Resource Center Closing Argument: Jackson County
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Transcript of Resource Center Closing Argument: Jackson County
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STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF JACKSON FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASE TYPE: Other
State of Minnesota, by Jackson Court File No. 32-CV-10-113Preservation Alliance,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARYINJUNCTION AND, IN THE ALTERVATIVE,
v. IN SUPPORT OF AN INCREASE INTHE BOND AMOUNT
Jackson County, a political subdivisionof the State of Minnesota,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff seeks a temporary injunction in order to prevent Defendant Jackson
County (County) from demolishing the 1938 Jackson Resource Center building and
constructing a new 10,000 square foot County Services building in its place. Plaintiff
asserts that the 1938 building is a historic resource entitled to protection under the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA). However, the County has
appropriately determined that no feasible and prudent alternatives to the proposed and
needed project exist. Therefore, the temporary injunction request should be denied.
FACTS
The Resource Center building is located in Jackson, Minnesota. It was built in
1938, and additions were constructed in 1962, 1975, and 1981. The Resource Center
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building is owned by Jackson County. The testimony to be presented at the November
30, 2010, hearing will demonstrate that between 2002 and 2010, the Jackson County
Board commissioned a number of different studies of the Countys facilities and the
Countys space needs with special emphasis on possible reuses and costs of renovation of
the 1938 Building. These included studies by professional consultants, a joint committee,
and a citizens committee.
On July 27, 2010, the County Board authorized construction of a new 10,000
square foot County Services building at the site of the Resource Center where the 1938
building stands at a budget not to exceed $2.5 million. Asbestos needed to be removed
from the 1938 building prior to demolition. On September 14, 2010, the County Board
awarded a contract for asbestos abatement work and entered into a contract for asbestos
removal. The asbestos abatement work is complete.
Demolition bids were solicited by advertisements in September and October 2010.
Bids were submitted on October 21, 2010. Bids are valid, per the terms of the bid
solicitation, for 45 days, or until December 5, 2010. Though the schedule contemplated
that a demolition contract would be awarded on October 26, 2010, and demolition work
would promptly commence, the Board refrained from an award due to this pending
litigation.
On November 5, 2010, this Court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining
demolition of the 1938 Building. This Court required the posting of a $25,000 bond and
reserved the right to increase that bond at the November 30, 2010 temporary injunction
hearing.
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ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
SHOULD BE DENIED
A. The County Has Appropriately Determined no Feasible and PrudentAlternatives to Demolition Exist.
The temporary injunction request should be denied because the County has
appropriately determined that no feasible and prudent alternatives to the demolition of
Resource Center building exist. As such, the County has established an affirmative
defense under the applicable environmental statute, and therefore Plaintiff will not
succeed on the merits of its action.
1. The Law
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) provides that a Defendant
may show, by way of an affirmative defense to a MERA claim, that there is no feasible
and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is consistent with and reasonably
required for promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare . . . Minn. Stat.
116B.04 (2010).1
1 The affirmative defense under MERA requires defendants to demonstrate: 1) that there is nofeasible and prudent alternative; and 2) that the conduct at issue is consistent with and reasonablyrequired for promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of the states paramountconcern for the protection of its air, water, land, and other natural resources from pollution,impairment, or destruction. Minn. Stat. 116B.04 (West 2010).
No court decision under MERA has concluded that a proposed project has met the firstrequirement, that there be no feasible and prudent alternatives, but failed the second requirementregarding the public health, safety, and welfare. In this case, the exhaustive process employedby the County clearly demonstrates that its goal in this project was to make a decision in regardto the Resource Center building in a manner that is consistent with public health, safety, andwelfare interests.
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Minnesota Courts have recognized that this affirmative defense and the phrase
feasible and prudent alternatives originated from federal environmental statutes. See,
e.g., County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 1976); Archabal v.
County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 423 (Minn. 1993). Case law indicates that
Minnesota Courts have expressly adopted the interpretation and construction of the
phrase feasible and prudent alternatives given by federal courts interpreting federal
law, particularly Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. Bryson, 243
N.W.2d at 320; Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 423.
The Supreme Court first discussed and interpreted the phrase feasible and
prudent alternatives in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) [hereinafter Overton Park]. The Court interpreted this phrase narrowly, holding
that the Secretary of Transportation cannot approve a project using Section 4(f) unless
he finds that alternative routes present unique problems. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
The Court further described this standard as requiring truly unusual factors present in a
particular case or the cost of community disruption resulting from alterative routes [to]
reach[] extraordinary magnitudes. Id. Applying this standard to the facts of Overton
Park, the Court held that the Secretary of Transportation had failed to meet the
appropriate burden and remanded the case to the District Court for further review of the
record. Id. at 420.
More recently, in Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff, who sought to enjoin a
road construction project. 910 F.2d 159, 161 (4th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Hickory
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League]. Plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to an injunction because the Secretary
of Transportations Section 4(f) evaluation did not expressly indicate a finding of unique
problems, which they argued was required under Overton Park. Id. at 162-63. The
Hickory League court recognized that Overton Park was controlling, however, the court
agreed with the interpretation employed by the Seventh Circuit: that the Supreme Court
used the term unique in Overton Park for emphasis, not as a substitute for the statutory
term prudent. Id. at 162-63 (citing Eagle Found., Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 804-05
(7th Cir. 1987)).
In analyzing whether the determination that no feasible and prudent alternatives
existed was proper, the Hickory League court held that it is not necessary for the
Secretary of Transportation to show that any one single factor presents unique
problems. Id. at 163. Rather, the court followed the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit,
that [a] prudent judgment by an agency is one that takes into account everything
important that matters. A cumulation (sic.) of small problems may add up to a sufficient
reason to use 4(f) lands. Id. (quoting Eagle Found., Inc., 813 F.2d at 805).
Turning this analysis to the proposed construction project at issue, the Hickory
League court held that the alternatives were properly rejected as imprudent. Id. at 164.
Each of the proposed alternatives either caused operational difficulties, or failed to
meet the needs and objectives of the project. Id. (citing Ringsred v. Dole, 828 F.2d 1300,
1304 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that an alternative is imprudent when it fails to meet one of
the projects main objectives); Druid Hills Civic Assn, Inc. v. Federah Highway Admin.,
772 F.2d 700, 715 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that alternative is imprudent if it fails to
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fulfill the needs of a project)). The court concluded: [A]pplying the rule of reason and
practicality, we are persuaded that the Secretary complied with the mandates of Section 4
(f). Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has recently
discussed the factors that are relevant in a Section 4(f) analysis. See Concerned Citizens
of Chappaqua v. U.S. Dept of Transp., 579 F.Supp.2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) [hereinafter
Chappaqua]. The Plaintiff in Chappaqua sought to enjoin the New York and U.S.
Departments of Transportation from felling any trees during the planned demolition and
reconstruction of a historic bridge. Id. at 429. The agencies evaluated three general
proposals: 1) no action; 2) repair and rehabilitation; and 3) replacement. Id. at 420.
The court recognized that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the term feasible
means capable of development through sound engineering, and the term prudent
involves a common sense balancing of practical concerns. Id. at 437 (quoting Overton
Park, 401 U.S. at 411). The court further held: An agency may reject feasible
alternatives as imprudent based on a wide variety of factors, including cost, traffic
considerations, and failure to meet project objectives. Id. (citing Monroe County
Conservation Council, Inc. v. Adams, 566 F.2d 419, 423-25 (2nd Cir. 1977)) (emphasis
added).
Applying these factors, the Chappaqua court held that each of the proposed
alternatives to the project was properly rejected as either infeasible or imprudent. Id.
Specifically, the no action and the rehabilitation options were properly rejected as
imprudent because they failed to meet the projects objectives. Id. (citing Citizens
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Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating case law
uniformly holds that an alternative is imprudent under 4(f) if it fails to meet the needs
of a project). The specific objectives of the Chappaqua project included: providing a
safe, non-deficient structural condition for more than 30 years and minimizing
maintenance and repair. Id.
Since Overton Park (and Archabal) was decided, Congress, the Department of
Transportation, and the federal courts have refined the factors to be considered and the
conceptual analysis to be employed regarding whether feasible and prudent alternatives
exist. See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users or SAFETEA-LU, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 6009(b), 119 Stat. 1144, 1876-77
(2005) (Congress instructed the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations
that clarify the factors to be considered and the standards to be applied in determining the
prudence and feasibility of alternatives); 23 C.F.R. 774.17 (Federal Regulations
promulgated by the Department of Transportation regarding the definition of feasible
and prudent alternatives); Citizens for Smart Growth v. Peters, 716 F.Supp.2d 1215,
1231-32 (S.D. Fla., 2010) (federal case decided May 3, 2010, recognizing that the
Federal Regulations are the appropriate source for guidance regarding when an
alternative is feasible and prudent). In accordance with this directive, the Department of
Transportation promulgated regulations clarifying and defining the appropriate factors.
Id. (citing 23 C.F.R. 774.17). See also 73 Fed.Reg. 13368 (March. 12, 2008). The
updated regulations provide:
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Feasible and prudent avoidance alternative.
(1) A feasible and prudent avoidance alternative avoids using Section 4(f) property and does not cause other severe problems of a magnitude thatsubstantially outweighs the importance of protecting the Section 4(f) property. Inassessing the importance of protecting the Section 4(f) property, it is appropriate
to consider the relative value of the resource to the preservation purpose of thestatute.(2) An alternative is not feasible if it cannot be built as a matter of soundengineering judgment.(3) An alternative is not prudent if:
(i) It compromises the project to a degree that it is unreasonable toproceed with the project in light of its stated purpose and need;(ii) It results in unacceptable safety or operational problems;(iii) After reasonable mitigation, it still causes:
(A) Severe social, economic, or environmental impacts;(B) Severe disruption to established communities;
(C) Severe disproportionate impacts to minority or low incomepopulations; or(D) Severe impacts to environmental resources protected under otherFederal statutes;
(iv) It results in additional construction, maintenance, oroperational costs of an extraordinary magnitude;(v) It causes other unique problems or unusual factors; or(vi) It involves multiple factors in paragraphs (3)(i) through (3)(v)of this definition, that while individually minor, cumulativelycause unique problems or impacts of extraordinary magnitude.
23 C.F.R. 774.17 (2010).
Very recently, in Citizens for Smart Growth v. Peters, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin a
proposed bridge improvement project in Florida, arguing that government did not
appropriately consider feasible and prudent alternatives to the project. 716 F.Supp.2d at
1219-20. The Department of Transportation examined seven (7) different alternative
corridors utilizing a multi-factor scoring matrix. Id. The matrix included considerations
of: cost factors, traffic service factors, engineering factors, environmental factors such as
noise, air quality, wetlands impact, endangered species impact, and potential
contamination sites, and socio-economic factors such as public opinion, Section 4(f)
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impacts, economic impacts, future development, sustainability, and community
cohesion. Id. at 1220.
Applying the factors for consideration outlined in the federal regulations, the
Peters court held that all alternatives were imprudent based upon the factors included in
the matrix. The court found that the matrix demonstrated that the alternatives were not
prudent because they did not meet the purpose and need of the project. Id. at 1232-34.
As such, the court held that the cumulative factors of disruption to established
communities, additional construction and maintenance costs, and social and economic
impacts were appropriate bases for rejecting alternatives as imprudent. Id. at 1233.
The cases discussed above show the evolution of the feasible and prudent
standard from Overton Park, which was decided in 1971, until the present. This history is
important to the issue at bar because Minnesota precedent, particularly Archabal v.
Hennepin County, 495 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1993), was decided prior to Congress
directing the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate more specific regulations, and
prior to the refinement of the notions of prudence by the courts.
In Archabal, the Plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin Hennepin County from
demolishing the Minneapolis Armory building so that a new jail could be built. 405
N.W.2d at 417. The Armory building was built in 1935, and is on the National Register
of Historic Places. Id. at 418. Hennepin County and the City of Minneapolis sought to
build a new jail due to severe overcrowding in the old building. Id. The county
empaneled committees to examine the project. Id. These committees identified a
number of alternative locations, including the Armory site. Id. In 1990, the Public
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Safety Facility Policy Committee concluded that there was no perfect site, and that
each proposed location would meet some sort of opposition. Id. The Policy Committee
indicated a preference for the Armory location, but also noted that other sites would meet
the varied criteria used in site evaluation. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Archabal noted that the affirmative defense
under MERA is apparently derived from Federal environmental law, and therefore
expressly followed the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Overton Park. Id.
at 423. Applying the strict standard outlined in Overton Park, the court held that the
defendants failed to establish that there were no feasible and prudent alternatives to
demolishing the Armory building. Id. at 423-426. Specifically, the court stated it
cannot be said that there is no feasible and prudent alternative, particularly when the
countys own Task Force could itself not find one site that was clearly advantageous over
others it considered. Id. at 423.
The court concluded: It may well be true that the use of the Armory site may be
more convenient, indeed may be more efficient than alternative more remote sites, but
that is simply not enough under MERA and our cases. Nothing in the reasons cited, nor
the evidence underlying them, rises to the level of truly unusual factors or community
disruption of extraordinary magnitude. Id. at 426.
It is clear from the use of phrases such as truly unusual factors and community
disruption of extraordinary magnitude that the Archabal court was heavily influenced by
the language and rationale of Overton Park. But, as discussed herein, notions of
feasible and prudent alternatives have changed since 1971.
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In a more recent unpublished case, attached hereto, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals demonstrated that Minnesota courts remain influenced by decisions of federal
courts interpreting the phrase feasible and prudent. See Friends of the Riverfront v.
DeLaSalle High School, No. A06-2222, 2007 WL 4110617 (Minn. Ct. App., Nov. 20,
2007) [hereinafter DeLaSalle].
DeLaSalle involved the proposed construction of an athletic facility on Nicollet
Island, where DeLaSalle High School has been located since 1898. Id. at *1.
Plaintiffs/Relators unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the project under MERA. Id. The
Court of Appeals held that the project proposer was not required to consider or evaluate
alternatives that were inconsistent with the stated goals of the project. Id. at *6 (citing
Mayo Found. V. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545, 550 (8th Cir. 2006)). In the case of
DeLaSalle, the project was by definition an adjacent athletic facility with locker rooms,
concession stands, and lighting consistent with such a facility. Id. Because the project
involved the building of an adjacentfacility, the city was not required to consider any
proposed off-site alternatives because they were inconsistent with the purpose and
objective of the project. Id.
Looking to the on-site alternatives, the DeLaSalle court held that the proposer did
not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its determination that there were no prudent or
feasible alternatives when the on-site alternatives raised potential safety, access, and
economic issues. Id. at *7. This analysis is consistent with the accumulation of factors
approach discussed in Hickory League, Peters, and the updated federal regulations.
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The DeLaSalle court noted that the Plaintiffs/Relators relied heavily upon
Archabal, arguing that the city and the school could not reject alternatives located off-
site. Id. at *7. The court noted, however, that Archabal was factually distinguishable. Id.
The court concluded: Although Archabals emphases on the potency of MERA in
the protection of historic resources is instructive, we do not read the case to require the
city in this case to consider project sites that are not adjacent to DeLaSalle. Id.
(emphasis added). This passage demonstrates the importance of the purposes and
objectives of a project when selecting and evaluating alternatives in order to determine
whether they are, in fact, feasible and prudent.
2. The present case is distinguishable from Archabal, both legally and
factually.
As discussed in detail above, Minnesota precedent interpreting and applying
MERA relies upon outdated interpretations of the relevant factors that are to be
considered when determining whether feasible and prudent alternatives exist. As such,
the case at bar is distinguishable from Archabal, both legally and factually.
i. Archabal is legally distinguishable
There have been numerous significant changes to the interpretation of the phrase
feasible and prudent since Archabal was decided in 1993, as demonstrated by the
federal cases, statutes, and federal regulations discussed and analyzed above. Each of the
selected cases demonstrates a step away from the rigid, narrow standard expounded in
Overton Park.
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For example, Hickory League validates the position that an accumulation of
problems with a particular alternative, or with all of the alternatives, is sufficient to
establish that no feasible and prudent alternatives exist. See Hickory League, 910 F.2d at
165. Hickory League also recognizes that factors such as operational difficulties, flow of
traffic, and the ultimate needs and objectives of a particular project are appropriate
standards by which to compare alternatives. Id. at 163-64. The role of the courts,
according to Hickory League, is to apply the rule of reason and practicality.
Similarly, Chappaqua represents another step in the ongoing development of the
feasible and prudent standard. The Chappaqua court recognized that a governmental
entity can rely on a wide array of factors, including cost, traffic considerations, safety,
traveler convenience, and failure to meet project objectives, when analyzing and
considering alternatives. 579 F.Supp.2d at 437. As importantly, Chappaqua also
recognizes the well-established rule that alternatives which fail to meet the purposes of a
particular project are, by definition, imprudent. Id. (quoting City of Bridgeton v.
F.A.A., 212 F.3d 488, 461 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Finally, and most illustrative, is the fact that Congress expressly indicated concern
with the manner in which courts had been interpreting feasible and prudent alternatives
after Overton Park. This caused Congress to instruct the Secretary of Transportation to
promulgate new regulations, including a multi-factor balancing test, to guide and assist
the evaluation of feasible and prudent alternatives. Peters demonstrates that as recently
as May 3, 2010, federal courts have recognized the significance of the newly
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promulgated regulations and have relied upon them for guidance in applying the
standards of feasibility and prudence. 716 F.Supp.2d at 1231-32.
In short, it is clear that the analysis and factors to take into consideration when
determining whether there are any feasible and prudent alternatives has changed since
Archabal was decided. Therefore, Archabal is legally distinguishable from the case at
bar because it relied upon an outdated narrow interpretation of what constitutes feasible
and prudent alternatives, as well as what factors are relevant to that analysis.
ii. Archabal is factually distinguishable
Archabal is also distinguishable from the present case on its facts. In Archabal,
the studies and evaluations conducted by Hennepin County did not conclude that the
Armory site was preferable to any of the alternatives. In fact, the studies concluded that
it would be far costlier to build the new jail at the Armory site and would create further
difficulties if the facility needed to be expanded in the future. Nowhere in the studies
done by the County was it suggested that the alternatives were consistent with or met the
purposes and objectives of the project.
In contrast, the evidence will show that in the present case all of the professional
consultants, joint committees, and citizens committees not only concluded that the
demolition of the Resource Center was the preferred course of action, but also determined
none of the alternatives were prudent. This was a very extensive and public process,
lasting more than eight years. Plaintiff (and the public) had many opportunities to
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participate in the process. Their ideas and opinions regarding the project were taken into
consideration and evaluated side by side with all other alternatives. Unlike in Archabal,
all of the evaluations in the present case concluded that the proposed demolition was the
preferred route, and that alternatives were imprudent.
B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Demonstrate Entitlement to a Temporary
Injunction.
1. Standards for a Temporary Injunction
Injunctive relief by its nature is an extraordinary equitable remedy. Miller v.
Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1982). Because temporary injunctive relief is granted
prior to a trial on the merits, it should be granted only when it is clear that the rights of a
party will be irreparably injured before a trial on the merits is held. Id. at 712. As the
Minnesota Supreme Court has explained:
Great caution and deliberation must be exercised by the trial court in thegranting of an interlocutory injunction since the injunctive process is the
strong arm of equity.
Injunctive relief should be awarded only in clear cases, reasonably free fromdoubt, and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.
AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348, 351
(1961). The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of showing that sufficient
grounds exist. Id.; Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.02. In Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
272 Minn. 264, 137 N.W.2d 314 (1965), the Minnesota Supreme Court specified the
following five factors that must be shown to weigh in a plaintiffs favor before a
temporary injunction may be ordered:
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1. The nature and background of the relationship between the partiesbefore the dispute giving rise to the request for relief;
2. The likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits;
3. The moving partys harm if the injunction is denied compared to theharm to the nonmoving party if the injunction is granted;
4. The public policy considerations triggered by the fact situation; and
5. The administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision orenforcement of the temporary injunction.
137 N.W.2d at 321-22. Considering the above standards leads to one conclusion: a
temporary injunction continuing to restrain the County from pursuing demolition of the
Resource Center building should not be issued in this case.
i. The nature and background of the relationship between the parties
before the dispute weighs in favor of the County
Plaintiff is allegedly composed of citizens of Jackson County seeking input and
intervention in the demolition process. The County conducted extensive and public
processes over eight years, and engaged citizens in the analysis of alternatives to
demolition. Plaintiff, through its members, had opportunities to and did participate in
these processes. At the November 5, 2010, temporary restraining order hearing, the
Court indicated on the Record that this factor favored the County. It still favors the
County.
ii. Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of its claim
The County has appropriately determined that no feasible and prudent alternatives
to the demolition of the Resource Center building exist, as is discussed in great detail in
this memorandum and will be discussed on November 30, 2010. As such, the County has
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established the affirmative defense provided by MERA, and therefore Plaintiff will not
succeed on the merits of its claim. The County, through professional consultants, a joint
committee, and a citizens committee, conducted a detailed evaluation of the various
alternatives to demolition. Each of these alternatives was compared to objective criteria,
and it was determined that all of the alternatives were imprudent based upon the object
and goals of the project. None of the alternatives that included reuse of the 1938
Building met the purposes and objectives of the project: new housing for the Human
Services Department that would be functional, efficient, secure, accessible, private,
flexible, and cost-effective.
This is consistent with MERA, which provides that economic considerations
alone shall not constitute a defense. Minn. Stat. 116B.04. However, Minnesota
Courts recognize that state agencies and courts are required by law to consider both
economic impact and environmental impact. Reserve Min. Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d
808, 841 (Minn. 1977) (citing MERA, Minn. Stat. 116B.04). The language of MERA
itself merely states that economic considerations cannot be the sole basis for concluding
that an alternative is not feasible and prudent. Here, the County has evaluated each
alternative based upon numerous non-economic and economic factors and concluded that
none of the alternatives are feasible and prudent, and are inconsistent with the objectives
of the project.
iii. Public policy considerations do not favor a temporary injunction
Public policy considerations refer to what is in the public interest. See 2A
Minnesota Practice, 65.14, p. 178. The economics and viability of reuse have been
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exhaustively studied in very public processes. In difficult budget times, public policy
does not support the draining of public coffers to preserve a late effort at saving an old
building. On the other hand, Plaintiff has to date failed to offer any evidence that an
economically viable market use exists for the Resource Center building, despite the
Countys eight years of study, and its own conclusion that no such use exists. Plaintiff is
a small group of residents who support historic preservation. Allowing the project to go
forward will provided needed space for the County Human Services Department allowing
the Department to function efficiently and effectively in providing services to the most
needy citizens. A new Human Services building is in the public interest.
II. IF A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED, THE BONDSHOULD BE INCREASED
Pursuant to MERA, the amount of the bond in this case should be sufficient to
indemnify the [County] for damages suffered because of the temporary relief, if
permanent relief is not granted. Minn. Stat. 116B.07. Likewise, Rule 65.03(a) of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that the amount of the bond should be
sufficient to cover damages that the restrained party may suffer.
Additionally, Minnesota Statutes section 562.02 allows the County to seek an
order requiring the Plaintiff to file a surety bond in an amount sufficient to cover any
loss or damage which may be caused to the [County] or taxpayers by such delay . . .
Minn. Stat. 562.02 (2010). The purpose of this statute is to obtain security in order to
protect against any loss to taxpayers caused by any delay resulting from an injunction
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involving a public project. See Gram v. Village of Shoreview, 106 N.W.2d 553, 559
(Minn. 1960).
Minnesota Courts have held that [t]he bond amount represents a prospective view
of damages and not a determination of actual damages. Eide v. Bierbaum, 472
N.W.2d 193, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added). In regard to the amount of
the bond, courts have stated: Security should be set in an amount which will insure
compensation to the party harmed by the erroneous issuance of an injunction. Bioline,
Inc. v. Wilfley, 366 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
The $25,000 bond currently posted is insufficient to compensate the County and
its taxpayers for the damages that will accrue if permanent injunctive relief is denied.
This court indicated at the November 5, 2010, temporary restraining order hearing it was
speculative to believe the project costs would increase based on the onset of winter and
the incurrence of winter construction costs. At this point, it is no longer speculation that
winter is upon us and that the delay caused by this action will increase the costs of the
project.
Additionally, the bids that were received by the County are only valid until
December 5, 2010. After that, the County will need to re-solicit bids. Evidence at the
November 30, 2010, hearing will demonstrate that it is unlikely that the bids will remain
the same the second time around. The contractors will be required to figure winter
construction costs into the calculation of their bids, which will likely increase the bids.
Additionally, the lowest bid submitted to the County on October 21, 2010, was
substantially lower than its competitors.
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Finally, Minnesota Courts have held that attorneys fees for defending a motion
for a temporary injunction are recoverable from an injunction bond if it is determined that
the injunction was erroneously issued. See Newmech Companies, Inc. v. ISD # 206, 556
N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Lamb v. Shaw, 45 N.W. 1134, 1135 (Minn.
1902)). Courts have similarly held in situations like here, where the sole purpose of [an]
action is to obtain a permanent injunction counsel fees incurred in defending the main
action are by like good authority damages within the term of the injunction bond.
Pelkey v. Natl Surety Co., 173 N.W. 435, 436 (Minn. 1919). As such, the injunction
bond should be increased to reflect the prospective damages that will occur as a result of
an erroneous injunction.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth herein, a temporary injunction should not be issued.
In the event it is issued, an increase in the bond amount should be required as will be
more fully presented at the November 30, 2010 hearing.
RATWIK, ROSZAK & MALONEY, P.A.
Dated:_________________________ By:_________________________________Jay T. SquiresAttorney Reg. No. 204699Timothy A. SullivanAttorney Reg. No. 391526300 U.S. Trust Building730 Second Avenue SouthMinneapolis, MN 55402(612) 339-0060
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8/8/2019 Resource Center Closing Argument: Jackson County
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
RRM: #147142