Reprinted from AMERICAN Psychologist, Vol. 40. No. 3, March 1985Printed in U. S. A.

The Social Constructionist Movementin Modern Psychology

Kenneth J. Gergen - Swarthmore College

March 1985 - American PsychologistCopyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association Inc. 0003-066X/85/500.75Vol. 40. No. 3, 266-275

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ABSTRACT: Social constructionism views discourseabout the world not as a reflection or map of theworld but as an artifact of communal interchange.Both as an orientation to knowledge and to thecharacter of psychological constructs, constructionismforms a significant challenge to conventional under-standings. Although the roots of constructionistthought may be traced to long-standing debatesbetween empiricist and rationalist schools of thought,constructionism attempts to move beyond the dualismto which both of these traditions are committed andto place knowledge within the process of socialinterchange. Although the role of psychological ex-planation is rendered problematic, a fully developedconstructionism could furnish a means for under-standing the process of science and invites the devel-opment of alternative criteria for the evaluation ofpsychological inquiry.

This article attempts to bring into focus the centralcontours of a contemporary movement of challengingimplication. It would be misleading to say eitherthat the movement is of recent origin or that itsproponents are legion. The roots of the movementmay properly be traced to earlier eras, and onemight prefer to speak of a shared consciousnessrather than a movement. However, in its currentmetamorphosis this emerging body of thought con-tains implications of substantial significance. Notonly are broad vistas of inquiry opened for study,but the foundations of psychological knowledge alsoare thrown into critical relief. When the implicationsare fully elaborated, it becomes apparent that thestudy of social process could become generic forunderstanding the nature of knowledge itself. Socialpsychology would not stand, in this case, as aderivative of general psychology. Rather, the latterwould be viewed as a form of social process, both

the grounds and outcomes’ of which stand to beelucidated by social inquiry. In similar fashion,epistemological inquiry along with the philosophyof science could both give way, or become subsumedby, social inquiry. These are indeed bold conjectures,and as we shall see, to make good on them mayrequire relinquishing much that is sacred. However,

it is the plausibility of these conjectures that I hopeto demonstrate in this article while simultaneouslyclarifying the contours and origins of the socialconstructionist movement.(1)

The Social Constructionist Orientation

Social constructionist inquiry is principally con-cerned with explicating the processes by which peoplecome to describe, explain, or otherwise account forthe world (including themselves) in which they live.lt attempts to articulate common forms of under-standing as they now exist, as they have existed inprior historical periods, and as they might existshould creative attention be so directed. At themetatheoretical level most such work manifests oneor more of the following assumptions.

1. What we take to be experience of the worlddoes not in itself dictate the terms by which theworld is understood. What we take to be knowledgeof the world is not a product of induction, or of thebuilding and testing of general hypotheses. Themounting criticism of the positivist-ernpiricist con-ception of knowledge has severely damaged thetraditional view that scientific theory serves to reflector map reality in any direct or decontextualizedmanner (cf. Feyerabend, 1976; Hanson, 1958; Kuhn,1962/1970; Quine, 1960; Taylor, 1971). How cantheoretical categories be induced or derived fromobservation, it is asked, if the process of identifyingobservational attributes itself relies on one’s possess-ing categories? How can theoretical categories mapor reflect the world if each definition used to link

- - - - -This article is an elaboration of an invited address to Divisions 8and 24 delivered at the annual meeting of the American Psycho-logical Association, Anaheim, California, September 1983.Requests for reprints should be sent to Kenneth J. Gergen,Department of Psychology, Swarthrnore College, Swarthmore,Pennsylvania 19081.- - -(1) Although the term constructivism is also used in referring

to the same movement (cf. Watzlawick. 1984), this term is alsoused in reference to Piagetian theory, to a form of perceptualtheory, and to a significant movement in 20th century art. Theterm construtionism avoids these various confusions and enablesa linkage to be retained to Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) seminalvolume, The Social Construction of Reality.

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category and observation itself requires a definition?How can words map reality when the major con-straints over word usage are furnished by linguisticcontext? How is it possible to determine whethercompeting theories refer to the same entities, withoutreference to some other theory not contained inthose under comparison? lf each theoretical propo-sition depends for its intelligibility on an array ofrelated propositions, what aspect of the propositionalnetwork would be challenged by a disconfirmationof any single proposition? These and other tellingquestions have largely gone unanswered, and thelack of answers has let the empirical sciences withouta viable logic of justification (Weimer, 1979). Running counterpoint with this developingdoubt has been a steadily intensifying concern withthe constraints over understanding engendered bylinguistic convention. Wittgenstein’s (1963) Philo-sophical Investigations must be viewed as seminalin this regard. By asking such questions as wheredoes an individual feel grief or happiness, could aperson have a profound feeling in one second, andcan the features of hope be described, Wittgensteinbrought into poignant clarity the extent to whichthe use of mental predicates is convention bound.His work has served to inspire an impressive arrayof philosophic studies into the linguistic constraintsgoverning the use of such concepts as mind (Ryle,1949), intention (Anscombe, 1976), sense data (Aus-tin, 1962b), and motivation (Peters, 1958). Suchinquiry has also elucidated a variety of importantproblems created through the reification of thelanguage. In effect, many classic problems both inpsychology and philosophy appear to be products oflinguistic entanglement; with clarity concerning thenature and functions of the language the problemsmay often be decomposed.

Social constructionism has been nurtured bythe soil of such discontent. It begins with radicaldoubt in the taken-for-granted world-whether in

the sciences or daily life - and in a specialized wayacts as a form of social criticism. Constructionismasks one to suspend belief that commonly acceptedcategories or understandings receive their warrantthrough observation. Thus, it invites one to challengethe objective basis of conventional knowledge. Forexample, in Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) investi-gation of the social construction of gender, theattempt is made to break down the seemingly in-corrigible fact that there are two genders. By exam-ining the variations in the way differing cultures andsubcultural groups understand gender, the referentsfor the terms man and woman are obscured. Possi-bilities are opened for alternative means of under-standing gender differences or of abandoning suchdistinctions altogether. In Averill‘s (1982) extensivework on emotion one is forced to question the

assumption that anger is a biological state of theorganism and is invited to consider it as a historicallycontingent social performance. Sarbin (1984) ex-tended this line of thinking to the entire array ofemotional terms. Emotions are not objects “outthere” to be studied, ventured Sarbin; emotionterms acquire their meaning not from real-worldreferents but from their context of usage.Similar kinds of critiques have been launchedagainst the taken-for-granted character of suicide(Atkinson, 1977), beliefs (Needham, 1972), schizo-phrenia (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980), altruism (Gergen& Gergen, 1983), psychological disorder (Garfinkel,1967), childhood (Kessen, 1979)-, domestic violence(Greenblat, 1983), menopause (McCrea, 1983), andsituational causes (Gergen & Gergen, 1982). In eachcase, the objective criteria for identifying such “be-haviors,” “events,” or “entities” are shown to beeither highly circumscribed by culture, history, orsocial context or altogether nonexistent.

2. The terms in which the world is understoodare social artifacts, products of historically situatedinterchanges among people. From the constructionistposition the process of understanding is not auto-matically driven by the forces of nature, but is theresult of an active, cooperative enterprise of personsin relationship. In this light, inquiry is invited intothe historical and cultural bases of various forms ofworld construction. For example, historical investi-gation has revealed broad historical variations in theconcept of the child (Aries, 1962), of romantic love

(Averill, 1985), of mother’s love (Badinter, 1980),and of self (Verhave & van Hoorne, 1984). In eachcase constructions of the person or relationshipshave undergone significant change across time. Incertain periods childhood was not considered aspecialized phase of development, romantic andmaternal love were not components of humanmakeup, and the self was not viewed as isolated andautonomous. Such changes in conception do notappear to reflect alterations in the objects or entitiesof concern but seem lodged in historically contingentfactors. Ethnographic study yields much the sameconclusion. Conceptions of psychological processdiffer markedly from one culture to another (seeHeelas & Lock’s 1981 edited volume). Accounts ofemotion among the Ifaluk (Lutz, 1982), of identityamong the Trobrianders (Lee, 1959), of knowledgeamong the Illongot (Rosaldo, 1980), and of the selfamong the Maori (Smith, 1981) all serve as challengesto the ontology of mind in contemporary Westernculture. They invite us to consider the social originsof taken-for-granted assumptions about the mind-such as the bifurcation between reason and emotion,the existence of motives and memories, and thesymbol system believed to underlie language. Theydirect our attention to the social, moral, political,

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and economic institutions that sustain and are sup-ported by current assumptions about human activity.

Constructionist inquiry has further been di-rected to the axioms or fundamental propositionsunderlying descriptions of persons in present-daysociety (Davis &. Todd, 1982; Gergen, 1984a; Ossario,1978; Semin & Chassein, in press; Shotter & Burton,1983; Smedslund, 1978). It is first asked whetherthe folk models of mind within a culture necessarilydetermine or constrain the conclusions reachedwithin the profession. How can the psychologist stepoutside cultural understandings and continue to“make sense”? Further, it is asked, are there genericrules governing accounts of human action fromwhich common conventions are derived? Such workis of special interest as it begins to outline thepossible constraints over what psychological researchcan say. If it is possible to isolate propositions orassumptions grounding discourse about persons, thenwe are furnished with a basis for understandingwhat psychological theory must say if it is to be

reasonable or communicable.

3. The degree to which a given form of under-standing prevails or is sustained across time is notfundamentally dependent on the empirical validityof the perspective in question, but on the vicissitudesof social processes (e.g., communication, negotiation,conflict, rhetoric). As proposed in this case, perspec-tives, views, or descriptions of persons can be retainedregardless of variations in their actual conduct.Regardless of the stability or repetition of conduct,perspectives may be abandoned as their intelligibilityis questioned within the community of interlocutors.Observation of persons, then, is questionable as acorrective or guide to descriptions of persons. Rather,the rules for “what counts as what” are inherentlyambiguous, continuously evolving, and free to varywith the predilections of those who use them. Onthese grounds, one is even led to query the conceptof truth. ls the major deployment of the term truthprimarily a means for warranting one’s own positionand discrediting contenders for intelligibility (Gergen,1984b)?

In this vein, Sabini and Silver (1982) havedemonstrated how people manage the definition ofmorality in relationships. Whether an act is definedas envy, flirtaton, or anger floats on a sea of socialinterchange. Interpretation may be suggested, fas-tened upon, and abandoned as social relationshipsunfold across time. In the same way, Mummendeyand her colleagues (Mummendey, Bonewasser,Loschper, & Linneweber, 1982) have shown howdecisions are reached as to whether an action con-stitutes aggression. Thus, aggression ceases to existas a fact in the world and becomes a labeling devicefor social control. Other investigators (cf. Cantor &Brown, 1981; Harré, 1981; Lalljee, 1981) have dis-

cussed social negotiation processes underlying theattribution of causality to persons’ actions. Earlierwork on self-identity (Gergen, 1977) has focused onthe manner in which self-definition is realigned overtime as social circumstances are altered. Commu-nications specialists Pearce and Cronen (1980) haveoutlined a general theory for the negotiation ofreality. Others have concentrated on the family(Reiss, 1981) and the media (Adoni & Mane, 1984)as they contribute to prevailing forms of interpre-tation.

Much this same line of thinking has beenincreasingly employed by historians and sociologistsof science to understand scientific conduct. Forexample, Mendelsohn (1977) has argued that theepistemological assumptions of modern science weredeveloped largely as a means of gaining social control.Bohme (1977) has discussed the informal rules usedwithin scientific communities to determine whatthey count as facts. Investigators such as Latour andWoolgar (1979) and Knorr-Cetina (1981) have car-ried out participant observation in natural sciencelaboratories - much as anthropologists exploringtribal customs. As they contend, what passes for“hard fact” in the natural sciences typically dependson a subtle but potent array of social microprocesses.ln effect, the move is from an experiential to asocial epistemology (Campbell, 1969; Sullivan, 1984).

4. Forms of negotiated understanding are ofcritical significance in social life, as they are integrallyconnected with many other activities in which peopleengage. Descriptions and explanations of the worldthemselves constitute forms of social action. As suchthey are intertwined with the full range of otherhuman activities. The opening, “Hello, how. areyou?” is typically accompanied by a range of facialexpressions, bodily postures, and movements withoutwhich the expression could seem artificial, if notaberrant. In the same way, descriptions and expla-nations form integral parts of various social patterns.They thus serve to sustain and support certainpatterns to the exclusion of others. To alter descrip-tion and explanation is thus to threaten certainactions and invite others. To construct persons insuch a way that they possess inherent sin is to invitecertain lines of action and not others. Or to treatdepression, anxiety, or fear as emotions from whichpeople involuntarily suffer is to have far differentimplications than to treat them as chosen, selected,or played out as on a stage.

It is in this vein that many investigators havebeen concerned with the prevailing images or met-aphors of human action employed within the fieldof psychology. Queries have been raised over thebroad social implications of viewing persons asmachines (Shorter, 1975), as self-contained individ-uals (Sampson, 1977, 1983), or as economic bar-

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gainers in social relations (Weider, 1983). Attackshave also been levied against the damaging effectson children of the prevailing constructions of thechild’s mind (Walkerdine, 1984), the sexism implicitin investigation that assumes the superiority ofuniversal principles in moral decision making (Gil-ligan, 1982), the effects of theories of cognitivemechanism in their implicit unconcern with materialcircumstances in society (Sampson, 1981), and theanomic effects of psychological assessment in orga-nizations (Hollway, 1984).

Social Constructionism in Historical Perspective

The significance of the constructionist movement ismore fully appreciated against the backdrop ofhistory. Although a full treatment of the relevantbackground is beyond the scope of this article, itdoes prove useful to understand constructionism inrelation to two major and competing intellectualtraditions. These traditions can largely be distin-guished in terms of basic epistemological orientationsor models of knowledge. On the one hand, thinkerssuch as Locke, Hume, the Mills, and various logicalempiricists in the present century have traced thesource of knowledge (as mental representation) toevents in the real world. Knowledge copies (orshould ideally copy) the contours of the world. Thisexagenic perspective (Gergen, 1982) thus tends toview knowledge as a pawn to nature. Proper knowl-edge maps or mirrors the actualities of the realworld. In contrast, philosophers such as Spinoza,Kant, Nietzsche, and various phenomenologists havetended to adopt an endogenic perspective regardingthe origins of knowledge. In this case, knowledgedepends on processes (sometimes viewed as innate)endemic to the organism. Humans harbor inherenttendencies, it is said, to think, categorize, or processinformation, and it is these tendencies (rather thanfeatures of the world in itself) that are of paramountimportance in fashioning knowledge.

The exogenic—endogenic antinomy has alsoplayed a major role in the history of psychologicaltheory. As I have outlined elsewhere (Gergen, 1982),early German theorists often wrestled in vain withmeans of cementing the two perspectives. The at-tempt of classical psychophysical research to plotthe precise relationship between external and intemalworlds is but one case in point. As psychology

developed in the United States, guided as it was byboth pragmatist and positivist philosophy, it took ona strong exogenic character. Behaviorism (along withneobehaviorism) placed (and continues to place) themajor determinants of human activity in the envi-ronment. If the organism is to adapt successfully, itis claimed, its knowledge must adequately representor reflect that environment. Until recently the en-

dogenic perspective failed to flourish on Americansoil. A handful of Gestalt psychologists, with theiremphasis on autochthonous tendencies of perceptualorganization,'and a stalwart band of phenomenolo-gists virtually prevented the orientation from other-wise perishing.

Yet, within the past two decades we have wit-nessed what appears to be a major reversal inemphasis. The endogenic perspective has returnedin full force in the guise of cognitive psychology.The seeds for this evolution in social psychologywere planted by Kurt Lewin, whose central concernwith the psychological field was essentially a holdoverfrom continental rationalism. In the hands of hisstudents this emphasis reinstituted itself in suchconcepts as social (as opposed to physical) reality(Festinger, 1954), the social comparison process(Festinger, l954), motivated perception (Pepitone,1949), emotions as perceived (Schachter, 1964), andcognitive dissonance (Festingeir, 1957). The centralityof this work in social psychology also served to honethe sensibilities of subsequent generations of re-searchers. Concerns with logical inference, cognitiveschemata, information storage and retrieval, andcognitive heuristics have all extended the Lewinianpremise: Human action is critically dependent onthe cognitive processing of information, that is, onthe world as cognized rather than the world as it is.Of course, much the same shift in explanatoryemphasis has taken place within psychology moregenerally. The contours of the “cognitive revolution”are widely recognized.

Yet, it is my view that in spite of the richnessof conceptualization and the profundity of its heri-tage, the endogenic perspective has not yet achievedfull ascendency - nor can it in principle. There ismuch to be said on this account, but again a briefsketch is necessitated. First, cognitivism has notyet - neither in social psychology nor in psychology

more generally - overturned the exogenic perspectivebecause the exogenic perspective forms the metathe-oretical basis of the science itself. That is, thecontemporary conception of psychological science isa by-product of empiricist or exogenic philosophy - committed as it has been to rendering an accountof objective knowledge of the world. The experimen-tal psychologist thus sets out to employ methods forestablishing objective knowledge about cognitiveprocesses. To the extent that the investigator claimsto achieve an accurate representation of the world(thus rendering support for exogenics), it threatensthe view that it is the world as represented (cognized)rather than the world in itself which is of importance.In seeking objective truth (that which is true inde-pendent of subjective appraisal) the cognitive re-searcher thus denigrates the importance of the veryprocesses he or she seeks to elucidate. The exogenic

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basis of the scientific activity undermines the validityof the endogenic theories under examination.

Nor, would it seem, can cognitivism ultimatelyachieve hegemony in psychological discourse. Thismay be anticipated in part by the example furnishedby the history of the philosophy of knowledge. Thishistory has been one of continuous and unresolveddisputation between exogenic (or empiricist, in thiscontext) and endogenic (rationalist, idealist, phe-nomenological) thinkers. Essentially, the history ofthe philosophy of knowledge can largely be writtenin terms of a continuous series of pendulum swings.We have witnessed the conflict between Plato’s pureforms of knowledge. versus Aristotle’s concern withthe role of sensory experience; between the authoritygranted to experience by Bacon, Locke, and Humeversus the rational capacities granted to the mindby Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant; between the em-phasis placed by Schopenhauer and Nietzche on willand passion in the generation of knowledge, and theattempts of logical positivists to ground all knowledgein observables. What is to prevent the same historicaltrajectory in psychology? We have most recentlywitnessed in the cognitive revolution a shift from anexogenic to an endogenic perspective. As the inherentflaws of cognitivism are once again revealed infuture psychological work, are we again to anticipatea retum to some form of (suitably enlightened)environmentalism? (Gibsonian affordance theory

[Gibson, 1979] may already be foreshadowing thenew swing.) And such problems are sure to emerge.For example, when cognitivism is extended to itsnatural conclusion it reverts into an unhappy andunacceptable solipsism. And, cognitivism remainsperennially unable to resolve such thorny problemsas the origin of ideas or concepts and the mannerin which cognitions influence behavior (cf. Gergen,1985). Compelling explanations for how cognitionscould either be “built up" from experience or ge-netically programmed remain to be fashioned. Norhave theorists been able to solve the Cartesiandilemma of explaining how “mind stuff” can influ-ence or dictate discrete bodily movements.It is against this backdrop that one can appre-ciate the emergence of social constructionism. Ratherthan recapitulating yet again the movement of thependulum, the challenge (for many) has been totranscend the traditional subject-object dualism andall its attendant problems (cf. Rorty, 1979) and todevelop a new framework of analysis based on analternative (nonempiricist) theory of the functioningand potentials of science. This movement begins inearnest when one challenges the concept of knowl-edge as mental representation. Given the myriad ofinsolubles to which such a concept gives rise, one ismoved to consider what passes as knowledge inhuman affairs. At least one major candidate is that

of linguistic rendering. We generally count as knowl-edge that which is represented in linguistic propo-sitions - stored in books, journals, floppy disks, andthe like. These renderings, to continue an earliertheme, are constituents of social practices. Fromthis perspective, knowledge is not something peoplepossess somewhere in their heads, but rather, some-thing people do together. Languages are essentiallyshared activities. Indeed, until the sounds or markingscome to be shared within a community, it is inap-propriate to speak of language at all. In effect, wemay cease inquiry into the psychological basis oflanguage (which account would inevitably form buta subtext or miniature language) and focus on theperformative use of language in human affairs.(2)

As we have seen, analyses of the social con-structionist variety have been devoted to such broadtopics as gender, aggression, mind, causality, person,

self, child, motivation, emotion, morality, and soon. Typically the concern has been with the languageforms that pervade the society, the means by whichthey are negotiated, and their implications for otherranges of social activity. In such endeavors socialpsychologists begin to join hands, as well, with anew range of disciplines. Rather than looking towardthe natural sciences and experimental psychologyfor kinship, an afiinity is rapidly sensed with a rangeof what may be termed interpretive disciplines, thatis, disciplines chiefly concerned with rendering ac-counts of human meaning systems (cf. Rabinow &Sullivan, 1979). On the most immediate level, socialconstructionist inquiry is conjoined with ethno-methodological work (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; Psathas,1979) with its emphasis on the methods employedby persons to render the world sensible, and withmuch dramaturgical analysis (cf. Goffman, 1959;Sarbin & Scheibe, 1983) and its focus on the strategicdeployment of social conduct. Similarly, treatmentsof the social basis of scientific knowledge, includingthe history and sociology of knowledge, becomerelevant (Knorr, Krohn, & Whitley, 1981; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983). Anthropological inquiryacquires a renewed interest for psychology. Of specialinterest is the work of symbolic anthropologistsconcerned with the construction of the world, in-cluding persons, developed in non-Western cultures(cf. Geertz, 1973; Shweder & Miller, 1985). Similarly,psychology gains a temporal dimension as its analysesbecome articulated with historical research in the

(2) If the emphasis is shifted, much cognitive research becomesrelevant to constructionist pursuits. Research on social prototypes,implied personality theory, attributional schemata, the concept ofintelligence, and the like do not, from the present standpoint,inform us about another world - namely, an internal, cognitiveone. Rather they might elucidate the nature of social discourseand thus raise interesting questions about the function of suchterms in scientific and social life.

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constructionist mode (Nowell-Smith, 1977; White,1978). And, psychology stands to gain much byopening consideration on literary theory, includingaccounts of metaphor (Lakolf & Johnson, 1980),narratology (Genette, 1980), and the deconstructionof meaning (Culler, 1982). Such work informs as tothe means by which various linguistic figures ortropes serve to organize or guide the attempt to“describe” reality.

Constructionism and the Problematics ofPsychological Explanation

Thus far we have considered grounding assumptionsof the constructionist orientation, along with itshistorical roots and contemporary emergence. Itremains now to touch upon the implications ofconstructionism both for the character of psycholog-ical inquiry and for the nature of science moregenerally. With regard to psychology the implicationsare far reaching, and many years will be requiredbefore they are fully explored. To appreciate thearguments at issue consider the typical constructionistanalysis of psychological processes or mechanisms.In Averill's (1982) hands the concept of anger islargely cut away from a deterministic physiology andbecomes a form of social role; anger as a term thusdoes not refer to a mental state but constitutes partof the role itself. In a related analysis (Mills, 1940),doubt is cast on the concept of motivation as aprimal power capable of moving people to action,and the focus shifts to people’s talk about theirmotives and its social implications. The mind (Coul-ter, 1979) becomes a form of social myth; the self-concept (Gergen, 1985) is removed from the headand placed within the sphere of social discourse. Ineach case, then, what have been taken by onesegment of the profession or another as “facts aboutthe nature of the psychological realm” are suspended;each concept (emotion, motive, etc.) is cut awayfrom an ontological base within the head and ismade a constituent of social process. In agreementwith Wittgenstein’s (1963) later analyses, one ceasesto view mental predicates as possessing a syntacticrelationship with a world of mental events; rather,as Austin (l962a) and other post-Wittgensteinianshave proposed, such terms are cashed out in termsof the social practices in which they function.

From this perspective, then, all psychologicaltheorizing and the full range of concepts that formthe grounds for research become problematic aspotential reflectors of an internal reality and becomethemselves matters of analytic interest. Professionalagreements become suspect; normalized beliefs be-come targets of demystification; “the truth" aboutmental life is rendered curious. Or, in a slightlydiiferent light, the contemporary views of the profes-sion on matters of cognition, motivation, perception,

information processing, and the like become candi-dates for historical and cross-cultural comparison.From the constructionist perspective they often con-stitute a form of ethnopsychology, historically andculturally situated, institutionally useful, normativelysustained, and subject to deterioration and decay associal history unfolds.

As is clear, constructionism will inevitably con-front strong resistance within psychology more gen-erally. lt forms a potential challenge to traditionalknowledge claims; psychological research itself isplaced in the uncomfortable position of a researchobject. Yet for social analysts the shift is one ofheady proportion. No longer would social inquiryconfront the threat of becoming a derivative enter-prise merely elaborating the social implications ofmore fundamental psychological processes. Rather,what is taken to be psychological process at the veryoutset becomes a derivative of social interchange.The explanatory locus of human action shifts fromthe interior region of the mind to the processes andstructure of human interaction. The question “why”is answered not with a psychological state or processbut with consideration of persons in relationship.Few are prepared for such a wrenching, conceptualdislocation. However, for the innovative, adventurousand resilient, the horizons are exciting indeed.

Constructionism and the Characterof Science

Although many will find it difficult to relinquish theuse of psychological mechanisms, structures, andprocesses as major explanatory vehicles, this lossmay be coupled with a challenge of no small con-sequence. The challenge is essentially that of grap-pling with a new conception of knowledge. Toappreciate the point it should be realized that prob-lems inherent in both the endo- and exogenic ori-entations are also deeply engrained in the contem-porary conception of scientific knowledge and itsacquisition. In particular, the empiricist assumptionsthat form the undergirding rationale for research inpsychology (and virtually all contemporary science)are drawn chiefly from the exogenic intellectualtradition. This orientation, with its emphasis onknowledge as an internal representation of the stateof nature, is manifestly apparent in the traditionalattempt to establish scientific knowledge throughprocesses of empirical verification and falsification.

However, if constructionism is to transcend theexogenic-endogenie antinomy, and the interminableconflict it has thus far spawned, then it must alsoeschew the empiricist account of scientific knowledge.As it abandons the subject-object dichotomy centralto disciplinary debate, so must it challenge dualismas the basis for a theory of scientific knowledge.What is confronted, then, is the traditional,

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Western conception of objective, individualistic,ahistoric knowledge - a conception that has insin-uated itself into virtually all aspects of moderninstitutional life. As this view is increasingly chal-lenged one must entertain the possibility of moldingan alternative scientific metatheory based on con-structionist assumptions. Such a metatheory wouldremove knowledge from the data-driven and/or thecognitively necessitated domains and place it in thehands of people in relationship. Scientific formula-tions would not on this account be the result of animpersonal application of decontextualized, meth-odological rules, but the responsibility of persons inactive, communal interchange.

Elsewhere, the contours of this emerging meta-theory have been referred to as sociorazionalist(Gergen, 1982; Gergen & Morawski, 1980). In thisview the locus of scientific rationality lies not withinthe minds of independent persons but within thesocial aggregate. That which is rational is the resultof negotiated intelligibility. For social thinkers thefurther development of the metatheory should be ofespecially high priority. For, if the character ofsociorationalist process is among the focal concernsof the social investigator, then the critical task ofunderstanding the generation and evolution ofknowledge falls centrally to scholars within the socialsphere. Much philosophic inquiry - including thephilosophy of science - thus falls subject to socialconstructionist analysis. To a certain degree philos-ophers of science are already aware of this prospect.In recent years philosophic inquiry into foundationsof scientific knowledge has waned. Confidence inempiricist assumptions has largely been eroded, andthere is no obvious contender on the horizon (Bern-stein, l978).(3) Such inquiry has become increasinglyreplaced by historical analysis. Kuhn’s (1962/1970)seminal treatise on revolutions in scientific knowledgeis essentially a historical account, and much subse-

quent discussion of rationality and progress in sciencehas largely proceeded on historical as opposed tophilosophic grounds. Such history is essentially social,and its elaboration requires close attention to pro-cesses of human interchange. It remains, however,for social analysts more generally to become awareof the pivotal position that they might legitimatelyoccupy.

Thus far feminist thinkers have been amongthose most acutely aware of such possibilities. Forfeminists, the empiricist orientation to knowledge

(3) Recent interest has been generated in a “realist” altemativeto empiricist metatheory (Bhaskar, 1978; Manicas & Secord,1983). However, although opposed to the Humean basis ofscientific explanation, realist philosophy of science shares withempiricism a range of fundamental assumptions. lt thus suffersfrom most of the criticisms lodged against empiricism.

has not generally been a congenial perspective-advocating as it does manipulation, suppression,and alienation of those one wishes to understand(Jaeger, 1983). Further, from the feminist perspective,empiricist science seems to have been oft employedby males to construct views of women that contributeto their subjugation (Bleier, 1984; Weisstein, 1971).Both the process and the products of empiricistscience have thus come under attack. As a resultmany feminists have searched for alternative formsof understanding - both of science and of otherhuman beings. Constructionism, because of its em-phasis on the communal basis of knowledge, pro-cesses of interpretation, and concern with the val-uational underpinnings of scientific accounts, hasbeen an attractive alternative. Thus, feminists havebeen frontrunners in employing interpretive researchstrategies (Acker, Barry, & Esseveld, 1983; Bowles,1984), documenting the scientific construction ofgender (Morawski, in press), demonstrating the prag-matic uses of constructionist inquiry (Sassen, 1980),and exploring the foundations for constructionistmetatheory (Unger, 1983).

Yet, the possibility of an alternative theory ofknowledge can hardly demand broad appeal. Theinvestments in and sense of security fostered by theenduring traditions are profound. Acute misgivingscan be anticipated within these circles regarding

criteria of knowledge and the companionate problemof appropriate methodology. Traditional ernpiricismholds experience to be the touchstone of objectivity;hypotheses are said to be confirmed or challengedby virtue of sense data. Yet, from the constructionistviewpoint, both the concepts of experience and sensedata are placed in question. From what grounds dothey derive their truth warrants? Are the so-called“reports of one’s experience” not linguistic con-structions guided and shaped by historically contin-gent conventions of discourse? Yet, although castingdoubt on the process of objective warranting, con-structionism offers no alternative truth criteria. Ac-counts of social construction cannot themselves bewarranted empirically. If properly executed. suchaccounts can enable one to escape the confines ofthe taken for granted. They may emancipate onefrom the demands of convention. However, thesuccess of such accounts depends primarily on theanalyst’s capacity to invite, compel, stimulate, ordelight the audience, and not on criteria of veracity.Required, then, are alternative criteria for evaluatingknowledge claims-criteria that might reasonablytake into account existing needs for systems ofintelligibility, limitations inherent in existing con-structions, along with a range of political, moral,aesthetic, and practical considerations.

By the same token, social constructionism offersno “truth through method.” In large degree the

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sciences have been enchanted by the myth that theassiduous application of rigorous method will yieldsound fact - as if empirical methodology were someform of meat grinder from which truth could beturned out like so many sausages. Yet, as analystssuch as Quine, Taylor, Hanson, and Feyerabend haveshown, such enchantment is of doubtful merit.Previous security is without firm foundation. Forone seeking such security social constructionismwill scarcely be palatable. Yet this is not to implythat constructionism eschews investigative methods.Whether rendering the conduct of organisms intel-ligible or demystifying existing forms of understand-ing, research methods can be used to produce “ob-jectifications” or illustrations useful in advancingthe pragmatic consequences of one’s work. In thissense it would seem that virtually any methodologycan be employed so long as it enables the analyst to

develop a more compelling case. Although somemethods may hold the allure of large samples, otherscan attract because of their purity, their sensitivityto nuance, or their ability to probe in depth. Suchassets do not thereby increase the “objective validity”of the resulting constructions. However, like vividphotographs or startling vignettes drawn from dailylife, when well wrought they may add vital powerto the pen.

Others may eschew the constructionist orien-tation for what appears to be its rampant relativism.Yet, as we have seen, the attempts to justify objectivefoundations for knowledge have yet to furnish reasonfor optimism. One might well argue that the scien-tist’s claims to privileged knowledge have served asmystifying devices within the society more generally.Constructionism offers no foundational rules ofwarrant and in this sense is relativistic. However,this does not mean that “anything goes.” Becauseof the inherent dependency of knowledge systemson communities of shared intelligibility, scientificactivity will always be governed in large measure bynormative rules. However, constructionism does in-vite the practitioners to view these rules as historicallyand culturally situated - thus subject to critique andtransformation. There is stability of understandingwithout the stultification of foundationalism. Further,unlike the moral relativism of the empiricist tradi-tion, constructionism reasserts the relevance of moralcriteria for scientific practice. To the extent thatpsychological theory (and related practices) enterinto the life of the culture, sustaining certain patternsof conduct and destroying others, such work mustbe evaluated in terms of good and ill. The practitionercan no longer justify any socially reprehensibleconclusion on the grounds of being a “victim of thefacts”; he or she must confront the pragmatic im-plications of such conclusions within society moregenerally.

Should the challenge of developing an alternativemetatheory be accepted, a variety of interestingchanges may be anticipated in the character ofprofessional life. The problem of forging a compellingaccount of the social genesis of knowledge is notinconsequential. New theoretical tools are required-concepts that lie between the problematic explanatorydomains of psychology and sociology. The functionsof language, both as a system of reference and as aform of social participation must be elaborated. Ageneral account must be furnished of the social

dimensions of natural science, social science, andphilosophy. The demarcation (if any) between scienceand nonscience must be carefully examined. Theextent to which scientific accounts may be (if ever)corrected or modified through observation must beassessed. In effect, an array of challenging problemswill be confronted, problems that are essentiallyconceptual rather than empirical. For such tasksdialogue is essential between psychologists and like-minded colleagues in sociology, anthropology, history,philosophy, and literary studies. Should such dialogueoccur, we might reasonably anticipate the develop-ment of new theoretical departures, metatheory fora new conception of science, and a general refur-bishment of intellectual resources.