprincipleofthemodelisthatthebenchmarklevelorcommunityratemustbeseparatefromeducationalneed.Thecommunityrateistheminimumresourcelevelforallstudents.Needsareinadditiontothislevel.

– Thoseschools,governmentandnon-government,withlowlevelsofprivaterevenuewouldhaveresourcelevelsthatarenotaboveormuchabovethecommunitybenchmark.Thecompensationforthiswouldbethroughtwoothersourcesofpublicfunds.

3Needs based funds(lightpinkline)couldbeallocatedbythestateorCommonwealthgovernments,oracombinationofthetwo.Ineithercasetheyshouldbelargerthancurrentlevels,notwithstandingtherecentCommonwealthinvestmentundertheNationalPartnerships.Alargeallocationisneededtoensurethathighneedschools,whichwillmostlybenoorlowfeeshouldnotbedisadvantagedbytheneedinthemodeltoretaintheincentivesforprivateinvestment,aswellasthemoredirectpurposeofsupportingeducationalneed.Logicallyneedsbasedfundingshouldbelocatedatthestatelevel.However,asitisformuladrivenitcouldbelocatedateitherorboth.AsindicatedabovetheneedscomponentcouldbeexpandedatthecostoftheminimumbenchmarkfundingasacompromisebetweentheuseofaneducationresourceindexandanSES(orICSEA)measureforlevelsofpublicfunding. With savings from the discounting of the community rate against the median school recurrent resource costs approximately $2.8 million (see below) could be allocated for needs based funding.

37

4Community guarantee fund (lightgreyline)wouldbeanewinnovationunderthemodel.Thepurposeoftheseresourcesistwofold:asincentiveforschoolstohaveopenenrolmentpoliciesandtocooperatewitheachotherindeliveringandimprovingthequalityofschooling;andameansofsupportingcloserintegrationofschoolswiththeircommunities.Ifsuccessfulthiswouldbeasubstantialfundofupto10percentofthecurrentrevenueofmostnonandlowfeeschools.Itcouldbeforasmanyas60percentofallschools,andprobablyagreaterpercentageofprimaryschools.With savings from the discounting of the community rate against the median school recurrent resource costs approximately $2.0 million could be allocated for the Community Guarantee fund.

5Special purpose fundingTheCommonwealthandthestatesandterritorieswouldcontinuetoinvestinspecialpurposeprograms,suchascareerseducation,specialneeds,literacyprograms,indigenousandruraleducationprograms.

Theoutlineofthesystemasshownaboveisindicativeonly,aslevelsandrelationshipsbetweenelementsoffundingwouldrequiregreaterinvestigationandmodelling.

The community guarantee fundThismodelisconditionedbythepoliticalscopeofschoolresourcingpolicyinAustralia.Assuchitisnotoptimalinitsadministrativeandgovernancedesignandarguablyitretainscharacteristicsofschoolautonomythatwouldbetoleratedinfewcountriesandareunjustifiedinprinciple.Howeverthiswindmilloftheautonomyofpubliclyfundedprivateschoolinghasbeentiltedatforseveraldecades,withlittleornoimpact.Anotherapproachisneeded.

Themodelputforwardbythisproposalthereforehastwocoreinnovations.Oneistheelimination of the parallel systems of fundingwithinthefederalistframe.Thisiscriticalforanygenuineandlongstandingreform.TheparallelsystemhasbeenthebasisfortheaberrationsoftheAustralianapproachestoschoolresourcinganditsmaintenancewillensuretheircontinuance.

TheotheristheproposalforaCommunity Guarantee fund.Asoutlinedabovethishasdualpurposes.Oneisthatofrewardinginclusiveenrolmentanddeliverypractices.ThishelpstocountertheintrinsicsegregatingeffectsofthemarketmodeloftheAustraliansystemwithinwhichthepublic-privatedivisionhasbeenakeydriver.Itisdesignedtoactasabridgebetweenthoseelementsofthegovernmentandnon-governmentsectorsthatsharecommoneducationalandsocialobjectives.Indoingthis,togetherwiththeavailabilityofasubstantialamountofneedsbasedresources,ithelpstocompensatethoseschoolsthatdonotseekincreasedrevenuethroughfeeregimesandothercharges,whichthemodelcontinuestoallow.

Thesecondandoverlappingpurposeistoenhancethepublicguarantee,orcommunityguaranteeofqualityschoolingforall.Thisguaranteeneedstobeattwolevels:

> That of access to schooling for all.Thishasbeenservedmainlybythegovernmentschoolsector,butnotexclusivelyandnotconsistently–especiallyatthesecondarylevel.Giventrendsinenrolmentsbetweenthesectorsandwithinthemthereisaneedformechanismstoexpandtheschoolcontributionstothisguarantee.

> That of quality for all.Therearemultipleeffortstoincreaseschoolqualityanddelivertheobjectivesharedbybothlevelsofgovernmentofqualityschoolingforall.Themechanismsincludemarketbasedapproaches,andformsofinterventionsincludingplacebasedinterventions.Thecommunityguaranteefundispremisedupontheargumentorhistoricalobservationthatmarketmechanismswillalwaysproduceresidualisingconsequences.Giventheembeddedstatusofeducationalchoiceandtheprincipleoftransparencyofeducationaloutcomes,communityapproachesareneededtocomplementthemandmoderatetheirnegativeimpacts.

Itisarguedthattoreachoratleastapproachtheobjectiveofqualityforallthereisaneedtomovetowardsthelocalorcommunitylevel.Thishasbeenalongestablishedorganisationalbaseforpublicschoolsystemsinmostcountries,andseveralincludingtheScandinaviancountrieshavedevolvedthefundingandsomeothercentralgovernancefunctionsofschoolingtothemunicipalorlocallevelinrecentdecades.InAustraliaseveralstateshaveemployednetworkapproachestoschoolimprovementandprogramdelivery.


Itisassumedthatbothlevelsofgovernmentwouldcontinuetoundertakespecialpurposeinitiatives.TheseinitiativestogetherwiththeCommunityEducationGuaranteefundwouldbekeymechanismsindeliveringthepublicguaranteeandinsecuringthepartnershipofelementsofthenon-governmentsectorinfulfillingthisrole.Thefundscouldbeusedacrossschoolsfromdifferentsectorsandcouldbethebasisofnegotiatedarrangementsbetweengovernmentandschoolsandschoolsectors.Inthisway,whilethenon-governmentschools’autonomyisnotthreatened,governmentastheresponsibleagencyforthepublicguaranteeandmissioncannegotiateandeffectivepurchasecontributionsfromthenon-governmentandgovernmentschoolsectors.

Systemic fundingItissuggestedthatsystemicfundingshouldcontinuetooperate.Blockgrantsthroughsystemicagencieshavebeenasignificantinstrumentfortheestablishmentanddeliveryoftheneedsbasedprincipleinnon-governmentschoolfunding(O’Brien,1999).TheirmainuseiswithintheCatholicsector.Theirequalisationeffectuponresourcelevelsforschoolscanbeseeninthelevelsofresourcesofsystemiccomparedwithnon-systemicschoolsacrossdifferentSESbands(ANAO,2009).Schoolswithinthesystemicfundingsystemwithhighlevelsofeducationalneedswouldalsohaveaccesstothestategovernmentneedsbasedfundingandcouldparticipateinthestateinitiatives.

BlockfundingalsocanalleviatetheproblemofcreatingpressureuponsomegovernmentschoolsthathavehighSESprofilestoseekhigherlevelsofprivateincome,includingputtingpressureuponparentsforvoluntaryfeepayments.Systemauthoritiescanensurethatalloftheirschoolshaveadequateresourcelevelsfortheirneeds.

TherearetwoweaknesseswiththecurrentCommonwealthSESmodel.Becauseitreliesuponcollecteddistrictcensusdata(whichitmustdo),itdoesnotaccountforincomedifferenceswithinthesedistrictsandtheacademicselectivitythattheSESproxycannotidentify.Second,itbuildsSESintothebaselevelfunding,whichrequiresittoprovidethenodisadvantageconcessionwhenintroducingtheSESmodel.Afundingmodelthatlinksbaselevelfundingtoaminimumresourcelevelshouldaccountforprivateincome.Needsbasedfundingshouldbelinkedtomeasuresofeducationdisadvantageandincomedisadvantagebecauseofthecostofschoolingforfamilies(BondandHorn,2009).

Thelevelsoffundingprovidedforeducationneedsasalevelofrecurrentfundingforgovernmentschoolstandardshasbeenlowbyinternationalstandards(Keating,2009b).Inthemid2000s,themajorsourceoffundsforneedsbasedinvestmentswithinmanyofstatesystemsunderLaborgovernmentswerefromthespecialpurposepaymentsoftheCommonwealthundertheCoalitionGovernment.

OneofthethreeprioritiesoftheCommonwealthGovernmentishelpingdisadvantagedschoolcommunities(Gillard,2008c).GiventhepatternsofeducationalparticipationinAustraliaandtheintensificationofpovertylevelsinhouseholdswithschoolagestudents,anyoverallimprovementswillneedtoincludeimprovementsforthemostdisadvantaged.Mostofthesegroupsandcommunitiesareservedbythegovernmentschoolsystem.Thefundingandassociatedprogramarrangementsforeducationalneedshouldbeloosenedfromtheirbaseingeneralresourceallocationsthatlimittheirtargetingandappropriateuse.

Schoolswouldretaintheirautonomy,buttherewouldbealocalordistrictfunctionofsupportingschools,linkingthemwithotheragencies,providingservices,supportingandinformingparents,andlinkingschools.Theapproachwouldhavesomesimilaritieswiththe‘HealthNetworks’thatcurrentlyoperateinVictoriawithapparentsuccess.Itwouldnotbefeasibletolocatetheirgovernanceinlocalgovernmentortheexistinggovernmentschoolregionalordistricteducationoffices.Anewsetofarrangementswouldneedtobeestablishedthatlocateddecisionmakingatthelocallevel,engenderhighlevelsoflocalparticipationandtrust,butensuredprobityandsomedegreeofconsistencyintheallocationoffunds.

Educational needs and the public guaranteeThemodelhastwosetsofrelationshipsthatinfluencegovernmentfundinglevels.Thefirstisrelatedtolevelsofprivaterevenue,similartothesystemusedthroughtheEducationResourceIndex.Asindicatedabove,abufferofprivateresourcingbeforeanyreductioningovernmentfundingwouldencouragethemaintenanceofthelowlevelsofprivaterevenuethatexistinalmostallschools.Forexample,thelevelsofprivateincomeinsystemicschoolsaremostlyinthe$1000to$3000range(ANAO,2009),andmostwouldsuffernooronlymoderatereductionsinbasefundingundertheproposedmodel.

Theotherrelationshipiswitheducationalneed,whichwouldmostlikelybebaseduponsomemeasureofSESorfamilyoccupation.Thusaschoolcouldhavearelativelyhighlevelofprivateincomebutalsoqualifyforhighlevelsofneedsbasedfunding,asisthecasewiththeCommonwealthfundingprogram,althoughsuchschoolswouldbeexceptional.

39

Levels of governmentInthecontextofthenationaldevelopmentsinschooling,thefundingmodelwouldcomplementanationalframework.Thereislogicinnationalapproachestocurriculumandqualifications,provisionstandards,includingprofessionalstandardsforschoolprincipalsandteachers.ThereisalsoacaseforanationaloverviewofthepatternsofparticipationandoutcomesinAustralia.

Theprincipleofdevolutionsuggeststhatmostinterventionprogramsshouldbelocatedatthestateratherthanthenationallevel.AlthoughtheCommonwealthhasastrongagendaofsocialinclusionandhelpingdisadvantagedschoolcommunities,itwouldbemoreappropriateforstateandterritorygovernmentstoadministeranddesignprogramsforschools,schoolcommunitiesandregions.ThiscouldbethroughthemaintenanceandextensionoftheNationalPartnerships,althoughthelongtermviabilityofthisapproach,givenpoliticalvicissitudes,mightbequestioned.

Therelativepolicyandadministrativestrengthofthetwolevelsofgovernmentwouldbeinfluencedbytheirdiscretionarypowersovertherespectivefundingcomponents.Stategovernmentscontinuetoownandberesponsibleformostschoolsandthroughthemretaincoreresponsibilityforthepublicguarantee.Whilethenon-governmentsectorwouldprefertonotdealwiththemandtheirdepartments,compromisesneedtobemade.Inthecontextofguaranteedbenchmarklevelsofresourceswithoutanymajorcompromisesintheirautonomy,thecompromiseofengagementwiththestatesandtheirdepartmentsandsomecontributiontowardsthepublicguaranteeinexchangeforadditionalresourcesseemsreasonable.

Assuchthestate,andinthisregardthestategovernmentsarethelocationofthisresponsibility,hastheresponsibilityfor‘thesystem’.However,unlikethecurrentarrangements,thissystemisnotdefinedbyandconfinedtogovernmentschoolsalone.Itshould–andwearguethatinthefutureitmust–includenon-governmentschools.Theseschoolswouldbeinpartnershipwiththestateindeliveringthepublicguarantee,eitherasindividualschoolsorassubsystems.Theircontributionthroughthesepartnershipsisboththroughthedirectprovisionofschoolingandtheengagementwithotherschools,schoolandotheragencies,andgovernment.

Throughthesepartnerships,whichwouldcontainexplicitobjectivessuchasaccessforall,meetingtheneedsofdisadvantagedcommunities,cateringforrefugeestudents,supportingstudentswithdisabilities,meetingthetargetsforindigenousstudentsanddealingwithstudentsatriskofearlyschoolleaving,theseschoolsandcollectives–governmentandnon-governmentschools–aresupportedwithextraresourcesbygovernment.

Underthesearrangements,itwouldbeconsistentforthecurrentinconsistencyoftheapplicationofcharitablestatusforschoolstobechanged.Charitablestatusshouldbeawardedeithertoallschoolsoruponthebasisoftheirmission,ratherthantheircapacitytochargefeesandhaveautonomyoverenrolments,whichineffectarethecurrentarrangements.Giventhelegalcomplexities,themostviableapproachistoallowallschoolsthatmeetregistrationrequirementstohavecharitablestatus.

Charitable statusTheproposedfundingmodelisbasedupontheassumptionthattheformalownershipofaschoolshouldnotinfluenceitslevelofpublicfunding.Fundingisbaseduponfourcriteria:

> Compliancewithpublicpurposesasestablishedinthenationalandstatecurricula,andnationalandstateregulations;

> Therealisationofprivateincome;> Educationalneed;and> Autonomyandtherealisationofautonomy–andconverselycontributionstowardsaneducationalguaranteeattheregionalorlocallevel.

Therearecomplexitiesrelatedtothelastthreecriteria.ThecurrentCommonwealthSESmodelisbaseduponameasureofthecapacityforprivaterevenue,whichisthesamemeasureofeducationalneed.TheproposedmodeldividesthesetwosothatmeasuredlevelsofprivateincomeareusedforonefundingstreamandSESoranothermeasureofeducationaldisadvantageisusedforneedsbasedfunding.

Thesecondcomplexityisaroundtheideaofautonomy.Theinclusionofthisfundingstreamisanexplicitacknowledgementthattherearesocialpurposesofschoolingthatgobeyondthatofthesingleschool.Thatis,therecontinuestobetheneedforasystemandsubsystems.Theneedsarelocatedinthepublicguaranteeandtheresponsibilitytoprotect,whichinherentlyarestateresponsibilities,butashasbeenargued,canonlybestronglyrealisedinAustraliathroughpartnershipswiththenon-governmentsector.


44Thisassumesthattheratiopublictoprivateexpenditureinthenon-governmentsectordoesnotchangesignificantly.The15percentreductionfromrealgovernmentschoolexpendituretotheCommunityRatewouldconstituteanoverallreductionofabout10.5percentasonethirdofschoolsarenon-governmentandwouldnothaveasignificantreductionintheirpublicrevenue.

Neverthelessthenon-governmentsectorhasobservedtheincapacitiesofstateeducationdepartmentstofullyseparatetheirgovernanceandfundingrolesforallschoolsandtheirownershipandgovernanceofgovernmentschools.Forthisreasonthecorediscretionaryelementoftheproposedfundingmodel–the Community Guarantee Fund –shouldhaveadegreeofautonomyfromstategovernmentsandbelocateditsgovernancelocatedatalocalorregionallevel.

Funding distributionsThetotallevelsofincomeforrecurrentcostsforAustralianschoolsapproached$45billionin2006–7.TherevenuesourcesandamountsareindicatedinTable1.Commonwealthpaymentsalsoincludeapproximately$2billioninspecificprogrampayments.Neverthelessitsshareoftotalcostsislessthan25percentofallschooleducationrevenueandlessthan30percentofallgovernmentpayments.WithoutashiftinGST,thisdistributionoffundingacrossthetwolevelsofgovernmentwouldneedtobereflectedintheaggregatesforeachoftheelementsofthisproposedmodel.

In2007–8,thestategovernmentpaymentsaccountedforapproximately65percentofschools’revenueand77percentofrecurrentgovernmentpaymentstoschools.In2008,thebulkofsystemicCatholicschoolswerefundedbytheCommonwealthatarateof56.2percentofAGSRC.However,theaveragepercentagewasslightlyhigherthanthis.StaterecurrentfundingforCatholicschoolsin2008wasapproximately23percentofAGSRC,sothecombinedlevelof79.2percentofAGSRCwasclosetothecurrentpercentagethatstategovernmentscontributetothepublicrecurrentfundingofschoolinginAustralia,andtheproposedlevelofthecommunityrateasapercentageoftheaveragegovernmentschoolrecurrentfundinglevel.PrivateincomefortheCatholicsectorin2008was$3059perstudent,whichtakesittotalrevenueclosetotheAGSRC.

Itcouldbeanticipatedthereforethatthevastbulkofschools,consistingofgovernmentschools,Catholicssystemicschools,andindependentschoolswithprivaterevenuenearorbelowthatoftheCatholicschoolaveragewouldreceiverevenuelevelsofatleast5percentabovetheCommunityRate.

Thisisbecausegovernmentschoolsgainabout5percentoftheirrevenuefromprivatesources,andblockfundingofthegovernmentandCatholicsectorscouldensurethatschoolswithnoprivaterevenuearecrosssubsidised.NeedsbasedfundingandtheCommunityEducationfundwouldliftthebulkofschoolstolevelsnearthecurrentlevelsforgovernmentschools.

The‘PublicFunding’componentofthemodel,assumingthemaintenanceofasimilartotalratioofpublictoprivaterevenue,wouldconstituteabout86.2percentofcurrentgovernmentrecurrentpayments.44Thiswouldleaveabout$4.8billionforneedsbasedfundingandtheCommunityEducationFund,basedupon2007–8paymentswheretotalpublicfundingwas$36.42billion(ProductivityCommission,2010).

Itisimportantfortheintegrityofthemodelthattheneeds based andtheCommunity Guarantee fundsshouldbesubstantial:

> Theyneedtocompensatethebulkofschoolsthathavenoorlowlevelsofprivateincome;

> Needsbasedpaymentsneedtobesubstantialtohaveanyimpact,whichalsomeansthattheyneedtoberelativelyconcentrated;and

> Schoolsthatacceptallcomersandcontributetothecommunityguaranteeneedtobeproperlysupported.

Table 1School education revenue by sector and source, 2006–7 ($000’s)

Commonwealth States and Territories Totals Private income Total

Government 2,950,665 26,272,069 29,222,734 1,461,367(a) 30,684,101

Non-government 5,531,062 2,135,703 7,888,765 6,280,560 14,169,325

Combined 8,481,727 28,407,772 37,111,499 7,741,927 44,853,426

(a)Estimatedat5percentofrevenue.Sources:MCEETYA,2008a;ProductivityCommission,2009.

41

InthecontextofthedebateandsubsequentpartialagreementbetweentheCommonwealthandsevenofthestatesandterritories,anotherproposalforthetransferbackofGSTfundstotheCommonwealthisnotfeasible.Thereforeitwouldbenecessaryforthetwolevelsofgovernmenttosharethefundingofthecommunityrate,whichwouldbroadlybeataratioof60percentstatesandterritoriesand40percentCommonwealth,similartothatforthevocationaleducationandtrainingsector.

Commonwealthexpenditureonschooleducationforthecurrentyearisover$16billion(Table2).Thefigureisinflatedbecauseoftheimpactofnewinitiativesandestimatesfor2011–12are$13.8billion(Table2).

New relationships with governmentTheproposedarrangementsofferthenon-governmentsectorgreatersecurityoverfunding,orbasefunding.Thisallowsforanewsetofrelationshipsoverthelinksbetweenresourcing,thepublicguarantee,andautonomy.Withintheserelationshipsthepublicguaranteerepresentsboththeguaranteeofaccessforallandtheguaranteeofschooling’scontributiontothefoundationsoftheliberalandseculardemocracy.Withinthem,theautonomyofthenon-governmentschoolsectorisalsopartiallyrepresentativeoftheparentalchoiceandrighttohavetheirchildrenschooledwithinaparticularphilosophy,andpartiallyacapacityinapluralisticliberaldemocracyforotheragenciesorelementsofcivilsocietytodirectlycontributetoschoolingandtothenationalnarrativeonschoolingtoenhancethecommongood.

Publicfundingmediatesthisautonomyinfourways:

> Atthenationallevelthesettingsforschoolingareestablishedandtobeeligibleforthebasefundingallschoolsneedtomeetthesesettings.Theyincludecurriculumanddeliverystandards.Baselevelfundingisanacknowledgementthattheyhavebeenmet.

> Areductionofbasefundingasprivateresourcesincreaseisbaseduponthefactthatsuchschoolshaveareducedneedforsuchfundingandthattheassociatedfeeregimeslimitaccessandanycontributiontothepublicguarantee.

> Needsbasedfundingatthestatelevelisanacknowledgementofeducationalneed,thelikelihoodoflowlevelsofprivateincome,andrecognitionthattheschool–inallprobability–ismakingasignificantcontributiontothepublicguaranteethroughitsenrolmentpractices.

> TheCommunity Guaranteefundisakeymechanismfordeliveringthepublicguaranteeandforlocatingpartnershipsatalevelwherethemoreautonomousnon-governmentschools,systemicschoolsandotheragenciesarebetterabletoengage.

Theproposedfundingmodelisdesignedessentiallytoaddresstheimpasseovertheautonomyofnon-governmentschoolinginAustraliabyestablishingaplatformforanegotiatedparticipationinthepublicguaranteeandpublicmissionforschooling,whicharethebasicjustificationsforpublicinvestmentineducation.

Itisdesignedtobuildaplatformforanegotiatedcontribution.Toachievethisitisessentialtoprovidesecurityforthenon-governmentsectorforabaselevelofresources.A‘settlement’onthisallowsforamoreopenandshareddialoguebetweengovernmentanditsagenciesandnon-governmentschoolsandtheiragencies–amoresharedapproachwithcivilsocietyintheincreasinglydifficultchallengeofimprovingschooleducationoutcomesandequity,especiallyfromdisadvantagedcommunitiesinAustralia.

“Atrulycivilsociety”(Cox,1995,intitle)can’taffordtoretainthecurrentseparationbetweengovernmentandnon-governmentschooling,andlocatewhatmaywellbecomethemajoritysectoroutsideofthesystemsthatarerequiredtodeliverthepublicguarantee.ThealternativeofamarketisedapproachtoschoolingwillbecomeinevitableinAustraliaifthegovernmentschoolsystemscontinuetodeclineandanationalschoolsystemcontinuestoevolvetowardsamajorityofschoolsoperatingupontheprincipleofautonomy.ThecurrentmilitantapproachoftheCommonwealthGovernmenttowardsschoolreformisaproductofthelimitationsofthestategovernmentsandtheireducationdepartments.However,theCommonwealthcannotfulfilthetraditionalroleofthestateschoolsystems.Partnershipsareneededandneedtobeembeddedwiththenon-governmentsector.Fundingiscentraltothisandaradicalapproachisneeded.

Table 22009 budget estimates for 2009–10, school education.

Programs Amount

Governmentschools 4,342

Non-governmentschools 6,306

Schooleducation–specificfunding 5,765

Source:CommonwealthofAustralia(2009)


Issues and alternativesResource index or SESAspreviouslydiscussedtherearestrengthsandweaknessesofbothsystems.OnthewholetheindependentschoolsectorwouldmostprobablyfavourtheSESmodel,andmanyindependentschoolshavegainedextrafundingthroughthemodel.SEShastwoapplications:oneinrelationtoprivateincomeandtheotherinisolationfromit.ThecurrentCommonwealthSESmodelcutsthelinkbetweenprivatefundingandpublicfundingfornon-governmentschools.However,itcontinuestoassumealinkbecauseitassumesthatschoolswithhighSESenrolmentswillhavesubstantialprivaterevenueresources.

ThereforethemaintenanceofthislinkforacommonpublicfundingsystemwouldassumethatallschoolswithmidtohighSESenrolmentswouldneedtohavesubstantialprivaterevenuesystems.Thisisuntenableasitwouldconstitutetheabandonmentoffreeschooling.NootherOECDcountryhasattakenthisstep.Therefore,thepublicguaranteeofthecommunitystandardcannotbeconditionalonSES,andsomustberelatedtothelevelofprivateincomethatschoolschoosetoseek.

Special needs Amajorcomplaintofthenon-governmentsectorhasbeenthelowlevelsofpaymentsforstudentswithspecialneeds,includingdisabilities.Thecountercomplaintfromthegovernmentsectorhasbeenthatthenon-governmentsectordoesnotenrolitsshareofstudentswithspecialneeds,indigenousstudents,andstudentswhofacedifficultcircumstancesandwhodisplayassociatedbehaviouralandlearningpatterns.

Thecoreprinciplesofthismodelwouldrequirethatallschoolsbetreatedinthesamewayinregardstospecialneeds.However,itisalsopossibleforschoolstobeselectiveinneeds.Somefactorssuchasstudentbehavioursarenotmeasurableandnotsubjecttoneedspayments.ThisisoneofthereasonsthattheCommunity Guarantee fundisproposed.Itisameansofsupportingthoseschoolsthattakeorendeavourtotakeallcomers.

Fees in government schoolsTherearepressuresuponthelongstandingprinciplethatschoolingshouldbefree,andanewfundingmodelshouldnotincreasethesepressures.Forthisreasonblockfundingandapublicfundingregimelinkedtolevelsofprivatefundingarenecessary.

Base funding and marginal fundingSchoolsystemsstructuretheirfundingregimestocompensateforthediseconomiesofscaleofsmallschools.Thistypicallycomesintheformofbasefundingguarantees.Thisisnecessaryforaschoolsystemthatmustcaterforallstudentsinalllocalities,andisafactorthatincreasestheaveragecostofgovernmentcomparedtonon-governmentschools.Itshouldbeassumedthatanon-governmentschoolwilloperateuponthebasisofaviableenrolmentnumberandbasefundingisnotjustifiedasnon-governmentschoolsarenotpartofthepublicguarantee.However,incircumstanceswheresomenon-governmentschoolsshareorcontributetothisguaranteetheremaybeaneedtoprovidesomebasesupport.Ifsuchschoolsarepartofasystem,whichinmostcaseswouldbeaCatholicsystem,thisfundingcouldbeaccommodatedthroughblockfunding.TheCommunity Guarantee Fundcouldalsosupportthiscontribution.

Capital fundingThepaperhasnotaddressedthequestionofpublicfundingforthecapitalcostsofnon-governmentschools.Theprinciplesbehindtheproposalforrecurrentfundingarelocatedintheideaofthepublicguarantee:aguaranteeofqualityeducationforall.Whiletheprinciplesaccommodatetheprincipleofchoicetheydonotsupportaneducationalconsumptionmodelasacoredriverofpubliclyfundedschooling.Theextensionoftheseprinciplestocapitalfundingwouldimplysomeconstraintsonpublicfundingofthecapitalnon-governmentschools.Theconstraintswouldbebothplanningconstraints,suchasthoseattemptedundertheformerNewSchoolsPolicyoftheCommonwealthGovernment,andlimitsupontheamountoffundingbenchmarkedagainstanindependentcapitalresourcingstandard.

The devil is in the details Anychangeinafundingsystemwillcreatecontestation.Itwillalsoinevitablycreatewinnersandlosers,andforthisreasonchangeswillinvariablycomeatacosttogovernment,themostobviousbeingtheCommonwealth’sguaranteethatnonon-governmentschoolwouldlosefundingwiththeintroductionoftheSESmodel.Sowhilecostneutralityisacoreprincipleoftheproposedmodel,ifintroduceditwouldinevitablyinvolvesomeextracosts.

Theproposedmodelismorerelationalthanthecurrentarrangements.ThefourfundingsystemsforAustralianschoolsaremostlyuncoupled,withthemostobviousexceptionbeingthelinkbetweenAGSRCandnon-governmentschoolfundinglevels.Thelackofcouplingisanexpressionofthepoliticallogicofthecurrent‘system’anditslackofprincipleandpurposefullogic.

43

Theproposedmodelisanintegratedsystemwheretherearemoredirectrelationshipsbetweendifferentelementsoffunding–Commonwealth,stateandprivate–andeducationalneed.Asaconsequence,theserelationshipsandthelevelsoffundingwillbecontested.DetailsofsuchmattersastherelationshipbetweenprivaterevenueandtheCommonwealthbasefunding,thebasisforthedistributionofstatelevelfunding,levelsofneedsbasedfundingandmethodsofallocation,andtherolesofthetwolevelsofgovernmentintargetedprograms,wouldneedtobesubjecttoinvestigationandmodelling.

Theproposedmodelandtherelationshipsbetweenthedifferentelementsoffundingareessentiallynotional.Degreesoffundingandtheirmutualrelationshipswouldrequirebothcarefulmeasuringandmodellinganddialoguewithkeystakeholderagencies.

Theproposalisbaseduponthecoreobjectiveofaconsistentfundingsystemthateliminatesthetwofundamentalweaknessesofthecurrentarrangements:theinconsistentandunproductivedifferencesinfundingofpublicandprivateschools,andtheinappropriateandunproductiverelationshipsbetweenstateandCommonwealthfunding.Itisdesignedtocreateasingleintegratedsystemthatwouldallowforafairandconsistentallocationoffunds,wouldbetterrecogniseandsupporteducationalneed,andwouldsupportandextendthepublicguaranteeacrossthenationalschoolsystem,ratherthanencourageschoolsandsystemstolimitthepublicguarantee.

The politics of the modelThepoliticalsensitivityofschoolfundingisalltooobviousinitshistoryandcurrentforms.Itmustbeassumedthattheradicalchangesproposedinthisdocumentwouldbestronglycontested.Theyalsowouldbesubjecttocomplexnegotiationsbetweenthetwolevelsofgovernment.

Yetthereisacasetobemadethatthetimeisrightforthesechanges.Atafiscallevel,thecurrentpublicfundingfornon-governmentschoolinghasreachedalevelwheremostnon-governmentschoolshaveresourcelevelsthatareequaltoorgreaterthanthoseofgovernmentschools.Thisshouldprovidethebasisofanewfundingsettlementthatdoesnotdifferentiatebetweenschoolsectors.Atasectorallevel,therearesubstantialadvantagesforthenon-governmentschoolstoachievea‘settlement’especiallywithinthecontextofgrowingmediaconcentrationsuponthelevelsofpublicfundingof‘private’schools.Withinthestateschoolsectors,thereisarealisationamongstsomepeopleofasignificantandgrowingcrisis,especiallyinsecondaryeducation,thatcurrentstrategiesareunlikelytosolve.Abroaderormoreinclusivenotionof‘publicschooling’andmechanismstobroadentheresponsibilityforthepublicguaranteeisneeded.FortheCommonwealthandthestates,thecurrentnationaltrajectoryofschoolingneedsalogicalandacceptableconclusion.Partnershipsbetweengovernmentatthenationallevelandbetweenschoolsatthelocallevelseemalogicalapproach.

AllofthesestakeholdersneedtoconfrontthefundingblockageinAustralianschooling.


References

45

ABS(AustralianBureauofStatistics)(2009)School Australia, Cat No. 4221.0,datacubes,online:http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/4221.02009?OpenDocument,accessed1.6.2010

Achterstraat,P.(2008)Improving Literacy and Numeracy in NSW Public Schools, Auditor General’s Report.Sydney:AuditorGeneral’sOffice.Online:http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/publications/reports/performance/2008/literacy/literacy_numeracy.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Albinski,H.S.(1966)The Australian Labor Party and the Aid to Parochial Schools Controversy.PennStateStudies19,ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversity

AllenConsulting(2004)Governments Working Together.Melbourne:DepartmentofPremierandCabinet

ANAO(AustralianNationalAuditOffice)(2009)Funding for Non-government Schools,PerformanceAuditReportNo.45

Angelico,T.(2006)The Voice Serving the Nation: The Contribution of Catholic Education to the Community,paperpresentedattheNationalCatholicEducationCommissionConference‘AmongTheManyVoices:CatholicEducationSpeaksNow’,SydneyConventionandExhibitionCentre,27–29September,http://web.cecv.catholic.edu.au/reseminar/conferences/ncecpaper.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Austin,A.G.(1961)Australian Education 1788–1900: Church, State and Public Education in Colonial Australia.Melbourne:Pitman

ABS(AustralianBureauofStatistics)(2000–2008)Schools Australia,CatNo.4221.0,Canberra

Bell,C.A.(2005)How good parents select failing schools.NewYork:NationalCenterfortheStudyofPrivatizationinEducation,TeachersCollege,ColumbiaUniversity

Bligh,A.(2008)Inaugural ANZSOG public lecture,BrisbaneHiltonHotel,July4,http://www.thepremier.qld.gov.au/library/word/newsroom/speeches/2008/ANZOGpercent2004perfcent20Julpercent2008.doc,accessed1.6.2010

Bond,S.(2009)Cost shifting in education. Implications for government, the community sector and low-income families.Fitzroy:BrotherhoodofStLaurence

Bond,S.&Horn,M.(2009)Counting the cost. Parental experiences of education expenses.Fitzroy:BrotherhoodofStLaurence.Online:http://www.bsl.org.au/pdfs/Bond&Horn_Counting_the_cost_2007_educn_survey.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Bonnor,C.(2009)Schools and the marketplace – fallacy and fallout,presentationtotheNationalPublicEducationForum,OldParliamentHouse,Canberra,March27&28,http://www.aeufederal.org.au/Publications/2009/NPEF/NPEFpapers.html,accessed1.6.2010

Bourdieu,P.&Passeron,J.C.(1979)The inheritors: French students and their relation to culture.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress

Bradley,D.(chair)(2008)Review of HigherEducation: Final Report,DepartmentofEducation,EmploymentandWorkplaceRelations,http://www.deewr.gov.au/HigherEducation/Review/Documents/PDF/Higher%20Education%20Review_one%20document_02.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Bunar,N.(2010)‘Choosingforqualityorinequality:currentperspectivesontheimplementationofschoolchoicepolicyinSweden’,Journal of Education Policy,25(1),pp.1–18

Burke,G.,White,P.&Long,M.(2004),School Education Funding,ReporttotheDepartmentofPremierandCabinet,Melbourne

ButtsR.F.(1955)Assumptions Underlying Australian Education.Melbourne:AustralianCouncilforEducationalResearch

Carnoy,M.&McEwan,P.(2000)Does privatization improve education?: The case of Chile’s National Voucher Plan.Online:http://www.stanford.edu/dept/SUSE/ICE/carnoy/Chilepaper.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

COAG(CouncilofAustralianGovernments)(2008)National partnership agreement on low socio-economic status schools.Online:http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/federal_financial_relations/docs/national_partnership/national_partnership_for_low_socio-economic_school_communities.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

COAG(CouncilofAustralianGovernments)(2009)Communiqué of Council of Australian Governments Meeting Brisbane, 7 December 2009.Online:http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2009-12-07/docs/20091207_communique.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Coleman,J.,Hoffer,T.&Kilgore,S.(1982),High School Achievement: Public, Catholic and Private Schools Compared,NewYork:BasicBooks

CommonwealthofAustralia(2009)Budget Strategy and Outlook, Budget Paper No 1.Canberra:CommonwealthofAustralia.Online:http://www.ato.gov.au/budget/2009-10/content/bp1/downloads/bp_1.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

46 ResourcingschoolsinAustralia:Aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfunding46 ResourcingschoolsinAustralia:Aproposalfortherestructureofpublicfunding

CongregationforCatholicEducation(1997)The Catholic School on the Threshold of the Third Millennium,Vatican.Online:http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_27041998_school2000_en.html,accessed1.6.2010

Connors,L.&McMorrow,J.(2010)New Directions in School Funding.UniversityofSydney.Online:http://www.sydney.edu.au/education_social_work/professional_learning/resources/studies_reports.shtml,accessed1.6.2010

Cox,E.(1995)A truly civil society, The 1995 Boyer Lectures,Online:http://www.ldb.org/boyerl1.htm

Cullen,J.B.,Jackobs,B.A.&Levit,S.D.(2005)‘Theimpactofschoolchoiceonstudentoutcomes:ananalysisofChicagopublicschools’,Journal of Public Economics,89,pp.729–760,accessed1.6.2010

DelaCroix,D.&Doepke,M.(2007)To segregate or to integrate: Education politics and democracy,DiscussionPaperNo.5799,CentreforEconomicPolicyResearch,London.Online:http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=5799.asp,accessed1.6.2010

DEETYA(DepartmentofEmployment,Education,TrainingandYouthAffairs)(1996)Review of the new schools policy,Canberra:DepartmentofEmployment,Education,TrainingandYouthAffairs

DEST(DepartmentofEducation,ScienceandTraining)(2007)Parents’ Attitudes to Schooling. Online:http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/311AA3E6-412E-4FA4-AC01-541F37070529/18555/ParentsAttitudestoSchoolingreporMay073Sept07Revisi.rtf,accessed1.6.2010

Dowling,A.(2007)Unhelpfully complex and exceedingly opaque: Australia’s school funding system,AustralianCouncilforEducationalResearch.

Dronkers,R.&Robert,P.(2004)The Effectiveness of Public and Private Schools from a Comparative Perspective,Budapest:EuropeanUniversityInstitute,SocialResearchCenter.Online:http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/8/4/7/pages108479/p108479-1.php,accessed1.6.2010

Elder,S.(2009)Credit Where Due,Melbourne:CatholicEducationOffice.Online:http://web.ceomelb.catholic.edu.au/index.php?sectionid=596,accessed1.6.2010

Eurydice(2000)Private Education in the European Union.Brussels:EuropeanUnion

Eurydice(2008)The database of education systems in Europe.Online:http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/Eurydice/EuryPresentation,accessed1.6.2010

Evans,G.(2009)The Responsibility to Protect Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All.WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitutionPress

Friedman,M.(1955)‘TheRoleofGovernmentinEducation’inSolo,R.A.(ed.),Economics and the Public Interest.RutgersUniversityPress

Furlong,A.(2009)Tory Swedish model for schools,BBCRadio4,7October.Online:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8292655.stm,accessed1.6.2010

Furtado,M.(2001)Funding Australian Catholic Schools in New Times: Policy Contexts, Policy Participants and Theoretical Perspectives,UniversityOfQueensland,PhDThesis

Furtado,M.(2006)‘SomeProposalsforChangetotheRoleoftheCatholicSectorinAustralianSchoolFundingPolicyProcess’,The Australian Education Researcher,33(3)

Gillard,J.(2008a)AddresstotheNationalAuditandRegistrationAgencyBreakfast,10September,Melbourne.Online:http://www.deewr.gov.au/Ministers/Gillard/Media/Speeches/Pages/Article_081010_121045.aspx,accessed1.6.2010

Gillard,J.(2008b)AddresstotheISCAParliamentaryForum,OldParliamentHouse,Canberra,1September.Online:http://mediacentre.dewr.gov.au/mediacentre/gillard/releases/theiscaparliamentaryforum.htm,accessed1.6.2010

Gillard,J.(2008c)Education Revolution in our Schools,JointMediaReleasewithKevinRudd,27August.Online:http://www.deewr.gov.au/Ministers/Gillard/Media/Releases/Pages/Article_081027_140802.aspx,accessed1.6.2010

Gillard,J.(2010a)Review of Funding for Schooling, Discussion Paper and Terms of Reference.Canberra:AustralianGovernment.Online:http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/education-workforce,accessed1.6.2010

Gillard,J.(2010b)A future fair for all: School funding in Australia,addresstoSydneyInstitute,15April.Online:http://www.deewr.gov.au/Ministers/Gillard/Media/Speeches/Pages/Article_100416_113412.aspx,accessed1.6.2010

Gregory,J.S.(1951)Church and State in Victoria. A study in the development of secular principles of government as revealed by the abolition of State aid to religion and denominational education in Victoria,MastersDissertation,UniversityofMelbourne.

Gregory,J.S.(1973)Church and State,NorthMelbourne:CassellAustralia

4747

Hanushek,E.A.(2007)Education Production Functions.StanfordUniversity:HooverInstitution.Online:http://edpro.stanford.edu/hanushek/admin/pages/files/uploads/Palgrave_ed_prod.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Harkness,T.(2002)Authentic and inclusive Catholic schools: some challenging contexts.Brisbane:AustralianCatholicUniversity.Online:http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/Issue3/Harkness.htm,accessed1.6.2010

Harrison,D.(2010)Gillard wants inspectors: ID numbers in schools,SydneyMorningHerald,25February

Heater,D.(2004)A History of Education for Citizenship.London:RoutledgeFalmer

Holmes-Smith,P.(2006)School socio-economic density and its effect on school performance,NewSouthWalesDepartmentofEducationandTraining.Online:http://www.mceetya.edu.au/verve/_resources/SES_Report.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Karmel,P.(Chair)(1973)Schools in Australia: report of the Interim Committee for the Australian Schools Commission.Canberra:InterimCommitteefortheAustralianSchoolsCommission

Keating,J.(2009a)A new federalism in Australian education: A proposal for a national reform agenda.Melbourne:TheFoundationforYoungAustralians

Keating,J.(2009b)Secondary schooling and the education revolution: Looking for means towards the end?WhitlamInstitute,UniversityofWesternSydney

Keating,J.&Lamb,S.(2004).Public Education and the Australian Community: A report to the Education Foundation.Melbourne:UniversityofMelbourne

Lamb,S.(2007)‘SchoolReformandInequalityinUrbanAustralia:Acaseofresidualisingthepoor’,inTeeseR.&LambS.(eds.)Education and Equity: International Perspectives on Theory and Policy,vol3.Amsterdam:Springer

Levin,H.(1989)‘EducationasaPublicandaPrivateGood’,inDevins,NealE.Public Values, Private Schools,NewYork:TheFalmerPress,pp.215–234

Lingard,B.(2000)‘FederalisminschoolingsincetheKarmelReport(1973),SchoolsinAustralia:Frommodernisthopetopostmodernistperformivity’,Australian Education Researcher,27(2),pp.25–61

Long,M.&Burke,G.(2004)The Affordability of Catholic Schools in Victoria: Access to Catholic schools by students from Catholic families.Melbourne:CatholicEducationCommissionofVictoria

Marginson,S.(1993)Education and public policy in Australia,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress

MCEETYA(MinisterialCouncilforEducation,Employment,TrainingandYouthAffairs)(2003)A national framework for the professional standards of teaching.CarltonSouth:MinisterialCouncilonEducation,Employment,TrainingandYouthAffairs.Online:http://www.curriculum.edu.au/verve/_resources/national_framework_file.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

MCEETYA(MinisterialCouncilonEducation,Employment,TrainingandYouthAffairs)(2008a)National Report on Schooling in Australia 2008, Additional statistics on Australian schooling.CarltonSouth:MinisterialCouncilonEducation,Employment,TrainingandYouthAffairs.Online:http://cms.curriculum.edu.au/anr2008/pdfs/anr2008_stats.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

MCEETYA(MinisterialCouncilonEducation,Employment,TrainingandYouthAffairs)(2008b)Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians. CarltonSouth:MinisterialCouncilonEducation,Employment,TrainingandYouthAffairs.Online:http://www.curriculum.edu.au/verve/_resources/National_Declaration_on_the_Educational_Goals_for_Young_Australians.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

McEwan,P.J.(2002)‘Publicsubsidiesforprivateschooling:AcomparativeanalysisofArgentinaandChile’,Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice,4(2),June,pp.189–216

McMorrow,J.(2008)Reviewing the evidence: Issues in Commonwealth funding of government and non-government schools in the Howard and Rudd year.UniversityofSydney

McMorrow,J.(2010)The Rudd Government’s funding commitments for schools: what lies beneath?Melbourne:AustralianEducationUnion.Online:http:wwwaeufederal.or.au/Publications/2010/JMcMorrowopinion2010.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Meadmore,P.(2001)‘“Free,compulsoryandsecular”?There-inventionofAustralianpubliceducation’,Journal of Education Policy,16(2),pp.113–125

Mill,J.S.(1975)On Liberty.NewYork:Norton

Murray,R.(1970)The split: Australian Labor in the fifties.Melbourne:Cheshire

NationalCommissionofAudit(2006)Report to the Commonwealth Government.Online:http://www.finance.gov.au/archive/archive-of-publications/ncoa/execsum.htm#I13,accessed1.6.2010


NCEC(NationalCatholicEducationCommission)(2009)Australian Catholic Schools: Why We Have Them; What They Aim To Achieve.Online:http://www.ncec.catholic.edu.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61:australian-catholic-schools-why-we-have-them-what-they-aim-to-achieve&catid=36:policies&Itemid=64,accessed1.6.2010

NCVER(NationalCentreforVocationalEducationResearch)(2008)Australian vocational education and training statistics: Financial information 2008.Online:http://www.ncver.edu.au/statistics/fin/ann08/Financial08.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Novak,J.(2009)A Real Education Revolution: Options for voucher funding reform.Melbourne:InstituteofPublicAffairs.Online:http://www.ipa.org.au/library/publication/1248057379_document_voucher_schemes.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

OECD(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment)(2009)Education At A Glance.Paris:OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

O’Brien,A.(1999)Blazing a trail: Catholic Education in Victoria 1963–1980.Melbourne:DavidLovellPublishing

ParliamentofAustralia(2008)Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority Bill 2008,BillsDigestNo.90,2008–9.Online:http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/bd/2008-09/09bd060.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

ParliamentofVictoria(2006)Education and Training Act

Perkins,D.,Nelms,L.&Smyth,P.(2004)Beyond Neo-liberalism: the social investment state?,SocialPolicyWorkingPaperNo.4,TheCentreforPublicPolicy,UniversityofMelbourne.Online:http://www.bsl.org.au/pdfs/beyond_neoliberalism_social_investment_state.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Perkins,M.(2009)State hands $2.1bn to non-government schools,TheAge,November12.Online:http://www.theage.com.au/national/education/state-hands-21bn-to-nongovernment-schools-20091111-i9yu.html,accessed1.6.2010

Plank,D.N.&Sykes,G.(eds.)(2003)Choosing Choice: School Choice in International Perspective.NewYork:TeachersCollegePress

Praetz,H.(1980)Building a school system: a sociological study of Catholic education.Melbourne:MelbourneUniversityPress

Praetz,H.(1982)Public policy and Catholic schools.Hawthorn:AustralianCouncilforEducationalResearch

Preston,B.(2003)The social make-up of schools: Family income, religion, Indigenous status, and family type in government, Catholic and other nongovernment schools.AustralianEducationUnion

ProductivityCommission(2009)Report on Government Services.Online:http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/rogs/2009,accessed1.6.2010

ProductivityCommission(2010)Report on Government Services.Online:http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/rogs/2010,accessed1.6.2010

Reay,D.(2004)Exclusivity exclusion and social class in urban education markets in the United Kingdom,UrbanEducation,vol39(5),pp.537–560

Ringer,F.(1979)Education and Society in Modern Europe,London:IndianaUniversityPress

Robertson,G.(2009)The public good and the education of children,keynotepresentationtotheNationalpubliceducationforum,OldParliamentHouse,Canberra,March28

Robinson,L.&Lamb,S.(2009).How Young People Are Faring 2009.Melbourne:TheFoundationforYoungAustralians

Sheehan,P.(2004)The Contribution of Catholic Schools to the Victorian Economy and Community.CatholicEducationCommissionofVictoria.Online:http://www.cfses.com/documents/The_Contirbution_of_Catholic_Schools.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Smith,C.(2008)What do Catholic schools look like?PresentationtotheVocationalEducationandTraininginNSWCatholicSchoolsForum,Sydney,March

Smith,G.(2002)‘Placebasededucation:Learningtobewhereweare’,Phi Delta Kappan,83,pp.584–594

Smyth,P.(2010)In or Out? Building an Inclusive Nation.AlbertPark:TheAustralianCollaboration

Stilwell,F.(2008)Who Gets What?: Analysing Economic Inequality in Australia,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress

Taylor,C.(2002)Geography of the “new” education market: secondary school choice in England and Wales.Burlington:Aldershot

Tomazin,F.(2008)State to seek closer ties with Catholic schools,TheAge,21April.Online:http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/state-to-seek-closer-ties-with-catholic-schools/2008/04/20/1208629730841.html,accessed1.6.2010

UNESCO(2001)World Education Report 2000: The Right to Education.Online:http://www.unesco.org/education/information/wer/PDFeng/wholewer.PDF,accessed1.6.2010

4949

UniversitiesAustralia(2005)Universities revenue and expenditure, 1996–2004.Online:http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/documents/publications/stats/UniIncomeTable-Nov05.xls,accessed1.6.2010

Viteritti,J.P.(2005)‘SchoolChoice:HowanAbstractIdeaBecameaPoliticalReality’,inRavitch,D.(ed.)Brookings Papers on Education Policy.WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitute

Watson,L.(1998)Intentions, opportunities and outcomes: The Impact of Commonwealth Involvement in Australian Schooling,unpublishedPhDthesis,AustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra

Watson,L.&Ryan,C.(2004)The drift to private schools in Australia. Understanding its features. Canberra:AustralianNationalUniversity.Online: http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/pdfDP479.pdf,accessed1.6.2010

Watson,L.andRyan,C.(2009) Choice, vouchers and the consequences for public high schools: lessons from Australia. Canberra:AustralianNationalUniversity

Whiltshire,K.(1981)‘Administrativecriteriafortheallocationoffunctionsbetweenlevelsofgovernmentinafederation’inAdvisoryCouncilforInter-governmentRelationsInformationPaperNo.9,Towards Adaptive Federalism: A Search for Responsibility Sharing in a Federal System.Canberra:AGPS

Whitlam,G.(1985)The Whitlam government 1972–1975. Ringwood:Viking

Wilkinson,D.,Denniss,R.&Macintosh,A.(2004)The Accountability of Private Schools to Public Values, TheAustraliaInstitute,DiscussionPaperNo.71.Online:https://www.tai.org.au/documents/dp_fulltext/DP71.pdf

Wilkinson,I.R.,Caldwell,B.J.,Selleck,R.J.W.,Harris,J.&Dettman,P.(2006)A History of State Aid to Non-Government Schools in Australia. Canberra:DepartmentofEducation,TrainingandScience

Wilkinson,R.&Pickett,K.(2009)The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better.London:Penguin

Williams,R.A.(1985)‘TheEconomicDeterminantsofPrivateSchoolinginAustralia’. The Economic Record

Williams,S.(1970)House of Commons Debate on the Address: Education. HansardHC[803/716–22],online:http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=101769,accessed1.6.2010

Willms,J.D.(1984)‘SchoolEffectivenesswithinthePublicandPrivateSectorsAnEvaluation’,Evaluation Review,8(1),pp.113–135

PresentationsAndrewHutchinson,ParksideCommunityCollege,Cambridge

(21.9.2009);

DavidDaniels,PetcheyAcademy,HackneyDowns,London(22.9.2009)


51

0?Title

51 HowYoungPeopleareFaring2008 51

Foundation for Young Australians21-27SomersetPlaceMelbourneVictoria3000GPOBox239MelbourneVictoria3001

p 0396705436f 0396702272e [email protected]

Education Foundation, a division of the foundation for young australians

21–27SomersetPlaceMelbourneVictoria3000

GPOBox239MelbourneVictoria3001

p0396705436f0396702272

Resourcing schools in Australia: A proposal for the restructure of ...

Documents

Transcript of Resourcing schools in Australia: A proposal for the restructure of ...