Repressed Democracy R. Kreide

7/28/2019 Repressed Democracy R. Kreide

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ISSN 2250-8619

Vol. I N 1 (2012) pp. 1-34

REPRESSED DEMOCRACY:

LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS IN WORLD SOCIETY

Regina KReide

Justus Liebig University Giessen

Resumen

La democracia parece ya no ser autoevidente. Colin Crouch yotros autores describen un creciente sentido de alienacin en lapoltica: las instituciones y procedimientos democrticos podranestar trabajando adecuadamente, pero podran promover valoresno democrticos tales como la tecnocracia, la oligarqua, el elitis-

mo. Para los ciudadanos, solo persiste una ilusin de democracia.Este artculo argumenta que el debilitamiento de la democracia enla prctica espeja el desvanecimiento de la democracia en la teorapoltica y la losoa. Podramos enrentar una crisis de la polti-ca democrtica como resultado de una crisis de la teora democr-tica. La teoras predominantes de la democracia no consiguen, en

su mayora, refejar adecuadamente las condiciones sociales cam-biantes en las sociedades democrticas ni orecer una concepcin dela poltica democrtica que pueda abordar los actuales dcits delegitimidad. Este artculo discute enoques tericos destacados (teo-ra ideal vs. realismo; consenso vs. teora del desacuerdo) y sostieneque todas tienen dicultades para conceptualizar posibles recursos

para la democratizacin que sean adecuados para las condiciones yproblemas contemporneos. Una nueva versin de teora poltica esesbozada y deendida. Se trata de una teora que se construye sobreuna redenida nocin de soberana democrtica y poder comunica-tivo, lo bastante compleja como para refejar la realidad sociolgica

de la poltica actual e ir ms all del ormalismo de la democracia.

Palabras clave: democracia radical, legitimidad, poder comunicativo,represin, lo poltico


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2 R. KReide -Repressed Democracy Repressed Democracy - R. KReide 3Vol. I N 1 (2012) Vol. I N 1 (2012)

AbstRAct

Democracy seems to be no longer sel-evident. Colin Crouch andothers describe a growing sense o alienation in politics: democraticinstitutions and procedures may be working properly, yet they

themselves promote non-democratic values such technocracy,oligarchy, elitism. For the citizens, only an illusion o democracypersists. The article argues that the weakening o democracy inpractice mirrors the vanishing o democracy in political theory andphilosophy. We may ace a crisis o democratic politics as a result o a

crisis o democratic theory. Predominant theories o democracy ail,or the most part, to adequately refect the changing social conditionsin democratic societies and to oer a conception o democraticpolitics that would address current legitimacy decits. The articlediscusses prominent theoretical approaches (idealist theory vs.

realism; consensus vs. Dissent theory) and points out that all havediculties conceptualizing possible resources or democratizationadequate to contemporary issues and conditions. A new version opolitical theory is outlined and deended, such that builds upon a

redened notion o democratic sovereignty and communicativepower, complex enough to refect the sociological reality o todays

politics and to reach beyond the institutionalized and ormalizedsetting o democracy.

Key words: radical democracy, legitimacy, communicative power,repression, the political

Democracy seems to be no longer sel-evident. Colin Crouch

and others describe a growing alienation in politics: global

neo-liberal politics has lead to a colonisation o state insti-

tutions by lites which represent private economic interests.

Democratic institutions and procedures may be working pro-

perly but important decisions are taken behind closed doors,

domestically and, to huge extent, internationally (Crouch

2004). For the citizens, only an illusion o democracy persists.

On the other hand, citizens in Europe and elsewhere seem

to be ar rom being politically demotivated. We witness mass

protests in many European cities, riots in London, and revolts

in Northern Arica. It is sae to say that, besides all context-

specic dierences, what these uprisings have in common is

that citizens are reclaiming political sel-determination. In a

period o time in which the euphoric ideas o global democracy

were long gone and the global nancial and economic crisis is

in ull swing, the citizen is back on the stage.

So we are conronted with two developments which at rstglance aim in dierent directions: the repression o democra-

cy, on the one hand, and the subversion o the existing politi-

cal systems (be they democratic or non-democratic) through

political action, on the other. Democracy seems to be both in

decline and to rise rom death at the same time. But questions

come up. Are protests, riots, and revolts democratic? And what

notion o democracy, i any at all, can be deended with a view

to these developments? Do we even need to think against all

odds o transnational democracy or at least o transnational

democratization? And what conception o political philosophyis appropriately equipped to avoid the pessimistic decline o

democracy?

My starting assumption here is that democracy is not only

under pressure in political practice but that it is marginalized

in political theory and philosophy as well. The weakening o

democracy in practice mirrors, in my view, the vanishing o

democracy in theory. The eclipse o democracy has many aces:

democracy or a globalised world, it is said, is declared as being

normatively too demanding, with no institutional backing

in reality; it is lampooned as not being very ecient and is

theoretically watered down to technical ruling, or reduced to

accountability, or transormed into rational deliberation -the

list o reservations towards democracy has grown long. But

are the reservations justied? In this paper, I want to argue

that they are not, and, moreover, that they neither meet the

empirical reality, nor the appropriate normative standards.

The point I wish to highlight in the rst section o this

paper is that some o the predominant theories or the most

part either ail to refect the changing social and political con-


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ditions adequately or ail to oer a concept o legitimate demo-

cracy that overcomes its current decits, or sometimes even

both. To overcome some o the prevailing decits (undoubtedly

not all o them), I argue in a second section that we should start

with two lines o argumentation: First, I think that, despite

the many diculties that democracy aces, we need to expand

the notion o democracy rather than minimalize it. I deend arenewed conception o radical democracy, which is based upon

communicative power and includes protests and other orms

o resistance. Second, a theory o democracy should be based

upon an international social theory. It is not reestanding, to

use a Rawlsian term, in the sense that it can be legitimized

without a systematically reerence to social conditions. Ins-

tead, a theory o radical democracy needs to link up with an

analysis o the social and political obstacles to political parti-

cipation. It is only then that theory regains its grip upon the

reality o democratization. I will conclude by deending thisapproach against some objections.

1. Four (not so convincing) answers to globalisation

Criticism o democracy is not new. The idea o democracy

has been under attack since its very early appearance. Plato

deended the leadership o the best and had strong reser-

vations against the Aristotelian idea o the authority o the

masses. The masses -he thought- would be easy to manipula-

te because o a lack o competent political judgement caused

by educational decits and the hardship o daily work (Plato,

Politeia). For Hobbes, democracy was a potentially dangerousidea, as people who know more about becoming rich, rather

than gaining knowledge, spur other people to revolt instead

o governing them (Hobbes 1982). And or Carl Schmitt, the

ongoing democratic dispute threatens the homogenous ethnic-

nationalist community o the people (Schmitt 2009). Besides

this critique which questions democracy in general, there has

always been criticism that addresses the weak perormance o

democracy. Schumpeter, or example, stressed the de-unctio-

nalities o popular democracy and stressed the advantages o

a model o democracy that serves not the common interest but

the selection o the lite. And Crouchs dark diagnosis leads to

the invocation to strengthen vigilant public spheres and alter-

native lobby work in order to infuence the political systemanew and rom another side.

What is new in Crouchs study and what is interesting or

our questions here is that he starts o rom the assumption

that we undeniably live in a world-society, an almost global

society in which transnational and highly-dierentiated,

administrative-technical networks o globally-operating eco-

nomic lites strongly determine global and national politics

(Brunkhorst 2009: 11).

Through this change in perspective, rom society to world

society, some threats to democracy come to the ore. Firstly,not only the economic and nancial crisis, but also climate

change and other global risks create the need or transnatio-

nal action and regulation, but the state-ramed democratic

embeddedness o decision-making alls short. Secondly, there

is an erosion o national sovereignty through transnational

governance and the globalisation o law and politics. Expert

committees, international organizations, and global corpora-

tions substitute the will o the people and legitimate private

international law and other regulations. And thirdly, modern

societies are characterized by a plurality o values, and deep

conficts and divisions. The subject o democracy, the popular

sovereign will, can never be homogeneous and create unity.

In other words, we are conronted with changes which

endanger the basic elements o democracy: the present demo-

cratic and state-based representational system becomes

increasingly powerless; citizens are aected by decisions and

rules o which they are not the authors; and the demos (the

people) is becoming more plural, domestically as well as glo-

bally. But how does political theory refect on these problems,


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and what is the role o democracy? I will discuss our promi-

nent approaches which all have diculties in identiying the

possible resources o democratization in world society.

1.1. Governance theory

One approach in particular in political theory has gained a

wide currency in political science and can be subscribed with

the container notion o governance theory. Even though

the notion o governance embraces everything that has to do

with regulation in the broadest sense, it can be dened a

little more precise by reerring to the American sociologist

Talcott Parsons to whom this strand o theory can be traced.

Governance theories describe society as being steered not so

much through concrete actors, as being mediated through

social systems. These systems are integrated through unctio-nalist requirements, which emerge in dierent societal areas,

such as economy, law, and politics (Parsons 1971). This way

to describe societal processes became prominent not just in

sociology but also in economic theory o transaction. Oliver

Williamson denes governance as the way o describing rules

and their enorcement in economic processes. What happened

was that since then, governance came to mean ecient regu-

lation. Political scientists, including Ouchi, Schmitter, Powell,

and Hollingworth, expanded this concept and added the regu-

lation o clans, associations, and networks, all o which can be

ound in the economy as well (Ouchi 1980; Streek and Sch-

mitter 1985; Powell 1990). Then, with globalisation-reaches

theory, the meaning o governance brought with it an enor-

mous advantage. It oers the tools not just to ocus on regu-

lations both within and between states, but also between the

traditional global players and non-state actors, such as trans-

national corporations, international organisations and NGOs

(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). This changed the meaning o

hierarchy within governance. Instead o analysing the hori-

zontal power relation o the institutions o the state and its

citizens, global governance theories claim to identiy non-hie-

rarchical, vertical relations between states, transnational ins-

titutions and non-governmental organisations (Hritier 2002).

Within a political setting in which, or example, the allocation

o common goods (water, healthcare, education) is at stake,

governance theories, the state (and the citizens) appear as oneactor among others (private companies, lobby groups, mem-

bers o trade unions, and so on).

This may sound as a critical counter-concept to the hie-

rarchical nature o steering processes. But it is less anti-hie-

rarchical than it may seem to be. Governance, as Adrienne

Hritier puts it, implies that private actors are involved in

decision-making processes in order to provide common goods

and that non-hierarchical means o guidance are employed

(Hritier 2002: 12). This could not express better that the

dierence between the steering object and the subject o thesteering has become blurred. This comes with a price, and it

is the citizens who pay this price. The steering subjects are no

longer citizens but private and other non-state actors, as they

have the competencies and the nancial means to regulate

common problems. The steering objects are not only states,

but can also be the citizens o subject to regulation or to poli-

tics itsel.

This change o roles has devastating eects sometimes

on the citizens but on political legitimacy as well. Whereas

public-private partnerships were once created in most Euro-

pean cities (or the water supply, or example) to deal with

collective concerns, the new denition o political subjects

(non-state actors) and new modes o governance has introdu-

ced new hierarchies: between those who can and are willing

to pay, and those who cannot and remain excluded; between

those who t into the required market schemes and those who

have nothing to oer the market; and between those who have

the expert knowledge to win over both the politicians and the

media. A second problem is that politics has become techni-


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cal engineering, which spurs the above-mentioned alienation

between politics and citizens. But this comes with another re-

denition o concepts. Eciency has replaced legitimacy, and

eciency is achieved through rational choice or the evolutio-

nary success o the existing regulations. It is de-coupled rom

any democratic infuence on the part o the citizens. Gover-

nance is substituting democracy.You may object that there are other advocates o governan-

ce who accept the role o the nation-state in international poli-

tics and who are aware o a problematical legitimation gap.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, or example, is interested, above all, in

the global government-networks in which ocial advocates o

the states in nancial and economic matters, those in charge

o police investigative work, as well as other representatives

including judges, exchange inormation across nation-state

borders, and attempt to nd solutions to global problems.

This sectorial extension and consolidation o governmentwork across nation-state borders has led to a disaggregation

o state sovereignty (Slaughter 2005: 266). The state now

appears as a many-headed power entity that speaks with

many voices both inwardly and outwardly. However, according

to Slaughter, this does not mean that great legitimacy gaps

inevitably emerge; in the event that they do, though, they can

be dealt with simply through transnational government work:

advocates o government and other global lites are already

accountable to national societies by virtue o their duty with

regard to their double unction as the representatives o die-

rent inner-societal interests and as transnational actors who

must deend the concerns o the nation-state against those

o other nation-states. Justication here is translated into

accountability. A transparent and public justication o the

past conduct o an actor is required (Benz and Papadopolous

2006). This conception o accountability is detached rom any

conception o reciprocity or o the political involvement o the

various stakeholders. The network-proposal abandons the

negotiation o multi-lateral regulations to the global lites,

who only need to inform the citizens o their societies aboutthe results o these negotiations. But what happens when the

arrangements are not acceptable to the citizens? One searches

in vain or proposals or the possible alteration o these regu-

lations in Slaughters theory. Political participation remains

limited to the global lite. And hegemonic law maintains legi-

timacy through, and not vis--vis, the ruling lites.

1.2. Idealist Theory

On the other side o the spectrum are idealist theories. 1

These theories articulate justied ideals and design an idea

o a desirable situation upon the basis o normative ideals.

For a ew consecutive years at least, when the implosion o

the Soviet Union ended the last territorial imperium hold

together by orce, this breakdown led to an upsurge o norma-tive theories that challenged the hegemony o realist-gover-

nance positions. Strong impulses came rom neo-cosmopolitan

theorists such as David Held, and rom those who argue or the

constitutionalization o international law, such as John Rawls

and Jrgen Habermas. Besides the discussion about global

constitutionalism, many normative international theories are

interested in global ethics. Moral philosophers such as Simon

Caney and the German philosopher Otried He, or exam-

ple, construct global normative principles rom the point o

view o moral philosophy, which they then apply to political

reality. One major problem is that the systemic complexity

o international law and the global economy as well as the

interest-based resistance in both class-struggles and power-

relations are addressed as only a marginal condition o politi-

1. Despite all dierences, the theories o Darrell Moellendor (Moellen-

dor 2002), Simon Caney (Caney 2005) or Otried He (He 1999) can be

identied as variants o the idealist approach.


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cal action. The notion o reason is justied by the right theoryo morality and justice and cannot be shaken by anything akin

to unriendly material or political conditions. In other words,

these views can be criticised using the notorious attack made

by Hegel against Kant: it is only an empty ought that they

argue or.

As a normativist, you may object that normative ideasare not empty at all, but have a perormative character i

they are mobilized in public disputes, or example. Then, they

may come to have an eect in the world and change it, which

has happened more than once. And, no doubt, ideal theories

remind us what realist theories systematically suppress: the

path-breaking role o ideas in the social evolution, politics

and history. Just think oOlympe de Gouges and her ght orwomens rights during the French Revolution, or the role that

Karl Marx played in orming ideals o socialism. Some ideals

can have a link to social reality. The problem is, however, thatidealist theories miss the dialectical point. They stress the

bright side o the ideas without taking into consideration the

downside which is always there. Law, or example, has a dual

character. It is being torn apart between reedom and orce,

and this problem o two-sidedness is only partially solved:

idealists stress reedom and legitimate law very oten ree-

rring to human rights when it comes to debates about a just

global order. But law has a coercive side, and idealists ignore

the dierent ways in which coercion is applied, they are not

interested in an analysis o how coercion and orce are legiti-

mized or what the criteria or legitimized and illegitimated

orce actually are. But even human rights, as we know, can be

misused or oppressive interventions and imperial geo-poli-

tics, and, as Spivak has pointed out, or colonization disgui-

sed as a help to the people who allegedly do not know what

is good or themselves (Spivak 2004). In this regard, idealist

theories are worldliness: they construct normative princi-

ples, reestanding to use a Rawlsian term, on moral grounds

and with no social-theory backing beorehand. So, whereas

empirical governance theories based solely upon the analy-

sis o interests and structures are social-technocratic without

ideas, idealist theories without any relation to the interests

and social conditions o political action are inapplicable to real

political struggles and the potential or emancipation. Only i

the gateway to the justied criticism o worldliness-moralism

can be closed, can normative theory successully overturn thehegemony o governance approaches.

There are two urther prominent approaches that suggest

how to deal with global politics. The confict here is about

whether democratic politics aims to create agreement or to

sustain plurality and dissent. What is at stake is not the loca-

lization o democracy (i at all) in relation to acts or ideas.

Instead, the debate is about the way in which politics deals

with conficts and how it comes to a decision.

1.3. Dissent

Let us have a look at the dissent approach rst. 2 Modern

politics some authors stressed has been characterised rom

its very inception by a paradoxical enterprise: traditional

sources o integration (religion, tradition) no longer work

because the plurality o interests in modern society cannot be

harmonised. But the integration o society is necessary and

should be reached by exactly what has no longer been possi-

ble: all the involved parties should disclaim part o their ree-

dom, give up part o their interests and submit themselves to

a common will. Acknowledging this paradox has led to a politi-

cal theory that scrutinises how an institutional order devel-

ops, even though it is almost impossible to achieve peaceul co-

existence. This was the birth o the concern with the political

in contra-distinction to politics. Whereas politics is captured

2. See also Kreide and Niederberger 2012.


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in the institutions o the state and democracy is tamed by both

parliaments and courts, the political in the thought o Lacoue-

Labarthe and Nancy, Lyotard and Moue does not embody the

static aspect o the institutional order (Lacoue-Labarthe and

Nancy 1997, Lyotard 1989, Moue 2005). Instead, it tries to

acknowledge the public dispute, conficting views, and contro-

versial decisions-dissent, in short.The political is also a kind o method o being refexive about

thinking; it uncovers the dierence between politics and non-

politics -non-politics including everything that eludes itsel

rom the market orces and other orms o societal reproduc-

tion. In contra-distinction, politics stands or decision-taking

processes, it embodies the world o institutional apparatuses

and the iron cages o law. Theories o the political aim to show

that political decisions do not rely upon the existing conver-

gences o belies or orms o lie. Rather, they present speci-

c political techniques, which make decisions collectively-binding. Whereas the ground or politics is dissent, it is only

through the insight that a common basis o politics cannot be

ound that allows or political action and the construction o

institutions. In order to describe politics, theorists reer to the

idea o the comparing orce in competitions. In these compe-

titions or agonal situations it is the strength as well as

the strategy and tactics that are decisive. However, political

decisions within democracies do not overcome dissent, but are

only an intermediate result o the societal competition. The

political is similar to Derridas idea o the non-decidable deci-

sion-in-the-making, about to be overturned by another deci-

sion. This is why the centre o power remains empty. As long

as the dissent is insurmountable, nobody can claim to know or

to occupy what keeps society together and running.

These approaches explicitly address hegemonic global prac-

tices and structures. Identity-creating antagonism is directed

against the ontological level o politics with all its discour-

ses, institutions and practices, which, because o the political,

are always contested. The political is not a distinct order or a

certain way o judging existing practices, but it is the possible

open space the space to create resistance against politics. I

think this is an intriguing idea in order to understand politi-

cal action beyond institutional political power.

One problem I see with this theory is the description o

politics as an external confict o interests. This is empirically

unconvincing. Political actors reer to the interests o others,and political decisions are usually not the result o a mere

aggregation o interests. Instead, actors modiy and adapt

their interests and political aims in the process be it through

a new insight or through an interest to achieve success. Secon-

dly, and more importantly, theories o dissent suggest that

they can well integrate the great plurality o views and inter-

ests. But it remains very unclear i the inclusion is not just

arbitrary. There is no normative conceptual rame that oers

criteria on who should be included, take part and speak upon

the basis o what reasons this should occur. It is not just thatdecisions are not justied, there is also the question o how it

can be prevented that only the politically and economically

powerul, the highly eloquent and very well educated get a

voice in negotiations. Dissent theories ail to take a position

regarding this problem.

1.4. Consensus

Contrary to the dissent theory o politics, political libe-

ralism I will only mention John Rawls as one o its most

amous proponents rests upon the idea that a commonly-sha-

red public agreement is possible as a result o rational argu-mentation. In Rawls theory, politics ocuses on the process o

how political rules should be created. Under hypothetically

air conditions, among them the equality o the participating

parties and the equal chance that an argument passes the

test o reasonableness, parties express their interests (Rawls

1993). This alone does not explain why the parties will comply


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with a political decision in the end -which is the problem o

idealist theories as well, o which Rawls is very much aware.

The reason why they nally submit to the outcomes o the

decision-making process is that all the parties need to be con-

vinced that, by so doing, they can ollow their interests better

than under any alternative rule system. The tension between

the unoreseeable results o political action and the orces oinstitutionalisation are solved through a trick: some basic

rights to political and social participation are assumed to be

already institutionalised and are not up to political disputes.

Here, similar to the idealist approaches, politics ollows jus-

tice. As long as the political system is just just according to

the principle o justice that all parties have agreed upon in

the original position outcomes are legitimate. And, similar

to realist positions, the parties in the original position are, to

some extent, driven by rational calculations and not by moral

considerations. The unction o public politics, however, is toapprove political decisions in retrospect. The establishing o

the basic structure is reduced to technical problems o imple-

mentation. Politics, in the words o Raymond Geuss, becomes

a kind o applied ethics (Geuss 2008). It is an irony o this

approach that it highlights the concrete embodiment o the

basic rights o every citizen including political rights, which

should be the/an object o public reasoning. But, on the other

hand, it abandons real politics.

So, whereas governance theories ace the problem that poli-

tics becomes a social technique and democratic legitimacy is

reduced to eciency, idealist theories miss democracy likewise.

In this castle-in-the-air approach, politics has turned into

applied ethics. And whereas dissent theories believe that they

can deal with conficts by occupying power positions in order

to overrule these positions again and again, they nevertheless

have no criteria to judge political decisions. The reasonable

agreement approach, on the other hand, dreams the old and

atal dream o overcoming deeply-entrenched conficts, the-

reby ailing to take political confict seriously. The repression

o democracy in practice takes place again, in psychoanalyti-

cal terms, in theory. We not only ace a crisis o democratic

politics, but also o democratic theory. But what is let or a

conception o politics beyond ideal and realist, beyond dissent

and consensus?

2. Towards a renewed conception of political theory

In the remaining part o my paper, I would like to outline

a conception o radical democracy which avoids the problems

mentioned above and meet the demands o world society. As

one problem is to nd a way beyond a governance theory lost

in realism and an idealist theory conronted with the criti-

cism o an empty ought, I start with this beore going on to

discuss the normative grounds o democracy between dissent

and consensus.3

2.1. An international social theory

First o all, I think the methodological restriction topoliti-cal theory when talking about politics is problematic. Politi-cal theory should open up to social theory that addresses the

phenomena o globalisation. O course, the entanglement o

political and social theory is not a brand new idea. Political

theory, however, especially the new branch o International

Political Theory that has correctly surpassed the methodolo-

gical nationalism, sometimes exercises a kind o hegemonic

disciplinary demarcation. I one sets aside an analysis o the

current conditions o world society, one misses an important

point that o taking the global as well as the local structural

and social obstacles to political participation into considera-

3. For an early concept o radical democracy see Laclau and Mouue 1995.


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tion. International social theory needs to reveal the barriers

o democratisation political, economical and social ones-

which can then in turn help us to detect the potentials or

democratization. There are at least two main approaches that

are complex enough to mediate the advantages o normati-

ve and empirical theories. This is systems theory, on the one

hand, and critical theory, on the other. I will deend the latterbecause it is the only one that does not exclude a non-empiri-

cal intermediation o idealist and realist theory. I will sketch

three characteristics o a critical social theory.

a) Practice

Critical social theory cannot be understood without ree-

rence to Marxs and Horkheimers theories. It was thanks to

them that Critical social theory overcame transcendentalconsciousness. Whereas, or Hegel, theoretical refection cul-

minates in the absolute knowledge o philosophy, Marx turned

to the real material processes. Theory, as Horkheimer stres-

sed, needs to describe itsel as a part o lies context, which

it tries to capture. This theoretical weakness is, at the same

time, its strength: social theory refects its sel-reerentiality

and understands itsel as a part o the selsame practice which

it describes. Phenomena such as alienation in the labour pro-

duction process, being subjected to transnational adminis-

trative structures (such as the EU or through the WTO), and

exclusion rom political participation, can only be overcome in

practice, not in theory (Habermas 1972: 14). In other words:

theory is the science o practice.

b) Subject

Habermas, however, criticises Marx or not distinguishing

between empirical and critical-refexive orms o knowledge

and stresses social criticism as self-refection. This spotlightsthe role o the subject an aspect Marx ignored. In the act

o sel-refection, the subject realises that he or she cannot

identiy himsel or hersel (Habermas 1972: 104). Like in

a mirror, the subject sees himsel or hersel as someone

trapped in the orces and restrictions o the labour process,

completely at the mercy o the requiring demands o a highlytechnological, extremely mobile and fexible world, and he

or she is politically powerless; a subject deormed through

oppressive processes o objectication and he or she realises

the catastrophic situation. This experience begs us to know

more about these processes and how to reverse them. This is

how sel-knowledge starts. The interest in knowing about the

conditions o sel-preservation and knowing about pathological

structures and developments has led to the amous insight

that radical criticism o knowledge (Erkenntniskritik) is only

possible as a social theory.

c) Negativity

Whereas idealist theory as well as political liberalism-

strengthen a notion o a just global order, and governance

theories describe injustice merely as social dierence, disre-

garding its negativity, critical social theory uses the genera-

lising power o negation (Brunkhorst 2005). It does not start

o rom the legitimation o principles, but rom a sense o

injustice (Mo ore 1978; Shklar 1992) which appears through

the exploited classes, the suppressed peoples, and the exclu-

ded parts o population. In the history o theory, this refexive

dynamic o negation has, or the most part, been neglected

even though there have been some exceptions.

Kant uses the refexive dynamic o negation when he speaks

o the violation o rights that can be elt in every place on

earth by everyone; Piaget identied the role o the experience

o injustice or the development o a consciousness o justice,


11/19


and Judith Shklar stresses the universality o a sense o injus-

tice or the ormation o a just order (Shklar 1992). Negative

eelings, as Adorno and later Habermas claimed, have a cogni-

tive content, which lies in their inter-subjectivity (Brunkhorst

2010: 45). Those who are enraged at the exploitation to which

they are subject have a reason, which can be shared with

others. This is why the moral eeling o humiliation experien-ced by slaves is not resentment (Wingert 1993: 79). When,

as Barrington Moore says, exploited workers or suppressed

people bring about their rejection o suering and oppression,

then they claim something like It is enough or Workers o

the world, unite! (Moore 1978: 81). They use the universalism

o negation, without which the theoretical knowledge about

society would be impossible (Brunkhorst 2005: 198).

But how can a theory refect practice-relation, subject-pers-

pective and negativity in a way that the decits and barriers

or democratic action become visible? With a view to processeso globalisation, let me just sketch three aspects o oppres-

sion which, in one way or another, eect political participation

(Young 1990).

2.2. Political marginalisation

International organisations (the World Bank, the Interna-

tional Monetary Fund) determine the domestic aairs o sta-

tes, even in Europe, and, by this exercise, political authority

which undercuts the political sel-determination o the peo-

ple. In Greece, a whole population is more or less excluded

rom participating in the process o dealing with the nancial

crisis o the country. Even within European countries, there

are a growing number o those who are marginalised beyond

the middle-classes and never or only seldom have a chance

to participate politically, and very oten they do not see how

they could do so i they wanted to (Ruppert 2003). Politically

marginalised, one can say, are those persons who seldom or

never are in a position to exercise power. Besides the global

constraints, obstacles to participation are prevalent in many

areas: missing intra-company participation and reduced work

autonomy, less competencies to deal with bureaucratic and

administrative demands, no ree access to the inormation

necessary to decide on a topic (Young 2001). For example, it

was only ater mass protests against a huge railway stationin Stuttgart that was to be moved underground, that some

details on the costs, unctionality, economic eciency and so

on were made publicly available. Moreover, eective infuen-

ce is even more dicult internationally. NGOs and organisa-

tions which try to establish some rules in policy areas such as

immigration, labour conditions, immigration, tracking, sex

tourism, etc., have not managed to establish an international

agenda in the long run.

2.3. Global economic exploitation

Capitalist societies are inherently unjust and oster econo-

mic exploitation since some people have no alternative than to

develop their capabilities only or the aims and advantages o

others (Young 1990: 30). For workers world-wide, the inexora-

ble aggressive competition o transnational companies means

an acceleration o production processes, orced long-hours and

a wage which very oten does not allow them to make a decent

living. Moreover, in some countries in Latin America or in

South-East Asia, massive national debt creates a dependence

on the part o these countries on the importation o convertible

currencies (Elson 2002). This, in turn, made work abroad or

immigrants attractive, as they could improve their own nan-

cial situation and, at the same time, improve the international

capacity o their country to compete (Young 2003). These push

and pull actors increase the number o immigrants in richer

countries who more or less invisibly oer their work. They

also widen the gap between women who need to work in the


12/19


precarious eld o private day and health-care and those who

use the workorce o immigrants to pursue their careers. They

work and oer their services without labour law protection

and are politically disconnected rom all decisions (Parreas

2001).

2.4. Cultural invisibility

In the political and economic international discourse, it is

rst and oremost women who nd themselves exposed to a

symbolic representation which is ar rom their sel-image.

They are reduced to being actory workers; maids; much too

young mothers; sex workers; asylum seekers and reugees

rom war zones (Mohanty 2003). These ascriptions create

shame and a eeling o alienation and make it dicult or

those aected to go public and complain.Admittedly, this is a very programmatic sketch, which

needs some renement and has to be urther developed.

However, these illustrative examples show that a negative

description o dierent orms o oppression in world society

allows us not merely to reveal characteristic orms o barriers

to political participation. Moreover, political marginalization,

exploitation, and cultural invisibility indicate potentials to

resist these hegemonic structures and show where political

participation is most urgent but most dicult to realize.

One may wonder how ar one can get with a negative

approach or a theory o democracy. What exactly does it tell usabout democracy? There are two answers to this, a short rst

one and a longer second one. The rst answer is that a social

analysis o the barriers to participation can tell us about the

requirements which a theory o democracy needs to consider.

For example, i structural obstacles hinder intra-company par-

ticipation and a humiliating depiction in public creates psycho-

logical obstructions, then a theory o democracy cannot igno-

re, but should, instead, refect these societal conditions. The

second, longer answer is that the societal theory part is, indeed,

only hal o the story. It is still an open question as to why cri-

ticism o the existing rule system is legitimized, and why dis-

respecting the social barriers o participation is a problem or

the legitimacy o democracy. Thereore, one needs a positive

legitimation o a normative rame o reerence. This could be

a theory o justice, o the good lie, or an expanded notion odemocracy. And it is the latter that I shall deend here.

2.4.1. Towards radical democracy

From Locke to Kant, and up to Sieys, theories o democra-

cy share one basic insight: the people are an indivisible whole.

Marx writes that in modern parliament, the citizens repre-

sent themselves and no longer have to be represented by a

ruler (Marx 1963: 124). And or Dewey democratic representa-tion is based upon the strict identication o the interests

o the governors with those o the governed (Dewey 1927:

93). Everyone belongs to the people. The people themselves

are not the rulers, and they cannot be divided into the rulers

and the ruled (Brunkhorst 2005: 170). The identity principleidenties the ruling and the ruled and separates the modern

concept o popular sovereignty rom the ancient one o rule

o the people. The rule o the people [Volksherrschaft] meansthat some are ree whereas others may be restricted in their

reedom at least sometimes. The Greek isonomia does not

mean that everybody is equal beore the law and that law isthe same or everybody. Rather, it means that everybody has

an equal right to ree speech in the polis. The word popu-

lar sovereignty [Volkssouvernitt], in contradistinction,expresses the permanence o the equal reedom o all legalsubjects (Maus 1992). It is this notion o popular sovereignty

that is the core o democratic legitimacy.

But how does this notion o popular sovereignty encounter

the above-mentioned global challenges such as de-nationaliza-


13/19


tion? Democracy without a demos is impossible. And so it is not

surprising that many recent eorts o ormulating a theory o

post-national governance hesitate to use the notion o demo-

cracy (Beck 2006; Dryzek 2006). The classical conception o

popular sovereignty is closely bound to national sovereign-

ty. The most prevailing argument is that we need state-like

institutions outtted with administrative power and ecientcoercive instruments as well as a monopoly o violence to pre-

serve equality to exercise participatory rights in the ace o

potential violation (Nagel 2005; Scheuerman 2011: 90). It is

only through eective state institutions that democratically-

achieved decisions can have binding orce and be legitimately

imposed. For some tatists the only legitimate way to adhe-re to the state-centred approach and to meet global challen-

ges is to argue or the conception o transnational democra-

cy which stresses the idea that the dierent national demoi

ought to be subsumed into a cosmopolitan hierarchy with asingle demos at its apex (Bohman 2010: 12). I think that thisis not an option, or at least two reasons. First o all, it is ques-

tionable regarding the assumption that popular sovereignty

needs a state. Sovereignty means that those who are aected

by binding legal-rules have to be included as ree and equal

members in the process o producing these rules (Habermas

1992; Brunkhorst 2004: 99). And ormulated like this, it beco-

mes apparent that it is the people who should be outtted with

sovereignty and not state institutions particularly because

state borders no longer determine the range and scope o the

decision-making that aects citizens (Brunkhorst 2004: 99).Instead o adhering to obsolete attempts to link sovereignty to

the state, a normative concept o democracy needs to be based

upon procedural guarantees so that those aected can reely

participate in the making o those rules they have to submit to.

Secondly, what speaks against democratic transnational gover-

nment is that this way o organizing transnational institutions

would amount to a decrease in democratic control, rather than

an increase. Kant, as we all know, thought that a world repu-

blic was philosophically demanded but empirically unrealistic

and even contra-democratic. Democracy can only unction in

small entities (Maus 1992). Who is really well-schooled with

the inormation fow in the juggernaut o world society? Howe-

ver, Kant was not amiliar with the new media and technolo-

gies which have supported the creation o some transnational

public spheres (Peters 2007). Moreover, a world government oreven a regional government together with international orga-

nizations and corporations may too easily come to have impe-

rialist and hegemonic pretensions (Cohen 2004).

I suggest that we attempt to understand political sel-deter-

mination dierently. Sel-ruling is notper se based upon a sin-gular demos, but is the rule o the many demoi. This allowscitizen to exercise their political powers in a realm o over-

lappingdemoi and in dispersed political units. This oers thepossibility o resisting against oppression where it appears,

regardless o whether it happens on a specic national terri-tory or is on a specic national political agenda. Moreover, yet

another problem could also be solved, the so-called demoi pro-blem (Bohman 2009: 174): individuals and groups run the risk

o being oppressed by transnational, non-democratic means,through the practices o transnational corporations, or exam-

ple. But this problem could be overcome as long as the capa-

city to initiate deliberation about the terms o democracy isitsel distributed among the demoi (Bohman 2009: 174).

Now, you may object that this sounds exactly like gov-

ernance, which I rejected in the above. Are we still talking

about popular sovereignty and the identity o the ruler andthe ruled? Indeed, when popular sovereignty should meet the

challenges o world society it cannot be restricted to weak

orms o deliberation.4 Yet, deliberative processes alone can-

not close the legitimacy gap that emerges when international

treaties, decisions, or even internationally-binding conven-

4. For the neo-republican position see Bohman 2009.


14/19


15/19


are aware o their external responsibilities regarding justi-

cation, and have become sensitive vis--vis those concerned.

c) Expansion of rights guarantee

Moreover, what is nally needed is the transnational expan-

sion o the existing legal guarantees o rights, through whichthe equality o the deliberating partners can be achieved inde-

pendently o economic and political bargaining-power. Inde-

pendent arbitration is an important step on the way to a trans-

national legal guarantee o rights, and, next to the signs o a

sel-developing democratic legitimation, represents a urther

aspect o the constitutionalization o international relations.

These are only some suggestions and we certainly need to

work on these in the uture. But the point I wish to make is

that political sel-determination is not bound to a state or a

state-like institution like the European Union which allows

or expanded participation. On the other hand, i political sel-

determination at some point is not linked to legitimate legal

institutions, then it would remain too weak to bind powerul

international actors, such as corporations.

One could object that this sounds all too amiliar: at the

end o the day, this proposal is deadlocked in the same techni-

cal-institutional understanding o participation, which Colin

Crouch has criticized so powerully. I popular sovereignty

means that citizens are both the ruled and the authors o

these rules, this is not restricted to legislator procedures. On

the contrary, one has to ocus on popular sovereignty also romthe perspective o power.

2.4.2. Communicative Power

I one overlooks the act that democracy is tainted with

power, one would misunderstand democracy. Seeing popular

sovereignty rom the point o view o power, it becomes obvious

that all power has its source in the people. Political power, as

Hannah Arendt puts it, is a power that (Arendt 1958: 200) no

one really is able to possess. Instead, it springs up between

men when they act together, beyond narrowing down action to

the enorcement o own or collective interests and its adminis-

trative embodiments (Arendt 1970: 45). It is through the exer-

cise o power that negative reedom is expressed: the negativereedom not the be dominated and not to dominate which

s the other side o the same coin- and the positive reedom to

create a space in which everybody is among ones own kind

(Arendt 1993/2003).

Habermas has taken up this idea and has transormed it

into communicative power. Communicative power is a orm

o political power, and he stresses, dierent to Arendt the

ree deliberation o topics and themes and discoursively crea-

ted inter-subjective convictions (Habermas 1996: 184). In the

end, communicative power is ocused on the ormation o legi-

timate law. This, however, is an unnecessary restriction. The

perormativity that is, the power to have eects in the world-

o arguments and opinions can be ound in many aairs o

citizens, rom the price o coee to urban planning, party pro-

grams, school, taxes, violence in private relations. Everything

can become political. But in contradistinction to Habermas,

communicative power need not always be translated through

law into administrative power (Habermas 1996: 211). Instead,

communicative power is directed at existing institutions,

conditions, and practices. It is the power to question. And it

expresses itsel especially articulately in acts o resistance,uprisings against repression and exploitation, in both passi-

ve and active resistance, when the momentum o revolution

is exploited. There are many historical examples. One promi-

nent example comes rom Rancire. Auguste Blanqui, head o

the revolution, claimed, in court in 1832, when asked about

his proession, that he was a proletarian. And when the

judge answered that his was not a proession, Blanqui rejoi-

ned that this was the proession o thirty million citizens o


16/19


France (Rancire 2002: 49). This made the judge write down

this newly-born proession. The citizens o the ormer German

Democratic Republic oxymoronically sounded the death knell

or a suppressive regime by silent protests, and the protests

in Madrid this year started allegedly through someone who

sat down in the Plaza del Sol and claimed to be too exhaus-

ted rom the hardships o making a living that he could notgo on like that. Communicative power has sometimes been

translated into deliberative and law-setting processes (Ben-

habib 2008) or argumentative justication (Forst 2007). And

this is also one aspect o it. But communicative power is not

cuddling up and giving arguments. It is resistance poweru-

lly eloquent or silent. It nds its reason in societal injustice

(political marginalization, exploitation, cultural invisibility)

and it is developed in political action. Political action can be

directed at creating democratic institutions or at questioning,

changing, or tearing down the existing decisions and institu-

tions. Action remains a crucial, ever-present resource or inno-

vation in every institution. Domestic and worldwide protests,

Twitter andFacebook and real revolutions, leaks (wikileaks)and civil disobedience all need to have a constant place in

democracy. A notion o politics should accept that politics and

democracy are in disorder (Mllers 2008). The condence in

legal rules and in the existing structures is striking, and oten

democracy is put on the same level with the rule o law. The

adoration o the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany is

one example or this. But this is a misunderstanding: demo-

cracies are conusing enterprises, containing inormality, testruns, experiments, the dislocation o borders and limits; they

are multi-aceted, loud and sometimes irrational. In the pro-

cess o questioning the existing institutions, politics becomes

apraxis in which both systems o rules and actions are seenas being inextricably linked together.

3. Conclusion

To conclude, I think that democracy has not come to an end

yet. To overcome the pessimistic assumptions o Colin Crouch,

politics needs to rearm the space or the articulation o broad

public criticism o the oppressive practices, values, institu-

tions, rules and maxims o our society such as, or example,neo-liberal politics, or o the emptying o the notion o political

reedom and equality. Without popular sovereignty, however,

there is no political legitimation o law, only domination. But

without non-institutionalized orms o democracy, institutions

tend to ossilize. Democracy needs to allow or the reinterpre-

tation o the system o rules and reinvention o existing insti-

tutions. In this sense, politics still has a lot to do with Hannah

Arendts notion o natality: politics is a never-ending process

o renewal.

Acknowledgments

For critical remarks and constructive advice I thank

Rahel Jaeggi and the participants o her lecturer series at

Humboldt University (June 2011), Robin Celiktes, Yolande

Jansen, Beate Rssler and the participants o the Philosophy

& Public Aairs Colloquium at the University o Amsterdam

(September 2011). I am grateul or critical reading to Osvaldo

Guariglia, Julio Montero, and as usual Hauke Brunkhorst.

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Received: January 17, 2012.

Accepted: May 5, 2012.

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