Resilience ortenzi fp_fb_lg

RISE: a method for the design of resilient infrastructures

and structures against emergencies

M. Ortenzi, Francesco Petrini*, F. Bontempi, L. Giuliani

*Associate Researcher, [email protected]

Sapienza – University of RomeDepartment of Structural and Geotechnical Engineering

RISE: a method for the design of resilient infrastructures and structures against em

ergencies

mailto:[email protected]

BackgroundThis paper originates from a European research proposal.

Background2

F. Petrini. RISE: Resilient Infrastructures and Structures against EmergenciesICOSSAR 2013, Columbia University, New York, 16-20 June 2013

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ergencies

Organization:Groups involved: ~ 12 groups directly involved

1 advisory board of 2-3 experts (not directly involved)Work packages: 7 technical work packages

2 additional work package for coordination and dissemination

Economical estimation:

Total budget: ~ 4.5 mil EUR (max. financing 3.5 mil EUR)

Time schedule:

Duration: 3 years (winter 2013 winter 2016)

Expected Impacts:

It is expected that action under this topic will improve the design of urban area and thus increase their security against and resilience to new threats. It is expected that it will lead to a systematic approach to resilience enhancements for large urban built infrastructures beginning at the design stage.


BackgroundThis paper originates from a European research proposal.

Background3


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ergencies

Organization:Groups involved: ~ 12 groups directly involved

1 advisory board of 2-3 experts (not directly involved)Work packages: 7 technical work packages

2 additional work package for coordination and dissemination

Economical estimation:

Total budget: ~ 4.5 mil EUR (max. financing 3.5 mil EUR)

Time schedule:

Duration: 3 years (winter 2013 winter 2016)

Expected Impacts:

It is expected that action under this topic will improve the design of urban area and thus increase their security against and resilience to new threats. It is expected that it will lead to a systematic approach to resilience enhancements for large urban built infrastructures beginning at the design stage.

THE PROPOSAL HAS

NOT BEEN FINANCED


RISE concept

Intro

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ergencies

Resilience conceptDefinition (not univocal):

A resilient community is defined as the one having the ability to absorb disaster impacts and rapidly return to normal socioeconomic activity.

MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research), (2006). “MCEER’s Resilience Framework”. Available at http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/resilience/Resilience_10-24-06.pdf

NEHRP (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program), 2010. “Comments on the Meaning of Resilience”. NEHRP Technical report. Available at http://www.nehrp.gov/pdf/ACEHRCommentsJan2010.pdf

MCEER framework for resilience evaluation:

Initial losses Recovery time, depending on:• Resourcefulness• Rapidity

Disaster strikes

Systemic Robustness


6


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ergencies

Definition (not univocal):

A resilient community is defined as the one having the ability to absorb disaster impacts and rapidly return to normal socioeconomic activity.

MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research), (2006). “MCEER’s Resilience Framework”. Available at http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/resilience/Resilience_10-24-06.pdf

NEHRP (National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program), 2010. “Comments on the Meaning of Resilience”. NEHRP Technical report. Available at http://www.nehrp.gov/pdf/ACEHRCommentsJan2010.pdf

(dQ/dt)L0

TR

(dQ/dt)0

A R.I.S.E. focuses on

L0 and (dQ/dt)0

MCEER framework for resilience evaluation:

Resilience is inversely proportional to the area A.

R.I.S.E. – Concept (I)


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ergencies

R.I.S.E. – Concept (II)

----- = ordinary node

= critical (active) node in case of emergency

-----

= ordinary principal link (e.g. road)

= ordinary alternative link (e.g. underground)

= critical principal link

= critical alternative linkSCHOOL

HOSPITAL

HOUSE AGGRGATE

SPORT ARENA

SHOPPING CENTER

EMBASSY

OFFICE

UNIV. CAMPUS

HOUSE AGGRGATESEA

(Haz

ard

sour

ce)

FIRE DEPT

Urban development

PLANT

Representation of an urban area as a network of nodes and links- Nodes: relevant premises for urban activities, strategic and crowded buildings - Links: interconnections between them, transport and supply systems


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ergencies

R.I.S.E. – Concept (II)

SCHOOL

HOSPITAL

HOUSE AGGRGATE

MALL

SHOPPING CENTER

EMBASSY

OFFICE

HOUSE AGGRGATE

HOUSE AGGRGATE

SEA

(Haz

ard

sour

ce)

FIRE DEPARTMENT

PLANT

EXAMPLE: CHAIN HAZARD

Tsunami after an Earthquake = flood action

= earthquake action

= blast action

= fire action

Actions due to different hazards

= chain actions

= concurrent actions

Actions combination (multiple)

accidental actions & multiple hazards


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ergencies

HOSPITAL

PLANT

SCHOOL

EMB-ASSY

OFFICE

MALL

HOUSE

Urban area


R.I.S.E. – Concept (III)

Advantage of this model:-Accurate: describes single responsesof nodes and links (local level) in termof both SERVICEABILITY and INTEGRITY

-Complete: accounts for INTERACTIONSbetween single structures or servicesand assesses the resilience of theinfrastructure as whole (network level)

-Flexible: can be applied to alltypes of large-scale infrastructures


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L0

(dQ/dt)0

MESO- LEVEL: Contribute of the single premise (e.g. hospital, by considering the interrelations with proximity elements)

MACRO- LEVEL: - Convolution of the meso-level contributes

dLi


R.I.S.E. – Concept (IV)




-Multi-scale: resilience is evaluated at meso- and macro-scale levels


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ergencies

HOSPITAL

PLANT

SCHOOL

EMB-ASSY

OFFICE

MALL

HOUSE

Urban area


R.I.S.E. – Concept (III)

Hospital




-Multi-scale: resilience is evaluated at meso- and macro-scale levels

-Powerful: the analysis output be used for the analysis of larger scale infrastructures


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RISE – Concept resume

MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research), (2006). “MCEER’s Resilience Framework”.

-- = ordinary node

= critical node in case of emergency---

= principal link (e.g. road)

HOSPITAL

HOUSE AGGRGATE

MALL

SHOPPING CENTEROFFICE

HOUSE AGGRGATE

FIRE DEPARTMENT

NUCLEAR PLANT

HOSPITAL

HOUSE AGGRGATE

MALL

SHOPPING CENTEROFFICE

HOUSE AGGRGATE

FIRE DEPARTMENT

NUCLEARPLANT

= earthquake action

= blast action= fire action

Representation of a large infrastructure as a network of nodes and links

Nodes: relevant premises of the infrastructure Links: local and access roads, pipelines and supply system

Initial losses

Recovery time:• Resourcefulness• Rapidity

Disaster strikes

A

L0

(dQ/dt)0

LOCAL- LEVEL:Contribute of the single premise (e.g. hospital, by considering the interrelations with proximity elements)

NETWORK- LEVEL:- Convolution of the local-level contributes

dLi

Quantitative definition of Resilience (MCEER) R.I.S.E. Multiscale philosophy

Disaster strikes --> Hazard scenario


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ergencies

RISE

– F

ram

ewor

k

Load

Network Model for resilience

Multi-hazard Scenarios

Local Level

NetworkLevel

Local resilience indicators Network resilience indicators

ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(A

naly

sis

for e

ach

node

and

link

)

Scenario output before mitigation

Scenario output after mitigation

ResIStframework for resilience assessment

Structure performanceA

B RecoveryE.g. Repair time

Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator

Status of nodes and links(no interaction)

A

Quality

Indicator

Interactions effects (quality drop)B

L0i TR

i

Quality (network level)

Combination of local indicators

Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C

Local resilience indicators are evaluated for each node and Link and for each scenario

Network resilience indicators are evaluated for each scenario

---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity

L0 = initial lossesTR = recovery time

Infrastructure representation

Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis

Performance analysis

Resilience Assessment

Network Level

1

2 System Recovery functionD

** Picture taken from:

Decò A., Bocchini P., Frangopol D.M.. A probabilistic approach for the prediction of seismic resilience of bridges.

Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics, Wiley, DOI: 10.1002/eqe.2282

Recovery analysis

**

3

RISE framework for resilience assessment

Case-Study1

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Case study: an urban area under Earthquake

Hospital

Residential complex

Energy and water supply infrastructure

Elec

tric

ity

tran

smiss

ion

line

Water supply

pipeline

Bridge



-----


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ergencies

Hospital

Residential complex


Elec

tric

ity

tran

smiss

ion

line

Water supply

pipeline

Bridge



-----

ZY

X

70 m



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ergencies

Hospital

Residential complex


Elec

tric

ity

tran

smiss

ion

line

Water supply

pipeline

Bridge



-----

ZY

X

70 m



18


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ergencies

Energy and water supply infrastructure: representation

WU

WD HY

CBCR

CU

RETAINING WALL UP (WU) RETAINING WALL DOWN (WD) HYDROELECTRIC POWER STATION (HY)

CONDUIT UP (CU) CONDUIT ROSALBA

CONDUIT PAVONCELLI BIS

1

2

34

5

6

7

1 2 3

4 5 6

7

HYDRAULIC JUNCTION

ELECTRICITY

WATER

Infrastructure plan view Individuation of the system/network components Representation of the system

Outputs

Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3


Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3



19


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Energy and water supply infrastructure: scenarios

FLOW REDUCTION (U)FLOW REDUCTION (R)

ELECTRIC POWER INTERRUPTIONTOTAL FLOW INTERRUPTION (R+U)

Cons

eque

nce

scen

ario

s

Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3


Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3



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ergencies

WU FAIL

HY FAIL?

CU FAIL?

Y

WU + WD +HY+ CU

TOTAL FLOW

TOTAL FLOW

TOTAL FLOW

NO R + E

CRFAIL?

WU

WU + WD

WU + WD + HY

WD FAIL?

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

CRFAIL?

CRFAIL?

CRFAIL? NO R

NO R

NO U + E

NO U+ E + R

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Faul

t-Tre

e an

alys

is

Criti

cal s

erie

s of

com

pone

nts

WU

WD HY

CBCR

CU




1

2

34

5

6

7

1 2 3

4 5 6

7

HYDRAULIC JUNCTION

ELECTRICITY

WATER


Outputs

Energy and water supply infrastructure: scenarios

Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3


Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3



Interaction analysis2

Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3


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ergencies

Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3


Critical series of components: retaining walls

WU

WD HY

CBCR

CU




1

2

34

5

6

7

1 2 3

4 5 6

7

HYDRAULIC JUNCTION

ELECTRICITY

WATER


Outputs

(0,0) (92,0)

(92,29)(0,29)

(0,54)

(0,62) (28.5,62)

(53,56)

(63,45)

(92,32)

(92,34)

Critical series of components

FE model


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ergencies

Individual components: seismic fragility

(0,0) (92,0)

(92,29)(0,29)

(0,54)

(0,62) (28.5,62)

(53,56)

(63,45)

(92,32)

(92,34)

record ID Earthquake Station Record/Component HP (Hz) LP (Hz) PGA (g)

1 P1047 Kobe 1995/01/16 20:46 0 OKA KOBE/OKA-UP 0.05 null 0.038

2P0189 Imperial Valley 1979/10/15

23:165052 Plaster City IMPVALL/H-PLS135 0.1 40 0.057

3 P1047 Kobe 1995/01/16 20:46 0 OKA KOBE/OKA000 0.05 null 0.0814 Imperial Valley El_Centro#13 NGA_no_176_H-E13230 0.138

5P0210 Imperial Valley 1979/10/16

06:585169 Westmorland Fire Sta

IMPVALL/F-WSM180 0.25 40 0.171

6P0027 Hollister 1961/04/09 07:23

1028 Hollister City Hall

HOLLISTR/B-HCH271 0.11 11 0.196

7 Loma Prieta AndersonDam NGA_no_739_AND250 0.2448 LomaPrieta HollisterDiff.Array NGA_no_778_HDA165 0.278

9 P0169 Imperial Valley 1979/10/15 23:16

6617 Cucapah IMPVALL/H-QKP085 0.05 null 0.309

10 LomaPrieta WAHO NGA_no_811_WAH090 0.3699611 Kobe, Japan Nishi-Akashi NGA_no_1111_NIS000 0.5027512 Kobe, Japan Takatori 0.6112613 CHI-CHI CHY028 NGA_no_1197_CHY028-E 0.6530114 Loma Prieta AndersonDam NGA_no_739_AND250 0.683215 LomaPrieta HollisterDiff.Array NGA_no_778_HDA165 0.7228

16Imperial Valley 1979/10/15 23:16

6617 Cucapah IMPVALL/H-QKP085 0.05 null 0.803417 LomaPrieta WAHO NGA_no_811_WAH090 0.850918 Kobe, Japan Nishi-Akashi NGA_no_1111_NIS000 0.9049519 Kobe, Japan Takatori 1.1002620 CHI-CHI CHY028 NGA_no_1197_CHY028-E 1.17542

EDP:1) Max bending moment in the

concrete wall2) Max drift3) Final drift

IM: PGA

METHODOLOGY:

Set of seismic records

Zhang J., Huo Y. (2009). Evaluating effectiveness and optimum design of isolation devices for highway bridges using the fragility function method. Engineering Structures 31; 1648-1660


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ergencies

Individual components: seismic fragility

(0,0) (92,0)

(92,29)(0,29)

(0,54)

(0,62) (28.5,62)

(53,56)

(63,45)

(92,32)

(92,34)

EDP:1) Max bending moment

in the concrete wall2) Max drift3) Final drift

LS threshold values:1) WU=WD=850848.8 N*m

2) WU=0.3m; WD=0.4m3) WU=0.3m; WD=0.4m

WUWD

P(ED

P|IM

)

IM (g)

WU

IM (g)

WD

P(ED

P|IM

)


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ergencies

Interactions on seismic fragility

Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3


Load



Local Level

NetworkLevel


ASSE

SSM

ENT

and

MIT

IGAT

ION

(Ana

lysis

for

eac

h no

de a

nd li

nk)






Damage

Action

Damage/Disservice

% of rescued

Action values

IM

A

IM

100 %

People safetyB

Quality

Indicator


A

Quality

Indicator


L0i TR

i



Indicator

L0 TR

Resilience ∞ 1 /A

C



---- = Output

---- = comment

Qua

lity



Hazard Analysis

Protection analysis



Network Level

1





Recovery analysis

**

3


IM (g)

P(ED

P|IM

)

WU WD+


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ergencies

Hospital

Residential complex


Elec

tric

ity

tran

smiss

ion

line

Water supply

pipeline

Bridge



-----


DIRECT LOSSESINDIRECT LOSSES


Deterioration analysis3

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ergencies

Considered deteriorations

RECOVERY TIME

DETERIORATION TIME

quality %

t0 t1 time

FULLY FUNCTIONAL

DETERIORATIONΔQ

ΔL


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ergencies

Pushover analysis

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5

Mm

ax

λ

dependence on concrete

"C12-15 load g"

"C25-30 load g"

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5

Mm

ax

λ

depedance on steel behaviour

"50% steel load g"

"100% steel load g"

MATERIALCONCRETE FROM C25/30 TO C12/15

STEEL FROM 100% AREA TO 50% - 75%


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ergencies

Considered deteriorations

C25/30 C12/15 50%steel 75%steel

g 2.425 2.5 1.675 2.15

g+0.2g 1.375 1.375 <1 1.1

C25/30 C12/15 50%steel 75%steel

g 2.425 2.5 1.675 2.15

g+0.2g 1.375 1.375 <1 1.1

BENDING MOMENT CURVATURE

cls 25/30 cls 12/15 50% steel

75% steel

0.000

0.500

1.000

1.500

2.000

2.500

λ at first plasticityg g+0.2g


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Performance-based w

ind design of tall buildings equipped with viscoelastic dam

pers

Conclusions• An effective multi-scale framework for resilience evaluation of the large scale

urban built infrastructure has been proposed.

• The resilience of all large critical infrastructures is first assessed (local level of nodes and link). The resilience of the whole system (network level) is evaluated on the basis of the interdependencies between its components and of the repercussion of the failure of one component on the other elements.

• Further investigations are required to assess the impact of different assumptions in the analysis process, namely: • definition of appropriate analytical and probabilistic methodologies in order to deal

with multiple-hazard scenarios;• definition of appropriate methods for handling so-called “low-probability, high-

consequence events”;• development of appropriate methods for the correct evaluation of the recovery

function;• improved evaluation of indirect losses occurring in urban developments in

consequence of natural disasters.


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