RÈGLEMENT DE CHANGE ET REVENU CONTRÔLE DE RAPATRIEMENT 15, Octobre 2013.
REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS RECUEIL...
Transcript of REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS RECUEIL...
REPORTS OF INTERNATIONALARBITRAL AWARDS
RECUEIL DES SENTENCESARBITRALES
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission - Preliminary Decisions
August 2001, December 2005 and July 2007
XXVI pp. 1-22VOLUME
NATIONS UNIES - UNITED NATIONSCopyright (c) 2009
ParT i
Preliminary decisions
Decisions of August 2001 19 December 2005
27 July 2007
Décisions préliminaires
Décisions d’août 2001 19 décembre 2005
27 juillet 2007
PreliminaryDecisions
Décisionspréliminaires
eritrea-ethiopia Claims Commission
decision number 1 of august 2001
décision numéro 1 d’août 2001JurisdictionoftheCommission—jurisdictiono�erclaimsrelatedtotheconflict
betweenEritreaandEthiopia—claimsrelatedtoe�entsthatoccurredafterMay1998untiltheeffecti�erepatriationofallprisonersofwar(POWs)—repatriationofPOWsincluded in thedisengagementmeasures toend theconflict—no jurisdictiono�erclaimsrelatingtotheinterpretationorimplementationoftheagreementbetweentheParties .
CompétencedelaCommission—compétences’agissantdesréclamationsrelati�esauconflitentrel’Érythréeetl’Éthiopie—réclamationsrelati�esauxé�énementssur�enuspostérieurementàmai1998etjusqu’aurapatriementeffectifdetouslesprisonniersdeguerre—rapatriement des prisonniers compris dans les mesures de désengagementpourmettrefinauconflit—absencedecompétences’agissantdesréclamationsrelati�esàl’interprétationetàlamiseenœu�redel’accorddepaixentrelesParties .
The Commission’s mandate/Temporal scope of JurisdictionUnderArticle5(1)oftheAgreementofDecember12,2000(“TheAgree-
ment”),theCommissionhasjurisdictiono�er“allclaimsforloss,damageorinjurybyoneGo�ernmentagainsttheother,andbynationals(includingbothnaturaland juridicalpersons)ofonepartyagainst theGo�ernmentof theotherparty . . .thatare(a)relatedtotheconflictthatwasthesubjectoftheFrameworkAgreement,theModalitiesforitsImplementationandtheCessa-tionofHostilitiesAgreement,and(b)resultfrom�iolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,includingthe1949Gene�aCon�entions,orother�iolationsofinternationallaw .”
A. No Supervisory Jurisdiction Over Interpretation or Application of the December Agreement
The Commission decides that claims regarding the interpretation orimplementationoftheAgreementassucharenotwithinthisgrantofjuris-diction .Suchanimportantgrantofjurisdictioncannotbeimplied .NeitherthetextofArticle(5)1noranyotherpartoftheAgreementgi�essuchasuper-�isory role to theCommission .Thiscontrastswith the jurisdictionof the
4 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
Iran-UnitedStatesClaimsTribunal,whichwasexpresslyauthorizedtodecidedisputesregardingtheinterpretationandapplicationoftheClaimsSettlementDeclaration .
B. Claims Arising During the Conflict
TheCommissionbelie�esthatthecentralreferencepointfordetermin-ingthescopeofitsmandateunderArticle(5)1oftheAgreementistheconflictbetweentheparties .Intheo�erallcontextoftherele�antdocumentscitedinArticle(5)1, theCommissionunderstandsthistomeanthearmedconflictthatbeganinMay1998andwasformallybroughttoanendbytheAgreementonDecember12,2000 .Thereisapresumptionthatclaimsarisingduringthisperiod“relateto”theconflictandarewithintheCommission’sjurisdiction .
C. Claims After December 2000
TheCommissionhasconcludedthatcertainclaimsassociatedwithe�entsafterDecember12,2000mayalso“relateto”theconflict,ifapartycandem-onstratethatthoseclaimsaroseasaresultofthearmedconflictbetweentheparties,oroccurredinthecourseofmeasurestodisengagecontendingforcesorotherwisetoendthemilitaryconfrontationbetweenthetwosides .Thesemightincludeforexample,claimsbyeitherpartyregardingalleged�iolationsofinternationallawoccurringwhilearmedforcesarebeingwithdrawnfromoccupiedterritoryorotherwisedisengagingintheperiodafterDecember12,2000 .AnysuchclaimsmustbefiledwithinthefilingperiodestablishedbytheAgreement .Moreo�er,asnotedinPartAabo�e,theCommissiondoesnotha�ejurisdictiono�erclaimsforallegedbreachedoftheAgreement .
D. Claims Before May 1998
TheCommissionbelie�esthatClaimsarisingpriortoMay1998areofadifferentcharacteranddonotcomewithinitsjurisdiction .Logically,suchclaimscannot“relateto”theconflictinthedirectsenseindicatedabo�eforcertainclaimsarisingafterDecember12,2000,becausethearmedconflictthatisthecentralfocusoftheCommission’sjurisdictionhadnotyetoccurred .Accordingly,theCommissionmustexaminewhetherthereareotherwaystointerprettheterm“relatedto”thatwouldbeinharmonywiththeterm’sordi-narymeaningandthepurposeandstructureoftheDecemberAgreement .
Intheirpapersandinoralargument,bothPartiesrecognizedthatthisconceptmightbegi�enbroad interpretations thatwouldbringwithin theCommission’sjurisdictionlong-standinglegalcontro�ersies,notjustgoing
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 5
backtoJuly and August 1997, but perhaps going back for decades.1 Neither Party suggested that the Commission adopt such a broad interpretation .Indeed,suchaninterpretationcouldnotbeeffecti�elyimplementedgi�enthelimitedcapacityandresourcesofthefi�e-memberclaimscommissioncreatedbytheDecember12Agreement .Howe�er,theargumentspresentedinsupportofjurisdictiono�ere�entspriortoMay1998didnotindicatetotheCommis-sionanyprincipledwaytointerpretthetexttoa�oidthisextremeresult,aresultapparentlynotintendedbyeitherParty .
Moreo�er,theCommission’smandateunderArticle5mustbeconstruedsoastobeinharmonywiththeo�erallinstitutionalstructureestablishedbytheAgreement .Inthisregard,thePartiesga�etwootherinstitutionsclearandexpansi�emandatesregardinge�entsthatoccurredbeforetheoutbreakofthearmedconflict .ItisdifficulttoseehowthisCommissioncouldinquireintoandpassjudgementregardinge�entspriortoMay1998andwithoutrunningafoulofthemandatesoftheseotherbodies .
Forexample,duringoralargument,itwasurgedthatcertainclaimsaris-ingbeforeMay1998shouldfallwithintheCommission’sjurisdiction .How-e�er,thesedisputesessentiallyresultedfromtheParties’disagreementso�erthelocationoftheirboundary .Article4oftheAgreementcreatesaneutralBoundaryCommission,andgi�estothatCommissionalonetheresponsibilityfordeterminingtheboundary .ItwouldnotbeconsistentwiththestructurecreatedbytheAgreementforthisCommissiontoattempttoarbitrateadisputethathasatitsheartthequestionofthecorrectlocationoftheboundary .
ThePartiesassignedotherimportantresponsibilitiesregardinge�entspriortoMay1998toyetanotherbody .UnderArticle3oftheAgreement,anindependentimpartialbodyappointedbytheSecretary-GeneraloftheOAUistocarryoutanin�estigation“ontheincidentsof6May1998andonanyotherincidentspriortothatdatewhichcouldha�econtributedtoamisunder-standingbetweenthepartiesregardingtheircommonborder,includingtheincidentsofJulyandAugust1997 .”Again,itisdifficulttoseehowthisCom-missioncouldexercisejurisdictionwithrespecttothee�entsoccurringpriortoMay6,1998thataremostindisputebetweenthepartieswithoutrunningafoulofthemandateofthein�estigatingbodyauthorizedbyArticle3 .
Thus,thePartiesexpresslyga�etomechanismsotherthatthisCommis-siontheprimaryresponsibilityfordecidingquestionsrelatedtotheboundaryandforassessingthecharacterandconsequencesofcontro�ersiesbetweenthePartiesbeforetheoutbreakofthearmedconflictinMay1998 .Gi�enthis,the
1 See,e .g .MemorandumoftheStateofEritrea,May1,2001at26,(“certainclaimsmaybeproperlycompensablebeforetheCommissione�enthoughtheyconcern,inpart,e�entstakingplacepriortothesummerof1997 . . .itisdifficulttostatecategoricallyanyjurisdictionaltimeframeidentifyingwhichclaimsaresuitableforconsiderationbythisCommission .”);MemorandumoftheFederalRepublicofEthiopia,June15,2001,(‘Thefactsande�entsofthepastduringwhichmisunderstandingsaroseo�ertheboundaryreachbacktothe19thcentury,whenboundarytreatieswerefirstconcluded .”)
6 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
Commissionbelie�esthatitwouldnotbeproperforittointerpretthewordsofArticle5toincludeaswellclaimsfor�iolationallegedtooccurbeforetheoutbreakofthearmedconflictinMay1998,onthegroundthatthoseclaims“relateto”thatconflict .
*****
decision number 2 of august 2001
décision numéro 2 d’août 2001OrganisationoftheworkoftheCommission—classificationofclaimsbysub-
ject—possibilityofmassclaimsproceduresforfixedamountcompensation .Organisationdutra�aildelaCommission—classificationdesréclamationspar
thèmes—possibilitédeprocéduresderéclamationscollecti�espouruneindemnitéfixe .
Claims Categories, forms and ProceduresA. Claims Categories
TheCommissionhasdecidedthatclaimsmaybefiledinthefollowingsixcategories:
Category1—Claimsofnaturalpersonsforunlawfulexpulsionfromthecountryoftheirresidence;
Category2—Claimsofnaturalpersonsforunlawfuldisplacementfromtheirresidence;
Category3—Claimsofprisonersofwarforinjuriessufferedfromunlaw-fultreatment;
Category4—Claimsofci�iliansforunlawfuldetentionandforinjuriessufferedfromunlawfultreatmentduringdetention;
Category5—Claimsofpersons for loss,damageor injuryother thanthoseco�eredbytheothercategories;
Category6—ClaimsofGo�ernmentsforloss,damageorinjury .
B. Mass Claims Procedures/Fixed Amount Compensation
TheCommissionhasdecidedtoestablishamassclaimsprocessunderwhichclaimsofpersonsinCategories1—5maybefiledforfixedamountcom-pensation .ThePartiesshallprepareclaimsformsforallsuchclaims,usingformstobeestablishedbytheCommission .Specifieddataderi�edfromthoseformsmaybefiledwiththeCommissioninelectronicformpursuanttoguid-ancetheCommissionwillpro�ide .
EachPartywillgroupitsclaimsineachCategoryinsub-categoriesthatitselects,insuchamannerthateachsub-categorycontainsallofthatParty’s
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 7
claimsinthatCategoryallegedtoarisefromaparticular�iolationofinterna-tionallawand/orfromthesamee�ents .
SubjecttofurtherdecisionsbytheCommission,fixedamountcompensa-tionshallbea�ailableintwotiersdependingonthetypeofe�idencea�ailable .TheamountineachtiershallbedecidedbytheCommissionafterrecei�ingfurther�iewsande�idence fromtheParties .Fixedamountcompensationshallbea�ailableinaccordancewithprocedurestobeestablishedinChapterThreeoftheCommission’sRulesofProcedure .
C. Other Claims
AllclaimsinCategory6,andthoseclaimsinCategories1through5thatseektopro�eactualdamagesorotherwiserequireindi�idualconsideration,shallbefiledinaccordancewithprocedurestobeestablishedinChapterTwooftheCommission’sRulesofProcedure .
*****
decision number 3 of august 2001
décision numéro 3 d’août 2001Remediesforthe�iolations—monetarycompensation .
Indemnisationdesinfractions—compensationfinancière .
remediesTheCommissiondecides that, inprinciple, theappropriateremedyfor
�alidclaimssubmittedtoitshouldbemonetarycompensation .Howe�er,theCommissiondoesnotforeclosethepossibilityofpro�idingothertypesofrem-ediesinappropriatecases,iftheparticularremedycanbeshowntobeinaccord-ancewithinternationalpractice,andiftheTribunaldeterminesthataparticularremedywouldbereasonableandappropriateinthecircumstances .
*****
decision number 4 of august 2001
décision numéro 4 d’août 2001Rules of procedure—compliance to international law rules—no decisions ex
aequo et bono—substanti�ee�idencerequested .
Règlesdeprocédure—conformitéauxrèglesdedroitinternational—pasdedéci-sionsex aequo et bono—nécessitédefournirdespreu�essubstantielles .
8 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
evidenceThePartiesareremindedthatunderArticle5(13)oftheAgreementof
December12,2000,theCommissionisboundtoapplytherele�antrulesofinternationallawandcannotmakedecisionsex aequo et bono.TherulesthattheCommissionmustapplyincludethoserelatingtotheneedfore�idencetopro�eordispro�edisputedfacts .
TheCommissionthereforecallsonthePartiestopayparticularattentiontomattersrelatedtoe�idenceinthecollectionandpreparationofclaims .TheCommissionexpectsthePartiestode�elopguidanceforallpersonnelwhocollectorprepareclaims,emphasizingtheimportanceofe�idence,andindi-catingthetypesofe�idencepotentiallya�ailable .
TheCommissioncallsonCounselforbothPartiestobeincontactregard-ingthismatter,andstronglyencouragesthePartiestoharmonizetheguid-anceregardinge�identiarymattersthateachPartypro�idestoitspersonnelwhocollectandprepareclaims .
*****
decision number 5 of august 2001
décision numéro 5 d’août 2001Rules of procedure—possibility of claims under se�eral categories in a mass
claimsprocess—�ariousle�elsoffixed-sumcompensationforindi�iduals .Règlesdeprocédure—possibilitéd’introduiredesréclamationsdansplusieurs
catégoriesdans lecadred’uneprocédurecollecti�e—fixationdedifférentsni�eauxd’indemnisationpourlesindi�idus .
multiple Claims in the mass Claims Process, fixed-sum Compensation at the $500 and $1500 levels, multiplier for
Household ClaimsOnthebasisoftheParties’submissionsbeforeandduringthehearingof
1—3July,2001,andthepost-hearingsubmissionsfiledbytheFederalDemo-craticRepublicofEthiopia(7August2001)andtheStateofEritrea(8August2001)inresponsetotheCommission’sletterof24July2001,theCommissiondecidesasfollows:
A. Multiple Claims in the Mass Claims Process
NotingthatArticle5,paragraph1,of theAgreementof12December2000requirestheCommissiontoentertain“allclaimsfor loss,damageorinjury”thatarerelatedtotheconflictandresultfrom�iolationsofinterna-tionalhumanitarianlaw,theCommissiondecidedthatthePartiesmayfile
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 9
claimsonbehalfofanindi�idualnationalinmorethanoneoftheCategories1—5inthemassclaimsprocess .
B. Fixed-Sum Compensation at the $500 and $1500 Levels
Takingintoaccount,amongotherthings,thatthePartiesmayfilemul-tipleclaimsonbehalfofindi�idualnationalsinthemassclaimsprocess,theCommissiondecidesthatthele�elofthefirsttieroffixed-sumcompensationinthemassclaimsprocesswillbe$500perindi�idualnationalandthele�elofthesecondtierwillbe$1500perindi�idualnational .(ThetwotiersremainasdescribedinDecisionNumber2 .)
Assetoutinparagraph7ofitsletterof24July2001,theCommissionwillconsiderestablishingadditionalle�elsoffixed-sumcompensationforclaimscategoriesastheclaimsprocessde�elopsande�idenceisfiled .
C. Household Claims
NotingtheParties’concurrencethatamultipliershouldbeusedtosetthefixed-sumcompensationformassclaimsforwrongfulexpulsionandforwrongfuldisplacement(Categories1and2),andfurthertakingnotethatmostfamilies inEritreaandEthiopiaha�echildren,theCommissiondecidestoadoptthemultiplierofthree(3) .
In response to questions raised in the post-hearing submissions, theCommissionfurtherdecides:
(1) Ahouseholdclaimforexpulsionmaybemadee�enifsomemem-bersofthehouseholdwerenotexpelled .(2) Ahouseholdexpulsionclaimandanindi�idualexpulsionclaimforamemberofthathouseholdcannotbothbemade .(3) Theageofapersonatthetimeofexpulsioncontrols,i .e .,apersonundertheageof18atthetimeofexpulsioniswithinthehouseholde�enifheorsheiso�ertheageof18atthetimeoffiling .
*****
decision number 6 of 19 december 2005
décision numéro 6 du 19 décembre 2005Proceedings—WithdrawalofaclaimbytheClaimant .
Procédure—Retraitd’uneplainteparlerequérant .
10 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
eritrea’s Claim 18
Eritrea’sClaim18wasbroughtbeforetheCommissionbytheClaimant,theStateofEritrea(“Eritrea”)againsttheRespondent,theFederalDemocrat-icRepublicofEthiopia(“Ethiopia”),pursuanttoArticle5oftheAgreementbetweentheGo�ernmentoftheStateofEritreaandtheGo�ernmentoftheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaofDecember12,2000(“theAgree-ment”) .TheClaimantsoughtcompensationforlossessufferedbyEritreaanditsnationalsandagentsasaresultofEthiopia’sallegedbreachoftheTelecom-municationsSer�icesAgreementofSeptember27,1993,abilateralagreementregulatingtheoperationoftelecommunicationsbetweenthetwonationsdur-ingthe1998—2000internationalarmedconflictbetweentheParties .Ethiopiadeniedliability .
TheCommissioninformedthePartiesonAugust29,2001thatitintendedtoconductproceedingsinGo�ernment-to-Go�ernmentclaimsintwostages,firstconcerningliability,andsecond,ifliabilityisfound,concerningdamages .EritreafileditsStatementofClaim18onDecember12,2001,pursuanttoArti-cle5,paragraph8oftheAgreement .EthiopiafileditsStatementofDefenseonOctober15,2002 .Eritreaad�isedtheCommissionbyletteraccompanyingitsMemorialsfiledonNo�ember1,2005thatitwasnotfilingaMemorialforClaim18 .
ThefinalroundofhearingsonliabilitywasheldinApril2005 .AtthehearingtheCommissionaskedEritreahowitwishedClaim18tobedealt,andcounselforEritrearespondedthat“Eritreafiledthestatementofclaimbutchosenottoproceedwithit .”(Transcriptatp .564)
Decision
In light of the history of this case as set out abo�e, the CommissiondecidestoregardEritrea’sClaim18aswithdrawnbytheClaimant .NoAwardwillbeissued .
(Signed)Hans�anHoutte
President
Eritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommission
*****
decision number 7 of 27 July 2007
décision numéro 7 du 27 juillet 2007Stateresponsibility—questionoftheextentofEritrea’sliabilitytopaydamages
foritsbreachofthejus ad bellum .
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 11
Legalcausation—degreeofconnectiondependinguponnatureoftheclaimandothercircumstances—measureofdiscretionnecessaryinassessingthelinkbetweendelictandcompensableinjury—choiceoftheelementofforeseeabilityforassessingproximitybetweencauseanddamage .
Extended�iewofStateresponsibilitynotsupportedbythepracticeofStates—broadcategoriesofclaimstraditionallyexcludedfromrangeofpossibledamagesbywarclaimstribunals—noreparationdeterminedthroughapplicationofinternationallawre�ealedbypre�iouspractice—unusualandcompellingcircumstancesleadingtoUnitedNationsCompensationCommission’screation .
RoleoftheSecurityCouncil—findingofjus ad bellumbreachesnotregardedasfindingthatEritreainitiatedanaggressi�ewarforwhichitbearsextensi�efinancialresponsibility .
Responsabilitédel’État—questiondel’étenduedelaresponsabilitédel’Érythréede compenser les dommages résultant de la �iolation du jus ad bellum qu’elle aperpétré .
Causalitéjuridique—degrédeconnexiondépendantdelanaturedelaréclama-tionetd’autrescirconstances—partdediscrétionnécessaireafind’établirlelienentreledélitetledommageindemnisable—choixdel’élémentdepré�isibilitéafind’é�aluerlaproximitéentrelacauseetledommage .
L’optiond’uneresponsabilitéétatiqueétenduen’estpassoutenueparlapratiqueétatique—largeé�entaildeplaintestraditionnellementexcluesdelagammedesdom-magesallouéspar les tribunauxdeguerre—lapratiqueantérieureneré�èleaucuncasderéparationdéterminéeparl’applicationdudroitinternational—circonstancesinhabituellesetincontestablesmenantàlacréationdelaCommissiond’indemnisationdesNationsUnies .
RôleduConseildesécurité—leconstatde�iolationsdujus ad bellumn’estpasassimiléauconstatdel’initiationd’uneguerred’agressionparl’Érythréepourlaquelleelleauraituneresponsabilitéfinancièreétendue .
Guidance regarding Jus ad Bellum liabilityI. Introduction
1 . ThepurposeofthisDecisionistopro�ideguidancefortheParties’pleadingsandargumentsinthefinalroundofhearingsoftheseproceed-ings,regardingtheextentofEritrea’sliabilitytopaydamagesforitsbreachofthe jus ad bellum, thelawregulatingresorttoarmedforce,asidentifiedintheCommission’sDecember2005partialawardJus ad bellum (Ethiopia’sClaims1–8)ofDecember19,2005 .
2 . As the Parties are aware, the Commission held four rounds ofhearingsonthemeritsofbothParties’claimsbetweenNo�ember2002andApril2005,andissuednumerouspartialandfinalawardsfollowingthosehearings .Theseresol�edthemeritsofallof theParties’claims,except forEthiopia’sclaimsrelatingtoEritrea’s�iolationofthe jus ad bellum.
12 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
3 . TheissueoftheextentofEritrea’sresponsibilityinthisregardper�ades Ethiopia’sdamagesclaims .Many rest, inwholeorpart,uponEthiopia’scontentionthatEritreabearsliabilitybecauseofthe�iolationofthe jus ad bellum. Theseclaims included se�eral typesof injury that theCommissionearlierfounddidnotin�ol�e�iolationsof the lawregulat-ingarmedconf lict,thejus in bello. Amongthesearelossesresultingfromshelling or incurred by internally displaced persons, deaths and injuriesattributable to landmines,andotherdamageassociatedwithbothPar-ties’militaryoperations .
4 . TheCommissionhelditsfirstroundofhearingsinthedamagesphaseoftheseproceedingsinApril2007 .BothPartieswerein�itedatthathearingtoaddressthelegalextentofcompensabledamageresultingfromits jus ad bellum partialaward .Atthehearing,EthiopiacontendedthatEritreabore�eryextensi�eliabilityonaccountofthis�iolation .Eritreacontendedthat,becausethemannerinwhichEthiopiapresenteditsclaimdidnotcon-formtotheCommission’sproceduralinstructionspriortothehearing,theclaimshouldbedismissedinitsentirety .
5 . TheCommissiondoesnotaccepteither�iew .Inaninformalmeet-ingwiththePartiesfollowingtheAprilhearing,theCommissioninformedthemasfollows:
TheCommissiondoesnotregarditsjus ad bellum findingasafindingthatEritreainitiatedanaggressi�ewarforwhichitbearstheextensi�efinancialresponsibilityclaimedbyEthiopia .Atthesametime,itdoesnotacceptEritrea’sargumentthatthereisnofinancialresponsibility .Atthenextstage,theCommissiondirectsthePartiestoaddressthespecificextentofdamagethatisreasonablyforeseeable/proximatelycausedbythespecificfindingofliabilitymadebytheCommission .TheCommissiondoesnotexpectthePartiestosimplyrepeattheargumentstheyha�emadeatthecurrentstage .
6 . ThepurposeofthisDecisionistopro�idethePartieswithfur-therguidanceregardingthesematters .
II. Legal Causation
7 . TheCommissionregardsthestandardoflegalcausationtoberel-e�anttothemattersatissue .Compensationcanonlybeawardedinrespectof damages ha�ing a sufficient causal connection with conduct �iolatinginternationallaw .AsthePartiesnoted,numeroustermsha�ebeenusedtodescribethisconnection,includingsuchtermsasreasonable,direct,proxi-mate,foreseeableorcertain(orcon�ersely,unreasonable,remote,attenuated,orspeculati�e) .AsbothPartiesacknowledged,these�aryingterminolo-giesoftenpro�idelimitedassistanceinanalyzingspecificsituations .11Both
1 See Marjorie M . Whiteman, III Damages in International Law pp . 1766–1767(1943) .
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 13
Parties also referred to a point noted by the International Law Com-mission in itsCommentary to itsStateResponsibilityArticles—that“therequirementofacausallinkisnotnecessarilythesameinrelationtoe�erybreachofaninternationalobligation .”2Thedegreeofconnectionmay�arydependinguponthenatureoftheclaimandothercircumstances .Inthisregard,somewritersseecausationbeingmorereadilyfoundincasesin�ol�ingparticularlyserious�iolationsoflaw .3
8 . Ethiopiaacknowledgedthepotential limitationsofany�erbalformulation .Howe�er,atthehearing,itmaintainedthatthe�aryingformu-laewerebestdistilledinWhiteman’streatiseonDamages in International Law—“thatdamagesallowedonaccountofthecommissionoromissionofanactgi�ingrisetoresponsibilitygenerallyarethosewhichitisreasonable toallow .”4WhileacknowledgingitsdebttoWhiteman’streatise,theCom-missionisnotpersuadedthatherformulationisthebestwayforward .Thenotionsof“reasonableness”or“reasonableconnection”restuponasubjec-ti�econcept—“reasonableness”—likelytobehea�ilyshapedbythedecision-maker’scultureandlifeexperience .Thisconcepthasasignificantroleinsomenationallegalsystems,butnotinothers .Gi�enthis,itcannotbeseenasageneralprincipleoflaw .Moreo�er,gi�enthe�aryingapproachestocausationadoptedbydifferinginternationaltribunals,theconcepthasnotattainedthestatusofacustomaryruleofinternationallaw,andEthiopiadidnotcontendthatitwas .
9 . Foritspart,Eritreaarguedthattheconnectionwasbetterdescribedinthemorefamiliarlexiconof“proximatecause,”althoughitacknowledgedthat this term was not a perfect expression of the required relationship .Again,thisformulationisnotageneralprincipleoflaworaruleofcustom-aryinternationallaw,andEritreadidnotcontendotherwise .Indeed,bothParties�iewedthelinkbetweendelictandcompensableinjuryasanareainwhichjudgmentwasrequired,andwheretheCommissionnecessarilyexercisedameasureofdiscretion .
10 . Yet another approach is the concept of “direct” or “indirect”damages . In the historicAlabama arbitration, thearbitrators’decision toexclude“indirect”claims(forlossesresultingfromthetransferofU .S .shipstotheBritishflag,increasedinsurancerates,andtheprolongationofthewar)
2 InternationalLawCommission,Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Art. 31, para. 10, reprinted in JamesCrawford,The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentariespp .204–205(2002) .
3 ArthurW .Ro�ine&GrantHanessian,Toward a Foreseeability Approach to Causa-tion Questions at the United Nations Compensation Commission, in TheUnitedNationsCompen-sationCommission[ThirteenthSokolColloquium]pp .235–236(RichardLillich,ed .1995)[hereinafterLillich] .
4 Whiteman,supra note1,atp .1767(emphasisinoriginal) .
14 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
wascrucialina�oidingpossiblefrustrationoftheprocess .5TheTreatyofVer-saillesalsorequiredGermanytopro�idecompensationfordamage“directlyinconsequenceofhostilitiesorofanyoperationsofwar .”6Howe�er,manytribunalsandcommentatorsha�ecriticizedthisapproach,findingthatitlacksanalyticalpower .TheumpireintheWar-Risk Insurance Premium Claims casedescribed the distinction as “frequently illusory and fanciful,” andurgedthatit“shouldha�enoplaceininternationallaw .”7
11 . Notwithstanding these concerns, when the Security CouncilestablishedthemandateoftheUnitedNationsCompensationCommis-sion(UNCC)inResolution687,itspecifiedthattheUNCC’sjurisdictionwaslimitedto“direct”injury .8Muchofthesubsequentworkof theUNCC’sGo�erningCouncilandof itsPanelsofCommissionershasin�ol�edline-drawingtodeterminewhatinjuryisdeemed“direct”forpurposesofResolution687 .9TheUNCC’sworkisofinterest,butitsrele�ancetothepresentquestionisuncertain .Inadditiontothecriticismsnotedabo�e,the fundamental “line-drawing” decisions regarding the extent of directinjuryfortheUNCC’spurposesha�ebeenmadebytheUNCCGo�erningCouncilinlightofreportsoftheUNCC’sPanelsofCommissioners .TheGo�erningCouncilisapoliticalorganthathasoperatedinanunusualpoliti-calandfactualsetting .Itdoesnotfollowjudicialprocessesornecessarilyapply international law in itsdecisions .10 Thus, while the UNCC offerssignificantprecedentsinmanyareas,itsdecisionsregardingthescopeof“direct”injurymustbeassessedwithcareandinlightoftheircontext .
12 . Anothersubstantiallineofcasesfindsthepropertestofthecon-nectionbetweendelictandcompensabledamagetobewhetherthedam-agewasforeseeable(orsometimes,“reasonablyforeseeable”)totheper-petratorofthedelict .Theseha�eincludedawardsoftheSamoanClaimsCommission,11theU .S .-VenezuelanMixedClaimsCommission,12thePortu-
5 1JohnBassettMoore,International Arbitrationp .646(1898);Whiteman,supra note1,atp .1773 .
6 TreatyofVersailles,June28,1919,225Parry’s Consol. T.S.189,11Martens Nou-veau Recueil(Ser .3)p .323,PartVIII,sec .1,AnnexI,para .9 .
7 7R .I .A .A .p .62,quotedinNorbertWühler,Causation and Directness of Loss as Elements of Compensability Before the United Nations Compensation Commission, in Lil-lich,supra note3,atp .231 .See ReportbySpecialRapporteuroftheInternationalLawCommission(ArangioRuiz),44U .N .GAORSupp .No .10at6,U .N .Doc .A/CN4/425(1989) .
8 See Wühler,supra note7,atpp .207,231 .9 Wühler,supra note7,atpp .207–209 .10 MichaelJ .Matheson,CouncilUnboundp .174(2006);Ro�ine&Hanessian,supra
note3,atp .238 .11 JointReportNo .2of12August1904,oftheAmericanandBritishCommissioners,
in Whiteman,supra note1,atpp .1778–1781 .12 RobertsCase(U.S. v. Venez.),Ralston’sReportp .142 .
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 15
go-GermanArbitralTribunalcase,13andtheLighthousesarbitrationbetweenFranceandGreece .14
13 . Gi�enthisambiguousterrain,theCommissionconcludesthatthenecessaryconnectionisbestcharacterizedthroughthecommonlyusednomenclatureof“proximatecause .”Inassessingwhetherthistestismet,andwhetherthechainofcausationissufficientlycloseinapar-ticularsituation,theCommissionwillgi�eweighttowhetherparticulardamagereasonablyshouldha�ebeenforeseeabletoanactorcommittingtheinternationaldelictinquestion .Theelementofforseeability,althoughnotwithoutitsowndifficulties,pro�idessomedisciplineandpredictabilityinassessingproximity .Accordingly,itwillbegi�enconsiderableweightinassessingwhetherparticulardamagesarecompensable .
14 . TheCommissionnotesthat,inmanysituations,thechoiceof�er-bal formula todescribe thenecessarydegreeofconnectionwill result innodifferenceinoutcomes .Inthisregard,bothPartiesagreedthatasignifi-cantrangeofpossibledamagesrelatedtowarliebeyondthepaleofStateresponsibility .Bothcitedwithappro�al thedecisionsoftheAmerican-GermanMixedClaimsCommissionestablishedin1922,whichexcludedsignificant typesof claims, suchas increased li�ingcosts and trans-portationcosts,asbeingtooremotefromparticularconductbyGermany .Inthisregard,theAmerican-GermanCommissionmirroredotherwarclaimstribunalsthatexcludedbroadcategoriesofclaims,suchasthoseforgeneral-izedeconomicdamages,increasedinsurancerates,andsimilarmatters .
III. Ethiopia’s Jus Ad Bellum Claims
15 . Asnoted,Ethiopiaclaimedforextensi�edamagessaidtoresultfromEritrea’sbreachofthejus ad bellum. InEthiopia’s�iew,theseallboreareasonableconnectiontoconducttheCommissionfoundtobeunlawful,sothatEritreashouldbeartheirfullcosts .EthiopiamaintainedthatthelegalconsequencesoftheCommission’sJus ad bellum partialawardarenotlim-itedtothetimesandplacesspecificallymentionedinthat partial award .Instead, Ethiopia contended that the jus ad bellum �iolation identi-fiedbytheCommission“inescapablyresultedinthiswidercondition[ofwidescalehostilities]and,totheextentthatthereisloss,damageorinjuryassociatedwithit,thenthatiscompensable .”15Inthisconnection,EthiopiareferredtoreparationsprogramsfollowingtheFirstandSecondWorld
13 NaulilaaCase,2R .I .A .A .p .1013 .(“Theuprising . . .thusconstitutesaninjurywhichtheauthoroftheinitialact . . .shouldha�eforeseenasanecessaryconsequenceofitsmilitaryoperations .”)
14 12R .I .A .A .p .217(1956) .15 TranscriptoftheEritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommissionHearingsofApril2007,
PeacePalace,TheHague,atp .39(ProfessorMurphy) .
16 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
Wars,bothofwhichin�ol�edreparationsforthetotalityoftheconflict,notjusttheinitialattacksattheiroutset .
16 . Ethiopiaplacedparticularemphasisupontheactionsof theUNSecurityCouncilinitsResolutions674and687,regardingIraq’sin�asionandoccupationofKuwait .Asnotedabo�e,inResolution687,theSecurityCouncilstatedthatunderinternationallaw,Iraq“isliableforanydirectloss,damageorinjuryarisinginregardtoKuwaitand thirdStates,and theirnationalsandcorporationsasaresultofthein�asionandillegaloccupa-tionofKuwaitbyIraq .”CounselforEthiopiadescribedinsomedetailhowtheUNCChaddefinedthescopeofIraq’sliabilitypursuanttoResolution687inwaysthat,inEthiopia’s�iew,substantiallyparalleleditsjus ad bellum damagesclaims .
17 . Eritrea acknowledged that Eritrea has an obligation to pro�idereparationforthespecific�iolationof lawidentifiedbytheCommission .Howe�er, itcontendedthatEthiopia’sdamagesclaims farexceeded thescopeof liabilityfollowingfromtheCommission’spartialaward .Eritreastressedwhatitunderstoodtobethelimitedandcarefulphrasingof theCommission’spartialaward .ItfurthercontendedthatEthiopia’ssweep-ingclaimsdidnotrespondtotheCommission’scall,inthedispositifofthepartialaward,foraconsideredassessmentofthescopeofitsliability,andpro�idednobasisforarulingbytheCommission .Eritreamaintainedthatin thesecircumstances,Ethiopia’smonetaryclaimsforthe jus ad bellum �iolationshouldberejected .Ethiopia’sreliefshouldbelimitedtosatisfaction,intheformofadeclarationbytheCommissionthatEritreahad�iolatedinternationallaw,whichcouldberepeatedinafuturedamagesaward .
18 . Eritreacontendedthatusesofforceincontra�entionofArticle2(4)oftheCharteroftheUnitedNationsoccurwithconsiderablefrequen-cy,andtheapplicationofthelawofStateresponsibilitytothemrequiresamorenuancedapproachthancontendedbyEthiopia .InEritrea’s�iew,thereha�ebeenonlythreecasesinwhichtheinternationalcommunityhassanctionedtheimpositionofbroadliabilityononesidetoaconf lict—theFirst and Second World Wars, and Iraq’s in�asion and occupationofKuwaitin1990–1991 .(ThesesamecaseswerealsocitedbyEthiopia .)Ineachcase,itwasestablishedthroughamultilateralprocessenjoyingbroadinternationalappro�althataStatehadinitiatedanaggressi�ewar,andwastoberesponsiblefortheconsequences .Eritreamaintainedthatnoth-ingcomparablehasoccurredhere,andemphasizedthepositionof theSecurityCouncilas thebodycharged by Article 24 of the UN Char-ter with primary responsibi lity for the maintenance of internationalpeaceandsecurity .ItcontrastedtheCouncil’streatmentofIraq’sin�asionofKuwait—whereitunequi�ocallyassignedtotalresponsibilityfortheconflicttoIraq—withitsapproachtotheconflictbetweenEritreaandEthiopia .InEri-trea’s�iew,theCouncil’sresolutionsdealingwiththisconflicttookmuch
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 17
moremeasuredpositions,anddidnotassignresponsibilityfortheconflicttoeitherparty .
19 . TheCommissionismindfulofthefactorsthatledeachPar-tytoseekitsmaximumpositionregardingthescopeofliabilityattheApril 2007 hearing . Ne�ertheless, the Commission does not regardeitherParty’sargumentsasanappropriatebasisforassessingtheissue .
20 . Becauseoftheimportanceoftheissues,andinordertoaffordbothPartiesanopportunityforfurtherref lectionregardingtheirposi-tionsinlightofthe�iewsexpressedhere,theCommissionreser�esdecisiononEthiopia’sjus ad bellum claims .Itwillreturntotheseissuesatthesecondstageoftheproceedings,afterrecei�ingfurther�iewsfromthePartiestak-ingaccountofthisDecision .
IV. Considerations relevant to assessing Jus Ad Bellum Liability
21 . AsbothParties indicated,thereha�ebeenfewmoderninstancesinwhichaStatehasbeendeterminedtobearresponsibilityfordamagesresultingfromawarasamatterofinternationallaw .Throughouthistory,indemnitiesfrequentlyha�ebeenexactedfromthelosingpartiesinwars,butthishasresultedfromtheexerciseofpowerbythe�ictor,nottheapplica-tionoftheinternationallawofStateresponsibility .
22 . IntheCommission’s�iew,thefewtwentiethcenturycasesinwhichStatesha�ebeenheldtobeinternationallyresponsibleforextensi�ewardam-agesdonotpro�ideclearguidance,andinsteadcounselcaution .Thewarguiltandreparationspro�isionsoftheTreatyofVersaillesreflectedacollecti�ejudgmentbythe�ictoriouspartiestotheFirstWorldWarthatGermanyboreresponsibility for the initiationandcontinuationofthatwar,andauthorizedamassi�eprogramofreparations .Howe�er,thehistoryofthosepro�isionsmakesclearthattheywerehea�ilyshapedbymoti�esofpolicyandre�engeunrelatedtotheprinciplesoflaw .TheprogramofreparationsundertheTreatyofVersailleshadabriefandunsatisfactoryhistory .
23 . TheCommissionlikewisedoesnotseetheinternationalcommuni-ty’smeasuresrelatingtocompensationfollowingtheSecondWorldWaraspro�idingcompellingreferencepointsinthepresentsituation,in�ol�inga�iolationoflawofamuchdifferentorder .Attheendofthatwar,therewasabroadconsensusonthepartoftheAlliedPowers—thatGermanyandJapanwereresponsible for initiatingandwagingaggressi�e war on a massi�escale . Indi�idual leadersofbothStateswereheldcriminallyresponsiblefortheirconduct,andsomeseniorleaderswereexecuted .
24 . Ne�ertheless,thepracticeofStatesatthattimedoesnotsupporttheexpansi�e�iewofStateresponsibilityEthiopiaurgesnow .TheStatesdeemedbytheinternationalcommunitytobedirectlyresponsibleforthewarultimatelyborefinancialconsequencesthatweremodestinrela-
18 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
tiontotheresultingdamages .Forreasonslargelyrelatedtothepost-wardi�isionofGermany,therewasnocomprehensi�emultilateralpeacetreatywithGermanycorrespondingtotheTreatyofVersailles,andtherewasnointernationally agreed program of reparations or compensation . TheSo�ietUnionforatimecarriedoutitsownprogramofenforcedreparationsfromGermany,butthiswas“�ictor’sjustice,”notaprincipledapplicationoftheinternational lawofStateresponsibilityenjoyinginternationalsup-portandlegitimacy .Germanysubsequentlycarriedoutextensi�eprogramsofcompensationandassistancetotheStateofIsraelandtomanygroupsofpersonsinjuredbyitsconduct,butthesewerelargelyshapedbyconsidera-tionsofmoralityandpolitics,notbythelawofStateresponsibility .
25 . TheSeptember1951TreatyofPeacewithJapanincludedsubstan-tialpro�isionsrelatingtoclaimsandproperty,butagaindoesnotpro�idecompellingguidance .WhiletheTreatyofPeacebroughtaboutorconfirmedsubstantialtransfersofassets,itspro�isionsresultedfromanegotiationaimedatreintegratingJapanintotheglobalcommunity,notanapplicationofthelawofStateresponsibility .16Article14oftheTreatyillustratesthisnegoti-atedaspect,aswellastheparties’decisionnottorepeattheexperienceoftheTreatyofVersailles .17
26 . Gi�en itspurposes, theTreatyofPeacedidnot require theimmediate commitmentoffreshfundstopro�idecompensation .Instead,Article14(a)(2)(I)ga�eeachoftheAlliedPowersandChinatherighttoseizeandkeeporliquidatecertaino�erseaspropertyofJapanandJapanesenation-alsandentities .UnderArticle14(a),Japanalsoagreedto“promptlyenterintonegotiationswithAlliedPowerssodesiring,whosepresentterritorieswereoccupiedbyJapaneseforcesanddamagedbyJapan,witha�iewtoassistingtocompensatethosecountriesforthecostofrepairingthedamagedone,bymakinga�ailabletheser�icesoftheJapanesepeopleinproduction,sal�agingandotherwork . . . .”Compensationunder theTreatywasexclusi�e . InArticle14(b)“theAlliedPowerswai�e[d]allreparationsclaims . . .arisingoutofanyactionstakenbyJapananditsnationalsinthecourseoftheprosecutionofthewar . . . .”
27 . Thus,thepost-warpracticeofStatesregardingNaziGermanyandJapan,bothgenerallyregardedbytheinternationalcommunityasha�inginitiatedandwagedaggressi�ewaronamassi�escale,pro�idenoclearrefer-encehere .Thereeitherwerenoreparationsdeterminedthroughapplicationofinternationallaw(Germany),orreparationsweredeterminedthrough
16 TreatyofPeacewithJapan,signedSept .8,1951,136U .N .T .S .p .45,3U .S .T .p .3169 .
17 Article14(a)pro�ides“ItisrecognizedthatJapanshouldpayreparationstotheAlliedPowersforthedamageandsufferingcausedbyitduringthewar .Ne�erthelessitisalsorecognizedthattheresourcesofJapanarenotpresentlysufficient,ifitistomaintaina�iableeconomy,tomakecompletereparationforallsuchdamageandsufferingandatthesametimemeetitsotherobligations .”
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 19
negotiationsshapedbythedefeatedState’sabilitytopayandotherpoliticalandeconomicfactors(Japan) .
28 . Themostrecentprecedent in�okedbyEthiopia is theUNCC,theclaimsandcompensationprocessestablished in response to Iraq’s1990–1991 in�asion and occupationoftheStateofKuwait .As indicatedelsewhere,theCommissionregardssomeaspectsoftheUNCC’sexperienceasrele�anttoitscurrenttasks .Howe�er,itsrele�ancetoEthiopia’sclaimsforcompensationislessclear,gi�entheunusualandcompellingcircumstancesleadingtotheUNCC’screation .
29 . TheCommissionseesasparticularlysignificantinthisregardthecentralroleoftheSecurityCouncil,theorganbearingprimaryresponsibil-ityforthemaintenanceofpeaceandsecurityunder theUnitedNationsCharter, increating theUNCC .TheCouncil created that commissionanddefineditsmandatefollowingbreachesof internationallawofunu-sualseriousnessandextent .BeginningwithResolution660onAugust2,1990—thedayIraqin�adedKuwait—theCounciladoptednumerousreso-lutionsunequi�ocallycondemningtheIraqiin�asion,directingIraqtowith-drawimmediatelyandunconditionally,anddemanding that Iraqceasehostagetaking,mistreatmentofci�ilians,�iolenceagainstdiplomatsanddiplomaticpremises,andotherformsofbeha�iorinbreachofinternationallaw .18InResolutions661,665and670,theCouncilimposedse�ereeconomicsanctionsonIraqandpro�idedfortheirenforcement .Finally, inResolu-tion678,theCounciltooktheexceptionalstepofauthorizingUNMem-bers“touseallnecessarymeans”—includingtheuseofforce—toupholdandimplementtheCouncil’searlierresolutions .
30 . AsbothPartiesnoted,thiswasthecontext—in�ol�ingper�asi�e,continuingillegalconductbyIraqextendingfarbeyondaninitialbreachofthejus ad bellum—inwhichtheCounciladoptedResolution674,wheretheCouncilfirst“reminded”Iraq“thatunderinternationallawitwasliableforanyloss,damageorinjuryarisinginregardtoKuwaitandthirdStates,andtheirnationalsandcorporations,asaresultofthein�asionandillegaloccu-pationofKuwaitbyIraq .”Asnotedabo�e,whentheCouncilsubsequentlycreatedtheframeworkoftheUNCCinResolution687,19itadoptedmorecautiousterminology .InParagraph16,theCouncilindicatedthatIraqwasliablefor“direct”loss,damageorinjury .
31 . TheSecurityCouncil ’sactionsinrelationtothewarbetweenEritrea and Ethiopia tookaquitedifferent course . Its resolutionsaremarkedlydifferentinsubstanceandtonefromthoseadoptedregarding
18 These includedSecurityCouncilResolutions660 (Aug .2,1990),661 (Aug .6,1990),662(Aug .9,1990),664(Aug .18,1990),665(Aug .25,1990),677(Sept .16,1990),670(Sept .25,1990),674(Oct .29,1990),and678(No� .29,1990) .
19 SecurityCouncilResolution687(Apr .3,1991)(deemedbysome“themotherofallSecurityCouncilResolutions”becauseofitsbreadth) .
20 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
thein�asionandoccupationofKuwait .Noneofthemassignedresponsibil-ityfortheconflicttoeitherparty .Likealloftheresolutionsthatfollowed,theCouncil’sfirstresolutiononthewarspoketobothparties,not toErit-reaalone .20Theresolution’spreamblefoundunacceptabletheuseof forcebothtoaddressterritorialdisputesand“changingcircumstancesontheground”;itskeyoperati�epro�isiondemandedthatbothpartiesimmedi-atelyceasehostilitiesandrefrainfromfurtheruseofforce .Whenhostilitiesintensifiedinearly1999duringEthiopia’sOperationSunset, theSecurityCouncilagainaddressedbothpartiesinequalterms .ItsupportedeffortsbytheOrganizationofAfricanUnitytofindapeacefulsolutionandcalledonbothsidestoexerciserestraintandrefrainfrommilitaryaction .21Ashostili-tiesintensifiedafewdayslater,theCouncilcondemnedtherecoursetoforcebybothsides,andurgedallStatestoimmediatelyendarmssalestoboth .22AtthetimeofEthiopia’sMay2000incursionintoEritrea,theCouncilagaindirecteditsresponsetobothparties,demandingthatbothendthefight-ing,andimposingamandatoryarmsembargoonboth .23
32 . EthiopiadismissedthedifferenceintheCouncil ’sapproachto these twosituationsasa“regrettable”failurebytheCounciltorespondtoanactofaggression,butmaintainedthat itdidnotaffecttheextentofEritrea’sliability .TheCommissiondoesnotagreethatthegreatdifferencesintheCouncil’streatmentofthesesituationscanbedismissedinthisway .TheSecurityCouncil—abodygi�engreatpowersandresponsibilitiesbytheCharter—madejudgmentsregardingthein�asionandcompleteoccupationofKuwaitthatitdidnotmakeinthecaseofEritrea’sunlawfuluseofforceagainstEthiopia .ThisCommission’smandateandpowersarefarmoremod-estthanthoseoftheSecurityCouncil .TheCommissionconcludedthatithadjurisdictiontodecideEthiopia’sclaimthatEritreahad�iolatedthejus ad bellum. Itmadeaspecificfindingregardingthat�iolationthatdidnotincludeafindingthatEritreahadwagedanaggressi�ewar,hadoccupiedlargepartsofEthiopia,orotherwiseengagedinthesortofwidespreadlawlessnessthattheSecurityCouncilidentifiedinthecaseofthein�asionandoccupationofKuwait .Moreo�er,thisCommissiondidnot—norcouldit—altertheinterna-tionallawrulesdefiningtheextentofcompensabledamagesthatfollowfromthebreachofinternationallawthatitidentified .
33 .Accordingly,atthenextstageoftheproceedings,theCommissionin�ites—andexpects—thePartiestoaddressinamoreconsideredandprecisemannerthescopeofdamagesfollowingfromtheCommission’spartialawardinrelationtothespecificelementsclaimedbyEthiopiaonthebasisof jus ad bellum, takingfullaccountofthisDecision .
20 S/RES/1177,June26,1998 .21 S/RES/1226,January29,1999 .22 S/RES/1227,February10,1999 .23 S/RES/1297,May17,2000 .
PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 21
(Signed)Hans�anHouttePresident
Eritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommissionJuly27,2007
*****
decision number 8 of 27 July 2007
décision numéro 8 du 27 juillet 2007Relieftowar�ictims—responsibilitiesoftherespecti�eStatestotakeeffecti�e
measurestoensurerelieftotheirnationalswhowere�ictimsofwar—State’sdiscretiontodeterminetheuseanddistributionofanydamagesawardedtoit—impossibilityofidentifyingindi�idualsha�ingsufferedinjurieslinkedwiththewar—requestbytheCommissionforinformationfromtheStatesontheirintendedmeanstorelie�ewar�ictims .
Indemnisationdes�ictimesdeguerre—responsabilitérespecti�edesÉtatsdeprendredesmesureseffecti�espourgarantirunecompensationàleursnationaux�ic-timesdelaguerre—discrétionétatiquepourdéterminerl’utilisationetladistributiondesindemnitésaccordées—impossibilitéd’identifierlesindi�idusayantsubidesdom-magesrésultantduconflit—demandedelaCommissiond’informationsdelapartdesÉtatssurleursmoyensdecompenserles�ictimesdeguerre .
relief to War Victims1 . TheCommissionisconfidentthatthePartiesaremindfuloftheir
responsibilitytotakeeffecti�emeasures,withinthescopeoftheresourcesa�ailabletothem,toensurethattheirnationalswhoare�ictimsofarmedconflictsrecei�erelief .
2 . InitsApril13,2006lettertothePartiesregardingschedulingforthedamagesphase,theCommissionstated:
In�iewofthehumanitarianpurposessetforthinArticle5(1)oftheDecember12Agreement,theCommissionrequeststhatthePartiesinformitintheirfirstfilingshowtheyintendtoensuredistributionofdamagesrecei�edtoci�ilian�ictims, includingpresentlya�ailable informationonexistingoranticipatedstructuresandproceduresforthispurpose .3 . TheCommissionrecognizesthatthePartieschosetopursueinter-
Stateclaims,andthateachPartyhasfullauthoritytodeterminetheuseanddistributionofanydamagesawardedtoit .Theabo�erequestwasnotintendedtoderogatefromtheParties’rightsinthisregard .
4 . IntheirMemorialsandinthefirstroundofhearingsinthedam-agesphaseinApril2007,bothPartiesrespondedtotherequestintheCom-mission’sApril13,2006letter .Bothrecognizedthehumanitarianpurposes
22 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA
emphasizedinArticle5(1)oftheAgreementofDecember2000,andin�itedthefurther�iewsoftheCommission .
5 . TheCommissionagreesthat,astomanyclaimsonwhichithasfoundliability,itwouldprobablybeimpossible,andcertainlyinordinatelyexpen-si�e, to attempt to identify the specific indi�idualswhosuffered injuriesasaresultof�ariousillegalactscommittedagainstthem .Examplesinclude�ictimsofrape,physicalabuseandintentionalkillings .
6 . In�iewoftheforegoing,theCommissiondecidestoin�itethePartiestoconsiderfurthermeansbywhich,intheexerciseoftheirdiscretionregardingtheuseanddispositionofdamagesthatmaybeawardedtothem,thehumanitarianobjecti�esofArticle5(1)canbestbeachie�ed,forexamplebydifferentkindsofreliefprogramsforcategoriesof�ictims,forexampletopro�idehealth,agriculturalandotherser�ices .
7 . The Commission would welcome comments by both Go�ern-mentsonthemattersaddressedinthisDecisionintheirfinalMemorials .
(Signed)Hans�anHouttePresident,Eritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommission
July27,2007
*****