Resolution Booklet | Cork 2014

Resolution Booklet

General Assembly Aula Maxima, UCC

1st – 2nd November 2014

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Saturday 1st November 2014 WORLDCAFÉ Coffee Break Debate 1 | Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety II Debate 2 | Committee on Transport and Tourism LUNCH Debate 3 | Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Debate 4 | Committee on Foreign Affairs II Debate 5 | Committee on Industry, Research and Trade

Sunday 2nd November 2014 Debate 6 | Committee on Employment and Social Affairs Debate 7 | Committee on Foreign Affairs I Coffee Break Debate 8 | Committee on Agriculture and Rural Affairs Debate 9 | Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection Lunch Debate 10 | Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Debate 11 | Committee on Constitutional Affairs Debate 12 | Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety I

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General rules The wish to speak is indicated by raising the Committee placard. The authority of the Board is absolute. Procedure and time settings 1. Presentation of the Motion for a Resolution (the Board reads out the topic and

introduces any Friendly Amendments, a member of the Proposing Committee reads out the Operative Clauses);

2. Points of Information (asked for by any Committees and answered by the Proposing Committee);

3. Defence Speech (maximum 3 minutes);

4. Attack Speeches

a) Attack Speech 1 (maximum 2 minutes);

b) Attack Speech 2 (maximum 2 minutes);

c) Response to Attack Speeches from proposing committee (maximum 90 seconds);

5. Open Debate on the whole Motion for a Resolution:

a) Debate structured by subheadings such that each round of debate focuses on one subheading,

b) Subheadings will be debated in the order that they are laid out in the resolution, at the discretion of the proposing committee,

c) The final round of debate will consist of “Alternative Suggestions” where delegates from other committees will critically compare alternative solutions or methods of achieving an objective

6. Summation Speech (maximum 3 minutes);

7. Voting procedure – the votes are collected by the Chairpersons;

8. Announcement of the voting results by the Board.

Points of Information These are requests for brief explanations of the meaning of specific words and abbreviations. Please note that translations are not Points of Information.

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Points of Personal Privilege These are requests for a Delegate to repeat a point that was inaudible. Failure to understand the language being spoken does not make for a Point of Personal Privilege. Direct Responses Once per Debate, each Committee may use the ‘Direct Response’ sign. Should a Committee member raise the Committee Placard and the ‘Direct Response’ sign during the Open Debate, he/she will immediately be recognised by the Board and given the floor as soon as the point being made is concluded. A Direct Response can only be used to refer to and discuss the point made directly beforehand. If two or more Direct Responses are requested at once, the Board will decide which Committee to recognise. In this case, the second Direct Response shall only be held if it can be referred to the first Direct Response, so on and so forth. Points of Order These can be raised by the Chairperson if a Delegate feels the Board have not properly followed Parliamentary procedure. Ultimately, the authority of the Board is absolute. Defense Speech One member of the Proposing Committee delivers the Defence Speech from the podium. It is used to explain the rationale of the overall lines of the Resolution and convince the Plenary that the Resolution is worthy of being adopted. This speech can last a maximum of three (3) minutes. Attack Speeches An individual Delegate from a Committee other than that proposing the Resolution at hand delivers an Attack Speech from the podium. It reflects an individual opinion and is used to point out the flaws of the approach taken by the Proposing Committee and should propose alternative solutions. Oftentimes, an Attack Speech is concluded with an appeal to the Plenary not to adopt the Resolution in their present form. This speech can last a maximum of two (2) minutes

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Summation Speech One or two members of the Proposing Committee deliver the Summation Speech from the podium; the microphone can only be passed once. It is used to summarise the Debate, respond to main, selected criticism and to once more explain why the chosen approach is the most sensible. It typically concludes with an appeal to vote in favour of the Resolution. This speech can last a maximum of three (3) minutes.

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THIS TOPIC WAS GENEROUSLY SPONSORED BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, COMMUNITY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ___________________

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH

AND FOOD SAFETY II

Europe’s trash or Sweden’s treasure – waste-‐‑to-‐‑fuel programmes have proven so successful that 50% of Sweden’s household waste is utilised in energy production, a total of 99% is recycled in one way or the other and additional waste is imported from its European neighbours. How should the EU incentivise a wider adoption of such programmes in other Member States and regulate the emerging waste

trade market?

Submitted by: Ella Åkesson (SE), Laura Berner (AT), Ayşenur Canca (TR), Rafaella Chrysostomou (CY), Lulu Coyne (IE), Torbjørn Reitan Fyrvik (NO), Matteo Gustin (IT), Flawia Paściak (PL), Miguel Silva (PT), Justine Tremerie (BE), Timm Brünjes (Chairperson, DE)

The European Youth Parliament,

A. Convinced that waste trade is not a sustainable method of waste management,

B. Regretting that as much as 25% of the waste shipments from the EU to developing countries do not meet international regulations1,

C. Aware of the existence of a pan-‐‑European waste trade market,

D. Observing that Sweden annually imports approximately 800,000 tonnes 2 of household waste from other Member States,

E. Supporting the Countering WEEE Illegal Trade project3 and its aim to reduce the illegal trade of e-‐‑waste,

1 Environment: Commission fights back against illegal waste shipments, European Commission press release, 11 2 Sweden turns trash into cash as EU seeks to curb dumping, Reuters, 2012 3 The CWIT project aims to provide a set of recommendations to support the European Commission, law enforcement authorities, and customs organisations, in countering the illegal trade of eWaste in and from Europe.

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F. Gravely concerned that each EU citizen produces 500kg of household waste every year4,

G. Bearing in mind that Member States are not equally capable of managing domestic waste,

H. Commending the implementation of deposit charges on recyclable and reusable items that have proven successful in Member States such as Germany, Sweden and Belgium,

I. Taking into consideration that waste-‐‑to-‐‑energy programmes do not produce the methane emissions5 that would otherwise arise from landfilling,

J. Realising that 3 tonnes of household waste holds the same amount of potential energy as one tonne of oil6,

K. Noting that landfilling is the least sustainable option of waste management due to the high methane gas emissions caused by landfills,

L. Acknowledging with gratitude that the landfilling rate of municipal waste in Europe has decreased by over 30% in the past two decades7;

Tackling waste trade 1. Asks for a series of amendments to be introduced to Regulation (EC) No

1013/2006 on shipments of waste8, including:

a) tariffs and quotas on the amount of waste exported from Member States,

b) stricter regulations on waste exported under the guise of “charitable donations”,

c) more efficient controls on waste exports to developing countries;

2. Urges the European Commission to prevent illegal waste trade by proposing further sanctions on Member States and their respective companies involved in this issue;

3. Calls for the introduction of a new Directive encouraging short distance shipping of waste by Member States that cannot yet manage it in an eco-‐‑friendly manner;

4 Kommunales Abfallaufkommen in den Ländern der EU-‐‑28 im Jahr 2012, Statista, 2012 5 The Swedish recycling revolution, Sweden.se, 2014 6 Ibid. 7 Municipal waste treatment EU27 kg per capita 1995 -‐‑ 2012, Eurostat, 2012 8 Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 on shipments of waste, EUR-‐‑Lex, 2006

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4. Proposes tax incentives to any waste producing industries which follow eco-‐‑friendly waste management procedures such as recycling or recovery;

Prevention of waste generation 5. Requests that a new amendment to Directive 2008/98/EC9 be made regarding the

introduction of deposit charges on certain recyclable and reusable items in all Member States;

6. Strongly supports the European Commission’s proposal10 to ban the use of plastic shopping bags in all Member States;

Improvement of waste management infrastructure 7. Demands that Member States use a certain percentage of their Gross Domestic

Product11 and maximise the proportion of their Horizon 2020 funds that can be used for the creation of sustainable waste management infrastructure such as:

a) recycling facilities,

b) waste-‐‑to-‐‑energy plants;

8. Suggests that Horizon 2020 funds are used to support scientists and engineers in developing more affordable and efficient eco-‐‑friendly waste programmes;

9. Encourages Member States with a vast knowledge of waste management to share their expertise with less specialised Member States.

Generously sponsored by:

9 Directive on Waste, Directive 2008/98/EC, EUR-‐‑Lex 10 “Commission seeks views on reducing plastic bag use”, Press Release, European Commission 05/2011 (IP/11/580) 11 Gross Domestic Product is defined by the OECD as an aggregate measure of production equal to the sum of the gross values added of all resident institutional units engaged in production.

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM

Port and policy – with 74% of inter-‐‑EU and 37% of intra-‐‑EU trade executed through the EU’s ports, how can the EU establish legal certainty and a level

playing field in its efforts not only to modernise port services but also to attract investment whilst improving the environmental profiles of ports?

Submitted by: Naomi Aidlin (CH), Kyriakos Attouni (CY), Ffion Davies (UK), Helene Benedicte Gråbø (NO), Petr Hladík (CZ), Armine Khamoyan (AM), Miljana Krstic (RS), Daria Kursa (PL), Ferdinand Mayrhofer (AT), Brooke Nicholls (ES), Albin Touma (SE), Karim Ben Hamda (Chairperson, NL)


A. Emphasising the importance of maritime transport to the European economy12,

B. Disturbed by the damaging effects on ecosystems of nearby ports including:

i) air and water pollution,

ii) land erosion,

iii) the disposal of industrial waste;

C. Realising that potential investment in European ports may be hindered by the EU’s strict environmental standards,

D. Recognising the disparity in legislation between Member States concerning the environmental standards of domestic ports,

E. Bearing in mind that ports in the Trans European Transport Network’s13 (TEN-‐‑T) core network will be required to use Liquefied Natural Gas14 (LNG) in European ports by 2025,

12Memo /12/ 317 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-‐‑release_MEMO-‐‑12-‐‑317_en.htm, Importance of ports for economic recovery and jobs, European Commission, 2011 13Trans European Transport Network: The TEN-‐‑T policy supports the completion of 30 Priority Projects, representing high European added value, as well as projects of common interest and traffic management systems that will play a key role in facilitating the mobility of goods and passengers within the EU. 14Liquefied Natural Gas: LNG is created by cooling gas to about -‐‑260°fahrenheit. Energy companies change the state of natural gas into liquid form mainly for ease of transport.

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F. Noting with regret the lack of investment in the development of ports, hindering the modernisation process which impedes the improvement of their environmental profiles,

G. Further believing that the construction work involved in port modernisation will provide new employment opportunities,

H. Commending the initial success of the Blue Belt 15 initiative in tackling bureaucratic customs formalities whilst recognising that there is still room for improvement,

I. Noting with appreciation that Member States fuel standards are more stringent than those set by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)16;

Enhancing the environmental profiles of ports 1. Urges Member States to promote research in eco-‐‑friendly alternatives to the

unsustainable resources currently used in ports;

2. Calls upon the European Commission to incentivise the implementation of eco-‐‑friendly alternative technologies in European ports by providing:

a) subsidies for capital investment in ports,

b) training for workers in the new skills required for the operation of eco-‐‑friendly technologies;

3. Encourages European ports to enforce common EU environmental standards for maritime shipping to improve their:

a) public image,

b) environmental profile,

c) attractiveness for investors;

15 Blue Belt: An initiative by the European Commission that calls for the simplification of the formalities for intra-‐‑ European shipping in order to lighten the administrative burden that has a negative impact on their competitiveness. 16 International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

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Increasing opportunities for investment in European ports

4. Requests that the European Investment Bank provide loans to stakeholders who are willing to invest in port modernisation;

5. Recommends that Member States reward investors who facilitate the modernisation of ports by offering tax reductions;

6. Suggests an increase in the number of core ports in the Blue Belt initiative;

APPEALS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO URGE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBER

STATES TO FULFIL THE TARGETS SET BY THE IMO.

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY

AFFAIRS

Meta austerity – while market confidence has improved and GDP growth in the EU and the Euro area has been forecasted to reach 2.0% and 1.8% respectively in 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) has had to introduce negative interest rates and lower lending rates to quell fears of possible price deflation. How should the

EU sustain the economic recovery whist preventing negative monetary externalities?

Submitted by: Conrad Bali (NO), Mónica Casanova (ES), Ellen Doherty (UK), Henriika Hakala (FI), Jovan Ivic (RS), Maximilian Landers (BE), Liam McCourt (IT), Alexandros Nikolaidis (GR), Mark Reidy (IE), Laura Teixeira (PT), Christian Ulmer (DE), Mallory Piña Villa (SE), Christian Browne (Chairperson, UK)


A. Deeply troubled by the fact there was zero economic growth in the Eurozone economy during the second quarter of 201417,

B. Noting with regret that the negative interest rates introduced by the ECB in June 2014 have so far failed to meet its goal of increasing the rate of inflation, with inflation down to 0.3% in September18,

C. Highlighting the presence of low investor confidence considering that although the ECB has made loans available amounting to €400bn at a low-‐‑interest rate of 0.05%, only EUR 82 billion of which has been taken up by banks19,

D. Firmly believing that Small and Medium-‐‑sized Enterprises (SMEs) are essential to the growth of the EU economy with 20 million SMEs representing 99% of all businesses in the EU20,

E. Aware that low consumer confidence reduces consumer spending,

17 Wall Street Journal (2014) “Zero growth Europe” 18 European Central Bank (2014) “Inflation forecasts” 19 Monaghan, A (2014) “What are negative interest rates?” 20 European Commission (2014) “Small and Medium-‐‑sized Enterprises”

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F. Affirms that low investor confidence increases the difficulty for companies in acquiring financing to aid with expansion and to deal with the effects of low consumer spending,

G. Cognisant that an increase in consumer spending will increase the supply of goods and services leading to rising price levels,

H. Aware that deflation causes the average price levels of goods to decrease subsequently reducing companies’ revenues and putting jobs at risk,

I. Conscious of the barriers for SMEs to enter the market with the average time and cost of starting up a private limited company amounted to 4.2 days in duration and EUR 315 in cost in 201321,

J. Further recognising that one third of SMEs within Europe stated they were unable to acquire as much funding as they had anticipated for 2013 as well as 15% stating that financing was a significant problem22,

K. Taking into account that unemployment rates in the EU rose from 6.2% to 10.1% from January 2008 to September 201423,

L. Congratulating Germany on taking steps to reduce unemployment by urging companies to offer employees shorter working weeks rather than making them redundant24,

M. Accepting with regret that consumer spending has decreased by EUR 34.2 billion from the last quarter of 2013 to the first quarter of 201425;

Improving investor confidence 7. Expresses its appreciation of the proposed funding of EUR 300 billon of the

European Investment Bank (EIB) by the ECB26;

8. Seeking more initiatives between the EIB and ECB to help increase the size and number of investments made by the EIB;

21 European Commission (2014) “Simplification of start-‐‑up procedures” 22 KKR (2014) “Alternative Capital’s Critical Role in Rebuilding Europe’s Economy for the Long Term” 23 Eurostat (2014) “Unemployment Statistics” 24 Baker, D (2011) “How to make short work of unemployment” 25 Trading Economics (2014) “Consumer spending” 26 Irish Times, (2014) “Junker calls for 300bn euro investment”

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9. Supports the proposal by the joint initiative of the European Commission and the EIB27 which aims to improve investor confidence by reducing investment risk through:

a) the establishment of an EIB Rating System (EIBRS) risk assessment for investments regarding SMEs,

b) joint guarantee instruments for SME loans from banks amounting to 80% of an investment;

Removing barriers for SMEs

10. Calls upon the EIB to take steps to increase their total investment in SMEs especially those focusing on research and development;

11. Requests that Member States establish training programs which provide support and education for individuals interested in starting up a business;

12. Asks the EIB to cover start-‐‑up costs of new businesses through the use of an application and approval system;

Increasing consumer spending

13. Encourages other Member States to follow Germany’s example in providing tax credits to firms which reduce working hours by 10% rather than making workers redundant.

27 European Commission (2014) “Increasing lending to the economy: implementing the EIB capital increase and joint Commission-‐‑EIB initiatives”

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS II

Beyond Crimea – with large Russian minorities in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania and growing tensions between Russia and the EU following diplomatic

antagonism and armed conflicts in Ukraine, how can the EU act preemptively to protect the territorial integrity of the Baltic region?

Submitted by: Bethany Appleton (UK), Ebba Bertilsson (SE), Ann Katrin Blachnik (DE), Luca Draisci (IT), Nuria Sans Durán (ES), Michael Ernst (AT), Laura Juan-‐‑Torres (CH), Sofia Paiva (PT), Yannick Mertens (LU), Rónán O’Connor (Chairperson, IE)


A. Deeply alarmed by Russia’s explicit threats of military intervention in the Baltic countries28 in the past months,

B. Interpreting the invasion and annexation of Crimea, in which ethnic tensions were instrumental, as a precedent for potential Russian expansion into other former Soviet Republics,

C. Deploring the roughly 3,000 casualties29 caused by the conflict between pro-‐‑Russian separatists alongside covert Russian troops and the Ukrainian forces,

D. Noting the limited success of the current EU and US sanctions implemented against Russia30,

E. Considering the definition of an effective sanction on Russia to be one whereby the costs to Russia from the sanctions outweigh the cumulative benefits of the action which the sanction seeks to deter,

F. Acknowledging Russia is both the EU’s third largest trading partner31 and also a significant source of the EU’s natural gas and oil,

28 The Baltic countries are Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 29 U.N. (August 2014) Summary of UN report on death toll in Ukrainian conflict between 16 July – 17 August 30 EU (March 2014) Current sanctions include blacklisting senior Russian officials, separatist commanders and Russian businesses accused of undermining Ukrainian sovereignty as well as targeting the Russian trade in energy, finances and arms. 31 European Commission (September 2014) Summary of EU-‐‑Russian trade relationship

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G. Recalling the decision made by the EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht, to put the trade aspect of the EU-‐‑Ukraine Association Agreement32 on hiatus for a year due to Russian concerns about the impact on their competitiveness in the Ukrainian market as a result,

H. Aware that an invasion of any of the Baltic states would trigger a military defence of the territory by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO),

I. Approving the increasing deployment of NATO forces and military equipment across the Baltic countries and Poland,

J. Concerned by the problematic integration of Russian minorities in the Baltic countries, which are former Soviet Republics, and the obstacles posed to the naturalisation of these ethnic Russians,

K. Noting with disbelief Russia’s stated intention of considering military intervention in the Baltic countries in order to protect ethnic Russian minorities in the region,

L. Recognising the role of Frontex33 in performing border monitoring on behalf of the EU through the use of European Border Guard Teams (EBGTs);

Trade Sanctions 1. Proposes to maintain the current EU and US sanctions imposed on Russia;

2. Has resolved to publicly commit to the following actions in the event of a breach of sovereignty of any of the Baltic countries by Russia:

a) blacklisting of Russian firms accused of involvement in the conflict so as to prevent them from operating within the EU,

b) significant tax increases on Russian exports,

c) an embargo on the purchase of Russian natural gas and oil;

Energy and Territorial Security

3. Endorses the creation of a European Energy Stability Factility as a means of neutralising the costs incurred through the reliance on more expensive energy alternatives in the event of an EU embargo on Russian natural gas and oil;

32 European Parliament (September 2014) EU-‐‑Ukraine Association Agreement ratification summary 33 Frontex (2014) Explanation of the role of EBGTs within Frontex

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4. Recommends the holding of an International Energy Summit in which potential global energy suppliers can negotiate contingency plans should the EU embargo Russian natural gas and oil;

5. Calls upon Frontex to deploy a EBGT to the Baltic countries, which in coordination with the NATO monitoring of the region’s airspace, will monitor border activity with particular regard to the risk of ground invasion and low-‐‑flying aircraft and ensure territorial integrity is maintained;

Cultural Integration of Russian Minorities

6. Approves the adoption of the measures outlined in the Estonian Language Act34 by all Baltic countries that ensure government correspondence is possible in all languages spoken by a significant proportion of the population;

7. Directs the Baltic countries towards the European Social Fund (ESF) as a potential source of funding for the introduction of language courses in the national language for adults of the ethnic Russian minority;

8. Encourages the Baltic countries to create after-‐‑school classes in coordination with the ESF that cater to ethnic Russian youths who seek education in Russian;

9. Invites Russia to participate in the funding of the language programmes outlined above in order to accommodate their desire to protect the ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltic countries.

34 Council of Europe (February 1995) Language Act of Estonia Chapter 2 § 10

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND TRADE

From linear to circular – with the European Commission tabling an enabling policy framework for a circular economy in the EU, how can both the EU and its Member States better manage existing resources and realign the production process through the use of existing infrastructure and enabling technologies to

ensure industrial sustainability?

Submitted by: Elif Aydinlandi (DE), Pedro Ferreira (PT), Maria Granero (ES), Michalis Konstantinou (CY), Joost de Haan (NL), Philippa Karlsson (SE), Haroldas Mackevicius (LT), Saskia Piercy (ES), Magnus Berg Sletfjerding (NO), Nikola Vranes (RS), Ciara Robinson (Chairperson, UK)


A. Alarmed by the potential exhaustion of natural resources by 2050 at the existing consumption rate of 16 tonnes of resources per capita35,

B. Noting the difficulty in establishing common, legally-‐‑binding legislation due to the difference in Member States’:

i) levels of financial stability,

ii) available natural resources,

iii) existing industrial infrastructure,

iv) various industrial sectors,

v) available technology;

C. Noting with regret the lack of awareness amongst consumers, businesses and Member States of the benefits of a circular economy such as, but not limited to:

i) the creation of an estimated 580,000 jobs36,

ii) environmentally-‐‑friendly production processes,

iii) a 30% increase in resource productivity by 203037, 35 European Commission, "ʺRoadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe"ʺ, 2011 36 European Commission, Communication "ʺTowards A Circular Economy"ʺ, 2014

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iv) increased economic competitiveness from resource independence;

D. Noting with approval the Eurobarometer report stating that 86% of EU citizens believe that a more resource-‐‑efficient Europe would have a positive effect on quality of life38,

E. Stressing the success of companies transitioning towards the circular model including Renault whose remanufactured parts have reduced costs by 30-‐‑50%39,

F. Bearing in mind that recycling can be expensive, require raw materials and the energy usage involved may outweigh the benefits of the final product,

G. Observing that one third of all waste produced in the EU is a result of the current maintenance, construction and demolition of buildings in the EU40,

H. Aware that a successful implementation of the circular economy model requires a shift in consumer mentality from owning to renting or leasing of commodities,

I. Acknowledging that many large corporations and Small and Medium-‐‑sized Enterprises (SMEs) may be unwilling to begin the transition to a circular economy due to the costs incurred and financial risk,

J. Concerned by the lack of common intelligible waste calculation measurements which hinder the effectiveness of waste management policies,

K. Aware of the criticism voiced by organisations such as Business Europe with regard to the efficiency of the proposed Resource Productivity Indicator41,

Targets for Industrial Sustainability 1. Agrees the following targets proposed by the European Commission should be

made legally binding42:

a) 70% recycling target for municipal waste by 2030,

b) 80% recycling target for packaging such as glass, paper and plastic,

c) 30% reduction of waste by 2025;

37 European Commission, Communication "ʺTowards A Circular Economy"ʺ, 2014 38 Eurobarometer, "ʺAttitudes of Europeans to Waste Management and Resource Efficiency"ʺ, 2014 39 Renault, "ʺCircular Economy: Re-‐‑cycle, Re-‐‑use, Re-‐‑nault"ʺ, 2014 40 European Commission,"ʺSustainable Buildings Communication"ʺ, 2014 41 EurActive, "ʺEU tables ‘circular economy’ package with zero-‐‑landfill goal"ʺ, 2014 42 European Commission, Communication "ʺTowards A Circular Economy"ʺ, 2014

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2. Requests abolition of the legally-‐‑binding element of the ban on landfilling of all recyclable and biodegradable waste by 202543;

3. Recommends the re-‐‑evaluation of the Resource Productivity Indicator taking into account the:

a) waste output per unit of Raw Material Consumption,

b) annual percentage increase in Raw Material Consumption in each Member State;

4. Calls for large companies and SMEs to implement production cycles that:

a) use food waste for the creation of biomass or biofuel,

b) include already recycled materials,

c) substitute hard to recycle materials for biodegradable materials;

Realigning the Production Process

5. Endorses increased investment in businesses transitioning to a circular economy through the European Structural and Investment Funds;

6. Encourages Member States to establish a tax deduction system for companies that incorporate circular economy principles;

7. Appeals to Horizon 2020 to direct more of their annual budget to subsidise companies that comply with the rent and reuse model;

8. Intends to establish Public-‐‑Private Partnerships (PPP) between national or local governments and companies that have incorporated circular principles to share good practices;

9. Suggests redefining the European Resource Efficiency Platform44 to focus on:

a) the production process in its entirety,

b) the principle of design to disassemble,

c) restructuring business models to include the renting of commodities as an alternative to ownership;

43 European Commission, Communication "ʺTowards A Circular Economy"ʺ, 2014 44 The European Resource Efficiency Platform aims to provide high-‐‑level guidance to the European Commission, Members States and private actors on the transition to a more resource-‐‑efficient economy.

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10. Strongly welcomes the creation of a building efficiency indicator that accounts for the use of energy, resources and recycled materials;

11. Approves the use of this indicator to set standards for new construction projects and targets for existing buildings;

Improving Consumers’ Understanding of a Circular Economy

12. Authorises cooperation with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation to jointly develop a strategy for Member States to include the principles of a circular economy in their respective education systems through workshops and curricula;

13. Has resolved to improve consumer awareness through the creation of:

a) interactive material on the benefits of a circular economy accessible online,

b) pan-‐‑European packaging labels indicating the resource efficiency of products;

Progress Reports by Member States

14. Urges Member States to report annually to the European Commission on their respective progress in resource management and their transition to a circular economy;

15. Invites the European Commission to strictly monitor the effective implementation of the indicator for waste generation used to measure landfill and waste output across Member States.

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Internity vs. integrity – with internships and traineeships regulated at the EU level and temporary, unregulated and often unpaid internships becoming the

route to professional work in domestic job markets, how can the EU ensure higher quality of learning and training, facilitate cross-‐‑border exchange and uphold

interns’ employment rights?

Submitted by: Markéta Balíková (CZ), Agnes Wentzel Blank (SE), Ella Blaxill (UK), Alessandro Bosco (IT), Shauna Breen (IE), Carolina Carvalheira (PT), Catriona Engstfeld (DE), Erik Gulbrandsen (NO), Lukas Jabloskas (LT), Luzia Johow (AT), Marcos Machattos (CY), Chris Papadogeorgopoulos (Chairperson, GR), Rosa Douw (Vice-‐‑President, NL)


A. Alarmed by the EU-‐‑28 youth unemployment rate of 21.6%45,

B. Aware of the current discrepancies amongst Member States in regard to employment policy, a competence shared between the EU and the Member States46,

C. Strongly emphasising the lack of a common definition for traineeships and internships across the EU47,

D. Taking into account that many enterprises take advantage of trainees and interns due to the lack of Member States'ʹ regulations with regard to:

i) insurance,

ii) remuneration,

iii) working hours,

iv) working conditions48,

45 "ʺUnemployment rate by sex and age groups -‐‑ monthly average"ʺ, Eurostat 46 "ʺArticles 4 and 5"ʺ, Treaty of the Functioning of the EU 47 "ʺStudy on a comprehensive overview on traineeship arrangements in Member States, Final Synthesis Report"ʺ, Rep. no. VC/2011/0176, European Commission, May 2012 48 "ʺThe Experience of Traineeships in the EU"ʺ, Flash Eurobarometer 378, European Commission, November 2013

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E. Realising that trainees and interns do not always receive a written contract from enterprises49,

F. Considering the inconsistent implementation of the Youth Guarantee50 amongst Member States,

G. Noting with deep regret that only 9% of the EU interns have participated in transnational internship schemes51,

H. Concerned that 24% of young people in the EU claim they do not have sufficient financial resources to undertake a traineeship abroad52,

I. Observing the lack of awareness regarding opportunities for cross-‐‑border internships53,

J. Noting with deep concern that the European Commission'ʹs recommendation of a Quality Framework for Traineeships54 has not been adopted by all Member States;

Employment Rights of Trainees 1. Calls on the European Commission’ Directorate General for Employment,

Inclusion and Social Affairs (DG EMPL) to initiate a regulation laying out a common definition of traineeships and internships for all Member States;

2. Recommends the provision of adequate social protection, health and accident insurance for trainees to be covered by the employers;

3. Designates the DG EMPL to instate regulations on the introduction of compulsory contracts for trainees;

4. Emphasises the need for Member States to implement the Youth Guarantee whilst recognising failure to do so is estimated to cost the EU EUR 153 billion per annum;

49 Ibid. 50 Youth Guarantee: It ensures that all young people under the age of 25 get a good-‐‑quality, concrete offer within 4 months of them leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. 51 "ʺThe Experience of Traineeships in the EU"ʺ, Flash Eurobarometer 378, European Commission, November 2013 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Quality Framework for Traineeships: It enables trainees to receive a high quality working experience, including high quality of learning and training, under safe and fair conditions

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Training quality and transnational traineeships 5. Requests the European Commission broaden the Erasmus+ Programme by

enabling enterprises to apply for the funding of cross-‐‑border exchange of trainees;

6. Further requests that enterprises must abide by the Quality Framework for Traineeships if they wish to receive the proposed funding;

7. Emphasises the need of reinforcing transnational traineeships as an integral part of study curricula in the higher education sector thus solidifying the link between industry and education.

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS I

Emerging enemies – with the Islamic State continuing its Islamisation; instances of mass executions, severe armed conflicts and ethnic cleansing persist. What should the role of the EU be in containing such entities fueled by violence,

religious fundamentalism and territorial ambition?

Submitted by: Olga Glinicka (PL), Elsa Karlsson Gustafsson (SE), Serena Long (UK), Nina Montanelli (CH), Nuno Oliveira (PT), Anna Ridka (CZ), Valentina Schutze (ES), Tiaji Maynell Sio (DE), Andreas Spanashis (CY), Ingvild Stautland (NO), Michelle Wardell (IT), Rafail Zoulis (GR), Francesco Colin (Chairperson, IT)


A. Emphasising that violent aims and acts of the Islamic State pose a serious threat to the Middle East area as well as the international community,

B. Recognising that the Islamic State’s sophisticated organisational structure and extensive control of infrastructure allows its unmonitored growth,

C. Deeply alarmed by the Islamic State’s continuous violation of human rights through actions such as55:

i) mass executions,

ii) terrorist attacks and suicide bombings,

iii) ethnic cleansing;

D. Considering the Islamic State to be one of the wealthiest terrorist organisations in the world with assets of an estimated value of USD 2 billion acquired through56:

i) supporting networks worldwide,

ii) oil revenue,

iii) extortion of local businesses,

55 United Nations Security Council Resolution, “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist”, S/RES/2170 (2014) 56 Chulov M., (15 June 2014) “How an arrest in Iraq revealed Isis’s $2bn jihadist network”, The Guardian

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iv) ransoms for kidnappings,

v) illegal taxing of the public;

E. Gravely concerned that the support of the Islamic State is increasing rapidly, including an estimated number of 3,000 European citizens57 now fighting with the Islamic State,

F. Acknowledging with deep concern that by August 2014 over three million inhabitants of the areas under the control of the Islamic State had fled due to continuous threats to their safety,

G. Bearing in mind that the aforementioned upsurge in the migration flows deteriorates the already existing humanitarian crisis,

H. Aware that independent action has been taken by both Member States and other nations,

I. Noting with deep concern that the ineffective control of borders in the region, in particular that of Turkey, creates issues in both defining and dealing with the Islamic State,

J. Recognising that though the Islamic State considers itself the sole authority of Islam it is only supported by a small minority of Muslims worldwide,

K. Noting with concern that extensive media presence and especially the recent brutalities broadcasted worldwide draw international public opinion to the Islamic State;

Human Rights and humanitarian aid

1. Condemns those actions performed by the Islamic State which represent a clear violation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and consist of various infringements of international law;

2. Calls for the continuation of the humanitarian aid granted by EU in accordance with the decisions made by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)58 for both refugees and inhabitants of the troubled regions;

3. Futher asks for an enhancement of the aforementioned humanitarian aid whether the situation deteriorates further or not;

57 “Islamic State crisis: ‘3000 European jihadist join fight”, BBC News 58 Press Release of the Foreign Affair Council meeting, Council of the European Union -‐‑ Press Office (23 June 2014)

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Media and culture 4. Encourages the continuation of the media and social media research aimed at

clarifying the difference between the Muslim community and the religious fundamentalists which the Islamic State represents;

5. Urges the Muslim community to further denounce the Islamic State with a common and firm voice to distinguish themselves from the ideals and beliefs of fundamentalists;

Direct actions

6. Asks Member States to put more ethical decisions in practice with regard to their business partners, especially for those companies that operate in the sectors from which the Islamic State benefits most;

7. Calls upon the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to initiate a proposal under the framework of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) to sanction companies and individuals proven to have financial relations with the Islamic State or any kind of relevant afiliation;

8. Encourages stricter border controls of neighbouring countries of the Islamic State;

9. Asks the High Representative to recommend the Council to launch a border control mission under the framework of the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) to provide both technical and financial support and ensure the eventual implementation of the border control;

10. Calls upon High Representative under the framework of the CSDP to recommend the FAC to produce a position encouraging Member States to intervene with cooridnated, indirect military action only in the event of all other non-‐‑military options failing to contain the growth in support and territory of the Islamic State.

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This topic was generously sponsored by the

ORIGIN GREEN

___________________

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL AFFAIRS

Growth in unequal terms – with the global population expected to reach 9 billion by 2050 and agriculture already having a vast impact on our planet, how should

EU governments work together with farmers, the food industry and the international community to overcome the joint challenges of reducing the impact of agriculture on the environment while increasing efficiency in food production

and distribution?

Submitted by: Patricia Moreira Azevedo (CH), Luise Bellach (AT), Francesca Donà (IT), Nora Bennin Gallala (NO), Richard Murray (IE), Dimitris Ntounis (GR), Charlotte Roberts (UK), Christine Sheldon (NL), Johanna Sperens (SE), Nazli Nur Tamer (TR), Leonore Zutter (LU), Bram Van Meldert (Chairperson, BE)


A. Believing that food security is a human right as recognised in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights59 and a prerequisite for a thriving society,

B. Expecting that the world population will keep growing over the next decades to reach approximately 9 billion by 205060 leading to an increased demand for agricultural output,

C. Concerned that the increasing wealth of the world population will lead to an additional rise in demand for agricultural output because of the increased consumption of:

i) products with a large environmental impact such as meat, eggs and dairy,

ii) low or non-‐‑caloric products such as coffee, tobacco and tea;

59 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 60 State of world population 2011, UNFPA (2011)

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D. Conscious that even under today’s status quo, 850 million people remain undernourished61 and that this is largely caused by the unequal distribution of food,

E. Alarmed by the catalysation of climate change and the loss of bio-‐‑diversity caused by agricultural practices that harm the environment through

i) emission of Greenhouse Gasses (GHG),

ii) usage of harmful chemicals,

iii) depletion of ground water resources,

iv) exhaustion of soils;

F. Further alarmed that these consequences of harmful agricultural practices in turn risk reducing agricultural productivity in the short and long run, thereby endangering food security around the world,

G. Stressing that agricultural activities already take up 40%62 of the world’s land surface and that 70%63 of the EU’s land area is covered by forests or agricultural area,

H. Noting with regret that 30 – 50%64 of human-‐‑edible food is wasted during the different stages in the food supply chain identified as:

i) production,

ii) processing,

iii) retailing,

iv) consumption;

I. Aware that humans consume only 55% of the world’s human-‐‑edible crop calories as 36% is fed to livestock and 9% is turned into bio fuels and industrial products65,

J. Bearing in mind that a yield gap66 exists in many regions of the world due to:

i) a lack of technological knowledge sharing amongst farmers and researchers,

61 The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012, FAO (2012) 62 P. Smith and P. J. Gregory, Proceedings of the Nutrition Society (2013), 72, 21-‐‑28 63 Webpage of the Directorate-‐‑General Innovation and research on the bioeconomy 64 P. C. West et al., Science 345, 325-‐‑328 (2014) 65 J. Foley, National Geographic, feeding 9 billion (2014). 66 The difference between crop yields observed at any location and the crops’ potential yield at the same location given the agricultural practices and technologies.

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ii) the unwillingness of some in the food industry to utilise available technologies,

iii) a lack of financial resources to implement available technologies;

K. Recognising that by making responsible diet choices, consumers can incentivise farmers and the food industry to become more sustainable,

L. Convinced that food security and environmentally sustainable food production can only be achieved through international cooperation and that the EU has a key role to play in realising this;

Productivity and environmental impact 1. Calls upon the European Commission Directorate-‐‑General (DG) Health and

Consumers to re-‐‑examine the EU policy on Genetically Modified Organisms67 (GMOs) in light of GMO’s potentially contributing to food security and reducing the harmful impacts of agriculture on the environment;

2. Proposes that the Commissioner on Agriculture and Rural Development takes action to avoid increasing the amount of land under agricultural use in order to increase agricultural output and to focus on increasing productivity instead;

3. Welcomes the suggestion made by the European Commission in its proposed Policy Framework for Climate and Energy 2020 to 203068 to recognise GHG emissions stemming from agriculture as a third pillar in the fight against GHG emissions;

Food waste

4. Proposes that the European Commission explicitly includes the reduction and management of food waste in agricultural businesses in the first axis of the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy69;

67 Organisms, such as plants and animals, whose genetic characteristics are being modified artificially in order to give them a new property. 68 European Commission, Communication on a Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the period 2020 to 2030 69 Second pillar of the CAP

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5. Invites the Commissioner on Heath and Food Safety to initiate legalisation on the usage of non-‐‑animal food waste stemming from the different stages along the food supply chain as feed for pigs;

6. Asks the DG Health and Consumers to re-‐‑examine EU legislation concerning expiration dates for food in order to prevent the unnecessary disposal of food;

7. Calls upon Member States to increase taxation of non-‐‑essential, non-‐‑caloric luxury agricultural goods such as coffee, tea, tobacco in order to reduce their consumption;

8. Urges the DG Research and Innovation to induce the intensification of research into the potential for development of second generation bio fuels70 to turn food waste into energy;

9. Encourages Member States and civil society to help children understand how to sustainably consume food, e.g. by having vegetarian meals available in schools;

International cooperation

10. Invites the G20 to place the challenges posed by the connection between agriculture, the environment and food security on the agenda of its next meeting with the aim of initiating a common international framework to jointly tackle the aforementioned challenges;

11. Appreciates the work done by the World Food Organisation and COPA-‐‑Cogeca71 in promoting sustainable farming techniques around the globe.


70 Bio fuels made from non-‐‑food crops, industrial waste and residue streams or agricultural or forestry residues. 71 An association representing farmers and their cooperatives in the European Union

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL MARKET AND CONSUMER

PROTECTION

The battle against Silicon villains – with Germany’s latest reaction to UBER’s penetration of commercial transport in Frankfurt and the application’s wide reach in several Member States’ markets, how can the EU ensure that emerging commercial transportation service providers uphold legal guidelines whilst protecting EU consumers and maintaining market stability?

Submitted by: John Ashworth (NL), Keda Bamber (ES), Hanna Banks (UK), Francesca Cecchin (IT), Leon Furuskog (SE), Peter Goldsborough (AT), Aino Roysko (FI), Oliver Senn (DE), Julien De Visschar (BE), Bensgiu Yankuncu (TR), Iman Idriss (Chairperson, FR), Niall Murphy (Vice President, IE)


A. Recognises “consumer-‐‑to-‐‑consumer sharing” (C2C) to be a business model in which a consumer sells or rents goods and services that are owned for the primary purpose of personal use directly to another, without going through a business intermediary,

B. Recognising that C2C platforms:

i) offer new job opportunities,

ii) encourage innovation and development within different industries,

iii) improve digital literacy,

iv) make certain industries more accessible for employment;

C. Cognisant of the need for a new regulatory framework for the sharing economy to protect consumers in Member States,

D. Aware that C2C platforms could have a temporarily destabilising effect within the internal market by putting existing businesses under increased levels of competition,

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E. Recognises that the arrival of the sharing economy has led to significant challenges for incumbent businesses, such as:

i) strikes,

ii) reduced market shares,

iii) pay cuts,

iv) redundancies;

F. Stressing that consumers need to feel safe and trust service providers when using C2C platforms if the sharing economy is to thrive and develop,

G. Aware of the need to protect consumers while also being considerate of regulatory divergence among Member States,

H. Concerned that the incumbent businesses’ lack of technological skills acts as a disadvantage when competing with new C2C platforms,

I. Concerned by the lack of awareness amongst incumbent businesses, consumers and Member State governments of the sharing economy and its future implications,

J. Acknowledging that the sharing of existing goods and services reduces production and ensures that resources are used more efficiently;

Establishing a regulatory legal framework 1. Calls for the European Commission to enforce legally binding standards for all

C2C platforms, in the areas of:

a) safety,

b) insurance,

c) liability,

d) quality of goods;

2. Recommends C2C platforms conduct criminal background check for each potential service provider, prior to that applicant becoming a C2C service provider, in the case of direct personal contact between service provider and consumer;

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Consumer protection and information

3. Asks for all Transportation Network Companies72 (TNC) to fully cover all parties involved by ensuring:

a) application of TNC’s liability,

b) existence of driver’s third party insurance,

c) vehicular Insurance;

4. Encourages C2C platforms to provide basic personal information about service providers, especially in cases of direct personal contact between service providers and consumers;

5. Calls for the European Consumer Centre Network73 to create an online database of incumbent businesses and C2C platforms, which will highlight the differences in services, cost and location;

Innovation and research for the sharing economy

6. Calls for the provision of online training to advance the technological skills of incumbent enterprises under ‘New skills for New Jobs’74 programme of Horizon 2020 75 in order to support, mentor and advise incumbents businesses on new market trends;

7. Calls for the Research Executive Agency76 to identify and research the effects of the sharing economy on the public and private sector;

72 A transportation network company (TNC) is a company that uses an online-‐‑enabled platform to connect passengers with drivers using their personal, non-‐‑commercial vehicle. 73 European Consumer Centre offers consumer advice and support to EU residents who are buying goods or services. 74 The 'ʹNew Skills for New Jobs'ʹ initiative launched in 2008 set out the Commission'ʹs agenda for better skills upgrading, anticipation and matching. It is part of the EU'ʹs overall strategy – Europe 2020 – promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 75 Horizon 2020 is the European Commission strategy launched in 2010 targeting innovation, the digital economy, employment, research and development, resource efficiency and poverty reduction 76 The Brussels-‐‑based Research Executive Agency (REA) was set up in 2007. The REA reports to the following Commission Research and Innovation, and is part of Horizon 2020.

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8. Invites the European Coalition for the Sharing Economy77 to research and assess existing legislation frameworks for C2C platforms in order to collect, assess and anticipate:

a) good practices, data and ideas regarding successful models for the sharing economy,

b) emerging issues in the field of the sharing economy.

77 The European Sharing Economy Coalition (EURO-‐‑SHE) is one of the advisory bodies of the European Commission providing a policy agenda for the EU.

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INDEPEDENT NEWS AND MEDIA

___________________

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERITIES, JUSTICE AND

HOME AFFAIRS

Digital polyphony -‐‑ freedom of the press and media pluralism is often cited as a key component for the protection of civil liberties, but in recent years there has been an increase in journalists using the legal defenses to which they are entitled to perform illegal and intrusive surveillance on private citizens. How can the EU continue to protect press freedom without encroaching upon the rights of its

citizens?

Submitted by: Kristin Glimstad Aspaas (NO), Geidre Birmontaite (LT), Cem Alfred Leon Candan (TR), Renáta Chalupská (CZ), Floris Dierickx (BE), Sarunja Kathirgamathamby (CH), Pauline Keane (IE), Tove Lindberg (SE), Boris Van der Lugt (NL), Inessa Manukyan (AM), Sofia Ntali (GR), Sara Reinikainen (FI), Emelia Smith (UK), Anna Borrell Mauri (Chairperson, ES)


A. Congratulating the EU’s commitment to respect freedom of the press and media pluralism as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights78,

B. Conscious that each Member State has its own regulatory framework regarding freedom of the press, media pluralism and individual privacy,

C. Regretting that Member States are struggling to implement regulations to ensure freedom of the press and media pluralism,

D. Aware that in the digital era national legislation is being used to deal with cross-‐‑border media issues,

78 Art. 11.2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. This is similar to the provisions under Art. 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), page 11.

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E. Recognising that media pluralism can be threatened by the concentration of media ownership by either private entities or the government,

F. Noting that potential threats against journalists regarding controversial stories may lead to untruthful reporting,

G. Realising that some journalists are being instructed by their employers to perform illegal and intrusive acts at the risk of losing their occupation,

H. Pointing out that journalists should always be able to prove the truthfulness of their work while respecting the confidential relationship they may have with their source79,

I. Deeply concerned that there is no clear consensus on the definition of the term “public interest”,

J. Noting with regret the lack of awareness of boundaries between private and public information, especially on social media,

K. Acknowledging the substantial grey area between the public and private life of a public figure,

L. Declaring that five countries within the EU do not penalise defamation80,

M. Alarmed by the lack of media literacy81 amongst EU citizens,

N. Stressing the lack of awareness and understanding of the implications that follow the usage of social media and Internet,

O. Observing that the rapid pace of technological change and globalisation have profoundly transformed the scale and way data is collected, accessed, used and transferred,

P. Fully alarmed by the fact that the slow updating and implementation of legislation relative to the evolution of digital media leaves legal ambiguities for journalists that could be used to justify intrusive and illegal surveillance on private citizens,

79 European Court of Human Rights. Goodwing v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 27 March 1996:“Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom. Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest (…). An order of source disclosure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest”. 80 International Press Institute Report. Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union and its Effect on the Press Freedom. July 2014. The five countries are Ireland, the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Croatia and Romania. 81 Media literacy: ability of individuals to access and understand information through different means, such as television, radio, print media, the internet and digital technology. European Commission official website.

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Q. Contemplating limited EU control over international issues concerning digital media,

R. Affirming that imposing overly strict media regulation could potentially damage both freedom of expression and the publishing sector;

Protection of freedom of the press and media pluralism 1. Emphasises the importance of the creation of media councils82 for each Member

State to monitor media freedom and pluralism at a national level and report annually to the European Commission;

2. Calls upon the European Commission to issue specifically tailored recommendations to each Member State based on the media council reports that would give basic guidelines on balancing freedom of the press with the right to privacy;

3. Affirms that the EU should be considered competent to protect media freedom and pluralism in Member States where such freedom is at risk under the definition in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union83;

4. Asks the International Press Institute84 (IPI) to increase support for journalists who are being forced to perform intrusive and illegal acts against the right to privacy and wish to speak out;

Protection of the right of privacy 5. Recommends the ECHR formulates a legal definition of the term “public

interest” around which Member States can legislate autonomously;

6. Invites all Member States to penalise defamation;

82 Media councils would be independent politically and culturally balanced councils with socially diverse membership. They would have real enforcement powers, including fines, the power to order the publishing of apologies and the power to remove journalistic status. 83 Article 7.1 of the Treaty on European Union: On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure. 84 The IPI is a global network of editors, media executives and leading journalists that works with the European Commission to safeguard press freedom, the promotion of the free flow of news and information and the improvement of practices of journalism.

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7. Further requests that a favourable court ruling always include an apology and retraction of the accusations published, with equal positioning and size of the original defamation in the case of publications, or presented in the same time slot in the case of radio or TV programmes;

Digital era

8. Reminds Member States to promote media literacy and ensure that their citizens have the ability to perform a choice and critical evaluation of information sources and understand the consequences of uploading and downloading data to and from the Internet by:

a) including the aforementioned in educational curricula,

b) seminars and conferences;

9. Calls upon the European Commission to expand the Right to be Forgotten85 to further safeguard the data of those whose information has been unlinked.


85 Article 17 of the Data Protection Regulation, page 51: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to them and the abstention from further dissemination of such data, especially in relation to personal data which are made available by the data subject while he or she was a child, where one of the following grounds applies: (a) the data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; (b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or when the storage period consented to has expired, and where there is no other legal ground for the processing of the data; (c) the data subject objects to the processing of personal data pursuant to Article 19; (d) the processing of the data does not comply with this Regulation for other reasons.

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

Institutional power play – with the constant struggle of competences within EU institutions and between Member States for the brokering of international

agreements, in what way should the Union’s external competences be defined to achieve a single, common and coherent voice in its external affairs?

Submitted by: Arvid Bertilsson (SE), Jan Čamaj (CZ), Clara Gehner (CH), Giovanna Giacca (IT), Nune Hayrapetyan (AM), Verna Lukka (FI), Ioanna Kostaki (GR), Ariadna Puig (ES), Donald de Vinck de Winnezeele (BE), Waltter Roslin (Chairperson, FI), Hans Maes (Vice President, BE)


A. Emphasising the need for a common and coherent representation of the EU when acting externally,

B. Recognising that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are currently not listed under the categories of EU competences86, but remain a separate title87 in the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

C. Aware of previous treaty changes aimed at strengthening the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security88, as was the case with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008,

D. Concerned by the level of political influence the European Council exercises over the position of the High Representative,

E. Expressing its concern about the reduced efficiency of the High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) due to the lack of resources

86 Listed in articles 3-‐‑6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 87 Title V, arts 21-‐‑46 TEU. 88 The position of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was set up with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.

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and organisational structure, as well as the lack of clarity around the Services’ tasks and objectives, as stated in the 2014 report of the Court of Auditors89,

F. Conscious of the rate of efficiency of the intergovernmental method when taking actions on urgent international political situations,

G. Noting with concern that the intergovernmental method primarily reflects the interests of individual Member States’ rather than those of the Union;

Towards a common and coherent voice 1. Encourages Member States represented in the Council at the EU level to respect

the CFSP values of the EU stated in Art 21(1) TEU and the objectives stated in Art 21(2) TEU when acting externally;

2. Urges Member States to refrain from communicating their individual positions towards third countries before a common position has been negotiated at EU level pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation (Art 4 (3) TEU);

A dual EU representation

3. Calls for a treaty change introducing a system of dual representation in which the EU would be represented by:

a) the High Representative at ministerial level,

b) the President of the European Commission at Head of State level and in international organisations such as the United Nations and the G7;

Overcoming the competence question

4. Calls for the definition of foreign affairs as a shared competence, including the CFSP and the CSDP;

5. Supports the use of the intergovernmental method of decision-‐‑making in EU foreign affairs;

6. Calls upon the High Representative to take into account the EU’s interest in intergovernmental decision-‐‑making by inviting the President of the European

89 “European External Action Service not living up to its potential, say EU auditors”, ECA/14/27

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Commission and the presidents of the political groups of the European Parliament to the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council as advisors without voting rights;

7. Suggests the introduction of the right for the European Parliament to refuse the European Council’s nominee for the position of High Representative without having to reject the full college of nominated Commissioners;

8. Calls for an increase of the budget allocated to the functioning of the EEAS, aimed at improving and developing current diplomatic services.

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DEPARTMENT ON ENVIRONMENT, COMMUNITY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

___________________

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH

AND FOOD SAFETY I

Eco-‐‑innovation partnerships – with the Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) expected to allow new technologies to reach the market more effectively, how can the EU further facilitate the introduction of green technologies to the

market through Innovation Partnerships between public and private stakeholders?

Submitted by: Berk Arcan (TR), Anna Barkemeyer (DE), Scarlett Blacker (UK), Ingrid Brustad (NO), Eimear Devaney (IE), Matthew Gibbons (IE), Alexsandar Gigov (RS), Maria Mertaka (CY), Amadeusz Muller (PL), Riccardo Pagnan (IT), Maren Umdasch (AT), Laure Steinville (Chairperson, FR)


A. Keeping in mind that Small and Medium-‐‑sized Enterprises (SMEs) represent 90% of the European green technology market90,

B. Guided by the fact that the European green technology market represents:

i) one-‐‑third of the global technology market,

ii) 2% of the EU’s Gross Domestic Product,

iii) 3.4 million jobs91,

C. Noting with regret the reluctance of investors to support the green technology sector due to their belief that they will not make a sufficient return on their investment,

90 'ʹSMEs, “Resource efficiency and green markets”, European Commission, 2013 (p.5) 91 European Voice report on green technologies, September 2013 (see page 1)

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D. Bearing in mind that most programmes related to green technologies developed under Horizon 2020 still need to be evaluated by the European Commission to gauge their effectiveness,

E. Viewing with appreciation the Eco-‐‑Innovation Action Plan (EcoAP)92, launched by the European Commission under Horizon 202093 which includes:

i) the ETV94 proposal,

ii) the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-‐‑sized Enterprises (COSME) programme95,

iii) the introduction of semi-‐‑annual European fora on eco-‐‑innovation;

F. Noting with approval the efforts of the European Institute for Innovation and Technology (EIT) 96 in the creation of Knowledge Innovation Communities (KICs)97,

G. Believing that the development of eco-‐‑innovation in large-‐‑scale projects could be achieved through Public-‐‑Private Partnerships (PPPs),

H. Regretting the lack of focus on contractual PPPs relating to eco-‐‑innovation within the Joint Technology Initiatives (JTI)98,

I. Observing weaknesses in the ETV programme that are jeopardising its accessibility to SME innovators, such as:

i) its high procedural costs99,

ii) the length of time involved in the procedure100;

J. Expressing its concern about the acute shortage of professionals with the technical and methodological background needed to develop complex environmental technology,

92 EcoAP : a broad policy framework providing directions for eco-‐‑innovation policy and funding having Horizon 2020 as a main source of support. 93 Horizon 2020: the EU’s biggest research and innovation programme ever with EUR 80 billion allocated to research and innovation and 60% the budget focusing on sustainable development policies. 94 ETV: consists of an independent third party verification of the performance of new environmental technologies entering the market. 95 COSME: a EU programme aiming to support SMEs in their access to finance, markets and creating more favourable conditions for business growth. 96 EIT: a EU body based in Budapest aiming to enhance Europe’s ability to innovate. 97 KICs: consists of communities bringing together all leaders of the three sides of the ‘knowledge triangle’ (higher education, research and business) to promote innovation in Europe. 98 JTI: a EUR 9 billion fund proposed under the Innovation Investment Package to run PPPs and organise a research agenda in a number of areas of strategic importance for the EU. 99 The average cost of an ETV is EUR 53,000 average. 100 The average ETV application process takes about 6 months.

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K. Pointing out a lack of consensus at the EU level on the legislative framework of PPPs with nine Member States not having clear legislation on the matter101,

L. Taking into consideration the strong regional imbalance persisting between Member States regarding their performance in innovation and the development of green industries102;

Enhancing investment in Eco-‐‑Innovation 1. Asks the EIT to compile a database which will include information on all current

eco-‐‑innovative:

a) initiatives and programmes included in the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme,

b) large, medium and small-‐‑sized enterprises,

c) testing bodies;

2. Requests that Member States provide tax incentives for enterprises producing green technologies aimed at lowering costs along the production chain, making their prices more affordable for investors;

3. Invites the European Commission to produce an extended report which would be published within two years to evaluate the results of the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme;

Supporting eco-‐‑innovative businesses

4. Urges the European Investment Fund (EIF)103 and the European Investment Bank104 to expand the list of banks in the Risk-‐‑Sharing Finance Facility105 in order to allow more diversified sources of funding for eco-‐‑innovative enterprises;

5. Further urges the EIF to allocate targeted finance to SMEs unable to afford the cost of an ETV application;

101 Status of PPP Institutional and Legal Structures in EU Member States, Asian Development Bank Institute, 2005 102 ‘Europe more innovative but regional differences persist’, press release of the EC, 2014 103 EIF: A European agency providing risk finance to benefit SMEs across Europe. 104 EIB: The only bank owned by and representing the interests of the EU Member States. In the innovation sphere the EIB is responsible for loans to large-‐‑scale enterprises. 105 Overview of the RSFF, EC, 2007

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6. Proposes the introduction of full scholarships for university students following a course related to eco-‐‑innovation;

7. Encourages the EIT to run free entrepreneurship training courses on green-‐‑technology related businesses;

Encouraging investment in all EU regional clusters 8. Calls upon the European Commission to create a single legislative framework for

PPPs in order to enhance cooperation across all regions of the EU;

9. Encourages the EIT to extend their efforts by sponsoring PPPs in modest innovator Member States106 107 to enhance research and development in green technology in those regions;

10. Suggests holding regular conferences in lowest innovator Member States108 to encourage the transfer of skills and funds across the EU.


106 Modest innovator Member States: Member States having an innovation performance well below that of EU average, including Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania for instance. 107 Innovation Union Scoreboard, European Commission, 2014 (p.11) 108 Lowest innovator Member States: Same as modest innovator Member States but at the lowest level.

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Resolution Booklet | Cork 2014

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Transcript of Resolution Booklet | Cork 2014