REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA RICE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT ...

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA

RICE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

COUNTRY DEPARTMENT OCDWWEST REGION NOVEMBER 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CURRENCY AND MEASURES, LIST OF TABLES, LIST OF ANNEXES, LIST OFABBREVIATIONS, PROJECT MATRIX, BASIC DATA SHEET, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND FORMULATION 12.1 Sector Goal and Project Objective 12.2 Project Formulation 12.3 Preparation, Appraisal, Negotiation and Approval 22.4 Project Description 2

3. PROJECT EXECUTION 23.1 Effectiveness and start-up 23.2 Modifications 23.3 Implementation Schedule 33.4 Reporting 33.5 Procurement 33.6 Financial Sources and Disbursement 4

4. OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS 54.1 Overall Assessment 54.2 Operating Results 54.3 Institutional Framework and Performance 64.4 Project Management and Organization 64.5 Staff Recruitment and Training 74.6 Performance of Consultants, Suppliers & Contractors 74.7 Conditions and Covenants 84.8 Financial and Economic Performance 8

5. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 95.1 Social Impact 95.2 Environmental Impact 10

6. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 10

7. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK AND THE BORROWER 117.1 Performance of the Bank 117.2 Performance of the Borrower 11

8. OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RATING 11

9. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12

This report is based on findings of an ADF Mission fielded in February 1999 consisting of Mr.Medhat M. Sabri, Principal Social-Economist, OCDW.3 (Mission Leader) and a ConsultantIrrigation Engineer. Any further enquiries should be addressed to Mr. Sabri, Ext. 5439 or Mr. C. R.Spencer, Division Manager, OCDW.3, Ext. 4152.

LIST OF TABLESPage

Table 1 : Comparison of Projected and Actual Cost by Component 4

LIST OF ANNEXESNumber of Pages

Annex 1 : Project Location Map 1

Annex 2 : Detailed Project Features 2

Annex 3 : Planned and Actual Implementation Schedule 1

Annex 4 : Procurement 2

Annex 5 : Summary of Financial Sources and Utilisation 1

Annex 6 : Comparison of Projected And actual Rice Production 2

Annex 7 : Project Organisation Chart 1

Annex 8 : Conditions Fulfilled Prior to Loan Effectiveness andOther Conditions. 2

Annex 9 : Project Performance Rating 1

Annex 10 : Matrix of Recommendations and Follow-up Actions 1

Annex 11 : Model Farm Budgets 1

Annex 12 : Economic Rate of Return 1

Annex 13 : Revolving Fund - Loan Recovery 1

Annex 14 : List of Equipment 1

Annex 15 : List of Sources of Information 1

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

CURRENCY UNIT GMD (Dalasis)

Appraisal - January 1988 PCR – February 1999UA 1 - GMD 7.6496 15.4763USD1 - GMD 7.05 10.85UA 1 - USD 01.0855 1.38977GMD1 - USD 0.14191 0.06461

Fiscal Year

1 January-31 December

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 Hectare (ha) = 10,000sq. meters = 2.47 acres1 Kilometre (Km) = 0.624 miles1 Sq. Kilometre = 0.386 sq. miles = 100 ha1 Kilogram = 2.2046 poundsMetric Ton = 1000 kg = 2240.6 pounds

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB - African Development BankADF - African Development FundCBG - Central Bank of GambiaCCS - Cooperative Credit SystemC.I. - Cropping IntensityDOSA - Department of State for AgricultureERR - Economic Rate of ReturnFAO/IC - Food and Agriculture Organization / Investment CentreGCU - Gambia Cooperative UnionGOTG - Government of the GambiaIDU - Irrigation Development UnitIMSU - Irrigation and Mechanical Service UnitIRDP - Irrigated Rice Development Programme, DOSALDU - Land Development UnitLRD - Land Resources DivisionMID - MacCcarthy Island DivisionPCC - Project Coordination CommitteePMU - Project Management UnitPPMU - Project Planning and Monitoring UnitRIDEP - Rice Development ProjectSMU - Seed Multiplication UnitTPU - Tractor Ploughing UnitURD - Upper River Division

RICE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT – PCRMPDE PROJECT MATRIX

Narrative Summary Verifiable Indicators Means of verification AssumptionsSector Goal :

1. Support the Government policy ofrehabilitating production assets (the SmallIrrigation Schemes) through thepromotion of increased rice production toease the balance of payments situation.

Increase in overall rice production by 7100-Ton paddy rice.

Agricultural census.

Regular reports of Department of State forAgriculture, DOSA.

Project Objective:

1. Sustainable income improvement andincrease self-sufficiency in riceproduction.

1. By end of project year 5, participatingfarmers family income increased by Dallas’s3,988 on a hectare of irrigated andremodelled schemes in the project area.

1. Project records.2. Revolving Fund records.3. Socio-economic Survey.4. Follow-up Study/Workshop.5. Yield survey.

1. No adverse climatic and rainfallconditions prevail during the projectperiod.

2. Farmers adopt better cropping practicesand use improved inputs.

Outputs:

1. Irrigation schemes developed.

2. Rainfed Swamps rehabilitated.3. Provision of credit to participating

farmers.

4. Training of project staff and participatingfarmers completed.

5. Use of high yielding seed varieties.

6. Project management and monitoring andevaluation mechanisms are effective.

1.Rehabilitation and development of 850 ha ofirrigation schemes.

2. Development of 400 ha rainfed swamps.3.Provide credit to participating farmers for

production inputs and water charges in theorder of UA 333,000

4.Traine 80 staff and 150 farmers includingwomen.External training for key project staff.

5.Increased use of number and type of seedVariety of rice with better disease resistanceFrom 1 to 4 varieties.

6.Project steering committee and PMU setup in year one.

1. File survey.

2. Project records & accounts.

3. Consultant reports.

4. Farmers survey.

5. Socio-economic survey.

6. Revolving Funds accounts and records.

7. Training records.

8. DOSA records.

1. Maintenance and operation of theschemes is given.

2. Knowledgeable and efficient projectmanager and staff available.

3. Farmers use credit.

4. Sound training programs to farmers tosuit their needs prepared.

5. Continuous development of high yieldingand disease resistance seed by NARI

6. Managerial staff turnover kept atminimum.

Narrative Summary

Activities:

1. Contract with TA Consultant in Py1signed.

2. Rehabilitation and development work ofthe irrigation schemes.

3. Continued and sustained provision ofinventory and production credit to framesthrough the project revolving fund.

Verifiable Indication

Inputs

1. Contract signed with TA Consultant toprovide assistance in management andrehabilitation of irrigation schemesdesigns and supervise implementation.

2.1 Land survey of 850 ha of irrigated shames.Design of irrigation & draining net worksfor 850 ha.

2.2 Land clearance and canal construction for850 ha.

2.3 Mounting irrigation pumps forrehabilitated perimeters (26 in number).

3. UA 333,000 of production credit usedfarmers by end of year five.

Means of verification

1. Regular reports prepared by TAConsultant.

2. Monitoring and Evaluation reports.

3. Progress reports.

4. Supervision missions findings andreports.

5. Revolving funds accounts and projectprogress.

Assumption

1. Local counterparts are already assigned tothe project to ensure its sustainability.

4. Training and improved mobility; vehiclesprocured, staff trained, farmers trained.

5. Setting up farmers water usersassociations and water use training centre.

6. Rehabilitation of office and housingfacilities at project site at SAPU.

1. 5 key managerial staff trained overseas.2. 150 farmers trained in various areas3. Procurement of vehicles.4. Operation and maintenance costs covered

by the project.

5. Provide facilities for setting up waterusers association through establishingwater users training centre close by therehabilitated area.

6. Rehabilitate two-10 room’s officefacilities.

7. Rehabilitate 6 houses for TA Consultant.

1. Project progress reports.2. Supervision missions findings and

reports.3. TA. Consultant reports.

4. Project progress reports.

5. Supervision mission findings and reports.

6. TA Consultant reports.

7. Project progress reports.

1. TA – recruited on time and carried hisassignment properly.

BASIC PROJECT DATA

1. Country : The Gambia2. Project : Rice Development Project3. Loan Number : F/GAM/AGR/88/134. Borrower : Government of the Gambia5. Beneficiary : Government of the Gambia6. Executing Agency : Department of State for Agriculture

A- LOAN APPRAISAL ESTIMATE ACTUAL

1. Amount UA 4.8 (UA/Million) UA 4.8 Million2. Service Charge % 0.75 0.753. Repayment Period 40 years 40 years4. Grace Period 10 years 10 years5. Loan Negotiation Date 19886. Loan Approval Date February 1988 23/02/19887. Loan Signature Date 29/03/19888. Date of Entry into Force June 1988 13/03/1989

B- PROJECT DATA

LOAN APPRAISAL ESTIMATE ACTUAL

1. Total Cost (UA/Million) 5.47 Million 5.119 Million2. Financing Plan (UA Million)

ADF Loan 4.8 Million (88%) 4.59 Million (89.67%)Government of the Gambia 0.67 Million (12%) 0.529Million (10.33%)

3. Effective Date of First Disbursement June 1988 08/11/19894. Date of last Disbursement June 1993 30/6/19975. Commencement of Activities June 1988 19896. Date of Completion/Closer June 1993 30/6/1997

C- PERFORMANCE INDICATORS1. Cost Overrun/ Under-run %2. Time Overrun/Underpin Overrun 48 months

- Slippage on Effectiveness 15 months- Slippage of Completion Date 48 months

Slippage on Last Disbursement 48 months- Number of Extensions of last Disbursement 5

3. Project Implementation Status : Closed4. Institutional Performance : Unsatisfactory5. Contractor Performance : Satisfactory6. Consultant Performance : Fair7. IERR Appraisal PCR 15% 4%

D- MISSIONSTYPE N° OF PERSONS COMPOSITION PERSON/DAYS

- Identification (1985) N.A N.A N.A- Preparation (1986) N.A N.A N.A- Appraisal & (1986) 2 Agricultural Economist

Re-appraisal (1987) 2 Agronomist3 Irrigation Engineers 75

Supervision (01/1990) 2 Agronomist &3 Irrigation Engineer 30

(12/1990) 2 Irrigation Engineer &Agronomist 30

(07/1993) 2 Agricultural Economist &Irrigation Engineer 30

(01/1994) 2 Agricultural Economist &Agronomist 30(10/1994)

2 Agricultural Economist &Agronomist 30(02/1995)

2 Agricultural Economist &Irrigation Engineer 30

(01/1996) 2 Irrigation Engineer &Agricultural Economist 30

(06/1996)2 Irrigation Engineer &

Socio-Economist 28- PCR (02/1999) 2 Socio-Economist & 30

Irrigation Engineer

E- Disbursement (UA Million)Year Appraisal Actual

Amount Cumulative %Disbursed

Amount Cumulative %Disbursed

1989 0.96 20 0.09 21990 0.87 38 0.22 61991 1.22 63 0.38 141992 0.87 82 0.76 301993 0.88 100 0.90 491994 1.20 741995 0.76 901996 0.13 921997 0.16 96Total 4.80 4.59

F. Contractors/Suppliers.(See the list in Annex 4)

G - Consultant- Name : MASCOT T LTD- Contract Description : Design and supervision of land development, assist

project management, conduct on the job training- Date Contract Signed : January 19, 1990- Date Contract Terminated : June 23,1995- Contract Duration : 65 months- Amount (UA Million) : 1.45

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Gambia is predominantly an agrarian economy. The Agriculture and natural resourcessector provides employment for about 75% of the labour force, generates about 40% of total exportearnings and an estimated two-thirds of total household income. The project was aimed to assist andsupport the Government policy of rehabilitating production assets (the small irrigation schemes)through the promotion of increased rice production to ease the balance of payments situation.

2. The project was approved on 22 February 1988 and the Loan Agreement was signed on 29March 1988. The Government of the Gambia (GOTG) fulfilled the conditions prior to the firstdisbursement in March 1989 following which the loan was declared effective on 13 March 1989.The objective of the project was to increase rice production in the Gambia through the rehabilitationin MacCarthy Island Division of some 850 ha of the deteriorating existing rice irrigation perimeterswhich were initiated by various programs in the 1960’s and 1970’s and through the development of400 ha of the rainfed rice swamps; this would benefit, some 25,000 persons. Major changes wereeffected to the project after the supervision mission of October 1994 and as a result of the slowprogress of implementation. The original target of developing 850 ha of irrigated perimeters and400 ha of rainfed rice swamps was scaled down to about 210 ha of irrigated perimeters. The plan todevelop 400 ha of rainfed rice swamps was excluded. The project components were projectmanagement, land development, procurement of equipment, tools & vehicles, input financing andtechnical assistance & training.

3. Total project cost was UA 5.119 million of which ADF contribution was UA 4.59 millioncovering 89.67% of the total project cost. ADF financed 100% of the foreign exchange cost (UA3.32 million) and 65% of the local cost (UA 1.27 million). The GOTG contribution was UA 0.529million or 10.33% of the project cost all in local cost. Disbursement of the project funds was 96%.The overall project performance is not satisfactorily. Even though the area rehabilitated has beenlow (28 % of the appraisal targets, however, it was 169% of the revised targets), the impact of theproject on the farming community has been positive. Farmers adopted the new technologies and theuse of high yielding varieties. This has therefore increased yields from 3.5 tonnes to an averageyield of 6.1 tonnes per hectare. Training was marginally satisfactorily although it was not extensiveas planned due to shortage of locally skilled staff.

4. A number of lessons can be drawn from the implementation of the project. Proper feasibilitystudy should precede consideration of projects for financing. Institutional Issues and humanresources development and in particular the need to involve farmers in management of theimplementation at early stages of the project should be emphasised. This type of projects shouldfrom the beginning be planned and financed over an eight to ten year period, so that the donor’sinvolvement continues during the agricultural production phase which be will planned from theoutset.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Gambia is predominantly an agrarian economy. Agriculture and natural Resourcessector provides employment for about 75% of the labour force, generates about 40% of total exportearnings and 66% of total household income. Overall agricultural production and productivity arelow. The system is characterised by high risk, low investment in small production units culminatingin low input use and thus giving rise to low production and marketed output.

1.2 Rice has long been an important food grain in the Gambia and is traditionally cultivatedboth in upland areas and in the seasonally flooded swamps, which lie adjacent to the river Gambiaand its tributaries. Rice production in the country fails to match demand and only some 40-50% oftotal rice consumption originates from local production, with the balance made up from imports.Production on the small-irrigated schemes had decreased due to a number of technical and socio-economic constraints facing such production systems. Some of these constraints were shortage ofhigh production seed varieties, fertilisers, ploughing services, shortage of funds to acquire inputsand mismanagement and non- distribution of land among farmers.

1.3 The appraisal report for the Rice Development Project called for rehabilitation of existingperimeters. The project embarked on complete reconstruction of all these perimeters especiallywhen traces of the old perimeters could not been seen or ascertained.

1.4 The Bank Group had financed two other projects in the rice-sub sector. These are JahalyPacharr Rice Development project, which was co-financed by ADF with IFAD, Germany,Netherlands & World Food Program and Lowland Agriculture Development Programme, whichalso is co-financed with IFAD. The Jahaly Pacharr project was successful during itsimplementation but was not sustainable after its completion. The Lowland AgriculturalDevelopment programme is the ongoing Rice Development Programme, which emphasise ricedevelopment in the swamp areas. The Rice Development project was closed on June 1997.Following the closure the Bank launched a PCR mission to prepare the project completion report,which is presented in this report.

2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND FORMULATION

2.1 Sector Goal and Project Objective

2.1.1 Agriculture sector is assisting and supporting Government policy of rehabilitatingproduction assets with emphasis on small irrigation schemes as means for enhancing production offood and rice production in particular, which is the stable food for the majority of the population.

2.1.2 The project was aimed, at the farmer level, to increase self-sufficiency in rice productionand generate an adequate income to ensure sustainable operations. The project was to increase riceproduction in The Gambia through the rehabilitation of 850 ha of the deteriorating existing riceirrigation perimeters and the development of 400 ha of the rain fed rice swamp in MacCarthy IslandDivision over a five-year period.

2.2 Project Formulation

The Project was formulated in 1985 to rehabilitate the existing irrigated perimeters consisting ofsome 150 small pump irrigated schemes of about 850 ha out of some 300 schemes of about 1700 ha

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developed from 1966 to 1979. The schemes were initially started through the TaiwaneseGovernment assistance (1966-1975) and then expanded by the World Bank (1973-1979) and thePeoples Republic of China (1975-1979). The development of 400 ha of rainfed swamp was alsoincluded as part of the project.

2.3 Preparation, Appraisal, Negotiation and Approval

The FAO/Investment Centre prepared the project in 1986. The project was appraised in September1986 and re-appraised in 1987. ADF Board approved the project on 23 February 1988. Loannegotiation took place in 1988 and the Loan was signed on March 29, 1988.

2.4 Project Description

2.4.1 The Rice Development Project comprised of the following components.

A. Project managementB. Land DevelopmentC. Equipment, tools and vehicle purchaseD. Input financingE. Technical assistance and training

2.4.2 The Project focused on the rehabilitation works which included the consolidation of smallperimeters, provision of new pumping stations, improved irrigation and drainage facilities, farmaccess roads and land preparation for efficient irrigation management. In the rainfed swamp areas,improvement of drainage and provision of access roads were planned for implementation. Each ofthe irrigated perimeters was configured to consist of a minimum of about 20 blocks of 10 units of0.1 ha each. The block is the basic irrigation field to which water is supplied directly from the fieldcanals. In addition to the improvement of the irrigation infrastructure, farm machinery services,provision of better seeds and enhancement of on farm agronomic practices, training in irrigationmanagement and rice production technology were also conceived as part of the project activities.

3. PROJECT EXECUTION

3.1 Effectiveness and start-up

The loan was declared effective in March 1989. The conditions for entry into force of the loan wereappropriate and should not have delayed the effectiveness of the project. There were no changesmade to scope or the design of the project prior to start-up.

3.2 Modifications

3.2.1 Major changes were effected after the supervision mission of October 1994 and as a resultof the slow progress of implementation. No more details of the project slow progress were given.These are briefly detailed below.

3.2.2 Land Development, the original target of developing 850 ha of irrigated perimeters and 400ha of rainfed rice swamps was scaled down to about 210 ha of irrigated perimeters of which about67 ha had been completed by the end of 1993. The plan to develop 400 ha of rainfed rice swampswas excluded.

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3.2.3 Transfer of Project Management, as the original Project Management (comprisingGovernment staff) had failed to implement the project according to the appraisal report due to underestimation of project costs during appraisal, the shortage of highly skilled local staff and theimplementation of land development activities through force account. The use of force accountmethod requires skilled staff and well-prepared plan of work of which the project was lacking.Later the Government decided to transfer the project management with effect from 1st May 1994 tothe Technical Assistant consultant. This arrangement lasted up to June 1995 after which the Projectwas brought under Government-appointed Project Manager.

3.3 Implementation Schedule

It was planned during appraisal to complete the project by December 31, 1992, slightly less thanfive years after loan agreement signature in 1988. Despite the decrease of the project target,implementation took about nine years. Implementation was greatly affected by increased volume ofwork, lack of proper irrigation and drainage design approach, poor procurement and constructionmanagement, and shortage of locally skilled personnel and inadequate supervision from thetechnical assistance Consultant. The project was formally closed on June 30, 1997, four and halfyear later than the originally planned date. Comparison of planned and actual implementation is inAnnex 2.

3.4 Reporting

Project Management did not fully comply with the requirement to submit progress reports to theBank Group on time. The project did not submit progress reports regularly as scheduled in the loanagreement. No reports were submitted until September 1990, one year and half after projectcommencement. One report was submitted in 1991 and no reports at all in 1992 and 1993. By June1997, only six progress reports were submitted to the Bank Group. The annual revision of the assetsregister was always late and the final revision at the end of the project was not submitted. Auditreports were not submitted annually as required in the loan agreement. Furthermore, audit reportswere not satisfactorily prepared due to insufficient recorded information and therefore were not anaccurate reflection of the project accounts status. This happened because the local manager andother project personnel were not up to the task given to them. Government monitoring andevaluation of the project were almost absent due to its low capacity and shortage of highly skilledstaff.

3.5 Procurement

All project items financed from the ADF loan were procured according to the Bank’s Procurementguidelines. The procurement of all imported machinery, equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs andconsultant services were made through International Competitive Bidding (ICB) while the LocalCompetitive Bidding (LCB) were applied for the procurement of civil works, construction ofbuildings and workshop facilities and fuel storage. Land development activities were carried byforce account method. Major procurement were cleared through the Gambian Central Tender Boardat Banjul which to certain extent created back log of procurement due to the bureaucratic processinvolved. Lack of proper understanding of the Bank procedure by the PMU at the initial stage of theproject has contributed to the delays experienced in procurement. Delays in the preparation ofspecification, tender issuing, tender negotiation and signing by the PMU has been a persistentfeature in the first few years of project implementation. Successive supervision Missions had raisedthis issue with the PMU and as well as the Government and some improvement was noted afterthird year of project implementation when management was transferred to the Technical AssistantConsultant. Additional details on procurement are included in Annex 4.

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3.6 Financial Sources and Disbursement

Financial Sources

3.6.1 Total project cost was UA 5.47 Million of which ADF contribution was UA 4.80 Million or87.7 % of the total Project cost. ADF financed 100 % of the foreign exchange cost (UA 3.53Million) and 65% of the local cost (UA 1.27 Million). The GOTG contribution was UA 0.67Million or 12.3 % of the project cost, all as local cost. The Project cost estimate is given in Annex 5.

3.6.2 The ADF financial contribution covers part of the cost of the Project Management Unit andprocurement of equipment, vehicles, machinery and tools and the full cost of credit financing andtechnical assistance cost. The GOTG component was allocated to the recurrent cost of the Projectmanagement unit and part of the procurement of equipment and machinery. Table 1 shows theplanned allocation at appraisal stage and actual expenditure.

Table 1: Comparison of Projected and Actual Cost by Component(UA Million)

Component Planned Actual Disbursement

Allocation ADF Finance GOTG Finance TotalProject Management 1.271 0.401 0.369 0.770Land Development 1.681 0.924 0.114 1.038Equip. Vehicles & Tools 1.580 1.768 0.043 1.811Input Financing 0.343 0.048 ----- 0.048Technical Assistance &Training

0.595 1.449 0.003 1.452

Total 5.47 4.590 0.529 5.119

Sources: (1) - Projected data - Appraisal Report of 1988

Disbursement

3.6.3 The List of Goods and Service was revised five times between 1990 and 1997 resulting inthe reallocation of funds within each component. Table 2, Annex 5 shows the projected and actualexpenditure under each component based on data obtained from the project and Bank records.Project expenditure was UA 5.12 Million as compared to the total projected allocation of UA 5.47Million, indicating a 96 % utilisation.

3.6.4 The Tables in Annex 5 present the annual disbursement recorded by the Bank for the ADFcomponent compared to the planed disbursement schedule in the Appraisal Report. Thecomparative analysis of the projected and actual disbursement shows that in year one of the projectabout 20 % of the total cost should have been utilised while the actual use was about 2 %. Thecumulative utilisation should have reached 38 % in Year two, 64 % in Year three and 82 % Year 4.For the same period the actual disbursement was 6 %, 14 % and 30 % respectively. By year five, atthe end of the planned project completion period only 49 % of the ADF loan component has beendisbursed only. The slow rate of disbursement was related to the delayed procurement programme,which had in turn affected the land development progress.

3.6.5 The actual amount of disbursement does not reflect the physical progress in landdevelopment which was about 69 ha (6 % of 1250 ha the originally planned project area) at the endof Year 5. Data obtained from the project office indicated that by the end of 1997 farmers hadborrowed about UA 148,545 for the various farming operation needs and had repaid UA 55, 612

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which was about 37 % of the total loan. Low repayment of loans in cash and in kind, by the farmershad been a major problem through out the project life.

4. OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS

4.1 Overall Assessment

The overall project performance was not satisfactorily. Even though the area rehabilitated had beenlow, the impact of the project on the farming community had been positive. Most of the farmersadopted the new technologies and the use of high yielding varieties. This had therefore contributedto the increase in yields from 3.5 tonnes to an average yield of 6.1 tonnes per hectare. Training wasmarginally satisfactorily although it was not extensive as planned due to shortage of locally skilledstaff among other factors such as poor management, frequent changes of project managers andlimited monitoring and evaluation.

4.2 Operating Results

Land development

4.2.1 Although the Project was declared effective in 1989, and has been operating for about 9years, the progress on land development, which is the key component of the project, was notsatisfactory. The Project received a technical supervision Mission in September/October 1994,following which a target of only 210 ha for improved rice perimeters and no new rainfeddevelopment was aimed at by the end of the loan period.

4.2.2 Assessment of land development status and achievement has revealed that the revised targetfor pumped irrigated perimeter, which is 210 ha was realised. The rehabilitated perimeters between1990 and 1997 were 339 ha thus exceeding the revised target. It is noted that 650 ha were surveyed,of which 514 ha were designed.

Equipment, tools and Vehicle

4.2.3 All equipment, tools and vehicles were purchased as it was planned. Some of the equipmentarrived rather late due to late procurement caused by unfamiliarity of the procurement procedures atthe early stages of the project. Details of the equipment procured are shown in Annex 15.

Input Financing

4.2.4 The project made provisions to provide the necessary initial funds to set up a revolvingcredit scheme for farm development and operating purposes, including the purchase of farm inputs.Seasonal credit were required to meet the cost of seeds, fertiliser, insecticides, hand tools and bags,irrigation water and mechanical land preparation charges. These inputs were vital to increaseproduction and many farmers were unable to purchase them from their own resources.

4.2.5 The project management unit (PMU) was responsible for controlling the credit funds inclose co-operation with the Gambia Co-operative Union (GCU). District Co-operative, which is abranch of the Co-operative Union, administered the credit component. By the end of 1997 farmershad borrowed about UA 148,545 for the various farming operation needs and had repaid UA 55,612which was about 37% of the total loan. Reasons for low recovery rate can be attributed to poormanagement of the credit. Furthermore, farmers were not keen enough to repay their loans.

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4.3 Institutional framework & Performance

4.3.1 According to the appraisal report the project was to be managed by a project managementunit (PMU) headed by project manager reporting directly to the Permanent Secretary of theDepartment of State for Agriculture. Four Specialist Units assisted the project manager withresponsibilities for finance and administration, irrigation and land development, mechanicalservices and agricultural services.

4.3.2 Since there was a need to co-ordinate project activities and supporting requirements at thecentral level, the project created a project co-ordination committee to be chaired by the PermanentSecretary of the Department of State for Agriculture. The project manager acted as secretary and thePermanent Secretary of the Water Resources and Environment Department acted as vice-chairman.Other members consisted of the General Manager of GCU and representatives of the Department ofFinance and Economic Affairs, Department of State for Planning, Department of State forAgriculture, Department of Co-operation and Department of State for Water Resources. Thecommittee was to ensure co-ordination of the project-related activities of the various Ministries(now called State Departments) and agencies involved in the project. It was to review and approveprogrammes of work and budget, monitor expenditures, and review quarterly and annual progressreports as well as monitoring and evaluation reports. The Project Co-ordination Committee wasnot effective in addressing the issues faced by the Project, which indicates lack of interest andpriority given to the project.

4.4 Project Management and Organization

4.4.1 The Project Management Unit was established at Sapu in 1989 headed by the Governmentappointed Project Manager assisted by internationally recruited Technical Assistance team to takeresponsibility for the design, construction and mechanical service tasks and assist in capacitybuilding and training of PMU staff to take over the full responsibility for project implementation.The organisation structure of the PMU is given in Annex 7. At the end of 1989 the PMU staff wererecruited for the various posts. Technical Assistance Team in Irrigation Engineering (40 p.m.),Mechanical Engineering (12 p.m.) and Financial Controller (12 p.m.) were recruited throughInternational consultants firm by early 1990. The Government was unable to fill the posts of thecounterpart staff needed for irrigation development i.e. Senior Irrigation Engineer, IrrigationEngineer and surveyors. The management of the Project has been affected by lack of qualified andexperienced senior management staff, especially in the field of irrigation engineering.

4.4.2 During the project implementation the design and construction of perimeter rehabilitationand providing agricultural support services to the farmers to produce rice were the most importantactivities on which the project viability depended. At the end of 1992 the target project completiondate, only 67 ha or 8 % of the total irrigated perimeter area, was rehabilitated, which was a clearevidence of poor management.

4.4.3 By early 1994 it was realised that the targets for development would not be met and decisionwas taken to change the management of the project. The Government appointed the internationaltechnical assistant consultant to manage the project and speed up implementation. The target wasalso revised and set as the achievement of 210 ha of rehabilitated perimeters with the rainfed swampdevelopment removed from the project objectives. During the 14-month period the consultantprovided a management team (63 p.m.) and was able to increase the rehabilitated perimeters to 134ha by the end of its contract period, also was a slow rate of achievement.

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4.4.4 From mid 1995, the Project Management Unit was again brought under the Governmentappointed Project Manager and the input from the Consultant was terminated where the fundsallocated for this component was exhausted (UA 1.45 million, about 35% of the total project cost).

4.4.5 The Project Planning and Monitoring Unit (PPMU) of the Ministry of Agriculture wasdesignated to be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation activities of the project. The Unitwas not active in the initial project period, which has been reflected in the absence of timely projectactivity reports and proper recording. In 1996 the project Monitoring, Evaluation and Control Unitwas established at the project level as a result of which improvement were made in reporting andrecording of project activities. Nevertheless the records of past works and various technical,statistical and other essential data are not readily available at the project office at Sapu for use bythe newly created program to take over of the previously irrigated projects in the area calledIntegrated Rice Development Program (IRDP). This included the study reports, survey data andtopographic maps, design calculations and drawings, as built drawings and other information thathave been compiled through the Project life.

4.5 Staff Recruitment and Training

4.5.1 The staffing level at appraisal had been set as eighty including the management, technicaland administrative support personnel. The staffing level has not been realised in terms of numberthrough out the project life even though key area such Senior Irrigation Engineer, IrrigationEngineer and qualified surveyors were not recruited. This was a severe hindrance in transferring theirrigation design and construction experience from the consultant to local staff and had contributedto the low level of the achievement of the project objectives.

4.5.2 The training activities undertaken during the project life included on the job training oftechnicians, mechanics, agricultural assistant and farmers. The planned training centres for wateruse and management was not established and the Technical Assistance Consultants did notsatisfactorily carry out the key areas of training, i.e. water management, Irrigation design andoperation. Training was carried both over seas and locally in the field of project management,construction, operation and rice production. The Government has also sponsored the training ofproject staff abroad in project planning & management and rice production technology throughbilateral arrangements. Selected farmers including women were sent to Senegal on networking visit.

4.6 Performance of Consultants, Suppliers and Contractors

Performance of Consultants

4.6.1 The consultant was assisting the project management in implementing the project. Theconsultant main role was to undertake design activities, construction planning, providing training,assisting in procurement and the use & maintenance of mechanical equipment. Even though thesurvey and design activities were carried out satisfactorily, supervision of the construction activitieswas poor as reflected by the limited achievements of the targets during the period of its contract.Further more, the consultant did not prepare any type of manuals that could have assisted theproject staff in carrying the various technical and managerial activities of the project although themanuals were required in their Terms of Reference. In this regard transfer of knowledge, skill andexperience were not successfully carried out. After transfer of project management to the consultantthe consultant developed a management system and implemented it efficiently. At the time

8

reporting was submitted on time and indicated a significant improvement in project works andachievements.

Performance of Suppliers and Contractors

4.6.2 The performance of the suppliers and contractors were satisfactory in that they executedtheir contracts timely. The list of contracts awarded and goods procured is given in appendix 4 page2.

4.7 Conditions and Covenants

All loan conditions were fulfilled without any difficulties. However, condition 5.2 concerning theinterest rate on credit extended to participating farmers was not to exceed eleven percent (11%) perannum, which was market rate at the time. During implementation the market rate was 15%.

4.8 Financial and Economic Performance

Financial Performance and Results

4.8.1 The loan was made to the Government of the Gambia and the funds had been used inaccordance with the appraisal report. Government contribution had been very close to what hadestimated during appraisal despite the fact that the project had continued for nine years rather thanfive.

4.8.2 Whilst the Government had met its obligations under the loan, it had failed to control andproperly monitor the project accounts and expenditure.

4.8.3 The targeted beneficiaries were mainly farmers who used improved practices provided bythe project. As a result of the improvements in extension and inputs delivery under the project, theannual net incremental farm incomes from paddy that accrue to farmer were GMD 3,988 on anhectare of irrigated and remodelled schemes.

4.8.4 Since farmers sell some of their marketable rice surplus through the Co-operative Union(GCU) in order to repay their loans, the resulting added turn over, though not very significant, hadhelped to reduce unit fixed costs and increase the union’s net margins. GCU and primary societieshad also earn interest on loans channelled to co-operative members.

4.8.5 The project did not directly generate revenue for the Government as there were no taxes orduties levied on home produced rice. However, there was some increase in spending by projectbeneficiaries on consumer goods, many of which were taxed. As a result, revenues from indirecttaxation were increased, although quantification of this was not possible.

Economic Performance

Agriculture Production

4.8.6 The project yield for the dry and wet season for the irrigated areas with project situationwere set as increasing from 4.5 and 3.5 ton/ha at the beginning of the project to 6 and 5 ton/ha at the

9

end of year nine respectively. The total production was expected to increase from 350 ton in yeartwo to 8550 ton in year 9 at full operation.

4.8.7 Annex 6 provides comparison of projected and actual rice production during the period from1990 to 1997. Total irrigated rice production area varied from 33 to 88 ha between 1989 and 1994while between 1994 to 1997 the variation was between 102 to 271 ha. The maximum developmentwas reached in 1997. Rice production increased from 583 ton to 1,454 tons with yields rangingfrom 3.4 ton/ha to a maximum of 6.2 ton/ha.

4.8.8 For the project rehabilitated perimeters, the area under rice production ranged from 7 ha in1990 to 176 ha in 1997 with production reaching 1,069 tons in 1997 from 44 tons in 1990 withyield varying from 5 to 6 tons/ha. The size of annual irrigated area ranged from 28 % to 52 % of therehabilitated area. The farming area works in two seasons, wet season and dry season. Irrigationneeded only in the dry season.

4.8.9 The internal economic rate of return (ERR) is estimated to be 4% as compared to 15.9%estimated at appraisal. As already mentioned before the main reason for the lower ERR is that therehabilitation of the 850 ha, which is the key component of the project, was only 42% of theAppraisal planned target. This has greatly affected the expected production at appraisal and in turnnet incremental returns.

Physical Implementation

4.8.10 The original target of developing 850 ha of irrigated perimeters and 400 ha of rainfed riceswamps has been scaled down to about 210 ha of irrigated perimeters. The plan to develop 400 haof rainfed rice swamps had been dropped. Out of the originally planned 850 ha pumped irrigatedperimeters only 355 ha (42%) of the target has been rehabilitated by February 1999,however, theachieved area exceed the scaled down target of 210 ha. Costs of land rehabilitation per hectare werealmost doubled. The use of high yielding seed varieties helped in increasing production up to 6tonnes per hectare. The main quantifiable economic benefits of the project realised were theincremental production of paddy. Total paddy production from1989 to 1997 was 8,013 Tons valuedat about GMD 12,794,854.17 at market price, (range from GMD 1,200 to 1,750 during the period).The net return on harvest was GMD 6,312,302.57.

5. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

5.1 Social Impact

5.1.1 The project benefited some 1,125 farmer and generated employment for about 2,500 personin the rural areas. The income of the farmers who participated in the project increased significantlydue to the increase in rice production. This had improved their standard of living and enhanced theiractivities as well as their social life (see annex 11). Furthermore the increased production of riceunder the project improved the food security situation at household level while the marketablesurplus contributed to poverty reduction in the surrounding areas.

5.1.2 The implementation of the project was a learning experience as it had increased theKnowledge and experience of project staff. This is a valuable asset to the Department of State forAgriculture and can be used to enhance its functions and activities in the field.

10

5.1.3 The development of water Users Associations/Groups to increase and sustain riceproduction within the rehabilitated areas in the Central River Division is still going on even afterclosing the project. These Associations/Groups have great impact on community live particularlysocial cohesiveness and co-operation as well as enhancing democratic actions among farmers.

5.1.4 No women in development concerns were addressed at appraisal or arose during theimplementation of the project. No indicators were ascertained to allow an assessment of the beforeand after project situation. It should be noted, though, that the role of women in the project area andin the Gambia in general is very significant. In the project area more than 60% of the participatingfarmers were women. Currently slightly more than 55% of the farmers in Gambia are women. Thus,it can be assumed that, as rice production improves, whether through the intervention of the projector other causes the income and/ or the availability of enhanced nutrition for the women and theirfamilies also improves.

5.2 Environmental Impact

At the time of appraisal environmental impact was not carried out. The Gambia has anenvironmental protection agency, which monitor implementation of all projects in the country in aneffort to reduce its affect on the environment. The project through its life used insignificant amountsof fertiliser and pesticide as shown by the very limited amount of credit extended to the farmers forthat purpose. Therefore, it is expected that the implementation of the project had negligible impacton the environment. As indicated before, the project objective was to rehabilitate the previouslydeveloped perimeters through the improvement of its irrigation and drainage schemes. Therehabilitation process enhanced flood protection measures in the area, where the drainage systemdeveloped can drain out any excess water out of the cultivable land. This in turn helped inenvironmental protection.

6. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

The project did rehabilitate about 355 ha of irrigated perimeters. Farmers were organised in severalwater users associations to manage and utilise the rehabilitated areas in an effort to increase theproject sustainability. However, these associations lakes sufficient managerial skills and the propermechanism of self-financing. The farmers’ revolving fund was to provide a basis to assist farmers tocrop their land on a sustainable basis, with support initially from project operations/activities, whichwere paid for from the fund. The objective was to ensure continual production of rice, and throughthe development of a self-financing culture, ensure self-sustainability after the termination of donorsupport (funding). As previously indicated the revolving fund was poorly managed and rate ofrecovery was very small, therefore sustainability of the project was very limited. The Government,realising these facts, had initiated a consolidated program called integrated rice developmentprogram (IRDP) covering all previous irrigation projects in the area. In the new integrated programthe Government will carry maintenance of major infrastructure meanwhile all other maintenancetasks in the rehabilitated areas as well as management of the irrigation schemes will be carried bythe farmers themselves to increase the sustainability of all the previous irrigation projects.

11

7. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK AND THE BORROWER

7.1 Performance of the Bank

The Bank interpretation of the Borrower’s sector needs was correct, and the loan convenants andprovisions were appropriate. The project was appropriate to the needs of the country. The projectwas implemented over a period of nine (9) years instead of the planned five (5) years at appraisal.The project was supervised by ADF nine (9) times during its course. However, there were nosupervision missions during 1991 and 1992. Starting from 1993 the project was supervised annuallyand sometimes twice a year as in 1994 and 1996 until it was closed in 1997. The ADF missionsgathered information about the project and often suggested the sharpening of its focus but did notprovide sufficient guidance to the Bank to allow for taking firm decisions. It also repeatedly advisedthe Government to closely monitor project implementation without providing a framework for that.The Bank reaction to missions recommendations was slow and not very effective such as itapproved the scaling down of project targets to more than 75% without scaling down the projectfinancing accordingly. The Bank also did not react effectively to the poor management of the creditto farmers. Procurement went on smoothly; however, some delays were experienced, at the earlystages of the project, due to PMU lack of sufficient knowledge of Bank procurement procedures.Disbursements were delayed sometimes due to incomplete documents and/or necessaryinformation. Although disbursements of the project funds were about 96% as previously indicated.

7.2 Performance of the Borrower

The Government contributed to the project cost sufficient funds almost very close to appraisalestimates. There were no shortages of local currency identified as affecting the implementation ofthe project. Land development, the key component of the project, works were done by forceaccount, however, supervision as well as monitoring and evaluation were very poor. Projectimplementation and records keeping were complicated by the frequent changes made in theallocation of funds and in the procurement of goods. The need for changes as the Governmentrevised its priorities according to immediate requirements and changes occurring in demand overtime can be justified. Five complete revision of the List of Goods and Services took place duringthe project course, which complicated project follow-up. Monitoring and evaluation of projectactivities and in particular land development and management of the credit funds were almostabsent due to the low capacity of the Department of State for Agriculture, former Ministry ofAgriculture.

8. OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RATING

8.1 The overall performance of the project was not satisfactory. The physical implementationachieved was 28% of the targets planned at appraisal (1250 ha), however, the project did realise therevised targets in 1994 and even exceeded them. Rate of achievement of the revised targets (210 haof irrigated perimeters) was 169%(335 ha). Disbursement of project funds was about 96%. Theoverall project rating is shown in Annex 9.

8.2 Maximum production on rehabilitated perimeters was not attained either in terms ofcultivated area or intensification to realise the full potential of the dry and wet seasons production.Rice yield has increased from an average of 3.5 tons/ha to 6 tons/ha on the rehabilitated areasestimated at appraisal.

12

8.3 The use of the credit component for establishing revolving fund for farm development wasnot fully successful. The recovery of loan has been poor (about 37 % of the total loan to farmers)and operating funds for spare parts, fuel and other essential inputs was not available as required asresult of which cultivation and agricultural activities has been impaired.

8.4 The institutional objective of creating an organisation with trained manpower to take overthe rehabilitation and continue on developing the irrigated perimeters was not successful, as therewere no irrigation engineers assigned to the project to work with the technical assistance team.

9. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Conclusions

9.1.1 The overall project performance is not satisfactorily. Out of 850 ha pumped irrigatedPerimeters planned at appraisal only 355 ha (42% of the target) had been rehabilitated, however, thescaled down targets in 1994 (210 ha) was fully rehabilitated. Rate of achievement of the scaleddown objectives was 169%. Cost of land rehabilitation per hectare was almost doubled. Noactivities were carried out with respect to the 400 ha rainfed swamp improvement perimeters as itwas abandoned in the revised targets of 1994. Disbursements of project funds were about 96%.

9.1.2 The use of high yielding seed varieties helped in increasing production up to 6 tonnes perhectare. The main quantifiable economic benefits of the project realised were the incrementalproduction of paddy. The impact of the project on the farming community has been positive. Mostfarmers adopted the new technologies and the use of high yielding varieties. Training of technicalsupport staff and farmers was generally satisfactory although was not extensive as planned due toshortage of locally skilled staff.

9.2 Lesson Learnt

9.2.1 The project preparation report was not based on a feasibility study of the targeted area foroptimizing technical, social, economical, institutional, environmental and financial aspects of theenvisaged development. These important details and facts about the project were not available,therefore, its negative implication on the project design and cost as well as implementationmodalities were quite obvious. Proper feasibility study for irrigation projects should precedeconsideration of projects for financing (para 2.3).

9.2.2 The quality and experience of local staff should be ascertained and if lacking considerationshould be given to direct recruitment of qualified and experienced expatriate staff. During theimplementation period care should be taken in the selection of the Technical Assistance team aperiodic evaluation of the Project Management Unit and the Technical Assistance team should becarried out by the supervision mission team (para 3.2.3 & 4.5.2).

9.2.3 In all project activities the Bank should have ensured that the Borrower’s perception abouttheir own capabilities for implementing the project and for understanding the Bank’s role andresponsibilities in project implementation are realistic and that false expectations and reportingabout these roles are dispelled (para 7.2).

9.2.4 As demonstrated by this and many similar projects the five-year implementation period iscounterproductive to the creation of a sustainable irrigation project. Too often, emphasis is placed

13

on implementation of the physical works, as this is the major cost component of the project.However, relatively rapid implementation of the physical works does not necessarily lead tosuccessful agricultural production. Therefore, this type of project should from the beginning, beplanned and financed over an eight to ten year period in the form of program approach so that thedonor’s involvement continues during the agricultural production phase which be will planned fromthe outset. In addition to the construction period the program and/or the project should provide aperiod for training of local staff and in particular the key personnel of the program (para 3.3).

9.2.5 The project demonstrated the importance of giving more attention to institutional issues andhuman resources development and in particular to the need to involve farmers at an early stage indevelopment. Inadequate attention was given to institutional problems at the farmers level which,following the end of the donor’s fund and reduced Government involvement, left the projectwithout the top heavy management that the farmers had become accustomed to. Had more thoughtbeen given at the design stage to the abilities of the farmers, a lower technology sustainable schemecould have been designed (para 4.3).

9.2.6 Throughout its implementation period, the project has lacked skilled local counterpartsparticularly irrigation engineers, a factor that has affected its sustainability. The Bank should,therefore not have continued disbursing the loan funds until the borrower provided the requiredcounterparts as had been agreed at the Loan Agreement (para 4.4.2).

9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Irrigation projects should preceded with feasibility studies of the target area for optimisingtechnical, social, economic, institutional, environmental and financial aspects of the envisageddevelopment.

ii. Periodic evaluation of the Technical Assistance Staff is highly recommended to ensureproper performance and adequate co-operation with project PMU.

iii Projects which involve development of Irrigation Schemes, Development of Infrastructureand later Agricultural aspects should from the beginning be planned and financed as a program forover an eight to ten year period, so that the donor’s involvement continues during the agriculturalproduction phase which be will planned from the outset.

iv. Local counterparts should assign to the project as soon as its commencement. Intensivetraining program for local counterparts should be prepared and implemented, during projectimplementation to ensure project sustainability after phasing out its planned activities.

v. Based on experience gained and lessons learnt from implementing previous irrigationprojects in the Gambia (Sapu area) a farmer managed rice irrigation program is highlyrecommended. It is envisaged that the proposed program will optimise the utilisation of thepotentials in the rice sub-sector and boost production for improved food at the national level as wellas consolidate the achievements of the previous Bank financed rice development projects. Thisprogram will complete the rehabilitation of around 600 ha, provide proper maintenance for thealready established irrigation schemes totally 1110 ha, provide support and training to the farmers’users associations which will manage the program, help in forming new farmers water associationsand/or groups and provide the necessary inputs such as seed varieties, fertiliser, etc.

Annex 1Page 1 of 1

GAMBIA: RICE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF THE COUNTRY

Banjul

BarraBakau

Sara Job Kunda

Brikama

Gunjur

WESTERN Kalagi

NORTH BANK

Kerewan

LOWER RIVER

Salikene

Farafenni

ManyaKonko

Kass Wollof

MacCARTHYISLAND

Sukuta

Georgetown

Diabugu

BasseSanta Su

UPPERRIVER

International boundary

Division boundary

National capital

Division capital

Railroad

Road

Kilometers

Miles

THE GAMBIA

SENEGAL

SENEGAL

This map has been drawn by the African Development Bank Group exclusively for the use of the readers of the report to which it is attached. The names used and the borders shown do not imply on the part of the Bank andits members any judgement concerning the legal status of a territory nor any approval or acceptance of these borders.

Annex 2Page 1 of 2

DETAILED PROJECT FEATURES

1. Project Management

1.1 The engineering design, construction and agricultural production activities were to becarried out by the Project Management Unit established at Sapu, the project operationcentre. The Project Management component provided for the establishment of aProject Management Unit (PMU) headed by a national Project Manager assisted byfour specialist units with responsibilities for finance & administration, mechanical,agricultural and irrigation services and land development and supported byinternationally recruited Technical assistance Team. The staffing level was envisagedto reach 80 during the planned five-year implementation period consisting ofprofessional, semi-professional, technical and support personnel.

1.2 Allowance have made for the construction of staff houses (94 m2) for the TechnicalAssistance team use and rehabilitation and re-equipping of the work shop facilities atSapu. Construction of 250 ton crop store, provision of 150,000 litre capacity fuelstorage, procurement of tools and workshop equipment and operating cost for theproject vehicles were also included for funding under the Project ManagementComponent.

2. Land development

2.1 The services envisaged under the Land Development Component were the fullrehabilitation of existing irrigated rice perimeters covering an area of 850 ha net andthe improvement of 400 ha of rainfed swaps. The planned rehabilitation workincluded integration of small perimeters into viable units (10 to 40 ha), provision ofnew pumps (45 units), construction of efficient irrigation canals (4 km of lined and 50of unlined canals) with the necessary irrigation structures, flood control and drainageworks (48 km of main drain, 52 km of field drains and 48 km of flood embankment),provision of secure access trucks, land levelling and consolidation (892 ha).

2.2 For the 400 ha rainfed swap areas, construction of causeways to improve access, earthembankments for controlling surface runoff in the wet seasons, bush clearing and landsmoothening to improve water retention was envisaged. Provision was also forsupplementary irrigation facilities including irrigation and drainage canals and floodembankments. Allowance has been made to introduce mechanical land cultivation toassist the farmers who are mainly females.

2.3 The Project Management Unit assisted by the expatriate Technical Team wasresponsible for conducting the detailed engineering studies, surveying, design andconstruction.

Annex 2Page 2 of 2

3. Equipment, Tools, And Vehicle Purchase

3.1 Under this component allowance was made for the procurement of 11 vehicles, 18motor cycles, engineering equipment for land development and 44 pump sets withspare parts. The engineering equipment for land development included 75 hpbulldozer, 70-hp grader, 100-hp tractor, tipping truck, land plane, concrete mixer andother construction machinery and equipment. Provision was also made to procure ten110 hp 4 WD tractors with land cultivation equipment, sprayers (20) and threshers(17).

4. Input Financing

4.1 The project provided Dalasis 3,638,600 over a period of four years, for theestablishment of initial funds to set up a revolving credit scheme for farmdevelopment and operating purposes. Credit was to be made available for thepurchase of seeds, fertiliser, insecticides, hand tools, rice bags, and to meet the cost ofirrigation and mechanical land preparation charges for about 2000 rice growing farmunit at full development. Allocation was also made (Dalasis 300, 000) for financingthe purchase of rice by six Gambia Co-operative Unions from the farmers

5. Technical assistance and Training

5.1 The Technical Assistance Team was required to undertake the detailed design ofproject works, assist in project management and train Gambian staff to be able toimplement and operate the project. The TA input was set at 48 man-months and theteam consisted of an Irrigation Engineer (24-mm), a Mechanical Engineer (12-mm)and a Financial Controller (12-mm).

5.2 In site training in engineering, extension, water management and mechanical plantmaintenance was to be carried out with the assistance of the Technical AssistanceTeam. More over the TA Irrigation Engineer is entrusted in training Gambiancounterparts in the planning, design and construction of small-scale irrigationschemes and to establish water management training centre for training agriculturalextension staff and the establishment of demonstration and trial units at Sapu. The TAMechanical Engineer was to set up workshop procedures and train mechanics andpump operators.

Annex 3PLANNED AND ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

Activity Totalwork

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996 1997

PY1 PY2

PY3 PY4

PY5 PY6

PY7 PY8 PY9

1. Planned Activity Schedule1.1 APPRAISAL REPORT PLANRehabilitation Of Irrigated Perimeters Survey & design 850

ha210 210 210 220

Construction Of Irrigated area 850ha

210 210 210 220

Rainfed Swap Development Rainfed swamp studies 400

ha400

Rainfed swap development 400ha

100 150 150

1.2 TECHNICAL ASSISTANT TEAM INCEPTION REPORTRehabilitation Of Irrigated Perimeters

Survey and design 850ha

159 376 315

Construction 850ha

260 215 215 100

Rainfed Swap Development Rainfed swamp studies 400

ha150 250

Rainfed swap development 400ha

150 250

2. Actual ImplementationRehabilitation Of Irrigated perimeters

Topographic survey 650ha

Design 514ha

Construction 339ha

35 25 7 30 85 110 47

3. Annually Cultivated area Dry season 0 0 19 47 112 147 176

Wet season 7 20 15 35 93 81 NA

4. Cumulative Developed Area Rehabilitated area 339

ha35 60 67 97 182 292 339

Rehabilitated area as % of total 1250ha

3 5 6 8 15 23 27

Annually irrigated area % of rehab. area under irrigation 0 0 28 50 61 50 52

Annex 4Page 1 of 2

PROCUREMENT

1. International Competitive Bidding (ICB)

1.1 The PMU signed twelve different contracts according to the Bank’s ICB rule duringthe implementation period from 1990 to 1995. The procurements were mainly relatedto recruitment of Technical Assistance Team, irrigation construction machinery andequipment, agricultural machinery, workshop tools and equipment, irrigation pumpsand spare parts.

1.2 After due advertisement in national and international publication the service related tothe Technical Assistance was awarded to Mascot limited of UK The initial contractwas for input from an Irrigation Engineer (24-mm), Mechanical Engineer (12 mm)and Financial Controller (12). The contract was revised to increase the input of theirrigation by 16 mm to a total of 40 mm. In 1994 Mascot were invited to take over thefull management of the Project heading the PMU with an expatriate Manager and anew contract was signed for a total input of 63 man month. The new team includedProject Manger (14 mm), Mechanical Engineer (12 mm), Construction Engineer (12mm), Drainage engineer (1 mm) Assistant Project Manger (12 mm) and financialcontroller (12 mm)

1.3 The procurement of workshop tools and equipment, construction and agriculturalmachinery, irrigation pumps and some vehicles was award to seven internationalcompanies through local representatives or directly. The tenders are evaluated by thePMU through the Central Tender Board and are passed to the bank for approval priorto award.

2. International Shopping

2.1 Five contracts were awarded to two companies for the procurement of spare parts foragricultural machinery and vehicles through the International Shopping procedure.The companies have local representation in Gambia.

3. Local Shopping

3.1 Construction material such cement, office equipment, some pare parts, fuel and two 4WD vehicle were procured in the Gambia through the Local Shopping procedure.

4. Other Contracts and Procurement

4.1 The construction of irrigation facilities was directly carried out by the PMU throughdirect engagement of the required construction team. Procurement of power tillersfrom the Peoples Republic China and training a senior Gambian project staff in theUK was made by the Direct Purchase procedure.

Annex 4Page 2 of 2

List of Goods and Services Procured by the Project

Item Contractor Goods & Services Procurementprocedure

Amount in Million UA

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total

1 ELF Oil (G) Limited Fuel - Diesel & Petrol LCB 0 20,780 56,740 77,520

2 Hydraulic Industrial Srev. Hydraulic Equipment ICB 10,178 715 10,894

3 Jimpex International Co. Ltd Cement Supply LS 12,273 12,273 24,545

4 OSA Motors Limited Truck, Spares etc. ICB 174,882 174,882

5 Winchester Proc. Limited Spare parts & Equipment IS 103,821 103,821

6 C.F.A.O. (Gambia) Limited Vehicles & Motorbikes IS,LS 24,916 2,881 40,364 68,160

7 I.T.S BUSUM W. Tools Equip. &Spareparts

ICB 5,020 67,503 72,523

8 INTL. Procurement Plant & Machinery ICB 511,462 511,462

9 Meridian & Breckwoldt Vehicles & Motorbikes ICB 24,360 95,137 119,496

10 Motorenfabrik HATZ Dump sets & Auxiliary ICB 315,732 315,732

11 Shyben A Madi & Sons LTD. Low bed trailer & Grader ICB 65,303 7,576 72,879

12 General Supply CO. Fiat Allis FDIOE Spares ICB 27,717 1,727 29,444

13 Inter Agraria Limited Hanomag Spares LS 65,500 4,333 69,833

14 International Land Trading J.C.B. Excavator ICB 89,451 89,451

15 SIMBA International Simba Laser Leveller ICB 14,237 4,575 18,813

16 China Geo-Engineering Corp. Rice Mill & Power tiller DP 32,372 25,887 58,259

17 Mascott Limited Tech. Assistance Fees ICB 138,359 285,387 114,793 198,437 395,871 293,057 1,425,902

18 Agri-Visual Limited Office Equipment DP 0 18,318 18,318

19 Wye College London Overseas Training DP 10,695 10,695

20 GRAND TOTAL 163,274 311,606 650,614 723,104 694,894 729,137 0 0 3,272,631

Sources: Compiled from information supplied by the project office, February 1999

Annex 5Summary of Financial Source and Utilisation

Table 1: RIDEP Project Sources of Finance (UA Million)

Sources ForeignExchange

LocalCost

Totalcost

%ofTotal

ADF loan 3.53 1.27 4.80 87.7GOG - 0.67 0.67 12.3Total For Project 3.53 1.94 5.74 100Physical Contingency 0.214 0.098 0.312 7.7Price Contingency 0.788 0.510 1.298 23.7Total contingency 1.002 0.608 1.610 29.4Source: Appraisal report. 1988

Table 2: ADF Finance - Comparison of Planned and Actual Disbursement(UA Million)

Component Planned And Actual Disbursement TOTAL

PY1 PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 PY6 PY7 PY8 PY9

1 Project Management Projected 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.73Actual 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.40

2. Land Development Projected 0.00 0.29 0.39 0.47 0.54 1.68Actual 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.53 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.92

3. Equip. Veh. & Tools Projected 0.68 0.03 0.54 0.14 0.06 1.45Actual 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.58 0.16 0.30 0.46 0.09 0.14 1.77

4. Input Financing Projected 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.34Actual 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05

5. Tech. Assist. & training Projected 0.13 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.60Actual 0.00 0.14 0.28 0.11 0.21 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.01 1.45

6 Grand Total Projected 0.96 0.87 1.22 0.87 0.88 4.80Actual 0.09 0.22 0.38 0.76 0.90 1.20 0.76 0.13 0.16 4.59

7.Projected disbursement as % of total 20 18 25 18 188. Annual disbursement as % of total 2 5 8 15 20 25 16 3 39. Cumu. Disbursement as % of total 2 7 15 30 50 75 91 94 97

Source: Projected Disbursement - Appraisal Report, 1988Actual Disablement - Bank disbursement printout, November 1998

Note: Project Year 1 (PY1) refers to 1989

Annex 6Page 1 of 2

Comparison of Projected and Actual Annual Rice Production

Year Season Projected Rice Production Actual Rice Production

Irrigated Rice Production Rainfed Rice Area Other Irrigated RiceProduction

Rehabilitated area

AreaHa

YieldT/ha

Prod. Ton Areaha

YieldT/ha

Prod.Ton

AreaHa

YieldT/ha

Prod.Ton

Areaha

YieldT/ha

Prod. Ton

1 dry season - - - - - - - - - - - -

wet season - - - - - - - - - - -

2 dry season - - - - - - 85 4.86 411 - - -

wet season 100 3.50 350 - - - 51 3.37 172 - - -

3 dry season 160 4.50 720 50 1.00 50 64 5.36 343 - - -

wet season 220 3.75 825 - - 0 58 4.83 279 7 6.00 44

4 dry season 340 4.75 1,615 135 1.20 162 33 5.62 185 - - -

wet season 350 4.25 1,488 - - - 76 4.79 363 20 5.80 114

5 dry season 540 5.13 2,768 230 1.44 331 68 5.80 393 19 6.20 116

wet season 500 4.50 2,250 - - - 40 4.91 194 15 4.80 71

6 dry season 740 5.38 3,978 262 1.94 508 88 6.19 542 47 6.16 287

wet season 550 4.75 2,613 - - - 62 5.74 354 35 5.82 202

7 dry season 780 5.50 4,290 285 2.31 658 155 5.98 930 112 6.26 703

wet season 580 5.00 2,900 - - - 141 5.01 704 93 4.59 427

8 dry season 800 5.75 4,600 300 2.50 750 192 6.19 1,191 147 6.20 913

wet season 600 5.00 3,000 - - - 102 4.89 498 81 4.69 378

9 dry season 800 6.00 4,800 300 2.50 750 271 5.37 1,454 176 6.09 1,069

wet season 600 5.00 3,000 - - - - - - - - -

Source: Compiled from Government PCR and Project records.

SUMMARY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF CROPPING SEASON (1990 – 1997) Annex 6Page 2 of 2

Season No. CroppingSeason

Total CultivatedArea (ha)

EstimatedAverage Yield(Paddy) T/H

Estimated TotalYield(Paddy) Ton

AverageMarketPriceD/T

Harvest CashReceiptsD

Total InputCreditD

EstimatedTotal LabourCostD

Net ReturnOn HarvestD

NetReturn PerHectare

D/ha1 1990 Dry

Season84.50 4.86 510.67 1,200 492,804.12 137,329.38 281,166.15 74,308.59 879.39

2 1990 WetSeason

51.04 3.37 172.00 1,200 206,400.00 57,575.00 169,831.01 -5,666.60 -111.02

3 1991 DrySeason

64.01 5.36 343.09 1,200 411,710.40 145,200.50 212,987.51 53,522.39 836.16

4 1991 WetSeason

57.67 4.83 278.57 1,200 334,285.20 62,765.00 191,891.73 227,920.42 3,952.15

5 1992 DrySeason

32.88 5.62 184.79 1,200 221,743.20 63,318.83 109,405.24 98,833.83 3,005.90

6 1992 WetSeason

75.80 4.79 363.10 1,500 544,653.00 41,153.16 252,217.68 251,282.16 3,315.07

7 1993 DrySeason

67.70 5.80 392.65 1,500 588,975.00 58,283.84 225,265.66 305,425.50 4,511.45

8 1993 WetSeason

39.50 4.91 193.95 1,500 290,925.00 26,928.20 131,432.70 132,564.11 3,356.05

9 1994 DrySeason

87.55 6.19 541.95 1,500 812,925.00 72,909.87 291,314.75 491,291.23 5,611.55

10 1994 WetSeason

61.60 5.74 353.58 1,500 530,370.00 40,776.15 204,968.46 284,625.39 4,620.54

11 1995 DrySeason

155.44 5.98 929.53 1,750 1,626,668.75 253,384.02 517,212.61 856,072.12 5,507.41

12 1995 WetSeason

140.60 5.01 704.47 1,750 1,232,813.75 102,636.78 467,833.85 662,343.12 4,710.83

13 1996 DrySeason

192.45 6.19 1,192.12 1,750 2,086,201.25 328,168.76 640,360.05 1,122,961.44

5,835.08

14 1996 WetSeason

101.80 4.89 497.85 1,750 871,237.50 42,922.38 338,730.34 522,858.88 5,136.14

15 1997 DrySeason

270.75 5.37 1,453.22 1,750 2,543,142.00 514,430.14 900,896.26 1,233,959.98

4,557.66

Grand Total 1,483.29 8,011.53 12,794,854.17 1,947,782.01 4,935,513.98 6,312,302.57

Grand Total(UA)

939,961.31 142,834.95 363,872.77 462,841.00

Annex 7

ORGANISION CHART Page 1 Of 1Department of State

for Agriculture

Permanent Secretary

African DevelopmentBank Group

Project Co-OrdinatingCommitee

Project Management Unit

Project Manager TechnicalAssistance

Farmers Co-OrdinatingCommitee

Agricultural ServicesUnit

Irrigation Development UnitTechnical Assistance

Mechanical Services UnitTechnical Assistance

Training

CO-OPS

Financing & AdministrationTechnical Assistance

Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section

Field OperationWater Mangement

Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance

Survey &ConstructionSupervision

Planning and DesignSection

THE GAMBIA RICE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Annex 7

ORGANISATION CHART Page 1 Of 1

Department of Statefor Agriculture

Permanent Secretary









Training

CO-OPS


Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section


Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance






Permanent Secretary









Training

CO-OPS


Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section


Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance






Permanent Secretary









Training

CO-OPS


Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section


Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance






Permanent Secretary









Training

CO-OPS


Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section


Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance






Permanent Secretary









Training

CO-OPS


Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section


Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance




Permanent Secretary









Training

CO-OPS


Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section


Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance




ORGANISATION CHART


Permanent Secretary









Training

CO-OPS


Finance &Accounts

Administration

Field Section


Field Maintenance

WorkshopSection

Repairs

Fuel andSpare Parts

Maintenance



Annex 8Page 1 of 2

A. CONDITIONS FULFILLED PRIOR TO LOAN EFFECTIVENESS

Prior to first disbursement the Borrower would have:

1. Established within the Ministry of Agriculture, a project Management Unit, whosecomposition, functions and responsibilities shall be acceptable to the ADF;

2. Appointed a project manager with qualifications and experience acceptable to the ADF, tothe head the PMU;

3. Given an undertaking to establish and maintain for the entire period of projectimplementation, separate project-related accounts for the ADF and the GOTG ;

4. Given an undertaking not to use the proceeds of the loan for the payment of the variousduties and taxes relating to goods and services required for the execution of the project

5. Given an undertaking to the ADF that it will cause the PMU to administer the developmentcredit funds provided under the project on, inter alia, the following terms and conditions:

5.1 Out of the proceeds of the present loan, an amount not exceeding the equivalent ofthree hundred and seventy-two thousand Unit of Account (FUA 372,000) shall beused, exclusively, in extending credits to rice farmers in the project area for theacquisition of seasonal inputs, irrigation water and mechanical land preparationcharges;

5.2 The interest rate that may be charged to participating rice farmers shall not exceedeleven percent (11%) per annum, for any credit; (this condition was partially fulfilledthe actual interest rate was 15%)

5.3 Credits to participating rice farmers shall be extended with a maturity of not morethan twelve (12) months;

5.4 Any interest surplus accruing to the PMU on credits to rice farmers shall be creditedto the project revolving fund account and shall be used in further extending seasonalcredits to rice farmers.

Annex 8Page 2 of 2

B. OTHER CONDITIONS

Condition Status of fulfilment

The Borrower would:

(1) Internationally recruit, within one year of thesignature of the loan agreement, technical (fulfilled)assistance personnel with qualifications andexperience satisfactory to the ADF, to fill theposts of Irrigation Engineer, Mechanical Engineerand Financial Controller;

(2) Cause the Ministry of Agriculture to appointcounterparts with qualification and experience (partially fulfilled)acceptable to the ADF, to all the expatriate technicalassistance personnel under the project.

THE GAMBIA RICE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT-PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT-PROJECT PERFORMANCE RATING

PROJECT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS RATINGS

A. Project Progress1. Compliance with Loan Conditions Precedent to entry into Force2. Compliance with Other conditions

3. Compliance with General conditions

1

2

1

B. Procurement Performance1. Procurement of consultancy services2. Procurement of Goods and works

2

2

C. Financial Performance1. Availability of Foreign Exchange2. Availability of Local Currency3. Disbursement flows

4. Cost Management

5.Performance of co-financiers

3

2

2

1

NA

D. Activities and Output1. Adherence to Implementation Schedule2. Performance of Consultants or Technical Assistants3. Performance of Contractors4. Performance of Project Management5. Quality of output

0

1

2

1

1

E. Impact on Development1. Likelihood of Achieving Project Objective2. Likelihood that Benefits will be Realised and Sustained Beyond the

Investment Stage of the Project3. Likely contribution of the Project toward an Increase in

institutional Capacity4. Current Rate of Return

1

1

11

F. Overall Assessment1. At Present2. Trend Over Time

1

1

Codes: 3 = Highly satisfactory

2 = Satisfactory: Occasional problems: Bank should monitor.1 = Unsatisfactory: Some problems: Bank should monitor closely but no immediate

actionrequired.

0 = Serious problems: Bank Action required.

Annex 10

Matrix of Recommendations and follow-up Actions

Problems & Observations Recommendations Follow-up ActionPoor design & high cost of some ofproject activities.

Irrigation projects should precede with feasibilitystudies of the target area for optimising technical, socio,economical, institutional, environmental and financialaspects of the envisaged development.

The Bank should take this in consideration andensure that feasibility studies precede the design ofirrigation projects.

Poor performance of TechnicalAssistance Staff.

Periodic evaluation of the Technical Assistance Staff ishighly recommended to ensure proper performance andadequate co-operation with project PMU

The Government and the Bank should monitor theperformance of the consultant (TA) closely and donot hesitate to suspend TA contract if performanceis not adequate.

Short project period during designwithout allowing enough time foragriculture activities to benefit fromproject funds & supports.

Projects which involve development of IrrigationSchemes and development of Infrastructure and laterAgricultural aspects should from the beginning beplanned and financed over an eight to ten year period sothat the donor’s involvement continues during theagricultural production phase which be will plannedfrom the outset.

The Government and the Bank should observe thatin designing new irrigation projects as to formulatethem as programs for at least ten years.

Inadequate attention to institutionalproblems at the farmers level duringproject design and appraisal.

More thought should be given at the design stage to theabilities of the farmers particularly with regard tohandling and maintaining the level of technologyprovided by the project. It is recommended that projectdesigners should select the proper and sustainabletechnology (Irrigation Scheme) which match farmers’abilities as well as knowledge and financial capacities.

The Bank should carefully examine therecommended level of technology inherited in theirrigation scheme against the abilities and socialsitting of the farmers.

Lack of skilled local counterpartsand delay of their assignment to theproject.

Local counterparts should assign to the project as soonas its commencement. Intensive training program forlocal counterparts should be prepared andimplementation to ensure project sustainability afterphasing out its planned activities

The Bank should not have continued disbursing theloan funds until the borrower provided the requiredcounterparts as had been agreed at the loannegotiations.

Annex 11

RICE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTMODEL FARM BUDGETS

Model I (Irrigation Schemes) Model II Without Project

Items Dry Season Wet Season Annual Wet Season Only 1Yield=6.0 Tons/ha Yield=5.0 tons/ha Total Yield=1.0 Tons/ha

(D) (D) (D) (D)InputsSeeds :50 kg/ha at 1.3 D/kg 65 65 130 -70 kg/ha at 1.3 D/kg - - - 91Fertiliserez (2)Compound 15 :15 :15 at D 1.4/kg 228 228 456 -Urea at D 1.02/kg 204 153 357 -Pest Control (3)Insecticides 1 L/ha (1L=114 D) 114 114 228 -Spraying Services 23 23 46 -Handtools at 20 D/ha (4) 7 7 14 7Bags (5) 28 23 51 5Water Charges 520 520 1,040 -Land Preparation Services 475 475 950 -Threshing Services (6) 318 265 583 -Hired Labour D 6.6/Day (7) - 330 330 -Transportationat D 1.5/Bag of 75 kg 126 105 231 21Total Cost of Input 2,108 2,308 4,416 124Credit extended (8) 1,664 1,608 3,272 103Interest on credit (9) 153 147 300 9Total Cost 2,261 2,455 4,716 133Total Value of OutputAt D 1,200/ton 7,200 6,000 13,200 1,200Net Farm Income 4,939 3,545 8,484 1,067Net Incremental Farm Income - - 4,716 133

(1) Model II represents production without project and it was assumed that by PY4 onwards cropping intensity in dryseason will drop to zero, thus farmers produce rice only in wet season from PY4 onwards at 25% croppingintensity.

(2) Fertilizer recommendation ; Rice Dry Season 1-15.15.15 and urea 200 kg/ha. Wet season 15.15/15 : 200kg/ha and 150 urea.

(3) An average 1 L/ha (0 to 2L)(4) 0 D/ha(5) 14 Bages/ton(6) 53 Dal/ton(7) No hired labour is required in the dry season-50 man-day in wet season.(8) Credit covers only fertilizers, seeds, insecticides, bags and tools, water charges and land preparation.(9) Interest at 11% on 10 months.

Annex 12The Gambia

Rice Development project – PCREconomic rate of return (D’000)

Year INVESTMENT

(COST)

PRODUCTIONCOST (2)

TOTAL COST (3) INCREMENTALPRODUCTION IN

TONS (4)

FARM GATEPRICE D/TONNE

(5)

VALUE OFRICE

NET BENEFITS

PY 1 689 689 -689PY 2 1683 1683 -1683PY 3 2907 2907 44 1.5 66 -2841PY 4 5814 5814 144 1.5 216 -5598PY 5 6885 6885 187 1.75 327 -6558PY 6 9180 9180 489 1.75 856 -8324PY 7 5814 5814 1130 1.75 1978 -3837PY 8 995 995 1291 1.75 2259 1264PY 9 1224 1224 1496 1.75 2618 1394

PY 10 803 803 1630 1.75 2852 2050PY 11 803 803 1800 1.75 3150 2347PY 12 803 803 2130 1.75 3728 2925PY 13 803 803 2130 1.75 3728 2925PY 14 803 803 2130 1.75 3728 2925PY 15 1825 803 2628 2130 1.85 3941 1313PY 16 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 17 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 18 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 19 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 20 1825 803 2628 2130 1.85 3941 1313PY 21 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 22 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 23 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 24 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138PY 25 803 803 2130 1.85 3941 3138

Note: 1) Investment cost includes replacement of some of Agric. Equipment & Spars ;2) Based on farm budgets and actual cropped areas ;3) Based on farm budget and actual costs for 1995 ;4) Rice production in tons of paddy ;5) Farm gate prices obtained from project records and from the field observations.

Annex 13

SUMMARY OF PRODUCTION INPUT LOAN RECOVERY (REVOLVING FUND)(From 1990 to 1996 as of 30TH. June 1997)

DevelopedPremeter

CommulativeLoan Issued(D)

CommulativeRepaymentAmount (D)

Repayment%

Current Balance(D)

Saruja No. 1 46,385.91 22,225.76 48 24,160.15Saruja No.2 141,009.73 53,015.57 38 87,994.16Kerewan Mandinka 2 42,611.29 15,887.76 37 26,723.51Wellingara Musa 52,820.90 6,415.08 12 46,405.82S/Kunda Pump No. 1 273,402.85 105,274.41 39 168,128.44S/Kunda Pump No. 2 106,375.15 21,573.26 20 84,801.89S/Kunda PumpNo.3 97,192.55 11,280.48 12 85,912.07S/Kunda Ous./Bakary 7,206.06 5,614.90 78 1,591.16S/Kunda Chinese 2B 7,087.91 5,990.40 85 1,097.51S/Kunda Aerea 4 5,996.31 3,044.10 51 2,952.21Nema Kemo Fatty 125,858.32 91,819.94 73 34,038.38Nema East 68,807.76 0.00 - 68,807.76Nema Kartong Fatty 5,455.96 1,255.00 23 4,200.96Nema Sulayman Lay 11,966.83 11,413.63 95 553.20Tabanani Chinese 2B 31,889.50 17,259.50 54 14,630.00Tabanani Kebba Lay 14,270.82 8,185.82 57 6,085.00Tabanani Pump 1 160,012.93 49,709.00 31 110,303.93Bansang/ Bantanto 186,373.56 58,627.10 31 127,746.46Bansang North 1&2 135,839.45 84,356.31 62 51,483.14Dobang Kunda(Old)

7,125.00 4,492.90 63 2,632.10

Dobang Kunda NewFld.

106,461.89 0.00 - 106,461.89

Boraba (Women Soc.) 518.00 0.00 - 518.00Buruko Chinese 8,458.09 4,446.17 53 4,011.92Buruko/Korop 0.00 0.00 - 0.00Manna 3,540.68 0.00 - 3,540.68Banni 6,336.15 0.00 - 6,336.15Kunting 9,707.45 0.00 - 9,707.45Janjanbureh Complex 234,642.71 124,514.49 53 110,128.22Janjanbureh Prison 14,703.00 8,200.00 56 6,503.00Bansang Musa Badjie 1,055.00 0.00 - 1,055.00KTR Whart Town 2,580.00 0.00 - 2,580.00Brajally Alimameh 30,008.02 13,475.00 45 16,533.02Kesere Kunda 15,096.50 6,000.58 40 9,095.92Total (D) 1,960,796.29 734,077.18 37 1,226,719.11Total (UA) 148,545.17 55,611.91 37 92,933.27

1 UA = Dalasi 13.2

Annex 14

LIST OF EQUIPMENT

ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION NUMBER OF UNITS WORKINGCONDITION-PCR

1 Tanker 1 Not Working2 Low Loader Trailer 1 Working3 Power Tiller 10 3 working4 Pump set 35 All in working

conditions5 Ricefan Threshe 17 8 in working condition6 Pick-Up 5 2 in working condition7 Tractor 4WD 5 2 in working condition8 Weighing Scales 7 4 in working condition9 Electric Stabiliser 5 3 in working condition10 Scraper 2 2 in working condition11 Pedal Thresher 5 3 in working condition12 Motor Cycle 14 5 in working condition13 Station Wagon 4WD 2 1 in working condition14 Disc Harrow 4 4 in working condition15 Concrete Mixer 2 2 in working condition16 Concrete Vibrator 1 Not working17 Excavator 1 Not working18 Generators 7 2 in working condition19 Truck 1 In –working condition20 Bulldozer 1 In working condition21 Compactors 2 Not working22 Levelling Crane 1 Not working

Annex 15

List of Sources of Information

1. Project Preparation Report, FAO/IC. July 1986

2. Staff Appraisal Repot Of Rice Development Project, October, 1987

3. Project files at PMU in Sapu and at the Bank

4. Supervision Reports, Aide Memoires, back to office reports, etc

5. Bi- annual and annual progress and status reports where available

6. RDP: Status Report, Mascot. June 1994

7. RDP: End of Assignment Report, Project Manager, Mascot, June 1995

8. RDP: End of Assignment Report, Construction Engineer, May 1995

9. RDP: Government Project Completion Report

10. RDP: Inception Report, Mascot, May 1990

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