Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly.
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Transcript of Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly.
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Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control
By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly
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A proportionally fair pricing. A fair distribution according to a price the
user is willing to pay.
Why ?
How ?
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Rates according to shadow pricing
• Let
• Then The change in the rate is:
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Rates according to shadow pricing
• If w(t) = wr Then the stable point of the system is :
A proportionally fair per unit charge.
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Congestion Mechanisms
• Creating various measurements and congestion control algorithms in the network itself (routers).[floyd and fall]
• Creating incentives for the end nodes to use congestion control –
charge aware TCP
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Different approaches to charge aware TCP
• Paris metro pricing
• Smart market
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The Expected Cost and Shadow price
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The Expected Number of marks
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When distribution is more general
Thus
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Congestion Algorithm 1 the Elastic User(w)
Where
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Congestion algorithm 2File Transfer(F,W)
Elastic User that changes the Payment.
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Comparison with the Internet Packet conversation principle
A new packet isn’t put into the network until the old packet leaves
=self clocking
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Current congestion algorithm disadvantages
• Not user specific.
• Dropping packages is an extreme mechanism for congestion control.
• The rate at which the signals a generated in the source.
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Response of end-nodes to Congestion
• Jacobson – Average Rate
• Elastic user - Inverse proportion to
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Jacobson Average Rate in our Equations
• If the user needs the average rate of Jacobson than the utility function
would produce that rate.
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Self Clocking in our Equations
When no congestion indications are present
File-transfer is doubling it’s rate
(with proportion to T).
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Self Clocking in our Equations
• Elastic User can be self clocking if cwnd increased by
• So the change in the rate is :
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Game Theory Model
• If the user is price-aware he will maximize:
• The solution is
When
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Game TheoryThe average paying is
When r= is constant and equal Then
Conclusion – users shade their bids if they have market power
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Concluding remarks
By appropriately marking the resources
end-nodes are provided with the necessary
information to make efficient use of the
network resources