REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

~anbiBanhallanQuezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

- versus - CRIM. CASES NOS. SB-17-CRM-0292For Violation of Sec. 3(g), RA 3019

NINIA P. LUMAUAN, ET AL.,Accused.

DE LA CRUZ, J., ChairpersonECONG, J. &CALDONA, J.

Promulgated on:

ore ~ ') 2018 r-:x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

DE LA CRUZ, J.

This resolves accused Macaria M. Duldulao's Motion to QuashInformation, dated September 4, 2018; the prosecution's Commentand/or Opposition (to the Motion to Quash filed by Accused Macaria M.Duldulao), dated October 10, 2018; and the accused-movant's Reply [tothe Plaintiff's Comment Dated October 10, 2018j, dated November 5,2018.

In her motion, accused Duldulao moves to dismiss the case againsther for violation of her constitutional right to the speedy disposition ofher case on account of the inordinate delay in the conduct of thepreliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman (OM B).

In support of her Motion, the accused-movant contends that ittook the OMB six (6) years to conduct the preliminary investigation andto file the Information in Court, giving the following timeline:

(a) March 8, 2011. - Complainants filed before the OMB a JointAffidavit-Complaint against her and her co-accused;

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(b) September 12, 2011. - The accused-movant and her eo-accused filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit;

(c) October 20, 2014. - The accused-movant learned that aResolution, dated April 20, 2012, finding probable cause against her andher co-accused was issued;

(d) November 14, 2014. - The accused-movant and her eo-accused filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the OMB's Resolution,dated April 20, 2012;

(e) February 12, 2015. - The OMB, in a Resolution, denied themotion for reconsideration;

(f) September 1, 2015. - The OMB approved and released itsOrder, dated April 10, 2015, recalling the two Resolutions on the groundthat they were not approved by the Ombudsman.

(g) February 24, 2017: - The OMB filed the Information, datedJuly 14, 2016, against the accused-movant and the other accused.

Thus, the accused-movant prays that just as the Court dismissedthe case as to her co-accused, the case as to her should likewise bedismissed.

In its Comment and/or Opposition, the prosecution submits thefollowing timeline:

March 8, 2011. - The OMB for Luzon received the Joint Affidavit-Complaint.

July 7, 2011. - An Order was issued directing respondents to filetheir counter-affidavits.

September 12, 2011. - The accused-movant and her eo-respondents filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit.

December 1, 2011. - Complainants filed their Reply-Affidavit.

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April 20, 2012. - A Resolution was prepared finding probablecause against the accused-movant, among others, for violation of Section3(g) of RA 3019.

October 20, 2014. - Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Gerard A.Mosquera approved the said resolution.

February 11, 2015. - The OMB-Luzon approved a Joint Order,denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-movant andher co-respondents.

April 10, 2015. - The OMB issued an Order, recalling theResolution, dated April 20, 2012, and Joint Order, dated January 2015, asit is the Ombudsman who should approve the Information, instead of theDeputy Ombudsman fOI Luzon. DO Mosquera approved this Order onSeptember 1, 2015.

March 23, 2016. - A Resolution was issued replacing Resolution,dated April 20, 2012, finding probable cause against the accused-movantand her co-respondents, for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.

February 24, 2017. - An Information against the accused-movantand her co-respondents were filed with the Sandiganbayan.

The foregoing timeline is no different from that of the accused-movant. However, the prosecution insists that there was no violation ofthe accused's right to a speedy disposition of the case as the timeexpended during the preliminary investigation is necessary to complywith the procedures. The prosecution contends that the OMB did notslacken or sleep on the proceedings as in fact it took only four monthsafter the issues were joined for the OMB to arrive at a Resolution, datedApril 20, 2012 finding probable cause against the accused.

Citing Cagang v. Sandiganbayan/ the prosecution also mentionedthat the accused-movant did not timely invoke her right to the speedydisposition of her case even upon the lapse of the statutory orprocedural period and, therefore, she should be deemed to have waivedher said right. Besides, according to the prosecution, the accused-movant suffered no prejudice by reason of the delay. Finally, the

1 G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31,2018


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prosecution avers that the period of the preliminary investigation wasnot deliberately taken to harass or abuse the accused-movant.

In her Reply, the accused-movant refutes the submission of theprosecution that it took the OMB only four months to resolve the chargeagainst her and her eo-accused for while it was true that the Resolutionhad already been prepared as early as April 20, 2012, it took the DeputyOmbudsman for Luzon until October 20, 2014 or about two years and ahalf to approve it. Not only that, the OM B subsequently recalled its April20, 2012 Resolution purportedly to correct an error and it was only onMay 3, 2016 that another Resolution, dated March 23, 2016 findingprobable cause against the accused was issued. The Information wasfiled before this Court only on February 24,2017.

As to her alleged failure to invoke her right to the speedydisposition of her case, the accused-movant avers that she could nothave invoked such right earlier as during the preliminary investigationand up to the filing of the Information against her and her eo-accused,she was in the United States and she only returned to the Philippines toface the charge against her when she learned of the filing of theInformation against her. However, at the very first opportunity, she filedthe subject motion to quash before this Court. Moreover, the accused-movant contends that there is no requirement under the constitution,law or jurisprudence stating that before she could invoke her right to aspeedy disposition of this case, she must have performed preliminaryaffirmative acts. Besides, citing Coscollueia v. Sandiqanbovan.' she hasno duty to bring herself to trial as the State has the duly to expedite thesame within the bounds of reasonable timeliness.

The accused-movant also disputes the contention of theprosecution that she did not suffer any prejudice arising from the delayin the preliminary investigation of the case as every public accusation ofa crime would naturally and Ipgically entail prejudice upon the accused.Finally, citing Coscoiueila, the accused-movant argues that "[t]hislooming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by thepassage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of theindividual."

There is merit in the accused-movant's motion.

2 G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013


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It is a matter of record that in Criminal Case No. SB-17-CRM-0291,entitled People v. Romeo O. Corral, the Court, in its Resolution, datedMay 8, 2017, resolved to dismiss the case for violation of his right to thespeedy disposition of his case. Subsequently, in its Resolution, datedJune 21, 2017, and later in its Resolution, dated July 6, 2017, the Courtdismissed this case as to accused Fausta L. Tanguilan, and accused NinaP. Lumauan, respectively, on the same ground of violation of theirconstitutional right to the speedy disposition of their cases on account ofthe inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigationagainst them.

Just like accused Corral, Tanguilan and Lumauan, the accused-movant was subjected to the same preliminary investigation proceedingswhich lasted for almost six (6) years and which was already found by theCourt to be vexatious and capricious because of the unjustified andinordinate delay committed by the OMB in the conduct of the saidinvestigation. Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling inthe motions to quash/dismiss filed by Corral, Tanguilan and Lumauanshould not equally apply to the case of the accused-movant. The Courtfinds it sufficient to reiterate its ruling in its Resolution, dated May 8,2017. Thus:

It is settled that the preliminary investigation of this caseconducted by the Office of the Ombudsman was a few days short of sixyears. The purpose of preliminary investigation is to secure the innocentagainst hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect himfrom an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenseand anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from uselessand expensive trials."

It is incumbent upon this Court to determine whether or not thealmost six years of preliminary investigation constitutes inordinate delay.

This Court answers in the affirmative.

In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)", the Supreme Courtlaid down the factors to be considered in the determination of whetherthere is inordinate delay. It said:

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. Amere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is notsufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts andcircumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule isthat in the determination of whether that right has been violated,

3Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216, January 13,19414 G.R. Nos. 199151-56, July 25, 2016


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the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:(1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) theassertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)the prejudice caused by the delay.

The concept of inordinate delay is not just a determination of thelength of time for the Office of the Ombudsman to complete thepreliminary investigation. In' other words, a mere delay in the conclusionof the preliminary investigation within a given period is not enough toconstitute delay. For a court to consider the delay as inordinate, the saiddelay must be for a considerable length of time and without anyjustifiable reason. It is also material for accused to invoke his right to thespeedy disposition of cases against him and that he must show that hewas prejudiced by the prosecution's delay.

We now proceed to apply the test in this case to determine ifthere was inordinate delay before the Office of the Ombudsman, asalleged by the accused.

Length of Delay From the table presented below, it is clear that ittook almost 6 years for the Office of the Ombudsman to complete thepreliminary investigation.

CaseEvent/Incident/Action of

Date the Office of the Time LapsedOmbudsman

March 8, 2011 Filing of Complaintagainst members of theTuguegarao Water DistrictBoard and Acting GeneralManager

July 7, 2011 Order directing 3 months and 29Respondents to file their daysrespective counter-affidavits

September 12, 2011 Counter -affidavits werereceived (afterrespondents soughtextension of time to filethe same)

November 17, 2011 Motion to AdmitSupplemental Counter-affidavit filed

December 1, 2011 Reply affidavit filed byComplainants wasreceived by OMB

April 20, 2012 Resolution finding 4 months and 20 daysprobable cause was (from the time issuesprepared were joined)

October 20,2014 Deputy. Ombudsman for 2 years and 6 monthsLuzon approved the April (from April 20, 2012)20, 2011 Resolution

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March 23, 2016

Joint Order denying the 3 months (fromMotions for approval of ResolutionReconsideration filed by finding probable cause)respondentsDeputy Ombudsman for 22 days (to approve theLuzon .approved the Joint Joint Order submitted)OrderOrder recalling theResolution findingprobable cause and theJoint OrderOrder approving the recallof the above describebResolution and JointOrderResolution in lieu of theResolution dated April 20,2012 was issuedApproval by theOmbudsman of the March23, 2016 Resolution

ne Order denying the Motioned for Reconsideration

1, Approval of the Order 1 year 4 months and 24ed denying the Motion for days (20 days for

Reconsideration accused Tanguilan)from (DO's approval ofthe Joint Order)

Filing of the Informationbefore theSandiganbayan

January 20, 2015

February 11, 2015

April 10, 2015

September 1, 2015

April 5, 2016

June 30, 2016 (Ju21, 2016 for accusTan uilan)July 5, 2016 (July2016 for accusTanguilan)

Therefore, based on the presentation of the prosecution of thetimeline of this case, it is obvious that the final approval of the resolutionfinding probable cause took the longest, as it took the approving officer2.5 years to affix his signature and approve the already completedresolution.

The second longest period where the Office of the Ombudsmanspent its time with is when it had to make anew its finding of probablecause. It took the said office 1 year and 4 months to have theOmbudsman approve a Resolution finding probable cause.

From these 2 case events alone, it took the Office of theOmbudsman a total of 3 years and 10 months, or almost 4 years tocomplete. Certainly, this is within the concept of delay that is frownedupon by law.

Reason for de/ay. The prosecution reasons that the first "chokepoint" or stall in the case processing at the Office of the DO-Luzon wasbecause when the investigating prosecutor submitted the resolution for

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approval, the DO-Luzon, who was just newly appointed, was"confronted with numerous orders, decisions, resolutions, etc. for hisreview and approval" in addition to the "administrative concerns that hehad to attend to."

The appointment of a new DO-Luzon could not be considered asjustification for the delay. Perhaps, a new head of office could be givena few months to settle down and that would be understandable. But tosolely attribute the delay of two and a half (2 and 1/2 ) years becausethe DO is just newly appointed would be absurd, considering that aDeputy Ombudsman has a fixed term of seven (7) years. Following theargument of the prosecution, it would mean that whoever is appointedneeds around one-third (1/3) of his entire term to adjust to his office.

The second major stall is because the records of this case had tobe forwarded to the Office of ·the Ombudsman after the DO-Luzonrecalled his approval of the resolution finding probable cause becausehe (DO-Luzon) had no authority to approve such resolution since therespondents were considered high ranking officials and therefore, theauthority to make such approval rests with the Ombudsman and not withthe DO-Luzon. It is really ironic that the case was pending for 2 and ~years for the DO-Luzon to approve and for the same DO-Luzon towithdraw his approval because he had no authority to make suchapproval in the first place.

Such lapses are understandable especially if the sheer volumeof the cases that flood the Office of the Ombudsman is taken intoconsideration. This is in addition to the highly centralized procedure inthe office where the Deputy Ombudsman is tasked to review, sign, andapprove or recommend approval of administrative and criminal cases aswell as administratively oversee the entire office operation.

But the Office of the Ombudsman was created to ensure that allpublic officials will be held accountable for their actions. Because of itspurpose, the office is inherently powerful. The only weapon arespondent government official has against this powerful office is his orher right to invoke his constitutional rights including the right to thespeedy disposition of cases against him. Thus, once a complaint islodged with the Office of the Ombudsman, the clock ticks and the saidOffice is burdened to dispose of the case with dispatch.

Assertion of such right by the accused. Accused could not beconsidered to have waived their right to speedy disposition of their case.As a matter of fact, he made this assertion at first opportunity to do so---i. e., he filed the motion to quash/dismiss on the ground of inordinatedelay immediately after the Information against them were filed.

xxx

The Court is convinced that accused Duldulao did not fail toassert her right to the speedy disposition of her case the soonest.Thus, she should be treated similarly in the same way that theCourt treated Corral, Lumauan and Tanguilan. Indeed, the Court

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accepts the accused-movant's explanation that while thepreliminary investigation was being conducted, she was in theUnited States and that upon learning that an Information had beenfiled against her, she immediately returned to the Philippines toface the charge against her. At the first instance the accused-movant filed this motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. TheCourt will regard the said act of the accused-movant as a timelyassertion of her right to the speedy disposition of her case.

Besides, it has been pronounced in Coscolluela that it is notthe duty of the accused to follow-up on the prosecution of hercase. Thus:

Being the respondents in the preliminary investigationproceedings, it was not the petitioner's duty to follow up on theprosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of theOmbudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds ofreasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on allcomplaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v.Wingo:5

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the Statehas that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial isconsistent with due process."

In the more recent case of Almeda v. Office of theOmbudsman (Mindanao) ,7 the Supreme Court again emphasizedthat:

"It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint,as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the(respondent) did not object to the delay or that the delay was with hisacquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributableto him" Failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended, yetunjustified delay nonetheless causes just as much vexation andoppression. Indeed, delay prejudices the accused or respondent - andthe State just the same.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, accused MacariaM. Duldulao's Motion to Quash Information, dated September 4,2018, is hereby GRANTED, and the instant case orderedDISMISSED as to the said accused, for violation of her right to thespeedy disposition of her case.

5407 U.S. 514 (1972)6 Coscolluela v, Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 1997 G.R. No. 204267. July 25,2016

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Considering that this dismissal is tantamount to an acquittal,the hold departure order issued against accused Duldulao byreason of this case is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE, and thebond she posted for her provisional liberty is ordered RELEASED,subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures.

SO ORDERED.

-"laEFREN N D LA CRUZChairperson/ ociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

~ ~ A!fJY1<hGERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG

Associate Justice

~~_ Q \,Lt( , CkU;fh v-:«:- •.•"•..•_~~ARDOM. CALD~'NA

Associate Justice

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